1

which are immaterial to the charge of being a dummy, nominee or agent, and that
ABALOS Virata acted, not as a dummy, nominee or agent of his co-defendants as what is
1. VIRATA v. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 114331 charged in the complaint, but as a government officer of the Republic.
May 27, 1997
Facts:
Dissatisfied, Virata filed this instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to challenge the foregoing Resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Cesar E. A. Virata is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035, entitled
Republic of the Philippines versus Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et. al.. The case, Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
which was filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government against fifty SANDIGANBAYAN RULED THAT THE COMPLAINT CONTAIN ULTIMATE FACTS
three persons (53) including Virata, involves the recovery of ill-gotten wealth during
the reign President Marcos. Ruling: YES

The complaint against the defendants was amended three times. The last amended The complaint should contain definite statement is sought, need only inform the
complaint filed with the Sandiganbayan, known as the expanded Second Amended defendant of the essential (or ultimate) facts to enable him to prepare an intelligent
Complaint. answer.

Asserting that the Second Amended Complaint contain allegations which are vague
and not averred with sufficient definiteness as to enable him to effectively prepare
his responsive pleading, petitioner Virata filed a motion for a bill of particulars.
In a Resolution promulgated, the Sandiganbayan partially granted the said motion
by requiring the Republic to submit a bill of particulars concerning the charges
against petitioner Virata. However, as to the other charges, the Sandiganbayan
declared that these accusations are clear and specific enough to allow Virata to
submit an intelligent responsive pleading, hence, the motion for a bill of particulars
respecting the three charges was denied.
In view of the Sandiganbayan's order of August 4, 1992, the Republic through the
Office of the Solicitor General submitted the bill of particulars dated October 22,
1992, called as the Limited Bill of Particulars which was signed by a certain Ramon
A. Felipe IV, who was designated in the bill of particulars as "private counsel".
The proper preparation of an intelligent answer requires information as to the
precise nature, character, scope and extent of the cause of action in order that the
pleader may be able to squarely meet the issues raised, thereby circumscribing
them within determined confines and, preventing surprises during the trial, and in
order that he may set forth his defenses which may not be so readily availed of if
the allegations controverted are vague, indefinite, uncertain or are mere general
conclusions. It was, therefore, grave error for the Sandiganbayan to state that"
[a]lleging the specific nature, character, time and extent of the phrase ‘active
collaboration’ would be a mere surplus age and would not serve any useful purpose"
for precisely, without any amplification or particularization thereof, the petitioner
would be hard put in meeting the charges squarely and in pleading appropriate
defenses. The complaint filed do not contain sufficient facts to lay down the cause of
action.

Virata, who was dissatisfied with the Sandiganbayan Resolution of August 4, 1992,
filed a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 106527) with this Court questioning the
Sandiganbayan's denial of his motion for a bill of particulars. The PCGG submitted
the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993, which was apparently signed by a
certain Reynaldo G. Ros, who was named in the bill of particulars as "deputized
prosecutor" of the PCGG.

Virata filed on November 23, 1993 his comment on the bill of particulars with
motion to dismiss the expanded Second Amended Complaint. He alleges that both
the bills of particulars are pro forma and should be stricken off the records.
According to him, the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 is merely a rehash
of the assertions made in the expanded Second Amended Complaint. Furthermore,
a reading of the Limited Bill of Particulars shows that it alleges new imputations

2. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS VS CA GR NO. 129227 MAY 30, 2000
FACTS: Elsa Arcilla and her husband, Calvin Arcilla secured on three occasions,
loans from the Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage bank in the amount of
Php.107,946.00 as evidenced by the “Promissory Note” executed by the spouses in
favor of the said bank. To secure payment of said loans, the spouses executed “Real
Estate Mortgages” in favor of the appellants (Banco Filipino) over their parcels of
land. The appellee spouses failed to pay their monthly amortization to appellant. On
September 2, 1985 the appellee’s filed a complaint for “Annulment of the Loan
Contracts, Foreclosure Sale with Prohibitory and Injunction” which was granted by
the RTC. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Aggrieved with the decision of the CA, filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it held that the cause of action of the
private respondents accrued on October 30, 1978 and the filing of their complaint
for annulment of their contracts in 1085 was not yet barred by the prescription
RULING: The court held that the petition is unmeritorious. Petitioner’s claim that the
action of the private respondents have prescribed is bereft of merit. Under Article
1150 of the Civil Code, the time for prescription of all kinds of action where there is
no special provision which ordains otherwise shall be counted from the day they
may be brought. Thus the period of prescription of any cause of action is reckoned
only from the date of the cause of action accrued. The period should not be made to
retroact to the date of the execution of the contract, but from the date they
received the statement of account showing the increased rate of interest, for it was
only from the moment that they discovered the petitioner’s unilateral increase
thereof.
2
3. VITANGCOL VS NEW VISTA GR. NO. 176014 SEPT 17, 2009
FACTS : Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1702 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (25311) 2528 of the Calamba, Laguna Registry in the
name of Maria A. Alipit and Clemente A. Alipit, married to Milagros
On June 18, 1989, Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital consent of the
latters wife, executed a Special Power of Attorney[4] (SPA) constituting Milagros A.
De Guzman as their attorney-in-fact to sell their property described in the SPA as
located at Bo. Latian, Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. (25311) 2538 with Lot
No. 1735 consisting of 242,540 square meters more or less. Pursuant to her
authority under the SPA, De Guzman executed on August 9, 1989 a Deed of
Absolute Sale[5] conveying to New Vista Properties, Inc. (New Vista) a parcel of
land with an area of 242,540 square meters situated in Calamba, Laguna.
Following the sale, New Vista immediately entered the subject lot, fenced it with
cement posts and barbed wires, and posted a security guard to deter trespassers.
he controversy arose more than a decade later when respondent New Vista learned
that the parcel of land it paid for and occupied, i.e., Lot No. 1702, was being
claimed by petitioners Vitangcol on the strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot
No. 1702 under TCT No. (25311) 2528 entered into on August 14, 2001 by and
between Vitangcol and Maria Alipit. Consequent to the Vitangcol-Maria Alipit sale,
TCT No. (25311) 2528 was canceled and TCT No. T-482731 issued in its stead in
favor of Vitangcol on August 15, 2001.
Alarmed by the foregoing turn of events, New Vista lost no time in protecting its
rights by, first, filing a notice of adverse claim over TCT No. T-482731, followed by
commencing a suit for quieting of title before the RTC. By Order of November 25,
2003, the trial court denied Vitangcols and Maria Alipits separate motions to dismiss
the amended complaint. As there held by the RTC, the amended complaint[10]
sufficiently stated a cause of action as shown therein that after the purchase and
compliance with its legal obligations relative thereto, New Vista was immediately
placed in possession of the subject lot, but which Maria Alipit, by herself, later sold
to Vitangcol to New Vistas prejudice
On August 14, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing
the December 21, 2004 RTC Order
ISSUE : WON THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE TWELFTH DIVISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER CHALLENGE ARE CONTRARY TO LAW

HELD : The Rules of Court defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. It contains three elements: (1) a right existing in
favor of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative duty on the part of the defendant to respect
that right; and (3) a breach of the defendants duty. It is, thus, only upon the
occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff a
right to file an action in court for recovery of damages or other relief.
Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint
through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the
determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after
trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be
made on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth
of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiffs
complaint.[21] When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause
of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the
complaint. However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions.
Among others, there is no hypothetical admission of conclusions or interpretations
of law which are false; legally impossible facts; facts inadmissible in evidence; facts
which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded;
allegations which the court will take judicial notice are not true; and where the
motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which discloses facts
sufficient to defeat the claim.
3
4. DABUCO VS CA G.R. No. 133775 January 20, 2000
FACTS: The Lazarrabal family were the registered owners of the properties, subject
matter of this case. In 1991, on different occasions, the subject properties were
sold to the Ruben Baculi, Editha Belocura, Lira Puno, Rafael Lapuz, Ladrioro
Montealto, Joel Masecampo, Delsa N. Manay, Ilderim Castañares, Maria Theresa
Puno, [and] Jill Mendoza. On June 27, 1994, GABI Multi-Purpose Cooperative, a
registered non-stock, non-profit cooperative filed a civil complaint against DABUCO,
et al. who were found residing and/or tilling the subject properties. The trial court
issued a TRO enjoining Dabuco, et al. to desist from further development of GABI’s
properties. The trial court then lifted the TRO upon failure of GABI to prove its title
over the properties. Dabuco et al. filed their answer alleging that GABI had no
personality to sue since they do not appear to be buyer of the properties neither
were the properties titled in its name. Dabuco filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action, GABI has no personality to sue and lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the case. GABI appealed to the CA and the
decision was reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the trial court on the ground of lack of cause
of action was proper.
RULING: The dismissal by the trial court was not proper. We note that the issue of
sufficiency of GABI's cause of action does not appear to have been passed upon by
the appellate court in its assailed decision. It appears that the trial court dismissed
the case on the ground that GABI was not the owner of the lands or one entitled to
the possession thereof, and thus had no cause of action. In dismissal for lack of
cause of action, the court in effect declared that plaintiff is not entitled to a
favorable judgment inasmuch as one or more elements of his cause of action do not
exist in fact. Because questions of fact are involved, courts hesitate to declare a
plaintiff as lacking in cause of action. Such declaration is postponed until the
insufficiency of cause is apparent from a preponderance of evidence. Usually, this is
done only after the parties have been given the opportunity to present all relevant
evidence on such questions of fact.
Moreover, GABI did not have sufficient chance to prove its allegation of ownership.
Thus, the conclusion that GABI's allegation of ownership is false and that its
complaint stated no cause of action, appears to be without basis. In sum, as
appears from the available records, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that
the dismissal by the trial court of GABI's complaint was incorrect. The case should,
therefore, proceed to trial where the parties may adduce evidence to support their
claims and defenses.
 4

5. AQUINO VS. QUIAZON GR. NO. 201248 MARCH 11, 2015
FACTS: A complaint for Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed before the RTC by
the petitioners. They alleged that they were the heirs of the late Epifanio Makam
and Severina Bautista, who acquired a house and lot consisting of 557 square
meters, by virtue of a Deed of Sale, dated April 20, 1894; that since then, they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, adverse, and notorious
possession for more than a hundred years, constructing houses and paying real
estate taxes on the property; that sometime in June 2005, they received various
demand letters from the respondents.
The respondents claiming ownership over the subject property and demanding that
they vacate the same; that upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds of San
Fernando, Pampanga, they confirmed that the property had been titled in the name
of respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 213777-R; that the said
title was invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable; and that they were the true
owners of the property. Respondents asserted that they were the absolute owners
of the subject land as per TCT No. 213777-R; that they had inherited the same from
their predecessor-in-interest, Fausta Baluyut, one of the registered owners under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-1138 (11376), as per the Project of
Partition and Deed of Agreement and those petitioners had been occupying the
property by mere tolerance. They denied the allegations in the complaint and
proffered affirmative defenses with counterclaims. RTC-Br. 56 - dismissed.
It is of note that although the trial court might not have erred in holding a
preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of prescription and res judicata, it is
readily apparent from the decisions of the lower courts that no disquisition
whatsoever was made on these grounds. It cannot be denied that evidence in
support of the ground of "lack of cause of action" was received and given great
weight by the trial court. In fact, all the evidence given credence by the trial court
were only in support of the ground of "lack of cause of action." This all the more
highlight that the trial court erred in receiving evidence to determine whether the
complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Although neither the RTC nor the CA ruled on the affirmative defenses of
prescription and res judicata, it appears that this case could not have been
dismissed on these grounds. First, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the
plaintiffs are in possession of the property, which is the situation prevailing in the
present case. Second, there appears to be no res judicata nor a violation of the
prohibition against forum shopping considering that Civil Case No. 5487 had been
dismissed, without prejudice, years before petitioners initiated their complaint for
quieting of title.

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that it was within the
discretion of the trial court to conduct a preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defense of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action, where both
parties were given the chance to submit arguments and evidence for or against the
dismissal of the complaint. Furthermore, they argue that the Court has previously
upheld cases where the court took into account external factors in the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. They assert that since
petitioners were given reasonable opportunity to present evidence to prove their
cause of action, they are now estopped from invoking the rule that only allegations
in the complaint should be considered.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on

the ground of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action.

Held:

The Court notes that respondents raised the affirmative defense in their Answer that
petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action," raising factual
matters, which is effectively the ground of "lack of cause of action."

6. PILIPINAS SHELL VS JOHN GR. NO. 159831 OCTOBER 14, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation ("Pilipinas Shell") is a
corporation engaged in the business of refining and processing petroleum products.
From 1955 to 1975, Respondent John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo, Inc. ("John Bordman")
purchased bunker oil in drums from Arabay. When Arabay ceased its operations in
1975, Pilipinas Shell took over and directly marketed its products to John Bordman.
On August 20, 1980, John Bordman filed against Pilipinas Shell a civil case for
specific performance. The former demanded the latter's short deliveries of fuel oil
since 1955; as well as the payment of exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
costs of suit. John Bordman alleged that Pilipinas Shell and Arabay had billed it at
210 liters per drum, while other oil companies operating in Bacolod had billed their
customers at 200 liters per drum.
On August 30, 1991, the RTC issued a Decision in favor of respondent. Pilipinas
Shell appealed to the CA, alleging that John Bordman had failed to prove the short
deliveries; and that the suit had been barred by estoppel, laches, and prescription.
Upholding the trial court, the CA overruled petitioner's objections to the evidence of
respondent in relation to the testimonies of the latter's witnesses and the results of
the volumetric tests. The appellate court also debunked petitioner's claims of
estoppel and laches. It held that the stipulation in the product invoices stating that
respondent had received the products in good order was not controlling.On the
issue of prescription, the CA ruled that the action had been filed within the period
required by law. Hence, this Petition.
Issue: WON THE COMPLAINT FILED HAS SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION
RULING: Actions based upon a written contract should be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues.This accrual refers to the cause of action,
which is defined as the act or the omission by which a party violates the right of
another.
Jurisprudence is replete with the elements of a cause of action: (1) a right in favor
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate the
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of an obligation to the latter. It is only when
the last element occurs that a cause of action arises.
Applying the foregoing elements, it can readily be determined that a cause of action
in a contract arises upon its breach or violation. Therefore, the period of prescription
commences, not from the date of the execution of the contract, but from the
occurrence of the breach.
To the mind of this Court, the cause of action in the present case arose on July 24,
1974, when respondent discovered the short deliveries with certainty. Prior to the
5
discovery, the latter had no indication that it was not getting what it was paying for.
There was yet no issue to speak of; thus, it could not have brought an action
against petitioner. It was only after the discovery of the short deliveries that
respondent got into a position to bring an action for specific performance. Evidently
then, that action was brought within the prescriptive period when it was filed on
August 20, 1980.
7. NAGA TELEPHONE VS CA GR. NO. 107112 FEB 24, 1994
FACTS: NATELCO entered into contract with CASURECO II for the use in operation
of its telephone service, electric light posts of CASURECO II and in return, there will
be free use of 10 telephone connections as long as NATELCO needs electric light
posts. The period would last for as long as NATELCO needs electric light posts. In
other words, the contract will terminate when they are forced to stop, abandon
operation and remove light posts. After 10 years, CASURECO filed for reformation of
contract with damages, for petitioner’s failure to conform to the guidelines of
National Electrification Administration of reasonable compensation for use of posts.
Compensation is worth P10, but the consumption of telephone cables costs P2,630.
NATELCO, who used 319, without the contract of P10 each, refused to pay.
Moreover, respondent alleged poor servicing. All in all, an amount of not less than
P100,000 is claimed as damages.
ISSUE: WON THE COMPLAINT HAS CAUSE OF ACTION
RULING:
The case at bar involves the reformation of a Contract. Among others, the grounds
for the action filed by the plaintiff included allegations that the contract was too
one-sided in favor of the defendant, and that certain events had made the
arrangement inequitable. The Court ruled that the cause of action for a reformation
would arise only when the contract appeared disadvantageous
However, the allegations in private respondent’s complaint and the evidence it has
presented sufficiently made out a cause of action under Article 1267. The Court,
therefore, released the parties from their correlative obligations under the contract.
However, the Court has to take into account the possible consequences of such
condition—disruption of electric services to the public and prejudice to business of
petitoners.
 6

8. NABUS VS CA G.R. No. 91670 February 7, 1991
FACTS: Albert Nabus instituted two Civil cases
1) June 22, 1970, herein petitioner Albert Nabus brought an action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land against herein private respondent Mariano Lim
in the then Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Respondent Lim moved to dismiss this complaint on the grounds of lack of
cause of action, there being no tender of the repurchase price of the parcel of
land in question, and of prescription which was denied by the trial court. The
motion for reconsideration on the order of denial was also seek which the trial
court ordered Nabus to deposit the repurchase pace of the said lot in the
amount of P183,000.00. On November 13,1980, Lim filed a motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 2159(24) for failure of Nabus to deposit in court the required
amount. On December 1, 1980, Nabus, by counsel, filed a motion for extension
of time within which to file an opposition to Lim's motion to dismiss. On March
13, 1981, no opposition having been filed to the motion to dismiss because of
the death of Nabus' counsel, the trial court dismissed with prejudice Civil Case
No. 2159(24) for his failure to deposit the required amount, evincing lack of
interest to repurchase the parcel of land in question. Nabus’ motion for
recondsideration was denied and did not appeal on such order of dismissal was
taken.
2) On March 15, 1982, Nabus filed Civil Case No. 4293 in the same Court of
First Instance of Baguio and Benguet for the annulment of the order of
dismissal in Civil Case No. 2159(24), claiming that the failure of Atty. Florendo,
his former counsel, to file an opposition to Lim's motion to dismiss was due to
his serious illness; that the dismissal of his complaint therein, without Nabus
being able to file an opposition to Lim's motion to dismiss, deprived him of the
opportunity to be heard amounting to denial of due process; and that the denial
of his motion for reconsideration constituted grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Civil Case No. 4293 was subsequently amended to allege grounds for rescission and
damages as additional causes of action. On August 8, 1986, Lim filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 4293 on the ground that it was barred by
prior judgment or res judicata and that the action had already prescribed. On
October 7, 1986, Nabus filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. A reply to the
opposition and a supplement to his motion to dismiss was filed by Lim, to which
Nabus filed a rejoinder. On July 22, 1987, the trial court dismissed the complaint in
Civil Case No. 4293 on both grounds invoked in the motion to dismiss.
dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to deposit the amount to
repurchased the subject land.
Court’s Ruling:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. –– Subject to rules regarding
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties, a party may in one pleading state, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an
opposing party (a) if the said causes of action arise out of the same contract,
transaction or relation between the parties, or (b) if the causes of action are for
demands for money, or are of the same nature and character.
The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is
no positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to
join all his causes of action and bring them at one and the same time.
Under the present rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he
must, unite several causes of action although they may be included in one of the
classes specified. This, therefore, leaves it to the plaintiffs option whether the
causes of action shall be joined in the same action, and no unfavorable inference
may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so. He may always file another action
based on the remaining cause or causes of action within the prescriptive period
therefor.
The holds that action for rescission has prescribed and should consequently be
dismissed on said ground. There can be no dispute that actions based on written
contracts prescribe after ten years from the time the right of the action accrues.
In the present case, petitioner's position is that the last three installments which he
claims were not paid by private respondent, allegedly fell due on July 1, 1968, July
1, 1969, and July 1,1970, respectively.
The ten-year period had started to run on July 2, 1970, petitioner should have filed
the action before July 2, 1980 when the prescriptive period expired. Considering
that the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 4293, invoking petitioner's right to
rescind the contract, was filed only on May 3, 1985, the action therefor has
obviously and ineluctably prescribed.

On appeal to respondent court, Nabus claimed that the trial court erred in holding
that all the causes of action in the case are barred by res judicata and that the
action for rescission and damages has prescribed.

Issue:

Whether or not the action for rescission and damages impleaded in the rejoinder of
the plaintiff is barred for failure to implead in the action for reconveyance which was

9. SERRANO VS CA GR. NO. 139420 AUGUST 15, 2001
FACTS: From 1974 to 1991, A Company, the local agent of foreign corporation B
Company, deployed petitioner Serrano as a seaman to Liberian, British and Danish
ships. As petitioners was on board a ship most of the time, respondent Maersk
offered to send portions of petitioners salary to his family in the Philippines by
money order. Petitioner agreed and from 1977 to 1978, he instructed respondent
Maersk to send money orders to his family. Respondent Maersk also deducted
various amounts from his salary for Danish Social Security System (SSS), welfare
contributions, ship clubs, and SSS medicate. Petitioner’s family failed to received
the money orders petitioners sent through respondent Maersk. Upon learning this in
1978, petitioners demanded that respondent Maersk pay him the amounts the latter
deducted from his salary, which request were ignored. Whenever he returned to the
Philippines, petitioners follow up his money claims but he would be told to return
after several weeks while respondent Maersk would hire him again to board another
one of their vessels for about a year.
Finally, in October 1993, petitioner wrote to respondent Maersk demanding
immediate payment to him of the total amount of the money orders deducted from
his salary from 1977 to 1978. On November 11, 1993, B company replied to
petitioner that they keep accounting documents only for a certain number of years,
thus data on his money claims from 1977 to 1978 were no longer declined
petitioners demand for payment. In April 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for
collection of the total amount of the unsent money orders and illegal salary
deductions against the respondents Maersk in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA). The NLRC dismissed within three years from the time the cause of
action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever berried.
ISSUE: Did the money claim of petitioner prescribe?
HELD: No. Petitioner’s cause of action accrued only in 1993 when respondent A.P
Moller wrote to him that its accounting records showed it had no outstanding money
orders and that his case was considered outdated. Thus the three (3) years
prescriptive period should be counted from 1993 and not 1978 and since his
complaint was filed in 1994, he claims that it has not prescribed. It is settled
jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, to wit (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2)
an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right, and 3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant volatile of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a branch of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff. In October 1993, Serrano finally demanded in writing payment of the
unsent money orders. Then and only then was the claim categorically denied by
respondent. AP. Moller in its letter dated November 22, 1993. Following the Baliwag
Transit ruling (1989), petitioner’s cause of action accrued only upon respondent. AP.
Mollers definite denial of his claim in November 1993. Having filed his action five (5)
months thereafter or in April 1994, we holds that it was filed within the three – year
(3) prescriptive period provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code.
7
10. ELIDO VS CA G.R. No. 95441 December 16, 1992
FACTS: From 15 October 1964 to 25 February 1965, Allied Credit Integrated
Services, Inc. obtained credit accommodations from private respondent, The
Overseas Bank of Manila, later known as the Commercial Bank of Manila, and still
later, the Boston Bank
of the Philippines. On 11 January 1965, to embody the terms of their undertaking in
writing, ALLIED and private respondent entered into an Overdraft Agreement
allowing ALLIED to overdraw from its account deposited with The Overseas Bank of
Manila such amounts not exceeding Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) at an annual
interest rate of twelve percent (12%) compounded monthly.
To secure ALLIED's prompt payment of any liability arising from the Overdraft
Agreement, petitioner Carlos O. Elido, Sr., and one Vicente M. Gomez executed a
Continuing Surety Agreement, solidarily binding themselves up to the principal
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), plus interest thereon at the rate
stated in the Overdraft Agreement. Like the Overdraft Agreement, the Continuing
Surety Agreement stipulates that ten percent (10%) of the amount due shall be
paid by the debtor as attorney's fees in case a judicial proceeding is instituted to
enforce the terms and conditions thereof.
By 23 March 1965, ALLIED had an existing overdraft of P9,598.72 which remained
outstanding even after the Central Bank forbade it from doing business on 13
August 1968 upon finding respondent bank's financial condition to be extremely
precarious. On 23 October 1974, the Court approved the Program of Rehabilitation
of The Overseas Bank of Manila submitted by both private respondent and the
Central Bank, Phase I of which provides, among others, for the collection of all loans
already due and demandable.
Hence, on 23 July 1976, after sending at least four (4) demand letters and still
failing to collect, private respondent filed a collection case against ALLIED and
petitioner Carlos O. Elido, Sr. Meanwhile, Vicente M. Gomez died, hence, was no
longer impleaded. ALLIED, which had ceased operations, was then dropped as co-
defendant at the instance of private respondent as it could not be properly served
with summons and was already delaying the proceedings.
After almost ten years from the time the case was instituted, the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Br. 7, rendered its Decision ordering defendant Carlos O. Elido, Sr.
to pay plaintiff.
From the foregoing judgment, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. However,
respondent appellate court, finding no reversible error, affirmed in toto the Decision
appealed from. Hence, this petition
ISSUE: WON THE CLAIM HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBE

Petitioner's defense of prescription is untenable. He seeks refuge in Art. 1144 (1) of
the Civil Code, which however provides that the cause of action must be brought
within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues.
Thus, in a number of cases, We held, Since a "cause of action" requires as essential
elements, not only a legal right of the plaintiff and a correlative obligation of the
defendant but also "an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right," the cause of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses,
expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty.
Also, in two (2) other cases, We ruled — A cause of action has three elements,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or
takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. Translated in
terms of hypothetical situation regarding a written contract, no cause of action
arises until there is breach or violation thereof by either party. It is not, therefore,
from the date of the instrument but from the date of the breach that the period of
prescription of the action starts.
In the case before Us, private respondent attached to its appellee's brief filed with
the court below copies of its demand letter of 7 June 1966, 1, 12 and 19 March
1976 all addressed to petitioner, apparently to show the interruption of the ten-year
prescriptive period. Petitioner however prays that We disregard the demand letters
because of their dubious authenticity as they were not allegedly presented in the
court below.
But this does not put petitioner in a better position. For, even if We disregard the
various demands (anyway, no evidence was adduced as to when they were
received), this could only mean that the prescriptive period never commenced to
run since there was no point in time when petitioner could have refused to pay, or
committed a breach, until the judicial demand on 23 July 1976 which, incidentally,
also suspended the running of the period. This must be so as the Overdraft
Agreement stipulates that the obligation shall be payable upon demand, while the
Continuing Surety Agreement, being a supplemental agreement, merely provides
that the obligation shall become due upon maturity, with or without demand.
Hence, it is only from this judicial demand that the cause of action accrued, and not
from 11 January 1966, the date the Overdraft Agreement and the Continuing Surety
Agreement were executed. Besides, even assuming that the action on the debt is
already barred by the statute of limitations, this cannot prevent the debtor from
recognizing and confessing judgment upon it, which was what petitioner did in fact.
8
11. CHINA BANKING CORP VS CA GR. NO. 153267 JUNE 23, 2005
FACTS: China Banking Corp. (CBC) is the registered owner of Home Notes (which
are debt instruments) issued in favor of Fund Centrum Finance, Inc. (FCI) and
eventually sold, transferred and assigned to Armed Forces and Police Savings &
Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI). AFPSLAI demanded payment, CBC refused to pay.
AFPSLAI filed a complaint for a sum of money against CBC in the RTC of QC. CBC
filed an MTD alleging that the real party in interest was FCFI which was not joined in
the complaint, and that AFPSLAI was a mere trustee of FCFI. RTC denied MTD and
MR. CA denied Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. SC denied Petition for
Certiorari under R65 for being an improper remedy. CBC filed another MTD, this
time invoking prescription. Lower court denied MTD and ordered CBC to present
evidence. CBC filed MR instead, which was denied by lower court, stating that: “This
Court finds that there are conflicting claims on the issue of whether or not the
action has already prescribed. A full blown trial is in order to determine fully the
rights of the contending parties.” CBC filed a petition under RULE 65 with CA. CA
dismissed, agreeing with the TC that more evidence should be presented in order to
properly determine WON action has prescribed. CBC insists that prescription is
apparent on the complaint. The maturity date of the Home Notes annexed to the
pleading indicate the date of accrual of the cause of action. [Dec. 2, 1983]. AFSPLAI
filed complaint for sum of money on Sep. 24, 1996, which is beyond the prescriptive
period of 10 years from when the creditor may file an action. AFSPLAI argues that
prescription is NOT apparent in the complaint. Maturity date stated in the Home
Notes is NOT the time of accrual of action. Action accrued on time of demand to
pay: July 20, 1995
ISSUE: Whether cause of action accrued on the maturity date of the instruments or
on the date of demand for payment? DATE of DEMAND for PAYMENT.
RULING: Cause of action accrued on the date when demand for payment of the
Home Notes was refused by CBC [July 20, 1995]. Cause of action requires: 1. Legal
right of plaintiff (with duty of defendant to respect that right) 2. Act/omission of
defendant violating that right. Cause of action does not accrue until party obligated
refuses (expressly or impliedly) to comply with its duty. The Three elements of
cause of action a. Right in favor of plaintiff b. Obligation of defendant to respect/not
violate such right c. Act/omission of defendant violating such right / constituting a
breach of obligation of defendant to plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs
that a cause of action arises.
In a written contract, cause of action accrues only when an actual breach or
violation occurs. In this case, breach occurred when demand was made by AFSPLAI
and CBC refused to pay. Maturity date of notes [Dec. 2, 1983] NOT the accrual of
cause of action because the 3rd element (violation/breach) was not present at this
date. Date for computing when prescription begins is therefore from the time of
actual demand (and refusal to comply thereof) and not from maturity date. Action
was filed (Sep. 24, 1996) before the end of 10 yrs from cause of action (July 20,
1995). Therefore, action is NOT barred by prescription.
 9

12. COLE VS GREGORIO GR. NO. L-55315 SEPTEMBER 21, 1982
FACTS: In August 1963, parents of plaintiffs (William Cole Sr. and Angelina Cole)
entered into an agreement to buy and sell a parcel of land with spouses Angel
Gregorio and Potenciana Casuga. Said lot was priced at P6,000 but P1,000 was
paid in advance by Cole and the balance of P5,000 was to be paid in full after the
preliminary survey of the land by a private surveyor for the purpose of ascertaining
the exact size of the lot.
paid after the results of the land survey. According to the deed of promise to buy
and sell, the balance of P5,000 of the purchase price of subject property was to be
“paid in full after the preliminary survey of the land by a private surveyor, for the
purpose of verifying whether or not said parcel of land contains the same area as
declared in the Tax declaration. Because of this stipulation, it cannot be said that
the prescriptive period of the petitioner’s action begins on the date of they entered
into the agreement.

In the same month, Salanga, a land surveyor, was hired. He conducted a survey of
the land on September 24 and October 7, 1963 and submitted his survey plans to
the Bureau of Lands on June 22, 1964. Salanga left for the US. He received the
approval only on June 29, 1965.

Cole Sr. wrote two demand letters to Salanga to speed up the process (October 20,
1964 and April 1, 1965). Plaintiffs Cole found out that their parents had an unpaid
balance on the subject property; they tried to pay off the balance but discovered
that the property was transferred to Gregorio’s daughter, Josefina Hufano. When
Cole discovered that the lot only contained an area of 23,408 square meters instead
of 32,976 as stated in the Tax Declaration, Cole rescinded the contract and Gregorio
returned the P1,000 advanced payments. Cole never took possession of the land
nor registered it under their names.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right of action has already prescribed

RULING:

NO. In the instant case, the Agreement to Buy and Sell constitutes a conditional
obligation (Art. 1181) since it clearly stipulates that the balance will be paid AFTER
a surveyor has ascertained the exact size of the subject property. The
accomplishment, then, of said survey gives rise to the acquisition of rights by the
contracting party (Cole) and the acquisition of said rights depends upon the results
of the survey. (SUSPENSIVE OBLIGATION)

If the contract was really rescinded and the P1,000 returned to Cole a few days
after the surveyor was hired, William Cole would not have written demand letters to
Salanga to finish the survey. Furthermore, no receipt was presented by Potenciana
proving their allegations.

The agreement to buy and sell was conditioned upon the conduct of a preliminary
survey of the land to verify whether it contained the area stated in the Tax
Declaration. Both the agreement and the survey were made in 1963. The Court
ruled that the right of action for specific performance arose only in 1966, when the
plaintiff discovered the completion of the survey

The prescriptive period cannot be counted from the date of execution of the deed of
promise to buy and sell where it was stipulated that the balance of the price shall be

13. RURAL BANK OF CALINOG VS CA GR. NO. 146519 July 8, 2005
Facts: Carmen D. Cerbo executed a REM over her property in favor of the Rural
Bank of Calinog. The mortgage was foreclosed and the subject property was sold at
public auction Calinog Bank as the highest bidder. The spouses redeemed the
subject property by depositing the amount of P18,000 to Calinog Bank. To complete
payment of the total redemption price of the subject property, the spouses obtained
a loan from Rural Bank of Dingle, Iloilo, in the amount of P109,000. To secure
payment of the loan obtained from Dingle Bank, the spouses mortgaged the subject
property in favor of Dingle Bank. The spouses have paid the loan obtained from the
bank. Later, the spouses received a Notice of Sale at public auction of the subject
property allegedly for failure to pay the mortgage debt. The spouses demanded
from the bank an accounting of all payments made and the holding in abeyance by
Dingle Bank of the public sale. The public sale proceeded as scheduled and the
subject property was adjudicated in favor of Calinog Bank. Because of the failure of
the bank to account all payments made by and for the spouses the mortgaged
property was unjustly foreclosed. Hence, the complaint.
Calinog Bank moved for the dismissal of the complaint. It said that only
Carmen Cerbo was the proper party because she was the one who executed the
mortgage. Since Carmen is dead, the case should be dismissed against Calinog
Bank. The spouses opposed claiming that they are the heirs of Carmen. The court
ordered the dismissal of the case. The CA reversed and ruled that the spouses have
both the capacity and personality to sue. Also it ruled that the spouses need not be
parties to the mortgage contract in order to have a cause of action to recover the
payments which they allege to have paid the bank in excess of the redemption
price.
ISSUE: WON THE SPOUSES HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION
RULING: Yes, In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are
sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint
does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of
action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case.
If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses
that may be assessed by the defendants.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show
that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively
stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. Moreover, a defendant moving to
dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having
hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof.
10
It is enough that private respondents allege that they made a deposit in the amount
of P18,000.00 after the mortgaged property was sold to petitioner at public auction;
that they subsequently applied for and obtained an agricultural loan from another
rural bank, the net proceeds of which they paid to petitioner in order to discharge
the obligation under the mortgage constituted on Carmen Cerbo’s property; that the
excess amount of P392.47 was not accounted for by petitioner; and that the
P18,000 deposit was not deducted from the repurchase price of the property. In
fine, private respondents contend that they were the ones who paid Carmen Cerbo’s
loan obligation with petitioner. Whether these allegations entitle private
respondents to the reliefs prayed for is a question which can best be resolved after
trial on the merits at which each party can present evidence to prove their
respective allegations and defenses.
It is significant to note that petitioner already filed an answer to the complaint at
which it admitted that private respondent Gregorio Cerbaña made a deposit of
P18,000 as initial payment on the redemption price, and that the latter made a total
payment of P101,000. Petitioner, therefore, had acknowledged that it was Gregorio
Cerbaña, Carmen Cerbo’s son-in-law, who was making payments on the loan
obligation. In fact, petitioner referred to Gregorio Cerbaña as the redemptioner of
the foreclosed property.This admission cannot be disavowed by petitioner’s
allegation in its motion to dismiss filed 8 months after its answer, that private
respondents do not have a cause of action against it just because Carmen Cerbo
had already passed away.
While the death of Carmen Cerbo certainly extinguished whatever cause of action
she had against petitioner, private respondents’ cause of action, based on the
allegations in the complaint, was not thereby similarly extinguished. Indeed,
assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true, private respondents, having
paid the redemption price, have the right to demand an accounting, to be refunded
for whatever excess payments they made, and even to redeem the property.
Correlatively, petitioner, having accepted payment from private respondents, has
the obligation to account for such payment, to return the excess, if any, and to
allow redemption.
As regards the ancillary procedural question concerning the propriety of certiorari in
lieu of appeal, we find that private respondents’ resort to certiorari is warranted
under the circumstances. While it is true that certiorari is not a substitute for
appeal, jurisprudence exempts from the application of this rule cases when the trial
court’s decision or resolution was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Considering that the trial court in this case completely disregarded the
fact that private respondents also filed the complaint on their own behalf and in so
doing prevented the latter from having their day in court, it gravely abused its
discretion justifying private respondents’ petition for certiorari.
 11

ALAS-AS allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL COOP VS DAVID GR NO. 129928 AUGUST 25 2005 be averred by the defendants. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts
Facts: Private Respondent Virgilio David, a supplier of electric hardware filed a case alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said
for specific performance against herein petitioner. The said case which was complaint.
essentially a collection suit was predicated on a document that according to David is
the contract to which he sold to petitioner one unit of 10 MVA Transformer.
HEIRS OF CONCHA VS SPOUSES LUMOCSO GR NO 158121
Petitioner on its Answer raised as affirmative defenses which also constitutes ground
DECEMBER 12, 2007
for dismissal, the grounds are lack of cause of action, there being allegedly no
enforceable contract between David and Petitioner, and improper venue. In essence
Facts: Spouses Concha have painstakingly preserved the forest standing in the area
they argue that the document was only a quotation letter and not really a contract
of their 24 hectare homestead including the 4 hectares untitled forest land located
and also dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. David opposed the
at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly married, the
contention stating that failure to state a cause of action is required to be based only
date they acquired this property by occupation or possession. Spouses have
on allegations of the complaint and the contract being merely an attachment cannot
preserved the forest to the exclusion of the defendant Lumocso or other person
be inquired into. Petitioners motion for preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses
from the year 1931 when defendants by force, intimidation and stealth forcibly
were denied as well as the Morion for Reconsideration and so the case was elevated
entered the premises illegally cut, collected, disposed, a total of 21 trees and 6
to CA by way of special civil action for certiorari. CA dismissed the petition holding
trees for separates cases. This claim is an assertion that the land is private land or
that the allegations constitutes a cause of action. The case was then elevated to the
that even assuming that it was public domain, plaintiff acquired imperfect title
SC
thereto under Sec 48 of CA No 141 otherwise known as public land Act.
Respondents and their predecessor in interest knew when they filed their respective
Issue: W/N the complaint file by David has a cause of action.
patent application and were issued their respective free patent that the subject land
belonged to the petitioners, thereby the certificates were issued in fraud.
Held: Affirmative. Consistent with our ruling in The Heirs of Juliana Clavano v.
Genato,as MOELCI II’s Motion is anchored on the ground that the Complaint
Issue: Whether or Not there is a cause of action in this case.
allegedly stated no cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon is more than
unnecessary as it constitutes an erroneous and improvident move. No error
Held: Affirmative .Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
therefore could be ascribed to the trial court in the denial of such Motion. The Court
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. It
ruled in the cited case, thus: . . . . respondent Judge committed an error in
is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the
conducting a preliminary hearing on the private respondent’s affirmative defenses.
parties. To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief
complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for
sought. The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether
reconveyance. An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as
those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically
incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or
admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the
erroneously registered in other persons’ names, to its rightful and legal owners, or
court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint?
to those who claim to have a better right. There is no special ground for an action
Stated otherwise, the sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of
for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the
the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter
property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property has not yet
may be considered nor facts not alleged, which would require evidence and
passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
therefore must be raised as defenses and await the trial. In other words, to
determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no other should be considered. The respondent Judge departed from
this rule in conducting a hearing and in receiving evidence in support of the private
respondent’s affirmative defense, that is, lack of cause of action.

To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the

complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of
external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the

PHILROCK, INC., petitioner, vs. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION
COMMISSION and Spouses VICENTE and NELIA CID, respondents.
G.R. No. 132848-49 June 26, 2001
FACTS : Private respondents, filed a Complaint for damages against Philrock and
seven of its officers and engineers with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 82. The trial court issued an Order dismissing the case and referring the
same to the CIAC because the Cid spouses and Philrock had filed an Agreement to
Arbitrate with the CIAC. Preliminary conferences were held among the parties and
their appointed arbitrators. At these conferences, disagreements arose as to:
1) whether moral and exemplary damages and tort should be included as an issue
along with breach of contract, and
2) whether the seven officers and engineers of Philrock who are not parties to the
Agreement to Arbitrate should be included in the arbitration proceedings.
No common ground could be reached by the parties, hence, on April 2, 1994, both
the Cid spouses and Philrock requested that the case be remanded to the trial court.
On June 13, 1995, The trial court declared that it no longer had jurisdiction over the
case and ordered the records of the case to be remanded anew to the CIAC for
arbitral proceedings. the CIAC resumed conducting preliminary conferences. On
August 21, 1995, herein [P]etitioner Philrock requested to suspend the proceedings
until the court clarified its ruling in the Order dated June 13, 1995
Petioner : Philrock argued that said Order was based on a mistaken premise that
'the proceedings in the CIAC fell through because of the refusal of Philrock to
include the issue of damages therein,' whereas the true reason for the withdrawal of
the case from the CIAC was due to Philrock's opposition to the inclusion of its seven
officers and engineers, who did not give their consent to arbitration, as party
defendants
Respondent : manifested that she was willing to exclude the seven officers and
engineers of Philrock as parties to the case so as to facilitate or expedite the
proceedings.
the Arbitral Tribunal denied Philrock's request for the suspension of the proceedings.
The parties then proceeded to finalize, approve and sign the Terms of Reference.
Philrock's counsel and representative, Atty. Pericles C. Consunji affixed his signature
to said Terms of Reference which stated that 'the parties agree that their differences
be settled by an Arbitral Tribunal
12
On September 12, 1995, [P]etitioner Philrock filed its Motion to Dismiss, alleging
therein that the CIAC had lost jurisdiction to hear the arbitration case due to the
parties' withdrawal of their consent to arbitrate. The motion was denied. public
respondent ordered the parties to appear before it on November 28, 1995 for the
continuation of the arbitral proceedings, and on February 7, 1996, public
respondent directed [P]etitioner Philrock to set two hearing dates in the month of
February to present its evidence and to pay all fees assessed by it, otherwise
Philrock would be deemed to have waived its right to present evidence
Judgment is rendered in favor of the Claimant, directing Respondent to pay.
Before the CA, petitioner filed a Petition for Review, docketed as CA-GR SP No.
42443, contesting the jurisdiction of the CIAC and assailing the propriety of the
monetary awards in favor of respondent spouses. This Petition was consolidated by
the CA with CA-GR SP No. 39781, a Petition for Certiorari earlier elevated by
petitioner questioning the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
ISSUE : Whether or not the CIAC could take jurisdiction over the case of
Respondent Cid spouses against Petitioner Philrock after the case had been
dismissed by both the RTC and the CIAC.
HELD : Section 4 of Executive Order 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with construction
contracts entered into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to
voluntary arbitration. It is undisputed that the parties submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Commission by virtue of their Agreement to Arbitrate dated
November 24, 1993. Signatories to the Agreement were Atty. Ismael J. Andres and
Perry Y. Uy (president of Philippine Rock Products, Inc.) for petitioner, and Nelia G.
Cid and Atty. Esteban A. Bautista for respondent spouses Petitioner claims, on the
other hand, that this Agreement was withdrawn by respondents on April 8, 1994,
because of the exclusion of the seven engineers of petitioners in the arbitration
case. This contention is untenable. First, private respondents removed the obstacle
to the continuation of the arbitration, precisely by withdrawing their objection to the
exclusion of the seven engineers. Second, petitioner continued participating in the
arbitration even after the CIAC Order had been issued. Finally, as pointed out by the
solicitor general, petitioner maneuvered to avoid the RTC’s final resolution of the
dispute by arguing that the regular court also lost jurisdiction after the arbitral
tribunal’s April 13, 1994 Order referring the case back to the RTC. After submitting
itself to arbitration proceedings and actively participating therein, petitioner is
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely because the latter
rendered an adverse decision.

SOCORRO LIMOS V SPOUSES ODONES (G.R. NO. 186979) AUGUST 11, 2010
A request for admission is not intended merely to reproduce or reiterate the
allegations levant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request.
FACTS: Spouses Odones filed a complaint for Annulment of Title against Limos
before the RTC in Camiling, Tarlac. The complaint alleged that they were owners of
a parcel of land by virtue of an extrajudicial succession. It took a while before the
respondents decided to register the conveyance and when they did, they found out
that the land’s OCT was replaced by a TCT in the name of Socorro Limos. Limos
allegedly secured the TCT by virtue of a sale executed by Donata Lardizabal and
husband, Francisco Razalan. Respondents sought the cancellation of the TCT on the
grounds that the signatures of Lardizabal and Razalan were forged. The petitioners
pleaded affirmative defenses in their Answer to which the respondents gave a Reply
maintaining that the sale was valid. Thereafter, the petitioners served upon
respondents a Request for Admission of the following matters:
1. That the husband of the deceased Donata Lardizabal is Francisco Razalan;
2. That the children of the deceased Sps. Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan
are Mercedes Razalan, Tomasa Razalan and Tomas Razalan;
3. That this Tomasa Razalan died on April 27, 1997, and her heirs are (a) Melecio
Partido surviving husband, and her surviving children are (b) Eduardo Partido, (c)
Enrique Razalan Partido, (d) Eduardo Razalan Partido, (e) Sotera Razalan Partido
and (f) Raymundo Razalan Partido.
4. That Amadeo Razalan is claiming also to be a grandchild and also claiming to be
sole forced heir of Donata Lardizabal
5. That Amadeo Razalan is not among those who signed the Extrajudicial Succession
of Estate and Sale;
6. That as per Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan which was submitted by
the plaintiffs, the children of Tomasa Razalan are Sotera Razalan and 2
brothers/sisters. These children of Tomasa Razalan did not also sign the
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale;
7. That there is/are no heirs of Clemente Razalan who appeared to have executed
the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale;
Petitioners failed to respond to this Request for Admission, prompting the filing of a
Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing and arguing that the failure of Respondents to
object to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission pursuant to
13
Rule 26, Sec 2 of the RoC. As such a hearing on the affirmative defenses had
become imperative because petitioners were no longer required to present evidence
on the admitted facts. Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending that
the facts sought to be admitted were not material and relevant to the case. RTC ->
denied the Motion and held that items 1-4 were already earlier pleaded as an
affirmative defense, hence, it would be redundant for Respondents to make another
denial. CA -> dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative defenses could be
best proven by a hearing. So Petitioner’s seek for a Motion for Reconsideration of
the CA’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense is proper.
HELD:
NO. Under Rule 26, Sec 1 and 2: A party who fails to respond to a Request for
Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all matters contained
therein. It must be emphasized that the application of the rules on modes of
discovery rests upon the discretion of the court. A request for admission is not
intended merely to reproduce or reiterate the allegations but should set forth
relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request. Thus, if the trial court
finds that the matters in the Request were already admitted then the requested
party cannot be compelled to admit or deny them again. In turn the requesting
party cannot reasonably expect a response to request or even demand the
application of the implied admission rule in Rule 26, Sec 2. In the case, the
redundant and unnecessary nature of the Petitioner’s Request rendered it irrelevant
so as to apply the implied admission rule. Since there is no implied admission
attributable to the Respondent’s failure to respond, then the argument that a
preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.*As to validity of the sale, Court
held that it shall be determined in a full-blown trial. A preliminary hearing will not
sufficiently address these issues.

Asia Brewery vs. Equitable PCI Bank
Gr No. 190432 April 25, 2017
Digest on Page 15 of Recitals in Civil Procedure
Butuan Development Corporation vs CA
GR No 197358, April 5 2017
Digest on Page 22, Item No 18 of Recitals in Civil Procedure
JUANA COMPLEX I vs FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC
G.R. No. 152272
FACTS: Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc., together with individual
residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively
referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for damages, in its own behalf and
as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex
I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road,
against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC),
La Paz Housing & Development Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency
and their respective officers (collectively referred as Fil-Estate, et al.).The complaint
alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and motorists who constantly
traveled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba; that they used the entry and
exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way
public road known as La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more
than ten (10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and
deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to
pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make
it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again; that JCHA reported the matter
to the Municipal Government and the Office of the Municipal Engineer but the latter
failed to repair the road to make it passable and safe to motorists and pedestrians;
that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice,
inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them, to the commuters
and motorists because traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that caused terrible
traffic congestion and hazard; and that its permanent closure would not only
prejudice their right to free and unhampered use of the property but would also
cause great damage and irreparable injury. Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for
the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and
intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road. On the RTC a 20-day TRO was issued
against Fil-Estate. Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to determine
the propriety of the issuance of a WPI. Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was
improperly filed as a class suit. The RTC issued a WPI. It also dismissed the motion
to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by Fil-estate.
Fil-estate elevated the case to CA via certiorari maintaining that JCHA, et al
14
complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class
suit. As to the WPI, the defendants averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that
they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and further
claimed that La Paz Road was a Torrens registered private road and there was
neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it. The CA partly granted
the petition. It annulled the issuance of WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their
clear and present right over the La Paz road while the order denying the motion to
dismiss was upheld ruling that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action. Whether or not the
complaint has been properly filed as a class suit. Whether or not a WPI is
warranted.
RULING:
The Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of
action. First, JCHA, et al.’s averments in the complaint show a demandable right
over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their
allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an
easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads. There is no
other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest,
convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists
may use.
Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al.
when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from
using the same.
Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could
have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought therein.
The complaint has been properly filed as a class suit.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to
court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of
the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who
use La Paz Road. Also, the subject matter–the closure and excavation of the La Paz
Road–is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The

records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower
court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming
that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also
prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road.
Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the
suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be
named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.
The issuance of a WPI is unwarranted. A writ of preliminary injunction is available to
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims
can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites for its issuance are: (1)
the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. For the
writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right
which must be shown to be clear and positive. This means that the persons applying
for the writ must show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed
for in their complaint. In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima
facie proof of violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to
the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK v. VDA. DE COSCOLLUELA
G.R. No. 167724 / June 27, 2006 / Callejo, Sr., J. / Splitting / KJMSTA.ANA
FACTS.
• Respondent and her late husband Oscar obtained an agricultural sugar crop
loan from Far East Bank & Trust Co. (later merged with BPI) for crop years 1997
and 1998. In the book of Far East, the loan account was treated as a single account,
and evidenced by 67 promissory notes.
• Sps. Coscolluela executed a real estate mortgage in favor of FEBTC over
their parcel of land as security of loans on credit accommodation obtained and those
that may be obtained.
• Under the terms and conditions of the real estate mortgage, in the event of
failure to pay the mortgage obligation or any portion thereof, the entire principal,
interest, penalties, and other charges shall be immediately due; and Far East mat
foreclose the same extra judicially.
• For failure to settle outstanding obligation on the maturity dates, Far East
sent a final demand letter to respondent demanding payment.
15
• Since respondent failed to settle her obligation, Far East filed a petition for
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property, but only only for 31 of the
promissory notes.
• During pendency of said case, Far East filed a complaint for collection of
money representing the amounts for the 36 other promissory notes.
• In respondent’s answer, she alleged that the complaint was barred by litis
pendentia for the pending petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM.
• Petitioner presented a loan officer as sole witness, who testified that
respondent were granted a loan, which was a “single loan account.”
• Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence contending that the loan officer’s
admission, that there is only one loan account secured by the REM thus barred the
personal action for collection. She insisted that the filing of said complaint should be
dismissed.
• Petitioner opposed the demurrer, stating that each promissory note
constituted a separate contract.
• The trial court denied the demurrer on the ground that each note covered a
loan distinct from the others.
• Respondent filed MR but denied, prompting her to file a certiorari petition
under Rule 65 with CA. CA granted the petitioner, stating that the remedies
sought are alternative and not cumulative. Thus, in denying the demurrer, RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner filed MR but it was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON collection suit should be dismissed – YES
Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may not
institute one suit for a single cause of action, and, if two or more suits are instituted
on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of others. The law does
not permit the owner of a single of entire cause of action or an entire or indivisible
demand to divide and split the cause to make it the subject of several actions.
The true rule which determined whether a party has only a single and entire cause
of action is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract
or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts. As gleaned from the plain
terms of the REM, the real estate of respondent served as a continuing security
liable for obligations already obtainer and obligations obtained thereafter. In this
case, the action of petitioner is anchored on one and the same cause: the

nonpayment of respondent. Though the debt may be covered by several promissory
notes and is covered by a real estate mortgage, the latter is subsidiary to the
former and both refer to one and the same obligation. A mortgage creditor may
institute two alternative remedies against the debtor, either to collect debt or to
foreclose mortgage, but not both.
DECISION. WHEREFORE instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
[G.R. No. 63145. October 5, 1999] VENTURA vs. HON. MILITANTE
FACTS: Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages
against petitioner. During the lifetime of Carlos Ngo he was indebted with the
plaintiff (herein priv. resp.). Said obligation is already due and demandable and the
defendant thru Ms. Ventura who is ostensibly taking care of the properties/estate of
deceased Carlos Ngo, refused, failed and neglected and still continues to refuse, fail
and neglect to pay despite repeated demands. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
foregoing complaint on the ground that “the estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal
personality,” the same being “neither a natural nor legal person in contemplation of
law.” In his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, petitioner insisted that since “the
money claim subject of this case actually represents the costs of automotive spare
parts/replacements contracted by deceased Carlos Ngo during his lifetime for the
benefit/business of the family x x x the conjugal partnership x x x shall be
accountable for the payment thereof.” Subsequently, private respondent's counsel
manifested that he is poised to “amend the complaint in order to state the correct
party defendant that he intends to sue in this case”. The public respondent gave
private respondent fifteen (15) days to make the amendment. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the order of public respondent permitting private
respondent to amend his complaint. Public respondent issued the herein assailed
order that the indebtedness was incurred by Carlos Ngo and defendant Sulpicia
Ventura and since Carlos Ngo is now dead that will not preclude the plaintiff from
filing a case against the living defendant, Sulpicia Ventura. Petitioner scurried to this
Court praying that the foregoing order of the public respondent be set aside and the
amended complaint of private respondent.
RULING: We grant the petition. The original complaint of petitioner named the
“estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura” as
the defendant. Petitioner moved to dismiss the same on the ground that the
defendant as named in the complaint had no legal personality. We agree. Neither a
dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased
person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so
that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action
begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person,
since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to
amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to
amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue,
to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not
be named a party defendant in a court action. It is clear that the original complaint
of private respondent against the estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo
16
himself who was already dead at the time of the filing of said complaint. At that
time, and this, private respondent admitted, no special proceeding to settle his
estate had been filed in court. As such, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his estate. To cure this fatal defect, private
respondent amended his original complaint. In his amended complaint, private
respondent deleted the estate of Carlos Ngo and named petitioner as the defendant.
When petitioner, in her comment to the amended complaint, reasoned that the
conjugal partnership of gains between her and Carlos Ngo was terminated upon the
latter's death and that the debt which he contracted, assuming it was a charge
against the conjugal property, could only be paid after an inventory is made in the
appropriate testate or intestate proceeding, private respondent simply reiterated his
demand that petitioner pay her husband's debt which, he insisted, redounded to the
benefit of everyone in her family.
It is true that amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of
justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real
facts, and in order to speed the trial of causes or prevent the circuitry of action and
unnecessary expense. But amendments cannot be allowed so as to confer
jurisdiction upon a court that never acquired it in the first place. When it is evident
that the court has no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter and that
the pleading is so fatally defective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or that to
permit such amendment would radically alter the theory and the nature of the
action, then the court should refuse the amendment of the defective pleading and
order the dismissal of the case.
Moreover, as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates
upon the death of either spouse. After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is
necessary to sell any portion of the conjugal property in order to pay outstanding
obligations of the partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and with the
formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of deceased
persons. Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery
of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, any judgment
obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be
filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses,
there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean, however,
that the conjugal partnership continues. And private respondent cannot be said to
have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may
apply in court for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of
the deceased Carlos Ngo if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to
apply for administration or request that administration be granted to some other
person.

Chang Kai Shek v. CA, GR No, 58028 172 SCRA 389 April 18 1989
FACTS: Fausta F. Oh worked at the Chiang Kai Shek School since 1932 for a
continuous period of almost 33 years. And now, out of the blue, and for no apparent
or given reason, this abrupt dismissal. Oh sued. She demanded separation pay,
social security benefits, salary differentials, maternity benefits and moral and
exemplary damages. 1 The original defendant was the Chiang Kai Shek School but
when it filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it could not be sued, the
complaint was amended. 2 Certain officials of the school were also impleaded to
make them solidarily liable with the school. As a school, the petitioner was governed
by Act No. 2706 as amended by C.A. No. 180, which provided as follows:
Unless exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of Public Instruction, any
private school or college recognized by the government shall be incorporated under
the provisions of Act No. 1459 known as the Corporation Law, within 90 days after
the date of recognition, and shall file with the Secretary of Public Instruction a copy
of its incorporation papers and by-laws.
The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not a school that has not been incorporated may be sued by
reason alone of its long continued existence and recognition by the government,
HELD: It is true that Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly provides that
"only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action." It is also not
denied that the school has NOT been incorporated. However, this omission should
not prejudice the private respondent in the assertion of her claims against the
school. Having been recognized by the government, it was under obligation to
incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. It
appears that it had not done so at the time the complaint was filed notwithstanding
that it had been in existence even earlier than 1932. The petitioner cannot now
invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize it from the private
respondent's complaint. There should also be no question that having contracted
with the private respondent every year for thirty two years and thus represented
itself as possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped
from denying such personality to defeat her claim against it. According to Article
1431 of the Civil Code, "through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved
as against the person relying on it." As the school itself may be sued in its own
17
name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the persons joined
in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with such
association. Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the board of
trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the private respondent's
dismissal. It is easy to imagine the astonishment and hurt she felt when she was
flatly and without warning told she was dismissed. There was not even the amenity
of a formal notice of her replacement, with perhaps a graceful expression of thanks
for her past services. She was simply informed she was no longer in the teaching
staff. To put it bluntly, she was fired. For the wrongful act of the petitioner, the
private respondent is entitled to moral damages. As a proximate result of her illegal
dismissal, she suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and even
besmirched reputation as an experienced teacher for more than three decades. We
also find that the respondent court did not err in awarding her exemplary damages
because the petitioner acted in a wanton and oppressive manner when it dismissed
her. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED
except for the award of separation pay, which is reduced to P2,880.00. All the other
awards are approved. Costs against the petitioner. This decision is immediately
executory.
BIENVENIDO EJERCITO VS M. R. VARGAS Gr No. 172595 April 10, 2008
FACTS:
• On March 5, 2004, City Government of Quezon City, represented by Mayor
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., entered into a construction contract with M.R. Vargas
Construction, represented by Marcial R. Vargas as the general manager, for the
improvement and concreting of Panay Avenue.
o Pursuant to the contract, the Vargas Construction commenced its clearing
operations by removing structures and uprooting the trees along Panay Avenue.
o Renato Agarao, the foreman, supervised the clearing operations.
• Petitioners Bienvenido Ejercito and Jose Martines, as well as a certain
Oscar Baria, claimed that the clearing operations lacked the necessary permit and
prior consultation. They brought the matter to the attention of barangay authorities,
Mayor Belmonte, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, DENR, and Philippine
Coconut Authority, but to no avail.
• On September 10, 2004, they filed a petition for injunction before Quezon
City RTC.
o The petition was accompanied with an application for TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction

o The petition indicated that MR Vargas Construction, is an entity, with office
address at the 4th Floor, President Tower,Timog Avenue corner Scout Ybardaloza
St., Quezon City where they may be served with summons and other court
processes.
o Office of the Clerk of Court then issued summons and notice of raffle on
Sept 10, 2004.
o Upon service of the processes, they were returned unserved on the ground
that respondent enterprise was unknown thereat.
• Petition was subsequently raffled to the sale of Judge Jacob before which
petitioners application for TRO was heard on Sept 15, 2004.
• On the same day, when Agarao was also present in court, Judge Jacob
issued a TRO directing MR Vargas to desist from cutting, damaging or transferring
the trees along Panay Avenue.
• Mangoba Tan Agus Law Offices then filed a special appearance on behalf of
MR Vargas Construction:
o Moved for the dismissal of the petition
o Quashal of the TRO on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
o Assailed the raffle of the case for having been conducted in violation of Sec
4, Rule 58 of RoC
o The issuance of TRO without requiring the posting of a bond
o Failure to implead the Government of QC despite its being the real party-
in-interest
o Petitioners’ application for the injunctive writ was allegedly grossly
defective in form and substance.
• Before the hearing, a court interpreter showed to MR Vargas’ counsel a
copy of the summons and of the notice of the raffle in which appear a signature at
the bottom of each copy, indicating receipt.
• MR Vargas’ counsel withdrew two of the grounds stated in the motion (lack
of jurisdiction and irregularity in the raffle of the case) on the mistaken belief that
the summons was received by MR Vargas.
• RTC issued an order granting petitioners application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
18
• The following day, counsel for MR Vargas filed a manifestation with urgent
omnibus motion to nullify the proceedings and to cite petitioners and the process
server in contempt of court.
o He argued that MR Vargas failed to receive summons, alleging that it was
petitioner Jose Martinez who signed as recipient of the summons and the notice of
raffle.
o RTC issued the assailed order, nullifying the proceedings thus far.
o MR of petitioners denied. CA
• Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the RTC Order
• They argued that RTC Judge Jacob committed grave abuse of direction in
nullifying the proceeding on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in view of Aragaos
presence at the hearing on petitioners’ application for TRO, in failing to act on
petitioners pending motions and in directing instead the issuance of new summons
on respondent enterprise.
• CA dismissed this petition
• MR also denied.
RULING: Petition denied.
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent enterprise? - NO
• Both the CA and the TC found that summons was not served on MR
Vargas. This factual finding is conclusive upon SC.
o The Officers Return stated essentially that the server failed to serve the
summons on MR Vargas because it could not be found at the address alleged in the
petition.
• Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant
does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid
service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is null and void.
• In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the
defendant in person.
• A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law does not vest a

separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend
an action in court. Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law
may be parties to a civil action and every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real parties-in-interest.
• As applied in this case:
o MR Vargas Construction Co is a sole proprietorship and, therefore, an
entity without juridical personality.
o Since respondent enterprise is only a sole proprietorship, an entity without
juridical personality, the suit for injunction may be instituted only against its owner,
Marcial Vargas, the real party-in-interest.
o The petition for injunction should have impleaded him as the party
respondent either simply by mention of his name or by denominating him as doing
business under the name and style of M.R. Vargas Construction Co. It was
erroneous to refer to him, as the petition did in both its caption and body, as
representing the enterprise.
o Summons should have been served on Vargas himself, following Rule 14,
Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court on personal service and substituted service.
o In this case, no service of summons, whether personal or substituted, was
effected on Vargas.
o Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice
desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If
however efforts to find him personally would make prompt service impossible,
service may be completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the
summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
• Aragao’s appearance in the hearing does not vest the court jurisdiction
over the respondent
o Agarao was not a party respondent in the injunction case before the trial
court. Certainly, he is not a real party-in-interest against whom the injunction suit
may be brought, absent any showing that he is also an owner or he acts as an
agent of respondent enterprise. Agarao is only a foreman, bereft of any authority to
defend the suit on behalf of respondent enterprise.
o Reiterating, only Vargas, as the sole owner, is authorized by the Rules of
Court to defend the suit on behalf of the enterprise.
19
o While it is true that an appearance in whatever form, without explicitly
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, the appearance must constitute a positive
act on the part of the litigant manifesting an intention to submit to the courts
jurisdiction.
o In the instances where the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the person of the defendant, the parties showed the intention to participate or
be bound by the proceedings through the filing of a motion, a plea or an answer.
• The service on a certain Rona Adol is not binding on MR Vargas.
o Records show that Rona Adol received the notice of hearing on behalf of an
entity named JCB.
o For purposes of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the
Rules require the service of summons and not of any other court processes.
LITONJUA GROUP OF COMPANIES, EDDIE LITONJUA and DANILO
LITONJUA, petitioners, vs. TERESITA VIGAN, respondent.
Facts:
TERESITA VIGAN’s version: She was hired by the Litonjua Group of Companies on
February 2, 1979 as telex operator. Later, she was assigned as accounting and
payroll clerk under the supervision of DaniloLitonjua. She had been performing well
until 1995, when DaniloLitonjua who was already naturally a (sic) very ill-tempered,
ill-mouthed and violent employer, became more so due to business problems. The
incidents prompted Vigan to write DaniloLitonjua letters asking why she was treated
so and what was her fault. DaniloLitonjua charged that Vigan had been hysterical,
emotional and created scenes at the office. He even required her to secure
psychiatric assistance. But despite proof that she was not suffering from psychosis
or organic brain syndrome as certified to by a Psychiatrist of DaniloLitonjua’s choice
still she was denied by the guards entry to her work upon instructions again of
DaniloLitonjua. Left with no alternative, Vigan filed this case for illegal dismissal,
alleging she was receiving a monthly salary of P8,000.00 at the time she was
unlawfully terminated.
Litonjuas version: They negate the existence of the Litonjua Group of Companies
and the connection of Eduardo Litonjua thereto. They contended that Vigan was
employed by ACT Theater, Inc., where DaniloLitonjua is a Director. They dispute the
charge of illegal dismissal for it was Vigan who ceased to report for work despite
notices and likewise contest the P8,000.00 monthly salary alleged by Vigan,
claiming it was merely P6,850.00.
 20

They claim that Vigan was a habitual absentee. Her performance had been
satisfactory, but then starting March 15, 1996 she had become emotional,
hysterical, uncontrollable and created disturbances at the office with her crying and
shouting for no reason at all. The incident was repeated on April 3, 1996, May 24,
1996 and on June 4, 1996. Thus alarmed, on July 24, 1996 Vigan was required by
management to undergo medical and psychological examination at the company’s
expense and naming three doctors to attend to her. Dr.Baltazar Reyes and Dr. Tony
Perlas of the Philippine General Hospital and Dr. Lourdes Ignacio of the Medical
Center Manila. But they claim that Vigan refused to comply.
On August 2, 1996, Vigan again had another breakdown, hysterical, shouting and
crying as usual for about an hour, and then she just left the premises without a
word. The next day, August 3, 1996, Saturday, she came to the office and explained
she was not feeling well the day before. After that Vigan went AWOL and did not
heed telegram notices from her employer made on August 26, 1996 and on
September 9, 1996. She instead filed the instant suit for illegal dismissal."
name of the real parties in interest.Petitioners’ claim that Litonjua Group of
Companies is not a legal entity with juridical personality hence cannot be a party to
this suit deserves consideration since respondent failed to prove otherwise. In fact,
respondent Vigan’s own allegation in her Memorandum supported petitioners’ claim
that Litonjua group of companies does not exist when she stated therein that
instead of naming each and every corporation of the Litonjua family where she had
rendered accounting and payroll works, she simply referred to these corporations as
the Litonjua group of companies, thus, respondent merely used such generic name
to describe collectively the various corporations in which the Litonjua family has
business interest. Considering the non-existence of the Litonjua group of companies
as a juridical entity and petitioner Eddie Litonjua’s denial of his connection in any
capacity with the ACT Theater, the supposed company where Vigan was employed,
petitioner Eddie Litonjuas should also be excluded as a party in this case since
respondent Vigan failed to prove Eddie Litonjua’s participation in the instant case. It
is respondent Vigan, being the party asserting a fact, who has the burden of proof
as to such fact10 which however, she failed to discharge.

On June 10, 1997, Labor Arbiter Ernesto S. Dinopol rendered his decision4 finding
Vigan diseased and unfit for work under Article 284 of the Labor Code5 and awarded
corresponding separation pay.

Vigan appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission which
modified7 the arbiter’s decision by ruling that Art. 284 of the Labor Code is
inapplicable in the instant case but affirmed the legality of the termination of the
complainant based on her having effectively abandoned her job; the rest of the
decision was affirmed. Vigan moved for a partial reconsideration which was denied
in a resolution dated August 7, 1998.

Vigan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which reversed the
NLRC Resolution. It ordered the respondents jointly and severally to: (a) Reinstate
VIGAN if she so desires; or (b) pay her separation compensation in the sum of
P8,000.00 multiplied by her years of service counted from February 2, 1979 up to
the time this Decision becomes final; and in either case to pay Vigan; (c) full back
wages from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the date of the finality of this
Decision; (d) moral damages in the amount of P40,000.00; (e) exemplary damages
in the amount of P15,000.00; and (f) attorney’s fees of P10,000.00.

Litonjuas filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the filing
of the instant petition for review on certiorari. alleging the following grounds:

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT “LITONJUA GROUP OF COMPANIES", WHICH HAS NO

JURIDICAL PERSONALITY, BUT ONLY A GENERIC NAME TO DESCRIBE THE VARIOUS
COMPANIES WHICH THE LITONJUA FAMILY HAS INTERESTS, CAN BE LEGALLY
CONSTRUED AS RESPONDENT’S EMPLOYER.

HELD: NO . Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be

parties to a civil action and every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
 21

PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. L-23825 15 SCRA 569 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126
to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.
Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise
by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the
executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional
mandate. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than
that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses
the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments,
bureaus or offices. Whether the settlement disputes is administrative in nature, the
municipality of Santo Tomas still remain to be part of Municipality of Kapalong
because the President has no power to create municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective
January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third
paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.”

Issues: Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an

undue delegation of legislative power.

Discussions: Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well
as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter,
the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority.

Rulings:

Parties to an Action
1.CARANDANG, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely:
CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 160347; November 29, 2006
FACTS: Spouses Carandang and the decedent Quirino de Guzman were
stockholders and corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS).
When the capital stock of MBS was increased on November 26, 1983, the
Carandangs subscribed P345,000 from it, P293,250 from the said amount was
loaned by Quirino to the Carandangs. In the subsequent increase in MBS’ capital
stock on March 3, 1989, the Carandangs subscribed again to the increase in the
amount of P93,750. But, P43,125 out of the mentioned amount was again loaned by
Quirino.
When Quirino sent a demand letter to the Carandangs for the payment of
the loan, the Carandangs refused to pay. They contend that a pre-incorporation
agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and Quirino, whereby Quirino
promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the Arcadio without cost, in
consideration for Arcadio’s technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment, and
his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore, there
is no indebtedness on the part of the Carandangs.
Thereafter, Quirino filed a complaint seeking to recover the P336,375 total amount
of the loan together with damages. The RTC ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered
the Carandangs to pay the loan plus interest, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. The
Carandangs appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA, but the CA affirmed the
same. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Carandangs were also
denied. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
SPOUSES CARANDANG: Three of the four checks used to pay their stock
subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the decedent’s wife.
Thus, Milagros should be considered as an indispensable party in the complaint.
Being such, the failure to join Milagros as a party in the case should cause the
dismissal of the action by reason of a jurisprudence stating that: “(i)f a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss
may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action."
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a
cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable
party, was not included as a party-plaintiff.
HELD: No. Assuming that the four checks are credits, they are assumed to be
conjugal properties of Quirino and Milagros. There being no evidence to the
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contrary, such presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner
of specific partnership property, is certainly a real party in interest.
Now, with regard to the discussion on the effect of non-inclusion of parties in the
complaint filed: in indispensable parties, when an indispensable party is not before
the court, the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actuations of the court void, for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. For necessary parties,
the non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding
in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the
rights of such necessary party. Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a
necessary party would not warrant the dismissal of the complaint. Lastly, for pro-
forma parties, the general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such
non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to
recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was
not a jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal
as it is merely a formal requirement which may be cured by amendment.
Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma parties are also indispensable or
necessary parties, the rules concerning indispensable or necessary parties, as the
case may be, should be applied. Thus, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma
party not joined in the complaint is an indispensable party.
Under Art. 147 of the Civil Code which was superceded by Art. 108 of the Family
Code, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership. Thus, Milagros is a co-owner of the subject personal property in this
case – the credit incurred by spouses Carandang. Being co-owners of the alleged
credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for the
Recovery thereof.
“In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any
one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned
properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the
suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary
parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-
owners.”
Thus, Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action for the
recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such, she
need not have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is not
warranted by her not being a party thereto. (The Civ Pro issue was not the main
issue in the case.)

2. G.R. No. 161916 January 20, 2006
ARNELITO ADLAWAN, Petitioner, vs. EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and NARCISA
M. ADLAWAN, Respondents
FACTS:
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the
father of (petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of
Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself
the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his
father to occupy the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came
when he demanded that they vacate but respondents refused. Hence, an action for
ejectment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit
HELD:
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole
heir of Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and
Graciana became co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed on to her
relatives by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487.
Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-
owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining all the co-owners as
plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the
action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his
repudiation of the ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition should be
dismissed.
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3.BUMATAY V BUMATAY
GR 191320 April 25, 2017
Lolita allegedly married a certain Amado Rosete (Amado) on January 30, 1968,
when she was 16 years old.[3] The marriage was solemnized before Judge Delfin D.
Rosario, in Malasiqui, Pangasinan.[4] Prior to the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Amado on September 20, 2005,[5] Lolita married Jona's foster
father.
Jona filed a Complaint for Bigamy.RTC granted the motion to Quash. CA affirmed
Issues:
whether the CA committed any reversible error in upholding the RTC-San Carlos'
Order granting Lolita's motion to quash the Information for the crime of Bigamy.
Ruling:
The petition is denied.
Petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case.
the People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings before this Court.
Settled is the rule that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest[,]" who, in turn, is one "who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."[56] Within this context, "interest" means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved.[57] To be clear, real interest refers to a
present substantial interest, and not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.[58] Here, the record is replete with
indications[59] that Jona's natural parents are unknown and she was merely raised
as the "foster daughter" of Jose Bumatay, without having undergone the process of
legal adoption.

4.SAMANIEGO vs AGUILA
GR 125567 June 27, 2000
Facts: The Office of the President granted the exemption from the coverage of the
"Operation Land Transfer Program" the land owned by X. On appeal, the CA
dismissed the petition questioning the decision of the Office for failure to implead
the Office of the President, as they should be considered as indispensable parties.
Issue: Whether the Office of the President should be considered as an indispensable
party and must therefore be impleaded pursuant to the Rules.
Held: No. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action without that party being impleaded.
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, or that the court cannot proceed
without their presence. "Interests" within the meaning of this rule, should be
material, directly in issue and to be v by the decree as distinguished from a mere
incidental interest in the question involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro
forma party is one who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party
has any real interest on the subject matter or because any relief is demanded, but
merely because the technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such party
on the record. In the case at bar, the failure to implead the Office of the President
does not warrant the dismissal of the case as such is considered as a pro forma
party.
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5. Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc.
G.R. No. 194024 April 25, 2012
FACTS
Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered
individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium developed
by the respondent.
In August 2008, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint before
the HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business practices and violation of the
MDDR, alleging that DPDCI committed misrepresentation in their circulated flyers
and brochures as to the facilities or amenities that would be available in the
condominium and failed to perform its obligation to comply with the MDDR.
In defense, DPDCI alleged that the brochure attached to the complaint was “a mere
preparatory draft”. HLURB rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. DPDCI filed
with the CA its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on the ground that HLURB
acted without or beyond its jurisdiction.
The CA ruled that the HLURB had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
petitioners as the controversy did not fall within the scope of the administrative
agency’s authority.
ISSUE:
Whether PHCC is an indispensable party
HELD:
. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. It is "precisely ‘when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.’
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
to those present. The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a
complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but
also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment.
PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded, as it would be
directly and adversely affected by any determination therein. Evidently, the cause
of action rightfully pertains to PHCC

6. Samahang Magsasaka ng 53Hektarya v. Mosquera
GR 152430 March 22, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya is an association of farmer-
beneficiaries duly recognized by the DAR. Petitioner alleged that its members had
been cultivating the disputed land of the case for many years prior to the effectivity
of R.A. 6657, known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law". Respondents
are the registered owners of three parcels of land located in Macabud, Rodriguez
(formerly Montalban), Rizal, previously owned by Philippine Suburban Development
Corporation which planned to develop it as a residential subdivision. In 1979, it was
sold to Vinebel Realties, Inc. through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Petitioner
alleged that in 1994, the landholding was sold to respondents without any DAR
clearance, in violation of Section CARL.
. petitioners falsified a document entitled Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous
On appeal, OP set aside the DAR Secretary’s Orders and exempted the property
from the CARL coverage. Petitioners filed two Motions for Reconsiderations but both
were denied by OP through its two Resolutions. Petitioner appealed the Resolutions
of the OP to the CA through Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA
ruled that the petitioner was not a real party-in-interest and not being actual
grantee of the land but mere qualified beneficiary, had no legal standing.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners are real parties-in-interest in this case.
HELD.
No.petitioner is not a real party-in-interest in this case. According to Sec. 2 of Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. In the case at bar, members of petitioner Samahan are mere qualified
beneficiaries of CARP. The certification that CLOAs were already generated in their
names, but were not issued because of the present dispute, does not vest any right
to the farmers since the fact remains that they have not yet been approved as
awardees, actually awarded lands, or granted CLOAs.
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7. Macababbad Jr. v Masirag GR. No. 161237
Jan. 14, 2009
Facts: Fernando Masirag (Fernando), Faustina Masirag (Faustina), Corazon Masirag
(Corazon), Leonor Masirag (Leonor) and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio)
(collectively called the respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint against
Macababbad, Chua and Say. They amended their complaint to allege new matters.
The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona)
were the original registered owners of Lot No. 4144 of the Cadastral Survey of
Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144), as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
1946. Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the
children of Valeriano and Alfora Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and
Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of their
respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their parents in
the first week of March 1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent
Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. The investigation disclosed that the
Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) dated December 3, 1967[12]
(hereinafter referred to as the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale) so that
the respondents were deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144. The document
purportedly bore the respondents signatures, making them appear to have
participated in the execution of the document when they did not; they did not even
know the petitioners. The document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to
Macababbad for the sum of P1,800.00
On May 18, 1972, Chua filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-13408 and
the issuance of a title evidencing his ownership over a subdivided portion of Lot No.
4144 covering 803.50 square meters. The RTC, after initially denying the motion to
dismiss, reconsidered its ruling and dismissed the complaint in its Order dated May
29, 2000 on one of the grounds that: there was failure to implead indispensable
parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the persons who have
already acquired title to portions of the subject property in good faith. CA reversed
and set aside the RTCs dismissal of the complaint
ISSUE : WON RTC is correct in dismissing complaint on ground of failure to
implead indispensable parties
SC: Indispensable parties are those parties who possess such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights so that the
courts cannot proceed without their presence. A party is indispensable if his interest
in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined
with the other parties’ interest. In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the
property sought to be recovered are indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance
were the only relief prayed for, impleading petitioners Macababbad and the spouses
Chua and Say would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the action is
for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, all of
the parties who executed the same should be impleaded for a complete resolution of
the case. This case, however, is not without its twist on the issue of impleading

indispensable parties as the RTC never issued an order directing their inclusion.
Under this legal situation, particularly in light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of
Court, there can be no basis for the immediate dismissal of the action.
Domingo v Scheer GR.
No.154745 Jan. 29, 2004
Respondent Scheer is a native of Germany, who was eventually granted a
permanent resident status in the Philippines. He eventually married here and
started a family as well as a business in Palawan. Vice Consul Hippelein informed
the Philippine Ambassador to Germany that the respondent had police records and
financial liabilities in Germany. The DFA receive from the German Embassy in Manila
that the respondent is wanted in Germany, and requested to turn over his German
passport to the Embassy. Thereafter BOC issued a Summary Deportation Order
dated September 27, 1997. It was stated that the deportation shall be held in
abeyance pending respondent’s case and he shall remain in the custody of the
bureau. In issuing this the BOC relied on the statements of the German Vice Consul
on the speculation that it is improbable that the respondent will be issued a new
passport, the warrant of arrest for insurance fraud and alleged illegal activities in
Palawan. Respondent nevertheless stayed in the Philippines after airing his side to
then BID Commissioner Verceles, the latter giving him time to apply for a clearance
and a new passport. Scheer eventually filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
stating that his right to due process was violated, for there was no notice or chance
to be heard before the issuance of the deportation order. Eventually the criminal
case for physical injuries against the respondent was dismissed, and he was issued
a passport. He informed Commissioner Verceles about this matter and reiterated
the cancellation of the order, but the Commissioner did not respond. Thereafter
Commissioner Domingo assumed office and on June 6, 2002, she ordered the
apprehension of the respondent who was held in custody awaiting deportation.
Shocked, respondent sought remedy with the CA, during the hearing of which the
Solicitor General suggested that the respondent leave the country first then just re-
apply. A decision was reached in favor of Scheer, permanently enjoining Domingo
from continuing the deportation, thus this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BOC was an indispensable party to the case.
SC: 1. Yes – but not enough to invalidate the petition.
Petitioner argues that the respondent must have impleaded BOC as the respondent,
and not Commissioner Domingo alone. The Summary Deportation Order was issued
by the BOC as a whole and Domingo is just but one Commissioner so the petitioner
argues that the action may be dismissed. The court ruled that it agrees with the
petitioner that the BOC was an indispensable party to the respondent’s petition in
the CA. However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. Parties may be added as ordered by the court and if the
petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party, then the petition may be
dismissed. In the case at bar, CA did not require to implead BOC as the respondent
26
so it does not warrant the dismissal of respondent’s petition. The court may choose
to amend the processes and the pleadings by substituting as party-plaintiff the real
party-interest, but the court also has the power to avoid delay in the disposition of
cases and it may just be unnecessary to still choose to implead BOC. The OSG has
already represented the petitioner in instant proceedings thus the BOC cannot claim
that it was not afforded the opportunity to be in court. Proceedings may be to
facilitate justice but they do not constitute the thing itself and they may be relaxed
in certain cases.
BACALSO VS. PADIGOS GR NO. 173192 APR 14, 2008
The case at bar involves a parcel of land located in Inayawan, Cebu, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2649 (0-9092) in the name of 13 co-owners.
Maximo Padigos (Maximo), Flaviano Mabuyo (Flaviano), Gaudencio Padigos
(Gaudencio), Domingo Padigos (Domingo), and Victoria P. Abarquez (Victoria), who
are among the herein respondents and are heirs of some of the co-owners of the
property, filed before the RTC of Cebu City, a Complaint against Rosendo Bacalso
(Rosendo) and Rodrigo Bacalso (Rodrigo) who are among the herein petitioners, for
quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession, and
damages.
Respondents alleged that the therein defendants-petitioners Rosendo and Rodrigo
are heirs of Alipio Bacalso, Sr. (Alipio, Sr.) who, during his lifetime, secured Tax
Declarations covering the lot without any legal basis; that Rosendo and Rodrigo
have been leasing portions of the lot to persons who built houses thereon, and
Rosendo has been living in a house built on a portion of the lot; and that demands
to vacate and efforts at conciliation proved futile, prompting them to file the
complaint at the RTC. On the other hand, petitioners Rosendo and Rodrigo claimed
that their father Alipio, Sr. purchased via deeds of sale the shares in the lot of
Fortunata, Simplicio, Wenceslao, Geronimo, and Felix from their respective heirs,
and that Alipio, Sr. acquired the shares of the other co-owners of the lot by
extraordinary acquisitive prescription through continuous, open, peaceful, and
adverse possession thereof in the concept of an owner since 1949.
RTC decided in favor in the therein plaintiffs-herein respondents. Upon appeal, the
CA also affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed because of the non-inclusion of
some of the heirs of the co-owners claimed to be indispensible parties in the
complaint
HELD:
Respondents’ contention does not lie. The action is for quieting of title, declaration
of nullity of documents, recovery of possession and ownership, and damages.

Arcelona v. Court of Appeals defines indispensable parties under Section 7 of Rule 3,
Rules of Court as follows:
[P]arties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action.
As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule
with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the
joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable
parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power. It is precisely “when an indispensable party is not before
the court (that) the action should be dismissed.” The absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
VILLANUEVA VS. NITE GR NO. 148211 JULY 25, 2006
Facts:
Marilyn Nite, the respondent, obtained a loan from petitioner Villanueva and as a
security for the loan, she issued an ABC check (Asian bank Corporation) thereto.
The date however was later on change but with consent of Villanueva. Upon
presentment of check by petitioner, it was dishonored due to material alteration, so
respondent Nite who already left the country, thru her representative, then instead
partially settle her loan with the agreement that the balance would be payable on a
later date.
However, only six (6) days thereafter, Villanueva instituted an action for sum of
money against ABC bank for the full amount of dishonored check where RTC ruled
in his favor and ordered the bank to pay Villanueva. Only then respondent Nite
found out that her account lacked such amount. She went to CA seeking to annul
RTC order and decision, who ruled now on her favor finding fraud and bad faith
attendant on part of Villanueva.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
HELD: The annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner. Respondent may avail of the remedy of
annulment of judgment under Rule 47. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal
and petition for relief were not available to her for the simple reason that she was
not made a party to the suit against ABC. Thus, she was neither able to participate
in the original proceedings nor resort to the other remedies because the case was
filed when she was abroad.
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Annulment of judgment may be based only on extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such fraud which prevents the
aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or is used to
procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy. This refers to acts
intended to keep the unsuccessful party away from the courts as when there is a
false promise of compromise or when one is kept in ignorance of the suit.
The contract of loan was between petitioner and respondent. No collection suit could
prosper without respondent who was an indispensable party. Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the
Rules of Court states: Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.—Parties
in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (emphasis ours) An indispensable party is
one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree will necessarily
affect his rights. The court cannot proceed without his presence. If an indispensable
party is not impleaded, any judgment is ineffective.
GALANG VS. WALLIS JULY 3, 2019
Facts:
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, Declaration of Nullity,
Annulment of Tax Declaration, Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Damages, claiming to be the lawful owners of parcels of land. In
said complaint, they traced the provenance of their title to a certain Wasiwas
Bermor who occupied the land as early as 1908 and registered the same in his
name in 1961By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner Fagyan acquired the
land from Wasiwas and subsequently divided and transferred portions thereof to the
rest of the petitioners. According to petitioners, despite the fact that they legally
acquired the subject lands as evidenced by the Deeds of Absolute Sale they
presented, respondents have been intruding into their land in bad faith and without
any color of title. They assert that the documents being used by respondents to
justify their intrusion were fraudulently acquired and are patent nullities. As such,
petitioners prayed that the RTC: (1) declare them as the true and absolute owners
of the subject lands; (2) issue a TRO restraining respondents from pursuing any
more improvements and excavations thereon; (3) order respondents to vacate the
portions of the lands that they are unlawfully occupying; (4) restore them of their
lawful possession of the same; (5) declare as null and void the documents of
ownership being used by respondents; and (6) order respondents to pay them
damages and costs of the suit.
Respondents filed motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case because of the fact that the land subject of the
controversy is an ancestral land and that said controversy is among members of
indigenous peoples' groups. As such, the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Hearing Officer of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).

RTC dismissed the complaint on the finding that it is bereft of jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
petitioners and ruled that the parties may litigate before the NCIP. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N NCIP has jurisdiction over the case filed by petitioners.
Held: Yes. In the case of Undaran, the Supreme Court ruled that NCIP shall have
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they
arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group because of the
qualifying provision under Section 66 of the IPRA that "no such dispute shall be
brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under
their customary laws. The Court thus noted that the two conditions cannot be
complied with if the parties to a case either (1) belong to different ICCs/IP groups
which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws, or (2)
if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary
laws or a Council of Elders/Leaders, for it would be contrary to the principles of fair
play and due process for parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be
subjected to its own distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. In which
case, the Court ruled that the regular courts shall have jurisdiction, and that the
NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is, in effect, limited to cases where the opposing
parties belong to the same ICC/IP group
In the case at bar, the parties are members of indigenous groups and that the case
involves a dispute among groups of indigenous people. They do not, however,
belong to the same ICC/IP group. Thus, applying the doctrine in Unduran, it is the
RTC, and not the NCIP, which has jurisdiction over the instant case. This is so even
if it was also found that the subject land appears to be classified as ancestral land.
RTC should not have dismissed the complaint as it actually had jurisdiction over the
same.
In the case of Unduran, the allegations in petitioners' complaint neither alleged that
the parties are members of ICC/IP nor that the case involves a dispute or
controversy over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IP. Rather, the allegations in their
complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action involving an interest
in a real property with an assessed value of more than P20,000.00. Thus, similar to
the finding of the Court in Unduran, the complaint of petitioners herein is well within
the jurisdiction of the RTC. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by the Constitution or by law. A court of general jurisdiction has the power or
authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial function.
28
With respect to the finding of the RTC on primary and concurrent jurisdiction of the
regular courts and the NCIP, moreover, the Court pronounced in Unduran that there
is nothing in the provisions of the entire IPRA that expressly or impliedly confer
concurrent jurisdiction to the NCIP and the regular courts over claims and disputes
involving rights of ICC/IP between and among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP
group. As such, the NCIP's jurisdiction vested under Section 66 of the IPRA is
merely limited and cannot be deemed concurrent with the regular courts.
CARANDANG V HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN GR. NO. 160347 NOV. 29, 2006
FACTS:
The Spouses Carandang and the decedent Quirino de Guzman were stockholders
and corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS). The Carandangs
have equities at 54 % while Quirino has 46%. When the capital stock of MBS was
increased, the Carandang borrowed money from Quirino. When Quirino sent a
demand letter to the Carandangs for the payment of the loan, the Carandangs
refused to pay. Thereafter, Quirino filed a complaint seeking to recover the
P336,375 total amount of the loan together with damages. The RTC ruled in favor of
Quirino and ordered the Carandangs to pay the loan plus interest, attorney’s fees,
and costs of suit. Carandangs argued that three of the four checks used to pay their
stock subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the decedent’s
wife. Thus, Milagros should be considered as an indispensable party in the
complaint. Being such, the failure to join Milagros as a party in the case should
cause the dismissal of the action.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of
action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was
not included as a party-plaintiff .
HELD: NO. Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is conferred by law and
is not subject to the discretion of the parties, jurisdiction over the person of the
parties to the case may be waived either expressly or impliedly. Implied waiver
comes in the form of either voluntary appearance or a failure to object. In the cases
cited by the spouses Carandang, we held that there had been no valid substitution
by the heirs of the deceased party, and therefore the judgment cannot be made
binding upon them. In the case at bar, not only do the heirs of de Guzman interpose
no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; they are actually
claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. In doing so, their waiver is not even
merely implied (by their participation in the appeal of said Decision), but express
(by their explicit espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals and in this
Court). The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of
the RTC. Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a
personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it
by silence.

It also pays to look into the spirit behind the general rule requiring a formal
substitution of heirs. The underlying principle therefor is not really because
substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional requirement, but because non-compliance
therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those
who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the
decision rendered therein. Such violation of due process can only be asserted by the
persons whose rights are claimed to have been violated, namely the heirs to whom
the adverse judgment is sought to be enforced.
The Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms “real
party in interest” and “indispensable party.” A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to
a necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined
as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not
joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is
omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may
order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may
be obtained. The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable
cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party. The noninclusion
of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and
the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
necessary party. Noncompliance with the order for the inclusion of a necessary
party would not warrant the dismissal of the complaint. This is an exception to
Section 3, Rule 17 which allows the dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply
with an order of the court, as Section 9, Rule 3 specifically provides for the effect of
such non-inclusion: it shall not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and
the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
necessary party. Section 11, Rule 3 likewise provides that the nonjoinder of parties
is not a ground for the dismissal of the action.
Other than the indispensable and necessary parties, there is a third set of
parties: the pro forma parties, which are those who are required to be joined as co-
parties in suits by or against another party as may be provided by the applicable
substantive law or procedural rule. An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court: Sec. 4. Spouses as parties.—Husband and wife shall sue or be
sued jointly, except as provided by law. Pro forma parties can either be
indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary. The third case
occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property which he
claims to be part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no legal interest in
such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be joined as a party. In
cases of pro forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary, the general
29
rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for
dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to recover a sum of money, we
held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional defect.
The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal
requirement which may be cured by amendment. Conversely, in the instances that
the pro forma parties are also indispensable or necessary parties, the rules
concerning indispensable or necessary parties, as the case may be, should be
applied. Thus, dismissal is warranted only if the pro forma party not joined in the
complaint is an indispensable party.
Article 108 of the Family Code provides: Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be
governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with
what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it
superseded: Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on
the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in this Chapter. In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code
provides that “[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific
partnership property.” Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the
funds used to finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners’ stock
subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of
conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of
the alleged credit. Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de
Guzman may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In the fairly recent
cases of Baloloy v. Hular, 438 SCRA 80 (2004), and Adlawan v. Adlawan, 479 SCRA
275 (2006), we held that, in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the
recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other
coowners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of his co-owners. In the latter case and in that of De Guia v. Court of
Appeals, 413 SCRA 114 (2003), we also held that Article 487 of the Civil Code,
which provides that any of the coowners may bring an action for ejectment, covers
all kinds of action for the recovery of possession.

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC V CA GR. NO. 110318 AUG. 28, 1996
FACTS:
Columbia Pictures, et al. had lodged a formal complaint with the NBI, vis-à-vis their
anti-film piracy drive. Eventually, the NBI obtained a search warrant against
Sunshine Video seeking to seize pirated video tapes, among others. The NBI carried
out the seizure, and filed a return with the trial court. However, the trial court
eventually granted a motion to lift the order of search warrant – the contention was
that the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied were never presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the
search warrants. The CA dismissed the appeal brought before it. Hence, Columbia
Pictures, et al. brought the case before the SC.Sunshine Video contended that
Columbia Pictures, et al. (being foreign corporations doing business in the
Philippines) should have a license in order to maintain an action in Philippine courts
– and without such license, it had no right to ask for the issuance of a search
warrant. Sunshine video submitted that the fact that Columbia Pictures, et al. were
copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of
copyrighted motion pictures, AND the fact that Att. Domingo had been appointed as
their atty.-in-fact constituted “doing business in the Philippines”, under the Rules of
the Board of Investments.
ISSUE:
Do Colombia Pictures, et al. have legal personality to sue in the Philippines?
HELD: YES. As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing
business in the State simply because it enters into contracts with residents of the
State, where such contracts are consummated outside the State. In fact, a view is
taken that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the State merely because
sales of its product are made there or other business furthering its interests is
transacted there by an alleged agent, whether a corporation or a natural person
where such activities are not under the direction and control of the foreign
corporation but are engaged in by the alleged agent as an independent business.
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent
dealer who has purchased and obtained title from the corporation to the products
sold are not a doing of business by the corporation. Likewise, a foreign corporation
which sells its products to persons styled “distributing agents” in the State, for
distribution by them, is not doing business in the State so as to render it subject to
service of process therein, where the contract with these purchasers is that they
shall buy exclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it manufactures
and shall sell them at trade prices established by it.
30
It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging an
attorney to represent it in a Federal court sitting in a particular State is not doing
business within the scope of the minimum contact test. With much more reason
should this doctrine apply to the mere retainer of Atty. Domingo for legal protection
against contingent acts of intellectual piracy.
In accordance with the rule that “doing business” imports only acts in furtherance of
the purposes for which a foreign corporation organized, it is held that the mere
institution and prosecution or defense of a suit, particularly if the transaction which
is the basis of the suit took place out of the State, do not amount to the doing of
business in the State. The institution of a suit or the removal thereof is neither the
making of a contract nor the doing of business within a constitutional provision
placing foreign corporation’s licensed to do business in the State under the same
regulations, limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic
corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not a sufficient
minimum contact to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are
lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack
of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil
rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does
not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is
dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real
party in interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.
The term “lack of capacity to sue” should not be confused with the term “lack of
personality to sue.” While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general disability to sue,
such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality
or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground
for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;
whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
 31

Evangelista v Santiago GR. No. 157447 April 29, 2005 Issue: Whether or not the Petitioner has the capacity to sue

Facts: This case is about the complaint for the declaration of nullity of
Original Certificate of Title No. 670 and all other titles emanating therefrom. The
subject property is a vast tract of lands where the petitioners alleged that they
occupied and possessed such parcels. The whole property covered by OCT No. 670
was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1024in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago the
mother of herein respondent. Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996,
an action for declaration of nullity of respondent’s certificates of title on the basis
that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious and also Petitioners came by information
that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the
petitioners had actually received notices to vacate.
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative
Defenses.Respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the
Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670
was genuine and authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondent’s
land titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive
against the petitioners and the whole world. Furthermore, He pointed out that any
action against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with regard to
OCT No. 670, which was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of
the Complaint by the petitioners.
During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer Placido
Naval, a supposed expert on land registration laws. In response to questions from
Honorable Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered
that a parcel of land titled illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title was
cancelled, and that it was the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that
should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the other
hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and documents
he had so far submitted to the trial court.
Held:No. Before anything else, it should be clarified that “the plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue” and “the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action” are
two different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative
defenses. Failure to distinguish between “the lack of legal capacity to sue” from “the
lack of personality to sue” is a fairly common mistake. The difference between the
two is explained by this Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: Among
the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal
capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal
capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or
does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have
the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible
for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term “lack of
capacity to sue” should not be confused with the term “lack of personality to sue.”
While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as on account
of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the
real party-in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to
dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second
can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the
complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.

RTC dismissed the case ruling that plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land
subject of this case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not
have the legal standing to bring before this Court the instant complaint.Defendants
title especially so with the mother title OCT 670 was entered and issued in 1913 or
more than Eighty Three (83) years ago, the same not having been questioned by
any party. Only now that it is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are on
the offensive and relying on their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their
case, unwittingly sealed their fate.

The MR of the petitioner are likewise dismissed. The CA affirmed the decision of
RTC. Hence the reason of this petition.

Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v Chubb and Sons, Inc . GR. No. 147724
June 8, 2004 Puno, J.
Facts:
Lorenzo Shipping Corporation is a corporation engaged in shipping. It was
the carrier of 581 bundles of black steel pipes from Manila to Davao City. From
Davao City, Gearbulk, Ltd. A corporation licensed as a common carrier under the
laws of Norway, through its agent, Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., carried the
goods on board M/V San Mateo to the US, for the account of Sumitomo Corporation.
Sumitomo insured the shipment with Chubb and Sons, Inc., a foreign
corporation licensed to engage in insurance business under the laws of the US. M/V
Lorcon received the shipping of steel pipes in good order and condition as evidenced
by the clean bill of lading. When the cargo was unloaded from Lorenzo Shipping’s
vessel at Davao City, the steel pipes were rusted all over.
M/V San Mateo of Gearbulk Ltd which received the cargo issued bills of
lading covering the entire shipment marked “all units heavily rusted”. Surveyors
found that the cargo hold of M/V Lorcon was flooded with seawater, the tank was
rusty, thinning and perforated thereby exposing the cargo to sea water. The cargo
was damaged while in the ship. Negligence was sufficiently established. The contact
with the steel pipes caused the development of rust.
While the ship was on transit from Davao to US, the consignee sent a letter
of intent to Lorenzo shipping informing them that it would file a claim based on the
damaged cargo once the damage had been ascertained. Once Sumitomo inspected
the pipes, it declared them unfit and filed a marine insurance claim against Chubb
and Sons for $104k.
Chubb and Sons filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against
Lorenzo Shipping, Gearbulk, and Transmarine. RTC found Chubb and Sons had the
right to institute the action and Lorenzo shipping was negligent. CA affirmed.
Lorenzo claimed the packaging was defective and that the action was
prescribed (SC ruled against both defenses. There was evidence that the shipment
was packed in superior condition.)
Issue:
1. Did Chubb and Sons have capacity to sue?
2. Had the action prescribed?
Held: 1. Yes
Re: Capacity to sue
Capacity to sue is a right personal to its holder , its is conferred by law.
The foreign corporation doing an isolated business transaction in the Philippines
does not need a license. The insurer Chubb and Sons is the real party in interest
and damages. Where an insurance company as subrogee pays the insured of the
entire loss it suffered, the insurer subrogee is the only real party in interest and
must sue in its own name to enforce its right of subrogation against a third party
which caused the loss. The subrogated unsurer becomes owner of the claims and
the entire fruits of the action.
2. No Ratio:
Re: Art 366 Code of Commerce:
32
24 hour period that does not begin until the consignee has received
possession of the merchandise or by delivery of the cargo by the carrier to the
consignee at the place of destination. · In this case, consignee Sumitomo only took
possession of the entire shipment when it reached the US. Only then was the
delivery made and completed and only then did the 24 hour prescriptive period run.
Steelcase Inc. v Design International Selection
GR. No. 171995
April 18, 2012
FACTS
Steelcase, Inc. (Steelcase) granted Design International Selections, Inc. (DISI) the
right to market, sell, distribute, install, and service its products to end-user
customers within the Philippines.Steelcase argues that Section 3(d) of R.A. No.
7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA) expressly states that the phrase
doing business excludes the appointment by a foreign corporation of a local
distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and
for its own account. On the other hand, DISI argues that it was appointed by
Steelcase as the latter’s exclusive distributor of Steelcase products. The dealership
agreement between Steelcase and DISI had been described by the owner himself as
basically a buy and sell arrangement.
ISSUE
Whether Steelcase had been doing business in the Philippines.
RULING
NO.
[T]he appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient to constitute
doing business unless it is under the full control of the foreign corporation. On the
other hand, if the distributor is an independent entity which buys and distributes
products, other than those of the foreign corporation, for its own name and its own
account, the latter cannot be considered to be doing business in the Philippines.
Here, DISI was an independent contractor which sold Steelcase products in its own
name and for its own account. As a result, Steelcase cannot be considered to be
doing business in the Philippines by its act of appointing a distributor as it falls
under one of the exceptions under R.A. No. 7042.
 33

La Chemise Lacoste, S.A v Fernandez We further held:

214 Phil 332
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
La chemise Lacoste is a French corporation and the actual owner of the
trademarks “Lacoste,”“Chemise Lacoste,” “Crocodile Device” and a composite mark
consisting of the word “Lacoste” and are presentation of a crocodile/alligator, used
on clothing's and other goods sold in many parts of the world and which has been
marketed in the Philippines (notably by Rustans) since 1964.
In 1975 and 1977, Hemandas Q. Co. was issued certificate of registration
for the trademark “Chemise Lacoste and Q Crocodile Device "both in the
supplemental and Principal Registry. In 1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed for the
registration of the “Crocodile device” and “Lacoste”.
xxx xxx xxx
... That company is not here seeking to enforce any legal or
control rights arising from, or growing out of, any business which
it has transacted in the Philippine Islands. The sole purpose of the
action:
Is to protect its reputation, its corporate name, its goodwill,
whenever that reputation, corporate name or goodwill have,
through the natural development of its trade, established
themselves.' And it contends that its rights to the use of its
corporate and trade name:

Games and Garments (Gobindram Hemandas, assignee of Hemandas Q.Co.) Is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect
opposed the registration of “Lacoste.” against all the world, in any of the courts of the world-even in
jurisdictions where it does not transact business-just the same as
In 1983, La Chemise Lacoste filed with the NBI a letter-complaint alleging it may protect its tangible property, real or personal, against
acts of unfair competition committed by Hemandas and requesting the agency’s trespass, or conversion. …….xx
assistance for investigation and prosection.
A search warrant was issued by the trial court. Various goods and articles were
Since it is the trade and not the mark that is to be protected, a
seized upon the execution of the warrants.
trade-mark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of
municipalities or states or nations, but extends to every market
Hemandas filed motion to quash the warrants, which the court granted.
where the trader's goods have become known and Identified by
The search warrants were recalled, and the goods ordered to be returned. La
the use of the mark.
Chemise Lacoste filed a petition for certiorari. The defendant argued that the
petitioner has no capacity to sue being a foreign corporation not doing business in
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded
the Philippines
this petition forcertiorari was a letter complaint filed before the NBI charging
Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation
Issue/s: Whether or not La Chemise Lacoste has capacity to sue
being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of
the People of the Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved
Ruling:-Yes.
party since a criminal offense is essentially an act against the State. It is the latter
which is principally the injured party although there is a private right violated.
As early as 1927, this Court was, and it still is, of the view that a foreign Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the
corporation not doing business in the Philippines needs no license to sue before main case
Philippine courts for infringement of trademark and unfair competition. Thus, in
Western Equipment and Supply Co. v. Reyes(51 Phil. 115), this Court held that a
foreign corporation which has never done any business in the Philippines and which
is unlicensed and unregistered to do business here, but is widely and favorably
known in the Philippines through the use therein of its products bearing its
corporate and tradename, has a legal right to maintain an action in the Philippines
to restrain the residents and inhabitants thereof from organizing a corporation
therein bearing the same name as the foreign corporation, when it appears that
they have personal knowledge of the existence of such a foreign corporation, and it
is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation is to deal and
trade in the same goods as those of the foreign corporation.

Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123231 November 17, 1997
Facts:
Plaintiffs-appellants [private respondents] filed complaint for the declaration of
nullity of Original Certificate of Title No. P-8265 issued in the name of the heirs of
Marciano Nagaño and covering Cad. Lot. No. 3275. Plaintiff-appellants alleged that
the issuance of the said title was on account of the fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation committed by defendant Marcario Valerio. An information for
perjury was even filed on November 2, 1983 against defendant Valerio, who
unlawfully attested that Lot No. 3275 was not occupied or being claimed by other
persons. Plaintiff-appellants alleged that part of the subject property was owned by
their predecessors-in-interest Rufino Mallari and Ferminal Jamlig and that they were
in possession of the said land since 1920. They recently discovered that their entire
Lot No. 3275 was registered by defendant Valerio under Free Patent No. (III-2)
001953 and OCT No. P-8265 in the name of the heirs of Marciano Nagaño. They
allegedly demanded from defendant Velerio to execute the necessary document in
order that the 2,250 square meters owned by them be segregated from the
property titled in the name of the defendants-appellee [petitioners herein].
Defendants-appellee, however, refused to accede their demands.
Issue:
Whether private respondents claim ownership to the 2,250 square meter portion of
the land.
Held:
It is clear from the allegations in the complaint that private respondents
claimownership to the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the
concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since
1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it
was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect
title thereto. Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint,
the lot in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau
of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence, dismissal of private
respondents’ complaintwas premature and trial on the merits should have been
conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters.
In light of the above, and at this time, prescription is unavailing against private
respondent’s action. It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land is null
and void, and produces no legal affects whatsoever. Moreover, private respondent’s
claim of open, public, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the 2,250
square meter portion since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of
petitioners and in their original certificateof title, gave private respondents a cause
of action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
34
Heirs of Kionisala vs Heirs of Dacut, GR No. 147379, Feb 27, 2002
Facts:
In this case, the Kionisalas acquired a free patent over the subject
properties. Thereafter an Original Certificate of Title was issued in their names.
However, the Dacuts filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles,
reconveyance and damages against the Kionisalas, claiming absolute ownership of
the subject properties even prior to the issuance of the corresponding free patents
and certificates of title.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the cause of
action of Dacuts was truly for reversion so that only the Director of Lands could
have filed the complaint. The CA ruled that, it was reversible error for the lower
court to have dismissed the complaint because in an action for reconveyance, what
is sought is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner or to one with a
better right. Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title the same
as action for reversion
SC: NO. The real party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a
pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the
grant of title to the defendant in case of action for declaration of nullity of free
patents and certificates of title.
In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit
State ownership of the disputed land. Hence in Gabila v. Barriga where the plaintiff
in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or
amendment of the defendants title because even if the title were canceled or
amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by
the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for
reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director
of Lands.

Macababbad Jr. v Masirag GR. No. 161237
Jan. 14, 2009
Facts:
Fernando Masirag (Fernando), Faustina Masirag (Faustina), Corazon Masirag
(Corazon), Leonor Masirag (Leonor) and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio)
(collectively called the respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint against
Macababbad, Chua and Say. They amended their complaint to allege new matters.
The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona)
were the original registered owners of Lot No. 4144 of the Cadastral Survey of
Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144), as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
1946. Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the
children of Valeriano and Alfora Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and
Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of their
respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their parents in
the first week of March 1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent
Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. The investigation disclosed that the
petitioners falsified a document entitled Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous
Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) dated December 3, 1967[12]
(hereinafter referred to as the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale) so that
the respondents were deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144. The document
purportedly bore the respondents signatures, making them appear to have
participated in the execution of the document when they did not; they did not even
know the petitioners. The document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to
Macababbad for the sum of P1,800.00
On May 18, 1972, Chua filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-13408 and
the issuance of a title evidencing his ownership over a subdivided portion of Lot No.
4144 covering 803.50 square meters. The RTC, after initially denying the motion to
dismiss, reconsidered its ruling and dismissed the complaint in its Order dated May
29, 2000 on one of the grounds that: there was failure to implead indispensable
parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the persons who have
already acquired title to portions of the subject property in good faith. CA reversed
and set aside the RTCs dismissal of the complaint
ISSUE : WON RTC is correct in dismissing complaint on ground of failure to
implead indispensable parties
SC: Indispensable parties are those parties who possess such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights so that the
courts cannot proceed without their presence. A party is indispensable if his interest
in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined
with the other parties’ interest. In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the
property sought to be recovered are indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance
were the only relief prayed for, impleading petitioners Macababbad and the spouses
Chua and Say would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the action is
35
for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, all of
the parties who executed the same should be impleaded for a complete resolution of
the case. This case, however, is not without its twist on the issue of impleading
indispensable parties as the RTC never issued an order directing their inclusion.
Under this legal situation, particularly in light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of
Court, there can be no basis for the immediate dismissal of the action.
Uy v CA GR. No. 157065 July 11, 2006
Facts:
Heritage Memorial Park is a flagship project of the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) in Fort Bonifacio. BCDA entered into an agreement denominated
as the Pool Formation Trust Agreement2 (PFTA) with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) and the Public Estates Authority (PEA). The BCDA was designated as the
Project Owner; PEA, the Project Manager; and PNB as the Trustee.
As project owner, the BCDA was tasked to sell the Heritage Park Investment
Certificates to the public and buyers become certificate holders. PEA, as project
manager, is tasked to implement and complete the various engineering works and
improvements of Heritage Park.Alleging delay in the construction of the projects and
huge discrepancy between the Accomplishment Report and the actual physical
accomplishment of petitioner's construction firm, the Heritage Park Executive
Committee terminated the two construction contracts namely, the landscaping and
nursery works, and the construction of the terrasoleum. Petitioner filed a complaint
against the PEA before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
where it sought to recover payment for its progress billings on the said projects.
On December 18, 2001, CIAC promulgated its decision in favor of the Claimant
Contractor ELPIDIO S. UY. Alias Writ of Execution was issued by CIAC and on the
following day, a Notice of Garnishment was served on private respondent. HPMC
then filed a petition for Injunction/Prohibition before the CA on the ground that
CIAC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter since HPMC was not impleaded as
a party thereby depriving it of its right to be heard. CA court ruled in favor of
respondent.
ISSUE: Is HPMC a real party-in-interest or an indispensable party
SC: Indispensable part is one that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity. Based on the Construction Agreement, PEA entered into it in
its capacity as Project Manager, pursuant to the PFTA. According to the provisions of
the PFTA, upon the formation of the HPMC, the PEA would turn over to the HPMC all
the contracts relating to the Heritage Park. At the time of the filing of the CIAC Case
on May 31, 2001, PEA ceased to be the Project Manager of the Heritage Park
Project, pursuant to Section 11 of the PFTA. Through a Deed of Assignment, PEA
assigned its interests in all the existing contracts it entered into as the Project
Manager for Heritage Park to HPMC. As early as March 17, 2000, PEA officially

turned over to HPMC all the documents and equipment in its possession related to
the Heritage Park Project. Petitioner was duly informed of these incidents through a
letter dated March 13, 2000. Apparently, as of the date of the filing of the CIAC
Case, PEA is no longer a party-in-interest. Instead, it is now private respondent
HPMC, as the assignee, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit. In its absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. We thus reiterate that
HPMC is an indispensable party.
SENO V MANGUBAT GR. NO. L-44339
DEC. 2, 1987
FACTS:
Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking: the reformation of a Deed of Sale executed in
favor of defendant Marcos Mangubat and, the annulment of a subsequent sale to
defendant spouses Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor of a parcel of land in
Barrio Dongalo, Paranaque, Rizal covered by OCT No. 1197 of the Land Registry of
Rizal.
Plaintiff Crisanta Seno negotiated with defendant Marcos Mangubat to enter with
him a mortgage over a parcel of land so she can pay off a previous indebtedness.
Here are the conditions agreed upon:
Money borrowed: P15,000.00 (with interest of 2% a month payable every month;
As long as the interest is being paid, the mortgage over the property will not be
foreclosed;Plaintiff Crisanta F. Seno (on the assurance of defendant Marcos
Mangubat, which is a practicing lawyer) agreed to the execution of a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the subject property for a consideration of P5,000.00. Later, the
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed transferring the title of the subject property to
defendant Marcos Mangubat.
Spouses Luzame and Penaflor moved to include as defendants Andres Evangelista
and Bienvenido Mangubat on the ground that they are indispensable parties.
The newly impleaded defendants moved for the dismissal of the case against them
on the ground of prescription.
DEFENDANTS Luzame, Penaflor and Marcos Mangubat asked the court a quo to
dismiss the case against all the defendants.
RTC: Dismissed the case against all the defendants – it is no longer in a position to
grant plaintiffs' demands, principally the reformation of subject Deed of Absolute
Sale. An appeal was brought to CA. CA certified the instant case to SC since the
assignment of errors made by plaintiffs are purely legal questions.
36
ISSUE: W/N defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat indispensable
parties in the case without whom no action can be properly taken thereon?
SC: NO. They are not indispensable parties, just proper parties. indispensable
parties must always be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the court cannot
proceed without them. Necessary parties must be joined, under Section 8, in order
to adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid multiplicity of suits.
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed
without their presence. Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to
adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a
final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.
In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista and
Bienvenido Mangubat to be safeguarded if the sale should be held to be in fact an
absolute sale nor if the sale is held to be an equitable mortgage. Defendant Marcos
Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the sale
to him of the shares of the aforementioned defendants in the property. Said
defendants no longer have any interest in the subject property. However, being
parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary in
order to settle all the possible issues of tile controversy. Whether the disputed sale
be declared an absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the
defendants will have been amply protected. Defendants-spouses Luzame in any
event may enforce their rights against defendant Marcos Mangubat.
Plaintiffs were not after defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat as
shown by their non-inclusion in the complaint and their opposition to the motion to
include said defendants in the complaint as indispensable parties. It was only
because they were ordered by the court a quo that they included the said
defendants in the complaint. The lower court erroneously held that the said
defendants are indispensable parties.
Notwithstanding, defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat not
being indispensable parties but only proper parties, their joinder as parties
defendants was correctly ordered being in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.
Landbank v Cacayuran GR. No. 191667
April 22, 2015
FACTS: The Municipality of Agoo entered into two loans with LBP in order to finance
a Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza. The Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality authorized the mayor Eufranio Eriguel to enter into a P4M loan with LBP
for the Public Plaza and again for the amount of P28M to construct a commercial
center called Agoo People’s Center within the Plaza’s premises. The Municipality
used as collateral a 2,323.75 sqm lot at the south-eastern portion of the Plaza.
Cacayuran and other residents opposed the redevelopment of the Plaza as well as

the means of the funding. They claim that these are highly irregular, violative of the
law, and detrimental to public interest resulting in the desecration of the public
plaza. Cacayuran’s request for the documents relating to the plaza’s redevelopment
was not granted. Cacayuran invokes his taxpayer right and files a complaint against
LBP and officers of the municipality but does not include the municipality itself as
party-defendant. He questioned the validity of the loan agreements and prays that
the redevelopment is enjoined. The municipal officers moved for the dismissal but
were denied. LBP asserted that Cacayuran did not have any cause of action because
he was not privy to the loan agreements.
RTC Ruling: Subject loans are null and void. Resolutions approving the procurement
were passed irregularly and are thus ultra vires.
CA Ruling: RTC decision affirmed with modification: Vice-Mayor Antonio Eslao is free
from personal liability.
ISSUE: WON the Municipality of Agoo should be deemed an indispensable party to
the case and thus be ordered impleaded herein.
SC: YES it is an indispensable party under Sec 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Sec 7, Rule 3 mandates that all indispensable parties are to be joined in a suit as it
is the party whose interest will be affected by the court’s action and without whom
no final determination of the case can be had. His legal presence is an absolute
necessity. Absence of the indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act. Failure to implead any indispensable
party is not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. The proper remedy is to
implead them. In this case, Cacayuran failed to implead the Municipality, a real
party in interest and an indispensable party that stands to be directly affected by
any judicial resolution. It is the contracting party and the owner of the public plaza.
It stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the case. The decision of the
RTC, affirmed with modification by the CA, and finally affirmed by the SC is not
binding upon the Municipality as it was not impleaded as defendant in the case
Subject motions are PARTLY GRANTED. Previous decisions are SET ASIDE. Instant
case is REMANDED to the RTC and Cacayuran is DIRECTED to implead all
indispensable parties.
Domingo v Scheer GR.
No.154745 Jan. 29, 2004
Respondent Scheer is a native of Germany, who was eventually granted a
permanent resident status in the Philippines. He eventually married here and
started a family as well as a business in Palawan. Vice Consul Hippelein informed
the Philippine Ambassador to Germany that the respondent had police records and
37
financial liabilities in Germany. The DFA receive from the German Embassy in Manila
that the respondent is wanted in Germany, and requested to turn over his German
passport to the Embassy. Thereafter BOC issued a Summary Deportation Order
dated September 27, 1997. It was stated that the deportation shall be held in
abeyance pending respondent’s case and he shall remain in the custody of the
bureau. In issuing this the BOC relied on the statements of the German Vice Consul
on the speculation that it is improbable that the respondent will be issued a new
passport, the warrant of arrest for insurance fraud and alleged illegal activities in
Palawan. Respondent nevertheless stayed in the Philippines after airing his side to
then BID Commissioner Verceles, the latter giving him time to apply for a clearance
and a new passport. Scheer eventually filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
stating that his right to due process was violated, for there was no notice or chance
to be heard before the issuance of the deportation order. Eventually the criminal
case for physical injuries against the respondent was dismissed, and he was issued
a passport. He informed Commissioner Verceles about this matter and reiterated
the cancellation of the order, but the Commissioner did not respond. Thereafter
Commissioner Domingo assumed office and on June 6, 2002, she ordered the
apprehension of the respondent who was held in custody awaiting deportation.
Shocked, respondent sought remedy with the CA, during the hearing of which the
Solicitor General suggested that the respondent leave the country first then just re-
apply. A decision was reached in favor of Scheer, permanently enjoining Domingo
from continuing the deportation, thus this petition
ISSUE: Whether or not the BOC was an indispensable party to the case.
SC: 1. Yes – but not enough to invalidate the petition.
Petitioner argues that the respondent must have impleaded BOC as the respondent,
and not Commissioner Domingo alone. The Summary Deportation Order was issued
by the BOC as a whole and Domingo is just but one Commissioner so the petitioner
argues that the action may be dismissed. The court ruled that it agrees with the
petitioner that the BOC was an indispensable party to the respondent’s petition in
the CA. However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. Parties may be added as ordered by the court and if the
petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party, then the petition may be
dismissed. In the case at bar, CA did not require to implead BOC as the respondent
so it does not warrant the dismissal of respondent’s petition. The court may choose
to amend the processes and the pleadings by substituting as party-plaintiff the real
party-interest, but the court also has the power to avoid delay in the disposition of
cases and it may just be unnecessary to still choose to implead BOC. The OSG has
already represented the petitioner in instant proceedings thus the BOC cannot claim
that it was not afforded the opportunity to be in court. Proceedings may be to
facilitate justice but they do not constitute the thing itself and they may be relaxed
in certain cases.

CORTEZ V AVILA 101 PHIL 205
Cortez, alleges in complaint that since 1935, he has continuously, publicly and
adversely occupied a parcel of land, of about sixteen (16) hectares, situated in the
Barrio of Conversion, Municipality of Pantabangan, Province of Nueva Ecija. Cortez
applied for a homestead patent on said 16-hectare lot, the same being a public
land; For reasons unknown to plaintiff, said homestead patent has not been issued
to him, although he has already become the "equitable owner" of the lot
aforementioned; that defendant Avila had filed a free patent application for the
same lot, knowing that it had been in continuous and actual possession of the
plaintiff since 1935, and despite his (Avila’s) knowledge, actual or presumed, of the
submission of plaintiff’s aforementioned final proof; that through threat, intimidation
and force, Avila succeeded in occupying said lot, in or about June, 1953, to the
exclusion of the plaintiff;
Avila filed a motion to dismiss alleging that plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue,
because the land in dispute is part of the public domain, and, hence, an action to
recover the same may be instituted exclusively by the Government, through the
Solicitor-General. Appellant now maintains that the lower court erred in granting
said motion, upon the ground that, having complied with the conditions essential to
be entitled to a patent, he is the equitable owner of the lot in question, and that the
Government could not have maintained the present action, the same being for the
benefit of the plaintiff, in his private capacity.
ISSUE: W/N Cortez has legal capacity to sue
SC: Obviously, plaintiff herein has "legal capacity" to sue, which is independent of
the public or private character of the lot in controversy. This does not mean,
however, that he has a cause of action, or that his appeal should prosper.
An indispensable party is lacking. The complaint is predicated upon the major
premise that plaintiff is the equitable owner of said lot, for he has fully satisfied the
prerequisites to the issuance of a homestead patent in his favor. This pretense
implies that said lot was a public land; that the legal, as well as the equitable, title
thereto used to be in the State; and that, although still its legal owner, the State
has already been divested of its equitable title, and plaintiff has acquired it, he
having fulfilled all the conditions essential for the issuance of a patent in his name.
Thus, the issue raised cannot be determined without affecting the interest of the
State, which is not a party in this proceeding, and, hence, cannot protect and
defend therein such interest.
Ordinarily, when a complaint is defective by reason of failure to include an
indispensable party, reasonable opportunity to amend said pleading must be given,
and the action should not be dismissed, except when plaintiff fails or refuses to
include said party, or the latter cannot be sued. In the case at bar, such policy need
not be followed, for plaintiff has not exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him. Indeed, he seeks, in effect, a review of the decision of the Director
38
of Lands in causing a patent to be issued to defendant Avila. Yet, plaintiff does not
appear to have asked the Director of Lands to reconsider said decision, or to have
appealed therefrom to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
PIMENTEL V SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE GR. NO. 187714 MAR. 8,
2011
FACTS:
Sen Lacson delivered a privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"
wherein he called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 GAA of the
P200M appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue
Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City including
Right-of-Way (ROW), and another P200M appropriated for the extension of C-5 road
including ROW. Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May
2009, with eleven Sens present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight Sens present. On
both, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to
the Senate Committee of the Whole. On 11 May 2009, petitioners proposed 11
amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the Rules
of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were
adopted.
Contentions Petitioners: The transfer of the complaint against Sen Villar from the
Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Sen Villar’s
constitutional right to equal protection;
Contentions Respondents: The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join
or implead an indispensable party;
ISSUE:
Whether Sen Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Sen Villar, is an
indispensable party in this petition- NO
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest. A person who is not an indispensable party if his interest in
the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties,
so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which
does complete justice between them. In this case, Sen Madrigal is not an
indispensable party to the petition before the Court. The issues in this case are
matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the
Whole which can be resolved without affecting Sen Madrigal’s interest.

Lagunilla v Velasco GR. No. 169278 June 16, 2009
FACTS:
Fr. Patricio, Magdalena, Venancio, Macaria ( all surnamed Monis) and Andrea Monis
Velasco are siblings. Venancio had two children (herein petitioners) : Dionisia Monis
Lagunilla and Rafael Monis. Fr. Patricio and Magdalena acquired several properties
in La Union and one in Quezon City.The Q.C. property was co-owned by Patricio and
Magdalena with Spouses Andrea Monis-Velasco and Pedro Velasco. After death of
Patricio and Magdalena, Andrea and Macaria executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement with Donation and donated it to Andrea’s Son : Pedro Monis Velasco Jr.
Petitioners, Dionisia and Rafael instituted an action for Annulment of Documents
and Damages before RTC on the ground of the alleged fraudulent act committed by
Andrea and Macaria that they misrepresented themselves as the only surviving
heirs of Patricio and Magdalena. Respondents countered that nowhere in the deed
did they assert to be the only surviving heirs, they also added that the petitioners
already received advances of their share of the properties and that there still other
properties not yet partitioned from which the petitioners could obtain reparation.
Petitioners moved for the amendment of the complaint to implead Pedro (donee)
raising that he is an indispensable party. RTC denied the motion. RTC decided in
favor of respondents: Art 887 NCC Petitioners are not compulsory heirs. Declaration
of respondents that they were the only heirs is a valid way of non recognition of
petitioners’ claim. CA affirmed RTC: ruled that the petitioners are heirs but they are
not compulsory heirs and that they cannot invoke bad faith.
ISSUE: WoN Pedro (donee) is an indispensable party.
RULING: The general rule with reference to parties to a civil action pursuant to
Section 7 Rule 3 of Rules of Court requires the joinder of all necessary parties and
the joinder of all indispensable partiesunder any and all conditions. Jurispridence
holds that an indispensable party is a party who has interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made in his absence without
injuring or affecting that interest. An indispensable party is one who must be
included in an action before it may properly go forward. A person is not
indispensable if his interest in controversy or subject matter is seperable. Pedro is
an indispensable party. At the time of filing of the complaint the title of the Quezon
City property was already transferred to Pedro. Even if the court will only resolve
the validity of the extrajudicial settlement, there would be no final adjudication of
the case without involving Pedro’s interest. His interest in the controversy and the
subject matter is not separable from the interests of the other parties. Well settled
is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. It is a condition sine
qua non to the exercise of judicial power. Without the presence of indispensable
parties, the judgment of the court cannot attain finality. Nevertheless the non
joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. The
remedy is to implead the non party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be
added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party then the court may
dismiss the complaint.
39
Plasabas v CA GR. No. 166519
Mar. 31, 2009
In 1074, Plasabas and Malazarte filed a complaint for recovery of title to property
with damages before CFI Maasin, Leyte. The subject property was a parcel of
coconut land declared in the name of Plasabas. They pray for their rights over the
land be confirmed and for Lumen and Aunzo to vacate the land. Aunzo and Lumen
interposed that they inherited the land from their common ancestor, Francisco
Plasabas. In the course of trial, it was found out that Nieves was not the absolute
owner of the land. Aunzo and Lumen then raised the argument that the case should
have been terminated at inception for petitioner's failure to implead indispensable
parties (Jose, Victor and Victoria).
CFI dismissed the case. The instant case should have been dismissed without
prejudice a long time ago for lack of cause of action as the plaintiffs spouses Marcos
Malazarte and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have no complete legal personality to sue
by themselves alone without joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves who are as
INDISPENSABLE as the latter in the final determination of the case. Not impleading
them, any judgment would have no effectiveness.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA. CA affirmed the ruling of the CFI. CA
declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle
of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied
considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a
reivindicatory action.
ISSUE: W/N CA is correct
Held:
With a motion to reconsider, SC grants the petition and remands the case to the CFI
for disposition on the merits, citing Article 487 that provides any one of the co-
owners may bring an action for ejectment.
In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they
summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases following a
protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure to implead
indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable.

In re: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing
Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation AM No. 09-6-9-SC Aug. 19,
2009
FACTS:
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C.
Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote that it be
granted the same exemption from paying docket fees as that of poor litigants.
ISSUE:
Should an incorporated foundation (serving indigent litigants) be exempted from
paying docket fees?
RULING:
NO. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State
with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a
juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of
all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity
with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore,
it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent
litigants.
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in
favor of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on
the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to
abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly
by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees.
Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove
too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.
Pangcatan v Maghuyop and Bangkiao GR. No. 194412
FACTS:
Pangcatan commenced Civil Case No. 1888-02 in the RTC to recover various
damages he had suffered in April 2002 from the vehicular accident caused by the
negligence of the defendants. Defendants Alexandro "Dodong" Maghuyop and
Belindo Bankiao, the petitioners in G.R. No. 194568, were respectively the owner
and driver of the passenger van that Pangcatan had hired to transport him and the
goods he had purchased in Pagadian City to his store in Margosatubig, Zamboanga
del Sur. Pangcatan's complaint alleged that his estimated daily income before the
accident was P400.00/day; When he filed his complaint in September 2002,
40
Pangcatan also filed his Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant,
which the RTC granted through its order of September 4, 2002 under the condition
that the filing fees would constitute a first lien on any favorable monetary judgment
that he would recover from the suit. Maghuyop and Bakiao did not file their answer
subsequently, and were declared in default as a consequence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pangcatan was exempt from the payment of filing and docket fees
as an indigent litigant?
RULING: Pangcatan was represented from the start by the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO). The exemption of the clients of the PAO like him from the payment of the
legal fees was expressly declared by law for the first time in Republic Act No.
9406,27 particularly its amendment of Section 16-D of the Administrative Code of
1987, as follows: Section 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit. – The
clients of the PAO shall be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental
to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original
proceeding or on appeal. The costs of the suit, attorney's fees and contingent fees
imposed upon the adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be
deposited in the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special
allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO. The exemption of clients
of the PAO from the payment of the legal fees under Republic Act No. 9406 and OCA
Circular No. 121-2007 was not yet a matter of law at the time Pangcatan initiated
Civil Case No. 1888-02 on September 4, 2002. Yet, we cannot avoid applying the
exemption in his favor for purposes of this case. The remand to the RTC for the
purpose of determining the factual basis for the exemption would be superfluous. To
start with, the exemption, being a matter of procedure, can be retrospectively
applied to his case. It is fundamental wisdom, indeed, that procedural laws do not
come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes, and, as such, they may be given retroactive effect
on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Doing so will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch
as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.31 And, secondly, if the ultimate
objective to be served by all courts is the administration of justice, the remand of
the case after the trial by the RTC would be unreasonable and burdensome on all
the parties as well as on the trial court.

DELOS SANTOS
SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J.ALGURA vs. THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THECITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL TEOXON, ENGR.
LEONPALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO,SR.
G.R. No. 150135 October 30, 2006
FACTS:
Souses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint for
damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the
alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house and for payment of
lost income derived from fees paid by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00
monthly.
Finding that petitioners' motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious,
Executive Judge Jose T. Atienza of the Naga City RTC granted petitioners' plea for
exemption from filing fees.
Respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim, arguing that the defenses of the
petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the spouses' boarding house
blocked the road right of way, and said structure was a nuisance per se.
Respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing Fees
dated March 10, 2000. They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP
3,000.00 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the Philippine
National Police, spouse Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop
on the ground floor of their residence along Bayawas St., Sta. Cruz, Naga City. On
March 2000, petitioners subsequently interposed their Opposition to the Motion to
respondents' motion to disqualify them for non-payment of filing fees.
RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground that
they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and
to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of
Court—directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not petitioners Algura should be considered as indigent litigants who
qualify for exemption from paying filing fees.
41
RULING:
Yes. Applying Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, The petitioner
Algura should be declared and considered as indigent litigants who qualify for
exemption from paying filing fees. The court rule that if the applicant for exemption
meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the
grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does
not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied
outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of
Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for
exemption.
In the Case at bar, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the
application of the Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed
that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income and
ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as
indigent litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3,
Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didn't
have property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic
necessities for them and their family. In that hearing, the respondents would have
had the right to also present evidence to refute the allegations and evidence in
support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants. Since
this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to
determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the
standards set in Rule 3, Section 21.
GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL v. ANIANA LAWAS SON.
G.R. No. 221815 November 29, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner is the daughter of Eddie Foronda, the registered owner of a parcel of land
located in Barrio Magay, Municipality of Compostela, Province of Cebu. The latter
derived his title over the property from a successful grant of a Free Patent.
On March 15, 1999, Aniana Lawas Son (respondent) instituted an action for
reconveyance and damages against Glynna Foronda-Crystal (petitioner) alleging
that, for twelve and a half years, she has been the lawful owner and possessor of
the subject lot. She alleged that she purchased the same from a certain Eleno T.
Arias (Arias) on August 4, 1986 for a sum of P200,000.00. According to her, since

her acquisition, she has been religiously paying real property taxes thereon as
evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 16408A, which was issued under her name.
On April 13, 1999, herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of (1)
lack of jurisdiction, (2) venue is improperly laid, (3) action has prescribed, and, (4)
lack of cause of action. A week thereafter, the RTC issued an Order dated April 20,
1999,8 which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC asserted that the
"market value of the subject property per Tax Declaration No. 16408 (Annex B,
Complaint) is P2,830.00" and thus, jurisdiction over the case lies with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-Compostela, Cebu.
However, in yet another Order9 dated July 23, 1999, issued by the RTC following
herein respondent's motion for reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered and set aside
its earlier ruling. On November 24, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of
the respondent. The Register of Deeds of Cebu was ordered to cancel OCT No. OP-
37324.
CA rendered the assailed Decision, which affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC of Mandaue City has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
NEGATIVE.
Settled is the requirement that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended, required the allegation of the real property's assessed value in the
complaint. That the complaint in the present case did not aver the assessed value of
the property is a violation of the law, and generally would be dismissed because the
court which would exercise jurisdiction over the case could not be identified.
In here, the respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the
subject property. Rather, what she included therein was an allegation of its market
value amounting to P200,000.00.47 In the course of the trial, the petitioner
asserted that the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration
was merely P1,030.00, and therefore the RTC lacked jurisdiction.
However, a liberal interpretation of this law, as opined by the Court in Tumpag,
would necessitate an examination of the documents annexed to the complaint. In
this instance, the complaint referred to Tax Declaration No. 16408A, attached
42
therein as Annex "B," which naturally would contain the assessed value of the
property. A perusal thereof would reveal that the property was valued at P2,826.00.
On this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC, that has jurisdiction
over the case. The RTC should have upheld its Order dated November 8, 2006
which dismissed the same. Consequently, the decision that it rendered is null and
void.
Barangay Piapi vs Talip
G.R. NO. 138248 SEPTEMBER
7, 2005
FACTS:
On August 28, 1998, Barangay Piapi, herein petitioners, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur, a complaint for Reconveyance and
Damages for a parcel of land consisting of 3.2 hectares situated in Piapi, Davaol del
Sur, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-(3331)-4244 of the
Registry of Deeds issued in the name of Juan Jayag and has a market value of
P15,000. They alleged that they have openly possessed such land for thirty (30)
years in the concept of owner, and that respondent, Talip, fraudulently obtained
from the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) under his name.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as considering that the assessed value of
the land is P6,030. Under Section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 129, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, Municipal Circuit Trial Court has
exclusive jurisdiction.
Petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC as the total assessed value
of the property is P41,890, as shown by Real Property Field Appraisal and
Assessment Sheet dated August 20, 1996 issued by the Provincial Assessor of
Davao del Sur, Atty. Marcos D. Risonar, Jr.
On January 12, 1999, RTC Davao dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
hence this certiorari petition alleging that Section 19 (1) of BP Bilang 129, as
amended, gives the RTC jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance since it is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance
RULING:

NO, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Davao del Sur has jurisdiction over the case
for failure to allege the property’s assessed value.
The contention is bereft of merit. This case is analogous to Huguete vs Embudo;
where petitioners argued that a complaint for annulment of a deed of sale and
partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC. Supreme Court ruled that the nature of an action is not
determined by the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint
and the reliefs prayed for.
When the ultimate objective of the petitioners, is to obtain title to real property, it
should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the
property subject thereof. However, they failed to alleged therein the assessed value
of the subject property. Instead, what they stated was the market value of the land
which was at P15,000.00.
The Rule requires that the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant. It bears reiterating that
what determines
jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners'
complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering that their action
involves the title to or interest in real property, they should have alleged therein its
assessed value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated value,
which is P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 33 (3), it is the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court and not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.
43
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied
by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.G.R. No. 200804
January 22, 2014
FACTS:
On 23 March 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money under
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from
respondent the amount of P23, 111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for
the period of 1 June 2002 to 30 September 2005.
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect
payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom
is the respondent.
Respondent assailed that she religiously paid the monthly charges of P75.00. She
claimed that the increased rate of P113.00 for every 10 cubic meter of water plus
an additional P11.60 for every cubic meter thereafter was not valid because the
petitioner unilaterally made the increase without informing the residents therein
which was stipulated in their agreement.
MTCC
The MTCC ruled in favour of the respondent. The petitioner can only charge the
respondent the agreed flat rate for the period 1 June 2002 to 7 August 2003 since
the Certificate of Public Convenience was only issued on the latter date. Respondent
should be considered to have fully paid.
The MTCC disregarded the petitioner’s reliance on HLURB’s decision because it failed
to prove that it complied with the directive to inform the HLURB of the result of its
consultation with the concerned homeowners as regards the rates to be charged
and the HLURB’s approval to such charges.
Petitioner also failed to submit evidence showing the exact date when it actually
began imposing the NWRB approved rates and the formal agreement of the parties
containing the terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with
certainty respondent’s obligation.
RTC
On a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for grave abuse of
discretion filed with the RTC, the petitioner assailed that the MTCC disregarded
petitioner’s reliance on the source of its authority to impose new water consumption
rates.
The RTC issued a decision dismissing the petition, finding that the petition was only
filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided in

Section23 of the Rules of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC
ruled that it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision
directing respondent to pay petitioners a bigger sum than that which has been
awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under
Rule 65 of the RRC assailing the propriety of the MTCC’s decision in the subject
small claims case.
RULING:
Yes. The RTC erred in its decision.
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RRC before the RTC was proper.
It is an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under
the Rules in the absence of an appeal or any “plain, speedy and adequate remedy”
in the ordinary course of law.
In the case at bar, the first level courts are vested exclusive jurisdiction over small
claims cases, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed to their
corresponding RTCs.
The SC held that the RTC was wrong in dismissing the said petition on the ground
that it was an improper remedy and, as such, the RTC case must be reinstated and
remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
Petition is granted. The RTC’s decision and resolution are reversed and set aside.
RTC case is reinstated and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the same with
dispatch.
44
LOURDES SUITES (CROWN HOTEL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION),
Petitioner, v. NOEMI BINARAO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204729 August 06,
2014
FACTS:
Lourdes Suites (petitioner) is the owner and operator of a hotel located along
Kalayaan Avenue, Makati City. It executed two (2) contracts with Noemi Binarao
(respondent) for room accommodations for two groups of students.
According to petitioner’s records, respondent was able to pay the total contract
price above. However, petitioner claimed that there was an unpaid balance of
P47,810.00 representing the charges for damages to the furniture, a lost key and
excess guests.3 Thus, on 25 July 2011, petitioner sent a demand letter to
respondent for the unsettled amount.4 Respondent failed to pay the amount,
prompting petitioner to file a Statement of Claim5 for collection of sum of money
plus damages before the MeTC.
In her Response, respondent alleged that she is not obliged to pay the claimed
amount because petitioner billed the charges twice.
The MeTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of cause of action in its
Decision dated 15 March 2012.
Aggrieved, petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Petitioner
argued that “a dismissal based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action cannot be deemed a dismissal with prejudice under the Rules.” Petitioner
further argued that lack of cause of action is not a valid ground for dismissal of
case, much more a dismissal with prejudice.
RTC ruled against petitioner, and found that there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the MeTC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC in its Order dated 16 November 2012.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the courts are not precluded from dismissing a case for lack of cause of action.
RULING:

NEGATIVE. The RTC correctly upheld the MTC Decision.
The basis of the public respondent in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action is the failure of petitioner to preponderantly establish its claim against the
private respondent by clear and convincing evidence. Hence, public respondent did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the Complaint for lack of
cause of action, as he referred to the evidence presented and not to the allegations
in the Complaint.
The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton
or palpable discretion. It must be noted that this case is an action for small claims
where decisions are rendered final and unappealable, hence, a decision dismissing
the same is necessarily with prejudice.
45
ESPERANZA SUPAPO et al vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS et
al.G.R. No. 198356, April 20,2015
FACTS:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and
Susan de Jesus with the MeTC of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel the
respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, and
registered under petitioners’ name. The land has an assessed value of
Php39,980.00. Petitioners did not reside on the lot but made sure to visit at least
twice a year.
During one of their visits, they saw two houses built on the lot without their
knowledge and permission. They learned that respondents occupied both houses.
They demanded the surrender of the lot by bringing the dispute before the
appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a certificate to file action for
failure of the parties to settle amicably.
The Spouses Supapo filed a criminal case against the respondents for violating PD
No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law). The trial court convicted the respondents. On appeal,
the CA dismissed the case because Congress enacted R.A. No. 8368 repealing the
Anti-Squatting Law. Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for
the execution of the respondents’ civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the
subject lot. The RTC granted the motion and issued the writ of execution.
Respondents moved to quash it but the RTC denied their motion. They filed with the
CA a petition for certiorari. The CA granted it and ruled that with the repeal of the
Anti-Squatting Law, the criminal and civil liabilities of respondents were
extinguished, but it also said that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper
action for recovery of possession. Thus, the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for
accion publiciana.
After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for
preliminary hearing and argued that there is another action pending between the
same parties, the complaint is barred by statute of limitations, and the petitioners’
cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing.
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari of respondents because the action has
prescribed and accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It
likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision; hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed.

3. Whether or not the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
RULING:
1. YES. Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is plenary. However, R.A. No. 7691 granted the MeTC,
MTC, and MCTC the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear actions where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed Php20,000 ot Php50,000 if the
property is located in Metro Manila. Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value. It is its fair
market value multiplied by the assessment level.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the
subject lot located in Metro Manila is Php39,980. Thus, the MeTC properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
2. NO. Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware
of the other persons’ occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at
any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated.
3. NO. Res judicata is not present in the case because:
a. First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint was prosecuted in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The accion publiciana was filed in the name of
the Spouses Supapo.
b. There is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution
of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to
recover possession of the subject property.
c. There is no identity of causes of action. The People of the Philippines filed the
case to protect governmental interests, while the spouses filed the accion publiciana
to protect their proprietary interests.
PETITION GRANTED.
46
EULALIA RUSSELL, RUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO, SUSANA T.
REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO
TAUTHO, DEODITA T. JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO,
WILLIAM TAUTHO, AND MARILYN PERALES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE
AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA
MENDOZA, DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO
CABATINGAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 119347 March 17,
1999
FACTS:
The complaint alleged that petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land
situated in Liloan, Cebu. The land was previously owned by the spouses Tautho.
Upon the death of the spouses, the property was inherited by their legal heirs,
petitioner and private respondents. Since then the lot had remained undivided until
petitioners discovered a public document denominated “DECLARATION OF HEIRS
AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION."
Private respondents divided the property with the exclusion of the petitioners
Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated “
Declaration of nullity and partition ,” with the RTC claiming that the document was
false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no
oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The
complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be
issued to partition the land among all the heirs.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the
subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MCTC.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC
has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.
ISSUES:
1. WON the action of the Petitioners is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
2. WON the RTC have jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the Petitioners
RULING:

1. The action of the Petitioners to annul a document or to declare a document null
and void is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In determining whether an action is one subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation the Court laid down the following criterion:
Ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought
-If it is primarily for the recovery if sum of money= the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation
- If the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequences of the principal sought=
considered incapable of pecuniary estimation
In this case, The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null
and void the document in which private respondents declared themselves as the
only heirs of the late spouses CasimeroTautho and CesariaTautho and divided his
property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be
legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the
partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the
declaration of nullity of the document above-described.
Hence the action of Petitioners are considered one that is incapable of pecuniary
investigation
2. The court held that, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Court
BP 129
While actions under Sec 33(3) of B.P 129, are also incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC,
METC or MCTC, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not
exceed P20,000 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.000 if located elsewhere. If the value
exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the RTC which have
jurisdiction
However, in this case, the subject matter of the complaint is ANNULMENT OF A
DOCUMENT.
47
SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES TEOFEDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO,
respondents G.R. No. 149554 July 1, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for the annulment of deed of sale and partition
of the 50-square meter portion of land against respondent spouses in the RTC.
Respondent spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, arguing that the action is one for
annulment of title and the total assessed value of the subject land was only
P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, pursuant to Sec
33(3) of BP Blg 129, as amended by RA 7691.
Petitioner spouses filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
subject matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is
cognizable by the RTC, as provided by Sec 19(1) of BP 129, as amended.
ISSUE:
WON the civil action is one in which the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
RULING:
No. The argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation
considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over
it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought (Cañiza
vs CA).
The principal purpose of the petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to
the 50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased from the
respondents. Their cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the
subject land from respondents. They pray that they be declared owners of the
property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any interest
therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which
was within the jurisdiction of MTC.

The annulment of the deed of sale, were prayed for in the complaint because they
were necessary before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion
subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.
De Ungria et al. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 165777
July 25, 2011
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari for ownership, possession and damages,
and alternativecauses of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities,
and/or for recovery of Rosario'sconjugal share with damages or redemption of the
subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria et al.Respondent Rosario is the
surviving wife of the late Fernando Castor, while the rest of the respondentsare
their legitimate children. The documents they (respondents) sought to annul are (1)
the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon allegedly executed
by Fernando in favorof Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the Affidavit
of Relinquishment executed by Eugenio infavor of petitioner.Petitioner also filed an
Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss raising, among others that the court has no
jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full.
Pending resolution of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to Allow them to
continue prosecuting this case as indigent litigants. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration and clarification on whether plaintiffs should beallowed to continue
prosecuting the case as indigent litigants. Said motion was denied.
The same wasfiled to the RTC and to the CA; both were denied. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari wherepetitioner raises the following assignment of error:
that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss despiterespondents
non-payment of the correct docket fees.
ISSUE:
Was jurisdiction vested to the RTC in this civil case despite the failure of the plaintiff
to file thenecessary docket fees?
48
RULING:
YES. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the
complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing
fees. It is not simply the filing of thecomplaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests atrial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action.Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court provides:SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an
action or a permissive counter-claim or moneyclaim against an estate not based on
judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party,etc. complaint,
or a complaint-in-intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the total-
sumclaimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in litigation,
is:x x x x(b) For filing:1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated
2. x x xIn a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees.
Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not
susceptible of pecuniaryestimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC,
the docket fees should not be based on theassessed value of the subject land as
claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be based onSection 7(b)(1)
of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees Form attached to the records
wouldreflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together
with the other fees, as assessedby the Clerk of Court.
Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC
hasproperly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is
never lost, it continuesuntil the case is terminated.

