CASE DIGESTS
CONSTI 1
HOMEWORK 1
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. PERFECTO V. COMELEC
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of
the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the
testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of
oil companies had disappeared from his office.
Then, the day following the convening of Senate,
the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein
respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an
article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr.
Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256
of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that
punishes those who insults the Ministers of the
Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and
can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the
Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC
was enacted to protect Spanish officials as
representatives of the King. However, the Court
explains that in the present case, we no longer
have Kings nor its representatives for the
provision to protect. Also, with the change of
sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to
American, it means that the invoked provision of
the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The
Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be
‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of
the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the
public law that on acquisition of territory, the
previous political relations of the ceded region
are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the
SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot
be applied to the present case. Therefore,
respondent was acquitted.
2. MACARIOLA V. ASUNCION
FACTS
On August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola
charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with
“acts unbecoming a judge when the latter
purchased a property which was previously the
subject of litigation on which he rendered
decision. Respondent and his wife were also
members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries Inc. to which their shares and interests
in said property were conveyed.
According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly
violated Article 1491, par. 5, of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot
No. 1184-E which was one of those properties
involved in in a case decided by him and that he
likewise violated Article 14, par. 1 and 5 of the
Code of Commerce, Section 3, par. H, of R.A.
3019, Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a
stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a
judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
ISSUES
I. Whether or not respondent Judge violated
Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code
in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No.
1184-E.
II. Whether or not respondent Judge violated
paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce when he associated himself with the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc.
HELD
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NEGATIVE. [The Court] find that there is no
merit in the contention of complainant that
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respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated
Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code
in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No.
1184-E which was one of those properties
involved in Civil Case No. 3010.
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies
only to the sale or assignment of the property
which is the subject of litigation to the persons
disqualified therein. In the case at bar, when the
respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965
a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8,
1963 was already final because none of the
parties therein filed an appeal; hence, the lot in
question was no longer subject of the litigation.
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did
not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of
Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it
was, however, improper for him to have acquired
the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires
that: “A judge’s official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and
in the performance of judicial duties, but also in
his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.”
II
NEGATIVE. Respondent Judge cannot be held
liable under [paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce] because there is no
showing that respondent participated or
intervened in his official capacity in the business
or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the
business of the corporation in which respondent
participated has obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office. The business
of said corporation is not that kind where
respondent intervenes or takes part in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance.
It is [the Court’s] considered view that although
[paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14] is incorporated
in the Code of Commerce which is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however,
partakes of the nature of a political law as it
regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and
employees, like justices and judges.
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes
more of the nature of an administrative law
because it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees with respect to engaging
in business: hence, political in essence. It is
significant to note that the present Code of
Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of
1885, with some modifications made by the
“Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias
de Ultramar,” which was extended to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6,
1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on
December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
the United States and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article
14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because where there is
change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not with
those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted
by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887,
897 [1922]), this Court stated that: “It is a general
principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated. ”
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce after the
change of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and then to the Republic of the
Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code
of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and
cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of
the Court of First Instance, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals.
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THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
3. IMBONG V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Congress passed Resolution No. 2 which called
for a Constitutional Convention (ConCon) to
propose constitutional amendments. The
ConCon shall be composed of two delegates
form each representative district who shall have
the same qualifications as those of
congressmen.
It later passed Resolution No. 4 amending
Resolution No. 2, providing that the convention
shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned
among existing representative districts
according to the number of inhabitants. Each
representative district shall be entitled to at least
two delegates with the same qualifications as
congressmen.
Finally, it enacted RA 6132 implementing
Resolution Nos. 2 and 4.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 8(a) of RA
6132 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
NO. The equal protection of the law is not unduly
subverted in Paragraph 1, Section 8(a) of RA
6132 because it does not create any hostile
discrimination against any party or group nor
does it confer undue favor or privilege on an
individual.
4. GONZALES V. COMELEC
Facts: The case is an original action for
prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16,
1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following
resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No.
1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended
so as to increase the membership of the
House of Representatives from a maximum
of 120, as provided in the present
Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of
their respective inhabitants, although each
province shall have, at least, one (1)
member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to
propose amendments to said Constitution,
the convention to be composed of two (2)
elective delegates from each representative
district, to be "elected in the general elections
to be held on the second Tuesday of
November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16,
Article VI, of the same Constitution, be
amended so as to authorize Senators and
members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which,
upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing
that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No.
1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people,
at the general elections which shall be held on
November 14, 1967.
Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
Constitution.
Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8)
votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and
R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and
invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must
be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
therein prayed for denied, without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
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As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer
cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts
be questioned upon the ground that he is merely
a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious:
(1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to
the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if
within the competence of his office, are valid,
insofar as the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by
a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately, may propose amendments to
this Constitution or call a contention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as
part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV
of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits
Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators,
even if they should run for and assume the
functions of delegates to the Convention.
5. TOLENTINO V. COMELEC
FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into
being by virtue of two resolutions of the
Congress approved in its capacity as a
constituent assembly convened for the purpose
of calling a convention to propose amendments
to the Constitution. After election of delegates
held on November 10, 1970, the Convention
held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the
morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is
entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING
SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE
VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971,
the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate
of the Convention, that it will hold the said
plebiscite together with the senatorial elections
on November 8, 1971.
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for
prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the necessary
implementing resolutions subsequently
approved have no force and effect as laws in so
far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite
co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the
ground that the calling and holding of such a
plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged
exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and
may not be exercised by the Convention, and
that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, the proposed amendment in
question cannot be presented to the people for
ratification separately from each and all other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to
the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the
same Convention must be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In
order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a
Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it
must provide the voter not only sufficient time but
ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the
nature of the amendment per se but as well as
its relation to the other parts of the Constitution
with which it has to form a harmonious whole.
In the present context, where the Convention
has hardly started considering the merits, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing
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Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with
this requirement.
6. OCCENA V. COMELEC
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition
proceedings against the validity of three
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments, goes further than
merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar
and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention that framed the present Constitution,
are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox
aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the
Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid,
and in force and effect when the Batasang
Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions
were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the
force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution.
In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for
prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its
ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a
vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect." Such a
statement served a useful purpose. It could even
be said that there was a need for it. It served to
clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as
of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution
came into force and effect. With such a
pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with
the recognition of the cardinal postulate that
what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled
to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for
instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter
of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973
Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as
simple as that. What cannot be too strongly
stressed is that the function of judicial review has
both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so
convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black
and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as
well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it
may not only nullify the acts of coordinate
branches but may also sustain their validity. In
the latter case, there is an affirmation that what
was done cannot be stigmatized as
constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of
a suit of this character suffices. That is the
meaning of the concluding statement in
Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably
applied the present Constitution. The latest case
in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely
two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the
effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten
cases may be cited.
7. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. COMELEC
Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin,
president of People’s Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with
COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution
to lift the term limits of elective officials, through
People’s Initiative. He based this petition on
Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides for the right of the people to
exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently
the COMELEC issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and of the notice of
hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing.
At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon,
Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as
intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a
motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the
ground that one which is cognizable by the
COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator
Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin
filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the
Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such
as the following: (1) The constitutional provision
on people’s initiative to amend the constitution
can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; (2)
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The people’s initiative is limited to amendments
to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting
of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore
it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The
Supreme Court granted the Motions for
Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
officials would constitute a revision or an
amendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self-
executory, thus, without implementing legislation
the same cannot operate. Although the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress does
not provide for its implementation.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
which prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void. It has been an established
rule that what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated (potestas delegata non delegari
potest). The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.
The lifting of the term limits was held to be that
of a revision, as it would affect other provisions
of the Constitution such as the synchronization
of elections, the constitutional guarantee of
equal access to opportunities for public service,
and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision
cannot be done by initiative. However,
considering the Court’s decision in the above
Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is
a revision or amendment has become academic.
8. LAMBINO V. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition
with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735.
Lambino group alleged that the petition had the
support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their
petition changes the 1987 constitution by
modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4
of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. The proposed
changes will shift the present bicameral-
