Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
FIRST DIVISION On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage
involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of
the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the
second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with
his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San
Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot
seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano,
Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna.
After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live
apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end,
they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately
and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
1
from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on
the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter,
ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife
until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be
paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was
to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10,
1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in
the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was
issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x
x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties
stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela
Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted
until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son
of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm
named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against
the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations) 2
acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED
their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of
her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE
bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF
properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium
GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT,
unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve
BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE
ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
Ruling of the RTC
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY
DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts,4 disposing thusly:
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE
DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM
have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry; UNIT;

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR
and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate
FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7
arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
No pronouncement as to costs.

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW
SO ORDERED.5
OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;

Decision of the CA
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY.
Both parties appealed to the CA.6 LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely: III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE
SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED
BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July
12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did
not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged
to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna
while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still
subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over
the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married
to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence,
their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
3
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s
approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient
proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject
law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to
the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should
determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage
entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by
virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The
non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types
of defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As
such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of
nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution,
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution, 19 and regards it as a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal
and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of
the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that
the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse,
or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be
given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement)
that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the
divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed
reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to
their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code,
the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the
spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the
time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
4
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent
court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue
of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be
decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with
it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as
well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe
hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third
persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply.
The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall
be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the
late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only
as an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the
action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law
for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was
not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12,
1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71
of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine
law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage
before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A
bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue
of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by
the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to
offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of
co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.
As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of
co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
5
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to
the bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their
allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in
Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in
the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership
absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved
by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as
in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff
is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure
of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief
can be granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant
such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation
is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the
purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting
in direct contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from
Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate
contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the
purchase of the condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of
₱1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of
her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that she
had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could
not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his
law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin
this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the
Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab
initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this
was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it
applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to
marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a
prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This
void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for
this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule and
presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the
parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if
both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of
gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce
decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of
Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to
prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to
establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the
share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the
trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was
issued on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of
Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of
₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to
PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check,
Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the
amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject
condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the
sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as
vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of
Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company
were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she
paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN
LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The
phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY.
LUNA.
6
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to
prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law
office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA
who bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law
rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he
headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and
undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge
her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not
serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal
funds and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally
pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the
sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of
the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 122, Caloocan City, and ALBERTO MORENO, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify
the Orders 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 122, dated November 8,
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
2001 2 and May 7, 2002 3 denying herein petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan
City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the
spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of
mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute
any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the
spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed
the contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was
then working abroad. 4
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent
failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any fact or averment that
earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint
should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. 5
Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike Out and to
Declare Defendants in Default. He argues that in cases where one of the parties is not a
member of the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to
allege in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the
plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Alberto asserts that
since three of the party-defendants are not members of his family the ground relied upon by
Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable and unavailable. Alberto also prayed that
defendants be declared in default for their failure to file their answer on time. 6
Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment with Opposition to the Motion to Strike and to Declare
Defendants in Default. 7 Private respondent, in turn, filed his Rejoinder. 8
On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed Orders denying the Motion to
Dismiss, thus:
The court agrees with plaintiff that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required before
the filing of the instant case considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are
strangers to the family. As aptly pointed out in the cases cited by plaintiff, Magbaleta v.
G[o]nong, L-44903, April 25, 1977 and Mendez v. [B]iangon, L-32159, October 28, 1977, if one
of the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a
compromise had been made by plaintiff before filing the complaint, is not a ground for motion
to dismiss.
7
Insofar as plaintiff’s prayer for declaration of default against defendants, the same is
meritorious only with respect to defendants Remedios Moreno and the Register of Deeds of
Kaloocan City. A declaration of default against defendant bank is not proper considering that
the filing of the Motion to Dismiss by said defendant operates to stop the running of the period
within which to file the required Answer. 9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. 10 Private respondent filed his
Comment, 11 after which petitioner filed its Reply. 12 Thereafter, private respondent filed his
Rejoinder. 13
On May 7, 2002, the RTC issued the second assailed Order denying petitioner’s Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. The trial court ruled:
Reiterating the resolution of the court, dated November 8, 2001, considering that the
above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family, failure to allege in the
complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made by plaintiff, is not a ground for
a Motion to Dismiss.
Additionally, the court agrees with plaintiff that inasmuch as it is defendant Remedios Moreno
who stands to be benefited by Art. 151 of the Family Code, being a member of the same family
as that of plaintiff, only she may invoke said Art. 151. 14
xxx
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he ruled that lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a ground for
a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are strangers to
the family are involved in the suit. Corollarily, public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he applied the decision in the case
of Magbaleta v. Gonong instead of the ruling in the case of De Guzman v. Genato.
II. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he ruled that a party who is a stranger to the family of the litigants could not
invoke lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise as a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint. 15
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant Petition for Certiorari should have been filed with
the Court of Appeals (CA) and not with this Court pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Reiterating the established policy for the strict observance of this doctrine, this Court held
in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor 16 that:
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. As we stated in People v. Cuaresma:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction
is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There
is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of
this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in
the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower
court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as
cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and
compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo on
citizens’ right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan on
bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla on government
contract involving modernization and computerization of voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs.
Corona on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified the
approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area. 17
In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its failure to
comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could
not have been brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition should be dismissed.
And even if this Court passes upon the substantial issues raised by petitioner, the instant
petition likewise fails for lack of merit.
Restating its arguments in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner argues that what is
applicable to the present case is the Court’s decision in De Guzman v. Genato 18 and not
8
in Magbaleta v. Gonong, 19 the former being a case involving a husband and wife while the
latter is between brothers.
The Court is not persuaded.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must
be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code.
Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken, essentially
contains the same provisions, to wit:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. 20
The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the
Family Code was taken explains:
[I]t is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members
of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise
before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit
between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. 21
In Magbaleta, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the
subject property. The Court, taking into consideration the explanation made by the Code
Commision in its report, ruled that:
[T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts
to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action
whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable
one. It is not always that one who is alien to the family would be willing to suffer the
inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings between or
among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the
determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently
acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be
made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves. 22 x x
x.
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations) 9
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the (2) Between parent and child;
law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a
compromise before the action can prosper. (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;