SAN PEDRO v. ASDALA
GR. NO. 164560
JULY 22, 2009
FACTS:
Sometime in July 2001, private respondents Allan and Eleonor Dionisio (heirs of
spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio) filed with the MeTC of Quezon City a
Complaint against herein petitioners (Ana de guia San Pedro and Alejo Dopeo) and
Wood Crest Residents Association, Inc., for Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title
and Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
PRs alleged that subject property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an
assessed value of P32,100.00, was titled in the name of SPS Dionisio but
petitioners, with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that they were the owners of
a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property but it was alleged in
the complaint that petitioners' TCT over the property was spurious. Since PRS had
allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and using subject property they
prayed that they be declared the sole and absolute owners of the subject property.
to recover possession of the same and for payment of actual and moral damages,
and attorney's fees.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action, as the subject of litigation was incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
MeTC: denied the motion to dismiss under B.P129, as amended, the MeTC had
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real
property of small value. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
RTC (petition for certiorari): dismissed the petition and sustained the MeTC ruling
pursuant Section 33(3) of R.A. No. 7691, amending B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had
jurisdiction over the complaint as it involves recovery of ownership and possession
of real property located in QC, with an assessed value not exceeding P50,000.00.
MR was denied.
CA (petition for certiorari): dismissed the petition outright, holding that petitioners'
should have availed themselves of the remedy of appeal. Petitioners' MR was
denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari under rule 65.
ISSUES:
49
WON the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:
YES. The Court reiterates the ruling in Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses
Lumocso,to wit: In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance
of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that
fall under the classification of cases that involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein.
x x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on
jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable
of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, or one involving title to
propertyunder Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became
crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, which expanded
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs."
Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of
which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with
the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This
amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which
would result in the speedier administration of justice."
Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction over
private respondents' complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria involving a lot in QC with
an assessed value not exceeding P50,000.

MALANA VS. TAPPA
GR NO. 181303 SEPTEMBER
17, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case filed before the RTC of Tuguegarao an action for
reivindicatoria and quieting of title against the respondents. The petitioners alleged
that they are the owners of the land because they acquire it by inheritance from
their father. And that the respondents were only allowed by their father before the
latter died, to occupy the land on the condition that they will vacate it anytime they
need the subject property. However when their father died, the respondents
continued to occupy the property and had already built their residences using
permanent materials and claimed ownership over the property.
Petitioners referred their land dispute with the respondents to the lupong
tagapamayapa for conciliation. During the conciliation proceeding, respondents
asserts their ownership over the land
Petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC an action to remove the cloud
from their title alleging that the documents of the respondents were highly Dubious,
falsified and incapable of proving their ownership.
RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. According to
BP 129, RTC has jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of the
property which involved exceeds 20,000 outside MM or 50,000 within MM. it found
out that the value of the property is only 410 pesos thus outside of its jurisdiction.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. They argued that the principal action is
quieting of title; reivindicacion was included merely to seek complete relief from
respondents.
RTC denied the MR it reasoned out that quieting of title is a real action. Pursuant
RA 7691 amending BP 129, it is the MTC that exercises jurisdiction over real action
where the assessed value does not exceed 20,000.
Hence this petition
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction
RULING:
The court ruled in the NEGATIVE
50
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, and whise rights are affected by a statute,
EO or regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this includes the
interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and
judicial declaration of the parties’ rights and duties
RTc correctly made a distinction between the 1st and the 2nd paragraph of section
1 rule 63. Specifically in second paragraph, in order to determine which court has
jurisdiction, it must be read together with the Judicial reorganization act of 1980 as
amended.
It is important to note that section 1 does not categorically require an action to
quiet the tile to be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly used the word “May”. It
denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an
opportunity or an option. In contrast judicial reorganization act uses the word
“shall” and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involves title to or possession of real property where the assessed
value does not exceed 20,000. Thus, the complaint involving title to or possession
of property is within the jurisdiction of MTC not the RTC
Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and
not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained
only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending
controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately
available. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the
filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction
over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the
institution of the action.
In the present case, petitioners’ Complaint for quieting of title was filed after
petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject
property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter’s express
claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in
direct challenge to petitioners’ title.
since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of
the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An
accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the
occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of
the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one’s recovery of
possession over the real property as owner
 51

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, not for validity or enforceability. And because it remained valid as between Juanito
Petitioners, vs. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in- and Garcia, the latter no longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners, for his
Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent. ownership thereof had ceased.

G.R. No. 181359 August 5, Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s
2013 rights. The mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right
over the land if the vendor was no longer the owner of the land, having previously
FACTS: sold the same to another even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Registration does
not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do
Petitioner Clemencio Sabitsana was the counsel of the respondent, Juanito not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.
Muertegui. The dispute involved a parcel of land bought by Juanito by virtue of an
unnotarized deed of sale from Alberto Garcia. Juanito’s father and his brother
Domingo, took actual possession of the land. Later on, Garcia sold the same land to
the petitioner this time, through a notarized deed of sale.

When the respondents’ father passed away, the heirs applied for the registration
and coverage of the lot under Public Land Act or CA No. 141. Petitioner opposed the
application, claiming he was the true owner of the lot. Respondent filed for quieting
of title and preliminary injunction against petitioners Clemencio and his wife,
Rosario, claiming that they bought the land in bad faith and are exercising
possession and ownership of the same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over the
title.

ISSUE:

Who between petitioners and respondent has a better right to the disputed lot?

RULING:

Respondent has a better right to the lot.

What applies in this case is Act No. 3344 as amended, which provides for the
system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. The said act
expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third
party with a better right.

The sale to respondent Juanito was executed via an unnotarized deed of sale ten
years earlier than that of the sale to petitioners, though this was made via a
notarized document. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the
lot, while the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was
made, the seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot.

The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the
sale between him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the
requirement of a public document under the Civil Code is only for convenience, and
 52

SALVADOR V. PATRICIA
GR. NO. 195834 NOVEMBER 9, 2016
FACTS:
This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the
property occupied by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano Mijares.
Additionally, to prevent Patricia Inc., from evicting the plaintiffs from their
respective improvements along Juan Luna St., plaintiffs applied for a preliminary
injunction in their complaint pending the quieting of title on the merits.
Complaint-in-intervention - filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land occupied
by the plaintiffs and by Mijares as they were similarly situated as the other
plaintiffs.
The preliminary injunction was granted. All parties agreed and admitted in evidence
by stipulation as to the authenticity of the documents. Hence, since the TCTs of
both Patricia, Inc. and the City of Manila are admitted as genuine, the question now
is: Where are the boundaries based on the description in the respective titles?
To resolve the above question, the RTC appointed 3 geodetic engineers as
commissioners. These commissioners ultimately submitted their reports.
complainant and other claimants, not only to put things in their proper place, to
make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not to disturb the
other, but also for the benefit of both. The two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.
The boundary dispute should not be litigated in an action for quieting of title due to
the limited scope of action. The action for quieting of title is a tool specifically used
to remove of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property; it
should not be used for any other purpose. Second, the boundary dispute would
essentially seek to alter or modify either the Torrens title of the City of Manila or
that of Patricia but any alteration or medication either way should be initiated only
by direct proceedings, not as an issue incidentally raised by the parties herein.
To allow the boundary dispute to be litigated in the action for quieting of title would
invalidate Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree by virtue of its prohibition
against collateral attacks on Torrens Title. A collateral attack takes place when, in
another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an
incident in said action. This is exactly what the petitioners sought to do herein,
seeking to modify or otherwise cancel Patricia, Inc. title.

RTC: It ruled in favor of the petitioners and against Patricia, Inc., permanently
enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict the former from their
respective premises and collecting any rentals from them. It sided with two of the
commissioners who had found that the land belonged to the City of Manila.

CA: It reversed the RTC’s decision and dismissed the complaint. It declared that the
petitioners were without the necessary interest, either legal or equitable title to
maintain a suit for quieting of title. It also opined that the RTC should have
conducted hearings on the reports of the commissioners; ruled as highly improper
the adjudication of the boundary dispute in an action for quieting of title.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners had the sufficient interest to bring the suit for quieting of title

RULING:

NO.

An action to quiet title or remove the clouds over the title is a special civil
action. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
 53

1. BARRIDO VS NONATO GR no 176492 oct 20 2014 (SEE DIGEST ON PAGE 97 OF THE BOOK)

Facts 5. VDA.DE PALANCA, ET AL V. CHUA KENG KIAN, ET AL. L-26430, MARCH 11, 1969

Leonardo and marrieta’s marriage was dissolved du to psychological incapacity. 6. REFUGIA, ET AL. V. CA, ET AL. GR. NO. 118284, JULY 5, 1996

Leonardo filed a petition for partition of property consisting of house and lot. 7. CANIZA V. CA, 335 PHIL 1107

Marrieta on the other hand claimed that the subject property has been sold to their 8. TEN FORTY REALTY AND DEV CORP V. CRUZ, GR. NO. 151212, SEPTEMBER 10,
children Raymond and joseph. 2003

She also moved for the dismissal of the action alleging that the MTCC has no
jurisdiction over the case, since and action for partition is an action incapable of
percuniary estimation.
MTCC ruled in favor of Marrieta.
Leonardo appealed the case before the RTC which then reversed the decision of the
MTCC, and ordered the partition of the property.
9. ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. ET AL. V. SPOUSES ONG, GR. NO. 132197,
AUGUST 16, 2005
10 QUINAGORAN V. CA, GR. NO. 155179, AUGUST 24, 2007
11. BERNARDO V. VILLEGAS, GR. NO. 183357, MARCH 15, 2010
12. HILARIO V. SALVADOR, GR. NO. 160384, APRIL 29, 2005

Marrieta brought the action before the CA thru petition for review, however the CA (SEE DIGEST ON PAGE 109 OF THE BOOK)
ruled in Favor of Leonardo, stating that since the value of the property in question is
only P8080.00 clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. 13. OUANO V. PGTT INTERNATIONAL NVESTMENT CORP, GR. NO. 134230, JULY 17,
2002
ISSUE: won the MTCC has jurisdiction over the petition for partition filed by
Leonardo?

RULING: the supreme court ruled in favor of Leonardo.

“contrary to the contention of barrid, the MTCC, has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of real actons affecting title to real property or possession, or for the partition of, or
foreclosure of mortgage over real property” under section 33 of BP 129.

2. Roldan vs spouses barrios

GR no 214803 april 23, 2018

( SEE DIGEST ON PAGE 91 OF THE BOOK)

3. Singson vs Isabela sawmill

(SEE CITATION ON PAGE 95 OF THE BOOK)

4. THE LATE SPOUSES ALEJANDRO RAMIRO AND FELICISIMA LLAMDA, ET AL V.

SPOUSES BACAROON, GR. NO. 196874, FEBRUARY 6, 2019

FALCULAN
TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY
FACTS:
The spouses Tijam filed a case against the spouses Sibonghanoy to recover the sum
of P1,908.00, with legal interest, plus costs.
A writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants’ properties, but the
same was dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Surety).
The Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, the Court issued a writ of execution against the
defendants.
The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a
writ of execution against the Surety’s bond. The Surety filed its opposition on these
grounds: (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for
the payment of the amount due under the judgment.
Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to
satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the
counterbond.
Upon failure of Surety to file an answer, the Court granted the motion for execution
and the corresponding writ was issued.
Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without
the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the order appealed from.
Five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for
extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
The CA granted the motion.
Two days later the Surety filed a MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging:
that appellee’s action was filed in the CFI for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00
only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the
value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed
54
P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the CFI therefore had no
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The CA required the appellees to answer the
motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Surety can raise the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time
on appeal.
RULING:
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.
However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, We are of
the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this
late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its
active participation.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the
court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said
courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on
the merits.
It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up
to raise the question of jurisdiction.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a

question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced
or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
The Court frowns upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse.
TUMPAG V. TUMPAG, GR. NO. 199133, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014
Facts:
The Plaintiff, Esperanza Tumpag is the absolute owner of a parcel of land,
identified as lot no. 1880-A containing an area of 12,992 square meters, more or
less, situated in Barangay Tuyom, Cauayan, Negros occidental. The Defendant,
Samuel Tumpag, has been occupying portion of not less than 1000 square meters of
the said parcel of land for more than 10 years, at the Tolerance of Ezperanza.
Ezperanza wanted to recover the portion occupied by Samuel but Samuel
refused to vacate said portion he has occupied inspite of repeated demands from
Ezperanza.
RTC ordered Samuel to return posession of subject portion of the property to
Esperanza and to pay for damages. However CA ruled that petitioner’s failure to
allege in her complaint the assessed value of the disputed property warranted the
nullifiaction of the RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s failure to allege in her complaint the assessed
value of the disputed property warranted the complaint’s dismissal.
Whether or not RTC lack jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
The SC held that CA’s dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint for recovery of
possession is erroneous and unwarranted. It is well-settled that jurisdiction over a
subject matter is conferred by law, not by the parties’ action or conduct, and is,
likewise, determined from the allegations in the complaint.
55
Although the petitioner failed to allege in her complaint the property’s
assessed value, The CA was fully aware of the copy of a Declaration of Real Property
showing that the subject property has a market value of P51,965.00 and assessed
value of P20,790.00 attached to the petitioner’s complaint.
ZAMORA vs. CA
183 SCRA 279
FACTS:
This case involves a conflict of jurisdiction between the RTC and SEC. The
petitioners claim they are suing members of an unregistered association, so under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Private respondents disagree, insisting that
they are being sued in an intra-corporate dispute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SEC has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
Yes. It is a rule that jurisdiction over subject matter cannot be changed by
agreement of the parties.
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has
no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint
later with the competent court.
The mere fact that the petitioners first filed their complaint with the SEC
did not have the effect of precluding them from filing the same complaint with the
CFI if this was the court that was vested with appropriate jurisdiction.

KATON V. PALANCA JR., ET AL, GR. NO. 151149, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004
FACTS:
On August 2, 1963, petitioner Katon filed a request with the District Office of the
Bureau of Forestry for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as
Sombrero Island in Palawan for the purpose of eventual conversion or
reclassification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for Katon to apply for
homestead patent.
Then, in 1965, the Director of Forestry informed the Director of Lands, that since
the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore
certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
However, there were also several favorable endorsements that were made to survey
the island under the request of herein respondents. Then, the records show that, on
November 8, 1996, one of the respondents Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent
application for the portion of the island consisiting of 8.5 hectares and the
respondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972. The
respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a Homestead Patent No. 14527 and OCT
No. G-7098 on March 3, 1875 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of
title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on
the ground that the same were obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for the
reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the
exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island
since it was he who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural
land.
Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their
respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that
they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years. Respondents
contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is
concerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner
and not a mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by
laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and
unexplained period of time.
Timeline:
June 30, 1999. Respondents filed a Motion to Dimiss on the ground of the alleged
defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s Order to amend his Complaint so he could
thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased Respondent Gapilango.
56
July 29, 1999. RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss.
December 17, 1999: RTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July
29, 1999 order for being a third and prohibited motion.
In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and
only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking residual
prerogative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is correct for the CA to invoke its alleged residual prerogative
under Sec. 1, Rule 9 in resolving the petition on an issue not raised in the petition.
HELD: YES.
Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the
Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual
prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows
that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives under
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial courts
over cases appealed to the CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except
when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res
judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on
record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the
claim or action.
The motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the
court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did
not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of
these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right
of the plaintiff to be heard.
 57

Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears
from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations.
On the other hand, “residual jurisdiction” is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, as follows:
Sidenote: SC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint due to lack of jurisdiction and lack
of cause of action (Sec. 2, Rule 3). Petitioner is not a proper party in the case
because the contested land was not privately owned by him prior to the issuance of
the assailed certificate of title to the defendant. He had never been privately titled
in his name. A mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has
no cause of action in a suit for reconveyance.
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SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is

deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORP. V. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, GR.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to NO. 209830, JUNE 17, 2015
the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due
time. The instant case arose from a collection suitfor unpaid taxes and customs duties in
the aggregate amount of P46,844,385.00 filed by respondent against petitioner
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation.
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal
of the other parties. Respondent alleged that from 1997 to1998, petitioner was able to secure tax credit
certificates (TCCs) from various transportation companies; after which, it made
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject several importations and utilized said TCCs for the payment of various customs
matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the duties and taxes in the aggregate amount of P46,844,385.00.Believing the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. authenticity of the TCCs, respondent allowed petitioner to use the same for the
settlement of such customs duties and taxes. However, a post-audit investigation of
the Department of Finance revealed that the TCCs were fraudulently secured with
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal,
the use of fake commercial and bank documents, and thus, respondent deemed that
the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
petitioner never settled its taxes and customs duties pertaining to the aforesaid
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
importations.
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal
in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
Initially, the RTC dismissedthe collection case due to the continuous absences of
respondent’s counsel during trial.On appeal to the CA,and eventually the Court,the
The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
said case was reinstated and trial on the merits continued before the RTC
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by
The RTC Ruling: the RTC granted petitioner’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence, and
the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the
accordingly, dismissed respondent’s collection case on the ground of insufficiency of
transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the
evidence. The RTC opined that fraud is never presumed and must be established by
trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders,
clear and convincing evidence, which petitioner failed to do, thus, necessitating the
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending
dismissal of the complaint
appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA Ruling: The CA referred the records of the collection case to the CTA for
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners’ Complaint could not have been
proper disposition of the appeal taken by respondent while the CA admitted that it
based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent’s appeal, as jurisdiction is
dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
properly lodged with the CTA, it nevertheless opted to relax procedural rules in not
parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as
dismissing the appeal outright.
residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an
action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 14 of the same rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly referred the records of the
collection case to the Court of Tax Appeals for proper disposition of the appeal taken
by respondent?
RULING: The Court finds that the CA erred in referring the records of the collection
case to the CTA for proper disposition of the appeal taken by respondent.
When a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to
dismiss the action.
LARESMA V. ABELLANA, GR. NO. 140973, NOVEMBER 11, 2004
FACTS: On May 24, 1994, Antonio P. Abellana filed a Complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo, Cebu, Branch 29, against Laresma Justino Laresma, a
farmer, for recovery of possession of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tampa-
an, Aloguinsan, Cebu. He alleged, inter alia, that since 1985, Laresma had been a
lessee of a certain Socorro Chiong, whose agricultural land adjoined his own; and
that sometime in 1985, Laresma, by means of threat, strategy, and stealth, took
possession of his property and deprived him of its possession.[1] Abellana prayed
that Laresma be ordered to vacate the property and pay him actual damages,
attorneys fees, and expenses of litigation.
In his answer to the complaint, Laresma averred that the dispute between him and
Abellana was agrarian in nature, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR,
involving as it did his right of possession covered by Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT) No. 0-031817 issued to his wife Praxedes. He alleged that the property titled
in the name of Abellana consisted of a portion of that property owned by the
Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 780
which was placed under OLT under Presidential Decree No. 27. Being a beneficiary
of the agrarian reform program of the government, his wife was issued CLT No. 0-
031817 on July 13, 1982 over a portion of the property, Lot No. 00013, with an
area of 0.1700 hectares. Since then, he and his wife became owners of the property
and, as such, were entitled to the possession thereof.
The parties agreed to defer further proceedings for the conduct of an ocular
inspection of the property. A Report was submitted, where it was indicated that the
parties had agreed that the house of Laresma was located at Abellana’s property.
Laresma denied being the tenant of Abellana.
On October 30, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Abellana and
against Laresma.
58
The court ruled that, as evidenced by the contract of lease executed by Praxedes
Laresma and Socorro Chiong, Laresma was the tenant of Chiong and not of
Abellana. Thus, the court had jurisdiction over the case. The court rejected the
reports of Epan and Navarro, and considered the same as barren of probative
weight, considering that the said reports failed to take into account the technical
descriptions of Lot 4-C owned by Chiong, Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171, and
Lot 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Abellana;
RULING: NO.
We agree with Abellana that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over his action against
Laresma. The bone of contention of the parties and the decisive issue in the trial
court was whether or not Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 is a portion
of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 under the name of Abellana. This is the reason
why the parties agreed to have Lot No. 00013 resurveyed in relation to Lot 4-C
owned by Socorro Chiong and to Lot 4-E titled in the name of Abellana. After a
calibration of the evidence on record and the reports of Epan and Navarro, the trial
court ruled that Lot No. 00013 formed part of Lot 4-C owned by Socorro Chiong and
not of Lot 4-E titled in the name of Abellana.
Laresma has not assailed the findings of the trial court in the petition at bar; hence,
he is bound by the said findings.
We agree with the ruling of the RTC that, as gleaned from the material averments
of his complaint, the action of Abellana against Laresma is not an agrarian dispute
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The well-entrenched principle is that
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.
In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation, we
ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject
matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or
upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained
up to the end of the litigation. We also held in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals that, in
American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from lack of jurisdiction
may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily from the face of the
judgment only.
It must be stressed that the regular court does not lose its jurisdiction over an
ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the
alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is the duty of

the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. If, after
hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the court should
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
We agree with the ruling of the trial court that based on the material allegations of
Abellana’s complaint and even on the admission of Laresma, the latter had never
been an agricultural tenant of Abellana. In fact, Abellana claimed that based on the
CLT issued to his wife, they became the owner of the property covered therein. As
such, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the said action. The dispute between
Abellana, as plaintiff, and Laresma, as defendant, in the RTC involving the de jure
possession of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 is not an agrarian dispute. Decisive
of the issue is our ruling in Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos v. Court of
Appeals:
Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and
matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos.
229, 228, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, by Republic Act No.
6389, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations.
Agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP
Law), as:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, stewardship or, otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending
parties for the ownership of the subject property.
Laresma and Abellana have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the
agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
59
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of Abellana petition for injunction
in the first place.
However, we find and so hold that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of
Abellana. In this case, Abellana filed his complaint against Laresma on May 24,
1994. Hence, the jurisdiction of the regular court over the nature of this action is
governed by Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994. Section 3
thereof amended Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, and reads:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall
be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
In this case, the complaint of Abellana against Laresma for recovery of possession
of real property (accion publiciana) reads:
3. That plaintiff is the owner and possessor of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. T-
47171 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu located at Tampa-an,
Aloguinsan, Cebu;
4. That defendant is the tenant of the land of Socorro P. Chiong, which adjoins
the parcel of land owned by the plaintiff as shown by a leasehold contract hereto
attached as Annex A and made an integral part hereof;
5. That sometime in 1985, by means of threats, strategy, and stealth, the herein
defendant took possession of the parcel of land owned by herein plaintiff, thus
effectively depriving plaintiff of the possession thereof;
6. That the defendants, while illegally occupying the land of herein plaintiff, cut
trees, and harvested the fruits of said land causing damages to the plaintiff in
the amount of P50,000.00;
7. That despite demand, defendant has refused to vacate said land and return
the possession thereof to herein plaintiff, thus compelling the plaintiff to file the
present action;

8. In filing the present action, the plaintiff engaged the services of counsel for
P10,000.00 and expects to incur expenses of litigation in the amount of
P5,000.00.
The complaint does not contain any allegation of the assessed value of Lot 4-E
covered by TCT No. 47171. There is, thus, no showing on the face of the complaint
that the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of Abellana. Moreover, as
gleaned from the receipt of realty tax payments issued to Abellana, the assessed
value of the property in 1993 was P8,300.00. Patently then, the Municipal Trial
Court of Aloguinsan, Cebu, and not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, had
exclusive jurisdiction over the action of Abellana. Hence, all the proceedings in the
RTC, including its decision, are null and void.
HEIRS OF SEBE V. SEVILLA, ET AL. GR. NO. 174497
Facts:
Spouses Generoso and Aurelia Sebe had been the owner for over 40 years of two
unregistered lots in Dipolog City with a total assessed value of P9,910.00. Sevilla
then caused the Sebes to sign documents entitled affidavits of quitclaim. Being
illiterate, they relied on Sevilla’s explanation that what they signed were "deeds of
real estate mortgage" covering a loan that they got from him. Although the
documents which turned out to be deeds conveying ownership over the two lots to
Sevilla for P10,000.00 were notarized, the Sebes did not appear before any notary
public. Using the affidavits of quitclaim, Sevilla applied for and obtained free patent
titles covering the two lots. Subsequently, he mortgaged the lots to Technology and
Livelihood Resource Center for P869,555.00.
Despite demands by the Sebes, Sevilla refused to return the lots, forcing them to
hire a lawyer and incur expenses of litigation. Spouses Sebe and their daughter,
Lydia filed with the RTC of Dipolog City a complaint against defendants Sevilla and
Technology and Livelihood Resources Center for Annulment of Document,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of two lots, which had a total assessed
value of P9,910.00, plus damages. In his Answer Sevilla insisted that he bought the
lots from the Sebes in a regular manner. While the case was pending before the
RTC, Generoso died so his wife and children substituted him. Parenthetically, with
Sevilla’s death in 2006, his heirs substituted him as respondents in this case.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
considering that the ultimate relief that the Sebes sought was the reconveyance of
title and possession over two lots that had a total assessed value of less than
60
P20,000.00. Under the law, said the RTC, it has jurisdiction over such actions when
the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, otherwise, jurisdiction shall
be with the first level courts. The RTC concluded that the Sebes should have filed
their action with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dipolog City.
The Sebes then filed a motion for reconsideration. They pointed out that the RTC
mistakenly classified their action as one involving title to or possession of real
property when, in fact, it was a case for the annulment of the documents and titles
that Sevilla got. Since such an action for annulment was incapable of pecuniary
estimation, it squarely fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Sec. 19
of Batas Pambansa 129, as amended.
To prove their point the Sebes cited the cases of De Rivera and Copioso. But the
RTC denied the Sebes’ motion for reconsideration, pointing out that the Copioso
ruling had already been overturned by Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo.
Before Huguete, cancellation of titles, declaration of deeds of sale as null and void
and partition were actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. Now, however, the
jurisdiction over actions of this nature, said the RTC, depended on the valuation of
the properties. In this case, the MTC had jurisdiction because the assessed value of
the lots did not exceed P20,000.00.
Issue:
Whether the Sebes’s action involving the two lots falls within the jurisdiction of the
RTC?
Held:
No. The Sebes’ claim that their action is, first, for the declaration of nullity of the
documents of conveyance that Sevilla tricked them into signing and, second, for the
reconveyance of the certificate of title for the two lots that Sevilla succeeded in
getting. The subject of their action is, they conclude, incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff’s cause of action
is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to
have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is
the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself."
"Title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of ownership
under the Torrens system of registration issued by the government through the

Register of Deeds. While title is the claim, right or interest in real property, a
certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.
Another way of looking at it is that, while "title" gives the owner the right to
demand or be issued a "certificate of title," the holder of a certificate of title does
not necessarily possess valid title to the real property. The issuance of a certificate
of title does not give the owner any better title than what he actually has in law.
Thus, a plaintiff’s action for cancellation or nullification of a certificate of title may
only be a necessary consequence of the defendant’s lack of title to real property.
Further, although the certificate of title may have been lost, burned, or destroyed
and later on reconstituted, title subsists and remains unaffected unless it is
transferred or conveyed to another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance
Thus the Sebes claim ownership because according to them, they never transferred
ownership of the same to anyone. Such title, they insist, has remained with them
untouched throughout the years, excepting only that in 1991 they constituted a real
estate mortgage over it in Sevilla’s favor. The Sebes alleged that Sevilla violated
their right of ownership by tricking them into signing documents of absolute sale,
rather than just a real estate mortgage to secure the loan that they got from him.
Assuming that the Sebes can prove that they have title to or a rightful claim of
ownership over the two lots, they would then be entitled, first, to secure evidence of
ownership or certificates of title covering the same and, second, to possess and
enjoy them. The court, in this situation, may in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction
and without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titles issued to Sevilla, direct
the latter to reconvey the two lots and their corresponding Torrens titles to them as
true owners.
The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of the
documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title covering the
two lots. These would merely follow after the trial court shall have first resolved the
issue of which between the contending parties is the lawful owner of such lots, the
one also entitled to their possession. Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is
whether or not defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of their property by making
them sign documents of conveyance rather than just a deed of real mortgage to
secure their debt to him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these
parties is the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined
by the assessed value of such lots.
Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit is P9,910.00.
Clearly, this amount does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold value of
P20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages that the Sebes claim are merely
incidental to their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the computation of
the jurisdictional amount
61
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS INC., V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PARANAQUE
CITY, 344 SCRA 680
NATURE:
A petition for review on the decision rendered by RTC of Parañaque City, Metro
Manila involving questions of law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name
from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was
approved by SEC. As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the
amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties owned by them,
all of which were under the old name. For this purpose, petitioner instituted a
petition for amendment of titles with the RTC Parañaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City,
apparently because the titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in
the body of the petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in
Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the
custody of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-
Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the
Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in
Parañaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio
on the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the
Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City.
Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. On
the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower court also denied
the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition that
the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the
Parañaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted
on the motion to admit amended petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue.
HELD:

Venue of real actions
This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, where this Court held that it may not. The motu proprio dismissal of
petitioner’s complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is
plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction
and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an
action is conferred only by law.[16] It may not be conferred by consent or waiver
upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be
changed by the consent of the parties, and an objection on improper venue may be
waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an
event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can
never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the
parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of
trial.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the
appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceedings. Where the defendant
fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4
of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly
challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly
erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing
motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing
the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course.
Amendments as a matter of right
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10)
days after it is served.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order
that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order
to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary
expense. The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed
by petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of the case to
be speedily determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are
62
presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without
unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit,
especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made before the
trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and
to prepare for trial.
DUERO V. CA. 373 SCRA 11
FACTS:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradelentered and occupied
petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San
Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed
value of P5,240. Petitioner informed respondent that the land was his, and
requested the latter to vacate the land. However, despite repeated demands,
private respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against private
respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.
Petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the
trial court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this
agreement, the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership
and possession of Duero. Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the
agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the
complaint.
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996,
judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to
peacefully vacate and turn over the lot.
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he
has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He
explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest
belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible
to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for
new trial.
Private respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment,
reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. The RTC again denied the
Petition.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he alleged that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the value of the land is only P5,240,
which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, the RTC denied the MR.
Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari which the
latter granted.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2) WON the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of RTC after he has successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom
HELD:
1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic Act
7691 amending BP 129.
2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and
intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was
merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to
a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do
anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private
respondent was declared in default.
He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He filed
before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his
motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This
motion was again denied.
Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the
case was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled
him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment,
and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration
The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action
cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or
even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the
court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The
appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren
of jurisdiction over the action
63
Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of the court
to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court)
FAUSTO V. MULTI AGRI-FOREST AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATIVE, GR. NO. 213939, OCTOBER 12, 2016
LYLITH B. FAUSTO, JONATHAN FAUSTO, RICO ALVIA, ARSENIA TOCLOY,
LOURDES ADOLFO AND ANECITA MANCITA vs. MULTI AGRI-FOREST AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE (FORMERLY MAF CAMARINES
SUR EMPLOYEES COOPERATIVE, INC.)
(G.R.No. 213939, October 12, 2016)
Facts: Multi Agri-Forest and Community Development Cooperative4 (respondent) is
a registered credit cooperative wherein Lylith Fausto (Lylith), Jonathan Fausto
(Jonathan), Rico Alvia (Rico), Arsenia Tocloy (Arsenia), Lourdes Adolfo (Lourdes)
and Anecita Mancita (Anecita) (collectively, the petitioners) are active members.
On September 10, 1998, Lylith obtained a loan from the respondent in the amount
of P80,000.00, with due date on January 8, 1999.7 Subsequently, she secured
another loan in the amount of P50,000.00 which will fall due on March 14, 1999.8
Shortly thereafter, she procured a third loan from the respondent also in the
amount of P50,000.00. All of the mentioned transactions were evidenced by
separate promissory notes, with Anecita and Lourdes signing as co-makers in the
first and second loans, and Rico and Glicerio Barce (Glicerio) in the third loan.
Similarly, on October 27, 1998, Jonathan obtained a loan from the respondent in
the amount of P60,000.00 to fall due on February 24, 1999, with Lylith and Glicerio
as co-makers. Thereafter, on December 10, 1998, he obtained a second loan in the
amount of P100,000.00, with Lylith and Arsenia as his co-makers. All five loans
obtained by Lylith and Jonathan were imposed with an interest of 2.3% per month,
with surcharge of 2% in case of default in payment of any installment due.
Lylith and Jonathan, however, failed to pay their loans despite repeated demands.
Thus, on December 12, 2000, the respondent, through its Acting Manager Ma.
Lucila G. Nacario (Nacario), filed five separate complaints for Collection of Sum of
Money before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Naga City against the
petitioners

OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION V. CASTILLO, GR. NO. 196251, JULY 9,
2014
Facts:
Castillo was the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT 19972. The Philippine
Tourism Authority allegedly claimed ownership of the same parcel of land based on
TCT 18493.
Castillo and Olivarez Realty Corporation, represented by Dr. Pablo Olivarez, entered
into a contract of conditional sale over the property. The details were as follows:
1. Under the deed of conditional sale, Castillo agreed to sell his property to Olivarez
Realty; with Olivarez Realty delivering the downpayment and the rest to be paid in
30 equal monthly installments every 8th of the month beginning in the month that
the parties would receive a decision voiding the PTA’s title to the property.
2. Under the same deed, Olivarez Realty will file the action against PTA with full
assistance of Castillo; and that should the petition be denied, Castillo shall
reimburse all the amounts paid by Olivarez Realty.
3. Under the same contract, Olivarez Realty undertook to pay the legitimate tenants
of the land disturbance compensation, while Castillo undertook to clear the land of
the tenants within 6 months from the signing of the deed; that should Castillo fail to
clear the land within 6 months, Olivarez Realty may suspend its monthly
downpayment until the tenants vacate the property.
4. The parties agreed that Olivarez Realty Corporation may immediately occupy the
property upon signing of the deed. Should the contract be cancelled, Olivarez Realty
Corporation agreed to return the property’s possession to Castillo and forfeit all the
improvements it may have introduced on the property.
Olivarez Realty failed to comply with the conditions, to wit: a) pay the full purchase
price; b) failed to file any action against PTA; c) failed to clear the land of the
tenants nor paying them disturbance compensation. For breaching the contract,
Castillo prayed for rescission of contract under Art. 1191 of Civil Code, plus
damages.
In their defense, Olivarez Realty alleged that Castillo failed to fully assist in filing the
action against PTA; that Castillo failed to clear the property of the tenants within 6
months from the signing of the deed. Thus, they had all the legal right to withhold
the subsequent payments to fully pay the purchase price.
Both RTC and CA ruled that Olivarez Realty breached the contract and ordered the
rescission of the sale plus damages.
64
HEIRS OF BAUTISTA V. LINDO, GR. NO. 208232, MARCH 10, 2014
Facts:
Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-
patent land located in Davao Oriental and covered by OCT No. (1572) P-6144.A few
years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein
respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991. Two months
later, OCT No.(1572) P-6144 was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)
were issued in favor of the vendees.
On August 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents
before the RTC, anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
No. (CA) 141, otherwise known as the “Public Land Act,” which reads:
“SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant,
his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the
conveyance.”
During the pendency of the action, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner,
Efipania. Respondents, Sps. Lindo entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, whereby they agree to cede to Epifania 3,230 sq.m..portion of the
property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and
counterclaims against each other. RTC approve the compromise agreement on
January 2011.
Other respondents, filed a Motion to Dismissed on February 2013 alleging lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the complaint failed to state the value of
the property sought to be recovered and alleges that the total value of the
properties in issue is only P16,500 pesos. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent
dismissing the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Ratio:
Yes. Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec.
19 of BP 129.

Issue:
Whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real
property or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Ratio:
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a
civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in
Russell v. Vestil, wrote that "in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim." But where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
TRAYVILLA V. SEJAS, GR. NO. 204970, FEBRUARY 1, 2016
An action for specific performance with prayer for reconveyance of a property was
filed, but the complaint did not allege the assessed value of the property. But the
declaration in the Amended Complaint stated that the property is valued at
P6,000.00 based on the handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings
indicated that the property was purchased for the price of P6,000.00. The relevance
of the said alleged value of the property was the subject that the SC discussed
where it was
Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction
Held: The action is one for specific performance. In other words, the aim is to
secure the claimed ownership and title to the property which qualified it as a real
action.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is
one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein.
65
Since the action is a real action, petitioners should have observed the requirement
under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC28 relative to declaring the fair market value of the
property as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). Since no such allegation was made in the Amended
Complaint, then the value of the subject property as stated in the handwritten
document sued upon and restated in the Amended Complaint should be the basis
for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees to be paid.
In the absence of the required declaration of the fair market value as stated in the
current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined
whether the RTC or first level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioners’ action, since the jurisdiction of these courts is determined on the basis
of the value of the property.
Since the value of the subject property as stated in the Amended Complaint is just
P6,000.00, then the RTC did not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first
instance; it should have dismissed Civil Case No. 4633-2K5. But it did not. In
continuing to take cognizance of the case, the trial court clearly committed grave
abuse of discretion.
GARCIA
GOCHAN V. GOCHAN GR. NO. 146089 DECEMBER 13, 2001
FACTS:
Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty
Corporation and the Mactan Realty Development Corporation. Respondents
offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to the individual petitioners
in consideration of the sum of P200,000,000:00. Petitioners accepted and paid
the said amount to respondents.
Respondents required individual petitioners to execute a promissory note. They
drafted the promissory note in his handwriting and had the same signed by the
petitioners. Unbeknown to petitioners, the respondents inserted in the
promissory note a phrase that says, “said amount is in partial consideration of
the sale."
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance and
damages alleging that the petitioners that offered to buy their shares of stock,
in consideration of P200M and multiple properties. Accordingly, respondents

claimed that they are entitled to the conveyance of the properties, in addition
to the amount of P200,000,000.00, which they acknowledge to have received
from petitioners plus damages.
Petitioners filed their answer, raising that the court is without jurisdiction
because of non-payment of the correct docket fees;
Trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. It cited that respondents paid the
necessary filing and docket fees of at least P165K.
MR denied. Petition for certiorari with CA dismissed. MR denied. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Court acquired jurisdiction over the case?
Held: NO. The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action.
In the case of Sun Insurance, the SC ruled that in case the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive period. However, the liberal interpretation of the rules relating to the
payment of docket fees as applied in the case of Sun Insurance cannot apply to the
instant case as respondents have never demonstrated any willingness to abide by
the rules and to pay the correct docket fees. Instead, respondents have stubbornly
insisted that the case they filed was one for specific performance and damages and
that they actually paid the correct docket fees therefor at the time of the filing of
the complaint.
2. What is the real nature of the case?
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the
issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees
therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather
than by its title or heading. The caption of the complaint below was denominated as
one for “specific performance and damages.” The relief sought, however, is the
conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of
conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional
66
memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below was
actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the
nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific
performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall
be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by
the claimant. Rule 141, Section 7, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
00-2-01-SC, provides: in a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if
there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall
be the basis in computing the fees.
WILMON AUTOSUPPLY CORP V. CA GR. NO. 97637 APRIL 10, 1992
Facts:
Wilmon was the lessee of a commercial building and bodegas standing on a
registered land owned in common by the Lacsons, Solinap, and Jaranilla. The leases
were embodied in deeds wherein one of the clauses provided for a reservation of
rights in which the seller has the right to encumber or sell the property provided
that the transferee would respect the lease of Wilmon. After the expiration of the
lease period, the premises were sold to Star Group Resources and Development.
Thereafter, the respondent filed against the petitioner, who stayed despite the
expiration of their lease contract, for unlawful detainer. The lessees refused to
concede and even impugned the right of the respondent to eject them. Petitioners
filed a case in the RTC to enforce their leasehold and pre-emptive rights, which
include the declaration of the sale null and void, their right of redemption, and to
recover their two-month deposits against the respondent in the dispute premises.
Subsequently they filed a motion to dismiss the ejectment case because of the case
they filed with RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC against a lessee
grounded on the expiration of the latter’s lease should be suspended by an action
filed in the RTC by the defendant lessee on the claim that he is entitled to a right of

preemption of the premises in question and wishes to have said right judicially
enforced?
HELD:
NO. An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed in the RTC based on
tenant’s claim that his right of preemption was violated. The underlying reasons for
the this were that the actions in the RTC did not involve physical or de facto
possession, and on not a few occasions, that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy
to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the
former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there
resolved
It has also been decided in a long line of cases that cases wherein ownership is the
issue does not a bar or suspend ejectment cases.
The Court however stressed that when in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. The MTC
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve “the issue of ownership x x
only to determine the issue of possession”
MONTEBLANCO V. HINIGIRAN SUGAR PLANTATION, GR. NO. L-43550,
NOVEMBER 27, 1936
Facts:
On September 18, 1924, a case was instituted in the justice of the peace court of
Hinigaran. The plaintiff amended his complaint praying that the defendant be
ordered to return to him the land described therein, having alleged in his former
complaint that said defendant and its co-defendants Siguenza and Coruña have
been detaining it since August 1924.
The justice of the peace court of Hinigaran, considering that the trial of the case
devolved upon the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, forwarded it to the
latter court. The Court of First Instance remanded the case to the justice of the
67
peace court with instructions to the effect that if it was of the opinion that the case
did not come within its jurisdiction it should issue an order to that effect and later
inform the parties thereof so that they might bring the action they deemed proper.
The justice of the peace court rendered its decision dismissing the case notifying the
parties that they could bring the action or actions they deemed proper in the
competent court. The plaintiff appealed from this decision to the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros which, after due hearing, again ordered the case
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Hinigaran, directing said court to try it
and pass upon the questions raised therein on the ground that it merely involved
forcible entry and detainer which is of the nature of those coming under its
exclusive jurisdiction.
The justice of the peace court rendered its judgment which was declared null and
void by the lower court on the ground that said justice of the peace court had no
jurisdiction to render it.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in declaring the judgment of the justice of the peace
court of Hinigaran null and void.
Held:
No. It is known that under the law (Acts Nos. 3881 and 4115), justice of the peace
courts alone have jurisdiction in cases of forcible entry and detainer, when the
action arising therefrom is commenced within one year from the time said acts took
place. It appears from the complaint which gave rise to this case in the justice of
the peace court of Hinigaran that the detainer took place in the month of August
1924 and the complaint was filed in the following month, on September 18, 1924,
scarcely a month after the cause of action had arisen.
Had the complaint been filed after the lapse of one year from the month of August
1924, the justice of the peace court of Hinigaran would not have had jurisdiction to
try the case. When the case was remanded to it on June 15, 1925, the justice of the
peace court still had eleven months and some days of the which conferred,
jurisdiction upon it, to try the case, excluding, of course, from said computation the
time it took the case to come and go from said court to the Court of First Instance
and from the latter to the former.

In order that justice of the peace courts in which a case for forcible entry and
detainer is brought may have jurisdiction to decide such case they must decide it
within the shortest time practicable, if possible within the year in which they have
jurisdiction or, at most, within three months after the expiration of said year, if the
action is commenced on the last days thereof which is the time when, as already
stated, they have jurisdiction.
The purpose of the law in fixing at one year the period within which actions for
forcible entry and detainer may be brought, is undoubtedly to require cases of said
nature to be tried as soon as possible and decided promptly.
The parties and the justice of the peace court allowed not only the said eleven
months and some days but nearly about eight years to elapse without making any
effort or taking any action to terminate the case. With this inaction or rather neglect
on their part, they made it understood that they abandoned the case, particularly
the plaintiff, being no longer interested in the result thereof. There was necessity for
the justice of the peace court to revive it by ordering the hearing thereof.
For purposes of the law, the case had died in the justice of the peace court one year
after it had been remanded thereto by the Court of First Instance, with no step
having been taken towards its termination in one way or another. For the foregoing
reasons, and not for those stated in the order appealed from, said order is affirmed.
GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES V. CA, GR. NO. 76217, SEPTEMBER
14, 1989
FACTS:
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the
land situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal. The spouses Jose
executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management
Services to develop their property. They have already acquired the proper permits
to do so but they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20
other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmer’s Association.) These farmers
have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of
the permits and they already have their crops all over the property. In short, they
are in actual possession of the land.
Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their
crops and property. The respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of
their property without due process of law by trespassing, demolishing and
bulldozing their crops and property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but
CA reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were
denied thus this appeal
68
ISSUE:
W/N private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner?
HELD:
Yes.The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due
process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has
sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the petition for review filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate
Court need not await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact
that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration
negates any violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner’s claim that it was duly authorized by the owners
to develop the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can
commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue.
Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to
an estate. Title is not involved.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the
muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the
issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated
that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or
terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles
him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized
petitioner’s drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private
respondents on the basis of the doctrine of selfhelp enunciated in Article 429 of the
New Civil Code. Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can
only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent
in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the
Civil Code which states, “(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes
that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must
invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the
thing.”

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES V. SECRETARY HERNANDO B. PEREZ, GR. NO.
166836, SEPTEMBER 4, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. purchased from B.F. Homes, Inc. 2,130
residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque. The transactions
were embodied in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought
under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but
20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land purchased under the third deed of
sale, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties. On its part, BF Homes claimed
that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the
third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation
receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver
by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the
SEC. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, San Miguel
Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas
charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No.
957. At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its
favor. San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las
Piñas, citing the pendency of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its
comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime,
however, the SEC terminated BF Homes’ receivership on September 12, 2000,
prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes’
comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of
proceedings due to the intervening termination of the receivership. The OCP Las
Piñas rendered its resolution, dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on several grounds, one of which was
that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal
action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB.
ISSUE:
Whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs
could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial
question
HELD:
YES. BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific performance
in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the
criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be
resolved is correct. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which
69
arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is
determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged
in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question
is to avoid conflicting decisions. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are
provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because
of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in
the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the
resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt
in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus
necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact
performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to
the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it. Evidently, before the
remedy of specific perfor-mance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the
contract. The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case
one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured
party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with
the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he
has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with
damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in
reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code
which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only to reciprocal
obligations, such that a party’s breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory
condition that entitled the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the
former one, contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is granted
the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or the specific
performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.
Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and
condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein “real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly” the basic
requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of
swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the

buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957
authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain
instances, as well as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it
prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-
compliance with its provisions.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not
conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the
prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party
who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all
the essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of
evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the
allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a
question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
The action for specific performance, although civil in nature, could be brought
only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
There has been of late a proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory
in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of
controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such
agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the
proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private
rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable only by
the regular courts.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on
matters demanding the special competence of administrative agencies even if such
matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that
requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of
some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or
intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although
the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the
doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its
suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body
are threshed out and determined.
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will
not determine a controversy involving a question within the competence of an
administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within the special
competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that
instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative
body for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot
resolve a question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body
70
prior to the resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative agency to ascertain
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or
dismissal of the action is proper.
It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by
which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’ directors and officers by the mere
failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the suspension unsustainable. The
mere fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with the
initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd result by means of rendering a
reasonable interpretation and application of the procedural law. Indeed, the
procedural law must always be given a reasonable construction to preclude
absurdity in its application. Hence, a literal application of the principle governing
prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such application would produce unjust and
absurd results or unreasonable consequences.
PORTILLO V. RODULF LIETZ, GR. NO. 196539, OCTOBER 10, 2012
Facts:
Marietta Portillo was promoted to Sales Representative and received a
corresponding increase in basic monthly salary sales and sales quota on her 10th
year with Lietz, Inc. In this regard, Portillo signed another letter agreement
containing a “Goodwill Clause.”
Three years thereafter, Portillo resigned from her employment and demanded from
Lietz Inc. for the payment of her remaining salaries and commissions not paid to
her upon such resignation. Later, within the 3-year prohibitory period, Lietz learned
that Portillo was hired by Ed Keller Philippines, a direct competitor of Lietz, as head
of its Pharma Raw Material Department.
Portillo's demands from Lietz, Inc. for the payment of her remaining salaries and
commissions went unheeded. Lietz, Inc. gave Portillo the run around, on the pretext
that her salaries and commissions were still being computed. She filed a complaint
with the NLRC for non-payment of 1½ months’ salary, 2 months’ commission, 13th
month pay, plus moral, exemplary and actual damages and attorney’s fees.
In its position paper, Lietz admitted liability for Portillo’s money claims.
However, Lietz raised the defense of legal compensation, stating that Portillo’s
money claims should be offset against her liability to Lietz for liquidated damages
for Portillo’s breach of the “Goodwill Clause” in the employment contract when she
became employed with Ed Keller.
 71

HELD:
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals may file a verified petition for review on certiorari. Considering
that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to Portillo, that available
recourse foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a limited
form of review and a remedy of last recourse, which lies only where there is no
appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
6715, it stated that it is the Labor Arbiter which had original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Dai-Chi asks for the reversal of RTC's dismissal of the civil case, contending that the
case is cognizable by the regular courts. It argues that the cause of action did not
arise from employer-employee relations, even though the claim is based on a
provision in the employment contract.
ISSUE:

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an
appeal or any other adequate remedy. If a petition for review is available, even
prescribed, the nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of
no consequence. It may well be that those questions of law will treat exclusively of
whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is
appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action.
W/N RTC has jurisdiction over the present case.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the
Philippines. It seeks to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for
private respondent’s breach of his contractual obligation to its damage and
prejudice. Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over
the controversy belongs to the regular courts. More so when we consider that the
stipulation refers to the post-employment relations of the parties.

