1.
ADDITION HILLS VS MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES not determine a controversy involving a question which is within
Facts:
MEGAWORLD was the registered owner of a parcel of
land located along Lee Street, Barangay Addition Hills,
Mandaluyong City. It conceptualized the construction of a
residential condominium complex on the said parcel of
land called the Wack-Wack Heights Condominium
consisting of a cluster of six (6) four-storey buildings and
one (1) seventeen (17) storey tower. MEGAWORLD
thereafter secured the necessary clearances, licenses
and permits for the condominium project
Thereafter, construction of the condominium project
began, but on June 30, 1995, the plaintiff-appellee
AHMCSO filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, to annul the Building Permit, CLV,
ECC and Development Permit granted to
MEGAWORLD; to prohibit the issuance to
MEGAWORLD of Certificate of Registration and License
to Sell Condominium Units; and to permanently enjoin
local and national building officials from issuing licenses
and permits to MEGAWORLD.
MEGAWORLD filed a Motion to Dismiss the case for lack
of cause of action and that jurisdiction over the case was
with the public respondent HLURB and not with the
regular courts.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the
CA reversed the trial court decision. Hence, the petitioner
filed the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies
Held:
Yes. CA Decision Affirmed.
Political Law- doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies; doctrine of primary jurisdiction
The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails
lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice
to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed.
In the case of Republic v. Lacap, the SC held that before a party
may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all
the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues
which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not
be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without
first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of
the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will
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the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution
of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact.
What is apparent, however, is that petitioner unjustifiably failed to
exhaust the administrative remedies available with the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before seeking recourse
with the trial court. Under the rules of the HLURB which were then
in effect.
2. SUNSHINE TRANSPO INC., VS NLRC
Facts:
On 24 August 1989, petitioner Sunshine Transportation, Inc. hired
private respondent Realucio R. Santos (hereinafter Santos) as a
bus driver on a probationary basis. After six months, the former
then extended the latter a regular appointment as Bus Driver Class
C on 16 March 1990.3
On 7 January 1992, Santos received a memorandum4 dated 4
January 1992 from the petitioner directing him to submit a written
explanation within 48 hours as to why he failed to report for his trip
scheduled on 28 December 1991. However, Santos claimed that
on 2 January 1992, he applied for a leave of absence with the
petitioners Operations Manager Danilo Alvarado; but Alvarado tore
the leave application, verbally terminated his services, and even
forced him off the premises. Santos then opted to mail his
application for leave, also on 2 January 1992.
Subsequently, Santos received a letter of termination dated 22
January 19926 premised on the grounds that: (1) he committed
insubordination to a lawful order of his superior by failing to submit
the required written explanation; and (2) such failure amounted to
an admission of his guilt. Nonetheless, he kept reporting for work,
but was not allowed entry into the companys premises, prompting
him to believe that he had been either suspended or dismissed.
On 21 December 1992, Santos filed with the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for (a) illegal suspension, (b) illegal dismissal, (c) illegal
deduction of Bicol trip allowance, (d) non-payment of salaries,
overtime pay, premiums for holidays, rest day and night shift,
allowances, and separation pay.8 He also prayed for reinstatement
with back wages and moral damages.
On its part, the petitioner emphasized that prior to Santos misdeed
of 28 December 1991, he had committed the violations of company
rules.
Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio dismissed the complaint upon a
finding that Santos was dismissed for cause with due process and
that he was not entitled to his money claims.
Santos appealed to the NLRC and, in its decision11 of 21
April1994, the NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiters finding, but granted
Santos money claims in the amount of P158,000.00, as the
petitioner failed to refute the complainants claim that he was
underpaid.
Unsatisfied with the NLRC decision, the petitioner filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari charging the NLRC with having
acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision.
More concretely, it imputes to the NLRC the commission of the
following errors: (1) in not dismissing the patently defective appeal
of Santos due to his failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements for perfecting an appeal; (2) in modifying the Labor
Arbiters decision by granting the private respondents money claim
without any factual nor legal basis; (3) in ruling that the private
respondents money claims for the year 1989 have not yet
prescribed; and (4) in failing to give consideration to the
waiver/quitclaim executed by the private respondent on 20 October
1992 discharging the petitioner from any obligation arising from his
(private respondents) claim for overtime pay.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing by petitioner of a civil action for certiorari
is correct?
Held:
It is now settled in our jurisdiction that while it is true that the only
way by which a labor case may reach this Court is through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must,
however, be shown that the NLRC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and that there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, which allows an aggrieved party to file a
motion for reconsideration of any order, resolution, or decision of
the NLRC, constitutes a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
which the said party may avail of. Accordingly, and in the light of
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,14 a motion
for reconsideration must first be filed before the special civil action
for certiorari may be availed of.15
In the case at bench, the records do not show and neither does the
petitioner make a claim that it filed a motion for the reconsideration
of the challenged decision before it came to us through this action.
It has not, as well, suggested any plausible reason for direct
recourse to this Court against the decision in question.
3. SAMELCO II VS SELUDO
Facts:
Private respondent, Ananias D. Seludo, Jr., a member of the Board
of Directors (BOD)of the petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (SAMELCO II) , an electric cooperative providing electric
service to all members and consumers in all municipalities within
the Second Congressional District of the Province of Samar filed
an urgent Petition in the Regional Trial Court in (RTC) In Calbiga,
Samar for prohibition against the petitioner SAMELCO II for
passing the resolution No. 5 Series of 2005 which disallowed him
to attend succeeding meetings of the BOD effective February 2005
until the end of his term as director. The same resolution also
disqualified him for one (1) term to run as a candidate for director
in the upcoming districtelections. In his petition, private respondent
prayed for the nullification of the Resolution No. 5 Series of 2005,
contending that it was issued without any legal and factual bases.
In their answer to the petition for prohibition, individual petitioners
raised the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over
the subject matter of the case. Individual petitioners assertthat,
since the matter involved an electric cooperative, SAMELCO Il,
primary jurisdiction is vested on the National Electrification
Administration (NEA).
Issue:
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Whether or not the NEA has primary jurisdiction over the question
of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II?
Held:
The NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control,
has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the
subject resolution.
Section 10, Chapter II of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 5 of
P.D. No. 1645, provides:
Section 5. Section 10, Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. − In the exercise
of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives
and other borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the NEA is
empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations and motuproprio
or upon petition of third parties, to conduct investigations,
referenda and other similar actions in all matters affecting said
electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or
controlled entities.
If the electric cooperative concerned or other similar entity fails
after due notice to comply with NEA orders, rules and regulations
and/or decisions, or with any of the terms of the Loan Agreement,
the NEA Board of Administrators may avail of any or all of the
following remedies:
(e) Take preventive and/or disciplinary measures including
suspension and/or removal and replacement of any or all of the
members of the Board of Directors, officers or employees of the
Cooperative, other borrower institutions or supervised or controlled
entities as the NEA Board of Administrators may deem fit and
necessary and to take any other remedial measures as the law or
the Loan Agreement may provide.
In addition, Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of P.D. No. 269,
as amended by Section 7 of P.D. No. 1645, states:
Section 7. Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of Presidential
Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 24. Board of Directors. − (a) The Management of a
Cooperative shall be vested in its Board, subject to the supervision
and control of NEA which shall have the right to be represented
and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations and to
approve all policies and resolutions.
The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling
of vacancies, the procedures for holding meetings and other similar
provisions shall be defined in the by-laws of the Cooperative
subject to NEA policies, rules and regulations.
A comparison of the original provisions of Sections 10 and 24 of
P.D. No. 269 and the amendatory provisions under Sections 5 and
7 of P.D. No. 1645 would readily show that the intention of the
framers of the amendatory law is to broaden the powers of the
NEA.
A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No. 269,
P.D. No. 1645 expressly provides for the authority of the NEA to
exercise supervision and control over electric cooperatives. In
administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties.[5] If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.[6] Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.[7]
Section 38 (1), Chapter 7, Book 4 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 provides,
thus:
Supervision and control shall include the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs
It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable
in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative agency.[9] In such a case, the court in which the
claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss
the case without prejudice.[10]
Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court, in a long line of
cases,[11] has held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself
of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be
exhausted first before the courts power of judicial review can be
sought.[12] The premature resort to the court is fatal to ones cause
of action.[13] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel,
the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.[14]
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons.[15] The availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies.[16] Furthermore, the courts of justice,
for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and
dispose of the case.[17]
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may
cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted
acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong
public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.[18]
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Respondent, however, failed to show that the instant case falls
under any of the above-enumerated exceptions. While respondent
alleged in his Urgent Petition for Prohibition that the subject
resolution was issued with grave abuse of discretion and in
violation of his right to due process, mere allegation of arbitrariness
will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that has been
specifically granted by law to special government agencies.[19]
Moreover, the issues raised in the petition for prohibition,
particularly the issue of whether or not there are valid grounds to
disallow respondent from attending SAMELCO's Board meetings
and to disqualify him from running for re-election as a director of
the said Board, are not purely legal questions. Instead, they involve
a determination of factual matters which fall within the competence
of the NEA to ascertain.
Finally, the Court agrees with petitioners' contention that the
availability of an administrative remedy via a complaint filed before
the NEA precludes respondent from filing a petition for prohibition
before the court. It is settled that one of the requisites for a writ of
prohibition to issue is that there is no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20] In order that prohibition
will lie, the petitioner must first exhaust all administrative remedies.
[21] Thus, respondent's failure to file a complaint before the NEA
prevents him from filing a petition for prohibition before the RTC.
4. WINSTON GARCIA VS MOLINA
Facts:
For review is the decision promulgated on April 29, 2004, whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) nullified the Memorandum dated
September 8, 2003 by which the petitioner, in his capacity as the
President of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
had charged the respondent, an Attorney V in the Litigation
Department of the Legal Service Group of the GSIS, with grave
misconduct and preventively suspended him for 60 days.
In his affidavit, Elino F. Caretero pointed to the respondent as the
person who had handed to him on August 26, 2003 the letter
entitled Is It True supposedly written by one R. Ibasco containing
"scurrilous and libellous statements" against petitioner. Considering
that Ibasco denied authorship of the letter, the finger of suspicion
came to point at the respondent, who was consequently
administratively investigated for grave misconduct. After the
investigation, the Investigation Unit transmitted its Memorandum
dated September 1, 2003 to the respondent to require him to
explain the circulation and publication of the letter, and to show
cause why no administrative sanction should be imposed on him
for doing so. In response, he denied the imputed act.
Thereafter, the petitioner issued Memorandum dated September 8,
2003 to formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct,
and to preventively suspend him for 60 days effective upon receipt.
The respondent sought the dismissal of the charge on the ground
of its being baseless; and requested the conduct of a formal
investigation by an impartial body. The respondent also instituted in
the CA a special civil action for certiorari to challenge the legality of
the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.
On April 29, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed decision
annulling the petitioner's Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner argues that it was in his power as the President and
General Manager of the GSIS to impose disciplinary action on the
respondent, pursuant to Section 47 of the Administrative Code of
1987; that the characterization of the respondent's act as grave
misconduct was not arbitrary because the latter had intentionally
passed on or caused the circulation of the malicious letter, thereby
transgressing "some established and definite rule of action" that
sufficiently established a prima facie case for an administrative
charge; that the respondent had thereby violated his solemn duty
to defend and assist the petitioner in disregard of his "legal, moral
or social duty" to stop or at discourage the publication or circulation
of the letter. He submits that the respondent's preventive
suspension was done in accordance with the Civil Service Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases, and upon an evaluation of the
evidence on record.
Issues:
 Whether the petitioner Garcia, in the exercise of his
authority, had sufficient basis to formally charge the
respondent with grave misconduct and impose
preventive suspension as a consequence.
 Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedy (DEAR) is applicable.
Held:
1. To resolve this issue, we need to ascertain if the respondent's
act of handing over the letter to Caretero constituted grave
misconduct. The CA concluded that the act of the respondent of
handing over the letter to Caretero did not constitute grave
misconduct because the act did not show or indicate the elements
of corruption, or the clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule.
The Court concurs with the CA.
Misconduct in office, by uniform legal definition, is such misconduct
that affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such
only as affects his character as a private individual. To warrant
removal from office, it must have direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of official duties amounting either
to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to
discharge the duties of the office. Moreover, it is “a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” It
becomes grave if it “involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence.”
The record contains nothing to show that the respondent's act
constituted misconduct. The passing of the letter to Caretero did
not equate to any "transgression" or "unlawful behavior," for it was
an innocuous act that did not breach any standard, norm or rule
pertinent to his office. Neither could it be regarded as "circulation"
of the letter inasmuch as the letter was handed only to a single
individual who just happened to be curious about the paper the
respondent was then holding in his hands. The handing of the
letter occurred in ostensibly innocent circumstances on board the
elevator in which other employees or passengers were on board. If
the motive of the respondent was to pass the letter in order to
publicize its contents, he should have made more copies of the
letter. But that was not so, considering that Caretero categorically
affirmed in his affidavit about asking the respondent what he had
wanted to do with the letter, to wit: Do you want me to photocopy
the document Sir?, but the respondent had simply replied: HINDI
NA SA IYO NA LANG YAN. It is plain, then, that intent to cause the
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widespread dissemination of the letter in order to libel the petitioner
could not be justifiably inferred.
To be sure, the respondent's act could not be classified as
pertaining to or having a direct connection to the performance of
his official duties as a litigation lawyer of the GSIS. The connection
was essential to a finding of misconduct, for without the connection
the conduct would not be sanctioned as an administrative offense.
The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently
declared to lack factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render
the preventive suspension without legal basis. The formal charge
against the respondent was for grave misconduct, an
administrative offense that justifies the imposition of the preventive
suspension of the respondent. Gloria has clarified that the
preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is
authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be considered
unjustified even if the charges are ultimately dismissed so as to
justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned.
Considering that the respondent's preventive suspension had legal
basis, he was not entitled to backwages.
2. Anent the petitioner's insistence that the respondent did not
exhaust his administrative remedies, Section 21 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides the
option either of filing a motion for reconsideration against the
preventive suspension order by the disciplining authority, or of
elevating the preventive suspension order by appeal to the Civil
Service Commission within 15 days from the receipt thereof.
We find and hold that the respondent was not strictly bound by the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. His failure to file the
motion for reconsideration did not justify the immediate dismissal of
the petition for certiorari, for we have recognized certain
exceptional circumstances that excused his non-filing of the motion
for reconsideration. Among the exceptional circumstances are the
following, namely: when the issue involved is purely a legal
question.
Considering that the matter brought to the CA - whether the act
complained against justified the filing of the formal charge for grave
misconduct and the imposition of preventive suspension pending
investigation — was a purely legal question due to the factual
antecedents of the case not being in dispute. Hence, the
respondent had no need to exhaust the available administrative
remedy of filing the motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for
review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the assailed decision promulgated
on April 29, 2004 and the resolution promulgated on September 6,
2004 insofar as the Court of Appeals dismissed the formal charge
for grave misconduct against respondent Mario I. Molina, but
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision and the resolution
insofar as they nullified the respondent's preventive suspension
and awarded backwages to him corresponding to the period of his
preventive suspension; and MAKES NO PRONOUNCEMENT on
costs of suit.
5. MAGLALANG VS PAGCOR
G.R. No. 190566 : December 11, 2013
Facts: Mark Maglalang was a teller at the exhaustion of administrative remedies lack
Casino Filipino operated by PAGCOR. In any legal standing
December 2008, he committed an error
counting the money of a lady customer.
Due to tension that arose between the two,
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of
they were invited to the casino’s Internal
administrative remedies, before a party is
Security Office in order to air their
allowed to seek the intervention of the
respective sides. He was required to file an
court, he or she should have availed
Incident Report. By January 2009, he was
himself or herself of all the means of
issued a memo charging him with
administrative processes afforded him or
Discourtesy. He was later on found guilty of
her.
the same and 30-day suspension was
imposed. He filed MR seeking reversal of
Exceptions:
the decision and also Motion for Production
to be furnished with documents relative to 1. when there is a violation of due
the case. Both were denied. He then filed process;
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before 2. when the issue involved is purely a
the CA. He ascribed grave abuse of legal question;
discretion amounting to lack or excess of 3. when the administrative action is
jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in patently illegal amounting to lack or
adjudging him guilty of the charge, in excess of jurisdiction;
failing to observe the proper procedure in 4. when there is estoppel on the part of
the rendition of its decision and in imposing the administrative agency
the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. concerned;
He further explained that he did not appeal 5. when there is irreparable injury;
to the Civil Service Commission because 6. when the respondent is a
the penalty imposed on him was only a 30- department secretary whose acts as
day suspension which is not within the an alter ego of the President bears
CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly the implied and assumed approval of
dismissed the petition for certiorari for the latter;
being premature as petitioner failed to 7. when to require exhaustion of
exhaust administrative remedies before administrative remedies would be
seeking recourse from the CA. unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim;
Issue: WON CA was correct in outrightly 9. when the subject matter is a private
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed land in land case proceedings;
before it on the ground of non-exhaustion 10.when the rule does not provide a
of administrative remedies. plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
and
11.when there are circumstances
Decision: CA’s outright dismissal of the indicating the urgency of judicial
petition for certiorari on the basis of non- intervention, and unreasonable delay
EJGP|ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
 would greatly prejudice the
complainant;
12.where no administrative review
is provided by law;
13.where the rule of qualified political
agency applies and
14.where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been
rendered moot.
The case falls squarely under exception
number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative
cases whereby an employee like petitioner
is covered by Civil Service law, rules and
regulations and penalized with a him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy
suspension for not more than 30 days.
The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in
this case before the CA is a special civil
action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not
an appeal. An appeal and a special civil
action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are
entirely distinct and separate from each
other. One cannot file petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is
available, even if the ground availed of is
grave abuse of discretion. A special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only
when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed
when a party to a case fails to appeal a
judgment despite the availability of that
remedy, as the same should not be a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.
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Supplemental: Prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies
Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of
the Laguna Lake Development Authority v.
SM Prime Holdings, Inc. on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is
instructive, to wit: Under the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies,
before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should
have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded
within the administrative machinery can
still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his or
her jurisdiction, then such remedy should
be exhausted first before the court's judicial
power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is
fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
based on practical and legal reasons. The
availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. Furthermore,
the courts of justice, for reasons of comity
and convenience, will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied
with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and dispose of the case.
Availability of appeal in administrative
disciplinary cases
Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, executory except when the penalty is
otherwise known as the Civil Service removal, in which case the same
Decree of the Philippines,provides for the shall be executory only after
unavailability of any appeal: confirmation by the department
head.
a) The Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative disciplinary
Similar provisions are reiterated in
cases involving the imposition of a
the aforequoted Section 47 of E.O.
penalty of suspension for more than
No. 292 essentially providing that
thirty days , or fine in an amount
cases of this sort are not appealable
exceeding thirty days salary,
to the CSC
demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from
Office. A complaint may be filed
directly with the Commission by a 6. Holy Spirit v. Defensor
private citizen against a government G.R. No. 163980
official or employee in which case it August 3, 2006

may hear and decide the case or it

may deputize any department or
agency or official or group of officials
to conduct the investigation. The
results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to
be imposed or other action to be
taken.
b) The heads of departments, agencies
and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action
against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction. Their decisions
shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more
than thirty days or fine in an amount
not exceeding thirty days salary. In
case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable
to the Commission, the same may be
initially appealed to the department
and finally to the Commission and
pending appeal, the same shall be
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Sec. 5 Art. 7 of the Constitution: On the
powers of Judicial Review of the Supreme
Court with regards to legal standing,
specifically on the legal standing of an
association.
FACTS:
The Petitioner Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc is a
homeowner’s association located at the
West Side of the National Government
Center(NGC). Petitioner filed an instant
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
against NGC in order to prevent
respondents from enforcing the
Implementing Rule and Regulations of RA
9207 also known as the "National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and
Land Utilization Act of 2003." Their Petition
was filed at the Supreme Court. Prior to the
passage of RA 9207, there was already a
number of presidential issuances which
authorized the creation and development of
what is now known as the NGC. That On
May 14,2003, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. That
in accordance with Section 5 of RA9207 the
committee formulated the Implementing
Rules and Regulations which the petitioners
are assailing in their instant petition.

ISSUE/RULING:
1. Whether or not Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc has
locus standi to file the instant
petition.
Yes, The Court held that the Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc has locus
standi to file the case. As an association,
they represent their individual members,
who are residents of the NGC. As such they
stand to be either benefitted or injured by
the enforcement of the IRR. Although under
sec 3.1 (b2) refers only to the NGC east
side, the rest of the assailed provisions,
such as sec 3.1(a4), 3.2(a1) and 3.2(c1)
refers to the disposition of lots in the NGC
west side.
2. Whether the Doctrine of Exhaustion
of Administrative Remedies is
applicable in this case
NO. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power. The assailed IRR was
issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative
power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition
rests mainly on the theory that the assailed
IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on
the ground that it is not germane to the
object and purpose of the statute it seeks
to implement.
3. Whether or not Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc had
filed for an improper remedy in
violation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy
of Courts.
Yes, The Court held that the Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc had file an
improper remedy which will warrant the
dismissal of the instant petition. Due to the
fact that the IRR was done in pursuant to its
quasi-legislative function, since what is
assailed is the validity or constitutionality of
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an IRR issued by an administrative agency.
It must therefore be follow the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts there being no
compelling reasons presented by the
petitioners that can compel the courts to
take cognizance of the case in its first
instance. As such they should have filed the
case in the RTC such failure to do so causes
the instant petition to be dismissed for
violation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts.
7. TASK FORCE SAGIP KALIKASAN VS JUDGE
PADERANGA
Facts:
On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives
from the PNPRMG, DENR, and the Philippine Coast Guard
inspected the container vans of MV General Ricarte Lines, Inc
base on the report that it contained illegal forest products from
Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The team discovered the
undocumented forest products and the names of the shippers and
consignees.
The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of
origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the
forest products, as required by DENR Administrative Order No. 07-
94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest
products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered
them as abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-
Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMC
Container Lines, Inc.
DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices
on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC
Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown owner about
the administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at
the Cebu City CENRO. Hence, nobody appeared during the
adjudication, Rivac, acting as adjudication officer, recommended to
DENR Regional Executive Director Clarence L. Baguilat that the
forest products be confiscated in favor of the government.
In a complaint dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge
Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of
replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen.
Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him. On 29
March 2005, Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin ordering
Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession of the forest
products.
In a motion to quash the writ of replevin, the defendants prayed
that the writ of replevin be set aside. However, Judge Paderanga
denied the motion. The defendants subsequently, filed a motion to
dismiss ad cautelam, they prayed that the complaint for replevin
and damages be dismissed: (1) the real defendant is the Republic
of the Philippines; (2) Edma failed to exhaust administrative
remedies; (3) the State cannot be sued without its consent; and (4)
Edma failed to allege that he is the owner or is entitled to the
possession of the forest products.
July 8, 2005, Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) an affidavit- charging Judge Paderanga with
gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge. Gen.
Dagudag stated that: a) Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to
recover the wood shipment from the DENR since he had not
sought administrative remedies available to him and that the
prudent thing for [Judge Paderanga to have done was to dismiss
the replevin suit outright. b) Judge Paderangas] act[s] of taking
cognizance of the x xx replevin suit, issuing the writ of replevin and
the subsequent denial of the motion to quash clearly demonstrates
[sic] ignorance of the law.
(1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies;
(2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; and (3) used
inappropriate language in court. The OCA recommended that the
case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that Judge
Paderanga be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and for
violation of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary;[16] and that he be fined
P30,000.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction;
Held:
The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of
forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that the
DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the
countrys natural resources.
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, states that possessing forest products
without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A
states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product
illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.In the
instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC
Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents and
were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR
seized the forest products.
Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright
for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,[20] the Court held that:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic.
Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have
first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given
an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if
any, committed in the administrative forum.
In Dy v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that a party must
exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the
courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court held that:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before
a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-
condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of
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action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the
case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any
administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a
complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and
decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are
subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the
DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts
cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through
a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,[23] the Court
held that all actions seeking to recover forest products in the
custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency not the
courts. In Paat,[24] the Court held that:
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of
the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies
should have been the proper course of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently
issuing the writ [of replevin]. Exhaustion of the remedies in the
administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones
recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of
private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid
by the lower court.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural
tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by
the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as
amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by
the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the
enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review
by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the
decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for
certiorari or prohibition. (Emphasis ours)
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot
take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies
of special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for
the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself
stated that members of DENRs Task Force SagipKalikasan took
over the forest products and brought them to the DENR
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This
should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody
of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have
been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed
outright. In Tabao v. Judge Lilagan[25] a case with a similar set of
facts as the instant case the Court held that:
The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x xx [was]
seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also
states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR for
official disposition and appropriate action. x xx To our mind, these
allegations [should] have been sufficient to alert respondent judge
that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that
administrative proceedings may have already been commenced
concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. x xxThe prudent
thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the
replevin suit outright.
In Paat,[26] the Court held that:
[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development and management of forest lands fall within
the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by
judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the
replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys
prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy
the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. (Emphasis ours)
Third, the forest products are already in custodialegis and thus
cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a violation of the
Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in
accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court
held that properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the
subject of replevin:
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the
seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the [properties
seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be
subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law,
and not otherwise. (Emphasis ours)
Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit
and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the
law. In Tabao,[28] the Court held that:
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before administrative of special
competence. x xx [T]he plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to
recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the
administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for
respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit
outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR
secretary or his authorized representatives may order the
confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned.
Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the x xx replevin
suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. x xx [J]udges are
expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
Judges are duty bound to have more than just a cursory
acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic
legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which
no one may be excused, not even a judge. (Emphasis ours)
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due
performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that
judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties.
Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments
and show acquaintance with laws.[29]
The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies is basic. There was no
reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The
forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had
not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should
have dismissed the replevin suit outright. In Espaol v. Toledo-
Mupas,[30] the Court held that:
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Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with
the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the
rules by the judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in
the competence of our courts to render justice. It subjects the
judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of
corruption.
When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so
basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of
his or her duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she holds, or the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in
grave abuse of judicial authority.
8. MARICHU EJERA VS MERTO
Facts:
The petitioner held the position of Agricultural Center Chief I in the
Office of the Provincial Agriculturist in Negros Oriental. Her position
was equivalent to the position of Senior Agriculturist, the next-in-
rank to the position of Supervising Agriculturist. Upon the
retirement of the Supervising Agriculturist, she applied for that
position, but one Daisy Kirit was eventually appointed. She filed a
protest against the appointment of Kirit before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Regional Office in Cebu City,4 but that said
office dismissed her protest. Meanwhile, on September 11, 2000,
respondent Provincial Agriculturist Beau Henry L. Merto issued
Office Order No. 008 (Re: Assignment/Re-assignment of BADC
Area Coordinators and Development Team Members)7 “[i]n the
interest of the service and to provide intensive agricultural
extension services to residents of interior barangays under the
Barangay Agricultural Development Center (BADC) Program in the
province, which is aimed at achieving Food Security and Poverty
Alleviation.” Provincial Governor George P. Arnaiz of Negros
Oriental was furnished a copy of Office Order No. 008.
The petitioner was one of the personnel re-assigned under Office
Order No. 008. She was designated therein as the team leader in
Lake Balanan and Sandulot in the Municipality of Siaton. When
she refused to obey the office order, Merto ordered her on March
12, 2001 to explain in writing within 72 hours why no administrative
disciplinary action should be taken against her. After she did not
submit her explanation, Merto and respondent Atty. Erwin B.
Vergara, the Provincial Legal Officer, summoned her to a
conference. She and her counsel, Atty. Lenin R. Victoriano,
attended the conference, but later on walked out allegedly because
Vergara refused to record her objections to the questions she was
being asked to answer.
Petitioner filed a supplemental complaint stated that Office Order
No. 005, to take effect on July 2, 2001, had not been posted in the
bulletin board of the Office of the Provincial Agriculturist; that she
had not been furnished a copy of the order; that OIC Paltinca had
acted with malice and evident bad faith by his failure to notify her of
the re-assignment, which was “worse than the original re-
assignment” by Merto, as it constituted her “banishment” from her
office in Dumaguete City; that the re-assignment had violated Book
V, Section 12 (2) and (3) of the Administrative Code of 1987
prohibiting re-assignments that were indiscriminately and
whimsically done; that although the appointing and disciplining
authority was the Provincial Governor, who had approved Office
Order No. 005, Paltinca should be impleaded because it was he
who had thereby violated the Administrative Code of 1987; and that
she had refused to obey the two office orders for justifiable
reasons because both were null and void ab initio as far as she
was concerned.20chanrobleslaw
Paltinca moved to dismiss the supplemental complaint on the
ground that the admission of the petitioner that the Provincial
Governor, not he, was her appointing and disciplining authority
exposed her lack of cause of action; that the non-inclusion of the
Provincial Governor as the real party in interest was a fatal error;
and that the failure of the petitioner to exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court was also a ground for the dismissal
of the case.
The petitioner opposed Paltinca’s motion to dismiss, contending
that the Provincial Governor was neither an indispensable nor a
necessary party inasmuch as Office Order No. 005 could be
declared null and void without impleading the Provincial Governor,
who could always intervene if he so desired; that there was no
need for the exhaustion of administrative remedies because the
issue was a purely legal one, i.e., the nullity of the office orders in
question; and that the motion to dismiss was premature because
the trial court had not yet admitted the supplemental complaint
After the RTC deemed the motion to dismiss submitted for
resolution,23 Vergara filed a manifestation informing the RTC of
the dismissal by the CSC Central Office of the petitioner’s appeal
(CSC Resolution No. 011253). Vergara argued that she had
utilized the pendency of the appeal as her legal excuse in
disobeying Office Order No. 008, which her affected co-employees
had dutifully obeyed; and that the dismissal of her appeal removed
any valid reason or legal ground for her to disobey the office orders
that the Provincial Governor had issued “for the good of the service
and to promote our food security.”24chanrobleslaw
The petitioner responded to the manifestation of Vergara, stating
that she had moved for the reconsideration of CSC Resolution No.
