Republic of the Philippines The Solicitor General for respondents.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors,
and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE
SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO,
AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by
their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE
and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents
ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE
CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE
GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all
surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING,
DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors,
represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and
REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and
MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their
parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH
JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and
VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of
"inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The
principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint2 was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but
are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable;
they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a
ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this
balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies,
such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
"aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result
of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of
the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from
the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from
the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of
the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known
as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted
as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares
of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests
are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares
for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex
"A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares
per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be
bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of
this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet
unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff
minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and
unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March
2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the
rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public
policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is
the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity
and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law —
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape
of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause
of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter
in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than
what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is
well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in
its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and
hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil
case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before
the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the
filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file
a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree
with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions,
it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to
enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1,
Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a
cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3)
co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and
that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
— generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air,
water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation
of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement
of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments
of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only
for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications
relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people,
the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account
social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will
serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to
insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act
or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution
involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the
truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule
that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what
the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal
order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed
for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there
is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
22
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents
a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political
in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He
was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom
it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may
be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification
of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
29
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally
matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows,
or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal,
the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few
years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because
of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary
locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action
in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency
directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the
governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in
an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14).
There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and
that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear
to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic
policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the
right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon
the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies"
and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an
extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court
has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code
which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each
of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does
not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be
hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all
or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying
that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering
the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have
no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification.
Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be
impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the
relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or
more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners
implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they
may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well
as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the
claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may
also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners,
under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including
the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out
in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained
the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill
effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the
unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. 2
But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of
cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their
respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the
first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To
most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to
carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their
cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad
commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming
with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation
activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official
indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several
government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of
the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed
from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of
the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion
and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be
held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of
petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the
Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular
inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management
Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different
beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from
50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No.
34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities,
or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml. 4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf
of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay
through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on
ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for
the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming,
skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with
defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to
act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted
scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment
facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and
operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and
maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes
but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of
the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the
marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of
cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the
free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which
eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government,
DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels,
and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge
companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal
sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the
Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG),
Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and
agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a
Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the
consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do
not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila
Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the
Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to
do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws. 7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the
following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON
BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER
SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC
POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT
OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings,
Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are
they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be
compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.8 A
ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." 9 It
connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a
"simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by
law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion,
but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid
waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of
judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its
mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that
petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not
require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in
particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to
clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents
maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of
solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to
such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law,
on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different
concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a
decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in
Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as
a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to
cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" within
six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case,
the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and
liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty
being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope
of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall
likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities
and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle
solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills
and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall
maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of
RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity
of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and
disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in
the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting
up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier
stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
officially according to their judgment or conscience. 13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a
person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." 14 Any suggestion that
the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties
ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws
would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from
choosing not to perform these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment
and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the
other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality
management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction
"over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity,
causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using
available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report,
an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality
Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and
adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As
such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and
publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months
following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months
following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such
action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every
five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework. 16 Within
twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action
Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to
it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR,
with the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and
non-government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a
comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation
Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of
the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases
should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them
under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control
over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of
Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the
duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the
proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts.
It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts
and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to
construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal
of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached
agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of
the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the
different parts of the country.19 In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to
provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan
to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO
292),20 is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances
respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources.
Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in
coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of
establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic
resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis. 21
Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the
enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be
responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management,
and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked
under EO 29223 to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among
others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national
development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform
metro-wide services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which include the
formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated
flood control, drainage and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and
MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro
Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood
control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services
shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers,
waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent
laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of
1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary
responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in
accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control
Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and enforcement
of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any
other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner,
into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or
deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or
from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float
or be washed into such navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the
bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into
such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise,
whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of
such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990
was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform
all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975,
the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the
capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the
capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG
and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and
regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was
made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the
PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws,
rules, and regulations.25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate,
manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national
development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within
the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and
attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the
Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority
shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles,
as well as movement within the port of watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL
73/78,28 the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception
facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine
ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the
Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the
vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP
Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal
systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of
RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated
are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning
of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable
or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open
dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an
environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or
demolition may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places
such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in
coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other
pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers,
waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge
wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned
LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the
DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked
to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect
the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of
RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies,
shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage
and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not
considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management
system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec.
5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the
regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies
through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation
clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their
environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152),
is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all
levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on
Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide
educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper
use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the
other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school
curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles. 33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of
the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government
funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the country’s development objectives.34
One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in
a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh,
brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among
others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of
pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental
strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality
management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated
from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and
quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble
objectives of RA 9275 in line with the country’s development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical,
and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the
law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass
the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies
concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such
water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain,
remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do
so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up
operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons
and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the
counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152
continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof,
any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and
prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution
incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit
for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations
are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in
coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment,
removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by
the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x
x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund
or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than
real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the
designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern
themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to
cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the
succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental
spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or
spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from
accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the
government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations
of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the
application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations
that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the
corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they
argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of
water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either
intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec.
62(h).
requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water
quality "has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This
section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take
such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine,
the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any
pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is
properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail
to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies
shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they
have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution
incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup
operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the
Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in
even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly
invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their
cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard,
what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid
as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive
program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs.
17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents." 35

Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec.
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as
20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of
delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for
such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific
accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in
and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable
fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g),
certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution
PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations
incidents" which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by
of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in
polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16
the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting
of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or
provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills
pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the
as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD
land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end
1152.
up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve
nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow pollution incident level.
reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of
the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so
cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup
undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the
operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As
Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila
pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec.
Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to
17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.
contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves
the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275,
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.
government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the
long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation
process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and
contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from
reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic
exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the
ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves
the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices
under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and
duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal
level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," 36 the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the
doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the
length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution. 37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized
structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the
National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters,
with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the
Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and
the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of
illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then
practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The
DENR Secretary said as much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD
1067 or the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along
banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the
easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.
(Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing
along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But
while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments
undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial
establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment
facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters,
from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such
period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to
comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on
the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage
Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is
shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and
Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the
surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in
the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack
alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of
pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be
established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003).
Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the
MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall
be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person,
including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years
following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years
which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which
strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering,
dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open
dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have
proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that
ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which
enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from
vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and
of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of
substances to the aquatic environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and other marine
litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous
materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid
substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the
extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act
and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence;
hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some
of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark
cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its
former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But
the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with
the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks
and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in
the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend
their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand
becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and
instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in
cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind
two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are
required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides
that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil
and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it
is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.41 Even assuming
the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the
bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as
possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent
developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now
read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government
agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its
waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR
Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment
and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary
government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed
to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call
regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to
ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its
indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of
the Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of
general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management
programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs
in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all
factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river
systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands
abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic
septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be
found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to
set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes,
sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the
Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with
the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation
facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the
provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest
possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and
restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized
methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in
accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend
violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent
marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to
prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes
into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control
projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC),
and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro
Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control
services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite,
and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and
other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws
along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that
discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1)
year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have
the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from
septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable
time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its
environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, 49 the
DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental
protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and
hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty
toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and
the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations
Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration,
and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,
and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG,
PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
"continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a
quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
No costs.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as
prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters
within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective
penal provisions of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing
laws on pollution.
 x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 181527

CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D.

ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal capacity and as
representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE
PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE
SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy
(DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his
capacity as DENR Regional Director-Region VII and as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait
Protected Seascape Management Board, ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as
Director - Environmental Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE Regional Director for
Region VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX),
as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC.,
Respondents.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

DECISION
EN BANC

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015

Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g.,
concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development,
TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES,
and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water
Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and
situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu.2
Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms
and as Responsible Stewards of God's Creations, Petitioners,
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and
vs.
Injunction, which seeks to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy
for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain international and municipal
(DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
laws.3
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR
Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition for Certiorari,
Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
Prohibition, and Mandamus, which seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate
(BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region
(ECC) issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection with SC-46; to prohibit
represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents to provide
petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the Tañon Strait Oil Exploration JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project.
Project.4 Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where
the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988,10 JAPEX agreed to comply with
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586,
entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes." 11
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in
the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board12 of the Tañon Strait
inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos
(PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001,13 wherein it adopted the Initial
(Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the
(to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the
approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner
is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for
the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others. 5
the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. 14 Months later, on November 16,
2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8,
(FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization, established for the welfare of
2008.16
the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong
(Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and as representatives of
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for redress,
the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly
seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of the
the 1987 Constitution.
Department of Energy (DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo R.
Sibbaluca, as then DENR-Regional Director for Region VII and Chairman of the Tañon Strait
On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike 17 its name as a respondent on the ground that
Protected Seascape Management Board; Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a
it is not the Philippine agent of JAPEX. In support of its motion, it submitted the branch office
company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch office; and
application of JAPEX,18 wherein the latter's resident agent was clearly identified. SOS claimed
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration activities
in the Philippines.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as additional public respondents: Alan C.
Arranguez (Arranguez) and Antonio Labios (Labios), in their capacities as then Director of the
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOS's motion on the ground
EMB, Region VII and then Regional Director of the DOE, Region VII, respectively. 6
that it was premature, it was pro-forma, and it was patently dilatory. They claimed that SOS
admitted that "it is in law a (sic) privy to JAPEX" since it did the drilling and other exploration
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
activities in Tañon Strait under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX. They argued that it
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract
would be premature to drop SOS as a party as JAPEX had not yet been joined in the case; and
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface
that it was "convenient" for SOS to ask the Court to simply drop its name from the parties when
geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by
what it should have done was to either notify or ask JAPEX to join it in its motion to enable
DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in
proper substitution. At this juncture, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also
Tañon Strait.7
asked the Court to implead JAPEX Philippines as a corespondent or as a substitute for its
parent company, JAPEX.19
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the
exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering
On April 8, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527.
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. 8
On May 26, 2008, the FIDEC manifested20 that they were adopting in toto the Opposition to
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A
Strike with Motion to Implead filed by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in
multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to
G.R. No. 180771.
determine the area's underwater composition.9
On June 19, 2008, public respondents filed their Manifestation 21 that they were not objecting to
SOS's Motion to Strike as it was not JAPEX's resident agent. JAPEX during all this time, did
not file any comment at all.
Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to ensure that all the parties were given
ample chance and opportunity to answer the issues herein, issued a Resolution directing the
Court's process servicing unit to again serve the parties with a copy of the September 23, 2008
Resolution of the Court, which gave due course to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and
181527, and which required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The February 7,
2012 Resolution22 reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 180771 (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape
Tañon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and Other
Cetacean Species, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Energy, et al.) and G.R. No. 181527 (Central
Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, et al.).
- The Court Resolved to direct the Process Servicing Unit to RE-SEND the
resolution dated September 23, 2008 to the following parties and counsel,
together with this resolution:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Resolution was personally served to the above parties, at the above addresses on
February 23, 2012. On March 20, 2012, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. (JAPEX PH), by way of
special appearance, filed a Motion to Admit23 its Motion for Clarification,24 wherein JAPEX PH
requested to be clarified as to whether or not it should deem the February 7, 2012 Resolution
as this Court's Order of its inclusion in the case, as it has not been impleaded. It also alleged
that JAPEX PH had already stopped exploration activities in the Tañon Strait way back in 2008,
rendering this case moot.
On March 22, 2012, JAPEX PH, also by special appearance, filed a Motion for Extension of
Time25 to file its Memorandum. It stated that since it received the February 7, 2012 Resolution
on February 23, 2012, it had until March 22, 2012 to file its Memorandum. JAPEX PH then
asked for an additional thirty days, supposedly to give this Court some time to consider its
Motion for Clarification.
On April 24, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution26 granting JAPEX PH's Motion to Admit its
Motion for Clarification. This Court, addressing JAPEX PH's Motion for Clarification,
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With regard to its Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated
March 19, 2012, this Court considers JAPEX Philippines. Ltd. as a real
party-in-interest in these cases. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Contrary to JAPEX Philippines, Ltd.'s allegation that it is a completely
distinct corporation, which should not be confused with JAPEX Company,
Ltd., JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. is a mere branch office, established by JAPEX
Company, Ltd. for the purpose of carrying out the latter's business
transactions here in the Philippines. Thus, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd., has no
separate personality from its mother foreign corporation, the party
impleaded in this case.
Moreover, Section 128 of the Corporation Code provides for the
responsibilities and duties of a resident agent of a foreign
corporation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 128. Resident agent; service of process. —
The Securities and Exchange Commission shall require
as a condition precedent to the issuance of the license to
transact business in the Philippines by any foreign
corporation that such corporation file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission a written power of attorney
designating some person who must be a resident of the
Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal
processes may be served in all actions or other legal
proceedings against such corporation, and consenting
that service upon such resident agent shall be admitted
and held as valid as if served upon the duly authorized
officers of the foreign corporation at its home office. Any
such foreign corporation shall likewise execute and file
with the Securities and Exchange Commission an
agreement or stipulation, executed by the proper
authorities of said corporation, in form and substance as
follows:
"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate
and agree, in consideration of its being granted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission a license to
transact business in the Philippines, that if at any time
said corporation shall cease to transact business in the
Philippines, or shall be without any resident agent in the
Philippines on whom any summons or other legal
processes may be served, then in any action or
proceeding arising out of any business or transaction
which occurred in the Philippines, service of any
summons or other legal process may be made upon the
Securities and Exchange Commission and that such
service shall have the same force and effect as if made
upon the duly-authorized officers of the corporation at its
home office."
Whenever such service of summons or other process
 shall be made upon the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Commission shall, within ten (10) days
thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such summons or
other legal process to the corporation at its home or
principal office. The sending of such copy by the
Commission shall be a necessary part of and shall
complete such service. All expenses incurred by the
Commission for such service shall be paid in advance by
the party at whose instance the service is made.
In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it
shall be his or its duty to immediately notify in writing the
Securities and Exchange Commission of the new
address.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the function of a resident agent is
to receive summons or legal processes that may be served in all actions or
other legal proceedings against the foreign corporation. These cases have
been prosecuted in the name of JAPEX Company, Ltd., and JAPEX
Philippines Ltd., as its branch office and resident agent, had been receiving
the various resolutions from this Court, as evidenced by Registry Return
Cards signed by its representatives.
And in the interest of justice, this Court resolved to grant JAPEX PH's motion for extension of
time to file its memorandum, and was given until April 21, 2012, as prayed for, within which to
comply with the submission.27
Without filing its Memorandum, JAPEX PH, on May 14, 2012, filed a motion, asking this Court
for an additional thirty days to file its Memorandum, to be counted from May 8, 2012. It justified
its request by claiming that this Court's April 24, 2012 Resolution was issued past its requested
deadline for filing, which was on April 21, 2012.28
On June 19, 2012, this Court denied JAPEX PH's second request for additional time to file its
Memorandum and dispensed with such filing.
Since petitioners had already filed their respective memoranda, 29 and public respondents had
earlier filed a Manifestation30 that they were adopting their Comment dated March 31, 2008 as
their memorandum, this Court submitted the case for decision.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioners' Allegations
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon
Strait, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the
seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They
claim that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos;
but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They
attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the "payao" also known as the "fish
aggregating device" or "artificial reef."31 Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
also impute the incidences of "fish kill"32 observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the seismic
survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid
because public consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to
the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.
In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards' allegations of reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations or discussions with
the fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior to the issuance of the ECC. Moreover, it alleges that
during the seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering and fishing within a
7-kilometer radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area greater than the
1.5-kilometer radius "exclusion zone" stated in the IEE.33 It also agrees in the allegation that
public respondents DENR and EMB abused their discretion when they issued an ECC to
public respondent DOE and private respondent JAPEX without ensuring the strict compliance
with the procedural and substantive requirements under the Environmental Impact
Assessment system, the Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations.34 It
further claims that despite several requests for copies of all the documents pertaining to the
project in Taflon Strait, only copies of the PAMB-Tañon Strait Resolution and the ECC were
given to the fisherfolk.35
Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does not
violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions; that the ECC was
issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations; that public respondents may not be
compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46; and
that all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief. They further
contend that the issues raised in these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by
the fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21,
2008.36
ISSUES
The following are the issues posited by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in
G.R. No. 180771:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO
FILE THE INSTANT PETITION;
 2. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS
VIOLAT[IVE] OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND
STATUTES;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE ON-GOING EXPLORATION AND
PROPOSED EXPLOITATION FOR OIL AND NATURAL GAS AT,
AROUND, AND UNDERNEATH THE MARINE WATERS OF THE
TANON STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE PHILIPPINE COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND INSTRUMENTS; AND
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE (ECC) IN ENVIRONMENTALLY
CRITICAL AREAS AND HABITATS OF MARINE WILDLIFE AND
ENDANGERED SPECIES IS LEGAL AND PROPER.37
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 181527, petitioner FIDEC presented the following issues for our
consideration:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 EXECUTED
BETWEEN RESPONDENTS DOE AND JAPEX SHOULD BE
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE FOR BEING IN DIRECT VIOLATION
OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFF-SHORE OIL EXPLORATION
CONTEMPLATED UNDER SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS
LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE WITHOUT A LAW BEING DULY
PASSED EXPRESSLY FOR THE PURPOSE;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE OIL EXPLORATION BEING
CONDUCTED WITHIN THE TANON STRAIT PROTECTED
SEASCAPE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL PROTECTION
GRANTED TO PETITIONERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
AND APPLICABLE LAWS.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE (ECC) FOR SUCH AN
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL PROJECT INSIDE AN
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA SUCH AS THE TANON
STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE CONFORMED TO LAW AND
EXISTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE MATTER.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS MAY BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO FURNISH PETITIONERS
WITH COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
TANON STRAIT OIL EXPLORATION PROJECT.38
In these consolidated petitions, this Court has determined that the various issues raised by the
petitioners may be condensed into two primary issues:
1. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards,
petitioners in G.R. No. 180771; and
2. Main Issue: Legality of Sendee Contract No. 46.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the '"moot and academic principle' is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case." Courts have decided
cases otherwise moot and academic under the following exceptions:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.39
In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these
consolidated petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both
petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood
issues raised undoubtedly affect the public's interest, and the respondents' contested actions
are capable of repetition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Procedural Issues
Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal
standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this
suit.40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,41 they also assert their right to sue for the faithful
performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for
their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the right to demand that they be
accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the
Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.42
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent
the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign
to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the
environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the
environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.43
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the
benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.44
In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing
because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either
natural or juridical persons, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The term "plaintiff may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the
cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant"
may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim,
the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners
therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.45
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their claim of legal
standing on the ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an
action. Moreover, the public respondents argue that the Stewards are not the real
parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the
decision in this case.46
Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public respondents claim that absent any
proof that former President Arroyo had disapproved of their acts in entering into and
implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her own.47
The public respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards' petition was not brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.48
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing
in actions before courts of law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental law.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972 United States case Sierra
Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton,49 wherein Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting to the
conventional thought on legal standing, opined:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in
focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be
litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the
inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and
bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage, x x x.
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal
personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes. The corporation
sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary and large
fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for
purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary,
spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries,
beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the
destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The river, for
example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes—fish,
aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other
animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight,
its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life
that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of
water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—must
be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are
threatened with destruction.50 (Citations omitted.)
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and
inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing
a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought
in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative,
viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 3
Parties to Civil Actions
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. -
Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff may
refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the
cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The
term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party,
the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or
the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the
 party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is
allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative
or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative
may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or
these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
without joining the principal except when the contract
involves things belonging to the principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural
and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who
cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in
representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental
cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly
injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments in
Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's
paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,51
which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts
for violations of our environmental laws:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing
of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once
in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all
affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed
by their respective provisions.52 (Emphasis ours.)
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, commented:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the
Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as
citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing
environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The
terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v.
Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn. 53
(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be
retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there
is no vested rights in rules of procedure."54
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission55 held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure,
which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not
come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent, x x x.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this
Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental
cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn
"based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned."56 Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.57

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring
a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as
real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The
Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an Unwilling Co-Petitioner
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the following reasons, which we
quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and
resident of Malacañang Palace, Manila Philippines. Steward Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be the incumbent President of the Philippine
Islands. She is personally impleaded in this suit as an unwilling co-petitioner
by reason of her express declaration and undertaking under the recently
signed ASEAN Charter to protect Your Petitioners' habitat, among others.
She is meantime dominated as an unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of
material time in seeking her signature and imprimatur hereof and due to
possible legal complications that may hereafter arise by reason of her official
relations with public respondents under the alter ego principle in political
law.58cralawlawlibrary
This is incorrect.
Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be
joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the
reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff
cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the
unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her
through its processes. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition,
without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due process.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President
Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner.
Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the
performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the
President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention."59
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners
in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Main Issue:
Legality of Service Contract No. 46
Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis
Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution
Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned.60
Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and financial
assistance agreement validly executed under paragraph 4 of the same provision.61 The
petitioners claim that La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos62 laid down the
guidelines for a valid service contract, one of which is that there must exist a general law for oil
exploration before a service contract may be entered into by the Government. The petitioners
posit that the service contract in La Bugal is presumed to have complied with the requisites of
(a) legislative enactment of a general law after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution (such as
Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Law of 1995, governing mining contracts) and
(b) presidential notification. The petitioners thus allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which
involved mining contracts under Republic Act No. 7942, does not apply in this case.63 The
petitioners also argue that Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development
Act of 1972 cannot legally justify SC-46 as it is deemed to have been repealed by the 1987
Constitution and subsequent laws, which enunciate new policies concerning the
environment.64 In addition, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandate the exclusive use and enjoyment by the
Filipinos of our natural resources,65 and paragraph 4 does not speak of service contracts but of
FTAAs or Financial Technical Assistance Agreements. 66
The public respondents again controvert the petitioners' claims and asseverate that SC-46
does not violate Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. They hold that SC-46 does not
fall under the coverage of paragraph 1 but instead, under paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution on FTAAs. They also insist that paragraphs 2 and 3, which refer to the
grant of exclusive fishing right to Filipinos, are not applicable to SC-46 as the contract does not
grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor does it otherwise impinge on the FIDEC's right to
preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources. 67
Ruling of the Court
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-a-vis Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution

The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into
in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
(Emphases ours.)
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under
the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in
the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we
quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they
were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with
safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime,
to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Summation of the ConCom Deliberations
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading
of the ConCom deliberations, as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used
the term service contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving either
technical or financial assistance.
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973
Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or
eradicate service contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that
would eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital law
regime. In brief, they were going to permit service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors, but with safety measures to prevent abuses, as
an exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of
Section 2 of Article XII. This provision reserves or limits to Filipino citizens
and corporations at least 60 percent of which is owned by such citizens —
the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.
This provision was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital
and the felt need for foreign investments in the EDU of minerals and
petroleum resources.
The framers for the most part debated about the sort of safeguards that
would be considered adequate and reasonable. But some of them, having
more "radical" leanings, wanted to ban service contracts altogether; for them,
the provision would permit aliens to exploit and benefit from the nation's
natural resources, which they felt should be reserved only for Filipinos.
In the explanation of their votes, the individual commissioners were heard by
the entire body. They sounded off their individual opinions, openly
enunciated their philosophies, and supported or attacked the provisions with
fervor. Everyone's viewpoint was heard.
In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy and Patrimony —
including paragraph 4 allowing service contracts with foreign corporations as
 an exception to the general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2 of the same
article — was resoundingly approved by a vote of 32 to 7, with 2 abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical Or Financial Assistance Are Service
Contracts with Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in
paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973
variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors
on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or "owner" of
the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide
capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the
creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the
government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control
and supervision over the entire operation.68cralawlawlibrary
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4,
with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII.
The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La
Bugal:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law
that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements,
presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because,
supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for signature,
it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it
conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it
to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over
the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.69cralawlawlibrary
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void
for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The General Law on Oil Exploration
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum
in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote
the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government
and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people
and the revenues to the Philippine Government. 70
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972,
before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise
repealed, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ARTICLE XVIII - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential Decree No. 87, it would have been done
expressly by Congress. For instance, Republic Act No. 7160, more popularly known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, expressly repealed a number of laws, including a specific
provision in Presidential Decree No. 87, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112
(1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees,
orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the
barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939
regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act No. 5447
regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree
No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464,
477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force
and effect.
 (d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs
locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16 and 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as
amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No. 87 had not yet been
expressly repealed, it had been impliedly repealed. As we held in Villareña v. The Commission
on Audit,71 "[i]mplied repeals are not lightly presumed." It is a settled rule that when laws are in
conflict with one another, every effort must be exerted to reconcile them. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Marcopper Mining Corporation,72 we said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof
must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule
is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into
accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on
the subject. (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should
be preferred.73 This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections74 expounding on this
point, pronounced:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than
the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute
must be read according to its spirit and intent, x x x. (Citation omitted.)
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground
that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and
requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.
But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource
in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon
Strait is a NIPAS75 area.
2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to
SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Code
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ARTICLE 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
(Italics ours.)
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals,76 this Court held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although a
contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law which
regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the
relations between the parties, x x x. (Citations omitted.)
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself
enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been
entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr.,
contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither
shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their acts are
also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres,77
we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency
and its limit in this wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation omitted.
)
While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role.
As we have explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the framers of the
Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime." 78
Thus, they are not just mere formalities, which will only render a contract unenforceable but not
void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in
the fundamental law, the non-observance of which will nullify the contract. Elucidating on the
concept of a "constitution," this Court, in Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance
System,79 held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments
their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles
on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other
words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. (Emphasis ours.)
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be the
signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration,
development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power
cannot be taken lightly.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any
participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually the acts of then President
Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the
President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary
statute, but in the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving the exploitation,
development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount interest to the present
and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the guidelines set
by law are meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily
penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or
approved of these service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum
Board, now the DOE, obtain the President's approval for the execution of any contract under
said statute, as shown in the following provision:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 5. Execution of contract authorized in this Act. - Every contract
herein authorized shall, subject to the approval of the President, be
executed by the Petroleum Board created in this Act, after due public notice
pre-qualification and public bidding or concluded through negotiations. In
case bids are requested or if requested no bid is submitted or the bids
submitted are rejected by the Petroleum Board for being disadvantageous to
the Government, the contract may be concluded through negotiation.
In opening contract areas and in selecting the best offer for petroleum
operations, any of the following alternative procedures may be resorted to
by the Petroleum Board, subject to prior approval of the President [.]
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to harmonize the 1987
Constitution with the aforementioned provision of Presidential Decree No. 87, it must be shown
that the government agency or subordinate official has been authorized by the President to
enter into such service contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown that
the President subsequently approved of such contract explicitly. None of these circumstances
is evident in the case at bar.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that SC-46 violates Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 9147
or the Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act, which bans all marine exploration
and exploitation of oil and gas deposits. They also aver that Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which
allows the exploration of protected areas for the purpose of information-gathering, has been
repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147. The said petitioners further claim that SC-46
is anathema to Republic Act No. 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, which protects
the rights of the fisherfolk in the preferential use of municipal waters, with the exception being
limited only to research and survey activities.80
The FIDEC, for its part, argues that to avail of the exceptions under Section 14 of the NIPAS
Act, the gathering of information must be in accordance with a DENR-approved program, and
the exploitation and utilization of energy resources must be pursuant to a general law passed
by Congress expressly for that purpose. Since there is neither a DENR-approved program nor
a general law passed by Congress, the seismic surveys and oil drilling operations were all
done illegally.81 The FIDEC likewise contends that SC-46 infringes on its right to the
preferential use of the communal fishing waters as it is denied free access within the prohibited
zone, in violation not only of the Fisheries Code but also of the 1987 Constitutional provisions
on subsistence fisherfolk and social justice.82 Furthermore, the FIDEC believes that the
provisions in Presidential Decree No. 87, which allow offshore drilling even in municipal waters,
should be deemed to have been rendered inoperative by the provisions of Republic Act No.
8550 and Republic Act No. 7160, which reiterate the social justice provisions of the
Constitution.83
The public respondents invoke the rules on statutory construction and argue that Section 14 of
the NIPAS Act is a more particular provision and cannot be deemed to have been repealed by
the more general prohibition in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147. They aver that Section 14,
under which SC-46 falls, should instead be regarded as an exemption to Section 27. 84
Addressing the claim of petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 that there was a violation of Section 27
of Republic Act No. 9147, the public respondents assert that what the section prohibits is the
exploration of minerals, which as defined in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, exclude energy
materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials and geothermal energy.
Thus, since SC-46 involves oil and gas exploration, Section 27 does not apply. 85
The public respondents defend the validity of SC-46 and insist that it does not grant exclusive
fishing rights to JAPEX; hence, it does not violate the rule on preferential use of municipal
waters. Moreover, they allege that JAPEX has not banned fishing in the project area, contrary
to the FIDEC's claim. The public respondents also contest the attribution of the declining fish
catch to the seismic surveys and aver that the allegation is unfounded. They claim that
according to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources' fish catch data, the reduced fish
catch started in the 1970s due to destructive fishing practices.86
Ruling of the Court
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws
Although we have already established above that SC-46 is null and void for being violative of
the 1987 Constitution, it is our duty to still rule on the legality of SC-46 vis-a-vis other pertinent
laws, to serve as a guide for the Government when executing service contracts involving not
only the Tañon Strait, but also other similar areas. While the petitioners allege that SC-46 is in
violation of several laws, including international ones, their arguments focus primarily on the
protected status of the Tañon Strait, thus this Court will concentrate on those laws that pertain
particularly to the Tañon Strait as a protected seascape.
The Tañon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East and
Negros in the West. It harbors a rich biodiversity of marine life, including endangered species
of dolphins and whales. For this reason, former President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Tañon
Strait as a protected seascape in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234 - Declaring the
Tañon Strait situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a
Protected Area pursuant to the NIP AS Act and shall be known as Tañon Strait Protected
Seascape. During former President Joseph E. Estrada's time, he also constituted the Tañon
Strait Commission via Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum and sustained use of the
resources in that area without threatening its marine life. He followed this with Executive Order
No. 177,87 wherein he included the mayor of Negros Occidental Municipality/City as a member
of the Tañon Strait Commission, to represent the LGUs concerned. This Commission, however,
was subsequently abolished in 2002 by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, via
Executive Order No. 72.88
True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature," 89
Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and
animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas.
These areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic plan
representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly remarkable
areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species
of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial,
wetland, or marine.90 It classifies and administers all the designated protected areas to
maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity,
to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions
to the greatest extent possible.91 The following categories of protected areas were established
under the NIPAS Act:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Strict nature reserve;
2. Natural park;
3. Natural monument;
4. Wildlife sanctuary;
5. Protected landscapes and seascapes;
6. Resource reserve;
7. Natural biotic areas; and
 8. Other categories established by law, conventions or international
agreements which the Philippine Government is a signatory. 92
Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set
aside due to their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological
diversity and protected against human exploitation.
The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected
area under the category of Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act defines a Protected Seascape
to be an area of national significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and
land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within
the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this areas;93 thus a management plan for each
area must be designed to protect and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural
conditions.94 Consistent with this endeavor is the requirement that an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope of the
management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent
with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.95
The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under
Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from
undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas without first
securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. 96 Pursuant to
the EISS, which called for the proper management of environmentally critical areas, 97
Proclamation No. 214698 was enacted, identifying the areas and types of projects to be
considered as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EISS, while DENR
Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area as "an area
delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are
expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or
implemented in it";99 thus, before a project, which is "any activity, regardless of scale or
magnitude, which may have significant impact on the environment," 100 is undertaken in it, such
project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the
environment.101 An EIA is described in detail as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area,
having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the
scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological
system.
The public respondents argue that they had complied with the procedures in obtaining an
ECC103 and that SC-46 falls under the exceptions in Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, due to the
following reasons:
1) The Tañon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or natural park;
2) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering information on possible energy resources;
and
3) Measures are undertaken to ensure that the exploration is being done with the least
damage to surrounding areas.104
We do not agree with the arguments raised by the public respondents.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities
which are outside the scope of the management plan for protected areas
shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law
before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into
consideration in the decision-making process.
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the
required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such
activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry
them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and take
preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be
liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion.
SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies
declared in Section 2 hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves
and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of
gathering information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried
out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted
only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of
such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the
President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization
of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through
a law passed by Congress.
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS Act are not without exceptions. However,
while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed
under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the
requirement to undergo an EIA under Section 12. In Sotto v. Sotto,105 this Court explained
why a statute should be construed as a whole:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated
by one general purpose and intent. Consequently each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section and so as
to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine the attention to
the one section to be construed. It is always an unsafe way of construing a
statute or contract to divide it by a process of etymological dissection, into
separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from its context,
some particular definition given by lexicographers, and then reconstruct the
instrument upon the basis of these definitions. An instrument must always
be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any
word or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the context, the nature of
the subject treated of and the purpose or intention of the parties who
executed the contract, or of the body which enacted or framed the statute or
constitution, x x x.
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying
with the EIA requirement in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional
requisites before any exploration for energy resources may be done in protected areas.
The rationale for such additional requirements are incorporated in Section 2 of the NIPAS Act,
to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy - Cognizant of the profound impact of
man's activities on all components of the natural environment particularly the
effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial
advancement amd recognizing the critical importance of protecting and
maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the environment
notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and
development, as well as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy
of the State to secure for the Filipino people of present and future
generations the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through
the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas
within the classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features,
possess common ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic
plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of
this area is possible only through cooperation among national government,
local government and concerned private organizations; that the use and
enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of
biological diversity and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected
Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass outstandingly remarkable
areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and
endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related
ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be
designated as "protected areas."
The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior
to the second sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This
means that when the seismic surveys were done in the Tañon Strait, no such environmental
impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the
Tañon Strait, such surveys were dona in violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section
4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586, which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and
Projects. - The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or
upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by
proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country
as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or
area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued
by the President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper
management of said critical project or area, the President may by his
proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions,
corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government
personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements shall: (a)
prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or
area(s); (b) establish ambient environmental quality standards; (c) develop a
program of environmental enhancement or protective measures against
calamitous factors such as earthquakes, floods, water erosion and others,
and (d) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President
from time to time.
The respondents' subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46
cannot and will not cure this violation. The following penalties are provided for under
Presidential Decree No. 1586 and the NIPAS Act.
Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 provides for the penalty involving violations of the
ECC requirement:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 9. Penalty for Violation. - Any person, corporation or partnership
found violating Section 4 of this Decree, or the terms and conditions in the
issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, or of the standards,
 rules and regulations issued by the National Environmental Protection
Council pursuant to this Decree shall be punished by the suspension or SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cancellation of his/its certificates and/or a fine in an amount not to
exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for every violation thereof,
at the discretion of the National Environmental Protection Council.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Violations of the NIPAS Act entails the following fines and/or imprisonment under Section
21:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SECTION 21. Penalties. - Whoever violates this Act or any rules and
regulations issued by the Department pursuant to this Act or whoever is
found guilty by a competent court of justice of any of the offenses in the
preceding section shall be fined in the amount of not less than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000), exclusive of the value of the thing damaged or
imprisonment for not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6)
years, or both, as determined by the court: Provided, that, if the area
requires rehabilitation or restoration as determined by the court, the
offender shall be required to restore or compensate for the restoration
to the damages: Provided, further, that court shall order the eviction of the
offender from the land and the forfeiture in favor of the Government of
all minerals, timber or any species collected or removed including all
equipment, devices and firearms used in connection therewith, and
any construction or improvement made thereon by the offender. If the
offender is an association or corporation, the president or manager shall be
directly responsible for the act of his employees and laborers: Provided,
finally, that the DENR may impose administrative fines and penalties
consistent with this Act. (Emphases supplied.)

Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the
possible energy resources in the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and
obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in commercial quantities
be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general
law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case
may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a
NIPAS area.106Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or
extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be
done in said protected seascape.

In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no longer necessary to discuss the
other issues raised in these consolidated petitions.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service
Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution,
Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.
 The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural
rights for animals through their allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are
asked to accept the premises that (a) they were chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of
Tañon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a representative group of all the species of the Resident
Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear
consent from their animal principals that they would wish to use human legal institutions to
pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge through judicial notice that the
interests that they, the human petitioners, assert are identical to what the Resident Marine
Mammals would assert had they been humans and the legal strategies that they invoked are
CONCURRING OPINION the strategies that they agree with.

"Until one has loved an animal, In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a relationship of
a part of one 's soul remains unawakened." Anatole France guardianship between them and all the resident mammals in the affected ecology.

LEONEN, J.: Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive and procedural law
cannot be founded on feigned representation.
I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.
Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for themselves and already have
I legal standing to sue with respect to the issue raised in their pleading. The rules on standing
have already been liberalized to take into consideration the difficulties in the assertion of
environmental rights. When standing becomes too liberal, this can be the occasion for abuse.
In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their
personal capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the
issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal II
guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations." 1 They use
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international and Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:
domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour
autrui.3 As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert that SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or
they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait as entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary
steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust.4
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be
authorized by statute to be parties in a civil action.
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this
court will have the opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of
Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:
"epistolary jurisdiction."5

ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
continue to define environmental rights in the context of actual cases is commendable.
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
However, the space for legal creativity usually required for advocacy of issues of the public
interest is not so unlimited that it should be allowed to undermine the other values protected by
current substantive and procedural laws. Even rules of procedure as currently formulated set Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:
the balance between competing interests. We cannot abandon these rules when the necessity
is not clearly and convincingly presented. ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified 'in the
following article.
Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law
grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply construe,
the provisions of the Rules of Court as well as substantive law to accommodate Resident
Marine Mammals or animals. This we cannot do.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party in interest:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. (2a)6
A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real party
in interest.7 When a case is brought to the courts, the real party in interest must show that
another party's act or omission has caused a direct injury, making his or her interest both
material and based on an enforceable legal right.8
Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in representation of the real
party in interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or
defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall
be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an executor or administrator,
or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except
when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.(3a) 9
The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who is not bound to
directly or actually benefit or suffer from the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an
identified real party in interest.10 The representative is an outsider to the cause of action.
Second, the rule provides a list of who may be considered as "representatives." It is not an
exhaustive list, but the rule limits the coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of
Court.11
These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment, which means that
for the Petition of the human petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident
Marine Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b) that the human petitioners are authorized
by law or the Rules to act in a representative capacity.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and
other cetacean species inhabiting Tañon Strait." 12 While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction,
the issue of whether animals have legal standing before courts has been the subject of
academic discourse in light of the emergence of animal and environmental rights.
In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish a system which
Hogan explains as the "guardianship model for nonhuman animals":13
Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which nonhuman animals
may obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory rights and protections: guardianships. With
court approval, animal advocacy organizations may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals
in the same way court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-challenged
humans who possess an enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.
In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, Christopher D. Stone asserts that the environment should possess the right to seek
judicial redress even though it is incapable of representing itself. While asserting the rights of
speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals certainly poses legitimate
challenges - such as identifying the proper spokesman -the American legal system is already
well-equipped with a reliable mechanism by which nonhumans may obtain standing via a
judicially established guardianship. Stone notes that other speechless - and nonhuman -
entities such as corporations, states, estates, and municipalities have standing to bring suit on
their own behalf. There is little reason to fear abuses under this regime as procedures for
removal and substitution, avoiding conflicts of interest, and termination of a guardianship are
well established.
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible.
The court indicated that AL VA might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an
established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that
the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known advocacy
organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an
organization's standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant
consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities
demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its
desire to pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a
demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in
the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.
This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-profit
organizations with an established history of dedication to the cause and relevant expertise to
serve as official guardians ad !item on behalf of nonhuman animals interests. The American
legal system has numerous mechanisms for representing the rights and interests of
nonhumans; any challenges inherent in extending these pre-existing mechanisms to
nonhuman animals are minimal compared to an interest in the proper administration of justice.
To adequately protect the statutory rights of nonhuman animals, the legal system must
recognize those statutory rights independent of humans and provide a viable means of
enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not new and has
been urged on behalf of the natural environment. 'Such a model is even more compelling as
applied to nonhuman animals, because they are sentient beings with the ability to feel pain and
exercise rational thought. Thus, animals are qualitatively different from other legally protected
nonhumans and therefore have interests deserving direct legal protection.
Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals threatens the
integrity of the federal statutes designed to protect them, essentially rendering them
meaningless. Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman animals would be difficult to enforce,
Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the most well-known example is found in the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such provisions are evidence of legislative intent to
encourage civic participation on behalf of nonhuman animals. Our law of standing should
reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable representatives of the natural
environment, which includes nonhuman animals.14 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as
similarly situated as individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g.,
cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit for themselves. They are also similar to entities
that by their very nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations, states,
and others).
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as
having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest.
The same cannot be said about animals.
Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we,
as humans, may feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we
represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As humans,
we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we know
what remedy they need in the face of an injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 15 the
court held that an emotional response to what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on an
animal is not within the "zone-of-interest" protected by law.16 Such sympathy cannot stand
independent of or as a substitute for an actual injury suffered by the claimant. 17 The ability to
represent animals was further limited in that case by the need to prove "genuine dedication" to
asserting and protecting animal rights:
What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's assertion that standing
doctrine further required ALVA to differentiate its genuine dedication to the humane treatment
of animals from the general disdain for animal cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing so,
the court found ALVA 's asserted organizational injury to be abstract and thus relegated ALVA
to the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "
....
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible.
The court indicated that ALVA might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an
established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that
the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known advocacy
organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an
organization's standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant
consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities
demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its
desire to pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a
demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in
the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.18 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the principle of human
stewardship over the environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to act as a representative of a party
who has enforceable rights under environmental laws before Philippine courts, and is defined
in Section 5: .
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to
manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign
representation on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric view of
environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let
alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is designed to ensure that
humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves,
which of course includes compassion for all living things.
Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.
In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad interpretation we have
given to the rule on standing. While representatives are not required to establish direct injury
on their part, they should only be allowed to represent after complying with the following: [I]t is
imperative for them to indicate with certainty the injured parties on whose behalf they bring the
suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal
rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general, nebulous idea of a
potential "injury."20
I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casiño 21 regarding this rule alongside the
appreciation of legal standing in Oposa v. Factoran22 for environmental cases. In Arigo, I
opined that procedural liberality, especially in cases brought by representatives, should be
used with great caution:
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.
That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental
concerns in light of emerging international legal principles. While "intergenerational
responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments that would
preclude future generations from making their own assessment based on their actual concerns.
The present generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who
will exist at a different time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled
resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future generations from
protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It reduces the
autonomy of our children and our children 's children. Even before they are born, we again
restricted their ability to make their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be
allowed only when a) there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual
concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any
countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be
born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of
catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the
light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together. 23 (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, in Paje:
A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect. He
or she who invokes the court's jurisdiction must be the "owner of the right sought to be
enforced." In other words, he or she must have a cause of action. An action may be dismissed
on the ground of lack of cause of action if the person who instituted it is not the real party in
interest.24 The term "interest" under the Rules of Court must refer to a material interest that is
not merely a curiosity about or an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be
present and substantial. It is not a mere expectancy or a future, contingent interest.
A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as
representative of a .real party in interest. When an action is prosecuted or defended by a
representative, that representative is not and does not become the real party in interest. The
person represented is deemed the real party in interest. The representative remains to be a
third party to the action instituted on behalf of another.
....
To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on behalf of an
identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and (b) the
representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim."
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit
under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental
law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that
allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party
in interest.
The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet
unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the
capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding
generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future
generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.
To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations,
is dangerous for three reasons:
First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit,
putting into. question its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in
arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this
court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations
yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in
light of the impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.
In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others.
Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they represent, and the court will decide based
on their evidence and arguments. Any decision by the court will be binding upon the
beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future generations. The court's
decision will be res judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented. 25
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its
potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of
"real party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a
judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern
rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what
their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be
any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product
of guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring
"reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they
represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should be
considered carefully so that no unintended or unwarranted consequences should follow. I
concur with the approach of Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant
ponencia as it carefully narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine
Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.
However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center,. Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties in
interest and as representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan
and Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families, and the present and future generations of
Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected. The activities undertaken under Service Contract
46 (SC-46) directly affected their source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant
reduction of their fish harvest.27 The actual, direct, and material damage they suffered, which
has potential long-term effects transcending generations, is a proper subject of a legal suit.
III
In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied
petitioners, most especially when the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic
of the Philippines. In G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating unto themselves the status of
"legal guardians" of whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, human
petitioners also impleaded Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling
co-petitioner" for "her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect
Tañon Strait."28
No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her
consent. In our jurisdiction, only when there is a party that should have been a necessary party
but was unwilling to join would there be an allegation as to why that party has been omitted. In
Rule 3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in any pleading in which a
claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known,
and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission
unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his
person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed
a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the
action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
necessary party.29
A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be obtained
should be impleaded as a defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3,
Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff
can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in
the complaint.30
The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action
but who do not consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or
other court processes. Petitioners. should not take it upon themselves to simply imp lead any
party who does not consent as a petitioner. This places the unwilling co-petitioner at the risk of
being denied due process.
Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a
co-equal constitutional department, we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce
policy directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by petitioners
may have gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The
Former President's name should be stricken out of the title of this case.
IV
I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and unconstitutional.
SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. ·7586 or the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992, and Presidential Decree No. 1234, 31 which declared Tañon Strait
as a protected seascape. It is unconstitutional because it violates the fourth paragraph of
Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution.
V
Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that SC-46 violated Article
XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the .1987 Constitution because Japan Petroleum Exploration
Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned.32 It further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly
classified as a technical and financial assistance agreement executed under Article XII,
Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution.33 Public respondents counter that SC-46 does
not fall under the coverage of paragraph 1, but is a validly executed contract under paragraph
4.34· Public respondents further aver that SC-46 neither granted exclusive fishing rights to
JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center's right to preferential use
of communal marine and fishing resources.35
VI
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception. of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens,
as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)
I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development,
and use of natural resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones.
This is the clear import of the words "either financial or technical assistance agreements." This
is also
the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973
and 1935 Constitution:
1973 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or association at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang
Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or
associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical,
management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity
for the exploitation, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial,
the technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby
recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)
1935 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any attempt to infer
interpretation from the Constitutional Commission deliberations. The constitutional texts are
the product of a full sovereign act: deliberations in a constituent assembly and ratification.
Reliance on recorded discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand, may result
in dependence on incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens judicial review to further
subjectivity from those who spoke during the Constitutional Commission deliberations who
may not have predicted how their words will be used. It is safer that we use the words already
in the Constitution. The Constitution was their product. Its words were read by those who
ratified it. The Constitution is what society relies upon even at present.
SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance agreement.
Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be declared valid in light of the
standards set forth in La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:36
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a general law that will set standard
or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to
give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely
objections, if any.37 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must be tested against
three important points: (a) whether SC-46 was crafted in accordance with a general law that
provides standards, terms, and conditions; (b) whether SC-46 was signed by the President for
and on behalf of the government; and (c) whether it was reported by the President to Congress
within 30 days of execution.
VII
The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is Presidential Decree No.
87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972.1âwphi1 It is my opinion that this law is
unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts, contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources. (Emphasis supplied)
The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of agreements the President
may enter into with foreign-owned corporations for exploration and utilization of resources
means that service contracts are no longer allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article
XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution,38 this inconsistency renders the law invalid and
ineffective.
SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion
emphasizes an important point, which is that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory
activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of the parties should it be discovered that
there is oil in commercial quantities in the area. The Tañon Strait being a protected seascape
under Presidential Decree No. 123439 requires that the exploitation and utilization of energy
resources from that area are explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress specifically for
that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2,
hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to
exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted
only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall
be made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to
Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIP AS areas shall
be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.40 (Emphasis supplied)
No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and conditions of
an oil exploration, extraction, and/or utilization for Tañon Strait and, therefore, no such
activities could have been validly undertaken under SC-46. The National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a
protected seascape such as Tañon Strait shall only be allowed through a specific law.
VIII
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the
requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts involving the
exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered into by then Department of Energy Secretary
Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in cases
where the Constitution or law requires the President to act personally on the matter, the duty
cannot be delegated to another public official. 41 La Bugal highlights the importance of the
President's involvement, being one of the constitutional safeguards against abuse and
corruption, as not mere formality:
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom
deliberations, as follows:
• In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service
contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance. •
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.
• It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service
contracts.
• Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place safeguards that would eliminate
or m minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital law regime.42 (Emphasis in the original)
Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
involved in the signing or execution of SC-46. The failure to comply with this constitutional
requirement renders SC-46 null and void.
IX
Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of the
execution and existence of SC-46. The reporting requirement is an equally important requisite
to the validity of any service contract involving the exploration, development, and utilization of
Philippine petroleum. Public respondents' failure to report to Congress about SC-46 effectively
took away any opportunity for the legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions.
In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the requirements provided under
paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2. It is, therefore, null and void.
X Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine Environment Impact
I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also
null and void for being violative of environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait. In particular,
SC-46 was implemented despite falling short of the requirements of the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992.
As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234, 43 Tañon Strait is covered by the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992. This law declares as a matter of
policy: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on
all components of the natural environment particularly the effect of increasing population,
resource exploitation and industrial advancement and recognizing the critical importance of
protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the environment
notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as
well as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the
Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native plants
and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected
areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common
ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural
heritage; that effective administration of these areas is possible only through cooperation
among national government, local and concerned private organizations; that the use and
enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of biological
diversity and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System
(NIPAS), which shall encompass outstanding remarkable areas and biologically important
public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals,
biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of
which shall be designated as "protected areas."44 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañon Strait must undergo an Environmental
Impact Assessment:
SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the
scope of the management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact
assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken
into consideration in the decision-making process.45 (Emphasis supplied)
The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance Certificate be secured
under the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment System before arty project is
implemented:
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required
Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are allowed to be undertaken,
the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse
effects and take preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be
liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion. 46 (Emphasis supplied)
In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992 additionally requires that a program be approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The
program shall also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the program to
Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law specifically allowing the exploitation of
energy resources found within a protected area such as Tañon Strait:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, (a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE OUT the name of Former
hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the title of this case;
exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted (b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and
only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall
be made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to
(c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987
Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall
Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1234.
be allowed only through a taw passed by Congress.47 (Emphasis supplied)

Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural requirements of obtaining
an Environmental Compliance Certificate.48 At any rate, they assert that the activities covered
by SC-46 fell under Section 14 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992,
which they interpret to be an exception to Section 12. They argue that the Environmental
Compliance Certificate is not a strict requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Tañon
Strait is not a nature' reserve or natural park; (b) the exploration was merely for gathering
information; and ( c) measures were in place to ensure that the exploration caused the least
possible damage to the area.49

Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional requirements for
cases involving Philippine energy resources. The National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992 was enacted to recognize the importance of protecting the environment in light of
resource exploitation, among others.50 Systems are put in place to secure for Filipinos local
resources under the most favorable conditions. With the status of Tañon Strait as a protected
seascape, the institution of additional legal safeguards is even more significant.

Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance Certificate for SC-46.
Based on the records, JAPEX commissioned an environmental impact evaluation only in the
second subphase of its project, with the Environmental Management .Bureau of Region

VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6, 2007. 51

Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were conducted without any
environmental assessment contrary to Section 12 of the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992.

Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment. As sentient
species, we do not lack in the wisdom or sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the
resources that we use to survive and to thrive. We are not incapable of mitigating the greed
that is slowly causing the demise of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us to feign
representation of any other species or some imagined unborn generation in filing any action in
our courts of law to claim any of our fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this way and
with candor and courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility deserving of the grace and power
endowed on our species.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote: