Admission to Practice
) The
Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000
FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only
to take oath but not to sign the roll of attorneys pending the resolution
of the complaint of the petitioner who charges respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and
grave misrepresentation. Apparently, the respondent appeared as
counsel to an election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed
the rolls of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he only
provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person
who knows the law. He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as
a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and
its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the meeting of
the MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and
signed in the pleading as counsel for the candidate.
I: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.
R: The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized
practice of law. It held that all the activities he participated during that
time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a
member of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a
privilege extended to those morally upright and with the proper
knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the
moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds
respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding
the fact that he already took his oath, he was denied admission to the
bar.
What constitutes practice of law
RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.
FACTS:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the
Comelec. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the
appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged
lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed
this certiorari and prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section
1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of
a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for
10 years.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave
abuse of discretion in confirming Monsod’s appointment.
HELD:
1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works
where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.
records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the
interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider
lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the
practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in
their respective work. The court also cited an article in the January 11,
1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their
own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that
because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in
other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most
corporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation.
Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the
World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment
bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also
became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be
considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-
economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the
Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution.
The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it
is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is
no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is
no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
Cruz v Atty. Cabrera AC No. 5737 October 25, 2004
Facts: The complainant files an administrative charge against the
respondent for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The complainant, a fourth year law student, appears in
court in his own behalf as he instituted a case against his neighbor
who is represented by the respondent as counsel. During a hearing,
the respondent uttered remarks that the complainant finds arrogant
and misconduct in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. The
complaint was referred to the IBP commissioner who recommended
suspension of respondent in the practice of law for 3 months which
was annulled by a resolution of the IBP Board recommending
dismissal of the case for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct.
RULING: The court ruled that although the outburst of the respondent
is uncalled for, it is not to such a magnitude as to warrant his
suspension in the practice of his profession. The court thereby
dismissed the case due to lack of merit.
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs ATTY. CARLOS SAGUCIO
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
FACTS:
Respondent, atty Sagucio was a former Personnel manager and
Counsel of Taggat Industries Inc. Thereafter in 1992, he was
appointed as Asst. Provincial prosecutor of Tuguegarao Cagayan .
Employees of Taggat filed criminal charges against the complainant
who took over the management and control of Taggat, withheld the
payment of their wages and salaries without a valid cause. The
complainant charges respondent with the engaging in private practice
of law while working as a government prosecutor and for violation of
Rule 15.03 of CPR.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent violated Rule 15.03 of CPR.
2. Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat posits conflict of
interests with his work as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
HELD:
The Court finds that there is no conflict of interest on the part of the
respondent when he handled the preliminary investigation of the
criminal charges filed by the Taggat Employees. The issue of the
matter of the criminal complaint was pertaining to the withholding of the
wages and salaries of the Taggat employees which occurred from April
1, 1996 to July 15, 1997. Evidently, the respondent was no longer
connected with the Taggat Inc during such period since he is working
as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor since 1992. Should there be
apparent conflict of interest, it must be supported by sufficient evidence
that Taggat, respondent’s former client, used any confidential
information from his preceding employment with Complainant in
resolving the filed criminal complaint.
As the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
together with the case he handled as government t prosecutor was
labor-related case which fact, is not a sufficient basis to charge
respondent for representing conflicting interests.
The Court emphasized that a lawyer’s absolute duty to his former
client does not cover transactions that...
Cruz v. Mina
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is
the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies
his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in
Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before
the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of
the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz
appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal
case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied
permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground
that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid
down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an
inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In
inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of
the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Membership to the IBP
n Re: Atty. Marcial Edillion A.M. 192 August 3, 1978
FACTS: The IBP adopted a resolution on Admin case against Atty.
Edillion on matter involving his membership due delinquency,
recommending striking his name from the rolls of attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues. Atty. Edillion contends
that the Rules of Court 139-A and the IBP by-laws are unconstitutional
and thereby questioning the power of the court to compel him to
become an IBP member as well as the provision of the Rules of Court
requiring payment for membership fee of the IBP.
ISSUE: WON the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his
membership fee to the IBP.
RULING: Yes. The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which
every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar
associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as
one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay
his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the
Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
Exemption from the payment of IBO dues
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
FACTS: Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP
dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that
after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then
migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is
that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law
profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The
compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive
since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the
profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the
deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.
ISSUE: WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to
payment for IBP annual membership.
RULING: The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a
matter of regulatory measure by the State, which is a necessary
consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The
compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one
remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer
or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP
membership fee dues is denied.
Santos Jr. v Llamas A.C. No. 4749 1.20.00
FACTS: This is a complaint against respondent for misrepresentation
and non-payment of IBP membership dues. For years, the respondent
does not indicate proper PTR no. in his practice of the law profession.
Now of old age, he contends that he is engaged in the limited practice
of his profession and as a senior citizen, he is exempt from paying
taxes and membership dues with the IBP.
ISSUE: WON the respondent is exempt from paying his membership
dues owing to limited practice of law and for being a senior citizen.
RULING: No. He is not exempt since Rule 139-A requires all IBP
members to pay the annual fee and failure thereof for 6 months merits
suspension of the membership and for 1 year becomes a ground for
removal of the member’s name from the Rolls of Attorney regardless
one is a practicing lawyer or not. His non-renewal of his PTR is a
misrepresentation to the public and the courts that he has paid his
dues violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1 Rule 1.01
Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan
to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme
Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against
Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and
filing informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzalez however proceeded with the investigation and he filed
criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a
newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on
the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of the TRO is a
manifestation that the “rich and influential persons get favorable
actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary
litigant to get his petition to be given due course”.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The
Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez
stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was
only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the
rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have
lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than
six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to

Tapucar vs Tapucar A.C. No. 4148 “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
Issues
FACTS: Disbarment was filed against Atty. Lauro Tapucar by his wife
on grounds for gross immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain 1. Whether the Supreme Court has the authority to discipline officers of
Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous circumstances. Prior to the
disbarment case, an administrative case was filed against Atty. the Court and members of the bar such as respondent Gonzalez
Tapucar in connection with his co-habitation in which he was penalized
with 6 months suspension without pay. He continued the illicit affair
that gave rise to another charge against him on grounds for conduct 2. Whether respondent Gonzalez’s statements constitute both
unbecoming for a court officer and gross immoral conduct which professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action
caused his dismissal and separation from the service as a judge. He
continued his cohabitation that born 2 children and he eventually marry against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the
the paramour in the subsistence of his previous marriage and
completely abandoned his real family. The wife migrated in the States contempt power
but was receiving complaints from their children left in the Philippines 1. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to discipline officers of
who are humiliated with said act of Atty, Tapucar. This caused the wife
to institute a disbarment case to shield their daughter with her the Court and members of the bar such as respondent Gonzalez.
daughter-lawyer representing her case. The IBP commissioner
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Tapucar.
The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession,
RULING: The court held that it is a settled rule that good moral
character is a precedent condition for admission in the legal profession has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to
and must be remain intact to maintain one’s good standing as member discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate to
in the Bar. The facts showed that despite previous sanction to Atty.
Tapucar, he continued his illicit affair and he even showed arrogance regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well
in the face of charges against him in the presence of the IBP
authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this
commission. Thus, he was disbarred and his name was stricken out
from the rolls of attorneys. constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court
over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper
Canon 1
administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to
Zaldivar v. Gonzalez
punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct
166 SCRA 316
of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other
7 October 1988
persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. The
Facts
power to punish for contempt is “necessary for its own protection
Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was
against an improper interference upon the complaint of any of the
charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and
parties litigant.”
Corrupt Practices Act. Respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez was the
then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case.
 Ruling
2. Yes. Respondent Gonzalez’s statements constitute both
professional misconduct and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.
Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and non-
lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a
lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the
Supreme Court’s disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into
play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is
charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for
contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority
of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over
§ W/N Ariola can be held liable.
members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an
officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task
and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society. Any act on his part, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action
against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the
contempt power.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez
from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Code of Professional Responsibility
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall
not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO THE JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
SICAT v ARIOLA
Facts:
§ Arturo Sicat, Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal
charged Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola of committing fraud, deceit, and
falsehood in notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA).
§ Said SPA was purportedly executed by Juanito Benitez, of the JC
Benitez Architect and Technical Management. Said company had a
contract with the Municipality of Cainta for the construction of low cost
houses.
§ What is fraudulent about it is the fact that the SPA was notarized more
than 2 months after the death of Benitez, the person who supposedly
executed it.
§ P3,700T was paid to JC Benitez Architect and Technical Management
for services not rendered (as consultants).
§ Ariola claims that the document he notarized was superfluous and
unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, and therefore he should be
exonerated – the document was cancelled the same day he notarized
it, hence legally there was no public document that existed.
Issue:
Held:
§ Yes.
§ Notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons
who signed them are the very same persons who executed them an
personally appeared before the, to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein.
§ His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the
most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast
suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act.
§ Ariola is disbarred, and not merely suspended for a year.
ROYONG VS OBLENA
Facts:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14,
1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston
Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed
on her person in the manner described therein.
Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person
really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief
Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is
required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of
herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of Attorneys.
LEGAL PROFESSION CASE 23
ROYONG VS. OBLENA
AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
En Banc, Barrera
FACTS:
• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena,
a member of the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General
immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was
no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent
seems to be consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
respondent did not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was
guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another
complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging
in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good
moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same
time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong.
Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render
judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer
and judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina
Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia
Angeles warrants disbarment.
HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.
RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character
or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and
its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do
not specify that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way
directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit
and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense
of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in
protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to
practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he
really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the
time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life
with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed
to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good
moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of
the bar.
People v. Tuanda
FACTS:
Atty. Fe Tuanda was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
violation of B.P. 22 with a fine and subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to indemnify the complainant Herminia Marquez.
Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court and imposed upon Atty. Fe Tuanda, in
addition, the suspension from the practice of law until further orders
from the Supreme Court. The respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals noted respondent’s Notice
of Appeal and advised her “to address her Notice of Appeal to the
Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum.” In the said motion,
responded stated:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not
painful penalty aggravating the lower court’s penalty of fine considering
that accused-appellant’s action on the case during the trial on the
merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere
belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to
cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposed suspension for Atty. Tuanda may be lifted.
HELD:
NO. Motion to Lift Order of Suspension denied.
RATIO:
[T]he crimes of which respondent was convicted [also] import deceit
and violation of her attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to “obey the laws of
the land.” Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as
in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects
the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense.
Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which
deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects of the
issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the
community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade
and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of which
respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both
of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order
ofSuspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice
of law until further orders from this Court.
Ui vs. Bonifacio
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Thursday, March 01,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Lesli Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Iris Bonifacio on the ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying
an immoral relationship with Carlos Ui, her (Lesli) husband.
In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Iris
attached a photocopy of a marriage certificate that said that she and
Carlos got married in 1985 but according to the certificate of
marriage obtained from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they
were married in 1987.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted herself in an
immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice
of law.
Held: NO. The practice of law is a privilege. The bar candidate does
not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by
passing the bar, he must also have a continued possession of good
moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral
conduct , which has been defined as the conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
good and respectable members of the community. Lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with great
caution.
Iris Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos, clothed as
it was with what she believed as a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. For such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, it must be “grossly immoral”, it must be
so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree.
A lawyer is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships
but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Her act of
distancing herself on her discovery that Carlos was married proves that
she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of
the legal profession.
On the matter of the falsified marriage certificate, it is contrary to
human experience and highly improbable that she did not know the
year of her marriage or she failed to check that the information on
the document she attached to her Answer were correct. Lawyers are
called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds
and acts of malpractice.
Figueroa vs. Barranco
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Thursday, March 01,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Figueroa and Barranco were sweethearts since their teens.
Their intimacy eventually resulted to a son born out of wedlock. At this
point (1964) Barranco promised Figueroa that he would marry her
when he passes the bar examinations. After four takes, he finally
passed but did not hold true to his promise of marriage. In 1971, their
relationship ended. Years later, he married another woman. When
Barranco was about to take his oath to enter the legal profession,
Figueroa filed a complaint relaying to the court whathappened between
her and Barranco. Until 1988, Barranco has filed three motions to
dismiss because Figueroa still would not persecute and because for
the past years, he has become elected in the Sangguniang Bayan, has
actively participated in various civicorganizations and has acquired a
good standing within his community while the case was pending. The
court sought the opinion of the IBP which recommended that
Barranco be allowed to take his oath. Figueroa reappeared and
intercepted the scheduled oath-taking of Barranco which led to its
delay.
Issue: Whether or not Barranco should be allowed to take his oath
despite the accusations of Figueroa.
Held: Yes. The maintenance of an intimate relationship between a
man and a woman, both of whom had no impediment to marry and
voluntarily carried on with the affair, does not amount to a grossly
immoral conduct even if a child was born out of the relationship. His
previous acts may be said to be a question to his moral character but
none of these are “so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.” Her allegations that she was forced to have sexual relations
with him cannot lie as evidenced by her continued cohabitation with
him even after their child was born in 1964. The ignobleness of
his treatment of Figueroa is sufficiently punished by the 26 years that
he has been prevented from entering the profession he has worked so
hard for.
BARRIOS VS. ATTY. FRANCISCO MARTINEZA.C.NO.4585, NOVEM
BER 12, 2004
Facts:The respondent was convicted of the crime involving BP 22. He
was also involved inanother estafa case pertaining to his legal services
rendered on the victim of Dona Paz tragedy.The victim he represented
filed a complaint because of the compensation that the victim
hadreceived from Sulpicio Lines which was later deducted by Atty.
Martinez. On Sept. 27, 2003 theIBP board of governors passed a
resolution approving the report and the recommendation of
itsinvestigating commissioner. On Dec. 3, 2003 respondent filed a
reinvestigation.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of issuing worthless check constitute
moral turpitude and is a ground for disbarment.