In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses and the alleged paramour of (4) Among brothers and sisters.
the wife. The Court ruled that due to the efforts exerted by the husband, through the Philippine
Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was substantial compliance with the law, thereby
Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
implying that even in the presence of a party who is not a family member, the requirements
that petitioner, not being a member of the same family as respondent, may not invoke the
that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been exerted must be complied with, pursuant
provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code.
to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now Article 151 of the Family Code.

Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the
While De Guzman was decided after Magbaleta, the principle enunciated in the Magbaleta is
Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of
the one that now prevails because it is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales v.
the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a
Lopez, 23 Esquivias v. Court of Appeals, 24Spouses Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
member of that same family.
Iloilo City, 25 and the most recent case of Martinez v. Martinez. 26 Thus, Article 151 of the
Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among family members.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in all of the
aforementioned cases should not equally apply to suits involving husband and wife. Costs against petitioner.

Petitioner makes much of the fact that the present case involves a husband and his wife SO ORDERED.
while Magbaleta is a case between brothers. However, the Court finds no specific, unique, or
special circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in the abovementioned
cases inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his wife, as in the present case. In the first
place, Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the Republic of the Philippines
provisions therein apply to suits involving "members of the same family" as contemplated under Supreme Court
Article 150 of the Family Code, to wit: Manila

ART. 150. Family relations include those:

SECOND DIVISION
(1) Between husband and wife;
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, G.R. No 176556
Petitioner,
(2) Between parents and children;
Present:

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. PEREZ,
SERENO, and
and Article 217 of the Civil Code, to wit: REYES, JJ.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C.
QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by
ART. 217. Family relations shall include those: their mother RITA QUIAO, Promulgated:
Respondents. July 4, 2012
(1) Between husband and wife;
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations) 10
DECISION 5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located
in Tungao, Butuan City;
REYES, J.: 6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located
in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family
Tungao, Butuan City;
where children are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or 8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
troublemakers in the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and
fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to their shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner]
children. Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the
involving legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties. unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.

[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the

The Case conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.

