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Sovereignty
Author(s): Stephen D. Krasner
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 122 (Jan. - Feb., 2001), pp. 20-22+24+26+28-29
Published by: Slate Group, LLC
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3183223
Accessed: 27-09-2019 08:39 UTC

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 THINK

AGAIN

By Stephen D. Krasner

SOVEREIGNTY
The idea of states as autonomous, independent entities
the combined onslaught of monetary unions, CNN, the I

governmental organizations. But those who proclaim the d

misread history. The nation-state has a keen instinct for

far adapted to new challenges-even the challenge of gl

The Sovereign State Is Just Abou

Very wrong. Sovereignty was never
guaranteesquite as
access to international organizations and some-
times to
vibrant as many contemporary observers international
suggest. Thefinance. It offers status to individual
conventional norms of sovereignty have always
leaders. been
While the great powers of Europe have eschewed
challenged. A few states, most notably the United
many elements of sovereignty, the United States, China, and
States, have had autonomy, control, Japan
and have
recognition
neither the interest nor the inclination to aban-
for most of their existence, but most others have
don their not.
usually effective claims to domestic autonomy.
The polities of many weaker states haveInbeen
various persist-
parts of the world, national borders still rep-
ently penetrated, and stronger nations have
resent notlines
the fault been
of conflict, whether it is Israelis and
immune to external influence. China was occupied.
Palestinians fightingThe
over the status of Jerusalem, Indians
constitutional arrangements of Japan
andand Germany
Pakistanis threatening to go nuclear over Kashmir, or
were directed by the United States afterEthiopia
World andWar
EritreaII.
clashing over disputed territories. Yet
commentators
The United Kingdom, despite its rejection of the nowadays
euro, are mostly concerned about
is part of the European Union. the erosion of national borders as a consequence of glob-
Even for weaker states-whose domestic structures alization. Governments and activists alike complain that
have been influenced by outside actors, and whose lead- multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the
ers have very little control over transborder movements or World Trade Organization, and the International Mon-
even activities within their own country-sovereignty etary Fund overstep their authority by promoting universal
remains attractive. Although sovereignty might provide lit- standards for everything from human rights and the envi-
tle more than international recognition, that recognition ronment to monetary policy and immigration. However,
the most important impact of economic globalization
Stephen D. Krasner is Graham H. Stuart professor of interna- and transnational norms will be to alter the scope of
tional relations at Stanford University and is currently on leave state authority rather than to generate some fundamen-
as a fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg of Berlin. tally new way to organize political life.

20 FOREIGN POLICY

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 Sovereignty Means Final Authority

Not anymore, if ever. When philoso-

Bodin and Hobbes, have best been provided by mod-
phers Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes first elabo-
ern democratic states whose organizing principles are
rated the notion of sovereignty in the 16th antithetical
and to the idea that sovereignty means uncon-
17th centuries, they were concerned with establish-
trolled domestic power.
ing the legitimacy of a single hierarchy of domestic If sovereignty does not mean a domestic order
authority. Although Bodin and Hobbes accepted with a single hierarchy of authority, what does it
the existence of divine and natural law, they both
mean? In the contemporary world, sovereignty pri-
(especially Hobbes) believed the word of the sover-
marily has been linked with the idea that states are
eign was law. Subjects had no right to revolt. Bodin
autonomous and independent from each other. With-
and Hobbes realized that imbuing the sovereign in their own boundaries, the members of a polity are
with such overweening power invited tyranny, but free to choose their own form of government. A nec-
they were predominately concerned with maintain- essary corollary of this claim is the principle of non-
ing domestic order, without which they believed intervention: One state does not have a right to inter-
there could be no justice. Both were writing invene
a in the internal affairs of another.
world riven by sectarian strife. Bodin was almost More recently, sovereignty has come to be asso-
ciated with the idea of control over transborder
killed in religious riots in France in 1572. Hobbes
published his seminal work, Leviathan, only a movements.
few When contemporary observers assert
years after parliament (composed of Britain's
that the sovereign state is just about dead, they do not
emerging wealthy middle class) had executed that constitutional structures are about to dis-
mean
Charles I in a civil war that had sought to wrest
appear. Instead, they mean that technological change
state control from the monarchy. has made it very difficult, or perhaps impossible,
This idea of supreme power was compelling, but for states to control movements across their bor-
ders of all kinds of material things (from coffee to
irrelevant in practice. By the end of the 17th century,
political authority in Britain was divided between
cocaine) and not-so-material things (from Holly-
wood movies to capital flows).
king and parliament. In the United States, the Found-
ing Fathers established a constitutional structure ofFinally, sovereignty has meant that political
checks and balances and multiple sovereignties dis-
authorities can enter into international agreements.
They are free to endorse any contract they find
tributed among local and national interests that were
inconsistent with hierarchy and supremacy. The prin-
attractive. Any treaty among states is legitimate pro-
vided
ciples of justice, and especially order, so valued by that it has not been coerced.