In Re: Terrel [2 Phil 266 (May 15, 1903)]
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Monday, March 05,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Terrel was ordered to show cause why he should not be
suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila
He assisted in the organization “Centro Bellas Artes” Club, after he had
been notified that the organization was made for the purpose of
evading the law
He acted as attorney for said club during the time of and after its
organization, which was known for the purpose of evading the law
In US vs. Terrel, he was charged with estafa. The court reviewed his
testimony and decided that the charges were true and made an order
suspending him from office as lawyer in the Philippine Islands.
Issue: Whether or not the court was justified in suspending Terrel.
Held: Yes, suspended for one year
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the
purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes
such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer of the court, as
amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which
he may be removed or suspended.
The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be
dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify
disbarment.
HOWEVER, Terrel was acquitted in US vs. Terrel on the charge
ofestafa. While unprofessional, is not criminal in nature. Hence, Terrel
is suspended for one year (as opposed to permanent suspension).
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that
would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended
information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the
petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that
will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key
phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due
process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general
terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected
speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances
left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.
2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process
No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing
the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the
accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in
the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process
Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is every element of the crime charged—the element of the
offense.
Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is
his submission that “pattern” is a “very important element of the crime
of plunder;” and that Sec. 4 is “two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
evidence and a substantive element of the crime, “ such that without it
the accused cannot be convicted of plunder – Facts: Spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido filed an
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential
administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Florante Madro
elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in
Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing
prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or numerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of
establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only
dishonesty. The cases filed were:
operated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to
engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755, for serious irregularity, filed by respondent
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum,
against Venustiano Saburnido.
and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely
because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that 2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758, for falsification, filed by respondent against
the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
Venustiano Saburnido and two others.
committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute
eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he 3. Crim. Case No. 93-67, for evasion through negligence under Article
claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of
224 of the Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against
Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy Venustiano Saburnido.
to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough
if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
4. Adm. Case No. 95-33, filed by respondent against Rosalia
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the
acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law
Previous to this case, complainants (spouses Saburnido) also filed
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the
degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal 3separate administrative cases against respondent, which led to the
intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se latter’s dismissal from the judiciary and forfeiture of his retirement
must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
benefits.
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are,
by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken SC referred this case to the IBP, the latter concluded hat complainants
or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to
submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts
completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human
being. constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be
of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are Issue: Whether or not Atty. Madrono’s act of filling
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does
multiplecomplaints constitute gross misconduct that will warrant the
not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. imposition of administrative sanctions.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit Held: YES. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his

Saburnido vs. Madrono professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Thursday, March 01,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity
and integrity of the legal profession. Clearly, respondent’s act of filing
multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness
to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness,
a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual,
as complainants were instrumental in respondent’s dismissal from the
judiciary. We see in respondent’s tenacity in pursuing several cases
against complainants not the persistence of one who has been
grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact
revenge.
Respondent’s action erodes rather than enhances public perception of
the legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may
be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We find that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to
discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out
only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not
hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood
of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him
where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In
this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against
respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as a
punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal
profession.
Linsangan v. Tolentino
In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through
his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, “pirated” a client of Atty. Linsangan.
Said client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangan’s
allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s calling card
which appears as follows:
In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied
authorizing the printing of such calling cards.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the
professional services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card
of Labiano.
HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangan’s
clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another’s legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially
denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he actually knew her later in the
proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his law
office. Through Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on
the strength of Labiano’s word that Atty. Tolentino could produce a
more favorable result.
Labiano’s calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the
law office will finance legal actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer
shall not lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind
so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause.
If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these
circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather
than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of
his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states “w/ financial assistance“,
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty.
Tolentino had a personal and direct hand in the printing of said calling
cards, he cannot be punished with severity. At any rate, for all the
infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the
Supreme Court for one year.
Vitriolo vs. Dasig FACTS: This is a case for disbarment filed with this
Court by high-ranking officers of the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED) against Atty. Felina Dasig, also an official of the CHED. The
charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in detriment of the
dignity and reputation of the CHED. ISSUE: WON the disbarment case
against the respondent should prosper. HELD: Yes. The Court finds
the respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a
character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a
lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and
illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the
approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. The
lawyer’s acts deliberately violated the Lawyer’s Oath and such may be
a ground for disbarment, suspension and other disciplinary action. The
Lawyer’s Oath imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to
delay no man for money or malice. The same is further stressed in
Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover,
respondent’s attempts to extort money are violative of Rule 1.01 of
said Code which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or
participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Said acts also
constitute breach of Rule 6.02 which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interests for a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren
in private practice. For these violations, the Highest Court found the
respondent worthy of disbarment.