He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of

This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the
[P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]
Rules of Court. The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order[2] dated January 8,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are SO ORDERED.[5]
asked to issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the
decree of legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code,
or alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided
for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation.[6]
Antecedent Facts
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution[7] which the trial
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal court granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). [3]Subsequently, the RTC
rendered a Decision[4] dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides: Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby
granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment the Judgment.
is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao
and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55. SO ORDERED.[8]

As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from

each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed. Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution [9] which
reads as follows:
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor
children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner]
under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse. BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums stated in the
afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the service of
Further, except for the personal and real properties already this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:

1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then we command you that of the
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said sums in the
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule
39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in
consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.[10]
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the
respondents the amount of P46,870.00, representing the following payments:
(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;
(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[11]
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,[12]asking the RTC to
define the term Net Profits Earned.
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order[13] dated
August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of
the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and
the debts.[14] The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have
any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2)
of the Family Code.[15] The dispositive portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends
to forfeit all the remaining properties after deducting the payments of the
debts for only separate properties of the defendant-respondent shall be
delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the
Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[17] on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another
Order[18] dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005
has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the
petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of net profit earned.[19] Furthermore, the same
Order held:
11
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby
ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in
favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be computed in
accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.[20]
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[21] praying for the correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8,
2006.Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,[22] the trial court had changed its ruling again and
granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8,
2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this
instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
I
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE
COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE
FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE
AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND
AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT
OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED
RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE
SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A
RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?[23]
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws,
we are well-aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed.[24] Thus,
we are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10,
2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10,
2005 has become final and
executory at the time the Motion
for Clarification was filed on July 7,
2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that
it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal
in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.[26]
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.[27] In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal
within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order denying
his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period
from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question
final and executory.
12
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The
petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16,
2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's
motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court
issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the
petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the
definition of the net profits earned. From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his
right to question the RTCs Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never
raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time the
petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has become final and
executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal
lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this
Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that
became final.[28]
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being
such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from
the issuance of the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that a void
judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor
any obligation.[29] But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a
judgment becomes void?
A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant
the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both. [30] In other
words, a court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.[31]
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For
sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation.Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status
and property relations of the husband and wife or those living together. [32] The Rule on Legal
Separation[33]provides that the petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of
the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.[34] In the instant case, herein
respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to the
date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's
petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties,
considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the
herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his Answer to the
Complaint on January 9, 2001.[35] Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the
questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court
is clearly not void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's
jurisdiction. Being such, the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is
meant to correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.[36] In fact, we
have ruled that for [as] long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. [37] Granting without admitting
that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should
be an appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do
this. He has already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which has become
immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very question raised below
and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the
October 10, 2005 judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a
woman who is not his wife;[38]
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita;[39]
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;[40]
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership;[41]
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody;[42]
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent
spouse by intestate succession;[43]
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
the innocent spouse;[44]
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of
gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the
marriage, whether acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved;[45]
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they
were living together;[46]
13
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
foreclosed;[47]
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and
liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the administration
of these properties;[48]
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under
Article 121 of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged
to the income generated by these properties;[49]
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had
separate properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family;[50]
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7);[51]
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall
therefore be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to
the children's legitime;[52]
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children;[53] and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of P19,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.[54]
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we
will discuss the following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code
applies to the present case since
the parties' property relation is
governed by the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership
of gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the
Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because
there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of
the Family Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record,
we can deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6,
1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of
the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains.[55] Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property
relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under
this property relation, the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or industry.[56] The husband and wife also
own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.[57]
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and
the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The
latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code [t]his Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.[58]