presidential form of government to unicameral-
parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition
due to lack of enabling law governing initiative
petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec
ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement
the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative
petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people’s initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling
in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group
failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held
that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
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 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that
the initiative signer must be informed at the
time of the signing of the nature and effect,
failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading”
which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a
clear distinction between “amendment” and
“revision, it is intended that the third mode of
stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may
propose only amendments to the
constitution. Merging of the legislative and
the executive is a radical change, therefore it
constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not
Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will
not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid
initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.
9. PIRMA V. COMELEC
- Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11
10. SANIDAD V. COMELEC
Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No.
6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN
ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into
law. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of
the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A.
6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a
petition dated November 20, 1989, herein
petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a
newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly
newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and
the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167,
which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on
columnists, commentators or announcers. —
During the plebiscite campaign period, on the
day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that
said provision is void and unconstitutional
because it violates the constitutional guarantees
of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution.
Issue: WON the said Section 19 of resolution No
2167 is unconstitutional
Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987
Constitution that what was granted to the
COMELEC was the power to supervise and
regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation
of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right
to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates are ensured Neither
(b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to
mean that the COMELEC has also been granted
the right to supervise and regulate the exercise
by media practitioners themselves of their right
to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither
the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact,
there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite.
Therefore, Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2167 has no statutory basis. While the
limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's
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freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on
his choice of the forum where he may express
his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold
that this form of regulation is tantamount to a
restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression
for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are
matters of public concern and importance. The
people's right to be informed and to be able to
freely and intelligently make a decision would be
better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum.
The people affected by the issues presented in a
plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised. COMELEC
spaces and COMELEC radio time may provide a
forum for expression but they do not guarantee
full dissemination of information to the public
concerned because they are limited to either
specific portions in newspapers or to specific
radio or television times.
11. JAVELLANA V. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the
Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite
cases, Javellana filed this suit against the
respondents to restrain them from implementing
any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935
Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a
Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered
voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf
of all citizens and voters similarly situated.
Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the
new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground the that the President
as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without
authority to create the Citizens Assemblies;
without power to approve proposed constitution;
without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and
the election held to ratify the proposed
constitution was not a free election, hence null
and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the
nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any
order, decree, and proclamation which have the
same import and objective.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or
political question, and therefore non-
justiciable.
 Whether or not the constitution proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
has been ratified validly conforming to
the applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions.
 Whether or not the proposed Constitution
has been acquiesced in (with or without
valid ratification) by the people.
 Whether or not the petitioners are entitled
for relief.
 Whether or not the proposed Constitution
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in
force.
HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new
constitution is in force depends upon whether or
not the said new constitution has been ratified in
accordance with the requirements of the 1935
Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of
ratification of an amendment to the constitution
should be settled applying the provisions of the
constitution in force at the time of the alleged
ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution
proposed has been ratified in accordance with
the provisions of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here
and in the US (from whom we patterned our
1935 Constitution) shall show.
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Second. The Constitution does not allow
Congress or anybody else to vest in those
lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution
the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age
render the proceedings in the Citizen’s
assemblies void. Proceedings held in such
Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally
irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in
said Assemblies. And, since there is no means
by which the invalid votes of those less than 21
years of age can be separated or segregated
from those of the qualified voters, the
proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be
considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the
constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935
Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast"
choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising
hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites.
This is but natural and logical, for, since the early
years of the American regime, we had adopted
the Australian Ballot System, with its major
characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots
prepared and furnished by the Government and
secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of
keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when
necessary, into the accuracy of the election
returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having
been conducted under the supervision of
COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the
Barrio Assemblies as were held took place
without the intervention of the COMELEC and
without complying with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure
therein mostly followed is such that there is no
reasonable means of checking the accuracy of
the returns filed by the officers who conducted
said plebiscites. This is another patent violation
of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form
part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the
1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the
"free, orderly, and honest" expression of the
people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in
the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar
as the same are claimed to have ratified the
revised Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence
of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution
places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the
"the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections,"
independently of the Executive. But there is not
even a certification by the COMELEC in support