The Peace of Westphalia Produced

the Modern Sovereign State
No, it came later. Contemporary pundits than the ideals of Christendom. But Westphalia was
often cite the 1648 Peace of Westphalia (actually two first and foremost a new constitution for the Holy
separate treaties, Miinster and Osnabriick) as the Roman Empire. The preexisting right of the princi-
political big bang that created the modern system of palities in the empire to make treaties was affirmed,
autonomous states. Westphalia-which ended thebut the Treaty of Miinster stated that "such Alliances
Thirty Years' War against the hegemonic power of the be not against the Emperor, and the Empire, nor
Holy Roman Empire-delegitimized the already wan- against the Publick Peace, and this Treaty, and with-
ing transnational role of the Catholic Church and val- out prejudice to the Oath by which every one is bound
idated the idea that international relations should be to the Emperor and the Empire." The domestic polit-
driven by balance-of-power considerations rather
ical structures of the principalities remained embedded

JANUARYJ FEBRUARY 2001 21

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 Think Again

in the Holy Roman Empire. The Duke of Saxony, the cities with mixed populations would share offices.
Margrave of Brandenburg, the Count of Palatine, Religious issues had to be settled by a majority of
and the Duke of Bavaria were affirmed as electors both Catholics and Protestants in the diet and courts
who (along with the archbishops of Mainz, Trier,
of the empire. None of the major political leaders in
and Cologne) chose the emperor. They did notEurope endorsed religious toleration in principle,
become or claim to be kings in their own right. but they recognized that religious conflicts were so
Perhaps most important, Westphalia established volatile that it was essential to contain rather than
rules for religious tolerance in Germany. The treaties repress sectarian differences. All in all, Westphalia is
gave lip service to the principle (cuius regio, eius a pretty medieval document, and its biggest explicit
religio) that the prince could set the religion of his ter-innovation-provisions that undermined the power
ritory-and then went on to violate this very princi-of princes to control religious affairs within their
ple through many specific provisions. The signatories territories-was antithetical to the ideas of national
agreed that the religious rules already in effect would sovereignty that later became associated with the
stay in place. Catholics and Protestants in Germanso-called Westphalian system.

Universal Human Rights Are an

Unprecedented Challenge to Sovereignty
Wrong. The struggle to establish internation-practices failed dismally. After World War II, human,
al rules that compel leaders to treat their subjects rather than minority, rights became the focus of
in a certain way has been going on for a long attention. The United Nations Charter endorsed
time. Over the centuries the emphasis has shifted both human rights and the classic sovereignty prin-
from religious toleration, to minority rightsciple of nonintervention. The 20-plus human rights
(often focusing on specific ethnic groups in spe-accords that have been signed during the last half cen-
cific countries), to human rights (emphasizing tury cover a wide range of issues including genocide,
rights enjoyed by all or broad classes of individu- torture, slavery, refugees, stateless persons, women's
als). In a few instances states have voluntarily rights, racial discrimination, children's rights, and
embraced international supervision, but generally forced labor. These U.N. agreements, however, have
the weak have acceded to the preferences of thefew enforcement mechanisms, and even their provi-
strong: The Vienna settlement following thesions for reporting violations are often ineffective.
Napoleonic wars guaranteed religious toleration The tragic and bloody disintegration of
for Catholics in the Netherlands. All of the suc-
Yugoslavia in the 1990s revived earlier concerns
cessor states of the Ottoman Empire, beginning with ethnic rights. International recognition of the
with Greece in 1832 and ending with Albania Yugoslav
in successor states was conditional upon
their acceptance of constitutional provisions guar-
1913, had to accept provisions for civic and polit-
ical equality for religious minorities as a condi-
anteeing minority rights. The Dayton accords estab-
tion for international recognition. The peace set-
lished externally controlled authority structures in
tlements following World War I included exten- Bosnia, including a Human Rights Commission (a
majority of whose members were appointed by the
sive provisions for the protection of minorities.
Western European states). NATO created a de facto
Poland, for instance, agreed to refrain from hold-
protectorate in Kosovo.
ing elections on Saturday because such balloting
would have violated the Jewish Sabbath. The motivations for such interventions-human-
itarianism and security-have hardly changed.
Individuals could bring complaints against gov-
ernments through a minority rights bureau estab-Indeed, the considerations that brought the great
lished within the League of Nations. powers into the Balkans following the wars of the
But as the Holocaust tragically demonstrated,1870s were hardly different from those that engaged
NATO and Russia in the 1990s.
interwar efforts at international constraints on domestic

