PSI vs Agana

FACTS:

On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital
(Medical City Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil, petitioner in G.R.
No. 127590, diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."

On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff 4 of the Medical City Hospital,
performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in
her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain
portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique
Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform
hysterectomy on her.

After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the
operation and closed the incision.

However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the corresponding Record of Operation

dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered these remarks:

"sponge count lacking 2

"announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure."

On April 24, 1984, Natividad was released from the hospital. Her hospital and medical
bills, including the doctors’ fees, amounted to P60,000.00.

After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She
consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the
natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an
oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation.

On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to
seek further treatment. After four months of consultations and laboratory examinations,
Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to the
Philippines.

On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains.
Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina.
Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to
extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that
the pains would soon vanish.

Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified, prompting
Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr.
Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-
smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A
recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete
through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus,
in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery.

On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Branch 96,
Quezon City a complaint for damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner
of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
43322. They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of
gauze inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.

Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as Administrative Case No. 1690. The PRC Board of
Medicine heard the case only with respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire
jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States.

On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad died and was
duly substituted by her above-named children (the Aganas).

On March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI,
Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice

CA: WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the case against defendant-appellant
Dr. Juan Fuentes is hereby DISMISSED,

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving Dr. Fuentes of any Liability
based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.

Held:

NO. Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." It is the rule that the
fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit
an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie
case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. 13 Stated
differently, where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, is
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not have
occurred if he, having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care, and the
burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and
diligence.14

From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which
caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant; (3) the
occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if
those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of
explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the
"control and management of the thing which caused the injury."15

We find the element of "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to
be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.

It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of
Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when
he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary.
Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr.
Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes
to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was
about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of
gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were
not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period,
Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital.

REYES VS SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL

Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. The other petitioners,
namely, Rose Nahdja, Johnny, Lloyd, and Kristine, all surnamed Reyes, were their
children. Five days before his death on January 8, 1987, Jorge had been suffering from a
recurring fever with chills. After he failed to get relief from some home medication he
was taking, which consisted of analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics, he decided to see
the doctor.

On January 8, 1987, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his wife. He was
attended to by respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico, resident physician and admitting physician on
duty, who gave Jorge a physical examination and took his medical history. She noted that
at the time of his admission, Jorge was conscious, ambulatory, oriented, coherent, and
with respiratory distress.2 Typhoid fever was then prevalent in the locality, as the clinic
had been getting from 15 to 20 cases of typhoid per month. 3 Suspecting that Jorge could
be suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered a Widal Test, a standard test for typhoid
fever, to be performed on Jorge. Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool examination, and
malarial smear were also made.4 After about an hour, the medical technician submitted
the results of the test from which Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive for typhoid
fever. As her shift was only up to 5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed Jorge to respondent Dr.
Marvie Blanes.

Dr. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the evening. She also took Jorge’s
history and gave him a physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her impression was that
Jorge had typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the accepted treatment for typhoid fever, she
ordered that a compatibility test with the antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. Said
test was administered by nurse Josephine Pagente who also gave the patient a dose of
triglobe. As she did not observe any adverse reaction by the patient to chloromycetin, Dr.
Blanes ordered the first five hundred milligrams of said antibiotic to be administered on
Jorge at around 9:00 p.m. A second dose was administered on Jorge about three hours
later just before midnight.

At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was called as Jorge’s temperature rose
to 41°C. The patient also experienced chills and exhibited respiratory distress, nausea,
vomiting, and convulsions. Dr. Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction machine,
and administered hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patient’s convulsions. When he
regained consciousness, the patient was asked by Dr. Blanes whether he had a previous
heart ailment or had suffered from chest pains in the past. Jorge replied he did not. 5 After
about 15 minutes, however, Jorge again started to vomit, showed restlessness, and his
convulsions returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency measures taken before and, in
addition, valium was administered. Jorge, however, did not respond to the treatment and
slipped into cyanosis, a bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane
due to deficient oxygenation of the blood. At around 2:00 a.m., Jorge died. He was forty
years old. The cause of his death was "Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia
and typhoid fever."