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of
the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children
pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: As
earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties,
the same being owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to
be given retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's
share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights
acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.[59] In other words, the petitioner is saying
14
that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the
properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which
provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband
and wife.[60] Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal
partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after the
promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code may
deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits
retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on
stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] we define and explained vested right in the following
manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency. The term vested right expresses the concept
of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative
right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto
the present or future enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List
Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita ,[63] we
also explained:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of
the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the
right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect
or fixed and irrefutable.[64] (Emphasisand underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his vested right,
he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was
well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be
awarded to her.[65] In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence
warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner
never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits,
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.[67] Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's vested right
is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil
Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty
spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit
his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded
to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall
not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled
to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering
that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may
be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the
petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may
in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each
spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into
title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the
right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
15
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be
divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.[69] (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated
October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family
Code.[70] The petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus,
the petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it has become
final and executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents
us from disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions
can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by this Court.[71]
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the
present case since the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision has attained
finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal
partnership of gains are all the
fruits of the separate properties of
the spouses and the products of
their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family
Code. He insists that since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines net
profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family
Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of net profits
earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of net profits earned
in the absolute community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property
relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of net profits. As earlier
discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In
other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under
Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of net profits, we cannot but refer to
Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the
net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4)
applies. In this provision, net profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of
the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
the time of its dissolution.[72] Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies
the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution
of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes
used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community
regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the
wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each
spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties.
And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have
established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.[73]
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is
prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of
the absolute community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the
separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance.
Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder
of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the husband and
the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.[74]
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires that we first find the
market value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution.From the totality of
the market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute
community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage,
which then results to the net profits.[75]
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what
will happen if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no
separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute
16
community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community
constitutes the market value at dissolution.
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all
the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the
community. Such debts and obligations will be subtracted from the market value at dissolution.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets
of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net
asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at
the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the net profits.
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing
would be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net
profits. However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share
of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which
should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their
marriage without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it
clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of
defining net profit. As earlier explained, the definition of net profits in Article 102(4) of the
Family Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime
as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal
Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.[76] From the foregoing provision, each of
the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture
or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete
separation of capitals.[77]
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code,
Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event
that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
the following procedure shall apply:
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each
spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of
personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the
conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her
exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the
conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be
paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source,
the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family,
belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said
spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and
wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties,
be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking
into consideration the best interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the
properties of the spouses:
17
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the
couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties.[78] In the instant case, the trial
court found that the couple has no separate properties when they
married.[79] Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80]
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during
the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership; [81] and if the
community is enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution
of the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made.[82]
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal
partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their
respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its
debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable. [83]
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of
the wife shall be returned to each of them.[84] In the instant case, since it was already
established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,[85] there
is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be
divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. [86] However, since the trial
court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations) 18
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate LOREA DE UGALDE, G.R. No. 130623
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor. Petitioner,
Present:
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not
CARPIO, J.,
entitled to any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005
Acting Chairperson,
of the trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January CARPIO MORALES,
8, 2007. AZCUNA,*
- versus - TINGA, and
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006
in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby CLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.
JON DE YSASI, Promulgated:
SO ORDERED. Respondent. February 29, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 21 November 1996 Decision[2] and 2
September 1997 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41121.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got married
before Municipal Judge Remigio Pea of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental.On 1 March 1951,[4] Rev.
Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral
in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They
had a son named Jon de Ysasi III.

Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April 1957. [5] On 26 May 1964, respondent
allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith) before
Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay City. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and Smith had
been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful
wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their
conjugal properties.
SECOND DIVISION
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of NegrosOccidental, Bacolod City,
Branch 48 (trial court). The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3330. In particular,
petitioner asked for her conjugal share in respondents inheritance as per the settlement of the
estate of respondents parents, Juan Ysasi[6] and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, who died on 17
November 1975 and 25 February 1979, respectively.[7] Petitioner also prayed for a monthly
support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in the conjugal partnership; the appointment
of a receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the annulment of all contracts, agreements,
and documents signed and ratified by respondent with third persons without her consent; and
payment of appearance and attorneys fees.
Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement which
provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as
of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement in Civil
Case No. 4791[8] then pending before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
(CFI). The Amicable Settlement stipulates:
2. That the petitioner shall pay the respondent the sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) in full satisfaction of and/or consideration
for and to cover any and all money and/or property claims she has or may
have against the petitioner in the future, including but not limited to
pensions, allowances, alimony, support, share in the conjugal property (if
any), inheritance, etc.;
3. That for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the payment
of THIRTY THOUSAND pesos (P30,000.00), the receipt of which sum is
hereby acknowledged and confessed by and to the entire satisfaction of the
respondent, she hereby completely and absolutely transfer, convey, assign,
set over, waive, remise, release and forever quitclaim, unto petitioner, his
successors and administrators, any and all rights, claims and interests which
the respondent has or may hereafter have against the petitioner arising,
directly or indirectly, from the fact that the petitioner and respondent were
married on March 1, 1951, including but not limited to any and all money
and/or property claims mentioned in the paragraph immediately preceding;
4. That, except with reference to the custody of the boy, the parties herein
hereby waive any and all rights to question the validity and effectivity of the
provisions of this amicable settlement, as well as the right to raise these
matters on appeal[.][9]
In its Order[10] dated 6 June 1961, the CFI approved the Amicable Settlement.
Respondent further alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from him before the
Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with
Richard Galoway (Galoway). After Galoways death, petitioner contracted a third marriage with
19
Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata.
In his Supplemental Affirmative Defense, respondent alleged that the marriage between him
and petitioner was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage license.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 22 November 1991, the trial court[11] rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, after collating the evidence, the evidence for the respondent is
preponderant to prove his affirmative and special defenses that the petition
does not state a sufficient cause of action. On these bases and under the
doctrine of res judicata, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without
pronouncements as to costs and attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The trial court ruled that the existence of a conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid
marriage. Considering that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized
without a marriage license, the marriage was null and void, and no community of property was
formed between them. The trial court further ruled that assuming that the marriage
was valid, the action was barred by res judicata. The trial court noted that petitioner and
respondent entered into an amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791. The amicable
settlement was approved by the CFI and petitioner may no longer repudiate it. Finally, the trial
court ruled that there was no proof to show that during their union, petitioner
and respondent acquired properties.
Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 21 November 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the absence of a marriage license is fatal and made the
marriage between petitioner and respondent a complete nullity. Hence, the trial court did not
err in finding that there was no conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and
respondent. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the compromise agreement is a valid
contract between the parties Since the compromise agreement was entered into freely,
voluntarily, and with the full understanding of its consequences, it is conclusive and binding on
the parties. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the action was barred by laches since it was
filed by petitioner 23 years from the time the CFI approved the additional amicable settlement
in Civil Case No. 4791. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
ruling that respondents right over the estate of his deceased parents was only inchoate and
there was no evidence that petitioner and respondent acquired any property that could be
considered conjugal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 2 September 1997 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court, raising the following assignment of errors:
The lower court erred in ruling that since the marriage of the plaintiff and
respondent was void due to the absence of a marriage license, no conjugal
partnership arose from their union.
The lower court erred in ruling that the amicable settlement in Civil Case No.
4791 bars all claims by the plaintiff under the principle of res judicata.
The lower court erred in ruling that respondents right to [the] estate of his
deceased parents was merely inchoate, thus, no property devolved to
respondent and no conjugal partnership was formed.
The lower court erred in ruling that the appellants petition did not sufficiently
state a cause of action.[13]
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
the trial courts Decision which dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of
gains.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is without merit.
Validity of Petitioner and Respondents Marriage
is the Subject of a Different Court Proceeding
Special Proceedings No. 3330 is an action for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains. In its
22 November 1991 Decision, the trial court ruled that the existence of conjugal partnership of
gains is predicated on a valid marriage. The trial court then proceeded to rule on the validity of
petitioner and respondents marriage. The trial court ruled that it was shown by competent
evidence that petitioner and respondent failed to obtain a marriage license. Hence, the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void, and no community of property
was formed between them.
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner and respondents
marriage, which was only raised by respondent as a defense to the action for dissolution of the
20
conjugal partnership of gains. The validity of petitioner and respondents marriage was the
subject of another action, Civil Case No. 430 for Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, Branch 55. In a
Decision[14] dated 31 May 1995, Civil Case No. 430 was resolved, as follows:
In this jurisdiction it is required, except in certain cases, that the marriage
license must first be secured by the parties and shown to the judge before
the latter can competently solemnize the marriage. In this present case,
none was ever secured. Failure to comply with the formal and essential
requirements of the law renders the marriage void ab initio.Since void
marriage can be assailed anytime as the action on assailing it does not
prescribe, the plaintiff is well within his right to seek judicial relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage between JON A. DE YSASI and LOREA DE UGALDE as NULL and
VOID AB INITIO. The Local Civil Registrar for the Municipality of Hinigaran is
hereby directed to cancel the entry of marriage between JON A. DE YSASI
and LOREA DE UGALDE from the Marriage register and to render the same of
no force and effect.
Lastly, furnish copy of this decision the National Census and Statistics Office,
Manila, to make the necessary cancellation of the entry of marriage between
the plaintiff and the defendant.
SO ORDERED.[15]
No appeal or motion for reconsideration of the 31 May 1995 Decision in Civil Case No. 430 has
been filed by any of the parties, and a Certification of finality was issued on 20 November
1995. Thus, the marriage between petitioner and respondent was already judicially annulled as
of 20 November 1995. The trial court had no jurisdiction to annul again in Special Proceedings
No. 3330 the marriage of petitioner and respondent.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains Dissolved
in Civil Case No. 4791
The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791 resulted in the dissolution of the
petitioner and respondents conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the time of
their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Civil Code) which took effect on 30 August 1950.[16] Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code,
the property regime of petitioner and respondent was conjugal partnership of gains, thus:
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations) 21
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the result of the 21 November
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of 1996 Decision and of the 2 September 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, No. 41121.
or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
SO ORDERED.
relations between husband and wife.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of gains, as follows:
Associate Justice
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife
place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income
from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination
of the conjugal partnership of gains:

Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Emphasis
supplied)

The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties separation of
property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with
Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No.
3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.

Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise Agreement because
the case was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties, as also
required under Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise
Agreement on this ground. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and
effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and
not binding on third persons who are not parties to it.[17]

The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was
approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFIs approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6
June 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner
and respondent on even date.
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations) 22
EFREN PANA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on conjugal properties where one of the
spouses has been found guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil indemnities to the victims'
heirs.

The Facts and the Case

The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder
before the. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233.1

On July 9, 1997 the RTC rendered a consolidated decision2 acquitting Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and
sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the
heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as
moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.

On appeal to this Court, it affirmed on May 24, 2001 the conviction of both accused but
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court
also affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual
damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place, however, the Court made an award of
P15,000.00 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the Court awarded P50,000.00
exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them. 3 The decision became final and
executory on October 1, 2001.4

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered
the issuance of the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren
and Melecia.6 Subsequently, a notice of levy7 and a notice of sale on execution8 were issued.

On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
Republic of the Philippines
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of
SUPREME COURT
Melecia.9 On September 16, 2002 the RTC denied the motion. 10 The spouses moved for
Manila
reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on March 6, 2003.11

THIRD DIVISION
Claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the challenged orders, Efren filed
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). On January 29, 2004 the CA dismissed
G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012 the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing
its assailed orders.12 It also denied Efren’s motion for reconsideration,13 prompting him to file
the present petition for review on certiorari.
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conjugal
properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
Ruling of the Court
To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable
against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses’ property
relations.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did
not execute any prenuptial agreement.14Although the heirs of the deceased victims do not
dispute that it was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed the marriage, they
insist that it was the system of absolute community of property that applied to Efren and
Melecia. The reasoning goes:
Admittedly, the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. But that fact
does not prevent the application of [A]rt. 94, last paragraph, of the Family Code because their
property regime is precisely governed by the law on absolute community. This finds support in
Art. 256 of the Family Code which states:
"This code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired by each over the
properties of the community. Hence, the liabilities imposed on the accused-spouse may
properly be charged against the community as heretofore discussed.15
The RTC applied the same reasoning as above.16 Efren and Melecia’s property relation was
admittedly conjugal under the Civil Code but, since the transitory provision of the Family Code
gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, that property
relation between the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in 1988. The latter
code now prescribes in Article 75 absolute community of property for all marriages unless the
parties entered into a prenuptial agreement. As it happens, Efren and Melecia had no prenuptial
agreement. The CA agreed with this position.17
Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of
each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested
rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach
back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal
partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial
agreements.
23
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified
except prior to marriage.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be
made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128,
135 and 136.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren
and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration
of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal
separation;18 (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their
former property regime;19 (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a
spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the
family;20 (d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly
filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership
of gains.21 None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil
Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes
from their work or industry in the common fund. Thus:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over
their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of
couples who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988
when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such
separate properties.
The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses’ loose admission that absolute community of
property governed their property relation since the record shows that they had been insistent
that their property regime is one of conjugal partnership of gains.22 No evidence of a prenuptial
agreement between them has been presented.
What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the operative
law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were
married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code thus
provides:
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations)
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In
the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that
supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Article 105 of the
Family Code states:
"x x x x
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to
conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of
this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws, as provided in Article 256."23
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not
the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities
imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122 provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that
of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of
either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should
have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose
above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own,24 the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on
her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.25 Those responsibilities are as follows:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
24
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either
spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this
Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or
by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or
other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the
family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common
legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.1âwphi1
Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities
imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated.
Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered."[ 26] No prior
liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that
"at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 77198 dated January 29, 2004 and May 14, 2004. The Regional Trial
Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on
the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the
Persons and Family Relations (Property Relations) 25
indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233,
the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice