DE AGBAYANI V. PNB
Aichi Forging Company of Asia (reinstating
FACTS:
On 19 Jul 1939 – De Agbayani loaned to PNB thru mortgage
13 Jul 1959 – PNB filed for extra-judicial disclosure proceedings for the
recovery of the unpaid loan -> sinisingil nya si De Agbayani
De Agbayani countered that it has already been more than 15 years, he
claimed that the loan had already lapsed
PNB on the other hand countered that there was EO 32 and RA 342. Tho
both laws were declared unconstitutional, it was deemed valid and correct
at the time these laws were enacted. Operative fact – doctrine rule.
ISSUE: W/N the period of effectivity of EO 32 and RA 342 extending the
Moratorium Law before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of
prescription (Effect of the declaration of Unconstitutionality of a law)
HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.” 4
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive
order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached. Precisely because of the judicial recognition
that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a
series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity that during the
eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342
were in force, prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest.
From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time
consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was
tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No.
32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was
promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously
then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the
mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be
availed of as a defense.
CIR v. SAN ROQUE POWER CORP.
FACTS:
- Proper period for filing the judicial claim for refund or credit of
creditable input tax;
- Timely filing by the taxpayers of their administrative claims with the
CIR.
- 120+30 day filing – by CIR
3 Consolidated digests / motion for reconsideration:
1. San Roque Power – premature filing -- denied
2. Taganito Mining -- premature filing – granted
3. Philex Mining – late filing -- denied
The majority denied refund to San Roque due to the waiting period for filing
a judicial claim is mandatory and jurisdictional. 20 April 2003.
Taganito – after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 Dec 2003
(taxpayer need not wait for the 120-day period lapse before it could seek
judicial relief with the CTA). In good faith relied to it prior to its reversal.
6 Oct 2010 – SC decision: CIR v.
the 120+30 day rule).
The majority held that since the Commissioner has exclusive and original
jurisdiction to interpret tax laws under Sec 4 of Tax Code.
Operative doctrine rule – a judicial declaration of invalidity may not
necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to
such declaration. Even tho a certain law is declared unconstitutional, it is
assumed valid at the time of its release prior to declaration of
unconstitutionality.
ATIENZA v. LIM
CASE: Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (G.R. Nos.
187836 and 187916)
DATE: 25 November 2014
PONENTE: J. Perez
FACTS
Essentially, this case is about oil companies (Chevron, Petron, and Shell)
located at Pandacan Terminal.
Lim – pro oil company, Ordinance 8119 (unconsti) and ; Atienza – against,
Ordinance 8027 (consti)
- 12 Oct 2001, there was MOA between the oil companies and DOE for
the creation of a Master Plan to address and minimize the potential
risks and hazards posed by the proximity of communities, business and
offices to Pandacan oil terminals without affecting security and
reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum products.
- 20 Nov 2001, SP enacted 0rdinance 8027, which reclassifies the land
use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to
Commercial I. This was later declared unconstitutional by the SC
- Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the
reclassification were given 6 months (May 2002) from the date of
effectivity to stop the operation of their businesses; extended until 30
April 2003.
- On 4 Dec 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the SC to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
- Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Manila RTC an
action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction. The same was issued in favor of Chevron and Shell. Petron,
on the other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.
- On 16 Jun 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119
entitled “An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the
Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto”. This
designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone.
- On 7 Mar 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and
directed Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
It declared that the objective of the ordinance is to protect the
residents of manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
- The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7
March 2007 Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027
is constitutional and that it was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance
No. 8119 as there is no irreconcilable conflict between them but later
denied by the SC.
- On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Lim, the SP enacted
Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119
was limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to
the list a Medium and a Heavy Industrial Zone where petroleum
refineries and oil depots are expressly allowed.
- Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance
No. 8187. Their contentions are as follows: - It is an invalid exercise of
police power because it does not promote the general welfare of the
people - It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution as well as health and environment related municipal laws
and international conventions and treaties, such as: Clean Air Act;
Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil Code
provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the Child - The title of
Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119
when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027
- On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the
intervenors oil companies contend that: - The petitioners have no legal
standing to sue whether as citizens, taxpayers or legislators. They
further failed to show that they have suffered any injury or threat of
injury as a result of the act complained of - The petition should be
dismissed outright for failure to properly apply the related provisions
of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available
- The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC
only exercises appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of an ordinance under Section 5, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution - It is the function of the SP to enact zoning
ordinance without prior referral to the Manila Zoning Board of
Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it may repeal all or part of zoning
ordinance sought to be modified - There is a valid exercise of police
power
- On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance 8283 which essentially
amended the assailed Ordinance to exclude the area where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial
Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.
ISSUES
1. W/N there are violations of environmental laws – no
2. W/N the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated – no
3. W/N the petitioners have legal standing to sue – yes
4. W/N Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals – yes
RULING
1. None. The existing laws, rules and regulations stated herein are
limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations of violations of
environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral
attacks that would support the other position of the petitioners – the
protection of the right to life, security and safety.
2. No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have been filed
with the RTC, having concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a special
civil action for prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. However, the petitions at bar are of transcendental
importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375)
3. Yes. The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007 which ruled
that the petitioners in that case have a legal right to seek the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because the subject of the
petition concerns a public right, and they, as residents of Manila, have
a direct interest in the implementation of the ordinances of the city.
The preservation of the life, security and safety of the people is
indisputably a right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the
petitioners, as residents of Manila, have the required personal interest
to seek relief to protect such right.
4. Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance
relative to the continued stay of the oil depots, the SC followed the
same line of reasoning used in its 7 March 2007 decision, to wit:
“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting a
sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general
welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to
take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in
the ordinance from industrial to commercial. The following facts were
found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila which recommended the approval
of the ordinance:
(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly
flammable and highly volatile products;
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang
Palace; and
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could
spread to the neighboring communities.
The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The
depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western
interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as there is such a
target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore
becomes necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
1. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and invalid with respect
to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
2. The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila (Lim) is ordered to cease and
desist from enforcing Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the relocation and
transfer of the oil terminals out of the Pandacan area
3. The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45)
days, submit to the RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated comprehensive plan
and relocation schedule, which relocation shall be completed not later than
six (6) months from the date the required document is submitted.
RP v. CA
FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain
portions of land owned by the private respondents for the widening and
concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section, Philippine-Japan Highway Loan
(PJHL) road. While the right of the Republic is not now disputed, the private
respondents, however, demand that the just compensation for the property
should be based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree
No. 76, as amended, (unconsti) which fixes payment on the basis of the
assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner,
whichever is lower. The RTC ruled for the private respondents. When
elevated to it, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
In Export Processing Zone Authority ("EPZA") vs. Dulay, etc. et al., this Court
held the determination of just compensation in eminent domain to be a
judicial function and it thereby declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well
as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary
extent, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of
judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by the Republic was
reiterated in subsequent cases.
ISSUE
W/N the declaration of nullity of the law in question should have
prospective, not retroactive, application.
HELD: No.
Although there are some instances that the unconstitutionality of the law is
not always invalid, in this case, it shall follow the orthodox/stringent view in
which a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as being,
for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had
never existed. Here, of course, we refer to the law itself being per se
repugnant to the Constitution.
“Instruction is the brief treatise made by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, whose
words we quote —
“ There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of a statute.
(1) the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby,
an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore
stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed
at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration
of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter
invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent
cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing
that "when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. . . .
(2) The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court
in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or
repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as
if such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for
ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties
only and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or
reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination
of other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute from the
 statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the
statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no
one else is bound.

The instant controversy, however, is too far distant away from any of
the above exceptional cases. To this day, the controversy between the
petitioner and the private respondents on the issue of just compensation is
still unresolved, partly attributable to the instant petition that has
prevented the finality of the decision appealed from. The fact of the matter
is that the expropriation cases, involved in this instance, were still pending
appeal when the EPZA ruling was rendered and forthwith invoked by said
parties.”