DAI-CHI ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING CORP. V. VILLARAMA,JR., 1994 San Miguel was cited in Ocheda v. Court of Appeals, where the court held that
when the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable
FACTS: causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over
the action is with the regular courts.
On July 29, 1993, Dai-Chi filed a complaint for damages with the Pasig RTC, Br 156,
Pasig against Limjuco, a former employee. Dai-Chi alleged that Limjuco violated
paragraph five of their Contract of Employment, which provides: “That for a period
of two (2) years after termination of service from EMPLOYER, EMPLOYEE shall not in
any manner be connected, and/or employed, be a consultant and/or be an
informative body directly or indirectly, with any business firm, entity or undertaking
engaged in a business similar to or in competition with that of the EMPLOYER.”

Dai-Chi claimed that Limjuco became an employee of Angel Sound Philippines

Corporation, a corporation engaged in the same line of business as that of Dai-Chi,
within two years from January 30, 1992, the date of Limjuco's resignation. Dai-Chi
further alleged that Limjuco is holding the position of Head of the Material
Management Control Department, the same position he held while in the employ of
Dai-Chi.

Dai-Chi sought to recover liquidated damages in the amount of P100,000.00, as

expressly provided for in paragraph 7of the contract.

RTC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy
because the complaint was for damages arising from employer-employee relations.
Citing Article 217(4) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by R.A. No.

YUSEN AIR AND SEA SERVICES PHILS INC. V. VILLAMOR, 2005
FACTS
Petitioner hired respondent Villamor as branch manager in its Cebu Office. Later,
petitioner reclassified respondent’s position to that of Division Manager, which
position respondent held until his resignation on February 1, 2002. Immediately
after his resignation, respondent started working for Aspac International, a
corporation engaged in the same line of business as that of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner Yusen Air filed against respondent a complaint for injunction
and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order in the RTC of Parañaque
City, on the ground that respondent violated the provision in his contract that he
should not affiliate himself with competitors for a period of two years from his
resignation or separation from petitioner company.
Respondent also filed against petitioner a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.
Instead of filing an answer to the case in the RTC, respondent moved for the
dismissal of said case, arguing that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of said case because an employer-employee relationship is involved.
Petitioner contends that its cause of action did not arise from employer-employee
relations even if the claim therein is based on a provision in its handbook.
ISSUE
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the present controversy.
HELD:
YES. It is settled that these injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for
the protection of substantive rights and interests. Injunction is not a cause of action
in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. When the act
sought to be enjoined ha[s] become fait accompli, only the prayer for provisional
remedy should be denied. However, the trial court should still proceed with the
determination of the principal action so that an adjudication of the rights of the
parties can be had.
Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph
4 of Article 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable
causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that article. Only if there is
such a connection with the other claims can a claim for damages be considered as
arising from employer-employee relations.
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the
allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only
72
after and as a result of a trial. Neither can jurisdiction of a court be made to depend
upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such
were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the
defendant.
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LTD., V. PANO, 1983
FACTS:
Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment Engineer Officer with the
opportunity to undergo a B-707 I conversion training course requiring him to enter
into a bond with Singapore Airlines Limited for 5 years. Claiming that Cruz had
applied for leave without pay and had gone on leave without approval of the
application during the second year, SIA filed suit for damages against Cruz and his
surety, Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions . The RTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground oflack of jurisdiction
ISSUE:
W/N properly cognizable by Courts of justice and not by the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission
HELD:
YES. Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present
controversy must be held to belong to the civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner’s
claim for damages arises from employer-employee relations, and the latest
amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130
provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship are
cognizable by Labor Arbiters, in essence, petitioner’s claim for damages is grounded
on the “wanton failure and refusal” without just cause of private respondent Cruz to
report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his
application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further
averment that Cruz “maliciously and with bad faith” violated the terms and
conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner
removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it
within the purview of Civil Law.
Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims
no benefits under the Labor Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated
damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not
labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor
disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The
items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation,
intrinsically a civil dispute.

BF CORPORATION V. WERDENBERG INTERNATIONAL CORP, 2015
FACTS:
BF Corporation and respondent Shangri-La Properties, Inc. entered into the 1st
agreement whereby Shang engaged BF to construct the main structure of the EDSA
Plaza Project – the EDSA Shangri-La Mall – in Mandaluyong City.
While the construction work was in progress Shang once again hired BF for the
expansion of the project, the 2nd agreement. BF incurred delay in the construction
work that SPI considered as serious and substantial. BF contended that they had
faithfully complied with the first agreement until a fire broke out on damaging phase
1 of the project, Hence SPI proposed the renegotiation of the agreement between
them.
Parties entered into another agreement named “Agreement for the Execution of
Builders Work for the EDSA Plaza Project” (3rd agreement) that would cover the
construction work on said project until its eventual completion.
BF filed with the RTC of Pasig a complaint for the collection of the balance due under
the construction agreement. Named Defendants therein were Shang and members
of its board of directors – A. Ramos, Colayco, Obles, Lanuza Jr., Licauco&B.Ramos.
Shang and its co-defendants filed a motion to suspend proceedings instead of filing
an answer.
Motion was anchored on the defendants allegation that the formal trade contract of
the the construction project provided for a clause requiring prior resort to arbitration
before judicial intervention.
BF opposed said motion stating that there was no formal contract between the
parties although they entered into an agreement. They emphasized that the
agreement did not provide for an arbitration thus cannot deprive the court of its
jurisdiction.
Shang insisted that there was an arbitration clause in the existing contract between
them. It alleged that the suspension would not deprive the court of its jurisdiction
and would expedite the settlement proceedings rather than delay it.
73
In a rejoinder, BF reiterated that there was no arbitration clause in the contract
bewtween the parties. It averred that if there was an arbitration clause, suspension
of the proceedings was no longer proper and that defendants should be declared in
default for failure to answer within the reglementary period.
The RTC found that the arbitration clause did exist, however the lower court denied
motion to suspend proceedings and ruled in favor of BF.
Shang filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied because of lack of merit
and directed the other defendants to file their responsive pleading within the
reglementary period. Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, SPI filed a
petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of appeals.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition and annulled and set aside the orders and
stayed the proceedings in the lower court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the parties entered into an arbitrary agreement
HELD:
YES. Contracts constitute the law between the parties, and they are bound by
its stipulations. For as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy, the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient.
The liability for liquidated damages is governed by Articles 2226 to 2228 of
the Civil Code, where the parties to a contract are allowed to stipulate on liquidated
damages to be paid in case of breach. It is attached to an obligation in order to
ensure performance and has a double function: (1) to provide for liquidated
damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the threat of
greater responsibility in the event of breach. The amount agreed upon answers for
damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the completion of the project.
 74

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., 200 SCRA 667
FACTS:
In a Joint Letter-Complaint to the Ombudsman dated January 8,1989,
Messrs. Arnel Blancaflor and Rodolfo Santos, residents of Kalookan City, charged
respondent Macario Asistio, Jr., who is the incumbent Mayor of Kalookan City, with
having violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019).
and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth which were amassed after February 25, 1986. Prior to said date, the
Ombudsman is without authority to initiate such forfeiture proceedings. The court
uphold his authority to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such ill-
gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed even before the aforementioned date,
pursuant to his general investigatory power under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No.
6770.

In the case at bar, the alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Macario

In the said Complaint, they alleged that during his incumbency as Kalookan
City Mayor, respondent Asistio acquired wealth amounting to P17,264,722.90,
which he deposited in his personal account in the Republic Planters Bank,
Sangandaan Branch, Kalookan City. In support of their allegations, they attached
the original copies of the bank deposits and receipts which indicated the various
sums deposited within the three-year period and which had been machine validated.
However, said amount was not reflected in his SALN. The Preliminary Investigation
was conducted by Special Prosecution Officer Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., before
whom authenticated xerox copies of the original ledger cards in the name of
respondent Macario Asistio, Jr. were produced and presented by the officer-in-
charge of the Republic Planters Bank, Sangandaan Branch, Kalookan City.
Asistio, Jr. was supposed to have been acquired from 1981 to 1983. Verily, the
Ombudsman, like the Special Prosecutor, is without authority to initiate and file the
petition for forfeiture against respondent Asistio.
It is our considered opinion, therefore, that in cases of unlawfully acquired
wealth amassed before February 25, 1986, as is the situation obtaining in the case
at bar, it is the Solicitor General who should file the petition for forfeiture. The
reason is manifestly supplied by an analysis of the interplay of antecedent
legislation.

ISSUE:
The Court further ruled that the authority restored to the then Tanodbayan to
W/N the Sandiganbayan is the proper court to try the subject of the case. file informations for cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan does not include the
filing of a petition for forfeiture. The Solicitor General was, therefore, acting within
RULING: the scope of his authority when he filed the petition for forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan.

NO. In the light of the foreging pronouncements, there is no doubt that the
power of the present Special Prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is subject to the following limitations: (a) it extends only to criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; and (b) the same may be exercised
only by authority of the Ombudsman.

The rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in remand,

therefore, civil in nature. Parenthetically, considering the limited authority of the
present Special Prosecutor, he is not allowed to file and prosecute forfeiture cases
provided for under Republic Act No. 1379 even if the same falls within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Nonetheless, while we do not discount the authority of the Ombudsman, we

believe and so hold that the exercise of his correlative powers to both investigate

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND MARCOS, GR. NO. 152154, NOVEMBER
18, 2003
FACTS:
Respondents sought the reconsideration of the court’s decision which ordered the
forfeiture in favor of the Republic of the Philippines of the Swiss deposits in escrow
at the PNB. Respondent Imelda Marcos, in her motion for reconsideration, asks this
Court to set aside the aforesaid decision. Respondents alleged that a forfeiture
proceedings under RA. 1379, in relation to the executive orders are criminal/penal
in nature, hence, respondent has all the rights in favor of the accused under the
constitution. Further, they alleged that a summary judgment cannot be rendered in
forfeiture proceedings.
ISSUE:
W/N the allegations of respondent is correct.
HELD:
No. The issue of the propriety of summary judgment was painstakingly discussed
and settled in our July 15, 2003 decision: A summary judgment is one granted upon
motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important
questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the
assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are
patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent
fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a
civil action where there exists no serious controversy. Summary judgment is a
procedural devise for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise
only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact.
A careful study of the provisions of RA 1379 readily discloses that the forfeiture
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan did not violate the substantive rights of
respondent Marcoses. These proceedings are civil in nature, contrary to the claim of
the Marcoses that it is penal in character.
In Almeda, Sr., et al. vs. Perez, et al., the court suggested a test to determine
whether the proceeding for forfeiture is civil or criminal. Forfeiture proceedings may
be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are
under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included
in the criminal case they are criminal in nature, although they may be civil in form;
75
and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be
criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding
does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged the
proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so provide,
where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a
misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in a civil action. The
rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in remand therefore civil in
nature.
LEDESMA V. CA, GR. NO. 96914, JULY 23, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma is the owner-lessor of an apartment building. Two
units were leased by respondent Jose T. Dizon.
Said lease was originally covered by written contracts and except for the rates and
duration, the terms and conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a
‘month to month’ basis. One of the terms of the lease, that of monthly payments,
was violated by respondent.
Upon failure of respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner referred the
matter to the Barangay for conciliation which eventually issued a certification to file
action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma during the
Barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring psychological ailments as
can be seen from prescription and receipts by her psychiatrist.
Due to the stubborn refusal of the respondent to vacate the premises, petitioner
was constrained to retain the services of a lawyer to initiate the ejectment
proceeding.
MTC ordered respondent to vacate. RTC affirmed the MTC.
Respondent however found favor in the CA because of lack of cause of action. CA
held that petitioner failed compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of PD 1508.
Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by respondent in the court
below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Issue:
W/N there is non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of PD 1508.
HELD:
 76

NO. The Court do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance
with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was raised only for the first time in the Court of
Respondent Jerry Montanez (Montanez) secured a loan of P143,864.00, payable in
Appeals. When private respondent stated that he was never summoned or
subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that since he was one (1) year, or until February 1, 2002, from the petitioner. The respondent gave as
never summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed confrontation of the collateral therefor his house and lot.
parties before the Lupon Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable settlement.
Without the mandatory personal confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the
MTC. Private respondent’s allegation in his Answer that he was never summoned or Resp failed to pay the loan. The petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent.
subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that plaintiff has no cause of action against
The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to
him; and that the certification to file action was improperly issued in view of the
foregoing allegations thereby resulting in non-compliance with the mandatory pay his loan in installments in the amount of P2,000.00 per month, and in the event
requirements of P.D. No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are in the house and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the balance
substantial compliance with the raising of said issues and/or objections in the court
below. of the loan in full. However, the respondent still failed to pay, the Lupong
Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court in favor of the petitioner.
Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before the
Barangay Chairman was because of her recurring psychological ailments. But for the
entire year of 1988, there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see her The petitioner filed before the MeTC of Makati City a complaint for Collection of Sum
psychiatrist for consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval
of Money. In his Answer with Counterclaim, the respondent raised the defense of
for petitioner. There was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance at the
Lupon Chairman’s office. improper venue considering that the petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong,
Caloocan City while he lived in San Mateo, Rizal.

Petitioner’s non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred her MeTC: ordered def Montanez to pay ptff.
from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of Manila. Having arrived at this RTC: Affirmed MeTC
conclusion, there is no need for Us to discuss the other issues involved.
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE RTC.

Issue:
MALIGAYA

Miguel v Montanez, (1) Whether or not the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is deemed
G.R. No. 191336, rescinded because of respondent’s failure to comply with it?
January 25, 2012

Doctrine: If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either expressly or
impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to enforce the compromise in
accordance with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the case may be,
or to consider it rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is in accord with
Article 2041 of the Civil Code
Facts:
Held: Yes.
Because the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos, said agreement is deemed rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the New
Civil Code and the petitioner can insist on his original demand. Perforce, the
complaint for collection of sum of money is the proper remedy.
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation
proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the

contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is
not contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public order and public policy. This is in accord with the broad precept of
Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in
compliance with a judicial compromise.
Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an
amicable settlement has the force and effect of res judicata even if not judicially
approved. [17]
It transcends being a mere contract binding only upon the parties
thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with
the Rules.
If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either expressly or
impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to enforce the compromise in
accordance with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the case may be,
or to consider it rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is in accord with
Article 2041 of the Civil Code, which qualifies the broad application of Article 2037,
viz:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the
compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise
or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
In the case of Leonor v. Sycip, the Supreme Court (SC) had the occasion to
explain this provision of law. It ruled that Article 2041 does not require an action for
rescission, and the aggrieved party, by the breach of compromise agreement, may
just consider it already rescinded, to wit:
It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike
Article 2039 of the same Code, which speaks of "a cause of
annulment or rescission of the compromise" and provides that
"the compromise may be annulled or rescinded" for the cause
therein specified, thus suggesting an action for annulment or
77
rescission, said Article 2041 confers upon the party concerned, not
a "cause" for rescission, or the right to "demand" the rescission of
a compromise, but the authority, not only to "regard it as
rescinded", but, also, to "insist upon his original
demand". The language of this Article 2041, particularly when
contrasted with that of Article 2039, denotes that no action for
rescission is required in said Article 2041, and that the party
aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he
chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original
demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement,
without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek
a judicial declaration of rescission, for he may "regard" the
compromise agreement already "rescinded".
As so well stated in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[23] a party's
non-compliance with the amicable settlement paved the way for the application of
Article 2041 under which the other party may either enforce the compromise,
following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or
consider it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and
conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be construed as
repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did not intend to be bound by
the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which it was executed.
Perforce, the petitioner has the option either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos,
or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, in accordance with
the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action for
collection of sum of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos.
Considering that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is deemed rescinded by the non-
compliance of the respondent of the terms thereof, remanding the case to the trial
court for the enforcement of said agreement is clearly unwarranted.

TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACINTO
S. TRILLANA
G.R. No. 159411
March 18, 2005
Facts:
In October 1994, petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered
into a contract of lease[4] whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond at
Sitio Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, for a term of six (6) years commencing
from October 23, 1994 to October 23, 2000. The rental for the whole term was two
million two hundred forty thousand (P2,240,000.00) pesos, of which one million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos was to be paid upon signing of the contract.
Paragraph 5 of the contract further provided that respondent shall undertake all
construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be
destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense, without reimbursement
from petitioner.
In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject
fishpond. Respondent did not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the
water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later, respondent was informed by a
barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with
the use of a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of
petitioner who had grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.
After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached.
Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the foregoing
Kasunduan, respondent filed a complaint on February 7, 1997 against petitioner
before the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Petitioner filed his answer but failed to submit the required pretrial brief and to
attend the pretrial conference.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of
Valenzuela City had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent considering that
the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease contract with
respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain
of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. Petitioner argued that respondent should have
followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided for
in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Assuming arguendo that the RTC
had jurisdiction, it cannot award more than the amount stipulated in the Kasunduan
which is P150,000.00. In any event, no factual or legal basis existed for the
reimbursement of alleged advance rentals for the unexpired portion of the lease
contract as well as for moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law[8] provides that an amicable
settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect
of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is
78
filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date.[9]
It further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong
tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date, or by action in the appropriate
city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.[10] This special provision
follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but
there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the
law between the parties themselves. It has upon them the effect and authority of
res judicata even if not judicially approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or
disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041 x x x created for the first
time the right of rescission. That provision gives to the aggrieved party the right to
either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand. Article 2041 should obviously be deemed to qualify the broad precept
enunciated in Article 2037 that [a] compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata. (underscoring ours)
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he
chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there
had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for
rescission.[15] This is because he may regard the compromise as already
rescinded[16] by the breach thereof of the other party.
Ruling:
The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong
Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the
party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is
judicial.21However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission
under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is
apparent from the wording of Sec. 41722 itself which provides that the amicable
settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from
its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period.
The use of the word "may" clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory23 or merely optional in nature.
Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the
Office of the Barangay Captainhad the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court, petitioner’s non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041
under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the
procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as
rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option

when he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and
reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees. Respondent was not limited to claiming ₱150,000.00 because although he
agreed to the amount in the "Kasunduan," it is axiomatic that a compromise
settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a recognition that there is a
dispute and an impending litigation24 which the parties hope to prevent by making
reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining
balanced by the danger of losing.25 Under the "Kasunduan," respondent was only
required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising from the lease contract if
petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder.26 It is undisputed that
herein petitioner did not.
MICHAEL SEBASTIAN v. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG
GR No. 164594
Apr 22, 2015
Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and
attorney-in-fact of her daughter Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint
before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija. She sought to collect
from Michael the sum of P350,000.00 that Annabel sent to Michael. She claimed
that Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts, and that they agreed to jointly
invest their financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while Annabel was
working in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of P350,000.00 to purchase
the truck. However, after Annabel and Michael's relationship has ended, Michael
allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the
matter before the Barangay Justice.
On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a
document denominated as "kasunduan''[4] wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel
the amount of P250,000.00 on specific dates. The kasunduan was signed by
Angelita (on behalf of Annabel), Michael, and the members of the pangkat ng
tagapagkasundo.
Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a period of ten (10)
days from the settlement, in accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
embodied in the Local Government Code of 1991 [Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160],
and Section 14 of its Implementing Rules. When Michael failed to honor the
kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay
Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File
Action.
After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan or
on January 15, 1999, Angelita filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of the kasunduan.
79
Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a ground
Angelita's alleged violation of Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
On January 17, 2000, the MCTC rendered a decision[5] in favor of Annabel. Michael
filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in prematurely deciding the case. Michael also pointed out that a hearing
was necessary for the petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of
the kasunduan.
The RTC, Branch 40 of Palayan City upheld the MCTC decision, finding Michael liable
to pay Annabel the sum of P250,000.00. It held that Michael failed to assail the
validity of the kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to dispute Annabel's claims or
the applicability of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7160.
Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that:
(i) an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced
by the Lupon within six (6) months from date of settlement or
after the lapse of six (6) months, by ordinary civil action in
the appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a
mere Motion for execution; and
(ii) (ii) the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since
the amount of P250,000.00 (as the subject matter of the
kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of
P200,000.00.
In its March 13, 2001 Order, the RTC granted Michael's Motion for Reconsideration,
and ruled that there is merit in the jurisdictional issue he raised. It dismissed
Angelita's Motion for Execution, and set aside the MCTC Decision.
Angelita moved for the reconsideration of the March 13, 2001 Order, but the motion
was subsequently denied. Aggrieved, she filed a Petition for Review with the CA.
On August 2, 2001, the CA initially dismissed the petition for review on a mere
technical ground of failure to attach the Affidavit of Service. Angelita moved for
reconsideration, attaching in her motion the Affidavit of Service. The CA granted the
motion.
On March 31, 2004, the CA rendered its decision granting the petition, and
reversing the RTC's decision. The CA declared that the "appropriate local trial court"
stated in Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160 refers to
the municipal trial courts. Thus, contrary to Michael's contention, the MCTC has
jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award, regardless of the amount
involved.
The CA also ruled that Michael's failure to repudiate the kasunduan in accordance
with the procedure prescribed under the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160,

rendered the kasunduan final. Hence, Michael can no longer assail the kasunduan
on the ground of forgery.
Issue:
Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the
kasunduan regardless of the amount involved.
Ruling:
The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction
to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved.
The Court also finds that the CA correctly upheld the MCTC's jurisdiction to enforce
any settlement or arbitration .award issued by the Lupon.
We again draw attention to the provision of Section 417 of the Local Government
Code that after the lapse of the six (6) month period from the date of the
settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or
municipal court.
The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal
court" as the forum for the execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued
by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these courts, Section
417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the
issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law's intendment was to
grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city
or municipal courts regardless of the amount. A basic principle of interpretation is
that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation where the words of a statute are clear,' plain and free from
ambiguity.
DOCTRINE venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable,
do not as rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered
merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. For, to restrict venue only to
that place stipulated in the agreement is a construction purely based on technicality
which, on the contrary, should be liberally construed
80
Phil Banking Corp vs. Tensuan
228 SCRA 385
FACTS
· Petitioners filed a complaint with prayer for Preliminary Attachment vs
private respondents (Brinell Metal Works Corporation and Spouses
Jose and Nally Ang) for collection of a loan evidenced by 2 promissory
notes. This was granted by the RTC Makati
· Private respondents then filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds:
o Lack of jurisdiction over persons of the defendants
o Improper venue
· RESPO CLAIM: summons were served on defendant corporation’s
customer who was not authorized to receive the same for and in behalf
of them.
o Also said the complaint is based on 2 promissory notes that
declare
§ “I/WE HEREBY EXPRESSLY SUBMIT TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF MANILA, ANY
LEGAL ACTION WHICH MAY ARISE OUT OF THIS
PROMISSORY NOTE” (essentially, sinasabi nila dapat
sa Manila yung venue, not Makati)
· RTC: Granted, agreed with improper venue issue raised à MR filed by
Petitioner
o Petitioner argued that there were no qualifying words
restricting venue to Manila. Plaintiff still has choice to file
action in place of residence (consent to be sued in stipulated
venue lang if ever)[cited Polytrade Corp v Blanco] à MR
DENIED.
· RTC: Cited Bautista v Hon. De Borja
o neither party reserved the right to choose venue as provided
for in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, as would
have been done had the parties intended to retain such right
of election.
o Polytrade and Bautista case seem to contradict so rules need
to be defined
· R45 petition for review on certiorari to SC
ISSUE
1. WON the respondent court erred in holding that the venue of the
action was improperly laid.à YES
RATIO
WON the respondent court erred in holding that the venue of the action was
improperly laid.à YES
· Section 1(c), Rule of the Revised Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss
an action may be made within the time for pleading on the ground that
venue is improperly laid.
o The matter of venue is regulated by the Rules of Court, so that
the choice of venue is not left to the caprices of plaintiff.

· As a general rule, all personal actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.
o However, by written agreement of the parties, the venue of an
action may be changed or transferred from one province to
another.
· when improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss it is
deemed waived
o merely procedural, not jurisdictional matter è intended for
convenience of parties, do not relate to power, authority, or
jurisdiction over subject matter
· an agreement in a contract fixing the venue of actions arising
therefrom is a valid waiver of the venue as fixed by law.
· The Bautista case came first, then the Polytrade decision came next.
Subsequent cases followed the rule set in Polytrade. “The conclusion to
be drawn from all these is that the more recent jurisprudence shall
properly be deemed modificatory of the old ones.” [SEE DIGESTER’S
NOTES FOR FULL DISCUSSION ON THIS]
· CURRENT RULE: Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered
valid and enforceable, do not as rule supersede the general rule set
forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an
agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive.
o For, to restrict venue only to that place stipulated in the
agreement is a construction purely based on technicality
which, on the contrary, should be liberally construed.
DACOYCOY V. IAC G.R. # 74854
FACTS
· On March 22, 1983, Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal,
filed before the Rizal RTC, a complaint against private respondent de
Guzman praying for the annulment of 2 deeds of sale involving a
parcel of riceland in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, the
surrender of the produce thereof and damages for private respondent's
refusal to have said deeds of sale set aside upon petitioner's demand.
· On May 25, 1983, before summons could be served on de Guzman,
the RTC Executive Judge issued an order requiring counsel for
petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the matter of venue.
After said conference, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground
of improper venue.
81
o It found, based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's
action is a real action as it sought not only the annulment of the
aforestated deeds of sale but also the recovery of ownership of
the subject parcel of riceland located in Pangasinan, outside its’
territorial jurisdiction.
· Petitioner appealed to the IAC, which affirmed the order of dismissal
of his complaint.
ISSUE
· W/N the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the
ground of improper venue?? NO
HELD
· The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by the RTC on the
ground of improper venue is plain error, attributable to its inability to
distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
· Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed
by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of
venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the
plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject
matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the
convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.
· Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the
merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may
be had.
· In Luna vs. Carandang, we emphasized:
1. A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over suits involving
title to, or possession of, real estate wherever situated in the
Philippines, subject to the rules on venue of actions;
2. Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court requiring that an action
involving real property shall be brought in the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land lies is a rule on venue
of actions, which may be waived expressly or by implication.
· In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of
petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court would still have
jurisdiction over the case, it being a regional trial court vested with the
exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein . . ." in
accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. With

respect to the parties, there is no dispute that it acquired jurisdiction
over the plaintiff Dacoycoy, the moment he filed his complaint for
annulment and damages. Respondent trial court could have acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in
court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of
legal process exercised over his person.
o Although petitioner contends that, he requested the City Sheriff of
Olongapo City or his deputy to serve the summons on de Guzman
at his residence, it does not appear that said service had been
properly effected or that private respondent had appeared
voluntarily in court or filed his answer to the complaint. At this
stage, respondent trial court should have required petitioner to
exhaust the various alternative modes of service of summons
under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, i.e., personal service under
Section 7, substituted service under Section 8, or service by
publication under Section 16 when the address of the defendant is
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
o Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is
certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in
the CFI (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where
defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to
dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,
and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he
cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge
belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
· Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion
to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly
laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though
technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court
cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper
laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
IAC decision is reversed and set aside. The complaint before the RTC is revived and
reinstated.
82
Manila Railroad Co vs. Attorney General
20 Phil 523
FACTS
On Dec 1907, Manila Railroad Co. began an action in CFI Tarlac for the
condemnation of 69,910 sq. m. real estate located in Tarlac. This is for construction
of a railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in Tarlac,"
Before beginning the action, Mla Railroad had caused to be made a thorough search
in the Office of the Registry of Property and of the Tax where the lands sought to be
condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such
investigations, it alleged that the lands in question were located in Tarlac.
After filing and duly serving the complaint, the plaintiff, pending final determination
of the action, took possession of and occupied the lands described in the complaint,
building its line and putting the same in operation.
On Oct 4, Mla Railroad gave notice to the defendants that on Oct. 9, a motion would
be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff
that the land sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija,
instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard
and, after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground
presented by the plaintiff.
ISSUES/RULING
WON CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of condemnation of real
estate located in another province
Ruling
YES, Sections 55 and 56[1] of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer
perfect and complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real
estate. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion
of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere provided, that a CFI of one
province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take
cognizance of an action arising in another province or of an action relating to real
estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time
be assigned.
Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the
manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if
that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This
does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that
he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be
rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over
diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That is a
matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On the
other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made
to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any
of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by consent,

expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented from
attaching or removed after it has attached.
SWEET LINES, INC. V. TEVES
G.R. NO. L-37750, 19 MAY 1978, 83 SCRA 361
FACTS:
Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro bought tickets for Tagbiliran City via the
port of Cebu. Since many passengers were bound for Surigao, “M/S Sweet Hope”
would not be proceeding to Bohol. They went to the proper branch office and were
relocated to “M/S Sweet Town” where they were forced to agree “to hide at the
cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippines Coastguard.” They
were exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship’s
cargo of corn grits and their tickets were not honored so they had to purchase a
new one. Because of the terrible experience they had, they sued Sweet Lines for
damages and for breach of contract of carriage before the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental who dismissed the complaint for improper venue. A motion was
premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets and was later
dismissed. Hence this instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru
condition printed at the back of passage tickets to its vessels that any and all
actions arising out of the contract of carriage should be filed only in a particular
province or city.
HELD:
No. Actions arising out of the contract of carriage should be filed not only in a
particular province or city. Contract of adhesions are not the kind of contract where
the parties sit down to deliberate, discuss and agree specifically on all its terms, but
rather, one which respondents took no part at all in preparing. It is only imposed
upon them when they paid for the fare for the freight they wanted to ship.
We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets
should be held as void and unenforceable for the following reasons:
1. Circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship will prejudice rights and interests
of innumerable passengers in different parts of the country who, under Condition
No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu;
2. Subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions; and
83
3. Philosophy underlying the provisions of transfers of venue of actions is the
convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of
justice.
Hence, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. The restraining order is LIFTED
and SET ASIDE.
LANTIN VS. LANTION
GR NO. 160053
AUGUST 28, 2006
FACTS:
Spouses Lantin took several dollar and peso loans from Planters Development Bank
(PDB) and executed mortgages and promissory notes to cover the loans. The
Lantins defaulted on their loans so PDB foreclosed on the properties to partially
satisfy the Lantins’ debt. Subsequently, the Lantins filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage,
Reconveyance, Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent Injunction, and
Damages with the RTC of Lipa City, Batangas against PDB. According to the Lantins,
the REM only covered the peso loans which they have already paid off, and not the
dollar loans. PDB filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue since
according to their agreement the venue of any suit should be Metro Manila. Judge
(Jane Aurora) Lantion dismissed the complaint because of improper venue. Lantins
asked for a reconsideration which was denied. Lantins claim that since they are
assailing the validity of the loan documents, then the stipulation stating that Metro
Manila should be the venue of any suit is also in question. They also argue that the
venue stipulated in the agreement is not the exclusive venue stipulation covered by
Section 4(b) of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether the stipulation on the loan agreement is an exclusive venue stipulation
under Sec. 4(b) of the Rules
HELD:
Yes. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed orders dated May 15,
2003 and September15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Batangas, in
Civil Case No. 2002-0555 are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
Under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules
on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action,
have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the
venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case
in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive.
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed
as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the

specified place. Under the agreement, it is clear that the Lantins and PDB agreed
that any suit arising from the contract should be brought exclusively in the proper
Makati court (or to any court that PDB wants to), as the Lantins had waived the
right to choose the venue of the action. The Lantins only assailed of the coverage of
the loan agreement and the validity of the loan agreement itself. since the issues of
whether the mortgages should be properly discharged and whether these also cover
the dollar loans, arose out of the said loan documents, the stipulation on venue is
also applicable thereto.
NOTE
: Lantins also raised the following arguments re: venue: (1) the rule on venue of
action was established for the convenience of the Lantins, and (2) since the
complaint involves several causes of action which did not arise solely from or
connected with the loan documents, the cited venue stipulation should not be made
to apply. The agreement between the Lantins and PDB states
that: “[i]
n the event of suit arising out of or in connection with this mortgage and/or the
promissory note/s secured by this mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their
causes of auction (sic) exclusively in the proper court of Makati, Metro Manila or at
such other venue chosen by the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor waiving for this purpose
any other venue. I/We further submit that the venue of any legal action arising out
of this note shall exclusively be at the proper court of Metropolitan Manila,
Philippines or any other venue chosen by the BANK, waiving for this purpose any
other venue provided by the Rules of Court.
LANGKAAN REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner, vs. UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Langkaan Realty Development Corporation (LANGKAAN, for brevity)
was the registered owner of a 631,693 square meter parcel of land.
On April 8, 1983, petitioner LANGKAAN executed a Real Estate Mortgage over
property in favor of private respondent United Coconut Planter’s Bank (UCPB) as a
security for a loan obtained from the bank by Guimaras Agricultural Development,
Inc. (GUIMARAS) in the amount of P3,000,000.00.[1] LANGKAAN and GUIMARAS
agreed to share in the total loan proceeds that the latter may obtain from UCPB.[2]
Subsequently, another loan of P2,000,000.00 was obtained by GUIMARAS, totaling
its obligation to the bank to P5,000,000.00. The loan was fully secured by the real
estate mortgage which covered all obligations obtained from UCPB by either
GUIMARAS or LANGKAAN “before, during or after the constitution” of the
mortgage.[3] Also provided in the mortgage agreement is an acceleration clause
stating that any default in payment of the secured obligations will render all such
obligations due and payable, and that UCPB may immediately foreclose the
mortgage.[4]
GUIMARAS defaulted in the payment of its loan obligation.[5] On July 28, 1986,
private respondent UCPB filed a “Petition for Sale under Act No. 3135[6], as
84
amended”, with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Sheriff of RTC of
Imus, Cavite. The “petition” was given due course, and a Notice of Extra-judicial
Sale of LANGKAAN’s property was issued by Acting Clerk of Court II and Ex-officio
Sheriff Regalado Eusebio on August 4, 1986, setting the sale on August 29, 1986 at
the main entrance of the Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC of Imus.[7]The Notice of
Extra-judicial Sale was published in the “Record Newsweekly”,[8] and was certified
by Court Deputy Sheriff Nonilon A. Caniya to have been duly posted.[9]
On August 29, 1986, the mortgaged property was sold for P3,095,000.00 at
public auction to private respondent UCPB as the highest bidder, and a
corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the bank.
As petitioner LANGKAAN failed to redeem the foreclosed property within the
redemption period, the title of the property was consolidated in the name of UCPB
on December 21, 1987, and a new Transfer Certificate of Title with no. T-232040
was issued in the latter’s favor.
On March 31, 1989, LANGKAAN, through counsel, Atty. Franco L. Loyola wrote
UCPB a letter offering to buy back the foreclosed property for P4,000,000.00.[10]
This offer was rejected by the bank in a letter dated May 22, 1989, stating that the
current selling price for the property was already P6,500,000.00.[11]
On May 30, 1989, petitioner LANGKAAN filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Extra-judicial Foreclosure and Sale, and of TCT No. 232040 with Damages, with the
RTC of Imus, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 360-89.
After trial, the RTC of Imus ruled in favor of private respondent UCPB, and
dismissed the petition of LANGKAAN for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed en toto the decision of the RTC of Imus. The petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated July 28, 1999. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the extra-judicial foreclosure sale is valid and legal on
account of the alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Act No. 3135 on
venue, posting and publication of the Notice of Sale, and of the alleged defects in
such Notice.
Held: Yes, the extra-judicial foreclosure sale is valid and legal.
After a careful analysis of the issue set forth by the petitioner, we find the
same not to involve a pure question of law[15] It has been our consistent ruling that
the question of compliance or non-compliance with notice and publication
requirements of an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is a factual issue binding on this
Court.[16] In the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, we declined to entertain the
petitioner’s argument as to lack of compliance with the requirements of notice and
publication prescribed in Act No. 3135, for being factual.[17] Hence, the matter of
sufficiency of posting and publication of a notice of foreclosure sale need not be
resolved by this Court, especially since the findings of the Regional Trial Court
thereon were sustained by the Court of Appeals. Well-established is the rule that

“factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry
even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial
court.”[18]
The RTC found the posting of the Notice of Sale to have been duly complied
with, thus:
“As regards the posting of the notices of sale, Deputy Sheriff Nonilon Caniya has
categorically declared that he posted the same in three conspicuous places, to wit:
(1) Municipal Hall of Dasmarinas, Cavite, (2) Barangay Hall of Langkaan, and (3) in
the place where the property is located (Exh. “6”). He added gratuitously that he
even posted it at the Dasmarinas Public Market. Such being the case, the negative
testimony of Virgilio Mangubat, a retired sheriff of Trece Martires City, to the effect
that he did not see any notice posted in the Bulletin Board of Dasmarinas, Cavite
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Deputy Sheriff Caniya. In like manner,
the general denial advanced by Barangay Captain Benjamin Sangco of Langkaan
that no notice was posted at the bulletin board of said barangay in August, 1986
cannot take precedence over the positive declaration of Deputy Sheriff Caniya who
is presumed to have performed his duties as such. Credence is generally accorded
the testimonies of (sic) sheriff who is presumed to have performed their (sic) duties
in regular manner.
In the case at bar, the Real Estate Mortgage contract contains the following
stipulation on the venue of the auction sale, viz:
It is hereby agreed that in case of foreclosure of this mortgage under Act 3135, as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 385, the auction sale shall be held at the
capital of the province, if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the
province concerned, or shall be held in the city, if the property is within the
territorial jurisdiction of the city concerned.”[23]
The foreclosed property is located in Dasmarinas, a municipality in Cavite.
Dasmarinas is within the territorial jurisdiction of the province of Cavite, but not
within that of the provincial capital, Trece Martires City, nor of any other city in
Cavite. The territorial jurisdiction of Dasmarinas is covered by the RTC of Imus,[24]
another municipality in Cavite..
Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129[29] provides for the power of the Supreme Court to
define the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Pursuant thereto, the
Supreme Court issued Administrative Order No. 7[30], placing the municipalities of
Imus, Dasmarinas and Kawit within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Imus.[31]
On the other hand, Section 2 of Act 3135 refers to the venue of an extra-judicial
foreclosure sale.[32]
Well-known is the basic legal principle that venue is waivable. Failure of any
party to object to the impropriety of venue is deemed a waiver of his right to do so.
In the case at bar, we find that such waiver was exercised by the petitioner.
85
An extra-judicial foreclosure sale is an action in rem, and thus requires only
notice by publication and posting to bind the parties interested in the foreclosed
property. No personal notice is necessary.
From 1986 to April 1989, despite knowledge of the foreclosure sale of their
property, the President of petitioner LANGKAAN did not take any step to question
the propriety of the venue of the sale. Nowhere can it be found that the petitioner
objected to or opposed the holding of the sale at the RTC of Imus. By neglecting to
do so, petitioner LANGKAAN is deemed to have waived its right to object to the
venue of the sale, and cannot belatedly raise its objection in this petition filed
before us.
AUCTION IN MANILA INC. VS. LUYABEN
GR NO. 173979
FEB 12, 2007
Facts:
Luyaben filed a complaint for damages against Auction in Malinta, Inc. in RTC-
Kalinga where Luyaben resides. Auction moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue by invoking the following stipulation in their agreement:
ALL COURT LITIGATION PROCEDURES SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN THE APPROPRIATE
COURTS OF VALENZUELA CITY, METRO MANILA.
Issue:
Did the stipulation in the Agreement effectively limit the venue of the case
exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City?
Held:
No. Mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties
from bringing a case in other venues. It must be shown that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively”
and “waiving for this purpose any other venue, “shall only” preceding the
designation of venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts,” or words of similar
import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
Antonio Chua vs. Total Office Products & Services (Topros) Inc
Facts:
 86

Respondent Total Office Products and Services, Inc., (TOPROS) lodged a
complaint for annulment of contracts of loan and real estate mortgage against
herein petitioner Antonio T. Chua before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
The said suit sought to annul a loan contract allegedly extended by petitioner to
respondent TOPROS in the amount of ten million four hundred thousand pesos
(P10,400,000) and the accessory real estate mortgage contract covering two
parcels of land situated in Quezon City as collateral, alleging that there was no
authority granted to Chua (its president) by the corporation to enter into a contract
of loan. It was alleged that the contracts were fictitious.
Petitioner Chua filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
He contended that the action filed by TOPROS affects title to or possession of the
parcels of land subject of the real estate mortgage. Thus should have been filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where the encumbered real properties are
located, instead of Pasig City where the parties reside.
In this case, ownership of the parcels of land subject of the questioned real
estate mortgage was never transferred to petitioner, but remained with TOPROS.
Thus, no real action for the recovery of real property is involved. This being the
case, TOPROS’ action for annulment of the contracts of loan and real estate
mortgage remains a personal action.
And thus falls under the catch-all provision on personal actions under
paragraph (b) of the above-cited section, to wit:
SEC. 2 (b) Personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election
of the plaintiff.
In the same vein, the action for annulment of a real estate mortgage in the present
case must fall under Section 2 of Rule 4, to wit:

RTC Judge deny motion to dismiss. She reasoned that the action to annul
the loan and mortgage contracts is a personal action and thus, the venue was
properly laid in the RTC of Pasig City where the parties reside.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the said order, which Judge
denied. Hence, petitioner filed with the CA however CA dismissed said petition.
CA applied Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. and ruled that an
action for the cancellation of a real estate mortgage is a personal action if the
mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage and the mortgagor is in possession of
the premises, as neither the mortgagor’s title to nor possession of the property is
disputed.
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff.
Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action
to nullify the subject loan and real estate mortgage contracts. The Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in upholding the orders of the Regional Trial Court
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.

Undeterred, petitioner elevated before SC a petition for review raising the following
issue:

ISSUE: Whether or not an action to annul a loan and mortgage contract duly alleged
as fictitious with absolutely no consideration is a personal action or real action.
Held:
In affirming the CA, the SC ruled….it is a personal Action.

Well – settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its
accessory real estate mortgage is a personal action. In personal action the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the
recovery of damages. In contrast, in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
real property, or, as indicated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the then Rules of Court, a
real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of
possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real
property.

Adelaida Infante vs. Aran Builders Inc.
Gr No. 156596
August 24, 2007
Facts:
Before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, presided over by Judge Perello was an action for
revival of judgment filed on June 6, 2001 by Aran Builders, Inc. against Adelaida
Infante.
The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by the RTC of Makati City in an
action for specific performance and damages, where it ruled in favor of R and
ordered P to execute a deed of sale of a lot in Ayala Alabang, to register the said
deed and deliver title to R, and to pay the taxes of the said lot. The same judgment
ordered R to pay P the sum of P321,918.25 upon P's compliance with the
aforementioned order. R sought to revive the judgment since P refused to comply to
the court’s order.
P filed a motion to dismiss the action for revival of judgment on the grounds that
the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that
venue was improperly laid. R opposed the motion.
Muntinlupa RTC denied P’s MTD. Stating that the reason that the case to be revived
was heard in the Makati RTC was only because there was still no RTC in Muntinlupa
City. With the creation of the RTCs of Muntinlupa City, matters involving properties
located in this City, and cases involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered
to be litigated before these Courts. Since the subject lot of the case to be revived is
located in Muntinlupa City, RTC of Muntinlupa is the correct venue.
P appealed to the CA and asserts that the complaint for specific performance and
damages before the Makati RTC is an action in personam and, therefore, the suit to
revive the judgment therein is also personal in nature; and that, consequently, the
venue of the action for revival of judgment is either Makati City or Parañaque City
where private respondent and petitioner respectively reside, at the election of
private respondent.
CA held that since the judgment sought to be revived was rendered in an action
involving title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, the action for
revival of judgment is then an action in rem which should be filed with the RTC of
the place where the real property is located.
Issues/Held:
WoN the revival of judgment is a real action- YES
WoN Muntinlupa RTC is the correct venue for the revival of judgment rendered by
Makati RTC- YES
Ratio:
87
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the lapse
of 5 years from entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by action.
The Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival of judgment should
be filed.
In Aldeguer v. Gemelo,[3] the Court held that:
x x x an action upon a judgment must be brought
either in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in
the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other
place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of
actions in general.
It must be noted that other provisions in the rules of procedure which fix the
venue of actions in general must be considered.
Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to
or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
xxxx
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action
for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action.
P cites the case of Aldeguer to support her claim but misunderstood the doctrine to
mean that any action for revival of judgment should be considered as a personal
one. The Court specified that the judgment sought to be revived in said case was a
judgment for damages. The judgment subject of the action for revival did not
involve or affect any title to or possession of real property or any interest therein. P
also cited the case of Donnelly, but the judgment to be revived in the said case was
for a collection of a sum money which is a personal action. Clearly, the Court's
classification in Aldeguer and Donnelly of the actions for revival of judgment as
being personal in character does not apply to the present case.

The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine whether it is a
real action or a personal action.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared private respondent's right to have
the title over the disputed property conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that
R has an established interest over the lot in question; and to protect such right or
interest, private respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole
reason for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent's
adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of
a real action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real property.
The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint
should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is
located.
According to Sec.18 of BP129, the Supreme Court shall define the territory over
which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory
thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for
purposes of determining the venue of all suits.
Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts.
However, Section 4 of RA No. 7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section Fourteen of
BP 129, Otherwise Known As The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect
on September 4, 1991. Said law provided for the creation of a branch of the RTC in
Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now the RTC in Muntinlupa City which has territorial
jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and processes concerning real
property within Muntinlupa City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 12, 2002
and Resolution dated January 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
GUINO
118. PEDRO GAYON V. SILVESTRE GAYON
G.R. No. L-28394, November 26, 1970
Facts:
On July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against spouses Silvestre
Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon alleging that on October 1, 1952, a deed
of sale was executed in favor of Pedro Gelera to sell an unregistered land
for Php 500.00 including improvements subject for redemption within 5
years or not later than October 1, 1957. The right of Redemption was not
exercised by Silvestre, Genoveva or any of their heirs or successors. On
March 21, 1961, Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita sold the land to Pedro
Gayon for Php 614.00. Since 1961 improvements were introduced and
taxes were fully paid until 1967. Genoveva filed an answer alleging that
88
her husband Silvestre Gayon died on January 6, 1954, that the deed
where they sold property to Gelera was fake, her signature was forged,
and they never executed such document, and that complaint is malicious .
Being the brother of Silvestre, Pedro did not exert efforts for the amicable
settlement of the case before filling his complaint. She prayed, therefore,
that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay
damages. On September 19, 1967, lower court dismissed for Silvestre was
dead, the absolute owner and the wife has nothing to do with it. MR was
also denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Pedro’s failure to compromise bars suits against the Silvestre
and Genoveva?
RULING: No.
Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides: “No suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.”
Genoveva is plaintiff’s sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews
and/or nieces, not part of enumeration provided under Article 217.
Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar,
it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, so
failure to seek compromise before filing of complaint does not bar the
same. The order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded
to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of
the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon or heirs if in
absence.
119. GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, vs. RTC OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI,
JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR. G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint of accion publiciana against private
respondent of which assumed another dimension when it was
dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being
brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts
were first exerted towards a compromise. Admittedly, the complaint
does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a
compromise and that the same failed. It was only on December 7,
1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner
Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted and so the
private respondent was given 5 days to file his motion and amended
complaint. On December 11, 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the
December 7, 1992 Order. On December 22, 1992, respondent Judge
 89

denied the motion for reconsideration. On January 29, 1993, the 5-
day period having expired without Guerrero amending his complaint,
respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however
to be without prejudice. Hence, Guerrero appeals by way of this
petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo.
ISSUE:
1. WON the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts
towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
2. WON brothers or sisters by affinity are considered members of the same
family contemplated in ART. 217, par. (4) and ART. 222 of the NCC, as
well as a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and
maintained.
RULING:
1. The attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a
condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the
same family, absent such allegation in the complaint being
assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack
of cause of action.
2. No. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon
v. Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as
members of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-
law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that
"sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under
Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family.
Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same
enumeration of "members of the family", we find no reason to
alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the
court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a
brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to
exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the
present suit.
loan from petitioner, or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; and
his wife was acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who
were benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract
of mortgage and he could not have executed the contract because he was
working abroad. Hiyas filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private
respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of Family Code. Alberto
asserts that since three of the party-defendants are not members of his
family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is
inapplicable . RTC denied motion to dismiss. Court agreed with Moreno.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration. RTC again denied
motion of partial reconsideration ruling that failure to allege in complaint
that earnest effort towards a compromise were made by plaintiff is not a
ground for motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: W/N HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. can invoke Article 151
of the Family Code.
RULING:
No. The Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the
Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or
among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same
may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of
the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that
earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can
prosper.

120. HIYAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC., V. JUDGE ACUNA,

GR.NO. 154132, AUGUST 31, 2006

FACTS:
Alberto Moreno , respondent filed with the RTC of Caloocan a complaint
against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc his wife Remedios, the spouses
Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
cancellation of mortgage. He contended that he did not secure/ sign any

121. EMILIA O'LACO and HUCO LUNA vs. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT,
O LAY KIA and COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 58010. March 31,
1993.
Facts:
On 31 May 1943, the Philippine Sugar Estate Development sold a parcel of
land situated at Oroquieta St., Sta. Cruz, Manila with the Deed of Absolute
name to Emilia O’Laco as vendee and a new title issued in her name. On
1960, Co Cho Chit and his wife, O Lay Kia, also Emilia’s older half-sister,
sued Emilia O’Laco and her husband for selling the same parcel of land to
the Catholic Archbishop of Manila and for recovery of the sold lot claiming
that they were the real owners of the property and the legal title was only
place in the name of Emilia. They claimed that Emilia breached the trust
when she sold the lot to the Archbishop of Manila. Emilia answered that
she bought the property with her own money, and that she only left the
Deed of Absolute Sale and the title to Co Cho Chit and her sister for
safekeeping. When she asked that the documents be returned to her, her
sister and Co Cho Chit claimed that they were misplaced or lost, and in
view of the loss, she asked for the issuance of a new title from the CFI of
Manila which was granted to her. RTC found no trust relation between
parties and dismissed the complaint. Court of Appeals set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered O’Laco to pay the sum representing
the value of the property sold to the Archbishop of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not O Lay Kia and Co Cho Chit’s complaint fails to
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted considering
the suit is between family member.
RULING:
NO. The complaint made by O Lay Kia and Co Cho Chit is valid. The
present action is between members of the same family since petitioner
Emilia O'Laco and respondent O Lay Kia are half-sisters. Consequently,
there should be an averment in the compliant that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, pursuant to Art. 222 of the New Civil Code,
or a motion to dismiss could have been filed under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16
of the Rules of Court. For, it is well-settled that the attempt to compromise
as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a
suit between members of the same family. Hence, the defect in the
complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal,
for lack of cause of action.
90
122. APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and MARIA
OLIVIA MARTINEZ, vs.
RODOLFO G. MARTINEZ, G.R. No. 162084, June 28, 2005
FACTS:
The spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez
were the owners of a parcel of land by TCT No. 54334, as well as the
house constructed thereon. On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed a Last
Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three
lots. He then handed down the three lots to each of his sons, namely,
Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was designated as the
administrator of the estate. After the death of the spouses, Rodolfo found
a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 15, 1996,
where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife
Lucila. He also discovered that TCT No. 237936 was issued to the vendees
based on the said deed of sale. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of
deed of sale and cancellation of TCT No. 237936 against his brother
Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC.
In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo,
demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and
refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that
they were the owners of the property covered by TCT No. 237936, and
that pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508, the matter was
referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement, but none was
reached. They appended the certification to file action executed by the
barangay chairman to the complaint.
In Rodolfo’s answer he alleged that the complaint failed to state a
condition precedent, namely, that earnest efforts for an amicable
settlement of the matter between the parties had been exerted, but that
none was reached. He also pointed out that the dispute had not been
referred to the barangay before the complaint was filed. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: WON Art. 150 of the Family Code or earnest efforts for amicable
settlement is necessary before the filing of this case.
RULING: No.
The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of
the Family Code because they alleged in their complaint that they had
initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in
the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D. No. 1508; and
that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at,
resulting in the barangay chairman’s issuance of a certificate to file action.

The Court rules that such allegation in the complaint, as well as the
certification to file action by the barangay chairman, is sufficient
compliance with article 151 of the Family Code. It bears stressing that
under Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, no complaint involving any
matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be instituted or filed directly
in court for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between
the parties and no settlement was reached.
123. MAURO BLARDONY, JR. v. HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, JR.
GR. NO. 70261, FEBRUARY 28, 1990
FACTS:
The petitioner and the private respondent Ma. Rosario Araneta Blardony
are spouses. During their marriage, they begot 1 child named Patricia
Araneta Blardony. Due to irreconcilable differences, petitioner and private
respondent separated in March 1981. On different dates, the spouses
executed different agreements such as MOA. On May 3, 1982, the Ma.
Rosario filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Partition
of Conjugal Partnership Properties in the CFI of Rizal, Br 306, in Makati.
The husband, in his answer, admitted that he had abandoned the conjugal
home since March 1981; that before the filing of the petition, they tried to
file a joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership but their
attempt failed due to their inability to agree upon the equitable partition of
their conjugal partnership properties.
On Oct 8, 1982, the husband filed a MD the petition on jurisdictional
grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in the Lupon
Tagapamayapa as provided in P.D. 1508, becuase both are residents of
the same Municipality of Makati. Mrs. Blardony opposed the MD.
Nevertheless, Judge Segundo Soza dismissed her petition for her failure,
as plaintiff, to comply with Sec 6 of P.D. 1508. Mrs. Blardony filed a MR. In
the meantime, the courts were reorganized and the case was transferred
to Br146 of RTC Makati, presided over by Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr. On
Aug 9, 1983, Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's order of dismissal
and the latter's MR of that order was denied by the court. Hence, this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the parties could go directly to court without passing through
the Lupon Tagapamayapa, as provided in Sec 6 of P.D. 1508.
91
RULING:
The petition has no merit. While the referral of a case to the Lupon
Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not
a jurisdictional requirement, "its non-compliance cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over the subject matter
or over the person of the defendant. Petitioner waived the pre-litigation
conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file a
motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his answer thereto
wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable partition of the conjugal
properties.
Furthermore, under Sec 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be filed directly
in a competent court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa. Respondent
Judge correctly observed that: “the issues of support pendente lite and
delivery of personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership,
although not coupled in the strict sense of the word with the instant
petition, are essentially involved in this petition becuase of the minority of
Patricia Araneta Blardony who, as of this date, is not yet 8 years old, and
because the resolution or decision of this court on the pending petition
would be incomplete without a clear cut disposition on the partition of the
personal and real properties of the conjugal partnership and consequent
delivery thereof to the proper parties. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible
error in the orders complained of, the petition for certiorari is denied for
lack of merit
124. LIBRADA M. AQUINO vs. ERNEST S. AURE G.R. No. 153567
February 18, 2008
FACTS:
Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino. In their
Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired the subject
property from a Deed of Sale. Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks
cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do not have any legal right over
the subject property. MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the
Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with
the barangay conciliation process, among other grounds. The MeTC
observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but
there is no showing that any attempt has been made to settle the case
amicably at the barangay level. RTC affirmed. CA reversed the MeTC and
RTC Decisions and remanding the case to the MeTC for further proceedings
and final determination of the substantive rights of the parties.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY

CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT
WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT.
RULING:
NO. There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred
to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending
instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of such barangay
conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lending’s Complaint
before the MeTC. Non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed
by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action
and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause
of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of
competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the
case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to
such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire
proceedings a quo.
The trial court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case. The 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provide only three instances when the court may motu
proprio dismiss the claim, and that is when the pleadings or evidence on
the record show that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (2) there is another cause of action pending between the same
parties for the same cause; or (3) where the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may
not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with
the requirement for barangay conciliation, this ground not being among
those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its own
initiative.
125. APOLINAR R. ROYALES v. IAC G.R. No. L-65072 January 31,
1984
FACTS:
The spouses Apolinar R. Royales and Presentacion Gregorio, petitioners
herein, are the lessees of a residential house owned by respondent Jose.
Planas instituted before the then City Court of Manila an ejectment suit
against petitioners. Issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued.
Respondent Planas testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined by
petitioners' counsel.. After the decision had become final and executory,
Planas filed a motion for execution and the same was granted by the
court. Execution of the judgment was however restrained by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila upon the filing by petitioners of a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, wherein they assailed
92
the said decision on ground of lack of jurisdiction, allegedly arising from
failure of respondent Planas to submit the dispute to the Barangay Lupon
for conciliation as required by P.D. 1508.
The Regional Trial Court handed down a decision declaring the judgment of
the trial court null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Having found that "the parties in the case are residents not only of the
same city, but of the same barangay, Reconsideration of the decision
having been denied, respondent Planas appealed to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, vacating the judgment of the RTC thus confirming the
decision of the City Court of Manila. Unable to obtain a reconsideration
thereof, petitioners filed the instant petition before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the omission to barangay conciliation process prior
to the filing of an action in court is fatal to the case?
RULING:
NO. In disputes covered by P.D. 1508, as in the case at bar, the barangay
conciliation process is a pre-condition for the filing of an action in court.
There is no dispute that prior to the filing of the complaint, the case was
never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. In fact, respondent
Planas failed to allege in his complaint compliance with this condition
precedent.
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D.
1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make
his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action
or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent
jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before
it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise
of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a
quo. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for
the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. And it is not
right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in
a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

126. DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by REYMEL R. SAGARIO, vs.
MARILOU M. PASCUAL. G.R. No. 157830. November 17, 2005
Facts:
Dante is a permanent resident of the U.S., who appointed Sagario as his
attorney-in-fact through a SPA to file a case for the cancellation and/or
annulment of title, Deed of Absolute Sale, and for the reconveyance of
property with damages. Marilou filed a motion to dismiss and contented
that there was non-compliance with requirement of the LGC and that
there must have been a confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or
Pangkat, before filing a claim in court. RTC granted the respondent's
motion to dismiss. Where real property or interest therein is involved, the
dispute shall be filed before the barangay where the property is located,
regardless of the residence of the parties. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. The court was of the opinion that the
attorney-in-fact shall be deemed the real party in interest, he was
therefore obliged to bring the case before the barangay. Hence petitioner
elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: WON the trial court dismissal is correct.
RULING: No.
The plaintiff not the Attorney-in-fact is the real-party-in-interest. The
Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not
actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the
barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.
To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as
applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by
respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a “real party in interest” as
defined in Section 2 of Rule 314 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-a-vis
Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and
misunderstood by respondent.
In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not
an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent
resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior
referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
93
127. JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY
ABAGATNAN, JOHN ABAGATNAN, JENALYN A.DELEON, JOEY
ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN, and JOY ABAGATNAN VS.
SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO and ELSA CLARITO
G.R. No. 211966 August 7, 2017
FACTS:
Wenceslao Abagatnan and Lydia Capote bought land in Barangay Cogon in
Roxas City from Mateo Ambrad and Soterafia Clarito. Lydia died, so
property passed to petitioners. Wenceslao then allowed Sps. Clarito
(distant relatives) to construct a house of light materials on the said land,
subject to the condition that they would vacate if he needs it. When
offered to sell the property to Clarito they declined, so Petitioners sent
them a letter requiring that they vacate the lot, but they refused.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages before the
MTC. It is noted that it alleged that prior conciliation proceedings before
the barangay is not a prerequisite for the action, since not all petitioners
lived in that barangay (Jimmy, Laguna; Jenalyn, Pasig). Clarito, argue that
such is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with, especially
since Jimmy and Jenny executed SPAs in favour of Josephine Parce, a
resident of the barangay. MTC ruled in favor of petitioners. RTC denied
appeal. CA dismissed the complaint, it held that the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of prior referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay.
Majority of petitioners resided in the barangay, and the 2 out-of-town
petitioners executed a SPA. Since respondents lived in the same barangay,
the dispute is within the Lupon Tagapamayapa’s authority. MR denied, so
petitioners filed the petition for review with SC.
ISSUE: WON the prior barangay conciliation is necessary, despite the fact
that not all of the parties reside in the same city or municipality?
RULING: NO.
Parties who do not actually reside in the same city or municipality, or in
adjoining barangays are not required to submit the dispute to the lupon
before they go to court. Citing Pascual v. Pascual and Banting v. Sps
Maglapuz, the Court stated that the requirement pertains to the real
parties in interest. It cannot be applied to an attorney-in-fact, as an
interpretation espousing such would abrogate the definition of a real party
in interest.
In this case, the Complaint alleged that not all real parties in interest
resided in Roxas City, therefore the lupon has no jurisdiction over the
dispute, and prior referral for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to
filing in court. The fact that a SPA was executed in favour of Josephine is
irrelevant insofar as the actual residence requirement under the LGC is
concerned.

128. JIMMY BANTING, ALFRED REYES AND MAXIMA ARCENO
REYES, PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. JOSE MAGLAPUZ AND RAYMUNDA
BANDIN MAGLAPUZ, RESPONDENTS. G.R. NO. 158867, August 22,
2006
FACTS:
An ejectment complaint was filed with the MeTC entitled, "Sps. Jose
Maglapuz & Raymunda Bandin-Maglapuz,represented by their Attorney-in-
Fact Rosalinda Maglapuz-Agulay, It involved the right to possession of a
parcel of land located at No. 405 Real Street, Talon I, Las Piñas City,
containing an area of 258 square meters. The complaint alleged that
spouses Alfred and Maxima Reyes (Spouses Reyes) paid rent to the
Spouses Jose and Raymunda Maglapuz (Spouses Maglapuz) for the use of
the property from 1994 to August 1997, that beginning September 1997,
however, Spouses Reyes stopped paying rent, SPOUSES Maglapuz
demanded payment but when no payment was made, Spouses Maglapuz
filed said Civil Case No. 5663 against Spouses Reyes impleading Jimmy
Banting (Banting) with whom Spouses Reyes entered into a partnership for
the operation of a grocery store on the subject property. The MeTC
rendered judgment in favor of Spouses Maglapuz. Spouses Reyes and
Banting appealed to the RTC. the RTC dismissed the appeal, thus the case
was elevated to the CA who dismissed the case. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal is correct.
RULING:
Yes. It is settled that the requirement under Section 412 of the Local
Government Code that a case be referred for conciliation before
the Lupon as a precondition to its filing in court applies only to those cases
where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or
municipality. Here, the complaint filed with the MeTC specifically alleged
that the parties reside in different barangays and cities.
As to the jurisdiction of the MeTC, this can be determined from the
complaint itself. It plainly states that the last demand was made by
respondents upon petitioners on August 9, 1999. The complaint for
ejectment was filed on September 21, 1999 or before the lapse of the one-
year period. It was therefore properly filed with the MeTC.
All told, the appeal of petitioners fell short even on the merits. It was
properly dismissed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the RTC.
94
129. SAME AS ROYALES VS IAC
130. MANUEL A. RAMOS, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and DOMINGO RAMOS G.R. No. 85475. June 30, 1989
FACTS:
Domingo Ramos authorized his brother Manuel to sell his share of lands
owned by them in common with their other brothers and sisters. Manuel
did. Later, Domingo revoked the power of attorney and demanded an
accounting from Manuel. Manuel refused. Domingo then filed a complaint
with the Punong Barangay of Pampanga, Buhangin District, Davao City.
Manuel appeared but Domingo did not on the schedule hearing by the
Punong Bgy. Domingo was represented, however, by his wife who said her
husband wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with his brother. She
requested that the Punong Bgy issue a certification that no settlement had
been reached so a complaint could be filed in court. The Punong Bgy
complied. Thereupon, Domingo sued Manuel in the RTC Davao, also for
accounting, in Civil Case No. 18560-87. Manuel moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of
PD1508. He cited the failure of the Punong Bgy to refer the dispute to the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo after the unsuccessful mediation proceedings
convened by him. The motion was denied. Manuel then filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari which was referred to the CA. CA denied the
petition. It held that there was no need for such referral because Domingo
had clearly indicated, by his refusal to appear before the Punong Bgy, that
no extrajudicial settlement was possible between him and his brother.
Manuel questioned this decision.
Issue:
WoN the referral to the Pangkat was no longer necessary.
RULING:
No. The dispute should not have ended with the mediation proceedings before the P
of his failure to affect a settlement. It was not for the Punong Barangay to say th
was no longer necessary merely because he himself had failed to work out an
parties. The Pangkat could have exerted more efforts and succeeded (where he
dispute. If the complainant refuses to appear before the Punong Barangay, he is ba
recourse for the same course of action. The parties must appear in person witho
except minors and incompetents.

MOTE
ERNESTO ALDEGUER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN GEMELO and VICENTE
GEMELO,defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-46045 July 31, 1939
FACTS:
This is an action brought in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the execution of a
judgment for damages, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros. The judgment was rendered against Vicente Gemelo alone, but in action for
execution thereof, Martin Gemelo was joined as defendant.
Defendants interposed an appeal raising questions of law and impugning the
jurisdiction of CFI Iloilo. They contended that since it was CFI of Negros Occidental
which rendered the judgment whose execution is sought, the action for its
enforcement should also be brought in said court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CFI Iloilo is a proper venue to enforce the action for execution.
RULING:
Yes.
There is no question that judgment was rendered more than five (5) years ago.
Consequently, section, 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that said
judgment may be enforced by an action instituted in regular form, that is, by
complaint, is applicable. In the case of Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Martinez
and Nolan (29 Phil., 515), this court said that after the lapse of five (5) years, the
judgment "is reduced to a mere right of action in favor of the person whom it favors
which must be enforced, as are all other ordinary actions, by the institution of a
complaint in the regular form." Although section 447 is silent as to the place where
the complaint should be filed, there is, however, section 377 of the same Code,
which fixes the venue of actions in general. The action for the execution of a
judgment for damages is a personal one, and under section 377 above-mentioned,
it should be brought in any province where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at
the election of the plaintiff. As the action in the present case was brought in Iloilo
where the plaintiff resides, we hold that it was duly brought therein.
The entire reasoning of the appellants on this question is based on American
authorities relative to the writ known as scire facias. However, we have already
stated in the case of Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Martinez and Nolan, supra,
that the remedy of scire facias is not available in the Philippines. The proceedings of
95
scire facias "are not original action, but mere continuances of the former suit and
supplementary remedies to aid in the recovery of the debt evidenced by the original
judgment". The action in the present case is an original action, and not a mere
incident of the primitive suit or a mere auxiliary and supplementary remedy. It is a
new and independent action for the recovery of a debt evidenced by the original
judgment. In other words, it is an action based on a judgment, or what is called in
English an action upon a judgment. The American doctrine is uniform in the sense
that whereas the remedy of scire facias, which is a mere incident of the original suit,
must be instituted in the court where said suit was brought
, an action upon a judgment must be brought either in the same court where said
judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or
in any other placed designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in
general.
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. (formerly WESTMONT BANK), Petitioner,
vs. ROSEMOORE MINING & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and DRA. LOURDES
PASCUAL, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 159669 & 163521 March 12, 2007
FACTS:
Respondent Rosemoore Mining and Development Corporation (Rosemoore), a
Philippine mining corporation with offices at Quezon City, applied for and was
granted by petitioner Westmont Bank (Bank) a credit facility. To secure the credit
facility, a lone real estate mortgage agreement was executed by Rosemoore and Dr.
Lourdes Pascual (Dr. Pascual), Rosemoore’s president in the City of Manila. The
agreement, however, covered six (6) parcels of land located in San Miguel, Bulacan
(Bulacan properties), all registered under the name of Rosemoore, and two (2)
parcels of land, situated in Gapan, Nueva Ecija (Nueva Ecija properties), owned and
registered under the name of Dr. Pascual.
Upon default of Rosemoore, the Bank caused the foreclosure extra-judicially the
Bulacan and Nueva Ecija properties, the Bank as highest bidder. As a result,
Rosemoore filed separate complaints against the Bank, one before Manila RTC and
Malolos RTC.
The complaint before Manila RTC was captioned as “Damages, Accounting and
Release of Balance of Loan and Machinery and for Injunction”. This was opposed by
the Bank for improper venue. The lower court as well as CA ruled in favor of
Rosemoore.

On the otherhand, the complaint before Malolos RTC was a Petition for Injunction
with Damages with Urgent Prayers for TROand/or Preliminary Injunction and for
nullification of the foreclosure of Bulacan and Nueva Ecija properties. The Bank
argued that Malolos RTC was an improper venue since the properties were situated
in Nueva Ecija. The trial court ruled in favor of Rosemoore ruling the foreclosure of
REM as null and void. CA also ruled in favor of Rosemoore.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the venue for foreclosure sale is properly laid in Malolos RTC?
RULING:
Yes.
The Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an
action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which
should be commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof
lies. The Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal action involving as it does the
enforcement of a contract between Rosemoore, whose office is in Quezon City, and
the Bank, whose principal office is in Binondo, Manila. Personal actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of
the plaintiff.
The rule on venue of real actions is provided in Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure
sale is properly laid with the Malolos RTC although two of the properties together
with the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. Following the provision of
the Rules of Court, the venue of real actions affecting properties found in different
provinces
is determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving said parcels
of land. Where said parcels are the object of one and the same transaction, the
venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein a parcel of land is situated.
96
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS and ROMEO G. DELA ROSA,
Petitioners, vs. ELENITA B. TRAZO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 165500 August 30, 2006
FACTS:
Respondent Elenita B. Trazo opened a payroll account with China Banking
Corporation (CBC). Petitioner Romeo G. dela Rosa (Dela Rosa), PBCOM assistant
vice-president, instructed CBC to credit all accounts under its payroll with the
medical and clothing subsidy for the year 1998 with the amount of P7,000.00 for
such annual subsidy.
However on 1997, respondent Trazo as project manager of information technology
and management group, resigned from her work thus Dela Rosa wrote to CBC thru
William Lim (Lim) , CBC’s senior assistant vice-President to debit from the
respondent account the amount of P7, 000.
Meanwhile, respondent Trazo drew checks against her current account in favor of
Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) and the House of Sara Lee Phils., Inc.
However, the checks were dishonored by CBC due to insufficiency of funds. As a
consequence, she instituted an action for damages before RTC QC against Dela
Rosa, PBCOM, Lim and CBC. She averred that Dela Rosa has no authority to order
the debiting of her account through Lim without her knowledge and consent.
Petitioners filed a motion for extension while respondent move to declare Dela Rosa,
PBCOM, Lim and CBC in default. Subsequently, Dela Rosa and PBCOM filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Lim and CBC also file their
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state cause of action.
RTC dismissed the complaint for improper venue and for failure to state cause of
action. Hence the respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. CA ruled in favor of
respondent. According to the Court of Appeals, absent any qualifying or restrictive
words, a stipulation on venue should be considered merely as an agreement on an
additional forum, and not to be considered as limiting venue to the specified place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue is properly laid in RTC –QC.
RULING:
NO.
Accordingly, only CBC and not the petitioner who can move for dismissal of the case
on ground of improper venue.

The Application for New Current Accounts, which embodies the terms and conditions
of respondent Trazo’s relationship with CBC, contains a stipulation on venue, to wit:
“In case of litigation hereunder, venue shall be in the City Court or Court of First
Instance of Manila as the case may be for determination of any and all questions
arising thereunder”
Since they are privy to and covered by the contract containing the venue
stipulation. Indeed, the dispositive portion of the RTC decision shows that the
dismissal on the ground of improper venue was effective only as against CBC and
Lim. As CBC and Lim did not appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing
the RTC ruling, such decision has become final and executory as regards its
disposition on the issue regarding venue.
Nevertheless, it was incorrect for the RTC to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue. The parties must be able to show that the stipulation is exclusive.
Thus, sans words expressing the parties’ intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a
particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any of the venues prescribed
by law or stipulated by the parties, as long as the jurisdictional requirements are
followed. The subject clause contains no qualifying nor restrictive words, such as
"must," or "exclusively," as would indicate the parties’ intention "mandatorily to
restrict the venue of actions to the courts of (Manila) only."
Where the venue stipulation contained the word "shall," we held that the
stipulations of the parties "lack qualifying or restrictive words to indicate the
exclusivity of the agreed forum," and therefore "the stipulated place is considered
only as an additional, not a limiting venue." Consequently, the dismissal by the RTC
of the complaint against CBC and Lim on ground of improper venue is erroneous,
and was correctly reversed by the Court of Appeals.
97
MARIANO L. GUMABON, JOSEFA GUMABON TOLENTINO, TERESA GUMABON
EUGENIO, MARIO GUEVARRA, FAUSTINO GUMABON ONDEVILLA,
WILFREDO GUMABON, GUILLERMO GUMABON, BRAULIO GUMABON and
NOEL DOLOJAN, petitioners, vs. AQUILINO T. LARIN, respondent.G.R. No.
142523 November 27, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioners executed in favor of respondent Aquilino Larin a "Deed of Sale With Right
of Repurchase" over a parcel of land located in Pangdara, Candaba, Pampanga. The
terms of repurchase, spelled out in the deed, were that the vendors, or any one of
them, could repurchase the property, or their respective undivided shares, "at any
time, from the date of the contract, after each harvest of each crop year," by
repaying Larin the purchase price and such other sums of money as might have
been or be advanced to them.
Thirty-nine years later, petitioners filed a complaint against respondent before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, seeking the return of the certificate of
title from Larin who, it was alleged, refused to hand over the certificate despite the
full payment, nearly seven times the original amount, of their loan. In his answer
with counterclaim, respondent averred that the transaction was not, as petitioners
so asserted, an equitable mortgage but a true sale with a right to repurchase; that
no repurchase amount was paid to him; and that the period for the right of
repurchase had already prescribed
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the case. In due time, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that, being a real action, the case should
have been filed before the RTC of Pampanga, not the RTC of Quezon City.
Petitioners emphasized that respondent Larin never assailed, at any stage
theretofore, the venue of the case nor raised in issue the competence of the RTC of
Quezon City to try the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a trial court judge can motu proprio dismiss an action for its
improper venue.
RULING:
NO.
Under Section 4, Rule 4, of the old rules,3 such an agreement to venue may be
impliedly made by the defendant when he fails to seasonably object to it. While the
present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Section 1, Rule 9,4thereof, does
not contain provisions similar to Sections 3 and 4 of the old rules, the deletion,

however, cannot be taken to mean that objection to venue may still be made in an
answer if no motion to dismiss is filed.
As so aptly observed by Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo during the deliberations, the
motu propriodismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court
clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not
appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time
or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of
these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right
of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2,7 Rule 9,
and Section 3,8 Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure9 brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court
may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence
on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another
cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. Improper venue not
being included in the enumeration, it should follow that motu proprio dismissal on
said ground would still not be allowed under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sections 6,10 Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further provides that if
no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided
under the rules, including improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative
defense in the answer, and upon the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing
may be made thereon as if a motion to dismiss has been filed. But, as it is,
improper venue not having been so raised by respondent as a ground to dismiss, he
must be deemed to have waived the same.
98
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,Petitioner vs. ROYAL FERRY
SERVICES, INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 188146 February 1, 2017
FACTS:
Royal Ferry Services Inc. (Royal Ferry) is a corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine law.5According to its Articles of Incorporation, Royal Ferry's
principal place of business is located at 2521 A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal, Makati
City. However, it currently holds office at Room 203, BF Condominium Building,
Andres Soriano comer Solano Streets, Intramuros, Manila.
Royal Ferry filed a verified Petition for Voluntary Insolvency upon the approval and
authorization of its Bad of Directors before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thus,
RTC declared it insolvent.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) filed before the RTC Manila a
Formal Notice of Claim asserted that Royal Ferry owed them the amount of
P2,000,000 + and a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Petition was filed in
the wrong venue. It argued that the Insolvency Law provides that a petition for
insolvency should be filed before the court with territorial jurisdiction over the
corporation's residence. Since Royal Ferry's Articles of Incorporation stated that the
corporation's principal office is located at 2521 A. Bonifacio St., Bangkal, Makati
City, the Petition should have been filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
and not before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. RTC denied the MD. However, it
reconsidered its previous decision and stated that, a corporation cannot change its
place of business without amending its Articles of Incorporation. Therefore it
granted the dismissal of the Petition of the respondent.
Upon appeal, the CA reinstated the insolvency proceeding. CA stated that Manila
was a proper venue since the cities of Makati and Manila are part of one region, or
even a province, city or municipality, if Section 51 of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines is taken by analogy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC Manila is the proper venue for insolvency proceeding in this
case?
RULING:
Yes.
Insolvency proceedings are defined as the statutory procedures by which a debtor
obtains financial relief and undergoes judicially supervised reorganization or
liquidation of its assets for the benefit of its creditors.

Section 14 of the Insolvency Law specifies that the proper venue for a petition for
voluntary insolvency is the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the
insolvent debtor has resided in for six (6) months before the filing of the petition.In
this case, the issue of which court is the proper venue for respondent's Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency comes from the confusion on an insolvent corporation's
residence.
Jurisdiction is acquired based on the allegations in the complaint. The relevant
portion of respondent's Petition for Voluntary Insolvency reads:
Petitioner was incorporated on 18 October 1996 with principal place of
business in 2521 A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal, Makati City. At present and
during the past six months, [Royal Ferry] has held office in Rm. 203 BF
Condo Building, Andres Soriano cor. Solana St., Intramuros, Manila, within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, where its books of accounts and
most of its remaining assets are kept.
To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a corporation
should be the actual place where its principal office has been located for six (6)
months before the filing of the petition. If there is a conflict between the place
stated in the articles of incorporation and the physical location of the corporation's
main office, the actual place of business should control.
Requiring a corporation to go back to a place it has abandoned just to file a case is
the very definition of inconvenience. There is no reason why an insolvent
corporation should be forced to exert whatever meager resources it has to litigate in
a city it has already left.
In any case, the creditors deal with the corporation's agents, officers, and
employees in the actual place of business. To compel a corporation to litigate in a
city it has already abandoned would create more confusion.
Moreover, the six (6)-month qualification of the law's requirement of residence
shows intent to find the most accurate location of the debtor's activities. If the
address in a corporation's articles of incorporation is proven to be no longer
accurate, then legal fiction should give way to fact.
99
RODRIGO B. SUPENA, Petitioner, v. JUDGE ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA,
Respondent.
[A.M. No. RTJ-93-1031. January 28, 1997]
FACTS:
Mortgagee BPI Agicltural Development Bank (BAID) decided to extrajudicially
foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage executed by mortgagor PQL Realty Inc., (PQL)
in the former's favor. Accordingly, BAID petitioned the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Manila to
take the necessary steps for the foreclosure of the mortgaged property and its sale
to the highest bidder.
By the ex parte petition filed by the mortgagor on the ground that the parties have
ageeed to hold the foreclosure proceedings in Makati and not in Manila, RTC Manila
held in abeyance the scheduled public auction sale. According to the complainant/
mortgagee this is an improper cancellation since no notice and hearing happened.
Respondent , in his comment, maintains that he held the foreclosure in abeyance to
determine first whether the venue of foreclosure was improperly laid in light of the
stipulation in their Loan Agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreclosure proceeding is properly laid?
RULING:
We have three different types of sales, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a
judicial foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. An ordinary execution
sale is governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments. Rule 68 of the Rules, captioned
Foreclosure of Mortgage, governs judicial foreclosure sales. On the other hand, Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate
the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate
Mortgages," applies in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate
mortgages.
If the main concern of respondent judge in holding in abeyance the auction sale in
Manila scheduled on May 26, 1993 was to determine whether or not venue of the
execution sale was improperly laid, he would have easily been enlightened by
referring to the correct law, definitely not the Rules of Court, which is Act No. 3135,
as amended particularly Sections 1 and 2, viz:
"SECTION 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to
any real estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or
the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall
 100

govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected, SMTC elevated the case to CA via petition for Certiorari 65 which was dismissed.
whether or not provision for the same is made in the power.
ISSUE:
SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the
property sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in which the Whether or not the court is correct in granting the writ of preliminary attachment in
sale is to be made is the subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place favor of the respondent LSMI?
or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof
is situated." RULING:

Here, the real property subject of the sale is situated in Felix Huertas Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila. Thus, by express provision of Section 2, the sale cannot be made
outside of Manila. Moreover, were the intention of the parties be considered with
respect to venue in case the properties mortgaged be extrajudicially foreclosed,
they even unequivocably stipulated in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage itself under
paragraph 15 that:
"xxx xxx xxx
It is hereby agreed that in case of foreclosure of this mortgage under Act 3135, as
amended by Act 4118, the auction sale, in case of properties situated in the
province, shall be held at the capital thereof."
Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to
enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted
in the main or principal action.20 Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is
available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for
purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are
provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the
pendency of the action and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in
and are dependent upon the result of the main action.21
A writ of preliminary attachment is a species of provisional remedy. As such, it is a
collateral proceeding, permitted only in connection with a regular action, and as one
of its incidents; one of which is provided for present need, or for the occasion; that
is, one adapted to meet a particular exigency.

SILANGAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, TRADEWORLD
SYNERGY, INCORPORATED, and CELLU INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED,
Petitioners,* vs. HON. AVELINO G. DEMETRIA, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LIPA CITY, BRANCH 85, and LUZON SPINNING
MILLS, INCORPORATED, Respondents.
In this case, the Court lifted the writ of preliminary attachment as a consequence of
the dismissal by this Court of the Civil Case for Collection of Sum of Money (for the
civil case is deemed instituted in criminal case for BP 22)

G.R. No. 166719 March 12, 2007

FACTS:

Respondent Luzon Spinning Mills, INc., (LSMI)filed a complaint for Collection of Sum
of Money before RTC Lipa against the Petitioner Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corp
(SMTC) for all the yarn deliverd by the former to the latter as evidenced by
receipts.

Allegedly SMTC issued postdated checks as payment, however the same had been
dishonored for the reason “Drawn against insufficient fund”. Despite demand by
LSIM, SMTC failed and refused to comply. RTC issued a writ of preliminary
attachment against STMC’s properties. This time, there was already a criminal case
instituted by LSMI against Silangans for violation of BP 22. Thus SMTC move to
dismiss the civil case against it and to discharge the attachment, which the court
denied.
 101

ALBERTO SIEVERT, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ARTEMON D. LUNA and AURELIO
CAMPOSANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 84034 December 22, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Sievert received by mail a Petition for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment
filed with RTC Manila. Obviously, he had not received any summons or any copy of
complaint against him in a Civil Case.
On the hearing, counsel for petitioner object to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the petitioner on the ground that no summons had been served upon him
on the main case,thus jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner had not been
acquired.
RTC manila denied the objection citing Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner filed
a Petition for Certiorari with CA which dismissed the same.
Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the
realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. A c
acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant, cannot bind that defendant whether in t
any ancillary proceeding such as attachment proceedings. The service of a petition for prel
without the prior or simultaneous service of summons and a copy of the complaint in the ma
is what happened in this case — does not of course confer jurisdiction upon the issuing court
the defendant.
Valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint will in such case vest jurisdiction in
defendant both for purposes of the main case and for purposes of the ancillary remedy of a
case, notice of the main case is at the same time notice of the auxiliary proceeding in a
however, the petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied in a discrete pleading,
be served either simultaneously with service of summons and a copy of the main complaint,
over the defendant has already been acquired by such service of summons. Notice of the se
petition is not notice of the main action. Put a little differently, jurisdiction whether ratione p
materiae in an attachment proceeding is ancillary to jurisdiction ratione personae or ratione m
action against the defendant. If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over
defendant in the principal action, it simply has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary
the defendant or his property.

ISSSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge may issue a writ of preliminary attachment

against petitioner before summons is served on the latter

RULING:

Under Sec. 1, Rule 57, it is clear that, at the commencement of the action, a party
may have the property of the adverse party attached as security. The resolution of
this issue depends, therefore, on what is meant by "Commencement of the action."
Moran, citing American jurisprudence on this point, stated thus: "Commencement of
action. — Action is commenced by filing of the complaint, even though summons is
not issued until a later date. Thus, a writ of preliminary attachment may issue upon
filing of the complaint even before issuance of the summons.
In the case at bar, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court to proceed in the main
case against the defendant is quite clear. It is not disputed that neither service of
summons with a copy of the complaint nor voluntary appearance of petitioner
Sievert was had in this case. Yet, the trial court proceeded to hear the petition for
issuance of the writ.

There is no question that a writ of preliminary attachment may be applied for a

plaintiff "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter" in the cases
enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The issue posed
in this case, however, is not to be resolved by determining when an action may be
regarded as having been commenced, a point in time which, in any case, is not
necessarily fixed and Identical regardless of the specific purpose for which the
determination is to be made. The critical time which must be Identified is, rather,
when the trial court acquires authority under law to act coercively against the
defendant or his property in a proceeding in attachment. We believe and so hold
that critical time is the time of the vesting of jurisdiction in the court over the
person of the defendant in the main case.

SOFIA TORRES, FRUCTOSA TORRES, HEIRS OF MARIO TORRES and SOLAR
RESOURCES, INC.,Petitioners,
vs.
NICANOR SATSATIN, EMILINDA AUSTRIA SATSATIN, NIKKI NORMEL
SATSATIN and NIKKI NORLIN SATSATIN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 166759 November 25, 2009
FACTS:
The siblings Sofia, Fructosa and Mario each owned a parcel of land located in
Cavitte. The respondent Nicanor Satsatin, asked their mother Agripina if they
wanted to sell the property. Upon consultation with her daughter and son, they
authorized Nicanor to sell the said property to Solar Resources, Inc. (solar).
Allegedly, Solar already paid the purchase price and yet Nicanor did not remit the
money to them. Instead they’ve lerned that Nicanor acquired a house and lot and a
car and registered them in the name of his unemployed children.
Subesquently, Nicanor was able to remit a portion of the purchase price and despite
demand, Nicanor dd not pay the balance thereof compelling the Petitioners to
institute a complaint for sum of money and damages against the respondents before
RTC Dasmarinas, Cavite.
Thereafter, Petitioners file an ex-parte Motion for Issuance of a Write of Attachment
alleging that the respondents are about to depart from the Philippines and that they
have properties in the nearby provinces.
Upon posting of the bond, the RTC ordered to serve the writ of Attachment and
directed the sheriff to attach the estate, real or personal of the respondents. A copy
of the writ was served to the respondents and levied the real and personal
properties including household appliances, cars and parcel of land in Manila.
Thereafter, a summon together with a copy of the complaint was also served.
The respondent, filed their ANnswer as well as Motion to Discharge Writ of
Attachment on the grounds of : the bond was issued before the issuance of the writ
of attachment; the writ of attachment was issued before the summons was received
by the respondents; the sheriff did not serve copies of the application for
attachment, order of attachment, plaintiffs’ affidavit, and attachment bond, to the
respondents; the sheriff did not submit a sheriff’s return in violation of the Rules;
and the grounds cited for the issuance of the writ are baseless and devoid of merit.
RTC denied the motion until they post a counterbond. The Urgent Motion to Lift/Set
side the Writ was also denied by the court. Hence, filed a petition for certiorari
before CA on the ground that there is a grave abuse of discretion when the lower
cout denied their motion even ithas no jurisdiction over the person of respondents
when the Writ was issued to them. CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
102
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the CA is correct in lifting the writ of preliminary Attachment
RULING:
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon
order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or
properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as
security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said
action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.
The CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond
posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were
complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for
its approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.
Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing
that the company concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for
thirty (30) days from the date of its issuance. However, it is apparent that the
Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the
bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty
Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and
Pasig. Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have
been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas, Branch 90, since the certification secured
by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the issuance of the bond
certified that it may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities. Thus, the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the writ of attachment founded on the said bond.
Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the
distinction between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment
is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably
necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should
be acquired in order to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person.
This Court has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional
remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary
attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action
or at any time before entry of judgment." This phrase refers to the date of the filing
of the complaint, which is the moment that marks "the commencement of the
action." The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the
defendant, or even before summons issues.

it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but also upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the
complaint against him and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the
grounds therefor that prior or contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of
attachment, service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the
application for attachment, the applicant’s affidavit and bond, and the order must
be served upon him.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the trial court validly issued the writ of
attachment on November 15, 2002, which was implemented on November 19,
2002, it is to be noted that the summons, together with a copy of the complaint,
was served only on November 21, 2002.
RICARDO CUARTERO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO
EVANGELISTA and FELICIA EVANGELISTA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 102448. August 5, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner Cuartero filed a complaint against respondents Evangelista spouses for
sum of money and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment
before RTC-QC. The court granted the issuance of the writ.
The said writ together with complaint and summons were simultaneously served to
the respondents. Thereafter, the sheriff levied and pulled out the properties of the
respondents pursuant to the court order.
Respondents moved to discharge the writ for being irregularly and improperly
issued. RTC denied. Thus, respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with
CA. CA ruled in favor of the respondents on the ground that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of defendants. (Adapting Sievert ruling)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct in lifting the writ of preliminary attachment
RULING:
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon
order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or
properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as
security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured in said action
by the attaching creditor against the defendant.
103
Under section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the only requisites for the issuance
of the writ are the affidavit and bond of the applicant. No notice to the adverse
party or hearing of the application is required inasmuch as the time which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property before a writ of attachment issues. In such a case, a hearing would
render nugatory the purpose of this provisional remedy. The ruling remains good
law.
In Davao Light and Power, Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra, the phrase "at the
commencement of the action" is interpreted as referring to the date of the filing of
the complaint which is a time before summons is served on the defendant or even
before summons issues. The Court added that —
". . . after an action is properly commenced — by filing of the complaint and the
payment of all requisite docket and other fees — the plaintiff may apply and obtain
a writ of preliminary attachment upon the fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid
down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of
summons on the defendant. And this, indeed, has been the immemorial practice
sanctioned by the courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the
application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading (counter-
claim, crossclaim, third-party-claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-
parte at the commencement of the action if it finds the application otherwise
sufficient in form and substance."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is clear from our pronouncements that a writ of preliminary attachment may issue
even before summons is served upon the defendant. However, we have likewise
ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant until jurisdiction over his
person is eventually obtained. Therefore, it is required that when the proper officer
commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should
be simultaneously made.
It must be emphasized that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment
practically involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the
application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting
the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not
necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should first be
obtained. However, once the implementation commences, it is required that the
court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the
defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.

G.R. No. 93262 December 29, 1991
DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, QUEENSLAND HOTEL or MOTEL or QUEENSLAND
TOURIST INN, and TEODORICO ADARNA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Davao Light, filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages
against the respondents before RTC Davao City. The complaint contained an ex
parte application for writ of preliminary attachment.
RTC granted the ex parte application. Thus, the summons, copy of the complaint
and the writ of attachment and a copy of the bond were served on respondents.
Pursuant to the said writ, the Sheriff seized properties of the respondents.
The respondents file a motion to Discharge the Attachment for lack of jurisdiction to
issue the same, because the lower court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
cause and the persons of the defendants when it issued. The motion was denied.
However, by way of certiorari, CA annulled the RTC decision citing the ruling in
Sievert.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a
defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter’s person by service of
summons or his voluntary submission to the court’s authority
RULING:
Yes.
A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the
provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may, at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the
adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of
any judgment that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is purely statutory in
respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it.
Withal no principle, statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court
before acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the
action or at any time thereafter." The phase, "at the commencement of the action,"
obviously refers to the date of the filing of the complaint — which, as above pointed
out, is the date that marks "the commencement of the action;" and the reference
plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before
summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is
104
properly commenced — by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all
requisite docket and other fees — the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of
preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law,
and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on
the defendant. And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the
courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for
attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading (counter-claim, cross-
claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the
commencement of the action if it finds the application otherwise sufficient in form
and substance.
For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition
that writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is
satisfied that the relevant requisites therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant,
although it may, in its discretion, require prior hearing on the application with notice
to the defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued may
not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by
service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the
appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not
incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint), the order of
attachment, and the plaintiff's attachment bond.
JOSEPHINE CRUZ MALOLOS represented by her HEIRS EMMANUEL, MARIA
MARINELA and MARIA MARJORIE, all surnamed MALOLOS, Petitioners, v.
ASIA PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION and HONORABLE JOSE P.
ALEJANDRO, Presiding Judge of Branch XXVI of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-55702. January 7, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner Malolos is represented by her heris (all petitioners). Whereas the
respondent APCOR is a quasi-banking institution.
APCOR purchased from Francisco Liner a postdated check issued in favor of Fransico
Liner by Malolos. On purchase, Francisco Liner execute a Deed of Assignment,
endorsed the same in favor of the respondent.
The check was later dishonored for the reason of account closed. Respondent
demanded from Francisco liner as well from petitioner as drawer but it remained
unpaid. Thus the respondent filed a complaint for sum of money with preliminary
attachment, alleging that a writ of preliminary attachment may be issued to serve
as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered therein. This
was granted by the lower court. Hence, the writ was issued. By virtue thereof, the
levy was annotated upon the residential property of the petitioner in Manila.

Malolos died and her counsel move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Sec. 21
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. RTC denied the motion and ruled in favor of the
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court is correct in granting the writ of preliminary
attachment even the main case did not survive by the death of the petitioner. (or is
the case among the exception to the non-survival of money claims under Rule 3)
RULING:
There is no question that the action in the court below is for collection or recovery of
money.
It is already a settled rule that an action for recovery of money or for collection of a
debt is one that does not survive and upon the death of the defendant the case
should be dismissed to be presented in the manner especially provided in the Rules
of Court. This is explicitly provided in Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which
states that:
"SEC. 21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in
the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in these rules.
In the present case, the money claim arose out of a pure and simple debt, which as
afore-mentioned, under the provision of Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the Rules of Court shall
be dismissed and must be brought before the probate court. . The fact that a writ
attachment has been issued cannot provide an excuse for such deviation, as a writ
of attachment is a remedy ancillary to the principal proceedings.
Allowing the private respondent to attach petitioners’ properties for the benefit of
her claim against the estate would give an undue advantage over other creditors
against the estate. (Gruenberg v. Court of Appeals, supra) citing Dy v. Enage,
supra). Therefore, under the same principle, a writ of attachment already issued in
connection with a money claim which has to be dismissed because of the death of
the defendant before final judgment cannot provide an exception to the general
rule, and must accordingly be dissolved.
\ some of his properties. But on the following day, this order was stayed by the same
105
ELEAZAR V. ADLAWAN, Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO P. TOMOL, as
Presiding Judge of Branch XI of RTC-Cebu (formerly Branch XI, CFI-Cebu),
Branch XXVII of RTC-Cebu, with Station in Lapu-Lapu City (formerly Branch
XVI, CFI-Cebu, Presided over by former Judge Ceferino E. Dulay), and
ABOITIZ COMPANY, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 63225. April 3, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner Adlawan was awarded by the NIA and Bureau of Public Highways for the
constructions of various infrastructure projects of the Government. He sought
financial assistance and support from respondent Aboitiz and Company, Inc. For his
failure to pay, the respondent then filed before CFI Cebu a complaint for the
collection of a sum of money and damages including an ex-parte application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the property of petitioner.
The Executive Judge without notice and hearing issued an order directing the
issuance of a writs of preliminary attachment. They were issued to Sheriff of Cebu,
Davao, Dvao del Sur and Quezon City.
Thereafter, the respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion asking the court that it
be allowed to take possession and custody of the attached properties to protect its
interest. The petitioner file a motion to Set Aside the Ex-Parte Writ of Preliminary
Attachment. The RTC then lifter the said writ. The three deputy sheriffs
implemented the lifting of attachment.
Nonetheless, the properties of the petitioner were then seized by virtue of the
decision of RTC in replevin case filed by the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not after the attachment of petitioner’s properties was dissolved and
discharged because it was found by respondent Judge to be wrongful and illegal,
does not constitute grave and manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the same
respondent judge TO REFUSE to implement his own order for the return of the
attached properties to petitioner simply because private respondent suddenly
dismissed its complaint
RULING:
Petitioner’s properties were attached on the strength of the writs of preliminary
attachment issued without notice and hearing by the executive judge. These
attached properties were given to the custody of private respondent, Aboitiz and
Company, Inc. Petitioner then filed a Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Attachment
which was granted by respondent Judge Tomol. Thus, petitioner was able to recover
respondent judge leaving the rest of petitioner’s properties with private Respondent.
 106

Later, private respondent withdrew its complaint which was confirmed by
respondent Judge Tomol. Petitioner Adlawan filed a motion to have the rest of his
properties returned but respondent judge refused to act on said motion due to cases
filed by both parties in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
relating to the same case.
There is no question that the order dated July 6, 1982 of respondent Judge
Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr. lifting and vacating the order granting the writ of preliminary
attachment is a valid order, issued while he had jurisdiction over the case. The
execution of aforesaid order of July 6, 1982 was stayed for a period of fifteen (15)
days on motion of the plaintiff to enable the latter to question the propriety or
impropriety of the same in the appellate court. Instead, plaintiff filed a civil case for
delivery of Personal Properties with Replevin and Damages with another branch of
the CFI of Cebu. Accordingly, having failed to appeal or question the
aforementioned order in the appellate court as originally manifested, the same
became final and executory.
It is basic that once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a
matter of right to a Writ of Execution, and the issuance thereof is the Court’s
ministerial duty. 17
But as earlier stated, the reasons advanced by respondent Judge Tomol for denying
the enforcement of his order dated July 6, 1982 which lifted the writ of attachment
and the restoration of the seized properties to the defendant petitioner herein are:
[a] the filing by private respondent of Civil Case No. 619-L with Branch XVI of CFI-
Lapu-Lapu City for delivery of Personal Properties with Replevin and Damages which
as a consequence, the same properties involved in this case were seized under a
writ of replevin upon order of aforesaid court and [b] the filing by petitioner of Civil
Case No. 22265 before Branch X of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, for
damages.
its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the
means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or
improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of
creditors.
Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to
enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted
in the main or principal action.
The remedy of attachment is adjunct to the main suit, therefore, it can have no
independent existence apart from a suit on a claim of the plaintiff against the
defendant. In other words, an attachment or garnishment is generally ancillary to,
and dependent on, a principal proceeding, either at law or in equity, which has for
its purpose a determination of the justice of a creditor’s demand.
During the life of the attachment, the attached property continues in the custody of
the law, the attaching officer being entitled to its possession and liability for its safe
keeping.
Based on the above-cited principles, it is obvious that the writ of preliminary
attachment issued is already dissolved and rendered non-existent in view of the
withdrawal of the complaint by Aboitiz and Company, Inc. More importantly, even if
the writ of attachment can be considered independently of the main case, the same,
having been improperly issued as found by respondent Judge Tomol himself, is null
and void and cannot be a justification for holding petitioners’ properties in custodia
legis any longer.

Hence, the issues in this case center on the nature and purpose of the writ of
attachment

"A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon order of the
court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the
defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the Sheriff as security for the
satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured in said action by the attaching
creditor against the defendant."

The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order that the defendant may
not dispose of his property attached, and thus secure the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be secured by plaintiff from defendant. The purpose and
function of an attachment or garnishment is two-fold. First, it seizes upon property
of an alleged debtor in advance of final judgment and holds it subject to
appropriation thus prevents the loss or dissipation of the property by fraud or
otherwise. Second, it subjects to the payment of a creditor’s claim property of the
debtor in those cases where personal service cannot be obtained upon the debtor.
This remedy is to secure a contingent lien on defendant’s property until plaintiff can,
by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property applied to
 107

BAC MANUFACTURING and SALES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF

APPEALS and WYNNER GARMENTS MANUFACTURING, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 96784. August 2, 1991 ISSUE:

FACTS: Whether or not the CA is correct in dissolving the writ of attachment?

Petitioner, as assignee of certain rights of one BOXTER LIMITED under various
contracts for clothing, entered into with the respondents, filed a complaint against
the latter with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 145), National Capital
Judicial Region. Embodied in the complaint is an application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment. Supporting it is an affidavit of its general manager
which is attached to the complaint. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued on
10 October 1986. No summons and a copy of the complaint were, however, served
upon Private Respondent.
A levy on attachment was made upon the machineries of private respondent by
Deputy Sheriff Ruben S. Nequinto of the aforesaid Branch 145 of the trial court a
quo.
Neither the Alias Summons nor the order granting the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment or the writ of attachment itself was served on the private
respondent before or at the time the levy was made.
RULING:
Yes.
A court which has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant cannot
bind the defendant, whether in the main case or in the proceedings for the ancillary
remedy of attachment. In the relatively recent case of Sievert v. Court of Appeals,
Et Al., We ruled: "Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own
sake but rather to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and
expected to be granted in the main or principal action. A court which has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot bind that defendant
whether in the main case or in any ancillary proceeding such as attachment
proceedings. The service of a petition for preliminary attachment without the prior
or simultaneous service of summons and a copy of the complaint in the main case
— and that is what happened in this case — does not of course confer jurisdiction
upon the issuing court over the person of the defendant.

Ordinarily, the prayer in a petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied

Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the
or incorporated in the main complaint itself as one of the forms of relief sought in
attachment for failure of petitioner to prosecute its case for an unreasonable length
such complaint. Thus, valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint will in
of time and that no copies of the summons and order of attachment were served
such case vest jurisdiction in the court over the defendant both for purposes of the
upon it. Petitioner filed its opposition thereto alleging therein that it could not,
main case and for purposes of the ancillary remedy of attachment. In such case,
inspite of its diligent efforts, locate private respondent’s principal office address.
notice of the main case is at the same time notice of the auxiliary proceeding in
Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence the respondent appealed to CA
attachment. Where, however, the petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is
which sustains private respondent’s stating that Since private respondent was not
embodied in a discrete pleading, such petition must be served either simultaneously
validly or properly served with summons, the court below did not acquire
with service of summons and a copy of the main complaint, or after jurisdiction over
jurisdiction over it, The fact that the Sheriff and the petitioner herein could not
the defendant has already been acquired by such service of summons. Notice of the
locate the principal office of private respondent is of no consequence, for whenever
separate attachment petition is not notice of the main action. Put a little differently,
the address of a defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
jurisdiction whether ratione personae or ratione materiae in an attachment
inquiry, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected by publication
proceeding is ancillary to jurisdiction ratione personae or ratione materiae in the
pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The trial court then acted
main action against the defendant. If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the attachment of the property of
matter or over the person of the defendant in the principal action, it simply has no
private Respondent. (b) Settled is the rule that where plaintiff fails to prosecute his
jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendant or his
action for an unreasonable length of time, the action may be dismissed upon motion
property
of defendant or upon the court’s own motion.

Petitioner sought to reconsider the above decision in its motion filed on 4 January
1990 alleging therein that (a) private respondent’s voluntary appearance via the
filing of its answer and motion to dismiss has rendered the petition, which is
founded on lack of summons and failure to prosecute, moot and academic, and (b)
private respondent’s reliance on technicalities cannot defeat the ends of substantial
justice whose issues have been joined by the filing of the answer.

RODIL
Calo vs. Roldan
G.R. No. L-825
July 20, 1948
FACTS: This is a petition for writ of certiorari against Judge Arsenio Roldan on the
ground of exceeding his jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing a receiver of certain lands and their fruits. Regino Relova and Teodula
Bartolome filed a complaint against Tranquilino Calo and Doroteo San Jose for
conniving with each other, and through the use of force, stealth, threats, and
intimidation, intend to enter and work or harvest existing fruits may be found in the
lands allegedly owned and possessed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs prayed for the
issuance of the preliminary injunction (WOPI) to be issued ex parte to immediately
restrain, enjoin, and prohibit the defendants and their agents from entering and
interfering with the harvest of the lands belonging to the plaintiffs. The defendants
opposed the WOPI on the ground that they are owners of the lands and have been
in actual possession thereof since 1925. The CFI Judge denied the petition for the
WOPI on the ground that the defendants were in actual possession of said lands. MR
was filed but was not decided by the CFI. Plaintiffs then filed an urgent petition ex-
parte praying that the MR of the order denying their petition for WOPI be granted
and/or for the appointment of the receiver of the properties on the ground that: a.
Plaintiffs have interest in properties in question and the fruits were in danger of
being lost unless a receiver is appointed b. The appointment of a receiver was the
most convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering, and or disposing
of the properties in litigation which included their fruits Judge Roldan decided to
consider the MR and granted the appointment of a receiver. Issue:
ISSUE: WON it is proper for the plaintiffs to apply and be granted of the preliminary
attachment?
HELD: According to the complaint filed by the plaintiffs, their action is one of
ordinary injunction, for they alleged that they are the owners of the lands, and were
in actual possession thereof and that the defendants with any legal right and
through the use of force, stealth, threat, and intimidation, intend to enter the lands
in violation of the plaintiff’s proprietary rights. In the present case, the plaintiffs
alleged that they are the owners and were in actual possession of the lands
described in the complaint and their fruits, the action of injunction filed by them is
the proper and adequate remedy in law, for a judgment in favor of plaintiffs would
quiet their title to said lands. The provisional remedies (PRs) denominated
attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, and delivery of personal property,
provided in Rules 59, 60, 61, and 62 of the ROC, are remedies to which parties
litigant may resort for the preservation or protection of their rights or interest, and
for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. If by the nature of
such action does not require such protection or preservation, said remedies cannot
be applied for and granted. To each kind of action, a proper provisional remedy is
provided by law. The Rules of Court clearly specify the case in which they may be
properly granted. Attachment may be issued only in the case or actions specifically
stated in section 1, Rule 59, in order that the defendant may not dispose of his
108
property attached, and thus secure the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered by plaintiff from defendant. For that reason a property subject of
litigation between the parties, or claimed by plaintiff as his, cannot be attached
upon motion of the same plaintiff.
The special remedy of preliminary prohibitory injunction (PPI) lies when the
plaintiff’s principal action is an ordinary action of injunction, that is when the relief
demanded in the complaint consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act complained of, either perpetually or for a limited period, or other conditions
required by Section 3 of Rule 60 are present. The purpose of this PR is to preserve
the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relation between the
parties, in order to protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting the subject of the
action during the pendency of the suit.
If no PPI were issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue the
doing of the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain, thus make ineffectual
the final judgment granting the relief sought by the plaintiff. But, a WOPI should not
be granted to take the property out of the possession of one party to place it in the
hands of another whose title has not been clearly established.
A receiver may be appointed to take charge of personal or real property which is
the subject of an ordinary civil action, when it appears that the party applying for
the appointment of a receiver has an interest in the property or fund which is
subject of the action or litigation.
According to law, the PR proper to plaintiff’s action of injunction is a PPI, if plaintiff’s
theory as set forth in the complaint, that he is the owner and in actual possession of
the premises is correct. But as the lower court found at the hearing of the petition
for preliminary injunction that the defendants were in possession of the lands, the
lower court acted in accordance with law in denying the petition.
From the foregoing it appears evident that the respondent judge acted in excess of
his jurisdiction in appointing a receiver. Appointment of a receiver is not proper or
does not lie in an action of injunction such as the one filed by the plaintiff. The
petition for appointment of a receiver filed by the plaintiffs is based on the ground
that it is the most convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering and
disposing of the properties in litigation; and according to plaintiffs' theory or
allegations in their complaint, neither the lands nor the palay harvested therein, are
in litigation.
The litigation or issue raised by plaintiffs in their complaint is not the ownership or
possession of the lands and their fruits. It is whether or not defendants intend or
were intending to enter or work or harvest whatever existing fruits could then be
found in the lands described in the complaint, alleged to be the exclusive property
and in the actual possession of the plaintiffs. It is a matter not only of law but of
plain common sense that a plaintiff will not and legally cannot ask for the

appointment or receiver of property which he alleges to belong to him and to be
actually in his possession.
MABANAG vs. GALLEMORE,
G.R. No. L-825
July 20, 1948
FACTS:Mabanag filed an action to recover P735.18, an amount said to have been
paid by the plaintiff to the defendant for two parcels of land whose sale was
afterward annulled. The defendant is said to be residing in Los Angeles, California,
U. S. A. He has no property in the Philippine except an alleged debt owing him by a
resident of the municipality of Occidental Misamis. This debt, upon petition of the
plaintiff, after the filing of the complaint and before the suit was dismissed, was
attached to the extent of plaintiff's claim for the payment of which the action was
brought. But the attachment was dissolved in the same order dismissing the case
the opining that it is has no authority nor jurisdiction to render judgment against
the herein defendant, Joseph M. Gallemore for being a non-resident.
ISSUE:whether or not the dismissal is proper?
HELD: NO. Rules of Court provides:
If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines,
and the action effects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of
the defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced
and tried in the province where the plaintiff resides or the property, or any
portion thereof, is situated or found.
As a general rule, when the defendant is not residing and is not found in the
Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person, unless he voluntarily appears
in court. But when the action ... is intended to seize or dispose of any property, real
or personal, of the defendant, located in the Philippines, it may validly be tried by
the Philippine courts, for then, they have jurisdiction over the res, i.e. ... the
property of the defendant, and their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident
is not essential
Attachment or garnishment of property of a non-resident defendant confers
jurisdiction on the court in an otherwise personal action. The main action in an
attachment or garnishment suit is in rem until jurisdiction of the defendant is
secured. Thereafter, it is in personam and also in rem, unless jurisdiction of the res
is lost as by dissolution of the attachment. If jurisdiction of the defendant is
acquired but jurisdiction of the res is lost, it is then purely in personam. . . a
proceeding against property without jurisdiction of the person of the defendant is in
substance a proceeding in rem; and where there is jurisdiction of the defendant, but
109
the proceedings against the property continues, that proceedings is none the less
necessarily in rem, although in form there is but a single proceeding.
Tested by severaldecisions and authorities, the Court has acquired jurisdiction of
the case at bar by virtue of the attachment of the defendant's credit. Those
authorities and decisionsare in agreement that though no jurisdiction is obtained
over the debtor's person, the case may proceed to judgment if there is property in
the custody of the court that can be applied to its satisfaction.
SALGADO vs COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL &
INDUSTRIAL BANK
G.R. No. 55381
March 26, 1984
FACTS:Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank filed an action against
petitionersto recover on a promissory note in the amount of P1,510,905.96,
inclusive of interest and other bank charges. The Bank further prayed for the
issuance of a writ of attachment. As grounds therefor it alleged that petitioners had
fraudulently misappropriated and/or converted to their own personal use and
benefit the sugar proceeds given as security for the payment of the indebtedness
and that there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the
action. Petitioners Salgado moved to quash the writ of attachment on the ground
that respondent Bank made fraudulent misrepresentation in securing the writ by
deleting the words "R E M" or "Real Estate Mortgage" from the xerox copy of the
promissory note attached to the complaint, thereby "making it appear that the note
was unsecured when in truth and in fact it was fully secured by a series of valid and
existing real estate mortgages duly registered and annotated in the titles of the
affected real properties in favor of the plaintiff Bank." In the same motion,
petitioners stressed the lack of factual basis of the Bank’s claim as to their alleged
fraudulent misappropriation or conversion of the sugar proceeds given as security
for their obligation.
ISSUE:Is the issuance of the attachment valid?
HELD: NO. The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent
lien on defendant’s property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a
judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction, or to make some
provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means of satisfaction thereof are
liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or
concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors.
The grounds upon which attachment may issue are set forth in Section 1, Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court. But quite apart from the grounds stated therein, it is further
provided in Section 3 of Rule 57 that "an order of attachment shall be granted only
 110

when it is made to appear by the affidavit of the applicant or some other person of Rule 57 authorizes the plaintiff or any proper party to have the property of the
who personally knows the facts, that . . . there is no other sufficient security for the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
claim sought to be enforced by the action."cralaw virtua1aw library recovered therein.

To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in

In the instant case, the allegation in the affidavit of the Bank’s Credit Division
Manager, Mrs. Helen Osias, to the effect that "there is no sufficient security for the
claim sought to be enforced by this action" has been shown to be false. It is
undisputed that the note sued upon "is fully secured by a series of valid and existing
real estate mortgages duly registered and annotated in the titles of the affected real
property in favor of the plaintiff Bank."
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The
fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason
which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have
otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued
upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has
a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case.

It has been established that all the collaterals given by the respondent Arkin as
security for the bond were either fraudulent or heavily encumbered. Records show
that the TCT issued by the ROD used as one of the collaterals, turned out to be fake
and spurious. Likewise, the supposed lien-free motor vehicle offered as collateral
Liberty Insurance Corporation v. CA turned out to be heavily mortgaged and was even disposed of without informing
G.R. No. 104405 petitioner. Furthermore, it has also been proven that subsequent to the issuance of
May 13, 1993 the surety bond, respondent Arkin started disposing of his other properties. Prior to
the filing of the complaint, respondent not only had sold the motor vehicle given as
Imperial Organizations put up a performance bond with Liberty Insurance to ensure collateral but that his two other condominium units, were also alienated in favor of a
compliance of the concerts entered by the former with Coca-Cola Bottlers company of which respondent Arkin is the president. All these circumstances
Philippines. In turn, Liberty Insurance required Imperial Organizations, Jose unerringly point to the devious scheme of respondent Arkin to defraud petitioner.
Imperial, AtillaArkin and Carmen Madlangbayan to execute an indemnity agreement
in its favour to indemnify it for any and all damages which it may incur by reason of
the bund. While the concerts took place, Imperial Organizations and private
respondents failed to comply with their obligations, as a result of which petitioner
Liberty Insurance paid to Coca-cola the P3M bond. Petitioner Liberty made demands
upon the private respondents based on the indemnity bond but to no avail.
Petitioner filed with RTC a complaint for damages with application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment against respondents. RTC issued Order allowing
issuance of writ, stating that there could have been fraud committed. Arkin filed a
motion to Quash/recall Writ of Attachment but this was denied. Arkin filed MR. The
Judge reversed the prior Order of denial of the Motion to Quash and thus directed
the lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment because a close examination of the
evidence shows that the delivery of the “fake collaterals” were made 2 days after
the issuance of the surety bond. Thus it was not prior or simultaneous with the
execution of the Surety bond. On the claim that Arkin removed or disposed of his
property with intent to defraud his creditors, plaintiff did not prove the intent of
Arkin to defraud creditors. Aggrieved, Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari with the
CA. CA dismissed petition on the ground that petitioner did not file MR.

ISSUE:Was the writ of preliminary attachment properly issued?

HELD: YES. In an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting
the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, Section 1 (d)

BUYCO VS BARAQUIA
GR. NO. 84034
December 22, 1988
FACTS: Baraquiafiled a complaint for the establishment of a permanent right of
way, injunction and damages with preliminary injunction and TRO to enjoin the
Buycos from closing off a private road which he uses as an access to his farm from
the public highway. The RTC granted the preliminary injunction – but after a while,
the RTC dismissed the claim for failure to establish the requisites to establish the
right of way, thus, the preliminary injunction was lifted. Baraquia filed a notice of
appeal while Buyco filed a partial notice of appeal. Baraquia filed a motion to cite
Buyco in contempt for closing the road which was a violation of the injunction. RTC
stated that the injunction remained valid and held petitioners in contempt.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and was granted by the court.
ISSUE:Whether or not the lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to the
dismissal of the complaint is immediately executor, even if the dismissal of the
complaint is pending appeal.
HELD: YES. A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is merely a
provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latters outcome. It is
not a cause of action in itself. Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available
during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve
and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes
of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. The writ is provisional
because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the
action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the
result of the main action. In the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was
granted by the lower court upon respondents showing that he and his poultry
business would be injured by the closure of the subject road. After trial, however,
the lower court found that respondent was not entitled to the easement of right of
way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential requisites for such entitlement,
hence, the writ was lifted. The present case having been heard and found
dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed
lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the appeal therefrom
notwithstanding.
111
SPOUSES AREVALO vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY
G.R. No. 193415
April 18, 2012
FACTS: Petitioners obtained from respondent Bank a 2,100,000 loan secured by a
mortgage on their property situated in Muntinlupa.₱Due to their failure to pay the
loaned amount, the Bank undertook to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage.
Petitioners filed the FirstComplaint wherein they asked for the nullification of
interests, penalties and other charges, as well as for specific performance with
anapplication for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the then
impending auction sale. During the pendency of the FirstComplaint, petitioners filed
yet another Complaint with the trial court. This time, they prayed for the
nullification of the real estate mortgage,the extra-judicial foreclosure sale, and the
subsequent proceedings, with a prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO. The trial
court refused to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of petitioner Spouses
Daisy and Socrates M. Arevalo (Spouses Arevalo) based on their failure to comply
with Section 2 of the Procedure in Extra-Judicial or Judicial Foreclosure of Real
Estate Mortgages (Procedure on Foreclosure)issued by this Court.Spouses Arevalo
filed a Rule 65 Petition with the CA to assail the Orders of the trial court involving
the non-issuance of the injunctive writ.Meanwhile, proceedings for the First
Complaint ensued at the trial court. Acting on the Motion to Dismiss filed by
respondent Bank, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the First
Complaint for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:Should the writ in question be issued?
HELD: NO. The Court rules that upon dismissal of the First Complaint by the trial
court on 27 October 2009, the issue of whether the writ of injunction should issue
has become moot. Although both parties failed to raise this particular argument in
their submissions, we deny the instant Petition on this ground.There remains no
actual controversy in the instant Petition because the First Complaint has already
been dismissed by the trial court. Upon its dismissal, the question of the non-
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction necessarily died with it.
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy. It is auxiliary to, an adjunct
of, and subject to the outcome of the main case. Thus, a writ of preliminary
injunction is deemed lifted upon dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom
notwithstanding. It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of
the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is
a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act
or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury
or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the
merits of the case.
 112

FEDERATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, through the Commanding General of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines – Visayas Command (AFP-VISCOM)
G.R. No. 127967
December 14, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner FRC is the registered owner of a 543-square meter lot in Apas,
Lahug, Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 119929. FRC
hired workers to fence the said lot in preparation for the construction of a
commercial building thereon. However, the fence construction was halted when
Captain Rogelio Molina arrived with a jeepload of fully-armed men from the AFP-
VISCOMM, and ordered FRC’s workers to stop building the structure per instructions
of AFP-VISCOMM Commanding General Romeo Zulueta. Intimidated, FRC’s men
stopped working. FRC filed a Complaint12 for injunction and damages with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu against Captain Rogelio Molina and six John
Does. The complaint was later amended to implead the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) through the AFP-VISCOMM and its Commanding General Romeo Zulueta.
FRC sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, to order the respondents to cease, desist and refrain from
threatening, intimidating and harassing the workers constructing its fence and to
cease, desist and refrain from committing acts of intrusion into and deprivation of
subject land, and to cease, desist and refrain from harassing, disturbing and
interfering with its peaceful and lawful possession and enjoyment thereof.the trial
court granted FRC’s application for preliminary injunction which writ it later made
permanent The trial court found that the subject property is in the possession of
FRC and its predecessor-in-interest and ruled that FRC’s assertion of ownership is
supported by a TCT which must be upheld until nullified by a competent court in a
proper proceeding. In all probability, the Republic would prevent the construction of
FRC’s fence, if not provisionally prevented by court order, thereby making injunction
a proper relief, the lower court noted.
compensation and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown
to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.
Thus, to be entitled to injunctive relief, the following must be shown: (1) the
invasion of a right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (2) the right
of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
FRC had sufficiently established the existence of a right to be protected by a writ of
injunction.Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental principle in land
registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.In the instant case, it is undisputed that FRC is a holder of a certificate of
title over the lot in question. Records show that each of FRC’s predecessors-in-
interest was likewise a holder of an indefeasible title.
Anent the third requisite, the appellate court ruled that in the event of a permanent
injunction the Republic stands to suffer greater injury compared to FRC, as a private
commercial building within a camp will pose serious danger and damage to military
operations.However, we cannot overemphasize that until FRC’s title is annulled in a
proper proceeding, the Republic has no enforceable right over the subject property.
Neither military operational integrity nor national defense vests title to property in
favor of the government. Hence, the CA was in error in enjoining enforcement of the
lower court’s order, as injunction does not protect rights not in esse. The possibility
of irreparable damage, without proof of violation of an actually existing right, is not
a ground for injunction.

Aggrieved, the Republic filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) on 24 November 1995
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with an urgent prayer for TRO and/or
preliminary injunction seeking to set aside the 12 October 1995 Orderof the trial
court. CA promulgated its assailed Decision granting the Republic’s
petitionratiocinating that FRC does not have a clear and unmistakable right over the
subject property on the ground that "the subject lot not only adjoins military
structures, but the main entrance thereof carries the arch of the AFP-VISCOMM
identifying beyond peradventure of doubt that one is entering the premises of the
AFP.

ISSUE: Whether or not injunction lies in favor of FRC to prevent the Republic from
interfering in the exercise of its rights of ownership over the subject property.

HELD: In a long line of cases, this Court has held that injunction is a preservative
remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The very foundation of
the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of
action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary
 113

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. RJ VENTURES REALTY & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 164548
FACTS: First Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) received an invitation to bid from
PNB anent the sale of an 8,000 square meter property and to which it acceded.
FWCC assigned all its rights, claims, interest, and title over the Buendia Property to
RJVRD. The latter assumed the right to purchase the Buendia Property and the
obligations of FWCC to PNB on the balance of the bid price. Respondents further
posited that PNB initially refused to finance the entire balance of the purchase price
except to the extent of seventy-five percent (75%) thereof. However, PNB finally
agreed to grant a loan to RJVRD equivalent to eighty percent (80%) of the purchase
price or for the amount of P2,944,000,000.00. The grant was conditioned on the
deposit by RJVRD with PNB of an additional ten percent (10%) of the purchase
price. RJVRD and PNB executed a Loan Agreement, a Deed of Sale and a Real
Estate Mortgage. PNB required the redenomination of RBN's loan as a condition for
its restructuring. On 25 January 1999, PNB, through its counsel, sent RBN a
demand letter, requiring the latter to settle their outstanding account of
P841,460,891.91. PNB made a demand to RBN to turnover the possession and/or
control of Broasting Equipment Inventory located at No. 33, Dominican Hills, Baguio
City. Respondents RJ Ventures Realty & Development Corporation filed a Complaint
for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against petitioner PNB and Juan S. Baun, Jr. with the RTC
Makati. In support of its Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, respondents alleged that RJVRD and
RNB would suffer great and irreparable injury by the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
property. RTC after a series of motions granted the writ which was later on after
being lifted in once instance, was reinstated by CA.
First, respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the
possession of the subject collaterals. Evidently, as owner of the subject collaterals
that stand to be extrajudicially foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the
possession and protection thereof. Second, there is an urgent and paramount
necessity to prevent serious damage. Indeed, an injunctive remedy may only be
resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
ROXAS - INJUNCTION
AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS GARCIA, and LYDIA
MARCIANO, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS PROVINCE,
G. R. No. 183367 : March 14, 2012
Facts:
Fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent Municipality of Padre
Garcia, Batangas. The municipal government, invited petitioner Australian
Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to rebuild the public market and construct shopping
center. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was executed between petitioner APRI
and respondent, represented by Mayor Gutierrez.
Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of respondent. Respondent, through
Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of
Agreement with Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario,
Batangas.

ISSUE:Whether respondents RJVRD and RBN are entitled to the Writ of Preliminary
The RTC issued an Order declaring petitioners in default and allowing respondent to
Injunction?
present evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled that the Memorandum of Agreement is
hereby declared null and void for being contrary to law and public policy and the
HELD: YES. Foremost, we reiterate that the sole object of a preliminary injunction is structures found within the unfinished PADRE GARCIA SHOPPING CENTER are
to maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard. For a Writ of Preliminary hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Municipality of Padre Garcia.
Injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the
existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an
After learning of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief from
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Judgment. This Petition was denied by the RTC. Petitioners later filed before the CA
Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that the very foundation of the
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Also, petitioners filed before the CA a Motion
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action
for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary
and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA issued a Resolution
and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of
denying the said motion.
preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence
towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive
determination.69 Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ Motion
for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Motion for Injunction).
Ruling: NO. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Essential to granting
the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to
prevent serious damage.
A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and
irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately. Under Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rule of Court,14 a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury
would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be
heard.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there
exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly
threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious and irreparable damage.
In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the CA. This is so
because APRI has no clear legal right. A perusal of the Motion for Injunction and its
accompanying Affidavit filed before the CA shows that petitioners rely on their
alleged right to the full and faithful execution of the MOA. However, their rights
under the MOA have already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to
respondent in the RTC case, under a judgment that has become final and executory.
At the very least, their rights under the MOA are precisely disputed by respondent.
Hence, there can be no "clear and unmistakable" right in favor of petitioners to
warrant the issuance of a writ of injunction. Where the complainant’s right or title is
doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
114
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY vs. CIPRES STEVEDORING & ARRASTRE,
INC.,
G.R. No 145742 July 14, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) awarded respondent Cipres
Stevedoring and Arrastre, Inc. (CISAI) permits of varied durations to operate the
cargo handling operations in Dumaguete City. In 1991, petitioner awarded an eight-
year contract to respondent expiring on 31 December 1998.
In 1990, PPA issued an administrative order which requires public bidding in
the award of contracts for cargo handling services. Upon expiration of its contract,
respondent were given hold-over permits by petitioner. While respondents second
hold-over permit was still in effect, petitioner issued another administrative order
which amended by substitution the administrative order issued in 1990. It expressly
provides that all contract for cargo handling services of more than three (3) years
shall be awarded through public bidding.
Pursuant to the new administrative order, petitioner set the deadline for the
submission of the technical and financial bids. Contending that this action on the
part of petitioner was in derogation of its vested right over the operation of cargo
handling enterprise, respondent initiated an action for specific performance,
injunction with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary
restraining order before the RTC.
Respondent alleged in its complaint that the administrative order issued in
1990 explicitly provides that cargo handling contractors with existing or expired
contracts but were able to obtain a satisfactory performance rating were entitled to
a renewal of their respective cargo handling contracts with petitioner; thus, as
respondent was given a rating of very satisfactory in 1998, it follows that its cargo
handling agreement should have been renewed after its expiration. Respondent
likewise claimed that the approval and implementation of the new administrative
order was plainly arbitrary.
The RTC granted respondents prayer for a temporary restraining order.
Petitioner filed a manifestation with urgent motion for reconsideration to the
aforesaid order of the trial court. Petitioner argued that the court a quo did not have
the requisite jurisdiction to issue the assailed temporary restraining order. This
motion was denied.
Petitioner seasonably sought reconsideration. The trial court set aside the
injunctive writ it previously issued. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals. The CA nullified the Order of the trial court and granted the petition
ordering the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary injunction and the PPA to desist from
conducting the public bidding effective until and after the case a quo shall have
been finally decided.

Petitioner sought the reversal of the decision of the appellate court on the
following grounds a) That P.D. No. 1818 as amended by R.A. 8975 and reiterated in
Administrative Circular of the SC, bans the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects and service
contracts which includes arrastre and stevedoring contracts; b). That CISAI has no
clear legal right to an injunctive writ since it acquired no vested rights because its
hold-over capacity could be revoked at any given time.
The main provision of P.D. No. 1818 provides:
SECTION 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining,
fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or
any public utility operated by the government, including among others public
utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre
contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from
proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project,
or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for
such execution, implementation or operation.
Rep. Act No. 8975 states:
SEC. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. 'No court, except
the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
subdivision, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under
the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
defined under Section 2 hereof; . .
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the RTC to issue the writ
of preliminary injunction to CISAI.
Ruling:
Yes.
Finally, it is settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, may it be
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard and the final judgment rendered. The status quo is the last actual
peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy.
115
In the case at bar, respondent sought the issuance of a writ for preliminary
injunction in order to prevent the cessation of cargo handling services in the port of
Dumaguete City to the detriment and prejudice of the public, shipper, consignees
and port workers. However, the factual backdrop of this case establishes that
respondents eight-year contract for cargo handling was already terminated and its
continued operation in the port of Dumaguete City was merely by virtue of a second
hold-over permit granted by petitioner. xxx
By its nature, the hold-over permit was merely temporary in nature and may
be revoked by petitioner at anytime. As we declared in the case of Anglo-Fil Trading
Corporation, hold-over permits are merely temporary and subject to the policy and
guidelines as may be implemented by petitioner. The temporary nature of the hold-
over permit should have served as adequate notice to respondent that, at any time,
its authority to remain within the premises of the port of Dumaguete City may be
terminated. Unlike the contract for cargo handling services previously entered into
by petitioner and respondent, whose terms and conditions were agreed upon by the
parties herein and which clearly provided for a specific period of effectivity as well
as a stipulation regarding the notice of violation, the hold-over permit was
unilaterally granted by petitioner pursuant to its authority under the law.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that at the time of the institution of this suit,
respondent no longer possessed any contract for its continued operation in
Dumaguete City and its stay in the port of said city was by virtue of a mere permit
extended by petitioner revocable at anytime by the latter. Obviously, the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals granted respondent the
authority to maintain its cargo handling services despite the absence of a valid
cargo handling agreement between respondent and petitioner. For this reason, we
hold that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the court a quo to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of respondent.
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS
GR L-82499 | 178 SCRA 493 | OCTOBER 13, 1989
DOCTRINE
The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is
the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy
(Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the
preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during
the pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). It should only
be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs.
Macaraeg, 4 SCRA 930; Subido vs. Gopengco 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs.
Bello, 37 SCRA 230).
 116

FACTS W/N the writ of preliminary injunction, preserving the status quo, is proper – NO

RULING & RATIO

- Petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc. (CMCI), a hospital corporation, 1. NO

opened and operated the Capitol Medical Center College (the “school”).
o The college offered a four-year nursing course, and two-year - The preliminary injunction, which reverts to the status quo, does more
courses on midwifery and medical secretarial courses. than what it should do.
o Halfway through the first semester, the faculty demanded that
they be granted vacation leave and sick leave privileges. - The status quo being referred to is the time prior to the closing of the
o Despite the dialogues between the administration led by its school
president, petitioner Dra. Clemente, and the faculty, no
agreement was reached. o This was the time when the schools were deserted; the students
o The hostilities aggravated. The CMCI Board, through its and teachers refused to hold classes; demonstrations are
resolution, authorized petitioner Clemente to close down the taking place
school, which then resulted to a demonstration by the
students and teachers. - “[T]he continued operation of the CMCC futile and untenable. The college
o Finally, a public announcement was posted which ordered for had no reason to remain open under the situation which the private
the closing down of the school, and that students were respondents themselves brought about.”
advised to transfer to other schools.
- Petitioner CMCI then wrote (twice) to the Department of Culture and
Sports (DECS), informing them of the closing down of the school.
o DECS approved for a “gradual closing down” of the school.
However, CMCI only intended to “inform” them of their
action. VICTORINA MEDINA v. CITY SHERIFF
o Teachers, students, and parents requested to open the school GR No. 113235, Jul 24, 1997
until the end of the school year.
o An agreement was prepared by the DECS, but CMCI wanted to
FACTS:
include a stipulation providing that no rallies or
demonstrations are to be held until the end of the school
Private respondents, as lessors, filed an unlawful detainer case against herein
year.
petitioners, the lessees, but before the institution of this action, respondents had
o The agreement, however, was not signed; the school did not
earlier sold the subject property to another person.
reopen.
- Private respondents (students and parents) filed a class suit.
Thereafter, the MTC of Manila rendered a decision in favor the lessors. When the
o Respondents prayed for the reopening of the school until the
respondents tried to move for the execution of the MTC decision, petitioners
end of the school year.
opposed thereto on the ground of supervening event of respondent’s loss of
- The RTC granted the petition ordering petitioners to reopen the school
ownership over the subject property. Inspite of the opposition, the lower court,
and allow its students to enroll in their respective courses.
nevertheless, granted the motion for execution.
- The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
o That petitioners had no right to close the school for the
Consequently, petitioners filed a case of Damages with preliminary injunction and/or
enrollment of the students created a binding contract
Temporary Restraining Order in the RTC of Manila but said court dismissed the said
between the parties
case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioner’s motion for the
o That the school should continue to operate until the students
issuance of the preliminary injunction. Hence, this petition.
shall have finished their courses
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:

ISSUE

WON THE PETITIONER HAS A CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT AND ENTITLED AS A MATTER OF
RIGHT TO THE WRIT OF EXECUTION.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the instant petition should be dismissed, there being
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying petitioner’s
application for preliminary injunction.
To be entitled to the injunctive writ, they must show that there exists a right to be
protected, which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. In the
instant case, petitioners clearly possessed no legal right that merits the protection
of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction, considering that the ground
relied upon by petitioners remains unresolved and does not confirm the existence of
a clear right in favor of herein petitioners.
Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. Complainant’s right must be clear and unmistakable
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. Where the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed,
injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage of without proof of an
actual existing right is not a ground for injunction. In the instant case, the
enforcement of the writ of execution, which would evict them from their homes, is
manifestly prejudicial to petitioners’ interest. However, they possess no clear legal
right that merits the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary
injunction. Their right to possess the property in question has been declared inferior
or inexistent in relation to the plaintiff in the ejectment case below after a judgment
which has become final and executory. Petitioners’ ground for the issuance of the
writ of prohibition and/or certiorari before the Court of Appeals is the presence of a
supervening event that renders execution unjust or inequitable. Said issue remains
unresolved in the main case still pending and does not confirm the existence of a
clear right in favor of petitioners. At best, they can obtain the suspension of the
enforcement of the writ of execution or other similar relief on equitable grounds.
117
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GODOFREDO CABLING,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 120567. March 20, 1998]
Facts:
Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from
the service for their alleged involvement in the currency smuggling in Hong Kong.
Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for
injunction. The NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner
to cease and desist from enforcing its Memorandum of dismissal.
In support of the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, the NLRC
adopted the view that: (1) private respondents cannot be validly dismissed on the
strength of petitioner's Code of Discipline which was declared illegal by this Court
for the reason that it was formulated by the petitioner without the participation of
its employees (2) the whimsical, baseless and premature dismissals of private
respondents which "caused them grave and irreparable injury" is enjoinable as
private respondents are left "with no speedy and adequate remedy at law' except
the issuance of a temporary mandatory injunction; (3) the NLRC is empowered not
only to restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts but also to require the performance of a particular act in any labor
dispute, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party; and (4) the temporary mandatory power of the
NLRC was recognized by this Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that the NLRC erred in
granting a temporary injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to issue an
injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only under Article 218 of the
Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor disputes.
The NLRC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The now
petitioner, for one, cannot validly claim that NLRC cannot exercise its injunctive
power under Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code on the pretext that what NLRC have
here is not a labor dispute as long as it concedes that as defined by law, Labor
Dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment.
Issue: WON the NLRC even without a complaint for illegal dismissal filed before the
labor arbiter, entertain an action for injunction and issue such writ enjoining
petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. from enforcing its Orders of dismissal against

private respondents, and ordering petitioner to reinstate the private respondents to
their previous positions.
Ruling: No.
It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the
contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor
dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no
complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents
against the petitioner. The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in
reality an action for illegal dismissal.
Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting
private respondents' petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate
private respondents. Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an
illegally dismissed employee is to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor
arbiter. In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded this rule and directly
went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction praying that petitioner be
enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders. Furthermore, an examination of private
respondents' petition for injunction reveals that it has no basis since there is no
showing of any urgency or irreparable injury which the private respondents might
suffer.
An injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law
considering that it generally has not proved to be an effective means of settling
labor disputes. It has been the policy of the State to encourage the parties to use
the non-judicial process of negotiation and compromise, mediation and arbitration.
Thus, injunctions may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal
grounds clearly established, after due consultations or hearing and when all efforts
at conciliation are exhausted which factors, however, are clearly absent in the
present case.
Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive
rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any
standard of compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the
existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly
heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that
the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis
for injunction and that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the
injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending
the litigation. Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted only in cases where
there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law
An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence
that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where
118
there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered
irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the
nature of the injury itself or the nature of the right or property injured or when
there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages.
SPS. ABELARDO & CONCHITA LOPEZ, and SPS. ANTONIO & CONCHITA
MANANSALA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROBERTO VALLARTA, respondents.
G. R. No. 110929 January 20, 2000
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession, damages and
injunction, filed by private respondent against petitioners. The complaint alleges,
inter alia: that respondent had been in actual, peaceful and lawful possession of
Lots 3305, 3329, 3331 and 3324 with a combined area of 57 hectares, situated at
sitio Teracan, Consuelo, Macabebe, Pampanga, except for the short interruption in
1981 until October 17, 1981; that on June 2, 1981, respondent filed a fishpond
application for lease agreement covering Lots No. 3324, 3329 and 3331 covering
40,1449 hectares; that on July 22, 1981, the Minister of Natural Resources declared
a portion of Masantol, Pampanga, containing an area of 4,574.8 hectares, including
the area applied for by private respondent as alienable and disposable for fishpond
development; that on July 13, 1988, the Department of Agriculture, Regional Office
No. III, San Fernando, Pampanga, issued a report of inspection declaring
respondent and one Guil Rivera in actual possession of their respective fishpond
areas and have fully developed the same since 1976; that on October 17, 1990,
petitioners unlawfully entered and occupied 34 hectares of the respondent's
fishpond ejecting him from the same.
Respondent prays that he be restored possession of the lots in question and that a
preliminary injunction be issued to maintain the status quo.
Traversing respondent's allegations, petitioners contend that they have been in
actual physical and peaceful possession of the land since time immemorial; that in
1976 petitioners and private respondent entered into an agreement whereby the
latter will provide capital for the development of the fishpond while petitioners labor
and management, the income to be divided between them; that the relationship
went on smoothly until 1981 when they were ejected from the premises by one
Marcelino Marcos; that they filed an ejectment complaint before the courts; that the
Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on June 30, 1987 in G.R. No. 74957
upheld their possession; that sometime in April 1990, petitioners were physically
ejected from the land by respondent but returned to the land on August 17, 1990;
that since October 17, 1990 up to the filing of the complaint, respondent has been
harassing them with threats and arson.
 119

A hearing on the application for preliminary injunction was held on December 29, when the plaintiff (private respondent herein) appears to be entitled to the relief
1992 with private respondent presenting his evidence. wp Based on the evidence demanded in his complaint.
presented, the trial court on December 29, 1992 granted respondent's prayer for
injunction . In the case at bar, private respondent has sufficiently established his right over the
subject fishpond.
Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the presiding judge which was granted by the
court on January 7, 1993. On January 8, 1993, pursuant to the trial court's order, a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued.