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 Think Again

Globalization Undermines State Control

No. State control could never be taken forcollapse

grant- of credit. The Asian financial crisis of the late
ed. Technological changes over the last 200
1990syears
was not nearly as devastating. Indeed, the speed
have increased the flow of people, goods,with which countries recovered from the Asian flu
capital,
and ideas-but the problems posed by such move-
reflects how a better working knowledge of economic
theories
ments are not new. In many ways, states are and more effective central banks have made it
better
able to respond now than they were in the past.
easier for states to secure the advantages (while at the
The impact of the global media on political same time minimizing the risks) of being enmeshed in
author-
global
ity (the so-called CNN effect) pales in comparison to financial
the markets.
havoc that followed the invention of the printing
In addition to attempting to control the flows of
press. Within a decade after Martin Luther capital
purport-and ideas, states have long struggled to manage
edly nailed his 95 theses to the Wittenberg
thechurch
impact of international trade. The opening of long-
door, his ideas had circulated throughout Europe.
distance trade for bulk commodities in the 19th century
created
Some political leaders seized upon the principles fundamental cleavages in all of the major states.
of the
Depression
Protestant Reformation as a way to legitimize secularand plummeting grain prices made it pos-
sible for
political authority. No sovereign monarch could German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck to prod
con-
tain the spread of these concepts, and somethe landholding
lost not aristocracy into a protectionist alliance
with urban
only their lands but also their heads. The sectarian con- heavy industry (this coalition of "iron and
troversies of the 16th and 17th centuries wererye" dominated German politics for decades). The tar-
perhaps
more politically consequential than any subsequent
iff question was a basic divide in U.S. politics for much
transnational flow of ideas. of the last half of the 19th and first half of the 20th cen-
turies. But, despite growing levels of imports and
In some ways, international capital movements
exports
were more significant in earlier periods than they since 1950, the political salience of trade has
are
now. During the 19th century, Latin American receded because national governments have developed
states
social welfare
(and to a lesser extent Canada, the United States, and strategies that cushion the impact of
international
Europe) were beset by boom-and-bust cycles associat- competition, and workers with higher
skill levels are better able to adjust to changing inter-
ed with global financial crises. The Great Depression,
national conditions.
which had a powerful effect on the domestic politics of It has become easier, not harder,
for states to manage the flow of goods and services.
all major states, was precipitated by an international

Globalization Is Changing the

Scope of State Control
Yes. The reach of the state has increased competence
in some nor the inclination to conduct independ-
areas but contracted in others. Rulers have ent
recog-
monetary policies. The mid-20th-century effort
to control
nized that their effective control can be enhanced by monetary affairs, which was associated
with
walking away from issues they cannot resolve. For Keynesian economics, has now been reversed
instance, beginning with the Peace of Westphalia,
due to the magnitude of short-term capital flows and
leaders chose to surrender their control overthe
religion
inability of some states to control inflation. With
because it proved too volatile. Keeping religion
the exception of Great Britain, the major European
states have established a single monetary authority.
within the scope of state authority undermined,
rather than strengthened, political stability. Confronting recurrent hyperinflation, Ecuador adopt-
ed the U.S. dollar as its currency in 2000.
Monetary policy is an area where state control
Along
expanded and then ultimately contracted. Before the with the erosion of national currencies, we
now see the erosion of national citizenship-the
20th century, states had neither the administrative

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 Think Again

notion that an individual should be a citizen of one monetary affairs, and claims to loyalty has declined,
and only one country, and that the state has exclusive overall government activity, as reflected in taxation
claims to that person's loyalty. For many states, there and government expenditures, has increased as a per-
is no longer a sharp distinction between citizens andcentage of national income since the 1950s among
noncitizens. Permanent residents, guest workers, the most economically advanced states. The extent
refugees, and undocumented immigrants are entitledof a country's social welfare programs tends to go
to some bundle of rights even if they cannot vote. The hand in hand with its level of integration within
ease of travel and the desire of many countries to the global economy. Crises of authority and control
attract either capital or skilled workers have increased have been most pronounced in the states that have
incentives to make citizenship a more flexible category.been the most isolated, with sub-Saharan Africa
Although government involvement in religion, offering the largest number of unhappy examples.

