Imelda Marcos vs Comelec

Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a
"Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
Comelec declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended COC as well as
the original COCs.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But the
Comelec suspended her proclamation. Petitioner contended that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction
over the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:
WON HRET has jurisdiction over petitioner’s qualification?

Held:
No. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction
over the question.
 First Philippine International Bank v. CA

Facts:
The bank had an agreement with Demetria to purchase the parcels of land. The said
agreement was made by Demetria with the bank’s manager, Rivera. Later, however, the
bank through its conservator, Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it
alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such agreement. Hence, there was no
valid contract of sale. Subsequently, Demtria sued the bank. The RTC ruled in favor of
Demetria. The bank filean appeal with the CA.
Meanwhile, Henry Co., who is a stockholder in the said bank, filed a motion for
intervention with the trial court which was denied since the trial has concluded already
and the case is now pending appeal. Subsequently, Henry Co., filed a separate civil case
against Ejercito, the successor-in-interest of Demetria seeking to have the contract of sale
be declared unenforceable against the bank. Ejercito argued that the second case
constitutes forum shopping since it was barred by litis pendentia by virtue of the case
then pending in the CA.

Issue:
whether or not a court may refuse to take cognizance of a case on the ground of
forum shopping.

Held:
Yes. Forum-shopping originated as a concept in private international law. 12 , where
non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the forum or place wherein to bring
their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to
annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more
friendly venue. To combat these less than honorable excuses, the principle of forum non
conveniens was developed whereby a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum
and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
 Schimdt vs Driscol

Facts:

Driscoll Hotel illegally sold liquaor to Sorrensen in Minnesota, causing the latter to
be drunk so that the automobile driven by him wherein Schmidt was a passenger, turned
over and thus caused injuries to Schmidt in Wisconsin. Schmidt, through his mother and
natural guardian, sued Driscoll Hotel for selling the liquor illegally to Sorrensen.
Defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint. Subsequently, it moved to
dismiss the action on the ground that the pleadings failed to state a claim against the
defendant and that the court lacked jurisdiction. On April 28, 1956, the trial court made
its order granting defendant's motion. In the order granting the same, the trial court
determined that "No penalty by way of collecting damages arose under the Minnesota
law, unless the injury was inflicted in the state. It is defendant's position that the action is
governed by the law of torts and that, since the last act in the series of events for which
plaintiff instituted his action occurred in Wisconsin, which has no Civil Damage Act
similar to § 340.95,[1] the latter can have no application in determining plaintiff's rights
or defendant's liability. In support thereof defendant cites Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
§ 377, which states:"The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."And § 378, which states: "The law of
the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury."
Issue: WON Schmidt could recover from the Corporation for its illegal act done in
Minnesota when the injuries incurred by him happened in Wisconsin?

Held:

Yes. The principles in Restatement, Conflict of Laws, S377 and S378, should not be
held applicable to fact situations such as the present to bring about the result described
and that a determination to the opposite effect would be more in conformity with
principles of equity and justice. Here all parties involved were residents of Minnesota.
Defendant was licensed under its laws and required to operate its establishment in
compliance therewith. Its violation of the Minnesota statutes occurred here, and its
wrongful conduct was complete within Minnesota when, as a result thereof, Sorrenson
became intoxicated before leaving its establishment. The consequential harm to plaintiff,
a Minnesota citizen, accordingly should be compensated for under M.S.A. 340.95, which
furnishes him a remedy against defendant for its wrongful acts. By this construction, no
greater burden is placed upon defendant than was intended by S340.95.