011253, and that the outcome of her appeal in the CSC did not
affect the case because the issue involved was the legality of her
re-assignment.
RTC dismissed the case. Not satisfied, the petitioner appealed to
the CA, the CA affirmed the RTC,28 ruling that the legality of Office
Order No. 008 and Office Order No. 005 could not be denied
because they were “intended for public service.” These Office
Orders do not single out plaintiff-appellee for transfer to the interior
localities of the province. They cannot therefore be considered as
her personal banishment as a consequence of the protest she
initiated for the appointment of Kirit.
It pointed out that the petitioner should have appealed her transfer
to the CSC conformably with the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 that mandated an
administrative appeal or remedy before a resort to judicial action
instead of directly resorting to the court action.
Therefore, the trial court, did not err in appreciating the defense of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies raised by defendant-
appelleePaltinca in favor of his co-defendants-appelleesMerto and
Vergara who had been declared in default by the trial court.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied her
motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the case did not constitute an exception to the rule
on the exhaustion of administrative remedies
Held:
No. It is true that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not an ironclad rule, but recognizes exceptions,
specifically: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
EJGP|ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act
is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there
is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrines
may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controversial acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j)
where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.
The exceptions did not cover the petitioner’s case. In her
complaint, she assailed Office Order No. 008 on three basic legal
grounds, namely: (a) the re-assignment, being “whimsical and
indiscriminate,” violated the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and
Other Personnel Actions; (b) Merto had no power to investigate
her, considering that the Provincial Governor was the “proper
disciplining authority;” and (c) whether the letter of Merto requiring
her to explain her refusal to follow Office Order No. 008 should be
under oath. Still, her immediate resort to the RTC remained
premature, because the legal issues she seemingly raised were
admittedly interlaced with factual issues, like whether or not Merto
had issued Office Order No. 008 because of her having attacked
him in her protest against Kirit as the appointee to the position of
Supervising Agriculturist, and whether or not her reassignment
constituted banishment from her office in Dumaguete City. She
further averred that the reassignment had been whimsical and
indiscriminate, an averment that surely called for factual basis. It
ought to be beyond question that the factual issues could only be
settled by a higher policy-determining provincial official like the
Provincial Governor by virtue of his authority, experience and
expertise to deal with the issues. The Provincial Governor should
have been given a very meaningful opportunity to resolve the
matter and to exhaust all opportunities for its resolution before
bringing the action in court.
The rule is that judicial intervention should only be availed of after
all administrative remedies had been exhausted. The Judiciary
must not intervene because Office Order No. 008 and Office Order
No. 005 both concerned the implementation of a provincial
executive policy. According to Dimson (Manila), Inc. v. Local Water
Utilities Administration:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a judicial
recognition of certain matters that are peculiarly within the
competence of the administrative agency to address. It operates as
a shield that prevents the overarching use of judicial power and
thus hinders courts from intervening in matters of policy infused
with administrative character. The Court has always adhered to this
precept, and it has no reason to depart from it now. (Bold emphasis
supplied.)
Moreover, the non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies resulted in the complaint having no cause
of action.47 Hence, the RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the
case.
Fourthly, the non-exhaustion by the petitioner had jurisdictional
implications.
Verily, had the petitioner followed the grievance procedure under
the CSC’s Omnibus Rules, her next step would have been to
elevate her case to the CSC itself,48 the constitutional body
charged with the exclusive jurisdiction not only over disciplinary
actions against government officials and employees but also over
cases involving personnel actions.
In Corsiga v. Judge Defensor, which concerned the reassignment
of an engineer in the National Irrigation Authority, the Court
ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 13 Rule VII of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 (the Adm. Code of 1987) provides how appeal can
be taken from a decision of a department or agency head. It states
that such decision shall be brought to the Merit System Protection
Board (now the CSC En Banc per CSC Resolution No. 93-2387
dated June 29, 1993). It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in
requiring the establishment of a grievance procedure in Rule XII,
Section 6 of the same rules, that decisions of lower level officials
be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service
Commission. Decisions of the Civil Service Commission, in turn,
may be elevated to the Court of Appeals. Under this set up, the trial
court does not have jurisdiction over personnel actions and, thus,
committed an error in taking jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462.
The trial court should have dismissed the case on motion of
petitioner and let private respondent question RMO No. 52 before
the NIA Administrator, and then the Civil Service Commission. As
held in Mantala v. Salvador,cases involving personnel actions,
reassignment included, affecting civil service employees, are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

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