NGOs Are Nibbling at National Sovereignty

To some extent. Transnational nongovern- been limited when compared to governments, inter-
mental organizations (NGOs) have been around national
for organizations, and multinational corpora-
quite awhile, especially if you include corporations. In The United Fruit Company had more influence
tions.
the 18th century, the East India Company possessed
in Central America in the early part of the 20th cen-
tury than any NGO could hope to have anywhere in
political power (and even an expeditionary military
force) that rivaled many national governments. the contemporary world. The International Monetary
Fund and other multilateral financial institutions
Throughout the 19th century, there were transnational
now routinely
movements to abolish slavery, promote the rights of negotiate conditionality agreements
women, and improve conditions for workers.that involve not only specific economic targets but
also domestic
The number of transnational NGOs, however, has institutional changes, such as pledges
grown tremendously, from around 200 in 1909 to crack
to down on corruption and break up cartels.
over 17,000 today. The availability of inexpensive Smaller,
and weaker states are the most frequent tar-
very fast communications technology has made gets ofitexternal efforts to alter domestic institutions,
easier for such groups to organize and make an but more powerful states are not immune. The open-
impact
ness of the U.S. political system means that not only
on public policy and international law-the interna-
tional agreement banning land mines being aNGOs, recent but also foreign governments, can play some
case in point. Such groups prompt questionsrole in political decisions. (The Mexican government,
about
sovereignty because they appear to threaten for instance,
the lobbied heavily for the passage of the
North
integrity of domestic decision making. Activists whoAmerican Free Trade Agreement.) In fact, the
permeability
lose on their home territory can pressure foreign gov- of the American polity makes the Unit-
ernments, which may in turn influence decision edmak-
States a less threatening partner; nations are more
ers in the activists' own nation. willing to sign on to U.S.-sponsored international
arrangements because they have some confidence
But for all of the talk of growing NGO influence,
thathas
their power to affect a country's domestic affairs they can play a role in U.S. decision making.

Sovereignty Blocks Conflict Resolution

Yes, sometimes. Rulers as well as their con-
quently by inconsistent principles (such as universal
human rights) and violated in practice (the U.S.- and
stituents have some reasonably clear notion of what
British-enforced no-fly zones over Iraq). In fact, the
sovereignty means-exclusive control within a given
political importance of conventional sovereignty
territory-even if this norm has been challenged fre-

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 Think Again

rules has made it harder to solve some problems. either side would even know what a tributary state
There is, for instance, no conventional sovereignty and even if the leaders of Tibet worked out some kin
solution for Jerusalem, but it doesn't require much of settlement that would give their country more sel
imagination to think of alternatives: Divide the city government, there would be no guarantee that th
into small pieces; divide the Temple Mount vertically could gain the support of their own constituents.
with the Palestinians controlling the top and the If, however, leaders can reach mutual agreemen
Israelis the bottom; establish some kind of interna- bring along their constituents, or are willing to
tional authority; divide control over different issues coercion, sovereignty rules can be violated in inventiv
(religious practices versus taxation, for instance) ways. The Chinese, for instance, made Hong Kong
among different authorities. Any one of these solu- special administrative region after the transfer fr
tions would be better for most Israelis and British rule, allowed a foreign judge to sit on
Palestinians than an ongoing stalemate, but Court of Final Appeal, and secured acceptance
political
leaders on both sides have had trouble delivering a
other states not only for Hong Kong's participation
settlement because they are subject to aattacks number byof international organizations but also
counterelites who can wave the sovereignty separate
flag. visa agreements and recognition of a d
Conventional rules have also been problematic for Kong passport. All of these measures v
tinct Hong
Tibet. Both the Chinese and the Tibetans mightlatebeconventional
bet- sovereignty rules since Hong Ko
does not
ter off if Tibet could regain some of the autonomy have juridical independence. Only by inve
it had
as a tributary state within the traditional ing Chinese
a unique status for Hong Kong, which involved th
empire. Tibet had extensive local control, butacquiescence of other states, could China claim so
symbol-
ereignty
ically (and sometimes through tribute payments) while simultaneously preserving the con
rec-
ognized the supremacy of the emperor. Today, dence of on
few the business community.