On June 3, 1987, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a
complaint6 for damages against respondents Sisters of Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr.
Marvie Blanes, Dr. Marlyn Rico, and nurse Josephine Pagente. On September 24, 1987,
petitioners amended their complaint to implead respondent Mercy Community Clinic as
additional defendant and to drop the name of Josephine Pagente as defendant since she
was no longer connected with respondent hospital. Their principal contention was that
Jorge did not die of typhoid fever.7 Instead, his death was due to the wrongful
administration of chloromycetin. They contended that had respondent doctors exercised
due care and diligence, they would not have recommended and rushed the performance of
the Widal Test, hastily concluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and
administered chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient tests on the patient’s
compatibility with said drug.

the trial court rendered its decision absolving respondents from the charges of negligence
and dismissing petitioners’ action for damages. The trial court likewise dismissed
respondents’ counterclaim, holding that, in seeking damages from respondents,
petitioners were impelled by the honest belief that Jorge’s death was due to the latter’s
negligence.

Petitioners brought the matter to the Court of Appeals. On July 31, 1997, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS NOT
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

HELD:

Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately apparent to a
layman so as to justify application of res ipsa loquitur. The question required expert
opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of the standard of care required by the
circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of the correctness of her diagnosis, no
presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.As held in Ramos:

. . . . Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a
rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is
generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care
were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A
distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of
something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered
followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be
conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any
particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not
produce the desired result.......

Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove
that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff, the
need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the
proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert
testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and
not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified
to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and
experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated
upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements
and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which
are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where
the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the
court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have
occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be
drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical
evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why
it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under
the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical
testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitor is allowed because
there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can
obtain redress for injury suffered by him.

Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations:
leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained
on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of
the wrong part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a
patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while
the patient was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for
appendicitis, among others.17

Petitioners asserted in the Court of Appeals that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
to the present case because Jorge Reyes was merely experiencing fever and chills for five
days and was fully conscious, coherent, and ambulant when he went to the hospital. Yet,
he died after only ten hours from the time of his admission.

This contention was rejected by the appellate court.

Petitioners now contend that all requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur were
present, namely: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.18

The contention is without merit. We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In the
Ramos case, the question was whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist, and a hospital
should be made liable for the comatose condition of a patient scheduled for
cholecystectomy.19 In that case, the patient was given anesthesia prior to her operation.
Noting that the patient was neurologically sound at the time of her operation, the Court
applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental brain damage does not normally occur
in a gallblader operation in the absence of negligence of the anesthesiologist. Taking
judicial notice that anesthesia procedures had become so common that even an ordinary
person could tell if it was administered properly, we allowed the testimony of a witness
who was not an expert. In this case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours
after professional medical assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or
extraordinary about his death. Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring
fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics
given him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering from a serious illness and
professional medical help came too late for him.

UNITED STATES VS. JUANILLO

1. United States v. Juanillo, 23 Phil. 212 (1912)

Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Jess Lopez

70 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Facts: Ponciano Leal was killed on the public highway while going from the town of Pavia to
Santa Barbara, Iloilo by being struck by an automobile, of which the Juanillo was the chauffeur.
The prosecution contends that the death of the deceased was due to the reckless driving of the
Juanillo while the defense insists that the unfortunate occurrence was purely an accident.

The prosecution presented 4 witnesses and the defense 6, including the Juanillo. According to
the witnesses for the prosecution (Labrila, Latoja, Agraviado, and son of Leal), Labrila, Leal, and
Latoja were walking along the road toward Santa Barbara that afternoon. Latoja was in the middle
of Labrila (left) and Leal (right). While they were walking and having a conversation, Latoja heard
a noise behind them and turning around he saw an automobile approaching. He called out
immediately that an automobile was coming and jumped to the left, colliding with Labrila and
knocking him into the ditch. Leal on the other hand, was seen lying on the ground, having been
knocked down by the automobile.

The defense introduced the testimony of the members of the party riding in the automobile,
(Becker, Dean, Rimmer, Hardwood, and Miller) and that of the chauffeur. All the witnesses for the
defense testified that the middle of the road was clear at that place and time and that the
deceased, as well as all others, were in perfectly safe places and that the deceased would not
have been killed if he had not at tempted to cross from the right to the left side of the road.

According to Juanillo, he noticed up ahead about 80 or 100 brazas some men walking in the road
and that when he got up to within about 40 or 50 brazas of them he closed off his gasoline and
kept blowing his horn. He also placed his foot on the exhaust so he could make a noise. They
were then going about 10 MPH. When they were within about 2 or 3 brazas of the men, the man
on the right side started to run across the road. He put on his brakes but could not stop right on
the spot. Some part of the automobile hit him. At the time they hit the man they were going about
6 or 8 MPH. They ran about 3 or 4 brazas more when the automobile stopped.

Q. If you could stop going at 8 miles an hour within 2 brazas, why did you run 3 or 4? A. I don't
know, sir; I was going about 8 miles an hour, I should say.

Issue: Whether Juanillo is liable for reckless imprudence.

Held: YES. According to the witnesses for the defense, when they were about 25 feet away from
the natives, the brakes were applied with such force that he and his companions were all thrown
forward, yet the machine still continued running, hitting the deceased under its own momentum
for about 150 or 200 yards.
In view of all the admitted facts and circumstances, and the unreasonableness of the stories told
by the defendantappellant and his witnesses we are fully satisfied that the trial court was justified
in accepting the testimony of Latoja, Labrila, and Agraviado as to how the collision took place.
Neither Latoja nor Labrila heard the blowing of the horn or any other warning until the machine
was so close that Latoja and Labrila barely had time to make their escape, while the deceased,
being on the left, did not have sufficient time.

It has been held, that courts will take judicial notice that an automobile makes an unusual noise;
that it can be driven at a great velocity—at a speed many times greater than that of ordinary
vehicles drawn by animals, and that it is highly dangerous when used on country roads. Its use as
a vehicle for traveling is comparatively recent. It makes an unusual noise. It can be and usually is
made to go on common roads at great velocity — at a speed many times greater than that of
ordinary vehicles hauled by animals; and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on
country roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel on
such roads.

It is generally held that the rights and duties of pedestrians and vehicles are equal. Each may use
the highway, and each must exercise such care and prudence as the circumstances demand.
Owners of automobiles have the same rights in the streets and highways that pedestrians and
drivers of horses have. Automobile drivers or the drivers of animals are not to use the means of
locomotion without regard to the rights of others having occasion to travel on the highway.

While an automobile is a lawful means of conveyance and has equal rights upon the roads with
pedestrians, horses, and carriages, its use cannot be lawfully countenanced unless accompanied
with that degree of prudence in management and consideration for the rights of others which is
consistent with safety. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Negligence is want of care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its application depends
upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably impose. Where the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure
to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.

The operator of an automobile is bound to exercise care in proportion to the varying danger and
risks of the highway and commensurate with the dangers naturally incident to the use of such
vehicle. He is obliged to take notice of the conditions before him, and if it is apparent that by any
particular method of proceeding he is liable to work an injury, it is his duty to adopt some other or
safer method if within reasonable care and prudence he can do so. In determining the degree of
care an operator of an automobile should use, when on the highway, it is proper to take

Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Jess Lopez

71 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

into consideration the place, presence or absence of other travelers, the speed of the automobile,
its size, appearance, manner of movement, and the amount of noise it makes, and anything that
indicates unusual or peculiar danger.

The quantum of care required is to be estimated by the exigencies of the particular situation; that
is, by the place, presence or absence of other vehicles and travelers; Also, the degree of care
required to be exercised varies with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself.
Thus, it has been held not to be negligence per se in a boy of 6 to play on the highway, where an
auto mobile came up on him under circumstances which produced fright and terror, and thus
caused an error of judgment by which the boy ran in front of the automobile.

The testimony of all the parties in the case at bar as to the surrounding conditions of this
occurrence was to the effect that the road on which they were traveling was dotted with simple
rural folk. In his brief, counsel for the Juanillo says: ―Two native farmers who all their lives have
seen nothing that moves faster than a bull cart, except on the two or three occasions on which
they testify they have visited Iloilo, cannot be expected to give an intelligent idea of speed of an
automobile, train, or even a fast horse.‖

Under such conditions Juanillo being in charge of the powerful machine, capable of doing great
damage if not skillfully manipulated, was bound to use a high degree of care to avoid injuring
these native farmers, who had a common right to the highway. A driver of an automobile, under
such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the
reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and further- more, it is absolutely under
the power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some
extent aid in averting an accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to
accommodate persons riding, driving, or walking.

It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person get out of
the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted and an
accident occurs, that the automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An
automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver
would have exercised under the circumstances. Juanillo was aware of and is chargeable with the
knowledge that the deceased and his companions were simple country people and were lacking
in the capacity to appreciate and to guard against the dangers of an automobile driven at a high
rate of speed, and he was bound to enlarge to a commensurate extent the degree of vigilance
and care necessary to avoid injuries which the use of his machine made more imminent.

The negligence of Juanillo in the case at bar consisted in his failure to recognize the great injury
that would accrue to the deceased from the collision. He had no right, it seems to us, after he saw
the deceased and his companions walking in the road ahead of him to continue at so great a
speed, at the eminent hazard of colliding with the deceased. Great care was due from him by
reason of the deadliness of the machine he was propelling along the highway. When one comes
through the highways with a machine of such power as an automobile, it is incumbent upon the
driver to use great care not to drive against or over pedestrians. An automobile is much more
dangerous than a street car or even a railway car. These are propelled along fixed rails and all the
traveling public has to do to be safe is to keep off the track. But the automobile can be turned as
easily as an individual, and for this reason is far more dangerous to the traveling public than
either the street car or the railway train.

CHAPMAN VS UNDERWOOD

Chapman v. Underwood, G.R. No. 9010, March 28, 1914 Facts: At the time the accident
occurred, there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran, with occasional
switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other. One of these switches was located at the
scene of the accident. Chapman had been visiting his friend, Creveling, in front of whose house
the accident happened.

He desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila.
Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly,
passed from the gate into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car
was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear platform.

Chapman attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reach it without extra
exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come
abreast of him in order to board. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by
the Underwood‘s automobile.

Underwood entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur. A
street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana being immediately in front of him, he followed along
behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the accident, the street car which he was following
took the switch — that is, went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the
main track. Thereupon the Underwood no longer followed that street car nor went to the left, but
either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the
Chapman intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in
which Underwood was going.

When the front of the "San Marcelino" car, the one the Chapman attempted to board, was almost
in front of Underwood‘s automobile, his driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over
the Chapman, as above described.

Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Jess Lopez

72 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Issue: Whether Underwood, as owner of the car, is liable.

Held: NO. Underwood‘s driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the Chapman.
He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. Chapman, in coming out to board the car,
was not obliged, for his own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his
left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to
the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side
of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones
under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.

Underwood, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts and
circumstances of this case.

As we have said in the case of Johnson vs. David, the driver does not fall within the list of
persons in article 1903 of the CC for whose acts the defendant would be responsible.

Although in David the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts
were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the
negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom.

An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself
responsible for such acts.

The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a
speed of 60 MPH, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to
do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the
acts of his chauffeur.

On the other hand, if the driver, by a SUDDEN act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor.

The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time
that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own. It does not appear from the
record that, from the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the
injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his
driver. The interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of
the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the
driver.

Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a competent driver, would be responsible,
whether present or not, for the negligent acts of his driver when the automobile was a part of a
business enterprise, and was being driven at the time of the accident in furtherance of the
owner's business, we do not now decide

CAEDO VS YU KHE THAI

Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24,
1958 along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San LorenzoVillage bound for the
airport. Several members of his family were in the car. Coming from the opposite
direction was the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael
Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a moderate speed with their headlights on.
Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. Defendant’s driver did not notice it until he was
about eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down behind the caretela defendant’s
driver veered to the left with the intention of passing by the caretela but in doing so its
rear bumper caught the ream of thecaretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car
skidded obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision by
veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the plaintiff and
members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the driver
and owner of the Cadillac car. There was no question that defendant’s drsiver was
negligent and liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in the car, was
solidarily liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.

HELD:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he
had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice
within the next preceding two months.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the
owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented
the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as
law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs. Underwood
(1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:

... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the
driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner
who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom,
becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits
his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour,
without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so,
becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by
the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of
negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act
or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not
 responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by
his acquiescence, makes his driver act his own.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant,
if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe
Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware
Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation
of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be
imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the
immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the
driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also
sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The
car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and
open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to
be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his
driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve
meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he
was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not
have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite
of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time
element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he
said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous
and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of
that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.

SERRA VS MUMAR

FACTS:

At around 6:30 in the evening of 3 April 2000, there was a vehicular accident along the
National Highway in Barangay Apopong, General Santos City, which resulted in the
death of Armando Mumar (Mumar), husband of respondent Nelfa T. Mumar
(respondent).

Based on the evidence presented before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General
Santos City, one Armando Tenerife (Tenerife) was driving his Toyota Corolla sedan on
the National Highway heading in the direction of Polomolok, South Cotabato. Tenerife
noticed the van owned by petitioner Paulita "Edith" Serra (petitioner) coming from the
opposite direction, which was trying to overtake a passenger jeep, and in the process
encroached on his lane. The left side of the sedan was hit by the van, causing the sedan to
swerve to the left and end up on the other side of the road. The van collided head on with
the motorcycle, which was about 12 meters behind the sedan on the outer lane, causing
injuries to Mumar, which eventually led to his death.

Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for Damages by Reason of

Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide and Attachment before the General Santos
City RTC.

the General Santos City RTC promulgated a judgment, 4 the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against defendant Paulita Sierra

In its 31 July 2009 Decision, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed with modification
the RTC’s ruling

ISSUE:

Whether or not both the lower court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
in holding Editha Serra as liable for damages and in not appreciating that she was not
negligent in the selection and supervision of the driver of the van, Marciano de Castro

HELD:

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by
their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Whenever an employee’s
negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that
the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection or supervision of its employees.22 The liability of the employer is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of insolvency of such employee.23

Moreover, under Article 2184 of the Civil Code, 24 if the causative factor was the driver’s
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could
have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.

Petitioner failed to show that she exercised the level of diligence required in supervising
her driver in order to prevent the accident. She admitted that de Castro had only been her
driver for one year and she had no knowledge of his driving experience or record of
previous accidents. She also admitted that it was de Castro who maintained the vehicle
and would even remind her "to pay the installment of the car."25

Petitioner also admitted that, at the time of the accident, she did not know what was
happening and only knew they bumped into another vehicle when the driver shouted. She
then closed her eyes and a moment later felt something heavy fall on the roof of the car.
When the vehicle stopped, petitioner left the scene purportedly to ask help from her
brother, leaving the other passengers to come to the aid of her injured driver.

MALLARI VS CA

FACTS:

On 14 October 1987, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, the passenger jeepney driven
by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr.
collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin Publishing Corp. (BULLETIN, for
brevity) along the National Highway in Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Petitioner Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a
Fiera which had stopped on the right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van
of respondent BULLETIN coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix
Angeles. The sketch of the accident showed that the collision occurred after Mallari Jr.
overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The points of collision were
the and the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery
van of BULLETIN. The two (2) right wheels of the delivery van were on the right
shoulder of the road and pieces of debris from the accident were found scattered along the
shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger jeepney.
The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries
to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of
his injuries.1âwphi1.nêt

On 16 December 1987 Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint
for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City against Alfredo Mallari Sr.
and Alfredo Mallari Jr., and also against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and the
N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company.

The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Felix
Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery van.

On appeal the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court and found no
negligence on the part of Angeles and consequently of his employer, respondent
BULLETIN. Instead, the appellate court ruled that the collision was caused by the sole
negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr.

ISSUE:

WON MALLARI IS LIABLE

HELD:

YES. In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the
BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider
the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly
occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve in the
highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel
Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger
jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a
lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil
Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic
regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory
evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

PCI LEASING VS. UCPB

FACTS:

On October 19, 1990 at about 10:30 p.m., a Mitsubishi Lancer car with Plate Number
PHD-206 owned by United Coconut Planters Bank was traversing the Laurel Highway,
Barangay Balintawak, Lipa City. The car was insured with plantiff-appellee [UCPB
General Insurance Inc.], then driven by Flaviano Isaac with Conrado Geronimo, the Asst.
Manager of said bank, was hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck with
Plate No. PJE-737 and Trailer Plate No. NVM-133, owned by defendants-appellants PCI
Leasing & Finance, Inc. allegedly leased to and operated by defendant-appellant Superior
Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its employee, defendant appellant
Renato Gonzaga.

The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in an explosion
of the rear part of the car. The driver and passenger suffered physical injuries. However,
the driver defendant-appellant Gonzaga continued on its [sic] way to its [sic] destination
and did not bother to bring his victims to the hospital.

Plaintiff-appellee paid the assured UCPB the amount of P244,500.00 representing the
insurance coverage of the damaged car.

As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing, repeated demands
were made by plaintiff-appellee for the payment of the aforesaid amounts. However, no
payment was made. Thus, plaintiff-appellee filed the instant case on March 13, 1991.

the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 15, 1999, 7 the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

plaintiff UCPB

the CA affirmed the RTC's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in a quasi-delict

may be held liable, jointly and severally, with the driver thereof, for the damages caused
to third parties.

HELD:

For damage or injuries arising out of negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner may be held civilly liable with the negligent driver either 1)
subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks relief based on a delict or crime under Articles
100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code; or 2) solidarily, if the complainant seeks relief
based on a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. It is the option of
the plaintiff whether to waive completely the filing of the civil action, or institute it with
the criminal action, or file it separately or independently of a criminal action; 15 his only
limitation is that he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.16

In case a separate civil action is filed, the long-standing principle is that the registered
owner of a motor vehicle is primarily and directly responsible for the consequences of its
operation, including the negligence of the driver, with respect to the public and all third
persons.17 In contemplation of law, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the
employer of its driver, with the actual operator and employer, such as a lessee, being
considered as merely the owner's agent.18 This being the case, even if a sale has been
executed before a tortious incident, the sale, if unregistered, has no effect as to the right
of the public and third persons to recover from the registered owner. 19 The public has the
right to conclusively presume that the registered owner is the real owner, and may sue
accordingly.

ANONUEVO VS CA

FACTS:

the accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at
the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city).
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing
the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was
owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan.
Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the
collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated
his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.

On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and
Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC

the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo, ordering them to
pay Villagracia. the Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
ISSUE:

whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized
vehicles.

HELD:

Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register
his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil
Code applies by analogy. The provision reads:

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic
regulation.

The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction with the adoption in
1950 of the New Civil Code. 22 Its applicability is expressly qualified to motor vehicles
only, and there is no ground to presume that the law intended a broader coverage.

The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached
responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated
to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed
the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code would
have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter,
pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities
attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there
has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles,
arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard.
Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other
types of vehicles.

Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized
vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the
distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt Añonuevo’s thesis would unwisely obviate this
distinction.

MARINDUQUE VS WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION

FACTS:

Mamador is an employee of MIMA. On Aug. 23, 1951, he boarded a haulage truck owned by
MIMA with other employees and driven by Macunat. On its way to their place of work, while trying
to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree. As a result,
Mamador died.
Macunat was convicted but could not pay the indemnity to Mamador heirs. For this reason, upon
the heirs‘ claims before the Workmen‘s Compensation Commissioner, it ordered MIMA to pay
referee‘s award of compensation to said heirs.

Thus, MIMA questions the order of the Commissioner on the grounds that 1) MIMA was not given
opportunity to crossexamine; 2) Since Macunat was convicted and made to pay indemnity, a
claim is barred based on the Workmen‘s Compensation law; and 3) Mamador was notoriously
negligent for violating the employer‘s prohibition against laborers riding haulage trucks.

Issue: Whether MIMA should pay said referee‘s award to the Macunat heirs.

HELD:

YES. The law permits the Commissioner to take testimony without notice provided that ex parte
evidence is reduced in writing and the adverse party is afforded the opportunity to rebut. Also, the
criminal case was not a suit for damages against a third person which would bar the claimant
from claiming under the Workmen‘s Compensation Law.

For the last part, there is no doubt that mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is
not negligence because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. Also, violation of a rule
promulgated by the Commission or board is not negligence per se but it may be evidence of
negligence.

This prohibition by MIMA could not be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or
board. And the Commissioner correctly considered this violation as possible evidence of
negligence; but it declared that under the circumstances, the laborer could not be declared to
have acted with negligence.

Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not "notorious" negligence, which
we have interpreted to mean the same thing as "gross" negligence implying "conscious
indifference to consequences" "pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably
result in injury" "utter disregard of consequences." Getting or accepting a free ride on the
company's haulage truck couldn't be gross negligence, because as the referee found, "no danger
or risk was apparent."

Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be
optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer,
under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance
with this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the
same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such person
what he paid:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Provided, That in case the employer recovers
from such third person damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act, such
excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any other person entitled thereto,
after deduction of the expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings. The sum
paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to which the
employee or his dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any
damage suit or action.”
It is the Petitioner’s contention that Criminal Case No. 1491 and its outcome constituted
an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person, such election having the
effect of releasing the employer. However, Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a suit for
damages against the third person, it being alleged, without contradiction that the heirs did
not intervene therein and have not so far received the indemnity ordered by the court. At
any rate, we have already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti Co. 1 that the indemnity granted
the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the “other person” does not affect the liability of the
employer to pay compensation.

FF CRUZ AND CO, INC. V. CA

The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to
the residence of private respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private respondent
Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a
firewall be constructed between the shop and private respondents' residence. The request
was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the early morning of September
6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop
premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to private
respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The cause of
the conflagration was never discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation found
specimens from the burned structures negative for the presence of inflammable
substances.
private respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner. The Court of First
Instance held for private respondents. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a decision
promulgated on November 19, 1979, affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced
the award of damages. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a
firewall between its shop and the residence of private respondents as required by a city
ordinance; that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that
gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes
smoked inside the shop
ISSUE: IS PETITIONER LIABLE?

HELD:

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a
firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of
negligence.

Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses
were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely,
their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from
leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and
beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would
predictably crumble and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendant's
negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also
 with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses. [Africa v. Caltex
(Phil.), Inc., supra; Emphasis supplied.]

In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since
it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents'
residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to
comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as
an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA
181.]

The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than adequate basis to find petitioner liable for
the loss sustained by private respondents.