Petitioners assailed the aforesaid orders before the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the same. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on July 5, Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corp.
1993. GR No. 146717 (22 November 2004)

Petitioners now come to this Court arguing that the issuance of the writ of SUBJECT MATTER: Special Laws; Letters of Credit; Independence Principle
preliminary mandatory injunction ordering them to surrender the possession and
CASE SUMMARY:
control of the fishpond effectively transferred the possession thereof from petitioner
to private respondent in violation of the settled jurisprudence that injunction cannot
Transfield, as a contractor, undertook to construct a hydro-electric power station
be used or resorted to, to take possession of the property from one person to
and complete the same on or before June 1, 2000. To secure the performance of its
another. Petitioners likewise assert that the issuance of the writ of preliminary
obligation. Transfield opened 2 letters of credits from ANZ Banking Group and
mandatory injunction and placing the private respondent in possession of the
Security Bank in favor of Luzon. Nonetheless, Transfield was unable to complete the
disputed lot virtually resolved the issue of possession and disposed of the main case
project on the target date allegedly due to force majeure. Both Transfield and Luzon
without hearing on the merits, leaving no issue for the trial court to decide save that
filed before separate arbitration tribunals, ICC and CIAC respectively, to determine
of damages.
whether force majeure would justify the delay. Pending the arbitration proceeding,
Transfield filed a complaint for preliminary injunction against the respondent banks
ISSUE:
to restrain them from paying on the securities and also against Luzon to prevent it
from calling on the securities. RTC issued a TRO but denied the application for writ
WON the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is proper.
of preliminary injunction. CA affirmed RTC. N.B. When the TRO expired, Luzon was
able to withdraw from ANZ.
HELD:

Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive right or

interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an
DOCTRINES:
adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
Under the independence principle, banks assume no liability or responsibility for the
compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an
form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any
emergency or of a special reason before the main case can be regularly heard.
document, or for the general and/or particular conditions stipulated in the
documents or superimposed thereon, nor do they assume any liability or
The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the
responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, quality, condition, packing,
complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for
delivery, value or existence of the goods represented by any documents, or for the
injunction and that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the
good faith or acts and/or omissions, solvency, performance or standing of the
injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending
consignor, the carriers, or the insurers of the goods, or any other person.
the litigation. Two requisites are necessary if a preliminary injunction is to issue,
namely, the existence of a right to be protected and the facts against which the
The independence principle liberates the issuing bank from the duty of ascertaining
injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. In particular, for a writ of
compliance by the parties in the main contract.
preliminary injunction to issue, the existence of the right and the violation must
appear in the allegation of the complaint and a preliminary injunction is proper only
FACTS:

Transfield and Luzon entered into a Turnkey Contract whereby Transfield undertook,
as a contractor, to construct a 70-Megawatt hydro-electric power station at the
Bakun River in Benguet and Ilocos Sur.
The contract provides that:
(1) the target completion date of the project is on June 1, 2000, or
such date as may be agreed upon; and
(2) petitioner is entitled to claim extensions of time (EOT) for reasons
enumerated in the contract e.g. variations, force majeure, and
delays caused by Luzon itself.
It was also agreed upon that in case of dispute, the parties are bound to
settle their differences through mediation, conciliation and such other
means enumerated in the contract.
To secure the performance of the obligation, Transfield opened in favor of Luzon, 2
standby letters of credits with ANZ and SBC, each in the amount of US$8.99M.
Nonetheless, in the course of construction, Transfield sought various EOT to
complete the project. The request for extensions were allegedly due to force
majeure occasioned by typhoon Zeb, barricades, and demonstrations, which
prevented the on-time completion of the project.
Luzon denied Transfield’s requests for EOT.
Luzon filed a Request for Arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC), while Transfield filed a Request for Arbitration before the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). These arbitration proceedings would
resolve the issues: (1)WON the alleged forcemajeure would justify the EOT sought
by Transfield, (2)WON Luzon had the right to terminate the contract for Transfield’s
failure to complete the project on target date.
Meanwhile, Transfield wrote letters to ANZ and SBC advising them of the arbitration
proceedings. Transfield asserted that Luzon had no right to call on the securities
until the resolution of the issued before CIAC and ICC. Transfield also warned the
banks that any transfer, release, or disposition of the securities in favor of Luzon
would constrain it to hold respondent banks liable for liquidated damages.
Despite the Transfield’s letters, the banks informed Transfield that they would pay
on the Securities if and when Luzon calls on them.
Transfield filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC. Transfield sought to restraint banks from calling on the
securities and the respondent banks from paying on the securities.
120
RTC –denied the application for writ of preliminary injunction. Applying the
“Independent Contract” principle, Luzon should be allowed to draw on the securities
for liquidated damages. Banks were mere custodians of the funds and were
obligated to transfer the same to the beneficiary for as long as the latter could
submit the required certification of its claims. Luzon, as the ultimate beneficiary,
may also invoke the “independent contract” principle.
CA - issued a TRO but failed to act on the application for preliminary injunction until
the TRO expired.
N.B. As soon as the TRO expired, Luzon went to ANZ bank and withdrew US$ 4.9M.
- CA affirmed RTC decisions; Luzon could call on the securities pursuant to the
first principle in credit law that the credit itself is independent of the underlying
transaction and that as long as the beneficiary complied with the credit.
ISSUE/S:
WON injunction is the proper remedy to restrain the allegedly wrongful draws
on the securities. (NO)
Petitioner’s argument:
o RTC and CA improperly relied on the “independence principle” on the
letters of credit when this case falls within the “fraud exception rule”.
o Luzon knowing misinterpreted the existence of delay despite its
knowledge that the issue was still pending arbitration to be able to
draw against the securities.
o Luzon should be ordered to return proceeds of the securities.
o Injunction was the appropriate remedy obtainable from the local courts.
Respondent SBC’s argument:
o Invoking the independence principle, it was under no obligation to look
into the validity or accuracy of the certification submitted by Luzon or
into the latter’s capacity or entitlement to so certify.
Respondent ANZ’s argument:
o Its actions could not be regarded as unjustified in the view of the
prevailing independence principle under which it had no obligation to
ascertain the truth of Luzon’s allegations (Similar to SBC)

HOLDING/RATIO:
1. No, injunction is not a remedy in this case.
Fraud is an exception to the independence principle and the remedy for fraudulent
abuse is injunction. However, injunction should not be granted unless: (a) there is a
clear proof of fraud; (b) the fraud constitutes fraudulent abuse of the independent
purpose of the letter of credit and not only fraud under the main agreement; and
(c) irreparable injury might follow if injunction is not granted or the recovery of
damages would be seriously damaged.
In this case, Transfield failed to show that it has a clear and unmistakable right to
restrain Luzon’s call on the securities. The contract was plain and unequivocal in
that it conferred upon Luzon the right to draw upon the securities in case of default.
Also, nothing in the contract would indicate that all disputes regarding delay should
first be settled through arbitration before Luzon would be allowed to call upon the
securities.
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's
substantive right or interest; it is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights of a
party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case, the only limitation being that this discretion should be
exercised based upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law.51
Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing
by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against
which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right.52 It must be shown
that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that
the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.53 Moreover, an
injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to show that it has a clear and unmistakable
right to restrain LHC's call on the Securities which would justify the issuance of
preliminary injunction.
121
FELIX DE GUZMAN OCAMPO, represented by GEORGE BUTLER, JR., , v.
ALICIA SISON VDA. DE FERNANDEZ and LETICIA S. FERNANDEZ
GR. NO. 164529 : June 19, 2007
FACTS:
Central to the Petition at bar is a piece of property, consisting of a residential lot
and improvement, located along 13th Avenue, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City (subject
property). It was previously registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
49804 in the name of Iluminada G. Piano (Iluminada), married to Ramon Piano
(Ramon).4
According to petitioner Felix, the spouses Piano took custody of George, Jr. as soon
as the latter was born in 1947. George, Jr. is purportedly an illegitimate son of
Corporal George Butler of the United States Army with Ms. Ermina Fornolles.
Although there is no allegation or evidence presented that they complied with the
legal adoption process, the spouses Piano, during their lifetime, maintained custody
of and raised George, Jr. as their own son.5 Apparently, Ramon passed away before
his wife. On 1 February 1990, Iluminada, already a widow, executed a document
supposedly bequeathing to George, Jr. the ownership and administration of all her
properties, including the subject property, which served as her residence, and other
properties which she leased out.
About a year later, George, Jr. met Emy Ramos (Emy), who hailed from Pangasinan.
George, Jr. and Emy developed an intimate relationship and, shortly after, Emy
came to live with Iluminada and George, Jr. on the subject property.
Iluminada died sometime in 1997. It appears that by said time, George, Jr. and
Emy had already parted ways. George, Jr. continued to live on the subject property
with his family until their possession was disturbed by herein respondent Leticia S.
Fernandez (Leticia), who instituted with the MeTC a suit for unlawful detainer
against George, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 22375.
It was only then that George, Jr. found out that the subject property was
supposedly transferred by Iluminada to herein respondent Alicia Sison vda. de
Fernandez (Alicia) by virtue of a Deed of Sale, dated 21 December 1993, for a
consideration of ₱580,000.00.7 On 6 September 1996, Alicia then conveyed the
subject property via a Deed of Absolute Sale8 to her daughter and co-respondent
Leticia for ₱500,000.00. Shortly thereafter, or on 26 September 1996, the subject
property was registered in respondent Leticia’s name under TCT No. N-165230.9
Respondent Leticia prevailed in MeTC Civil Case No. 22375,10 and since George, Jr.
did not interpose any appeal within the reglementary period, the judgment therein
became final and executory, and a writ of execution was issued to enforce the

same.11 George, Jr. was thus served by the Sheriff of Quezon City with a Notice to
Vacate the subject property.
This prompted George, Jr. to file with the RTC Civil Case No. Q-01-44582, against
respondents Alicia and Leticia, as well as Emy,12 the MeTC, and the Office of the
Sheriff and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, for Recovery of
Ownership/Reconveyance, Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction and
Damages. The original Complaint13 filed with the RTC was in the name of George,
Jr. as "the administrator, acknowledged son and for or in behalf of the other heirs"
of Iluminada.
ISSUE:
Won the petitioner is entitled to the injunctive writ.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a
substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act
or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury
or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the
merits of the case.26
To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a
right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined.
Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. The applicant's right must be clear and unmistakable. In
the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Where the applicant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is
not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing
right is not a ground for injunction.
A clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown.
Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future
rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or
to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an
actual right. There must be a patent showing by the applicant that there exists a
right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are
violative of said right.28
In the present Petition, petitioner Felix miserably failed to establish such a clear and
positive right that would entitle him to the issuance of the injunctive writ prayed for.
122
ATTY. OROCIO VS. ANGULUAN
GR NO. 179892-93; 30 JANUARY 2009
FACTS:
NAPOCOR passed a resolution approving the grant of a monthly welfare
allowance equivalent to 10% of basic pay to all its employees effective 1 October
1978. This was called the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Later on NAPOCOR passed a
resolution lowering it to 5%. After 2 decades Congress passed EPIRA which directed
the reorganization of NAPOCOR. Following the directive of EPIRA NAPOCOR
abolished the fund. Later on NAPOCOR was approved to release P184M from the
fund for distribution to members who resigned, retired or separated. Anguluhan
however issued a memorandum that allowed the release to separated members
only to the exclusion of those who resigned, retired or separated prior to the EPIRA.
Segovia, Baysic and affected employees affected represented by Atty.
Orocio filed with the RTC a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a TRO against
NPC. Orocio and his clients settled for a contingency fee of 15%. The parties settled
for a compromise agreement which granted earning differential to the affected
members and allowed Orocio to collect 15% from it as attorney’s fees.
RTC issued a writ of execution for Orocio to collect his attorney’s fees. A
notice of garnishment was also issued. But, respondents contended that the amount
Orocio based his 15% fees was merely an estimate. Respondents appealed to the
CA which issued a TRO. The CA held that Orocio may only collect P1M on the basis
of quantum meruit because the employees settled through a compromise
agreement and not won by Orocio in a trial.
Issue:
Whether the Atty. Orocio may collect 15% of the amount stated in the Compromise
Agreement.
Ruling:
No. First, herein respondents are not clients of Orocio they are in fact the opponents
of Orocio’s clients. There had been no objection by his client’s when he partially
collected from payments by NAPOCOR to them. His clients do not claim any damage
or injury by the issuance of the writ of execution. The 15% to be collected by Orocio
is from the agreement with his clients that he will only collect contingency fees. This
kind of arrangement is allowed by law subject to Canon 20 which provides that a
lawyer shall charge fair and reasonable fees. The principle of quantum meruit may

be a basis for determining reasonable attorney’s fees. This principle may apply even
if there is already an agreed written fee as long as the court finds it unconscionable.
The SC found Orocio to have worked diligently and if it were not for him there would
have been no compromise agreement. However, the attorney’s fees had to be
reduced to 10% which is also the percentage allowed by the labor code. The
practice of law is a profession and not a moneymaking venture.
TOLENTINO
182. RAVAGO V. ESSO EASTERN MARINE & TRANS-GLOBAL
FACTS:
Trans-Global Maritime Agency is the Phil agent of Singapore-based Esso Eastern
Marine (now Petroleum Shipping). Ravago was hired as a seaman onboard various
Esso vessels (34 separate and unconnected fixed-period contracts, by 3 different
companies Esso Tankers, Esso Intl Shipping, Esso Eastern Marine; total of 22
years). Under a new contract, he was ordered to report on Sept 1992 for a medical
pre-employment examination which he passed and attended the pre-departure
orientation seminar after/ On Oct 1992, a stray bullet hit Ravago on the left leg
while waiting for a bus ride in Cubao. His wife informed EIS of the incident for the
purpose of availing medical benefits. The doctor opined that Ravago would not be
able to cope with the job of a seaman and suggested that he be given a desk job.
Ravago’s left leg became shorter and resulted in a limp when walking. Instead of
rehiring him, and after Ravago’s execution of a Quitclaim, EIS paid him his Career
Employment Incentive Plant and tax refund amounting to 162k.
Ravago filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement with
POEA
LA: illegally dismissed. NLRC: affirmed
Esso Eastern Marine and Trans-Global filed with the CA:
o Petition for certiorari
o Urgent Application for the issuance of a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction which it granted
- Ravago filed a motion to set aside Resolution granting TRO, arguing that the
case was a labor dispute wherein an injunction is proscribed under Art. 254
123
- Respondents countered that the case did not involve a labor dispute but a
money claim against an employer as a result of termination of employment
- CA: reversed NLRC decision
o Injunction made permanent
o An injunction is a preservative remedy issued for the
protection of a substantive right or interest, an antidote resorted
to only when there is pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be rendered under any standard
compensation
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in issuing a restraining order and the writ of preliminary
injunction
Held:
Reliance on Art. 254 is misplaced. The law proscribes the issuance of injunctive
relief only in those cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute. Moreover, said
article specifically provides that the NLRC may grant injunctive relief under Art. 218
thereof.
The case at bar neither involves nor grows out of a labor dispute. It did not involve
the fixing of terms or conditions of employment or representation of persons with
respect thereto. Ravago’s complaint revolves around the issue of his alleged
dismissal from office and his claim for backwages, damages and attorney’s fees.
Besides, the anti-injunction policy of the Labor Code, basically is freedom at the
workplace. It is more appropriate in the promotion of the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and
conciliation as modes of settling labor and industrial disputes.
Generally, an injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of a person’s
substantive rights/interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but a mere
provisional remedy, an appendage to the main suit. Pressing necessity requires that
it should be resorted only to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any measure of consideration. The application of an injunctive writ
rests upon the presence of an exigency or of an exceptional reason before the main
case can be regularly heard. The indispensable conditions for granting such
temporary injunctive relief are:
a. that the complaint alleges facts which appear satisfactory to establish a
proper basis for injunction, and

b. that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is
reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the
litigation.
Case at bar: Respondents’ petition contains facts sufficient to warrant the issuance
of an injunction under Art. 218(3) of the Labor Code. Further, respondents had
already posted a surety bond more than adequate to cover the judgment award.
183. PAUL G. ROBERTS, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola
Products Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi “Number Fever”
promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of the four
cases filed against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the investigating
prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything
accompanying it. A copy of the investigating prosecutor’s Joint Resolution was
forwarded to and received by the trial court only on 22 April 1993. However, no
affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings
during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course
thereof were found in the records of the case as of 19 May 1993.
On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the
Department of Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings
and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.
Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the
accused-appellants pending the final disposition of the appeal to the Department of
Justice.
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1)
denying, on the basis of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed
by the petitioners and the public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the
warrants of arrest “after June 1993” and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993.
In part, respondent judge stated in his order that since the case is already pending
in this Court for trial, following whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have
124
on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity his court. To justify
his order, he quoted the ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court,
the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for
the determination of the Court.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge
had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered
the issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy of the public
prosecutor’s Joint Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the
trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied petitioners’ application for writ of
preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint Resolution “was sufficient in itself
to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that probable
cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest”
and that the “mere silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration”
in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise to an
adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duty. Roberts, et al. sought
reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable cause by
the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.
ISSUE:
WON the Supreme Court determine in this proceedings the existence of probable
cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their
prosecution for the crime of estafa?
HELD:
NO.
the Supreme Court MAY NOT determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of
probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners
or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its
duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or
judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may
not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.
There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court refused to
reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest in this case. For the respondent judge did not, in fact,
find that probable cause exists, and if he did he did not have the basis therefor.
Moreover, the records of the preliminary investigation in this case are not with the
Court. They were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
the DOJ in compliance with the latter's 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial
court and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.
184. DIMAYUGA VS FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are Chiropractic Doctors, practicing their profession in the city of Manila,
and that they are graduates of reputable American universities, and have complied
with all the rules and regulations of such universities, which are required for the
issuance of the degree of Doctor of Chiropractics.
"That the plaintiffs are exercising the profession of chiropractics after having duly
paid the license fee reacquired by Internal Revenue Law." That the plaintiff,
Dimayuga, appeared before the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, the Honorable
Director Health and the Board of Medical Examiners, for the purpose of submitting
to, and taking, an examination, if any was required. That he was advised that he
could practice his profession so long as there is no express provision against it. That
the Board of Medical Examiners informed plaintiff that it could not give him any
examination, because no one of its members had any knowledge of chiropractics.
That the Director of Health held that he did not have any objection to the plaintiff's
practicing chiropractics in the Philippine Islands so long as there is no complaint
against his treatment. "That there is no law prohibiting directly or indirectly or
regulating in any manner the practice of the chiropractics in the Philippine Islands."
That the defendants, with full knowledge of such facts, and in flagrant violation of
the constitutional right is of the plaintiffs, are, with the use of force, about to arrest
and persecute them in the exercise of their profession in the city of Manila, and to
125
illegally prohibit their practice, as evidenced by a written opinion of Mr. Torres, as
fiscal of the city of Manila, and that their arrest would be without any legal right or
authority. That, on account of such illegal acts, the plaintiffs have been damaged in
the sum of P10,000, and they have no speedy or adequate remedy at law.
ISSUE:
WON the prosecution will be restrained or stayed by injunction
HELD:
The writ of prohibition in somewhat sui generis, and in more of less in the sound
legal discretion of the court and in intended to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of legal authority, and to bring about the orderly administration of justice.
It appears that the defendants are acting upon the written advice of the city
attorney as to the construction of the law. The Mayor had a right to as that official
for his legal opinion and rely upon it, and he has a right to give it. The record simply
shows that the defendants are seeking to discharge their official duties as they
understand them, and there in evidence that either of they are acting from
malicious or dishonest motives. Neither in there any evidence that the defendants
are threatening plaintiffs with daily arrest or a number of oppressive prosecutions,
or that they are disposed to involve them in expensive litigation.
It does not appear that the defendants are threatening to or will, make numerous
arrests of the plaintiffs at least until such time as the law of the case is finally
settled. There is no allegation that Fiscal Torres was not acting in good faith in the
giving of his advice, or that he is not honest in his opinion. The very most that is
charged against him is that he is mistaken in the construction of a law, which has
never been judicially construed and which can be construed in the case now
pending, to which one of the plaintiffs is a party.
The court declines to pass upon the constitutional questions presented and hold that
the temporary injunction should be dissolved and the demurrer sustained, with
leave to plaintiffs to file an amended complaint within ten days from the
promulgation of this decision.

185. FORTUN VS GARCIA
FACTS:
Petition on its face is indicative of a possible harrassment to which Judge Fortun was
subjected by reason of his official action, the letter-complaint coming from a
member of the bar who had lost six of the nine cases in petitioner's sala and the
supporting affidavit coming from a disgruntled former employee, this Court issued a
temporary restraining order, and, in the same resolution of March 25, 1974, require
comment from the respondents.
Only respondent City Fiscal filed a comment on May 6, 1974. There was no explicit
denial of certain allegations indicative of the hostility manifested towards petitioner
Judge. Instead, the ten-page comment relied on what was considered to be
applicable decisions. There was no effort to refute the allegation that there was a
failure to abide by the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 77, but, it was
argued that there was substantial compliance..
Thus "Under date of September 17th, 1973, Atty. Martin Vera Cruz, a disgruntled
barrister who lost 6 out of the 9 cases he filed before petitioner's sala, sent a letter,
not to the City Fiscal, but to Atty. Andres Bersales, President of the Zamboanga del
Sur Chapter of the Integrated Bar, asking, in effect, that administrative charges be
initiated against petitioner for alleged misuse of his travel allowances.
The five of them, without the concurrence or attendance of the remaining 4
members of the 9-man Board of Directors of the Integrated Bar Chapter of
Zamboanga del Sur on so important a subject, peremptorily passed resolution no. 7
resolving to file not only administrative but criminal charges against petitioner. The
resolution discloses 2 things: first, it is not reflective of the collective will of the IBP
Chapter concerned because it was a divided Board that acted on it and, second, the
five members who voted for it without the participation of the 4 others have 'axes to
grind' against petitioner. Two of them, Atty. Bersales and Zulueta, invariably lost
their cases before petitioner's sala while Atty. Pielago and Carpio are subordinates
of Atty. Bersales in the Governor's Office."
To indicate that the complaint was filed as a manifestation of vindictiveness and for
the humiliation of petitioner judge, the reply characterized the resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines chapter as having been "railroaded," petitioner not
having been given a chance to explain his side contrary to procedural due process.
No effort was made either by respondent City Fiscal or any of the private
respondents to dispel in any way the grave doubts raised as to the bona fides in the
filing of this complaint against petitioner. A memorandum was submitted by
126
petitioner. Respondents maintained their silence. The only explanation appears to
be their realization that the petition is meritorious
ISSUE:
WON the prohibition will lie
HELD:
YES.
At the outset, reference was made to the invocation by petitioner-judge of the
leading Dimayuga decision. Seven years after its promulgation, in 1930 to be
precise, it was relied upon in Tong v. Santamaria & Standard Oil Co. Justice
Villamor as ponente stressed that "the remedy of prohibition is somewhat sui
generis, and is one more or less of legal discretion, and is intended to prevent the
oppressive exercise of legal authority." Such categorical enunciation of one of the
most highly valued principles of equity ought to have cautioned respondent City
Fiscal against, in the language of then President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes, acting with "unseemly haste." This is one
occasion then that calls for the exercise of the equitable powers of this Court to
repudiate what was clearly an "oppressive exercise of legal authority."
The characterization by retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes, then President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, of the "unseemly haste" that marked the actuation
of respondent members of the Board of Directors of the Integrated Bar Chapter of
Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian City Chapter, appears to be rather mild all things
considered. He pointed out that there was a violation of the cardinal principles of
fairness and due process that underlie the Rule of Law. Petitioner-Judge was not
heard; he was denied the opportunity to defend himself against the accusation.
There was, on the part of private respondents then, a failure to abide by a
Resolution of the Integrated Bar stressing that precisely integration could shield
"the judiciary which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self- interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity impartiality and independence.'"
 127

186. BROCKA VS ENRILE · GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by
injunction, preliminary or final
FACTS:
· EXCEPTIONS:
Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) a
demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed a 1. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers – Jan 28 ‘85/ Petitioners accused
charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases filed before RTC QC. All
petitioners released on bail – P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, 2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged as leaders of avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions
the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended.
3. When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice
Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC a daily hearings held between Feb.1-7
1985 a On Feb. 7 or 9 1985, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered 4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
Brocka, et al’s provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each a Brocka, et
al filed respective bail bonds but despite service of release order, Brocka, et al 5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
remained in detention a respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention regulation
Action (PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 ’85 Neither original
nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et al 6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent

On Feb 11 1985, Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases; 7. When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
hasty and spurious filing of a second offense.
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
· Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 ’85 on orders of then Pres.
Marcos a release narrated in Court’s resolution in petition for habeas corpus 9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for
filed by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al: vengeance

· Hence, this petition. Brocka, et al contend: 10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground had been denied
1. bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their
criminal prosecution 11. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners
2. second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal – premised
on one and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike a
matter of defense in sedition charge so, only issue here is…
In the case at bar, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have
been undertaken by state officials in bad faith:

ISSUE: Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined
HELD: YES.
The court ruled in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for
the second offense of inciting to sedition.
1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et al’s release
from detention BUT this PDA was issued on Jan.28 ’85 and invoked only on
Feb.9 ’85 upon receipt of TC’s order of release a violates guideline that PDA
shall be invoked within 24 hrs in Metro, Manila or 48 hours outside Metro,
Manila
Despite subpoenas for PDA’s production, prosecution merely presented a
purported xeerox copy of it a violates Court pronouncement that

“individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with
the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by
the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the
apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile)
2. SolGen’s manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to
quash the information instead of a petition for Habeas Corpus
The Court agreed with the contention of the SolGen. However, it noted that such
course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then
prevailing:
1. Spurious and inoperational PDA
2. Sham and hasty Preliminary Investigation
Clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention until
the second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a
warrant of arrest anew
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest
and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution.
If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in
this case where petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until such
time that charges were filed) and where a sham preliminary investigation was
hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be
enjoined.
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.
128
187. GOV. GARCIA VS JOSE
FACTS:
PETITIONERS VERSION
The Cebu South Reclamation Project is a FOUR BILLION PESO project of the RP,
funded out of a loan taken from the Government of Japan, through its international
financing institution, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). The loan
was made possible by virtue of an Exchange of Notes between the Governments of
the Republic of the Philippines and Japan. The project is an integral part of the Third
Phase of the Metro Cebu Development Projects (MCDP III).
On 19 January 1996, PR Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation (MALAYAN),
filed a case fo "Specific Performance, Declaration of Nullity, Damages and
Injunction, with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
against herein petitioners in the RTC of Cebu City.
During the summary hearing to determine whether the TRO should issue,
defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the court to issue the same, citing Section
1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818. It was also pointed out that Administrative,
Circular 13-93, pursuant to P.D. 1818, and in implementation of the policy behind
the law, prohibited all judges of all courts from issuing TRO's and/or writs of
preliminary injunction against the implementation of government infrastructure
projects.
In gross violation of the law and the circulars of the Honorable Supreme Court,
however, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order.
Private Respondents Version
On May 22, 1967, Proclamation No. 200-A was issued which reserved for national
improvement purposes, a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the
foreshore of the District of San Nicolas, Pardo, Cebu City and Tangkey, Talisay,
Cebu. This area was transferred and relinquished by the President of the Philippines
to the Province of Cebu in behalf of the government, subject to private rights, if any
there be.
On January 11, 1973, Presidential Decree No. 3-A was issued which decreed that
the reclamation of land under water, whether foreshore or inland, throughout the
Philippines belong to and are owned by and limited to the national government or to
any person authorized by it under a proper contract.
The Province of Cebu and private respondent entered into, signed and executed a
Confirmatory Agreement dated November 1979, by virtue of which the services of
MALAYAN was contracted to undertake the preparation and making of the said
Detailed and Integrated Development Plan on Land use, etc., of the Cebu South
Reclamation Project at no cost to the Province of Cebu.

The said Confirmatory Agreement acknowledged that it was the private respondent
which made initial investments in the Cebu South Reclamation Project and the
entity granted the right of first refusal or option rights to undertake the project.
On January 24, 1980, the PEA and the City of Cebu entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding which recognized the pre-emptive right of plaintiff to undertake the
Project as recognized in the Presidential directive dated August 13, 1979.
A memorandum of understanding with respect to the Cebu South Reclamation
project wherein, paragraph 6 of its Section II, it provided that the City of Cebu was
obliged "to accord pre-emptive rights for the actual prosecution of the reclamation
project to private entities which have made initial investments on the project",
which entity is no other than herein plaintiff. This option of first refusal or pre-
emptive rights of plaintiff to undertake the actual prosecution of the project has
never been cancelled, or rescinded.
The herein private respondent filed this case for injunction when the respondents
issued an invitation to bidders. Exhibit "A-21" particularly section 3.2 thereof which
provides "for the conduct of tenders and subsequent evaluation of bids" for the
Cebu South Reclamation Project. In, other words, the petitioners were going to
entertain bids from private contractors for the undertaking of the Cebu South
Reclamation Project in violation of the preemptive rights or right of first refusal of
private respondent to prosecute the project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the orders
dated 22 February 1996 and 18 March 1996, in contumacious violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1818, and Supreme Court Administrative Circulars Nos. 13-
93 and 68-94.
HELD:
Sec. 1 of PD 1818 distinctly provides that "noo court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an
infrastructure project . . . of the government, . . . to prohibit any person or persons,
entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project, . . . or pursuing any lawful activity necessary
for such execution, implementation or operation." At the risk of being repetitious,
we stress that the foregoing statutory provision expressly deprives courts of
jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of an
infrastructure project.
In the case at bar, the assailed March 18, 1996 Order of respondent judge
specifically enjoined petitioners from implementing their Memorandum of
Agreement dated September 11, 1995 (except as to the Cebu South Coastal Road),
129
which pertains to the implementation of the Metro Cebu Development Project, Phase
III, a major component of which is the Cebu South Reclamation Project. The
petitioners were also enjoined from acting on or implementing all other contracts
involving the said reclamation project. The issuance of said writ of preliminary
injunction evidently constitutes a blatant violation of PD 1818. The assailed Order is
therefore void for being issued with grave abuse of discretion and without
jurisdiction.
Itis clear that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the
grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Although private respondent
alleged these grounds, respondent judge had the duty to take judicial notice of PD
1818 and PD 1594. These laws, based on the foregoing discussion, ineludibly show
that private respondent had no right to the relief it sought. It is well-settled that,
"before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear
showing, by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected, and that the
acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right." In
hindsight, the respondent judge's grant of the writ is truly regrettable, as it
unnecessarily delayed the implementation of an important infrastructure project, a
delay which had far-reaching consequences on the economic development and
interest of Cebu, as well as the nation.
188. BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT VS LABAYEN
FACTS:
Respondent City opposed the Schedule of Automatic Water Rates Adjustments for
the years 1999, 2000 and 2001published by the petitioner. It alleged that the
proposed water rates would violate due process as they were to be imposed without
the public hearing. Hence, it prayed that before the hearing of the main case, a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction be issued.
On February 24, 2000. On the same date requested, respondent court heard
respondents application for temporary restraining order and issued an Order
commanding petitioner to stop, desist and refrain from implementing the proposed
water rates.
On December 21, 2000, respondent court issued the assailed Decision granting the
final injunction which allegedly confirmed the previous preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Decision on January 11,
2001 asserting, among others, that the case was not yet ripe for decision when the
court granted the final injunction, the petitioner having had no opportunity to file its
answer, avail of the mandatory pre-trial conference and have the case tried on the
merits.
ISSUE:

Whether or not preliminary injunction had been issued
HELD:
No.
The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the trial court make
a clear conclusion that the Order issued was a temporary restraining order and not
a preliminary injunction.
Given the previous undeviating references to it as a temporary restraining order,
respondents cannot now consider it as a preliminary injunction to justify the validity
of the assailed Decision. The attendant facts and circumstances clearly show that
the respondent trial court issued a temporary restraining order.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do
or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a
provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.]
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction,
the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory,
may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment
embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused
with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to
preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order.
It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court
issuing a final injunction.
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex
parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary
restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before
the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary
injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed
automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for
preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining
order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no
judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.[47]
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the temporary
restraining order granted automatically expired after twenty (20) days under the
Rules. The fact that respondent court merely ordered the respondent[,] its agents,
representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from
implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will start on March
1, 2000[48] without stating the period for the restraint does not convert the
temporary restraining order to a preliminary injunction.
130
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of
effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial
court. The failure of respondent court to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not
lend the temporary restraining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only
be characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day period provided
by the Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an
omission to do so. It is because of this rule on non-extendibility that respondent
City was prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a preliminary
injunction. Respondent City cannot take advantage of this omission by respondent
trial court.
189. CHIAO LIONG TAN VS CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Chiao Liong Tan claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle, particularly
described as Isuzu Elf van, 1976 Model that he purchased in March 1987. As owner
thereof, petitioner says he has been in possession, enjoyment and utilization of the
said motor vehicle until his older brother, Tan Ban Yong, the private respondent,
took it from him.
Petitioner relies principally on the fact that the van is registered in his name under
Certificate of Registration. He claims in his testimony before the trial court that the
said motor vehicle was purchased from Balintawak Isuzu Motor Center for a price of
over P100, 000. 00; that he sent his brother to pay for the van and the receipt fro
payment was placed in his name because it was his money that was used to pay for
the vehicle; that he allowed his brother to use the van because the latter was
working for his company, the CLT Industries; and that his brother later refused to
return the van to him and appropriated the same for himself.
On the other hand, private respondent testified that CLT Industries is a family
business that was placed in petitioner’s name because at that time he was then
leaving for the United Stated and petitioner remaining Filipino in the family residing
in the Philippines. When the family business needed a vehicle in 1987 for use in the
deliver of machinery to its customers, he asked petitioner to look for a vehicle and
gave him the amount of P5,000.00 to be deposited as down payment for the van,
which would be available in about a month. After a month, he himself paid the
whole price out of a loan of P140, 000.00 from his friend Tan Pit Sin. Nevertheless,
respondent allowed the registration of the vehicle in petitioner’s name. It was also
their understanding that he would keep the van for himself because CLT Industries
was not in a position to pay him. Hence, from the time of the purchase, he had
 131

been in possession of the vehicle including the original registration papers thereof, 190. BA FINANCE CORPORATION V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
but allowing petitioner from time to time to use the van for deliveries of machinery. ROBERTO M. REYES

After hearing, the trial court found for the private respondent. Finding no merit in
FACTS:
the appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trail court.

ISSUE: Spouses Manahan executed a promissory note binding themselves to pay

WON ownership may be decided in a proceeding for replevin.
HELD:
The Court observes that the action by petitioner as plaintiff in the trial court was
only one for Replevin and Damages. Since replevin is only a provisional remedy
where the replevin plaintiff claims immediate delivery of personal property pending
the judgment of the trial court in a principal case, the petitioner should have filed in
the trial court as a main case an action to recover possession of the Isuzu Elf van
which was in the possession of the private respondent. Logically, the basis of
petitioner's cause of action should have been his ownership of said van.
It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right
of possession. Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character
determines nothing more than the right of possession. However, when the
title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendant’s plea and by
reason of this policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties
to the possession of the property in controversy, the question of ownership
Carmasters, Inc., P83,080.00 in 36 monthly installments. To secure payment, the
Manahan spouses executed a deed of chattel mortgage over a motor vehicle, a Ford
Cortina. Carmasters later assigned the promissory note and the chattel mortgage to
petitioner BA Finance Corporation with the conformity of the Manahans. When the
latter failed to pay the installments, petitioner sent demand letters. The demands
not having been heeded, petitioner filed a complaint for replevin with damages
against the spouses, as well as against a John Doe, praying for the recovery of the
vehicle with an alternative prayer for the payment of a sum of money should the
vehicle not be returned. The lower court issued a writ of replevin.
The service of summons upon the spouses Manahan was caused to be served by
petitioner. The original of the summons had the name and the signature of private
respondent Roberto M. Reyes indicating that he received a copy of the summons
and the complaint. Petitioner, through its Legal Assistant, issued a certification to
the effect that it had received from Orson R. Santiago, the deputy sheriff of the RTC
the Ford Cortina seized from private respondent Roberto M. Reyes, the John Doe
and referred to in the complaint, in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Consequently, the lower court
came out with an order of seizure.
A few months later, the court issued an order dismissing the caste for failure to
prosecute and further ordering the plaintiff to return the property seized with all its
accessories to defendant John Doe in the person of Roberto M. Reyes.

may be resolved in the same proceeding.

The order was recalled, but summons still could not be served on the Manahans.
So, the trial court dismissed the case and ordered that the vehicle be returned to
Reyes. The CA affirmed.
Furthermore, a replevin action is primarily one for the possession of
personalty, yet it is sufficiently flexible to authorize a settlement of all On appeal, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
equities between the parties, arising or growing out of the main
controversy. Thus, in an action for replevin where the defendant is ISSUE:
adjudged to possession, he need not go to another forum to procure relief for the
return of the replevied property or secure judgment for the value of the property in Whether or not a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against any
possessor of the object of a chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a party to
case the adjudged return thereof could not be had.
the mortgage.

HELD:

No. Replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may
refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels
being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy
that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action
and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally
determines nothing more than the right of possession. The person in possession of
the property sought to be replevied is ordinarily the proper and only necessary
party defendant, and the plaintiff is not required to so join as defendants other
persons claiming a right on the property but not in possession thereof. The Rules of
Court allows an application for the immediate possession of the property but the
plaintiff must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for
seeking such interim possession.
Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specific property is so
conceded or evident, the action need only be maintained against him who so
possesses the property. The court, in an earlier case held that persons having a
special right of property in the goods the recovery of which is sought, such as a
chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin therefor. Where the
mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of the property on default,
he may maintain an action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattels from
the mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may find them.
A chattel mortgagee, unlike a pledgee, need not be in, nor entitled to, the
possession of the property unless and until the mortgagor defaults and the
mortgagee thereupon seeks to foreclose thereon. Since the mortgagee’s right of
possession is conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be
controverted, the inclusion of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor
himself, may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive determination of the
case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the eventual
foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the mortgagor’s
default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the
right to replevy the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for that
action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor,
cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the
chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for
replevin.
132
191. TILLSON vs.CA
FACTS:
Tillson brought suit in the RTC Pasig against La Pierre for “specific performance and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and restraining order.” It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 54587. Briefly, Tillson’s complaint alleged that: 1) he
entered into a contract with La Pierre for the construction of yacht 1, it was Seacraft
International Corporation that actually undertook the construction of the boat,
advances on the price being made by Tillson, and the money thus advanced was,
however, used by La Pierre and Seacraft for the construction of yacht 2. Only
Seacraft filed an answer; La Pierre failed to answer within the reglementary period
and was consequently declared in default.
The Court thereafter received Tillson’s evidence against La Pierre ex parte and on
the basis thereof, rendered judgment by default against La Pierre. The judgment
became final and executory, no appeal having been taken by La Pierre. The action
however continued as regards his co-defendant Seacraft.
At Tillson’s instance, the Trial Court authorized execution of the default judgment
against La Pierre. The Sheriff levied on, and subsequently took possession of, the 2
yachts above mentioned.
Seacraft filed a third-party claim in respect of both vessels in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 39 of the ROC, contending that the yachts belonged to it, and not
to La Pierre. The execution sale of yacht 1 was then scheduled and held by the
Sheriff, resulting in the boat’s being struck off to Tillson as the highest bidder. Yacht
2 was somehow delivered by the Sheriff to Tillson’s counsel. It was thereafter
moved by Tillson to the Manila Yacht Club.
But a claim for yacht 2 was being put forth by a certain Cooney, grounded on a
compromise agreement between him and La Pierre. Indeed, there was then pending
in another branch of the same RTC an action which had been commenced by
Cooney against La Pierre, docketed as Civil Case No. 55152. Said Branch issued
orders directing the sheriff to take immediate possession of the yacht 2 and deliver
it to Cooney after the expiration of five days.
Tillson promptly instituted a certiorari action in the CA, praying for nullification of
that order. The CA dismissed Tillson’s action.
Cooney next turned his attention to yacht 1 which, as above stated, had been
earlier acquired by Tillson at the auction sale. Cooney filed with the RTC Manila an
action against Tillson for annulment of the sale and for delivery thereof to him by
way of replevin. In his complaint he alleged that by a deed of sale executed on by
Seacraft he had become owner of yacht. Judge Jaguros ordered the issuance of “the

corresponding Writ of Replevin of Personal Property,” The “writ of replevin” issued
on the same day but, as will shortly be narrated, custody of the vessel was not
taken by the Sheriff until three days later.
Cooney filed a “Manifestation/Motion” stating that when the Sheriff went to the
place where the vessel was moored, he discovered that “the number of the boat
(sought to be seized) had been deliberately tampered with,” . . Cooney filed an
amended adding to his prayer the request that the Sheriff “deposit (the yacht) for
safekeeping with the Philippine Coast Guard, pending determination and/or
resolution by this Honorable Court of this motion.” On the same day, the Court
granted the motion and ordered (a) “the sheriff to deposit the boat for safekeeping
with the Philippine Coast Guard. The Sheriff took custody of the yacht 1 and
delivered it for safekeeping to the Coast Guard.
On the following day, Tillson’s counsel filed an “Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion.” Tillson also filed thru counsel an “Urgent Motion for Approval of Bond (and)
Surrender of [yacht 1],” submitting a bond and praying that the boat seized from
him by the sheriff “be ordered returned/surrendered/released to Tillson, in
accordance with Section 5 of Rule 60 of the ROC.” A copy of the motion and the
bond was sent by registered mail to and in due course received by Cooney’s
attorney.
However, the Trial Court refused to order re-delivery of the boat to Tillson. It held
that the provision for the return of seized property on a counterbond in Rule 60—. .
. is not exactly applicable to the situation . . . because said provision presupposes
that possession is to be given to the plaintiff, however, . . . the writ precisely
ordered that the possession and control of [yacht 1] . . . be put under the Coast
Guard which is a disinterested third person; . . . (and to) transfer . . . possession
and control of the boat to either party would render the case moot and academic.
Once again, Tillson went to the CA. He filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to nullify the above Order and compel re-delivery of the yacht 1 to him.
Once again, the verdict of the Appellate Tribunal went against Tillson
ISSUE:
WON Tillson, as defendant in the replevin action had properly complied with
therequisites of Rule 60 for the return to him of the seized vessel
133
HELD:
YES. The term replevin is popularly understood as “the return to or recovery by a
person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the
person’s giving security to try the matter in court and return the goods if defeated
in the action;” “the writ by or the common-law action in which goods and chattels
are replevied,” i.e., taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin;” and to replevy,
means to recover possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of goods
or chattels under a replevin order.
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as “a form of action which lies to regain
the possession of personal chattels which have been taken from the plaintiff
unlawfully . . ., (or as) the writ by virtue of which the sheriff proceeds at once to
take possession of the property therein described and transfer it to the plaintiff
upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his title, or
return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the same authority states that the term,
“to replevy” means “to re-deliver goods which have been distrained to the original
possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of replevin.” The term
therefore may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the
provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the
property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the
action. In this jurisdiction, the provisional remedy is identified in Rule 60 of the ROC
as an order for delivery of personal property.
That the action commenced by Cooney against Tillson, in the Manila RTC Manila was
one for replevin — and the provisional remedy therein applied for, the writ or order
of delivery just described — hardly admits of doubt. The facts set out in his
complaint and the affidavit accompanying it, as well as his filing of a bond in double
the value of the property sought to be recovered, show that Cooney filed the action
precisely with Rule 60 in mind. This is evident from a perusal of Sections 1 and 2 of
the Rule.
The plaintiff must also give a bond, executed to the defendant in double the value of
the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property
to the defendant if the return thereof be adjudged, and for the payment to the
defendant of such sum as he may recover from the plaintiff in the action.
As will be noted, Cooney’s complaint incorporates the factual allegations necessary
to bring his cause within the operation of Rule 60 of the ROC. In his complaint he
asserts that he is the owner of the yacht 1 in virtue of a deed of sale executed in his
favor by Seacraft; that he was being deprived of possession thereof by Tillson, who
was acting in conspiracy with the Sheriff and other persons; that as owner, he was
entitled to a “preliminary order for the immediate delivery” upon “a bond in a
reasonable amount” and, “after trial of the issues,” to have his ownership vindicated
and recover damages from the defendants.

And that it was so understood by the RTC can scarcely be doubted, too. Judge
Jaguros directed the issuance of “the corresponding Writ of Replevin of Personal
Property.” Moreover, a writ denominated “writ of replevin” issued on the same day,
pursuant to which the sheriff took possesion of yacht 1.
The case is not removed from the operation of Rule 60 by the fact that after the
property was taken from the defendant it was not turned over to the plaintiff
Cooney (but) to the Coast Guard, on instructions of the Trial Court. That
circumstance is totally inconsequential.
For one thing, it does not alter the reality of the defendant’s loss of possession; it is
unreasonable to approve of the taking of the boat from his possession pursuant to
Rule 60, and then deny him the remedies prescribed by that self same rule; and if
the seizure was not effected in accordance with Rule 60, then the seizure was
unjustified.
For another, property seized under a writ of delivery or replevin is not supposed to
be turned over to the plaintiff until after the lapse of five 5 days, a proposition that
is made plain by Section 6 of Rule 60:
Hence, whether the property remained with the sheriff, or was given over to
another officer designated by the Court is of no significance, and certainly should
not be taken as disabling the defendant from moving for the return of the property
to him by either of the modes set out in Section 5 of Rule 60: (1) by objecting to
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s replevin bond, or (2) if he does not so object, by
filing a counter-bond “in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff’s
affidavit.”
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192. FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION VS CA
FACTS:
Spouses Edilberto and Marciana Tadiaman, residents of Cabanatuan City, purchased
a 10-wheeler Izusu cargo truck from Jordan Enterprises, Inc., in Quezon City, in
installments. Said spouses executed a promissory note for P196,680.00 payable in
24 monthly installments in favor of Jordan Enterprises, Inc., and a Chattel Mortgage
over the motor vehicle purchased to secure the payment of the promissory note.
Jordan Enterprises, Inc. assigned its rights and interests over the said instruments
to Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corporation, which in turn assigned them to
plaintiff-appellant Filinvest Credit Corporation.
Subsequently, the spouses Tadiaman defaulted in the payment of the installments
due on the promissory note, and plaintiff-appellant filed an action for replevin and
damages against them with the court below. Upon motion of the plaintiff-appellant,
a writ of replevin was issued, and the truck was seized in the province of Isabela, by
persons who represented themselves to be special sheriffs of the court, but who
turned out to be employees of the plaintiff-appellant. The truck was brought by such
persons all the way back to Metro Manila.
Thereafter, defendant spouses filed a counterbond, and the lower court ordered the
return of the truck. This was not immediately implemented because the defendant
spouses were met with delaying tactics of the plaintiff-appellant, and when they
finally recovered the truck, they found the same to be "cannibalized".
RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. CA Affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON writ of replevin is an appropriate action to recover possession preliminary to
the extrajudicial foreclosure of a chattel mortgage
HELD:
YES.
The SC held that Replevin is, the appropriate action to recover possession
preliminary to the extrajudicial foreclosure of a chattel mortgage. Filinvest did in
fact institute such an action and obtained a writ of replevin. And, by filing it,
Filinvest admitted that it cannot acquire possession of the mortgaged vehicle in an
orderly or peaceful manner. Accordingly, it should have left the enforcement of the
writ in accordance with Rule 60 of the Rules of Court which it had voluntarily
invoked.It must be observed that the trial court erred in holding that the action for
replevin was "not in order as [Filinvest] is not the owner of the property (Sec, 2 par.
(a) Rule 60)."11 It is not only the owner who can institute a replevin suit.

Upon the default by the mortgagor in his obligations, Filinvest, as a mortgagee, had
the right to the possession of the property mortgaged preparatory to its sale in a
public auction.12 However, for employing subterfuge in seizing the truck by
misrepresenting its employees as deputy sheriffs and then hiding and cannibalizing
it, Filinvest committed bad faith in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
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193. OSCAR FERNANDEZ VS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK
FACTS:
Petitioners purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a financing scheme of the
private respondent, and the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the financing
institution. The total amount to be paid for 48 monthly installments would amount
to P553,944.
Due to the respondent bank's "greedy desire" to unjustly enrich itself at the
expense of the petitioners, the former filed an unfounded complaint for a sum of
money with replevin before the MTC of Pasay City.
Considering that the principal amount involved was P553,944, petitioners filed an
Answer mentioning in the special and affirmative defenses a Motion to Dismiss, for
lack of jurisdiction, but this was denied on February 10, 1997 and was received on
February 20, 1997. A Motion for Reconsideration was then submitted on April 2,
1997.
Aside from that, petitioners contested the venue considering that the principal office
of the respondent bank was in Makati, while their residence was in QC.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 9, 1997 and received by them on
May 29, 1997.
When the respondent bank filed its complaint with prayer for the issuance of a Writ
of Replevin on November 28, 1997, the monthly installments were almost fully paid;
they would have been fully paid on November 26, 1997. Furthermore, the car's
mileage at the time of illegal seizure was only 28,464 kilometers. They could not
have been considered in default at the time the complaint was filed, considering
that: (a) they attempted many times to pay the bank their installments for the
months of August, September, October, 1996, and up to the time of the filing of the
case, they had not received any statement of delinquency as mandated by RA3165
(Truth in Lending Act).
If at all, petitioners added, the baseless filing of the case was deliberately done to
enrich the bank at the expense of the petitioners which [was] tantamount to simple
robbery. They even tried consigning the P69,168 through a Manager's Check dated
January 7, 1997 for the months of August to February, 1997, or beyond the four
months installment in advance but were similarly refused by the court for no valid
reason.
Their petition for the outright dismissal of the complaint, as well as the lifting of the
Writ of Replevin was denied even if the amount of P553,344 representing the value
of the chattel was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
To be precise, MTC Order states:

As to the question of jurisdiction the complaint shows that the amount
plaintiff seeks to recover is P190,635, which is well within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court. Likewise the attached Promissory Note in the Complaint
also contains stipulation as to the venue agreed upon by the parties in case
an action is filed in court, in which case this court has jurisdiction.The Motion
to Dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction is likewise denied for being
unmeritorious.
PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT:
1. The jurisdiction of the MTC of Pasay City is strictly limited within the confines
of the boundary limits of Pasay City, B.P. 129, Sec. 28.
2. The MTC's jurisdiction is limited to not more than two hundred thousand
pesos.
3. Assuming that the MTC of Pasay City has jurisdiction to try and decide the
case and to issue the ancillary writ of replevin, the CA erred in sanctioning the
order of the MTC in denying Petitioners' Motion for Redelivery of the vehicle
which was filed within five days after such seizure, which in essence was an
outright departure from the express provision of the law and the settled
jurisprudence on the matter.
4. The bank's Memorandum dated July 5, 1999 should be stricken off and
ordered expunged from the records for being fatally defective in form and
substance. No Annexes to said Memorandum were attached to petitioners'
copy, thereby making said memorandum fatally defective because the annexes
were integral parts of the memorandum itself. Up to this late date, respondent
Premiere Insurance and Surety Corporation has not submitted its memorandum
and may therefore be deemed to have admitted the entire text of the Petition
to be true, valid and binding against it.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
CA ruled that the MTC of Pasay City had jurisdiction over civil cases in which the
amount of the demand did not exceed P200,000 exclusive of interest, damages and
attorney's fees. The basic claim in the present case was P190,635.90; hence, the
MTC had jurisdiction.
CA further held that the objection to the impropriety of the venue should have been
raised in a motion to dismiss before the filing of a responsive pleading. The said
issue, however, was raised for the first time only in petitioners' Answer.
Lastly, the CA agreed with the MTC that the Writ of Replevin could be validly
executed anywhere in Metro Manila because Section 27, Chapter III of B.P. 129,
authorized the establishment of the MTC of Metro Manila with 82 branches.
Therefore, any branch — in this case, Branch 44 which was stationed in Pasay —
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could issue writs and processes that could validly be served and executed anywhere
within Metro Manila.
ISSUE:
May the Writ of Replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay City be enforced outside the
city? YES
HELD:
A writ of replevin issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City may be served
and enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the amount of the claim alleged in the complaint, not by the value of
the chattel seized in ancillary proceedings.
The Petition has no merit.
Petitioners argue that the Writ of Replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay could be
enforced only within the confines of Pasay City. In support, they cite Section 28 of
Batas Pambansa (BP) 129, which states:
Sec. 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. — The Supreme Court shall
constitute Metropolitan Trial Courts in such other metropolitan areas as may
be established by law whose territorial jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with
the cities and municipalities comprising the metropolitan area.
Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a metropolitan area
which shall be his permanent station and his appointment shall state the
branch of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be originally
assigned. A Metropolitan Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court
to any branch within said metropolitan area as the interest of justice may
require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another
station within the meaning of this section.9
We are not convinced. Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated
January 11, 1983, providing for the interim rules and guidelines relative to the
implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin like the one issued in the present case
may be served anywhere in the Philippines. Specifically, the said Resolution states:
3. Writs and processes. —
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo, warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of
the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court
 137

may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases,
without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. 10

Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas, which obviously does not fall under
item "a" of the above-cited Rule, may be validly enforced anywhere in the
Philippines. Petitioners confused the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case
on the one hand with, on the other, its power to issue writs and processes pursuant
to and in the exercise of said jurisdiction. Applying the said Rule, Malaloan v. Court
of Appeals reiterated the foregoing distinction between the jurisdiction of the trial
court and the administrative area in which it could enforce its orders and processes
pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on it:

The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a
regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast,
it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of
which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or
impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit to its area of
enforceability. On the contrary, the provision of the interim Rules expressly
authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the
processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception
made regarding the processes contemplated in paragraph (b).