The European Union Is a New Model

Supranational Governance
Yes, but only for the Europeans. effect and supremacy within national judicial sys-
The European Union (EU) really is a new thing, tems, evenfarthough these doctrines were never explic-
more interesting in terms of sovereignty itly thanendorsed
Hong in any treaty. The European Monetary
Kong. It is not a conventional international Union created a central bank that now controls mon-
organi-
zation because its member states are now so inti- etary affairs for three of the union's four largest
mately linked with one another that withdrawal is notstates. The Single European Act and the Maastricht
a viable option. It is not likely to become a "UnitedTreaty provide for majority or qualified majority,
States of Europe"-a large federal state that might but not unanimous, voting in some issue areas. In one
look something like the United States of America- sense, the European Union is a product of state sov-
because the interests, cultures, economies, and domes-
ereignty because it has been created through volun-
tic institutional arrangements of its members are tarytoo agreements among its member states. But, in
diverse. Widening the EU to include the former com- another sense, it fundamentally contradicts conven-
munist states of Central Europe would further com- tional understandings of sovereignty because these
plicate any efforts to move toward a political organ-same agreements have undermined the juridical auton-
ization that looks like a conventional sovereign state.
omy of its individual members.
The EU is inconsistent with conventional sover- The European Union, however, is not a model that
eignty rules. Its member states have created supra-other parts of the world can imitate. The initial moves
national institutions (the European Court of Justice,toward integration could not have taken place with-
the European Commission, and the Council of Min-out the political and economic support of the Unit-
isters) that can make decisions opposed by some ed States, which was, in the early years of the Cold
member states. The rulings of the court have direct War, much more interested in creating a strong

28 FOREIGN POLICY

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alliance that could effectively oppose the Soviet Union
than it was in any potential European challenge to
U.S. leadership. Germany, one of the largest states in
the European Union, has been the most consistent
supporter of an institutional structure that would
limit Berlin's own freedom of action, a reflection of
the lessons of two devastating wars and the attrac-
tiveness of a European identity for a country still
grappling with the sins of the Nazi era. It is hard to
imagine that other regional powers such as China,
Japan, or Brazil, much less the United States, would
have any interest in tying their own hands in similar
ways. (Regional trading agreements such as Merco-
sur and NAFTA have very limited supranational pro-
visions and show few signs of evolving into broader
monetary or political unions.) The EU is a new and
unique institutional structure, but it will coexist with,
not displace, the sovereign-state model. IU

Want to Know More?

For some examples of the conventional view that sovereignty is a mechanistic process that cons
state behavior, see Hedley Bull's classic The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Po
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) and Robert Jackson's Quasi-states: Sovereignty,
national Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The m
forceful recent presentations of the constructivist perspective, which emphasizes the importan
ideas, are Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Un
versity Press, 1999) and John Ruggie's Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International I
tutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998).

More skeptical views about the impact of sovereignty on state behavior can be found in Step
D. Krasner's Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) a
Michael Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck's Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evoluti
Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press,

Hendrik Spruyt's The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton Unive
Press, 1994) and Charles Tilly's Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 99ggo-z992 (Cambri
Blackwell Publishers, 1992) emphasize economic and military considerations in their excellent
torical analyses of the evolution of the sovereign-state system. Quentin Skinner's The Founda
of Modern Political Thought, Volume 2, The Age of Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ
sity Press, 1978) is a superlative treatment of the relationship between the ideas of the Reform
and the development of the modem state.

Paul Gordon Lauren offers historical insight into international efforts to safeguard human rights in
Evolu*in oflnteemational Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1
For a treatment of the almost forgotten Versailles minority-rights regimes established after World War
Inis L. Claude Jr.'s National Minorities: An International Problem (New York: Greenwood Press,

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink investigate the growing significance of transnational
governmental organizations in Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International P
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), and Jeremy Rabkin discusses the anxiety they provoke i
Sovereignty Matters (Washington: AEI Press, 1998). Anyone interested in globalization and its n
al political underpinnings must read Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson's Globalizatio
History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 19

?For links to relevant Web sites, as well as a comprehensive index of related FOREIGN P
articles, access www.foreignpolicy.com.

JANUARYI FEBRUARY 2001 29

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