of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies
relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on
January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president
of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays
nor the Department of Local Governments had
certified to the President the alleged result of the
citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The
citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed
constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial
knowledge that there have been no such
citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and
suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the
Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede
that the acts the officers and offices of the
Executive Department, in line with Proclamation
No. 1102, connote recognition of or
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot
“recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally
connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the
acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by
members of Congress do not constitute
congressional recognition, unless the members
have performed said acts in session duly
assembled. This is a well-established principle of
Administrative Law and of the Law of Public
Officers. The compliance by the people with the
orders of martial law government does not
constitute acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to
declare that the people's inaction as regards
Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance
with a number of Presidential orders, decrees
and/or instructions, some or many of which have
admittedly had salutary effects, issued
subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification,
9
adoption or approval of said Proclamation No.
1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or
obedience of the people, under these conditions,
is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the
"enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the
same refers to a document certified to the
President for his action under the Constitution by
the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Reps, and attested to by the respective
Secretaries of both Houses, concerning
legislative measures approved by said Houses.
Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the
President declaring the results of a plebiscite on
the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X
of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive
department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other
respondent in said case, petitions therein should
be given due course, there being more than
prima facie showing that the proposed
Constitution has not been ratified in accordance
with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either
strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in
by the people or majority thereof; that said
proposed Constitution is not in force and effect;
and that the 1935 Constitution is still the
Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice
to the submission of said proposed Constitution
to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or
rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV
of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the
Revised Election Code in force at the time of
such plebiscite.
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the
people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the
Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon
on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial
certainty whether the people have accepted or
not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of
the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself
voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the
result, there are not enough votes to declare that
the new Constitution is not in force.
12. LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER
PHILIPPINES V. AQUINO
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking
power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was
issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that
the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines."
ISSUE: Whether or not the government of
Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is
not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:
 The people have accepted the Aquino
government which is in effective control
of the entire country;
 It is not merely a de facto government but
in fact and law a de jure government; and
 The community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.
10
 10. SANIDAD V. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333 – Political Law – Constitutional
Law – Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991
calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct
1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(“barangays”) to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the interim
assembly, its replacement, the powers of
such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present
powers. Twenty days after, the President
issued another related decree, PD No. 1031,
amending the previous PD No. 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD No. 229
providing for the manner of voting and
canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to
the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16,
1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031
repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On
the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos
issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to
he submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses
that the people’s continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as
well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar
as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on
October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there
is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the
question is political in nature hence the court
cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly
propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as
to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases
where the power of the Presidency to initiate
the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised
by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the
power to propose amendments to the
Constitution resides in the interim National
Assembly during the period of transition
(Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that
period, and the regular National Assembly in
its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly
(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
Constitution). The normal course has not
been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a
constituent assembly, the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of
amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033
to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of
the procedure for amendments, written in
lambent words in the very Constitution
sought to be amended, raises a contestable
issue. The implementing Presidential Decree
Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly
purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the
issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly
a justiciable one, within the competence of
11
this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article
X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
executive agreement, or law shall be heard
and decided by the Supreme Court en banc
and no treaty, executive agreement, or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..”
The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes,
but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in
the Constitution, is in form a delegated and
hence a limited power, so that the Supreme
Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The
President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present
those proposals to the people in sufficient
time. The President at that time also sits as
the legislature.
12
 LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES V. AQUINO

(There is no "Full-Text" of this case. This is a Minute Resolution made by the SC.)

Minute Resolutions

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS.

PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.

SIRS/MESDAMES:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.

In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R.
No. 73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No.
73990, Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of
President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated
below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972
withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The
withdrawal is functus oficio.

The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter.
It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a
de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental
law of the Republic under her government.

In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.

Very truly yours,

13
 (Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS
Clerk of Court

* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.------------------------------------------

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