Jurisdiction Fullcases SUPREMECOURT

August 8, 2017. G.R. No. 225442.
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN

(SPARK),** JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO
BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS
REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself
and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR.,
petitioners, vs. QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR
HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by
MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as
represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice not only “to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”—Under the 1987 Constitution,
judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also “to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads: ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. Case law explains that the present Constitution
has “expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then
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* EN BANC.
** Or “Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan”; Rollo, p. 4.
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Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City
was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights
that were legally demandable and enforceable.”
Grave Abuse of Discretion; It has been held that “[t]here is grave abuse of discretion
when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.”—In this
case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils
of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on
the ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions
pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children.
They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts
with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status
offenses. It has been held that “[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.” In light of the foregoing,
petitioners correctly availed of the remedies ofcertiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy
of courts requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.—The doctrine of hierarchy of courts “[r]equires
that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this
jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [CA] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a
direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition[.]”
This Court is tasked to resolve “the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at
the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,” as in this case. Hence,
petitioners’ direct resort to the Court is justified.
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352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Judicial Review; No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Supreme Court (SC) unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the
act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.—“The prevailing rule in
constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance
with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.” In this case,
respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
Same; Expanded Jurisdiction; According to recent jurisprudence, in the Supreme
Court’s (SC’s) exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this
requirement is simplified “by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed governmental act.”—“Basic in the exercise of judicial power —
whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting — is the presence of an actual
case or controversy.” “[A]n actual case or controversy is one which ‘involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.’ In other words, ‘there
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence.’” According to recent jurisprudence, in the
Court’s exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement
is simplified “by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed governmental act.”
Same; A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challeng-
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ing it.—Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained of.
Same; Locus Standi; The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the
determination of whether those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance
to bring the matter to the court for adjudication.—“The question of locus standi or legal
standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the governmental act
have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners]
must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury
as a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act.”
“‘[I]nterest’ in the question involved must be material — an interest that is in issue and will
be affected by the official act — as distinguished from being merely incidental or general.”
“The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has
no standing.”
Same; Same; Curfew Ordinances; Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only
Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor’s
right to travel, because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this
Court, and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels
from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of
apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances.—Among the five (5) individual
petitioners, only
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Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the
minor’s right to travel, because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed
before this Court, and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged,
she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent
danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners
Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark
Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and
therefore, beyond the ordinances’ coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the
Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.
Same; Same; Same; None of them, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew
Ordinances violate the parents’ right to rear their children as they have not shown that they
stand before the Supreme Court (SC) as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional
parental right has been infringed.—None of them has standing to raise the issue of whether
the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents’ right to rear their children as they have not
shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional
parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her
father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for
himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the
Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the
representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal
personality to bring an action in court. Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue,
SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members
who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their
behalf.
Same; Same; Same; When those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue
of transcendental significance to the people, the Supreme Court (SC) may exercise its sound
discretion and take cognizance of the suit.—This Court finds it proper to relax the standing
requirement insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case.
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“In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of
legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who
challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of
the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.” This is a case of
first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under
judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on
the right of parents to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also
requested to determine the extent of the State’s authority to regulate these rights in the
interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the
public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others,
the standing requirement.
Statutes; Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine; Curfew Ordinances; In this case, petitioners’
invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not
properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague
terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or
required so that one may act accordingly.—“A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.” In this case,
petitioners’ invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they
do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of
its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is
prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly. The void for vagueness doctrine
is premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this particular
claim.
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Same; Same; Same; Petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide
the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not
assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but
only point to the ordinances’ lack of enforcement guidelines.—Essentially, petitioners only
bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to
what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to
the ordinances’ lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the
implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left
for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing
unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather,
petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an
ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a
particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision
of law contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably
decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, it was ratiocinated that: A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and
vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual impressions
and personal predilections. As above mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous
standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of
detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any
correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down
under the void for vagueness doctrine.
Same; Same; Same; Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue
the appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances
invalidated.—Any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be
a minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the
Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of identification establishing
their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities
to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect,
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which — needless to state — should be done ethically and judiciously under the
circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the
appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances
invalidated.
Parental Rights and Obligations; The rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the “youth”)
for civic efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as
parental rights, but also as parental duties.—The rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the
“youth”) for civic efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized
not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not
only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally
obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a
reflection of the State’s independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually
grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is
during childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. “[T]he
duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship.” “This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible
citizens.”
Same; In cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public
safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override
the parents’ qualified right to control the upbringing of their children.—While parents have
the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that “when actions concerning
the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the
[S]tate may act to promote these legitimate interests.” Thus, “[i]n cases in which
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace,
order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override
the parents’ qualified right to control the upbringing of their children.” As our
Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to supportparents in the exercise of
these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather,
complementary to parental supervision.
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Same; As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the
moral development of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to
fulfill their parental obligations.—As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right
and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children, and, thus,
assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was
held that “[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may
be important to the child’s chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the
State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who
have the primary responsibility for children’s well-being are entitled to the
support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.” The Curfew
Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children’s well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these
ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety
and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary
right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and
lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal
elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as
minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this time.
Same; Curfew Ordinances; It should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply
only when the minors are not — whether actually or constructively — accompanied by their
parents.—It should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors
are not — whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) — accompanied by
their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State’s deference to the primary
nature of parental authority and the importance of parents’ role in child-rearing. Parents
are effectively given unfettered authority over their children’s conduct during curfew hours
when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of
parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents’ prerogative to allow
minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment during the
curfew hours. In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an overall plan of
disci-
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pline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate
their authority to influence or control their minors’ activities. As such, the Curfew
Ordinances only amount to a minimal — albeit reasonable — infringement upon a parent’s
right to bring up his or her child.
Same; Same; A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children
from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those
children.—It may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence
children to spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with
better opportunities to take a more active role in their children’s upbringing. In Schleifer v.
City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer), the US court observed that the city government “was
entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a
child’s upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children
from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those
children.” Curfews may also aid the “efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend
time on their studies than on the streets.” Reason dictates that these realities observed
in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons
which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
Curfew Ordinances; Overbreadth Doctrine; The application of the overbreadth doctrine
is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.—Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the
Curfew Ordinances based on the minors’ right to travel. They claim that the liberty to
travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict
scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest,
such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are
other less restrictive means for achieving the government’s interest. In addition, they posit
that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours. Petitioner’s submissions are partly meritorious. At
the outset, the Court rejects petitioners’ invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering
that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any
inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern
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Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146
(2010), this Court explained that “the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable
only to free speech cases.”
Same; Same; Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council, 632 SCRA 146 (2010),demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due
process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited
to the realm of freedom of expression.—In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa,
Jr., it was opined that “[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the basis of
overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v.
Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146 (2010), demonstrated how vagueness relates to
violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of
overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression.” That being said,
this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being
no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to
examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
Constitutional Law; Right to Travel; The right to travel is essential as it enables
individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free
expression, assembly, association, and religion.—Jurisprudence provides that this right
refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty. Liberty — a
birthright of every person — includes the power of locomotion and the right of citizens to be
free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where
they can best pursue the ends of life. The right to travel is essential as it enables
individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free
expression, assembly, association, and religion.
Same; Same; The restriction on the minor’s movement and activities within the confines
of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to
reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and
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criminal activities.—Grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify
restrictions even if made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move
from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the
1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this
right, provided, that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health; and (2) are provided by law. The stated purposes of the Curfew
Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime,
inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor’s movement and
activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the
curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or
getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that
the limitation “be provided by law,” our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the
State’s duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, as amended, RA 9775, RA
9262, RA 9851, RA 9344, RA 10364, RA 9211, RA 8980, RA 9288, and Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 603, as amended.
Same; Same; With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a
clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) before they can
travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents.—The
restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise
constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess
and enjoy constitutional rights, but the exercise of these rights is not coextensive as
those of adults. They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as
their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. As parens patriae, the State regulates and,
to a certain extent, restricts the minors’ exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs
concerning the right to vote, the right to execute contracts, and the right to engage in
gainful employment. With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to
obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can
travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents. These
limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors’ activities
than over similar actions of adults, and overall, reflect the State’s general interest in the
well-being of minors. Thus, the State may impose limitations on the
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minors’ exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to
adults.
Same; Same; Strict Scrutiny Test; Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests
of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications; Considering that the
right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our
Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is the applicable test.—Philippine jurisprudence has
developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications. The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with
the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The intermediate scrutiny test applies
when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires
heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the
rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed
no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is the applicable test. At this juncture, it
should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact
that the State has broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the
application of a lower level of scrutiny.
Same; Same; Same; Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.—The strict scrutiny test as applied to
minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as enumerated
in Bellotti vis-à-vis the State’s duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve their well-
being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the
strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the
least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly
tailored to accomplish the interest.
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Same; Same; Same; Compelling State Interest; The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that
children’s welfare and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them as parens
patriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.—Jurisprudence
holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies. This Court
has ruled that children’s welfare and the State’s mandate to protect and care for
them as parens patriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by
the State. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way. As explained in Nunez, the Bellottiframework shows that the State
has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The
limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the
State to protect and care for their welfare.
Same; Same; Same; While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or
only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State’s compelling
interest.—The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental
premise that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the
exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must
be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State’s
compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more
narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be
so narrowly drawn.
Same; Curfew Ordinances; The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the
first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors’ constitutional rights.—In
sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their
exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew
regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above mentioned fundamental
rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such,
they cannot subsist independently despite the presence of any separability clause. The
Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it
sufficiently safeguards the minors’ constitutional rights.
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Same; Same; Right to Travel; As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of
exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect
the minors’ rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and
of free expression.—As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under
the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors’
rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression. Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right
of association by enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular
activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate
organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also
covered by these items given that the minors’ attendance in the official activities
of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in
the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded
in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even
during curfew hours. In relation to their right to travel, the ordinance allows the
minor-participants to move to and from the places where these activities are
held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth,
only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of
minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is
perceivably more prominent.
Same; Same; There is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her
minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night,
notwithstanding curfew hours.—To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly
authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities
during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the
deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception
found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., “[t]hose accompanied by
their parents or guardian,” as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual
but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reason-
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able construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with
the basic premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary to
parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents’ right to
rear their children is not only natural but primary.
Same; Same; Under our legal system’s own recognition of a minor’s inherent lack of full
rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State’s compelling interest to promote
juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that the curfew
imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn
exceptions and hence, constitutional.—Under our legal system’s own recognition of a minor’s
inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State’s
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds
that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its
narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are
in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its
police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as
applied in this case.
Same; Same; Requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of
intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors.—The provisions of
RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in
violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers
local governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based
programs recognized under Section 54 of the same law. In this regard, requiring the minor
to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to
promote the welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an
alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts
without the moral and social stigma caused by jail detention. In the same light, these
programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and
366
legal orders. More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive
members of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their
community.
Administrative Law; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Admonition; The Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and
our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that “a warning or admonition
shall not be considered a penalty.”—The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of
Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal
way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor’s misdemeanor.
Admonition is generally defined as a “gentle or friendly reproof” or “counsel or warning
against fault or oversight.” The Black’s Law Dictionary defines admonition as “[a]n
authoritatively issued warning or censure”; while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it
as a “gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a
fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning.” Notably, the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our
jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that “a warning or admonition shall
not be considered a penalty.”
Same; Penalties; The prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and
unambiguous. It states that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations
[of] juvenile status offenses.”—As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear,
categorical, and unambiguous. It states that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed on
children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses].” Thus, for imposing the
sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions
of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear
language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand,
the impositions of community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed
as they do not constitute penalties.
Curfew Ordinances; Strict Scrutiny Test; While the Supreme Court (SC) finds that all
three (3) Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test — that is,
that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
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and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance
has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the
three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest.—While the Court
finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test
— that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City
Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance
out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In
particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors
to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and
therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State’s purpose. Section 4(a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., “[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian,” has also been construed
to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an
allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to
the discretion of the local government unit.
LEONEN,J., Separate Opinion:

Curfew Ordinances; View that all of the assailed ordinances should have been struck
down for failing to ground themselves on demonstrated rational bases, for failing to adopt
the least restrictive means to achieve their aims, and for failing to show narrowly tailored
enforcement measures that foreclose abuse by law enforcers.—I concur in the result. All of
the assailed ordinances should have been struck down for failing to ground themselves on
demonstrated rational bases, for failing to adopt the least restrictive means to achieve their
aims, and for failing to show narrowly tailored enforcement measures that foreclose abuse
by law enforcers. The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify these ordinances. While this
doctrine enables state intervention for the welfare of children, its operation must not
transgress the constitutionally enshrined natural and primary right of parents to rear their
children.
Same; View that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not con-
368
travene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.—Consistent
with the exacting standard for invalidating ordinances, Hon. Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s
College, 693 SCRA 141 (2013), outlined the test for determining the validity of an
ordinance: The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not
be unreasonable.
Same; Strict Scrutiny Test; View that strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are
fundamental freedoms or what is involved are suspect classifications.—Strict scrutiny
applies when what is at stake are fundamental freedoms or what is involved are suspect
classifications. It requires that there be a compelling state interest and that the means
employed to effect it are narrowly-tailored, actually — not only conceptually — being the
least restrictive means for effecting the invoked interest. Here, it does not suffice that the
government contemplated on the means available to it. Rather, it must show an active
effort at demonstrating the inefficacy of all possible alternatives. Here, it is required to not
only explore all possible avenues but to even debunk the viability of alternatives so as to
ensure that its chosen course of action is the sole effective means. To the extent practicable,
this must be supported by sound data gathering mechanisms.
Same; Same; View that cases involving strict scrutiny innately favor the preservation of
fundamental rights and the nondiscrimination of protected classes.—Cases involving strict
scrutiny innately favor the preservation of fundamental rights and the nondiscrimination of
protected classes. Thus, in these cases, the burden falls upon the government to prove that
it was impelled by a compelling state interest and that there is actually no other less
restrictive mechanism for realizing the interest that it invokes: Applying strict scru-
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tiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the
burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
Same; Same; View that the Constitution itself states that the right [to travel] may be
“impaired” in consideration of: national security, public safety, or public health.—By
definition, a curfew restricts mobility. As effected by the assailed ordinances, this
restriction applies daily at specified times and is directed at minors, who remain under the
authority of their parents. Thus, petitioners correctly note that at stake in the present
Petition is the right to travel. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law. While a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, this right
is not absolute. The Constitution itself states that the right may be “impaired” in
consideration of: national security, public safety, or public health. The ponencia underscores
that the avowed purpose of the assailed ordinances is “the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime.” The assailed ordinances, therefore, seem to find justification
as a valid exercise of the State’s police power, regulating — as opposed to completely
negating — the right to travel.
Constitutional Law; Right to Liberty; Right to Privacy; View that while not among the
rights enumerated under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of parents with
respect to the family is no less a fundamental right and an integral aspect of liberty and
privacy.—There are several facets of the right to privacy. Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141
(1998), identified the right of persons to be secure “in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects,” the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, liberty of abode, the right to
form associations, and the right against self-incrimination as among these facets. While not
among the rights enumerated under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of
parents with respect to the family is no less a fundamental right and an integral aspect of
liberty and privacy. Article II, Section 12 characterizes the right of parents in the rearing of
the youth to be ‘‘natural and pri-
370
mary.” It adds that it is a right, which shall “receive the support of the Government.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the assailed ordinances are demonstrably incongruent
with the Constitution’s unequivocal nurturing attitude towards the youths and whose
mandate is to “promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being.”—The assailed ordinances’ adoption and implementation concern a prejudicial
classification. The assailed ordinances are demonstrably incongruent with the
Constitution’s unequivocal nurturing attitude towards the youths and whose mandate is to
“promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.”
This attitude is reflected in Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006, which takes great pains at a nuanced approach to children.
Republic Act No. 9344 meticulously defines a “child at risk” and a “child in conflict with the
law” and distinguishes them from the generic identification of a “child” as any “person
under the age of eighteen (18) years.” These concepts were adopted precisely to prevent a
lackadaisical reduction to a wholesale and indiscriminate concept, consistent with the
protection that is proper to a vulnerable sector. The assailed ordinances’ broad and
sweeping determination of presence in the streets past defined times as delinquencies
warranting the imposition of sanctions tend to run afoul of the carefully calibrated attitude
of Republic Act No. 9344 and the protection that the Constitution mandates. For these, a
strict consideration of the assailed ordinances is equally proper.
Same; Same; Right to Travel; View that with incomplete and inconclusive bases, the
concerned local government units’ justifications of reducing crime and sweeping averments
of “peace and order” hardly sustain a rational basis for the restriction of minors’ movement
during curfew hours.—With incomplete and inconclusive bases, the concerned local
government units’ justifications of reducing crime and sweeping averments of “peace and
order” hardly sustain a rational basis for the restriction of minors’ movement during curfew
hours. If at all, the assertion that curfew restrictions ipso facto equate to the reduction of
CICLs appears to be a gratuitous conclusion. It is more sentimental than logical. Lacking in
even a rational basis, it follows that there is no support for the more arduous requirement
of demonstrating that the assailed ordinances support a compelling state interest.
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Same; Strict Scrutiny Test; View that the strict scrutiny test not only requires that the
challenged law be narrowly tailored in order to achieve compelling governmental interests, it
also requires that the mechanisms it adopts are the least burdensome or least drastic means
to achieve its ends.—The strict scrutiny test not only requires that the challenged law be
narrowly tailored in order to achieve compelling governmental interests, it also requires
that the mechanisms it adopts are the least burdensome or least drastic means to achieve
its ends: Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of
procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise. First Amendment freedoms such as
free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the
right to vote. Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either classifies on the basis
of an inherently suspect characteristic or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the
presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is, such legislation is assumed to be
unconstitutional until the government demonstrates otherwise. The government must show
that the statute is supported by a compelling governmental interest and the means chosen
to accomplish that interest are narrowly tailored. Gerald Gunther explains as follows: . . .
The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands a
demand not only as to means but also as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny
required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and
ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown
“necessary” to achieve statutory ends, not merely “reasonably related.” Moreover, equal
protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new
equal protection had to be justified by “compelling” state interests, not merely the wide
spectrum of “legitimate” state ends. Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least
burdensome or least drastic means available for achieving the governmental objective.
Curfew Ordinances; Children in Conflict with the Law; View that respondents have not
shown adequate data to prove that an imposition of curfew lessens the number of Children
in Conflict with the Law (CICLs).—Respondents have not shown adequate data to prove
that an imposition of curfew lessens the number of CICLs. Respondents further fail to
provide data on the frequency of crimes against unattended minors during curfew hours.
Without this data, it cannot be concluded that the safety of minors is better achieved if
372
they are not allowed out on the streets during curfew hours. While the ponencia holds
that the Navotas and Manila Ordinances tend to restrict minors’ fundamental rights, it
found that the Quezon City Ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives.
Same; Same; View that public safety is better achieved by effective police work, not by
clearing streets of children en masse at night.—Imposing a curfew on minors merely on the
assumption that it can keep them safe from crime is not the least restrictive means to
achieve this objective. Petitioners suggest street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs
in street corners, and visible police patrol. Public safety is better achieved by effective police
work, not by clearing streets of children en masse at night. Crimes can just as well occur in
broad daylight and children can be just as susceptible in such an environment. Efficient law
enforcement, more than sweeping, generalized measures, ensures that children will be safe
regardless of what time they are out on the streets. The assailed ordinances’ deficiencies
only serve to highlight their most disturbing aspect: the imposition of a curfew only burdens
minors who are living in poverty.
Same; Same; View that to lessen the instances of juvenile crime, the government must
first alleviate poverty, not impose a curfew.—An examination of Manila Police District’s
data on CICLs show that for most of the crimes committed, the motive is poverty, not a
drive for nocturnal escapades. Thus, to lessen the instances of juvenile crime, the
government must first alleviate poverty, not impose a curfew. Poverty alleviation programs,
not curfews, are the least restrictive means of preventing indigent children from turning to
a life of criminality.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine; View that in assailing the lack
of expressed standards for identifying minor, petitioners invoke the void for vagueness
doctrine.—The assailed ordinances are deficient not only for failing to provide the least
restrictive means for achieving their avowed ends but also in failing to articulate
safeguards and define limitations that foreclose abuses. In assailing the lack of expressed
standards for identifying minor, petitioners invoke the void for vagueness doctrine. The
doctrine is explained in People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988): As a rule, a statute or act
may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
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standards that men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.’’ It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Same; Same; Same; View that while facial challenges of a statute on the ground of
vagueness is permitted only in cases involving alleged transgressions against the right to free
speech, penal laws may nevertheless be invalidated for vagueness “as applied.”—While facial
challenges of a statute on the ground of vagueness is permitted only in cases involving
alleged transgressions against the right to free speech, penal laws may nevertheless be
invalidated for vagueness “as applied.” In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394
(2001): [T]he doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that “one
to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.” As has been pointed out,
“vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a particular defendant.” Consequently, there
is no basis for petitioner’s claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face
and in its entirety.
Statutes; Facial Challenge; As-applied Challenge; View that the difference between a
facial challenge and an as-applied challenge is settled.—The difference between a facial
challenge and an as-applied challenge is settled. As explained in Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146 (2010): Distinguished from
an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial
invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only
on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
374
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Parens Patriae; View that the State acts as parens patriae in the protection of minors
only when there is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or exploitation. It cannot, on its own,
decide on how children are to be reared, supplanting its own wisdom to that of parents.—
The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify the intrusions into parental prerogatives made
by the assailed ordinances. The State acts as parens patriae in the protection of minors only
when there is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or exploitation. It cannot, on its own, decide
on how children are to be reared, supplanting its own wisdom to that of parents. The
doctrine of parens patriae is of Anglo-American, common law origin. It was understood to
have “emanate[d] from the right of the Crown to protect those of its subjects who were
unable to protect themselves.” It was the King’s “royal prerogative” to “take responsibility
for those without capacity to look after themselves.” At its outset, parens
patriae contemplated situations where vulnerable persons had no means to support or
protect themselves. Given this, it was the duty of the State, as the ultimate guardian of the
people, to safeguard its citizens’ welfare.
Same; Substitute Parental Authority; View that the doctrine of parens patriae is a mere
substitute or supplement to parents’ authority over their children. It operates only when
parental authority is established to be absent or grossly deficient.—As it stands, the doctrine
of parens patriae is a mere substitute or supplement to parents’ authority over their
children. It operates only when parental authority is established to be absent or grossly
deficient. The wisdom underlying this doctrine considers the existence of harm and the
subsequent inability of the person to protect himself or herself. This premise entails the
incapacity of parents and/or legal guardians to protect a child. To hold otherwise is to afford
an overarching and almost absolute power to the State; to allow the Government to
arbitrarily exercise its parens patriae power might as well render the superior
Constitutional right of parents inutile. More refined applications of this doctrine reflect this
position. In these instances where the State exercised its powers over minors on account
of parens patriae, it was only because the children were prejudiced and it
was without subverting the authority of the parents themselves when
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they have not acted in manifest offense against the rights of their children.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III for petitioners.
Jose Alberto C. Flaminiano, et al. for City of Manila.
Christian B. Valencia, et al. for Quezon City.
Joel Joselito D. Parong for City of Navotas.
Alberto C. Agra Amicus Imperiorum Locorum/Pro
Bono Counsel for respondents-Local Governments.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the

constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local
governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition
prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering
respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey
Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to
prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and enforcing
these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually,
declare the City of Manila’s ordinance as ultra vires for being
contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the “Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act,” as amended, and all curfew ordinances as
unconstitutional for violating the
_______________
1 Id., at pp. 3-36.

2 Entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” approved on April 28, 2006.
376
constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of
parents to rear their children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to

implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their
curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were
publicly known as part of “Oplan Rody.”3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew
ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02,4 dated August 26, 1999,
entitled “Nagtatakda ng ‘Curfew’ ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang
Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas,
Kalakhang Maynila,” as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg.
2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of
Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled “An Ordinance
Declaring the Hours from 10:00 PM to 4:00 AM of the Following
Day as ‘Barangay Curfew Hours’ for Children and Youths Below
Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for
Other Purposes” dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and
(c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-2301,7 Series of 2014,
entitled “An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in
Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 PM to 5:00 AM, Providing
Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes”
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 6.
4 Id., at pp. 37-40.
5 Id., at pp. 41-43. Entitled “Ordinansa na Nag-aamyenda sa Ilang Bahagi ng Tuntunin 1, 2 at
Tuntunin 4 ng Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02, Kilala Bilang Ordinansang Nagtatakda ng ‘Curfew’ ng
mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang
Maynila.”
6 Id., at pp. 44-47.
7 Id., at pp. 48-60.
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dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew
Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK) — an association of young adults and minors
that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the
protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors10 —
filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for
vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c)
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel
without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that the
Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA
10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are
no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers
should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged
curfew violators.13 They further argue that
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 5-6.

9 Namely, herein petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim and John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, and Ronel
Baccutan, Mark Leo Delos Reyes, and Clarissa Joyce Villegas, minor, for herself and as represented by
her father, Julian Villegas, Jr., as leaders and members of the SPARK, respectively. Id., at pp. 4-5.
10 Id., at p. 4.
11 Id., at p. 16.
12 Entitled “AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ‘JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT
OF 2006’ AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR,” approved on October 3, 2013.
13 See Rollo, pp. 20-21.
378
the law enforcer’s apprehension depends only on his physical
assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law
enforcer’s visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain
provisions indicating the activities exempted from the operation of
the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or
students with evening class, they contend that the lists of
exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate
activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and,
hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are
unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and
the right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to
pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for
employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their
purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets
during curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social
and moral welfare of children of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance,
particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of
_______________
14 Id.
15 Id., at pp. 21-22.
16 Id., at p. 23.
17 Id., at pp. 23-25.
18 Id., at p. 25.
19 4. Sec.Sanctions and Penalties for Violation.—Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall
be sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender’s parent, guardian or
person exercising parental authority.
(b) If offender is Fifteen (15) years and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty
shall be:
379
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 379
RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision
imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and
admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties
contravenes RA 9344’s express command that no penalty shall be
imposed on minors for curfew violations.21
_______________
1. for the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. for the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a
warning about the legal impositions in case of a third and subsequent
violation; and
3. for the THIRD OFFENSE AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES,
Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court: PROVIDED,
That the complaint shall be filed by the Punong Barangay with the office of
the City Prosecutor. (Id., at p. 45)
20 57-A. SectionViolations of Local Ordinances.—Ordinances enacted by local
governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew
violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as
well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but
not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public
urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall
be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their
residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the
custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in
such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a “child at risk” and not as a
“child in conflict with the law.” The ordinance shall also provide for intervention
programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for
the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars.
380
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State
interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents’ prerogative to
impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in
the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest
exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In
this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs,
installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets,
and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means
of protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further
opine that the government can impose more reasonable
sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education
seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew,
and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution in this case is

whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in

this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition,
questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the
Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners’ direct resort to the Court,
contrary to the hierarchy of courts doc-
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 26-28.
381
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 381
trine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing to
warrant judicial review.23
A.Propriety of the Peti-

tion for Certiorari
and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of

the courts of justice not only “to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,”
but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”24Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. 1. Section
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has “expanded

the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its
traditional ambit of settling actual controver-
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 243-248.

24 Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 525; 728 SCRA 1, 67-68 (2014).
382
sies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.”25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions
for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court “are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution.”27 It was explained that “[w]ith respect to the Court,
x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition
may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only
by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right,
undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited
above].”28
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.
GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was
expounded that “[m]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has
been promulgated to enforce [the] ‘expanded’ constitutional
definition of judicial power and because of the commonality of
‘grave abuse of discretion’ as a ground for review under Rule 65
and the courts’ expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court — based
on its power to relax its rules — al-
_______________
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id., at p. 528; p. 71.
28 Id., at p. 531; p. 74; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
29 See G.R. Nos. 207132 and 207205, December 6, 2016, 812 SCRA 452.
383
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 383
lowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the
courts’ expanded jurisdiction[.]”30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew
Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and
Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the
ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically,
the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the
right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the
Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts
with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that
“[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2)
executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill
will or personal bias.”31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners
correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition,
although these governmental actions were not made pursuant to
any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
B.Direct Resort
to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as

remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative and executive
enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not
petitioners’ direct resort to this Court is justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts “[r]equires that recourse must
first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While
this
_______________
30 Id.
31 See Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, 807 SCRA 223.
384
jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [CA] and the
[Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court’s
jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in
the petition[.]”32 This Court is tasked to resolve “the issue of
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance
[if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects
the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people,”33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners’ direct resort to the
Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial
Review.
“The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless
there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standingto question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.”34 In this case, respondents assail the
existence of the first two (2) requisites.
Actual Case or Controversy. 1.
“Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the
traditional or in the expanded setting — is the presence of
_______________
32 Arroyo v. Department of Justice, 695 Phil. 302, 334; 681 SCRA 181, 207-208 (2012); emphasis and
underscoring supplied.
33 Id., at p. 335; p. 208; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
34 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416, 518-519; 710 SCRA 1, 89 (2013).
385
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 385
an actual case or controversy.”35 “[A]n actual case or controversy is
one which ‘involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.’
In other words, ‘there must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence.’”36 According to recent
jurisprudence, in the Court’s exercise of its expanded jurisdiction
under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified “by
merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed governmental act.”37
“Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has
then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of.”38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an
actual justiciable controversy in this case given the evident
_______________
35 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., supra note 29.
36 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
37 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., supra; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
38 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 732 Phil. 1, 123-124; 721 SCRA 146, 280 (2014); emphasis and underscoring
supplied.
386
clash of the parties’ legal claims, particularly on whether the
Curfew Ordinances impair the minors’ and parents’ constitutional
rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the
provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, petitioners
have — as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below
— conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which
perforce impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction.
The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the
Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued
the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or
incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or
hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
Legal Standing. 2.
“The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the
determination of whether those assailing the governmental act
have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for
adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that they have
sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some
direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the
challenged governmental act.”40 “‘[I]nterest’ in the question
involved must be material — an interest that is in issue and will be
affected by the official act — as distinguished from being merely
incidental or general.”41
“The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
_______________
39 See TRO dated July 26, 2016 issued by Clerk of Court Felipa B.
Anama; Rollo, pp. 67-70.
40 Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 212426 and 212444, January 12, 2016, 779
SCRA 241, 327-328; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
41 Id., at p. 328.
387
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 387
the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected
in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing.”42
As above mentioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged
breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of
minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the
primary right of parents to rear their children. Related to the first
is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the
penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce
Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting
the minor’s right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at
the time the petition was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a
proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she
travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is,
thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew
Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim,
John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and
Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that
they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances’
coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew
Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a
consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of
whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents’ right to rear
their children as they have not shown that they stand before this
Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose consti-
_______________
42 Supra note 34 at p. 527; p. 99; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

43 Rollo, p. 5.
44 Clarissa was seventeen (17) years old (see Certificate of Live Birth; id., at p. 63) at the time the
petition was filed on July 22, 2016 (id., at p. 3).
388
tutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that
Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr.
Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for himself for
the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not
question the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a
parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor child,
Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and,
consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in
court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still
has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its
members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the
minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required
personal interest in the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa
has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the
minors’ right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the
parents’ right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the
standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are concerned,
in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case. “In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal
stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when
paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who
challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, the Court may
exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the
suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show
that they have been
_______________
45 Association of Flood Victims v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014, 732
SCRA 100, 108.
389
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 389
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.”46
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of
juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not
only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances
on the right of parents to rear their children and the right of
minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the
State’s authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general
welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the
public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules,
including, among others, the standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive
aspect of this case.
II.
A.Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to
travel and of parents to rear their children, this Court must first
tackle petitioners’ contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void
for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are
void for not containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which
leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry
out their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural
guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners
Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age.
They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the
suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical
appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although
they conceded that the
_______________
46 Supra note 40 at pp. 335-336; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
390
Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of
the child, they submit that nowhere does the said ordinance
require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the
child to show his age.47
The arguments are untenable.
“A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.”48
In this case, petitioners’ invocation of the void for vagueness
doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly identify
any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of
its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to
the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly.49The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on
due process considerations, which are absent from this
particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of “unconstitutional uncertainty,” which may involve
“procedural due process uncertainty cases” and “substantive due process uncertainty cases.”
“Procedural due process uncertainty” in-
_______________

48 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 488; 632
SCRA 146, 185 (2010); emphases and underscoring supplied.
49 See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566; 94 S. Ct. 1242; 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974) U.S. LEXIS 113.
391
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 391
volves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate
warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for
adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective
rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary
interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are
“void-for-vagueness.”50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement

parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any
confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not
prohibit but only point to the ordinances’ lack of enforcement
guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the
Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best
left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the
objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole
consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners
must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement
stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows
enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is
prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous
provision of law contravenes due process because agents of the
government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law
permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,51 it
was ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result
_______________
50 Dissenting Opinion of Retired Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga in Romualdez v. Commission on

Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 432; 553 SCRA 370, 463-464 (2008).
51 401 F. Supp. 1242 (1975) U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477.
392
in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual impressions and personal
predilections.52
As above mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous
standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but
rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected
minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any
vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken
down under the void for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no
sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it
is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these
parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the
prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing
ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:
7. SectionDetermination of Age.—x x x The age of a child may be determined from the
child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the
absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other
relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew

Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344)
repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant
to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA
_______________
52 Id., citation omitted.

53 Section 16 of RA No. 10630 provides:
16. SectionRepealing Clause.—All laws, decrees, ordinances and rules inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby modified or repealed accordingly.
393
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 393
10630,54 minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are
children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a
long-standing principle that “[c]onformity with law is one of
the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal
ordinance.”56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should
be read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory
law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel
and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating the
curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of
the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof
of identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of
such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a
visual assessment of the suspect, which — needless to state —
should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances.
Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to
pursue the appropriate
_______________
54 Section 11 of RA No. 10630 provides:

57-A. SectionViolations of Local Ordinances.—Ordinances enacted by local governments
concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy,
parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public
scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling,
mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. x x
x The child shall also be recorded as a ‘child at risk’ and not as a ‘child in conflict with
the law.’ x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
55 1. SectionShort Title and Scope.—This Act shall be known as the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006.” It shall cover the different stages involving children at risk and children in conflict with the
law from prevention to rehabilitation and reintegration.
56 People v. Chong Hong, 65 Phil. 625, 628 (1938); emphasis and underscoring supplied.
394
action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the
ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners’ prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as
void for vagueness is denied.
B.Right of Parents to
Rear their Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due
process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes the
right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at a
certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the
right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the
State, the latter’s interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be
compelling.57
Petitioners’ stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the
State’s policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their
children:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. 12. Section The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children

(i.e., referred to as the “youth”) for civic efficiency and
_______________
395
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 395
the development of their moral character are characterized not
only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means
that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their
authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise
this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is
a reflection of the State’s independent interest to ensure that the
youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-
developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood
that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society.
“[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must
be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”58 “This
affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept
and example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.”59
By history and tradition, “the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one’s children.”60 In Ginsberg v. New
York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that
“constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society.”62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to
rear their children is not only described as “natural,” but also as
“primary.” The qualifier “primary” connotes the parents’
superior right over the State in the upbringing of their
children.63 The ra-
_______________
58 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; 92 S. Ct. 1526; 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972) U.S. LEXIS 144; emphasis
and underscoring supplied.
59 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622; 99 S. Ct. 3035; 61 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1979) U.S. LEXIS 17.
60 Id.
61 390 U.S. 629; 88 S. Ct. 1274; 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1968) U.S. LEXIS 1880; 1 Media L. Rep. 1424; 44
Ohio Op. 2d 339.
62 Id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
63 Supra note 38 at pp. 192 and 195; p. 622.
396
tionale for the State’s deference to parental control over their
children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v.
Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
important decisions by minors. But an additional and more important justification
for state deference to parental control over children is that “the child is not [a]
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.”65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should

be stressed that “when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child,
the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate
interests.”66 Thus, “[i]n cases in which harm to the physical
or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace,
order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state
interests may override the parents’ qualified right to
control the upbringing of their children.”67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated
to support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of,
but rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery
v. Loren-
_______________
64 Supra note 59.

65 Id.
66 Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, supra note 51; emphasis supplied.
67 Id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
397
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 397
zo,68 this Court acknowledged the State’s role as parens patriae in
protecting minors, viz.:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the
duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or
incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-à-vis other parties. Unable as they
are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look after
their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust.
As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: “This prerogative
of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
x x x.”69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and

duty to aid parents in the moral development of their
children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to
fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that
“[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the
parental role, may be important to the child’s chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the
State can properly conclude that parents and others,
teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility
for children’s well-being are entitled to the support of the
laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.”71
_______________
68 150-A Phil. 241; 44 SCRA 431 (1972).

69 Id., at p. 248; p. 438, citing Mormon Church v. US, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
70 See supra note 38 at pp. 195-196; pp. 355-356.
71 Bellotti, supra note 59, citing Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their “Rights,” 1976 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605 and Ginsberg v. New
York, supranote 61; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
398
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions
designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their children’s
well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these
ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the
promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime),
which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents
to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar
vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to
potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during
the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor
children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this
time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew
Ordinances apply only when the minors are not — whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) —
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State’s deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of parents’ role in child-
rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over
their children’s conduct during curfew hours when they are able to
supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of
parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the
parents’ prerogative to allow minors to remain in public
places without parental accompaniment during the curfew
hours.73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an
overall plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their
minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to
influence or control their minors’ activities.74 As such, the
Curfew Ordinances only
_______________
72 See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (1998) U.S. App. LEXIS 26597.
73 See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (1993) U.S. App. LEXIS 29974.
74 See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, supra note 51; and City of Panora v. Simmons, 445
N.W.2d 363; 1989 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 254; 83 A.L.R. 4th 1035.
399
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 399
amount to a minimal — albeit reasonable — infringement upon a
parent’s right to bring up his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances
positively influence children to spend more time at home.
Consequently, this situation provides parents with better
opportunities to take a more active role in their children’s
upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the
US court observed that the city government “was entitled to
believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental
involvement in a child’s upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of
parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of the
street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those
children.”76 Curfews may also aid the “efforts of parents who prefer
their children to spend time on their studies than on the
streets.”77 Reason dictates that these realities observed
in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these
are additional reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal
curfews on parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared
unconstitutional for violating the parents’ right to rear their
children.
C.Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew

Ordinances based on the minors’ right to travel. They claim that
the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore,
necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further,
they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest,
such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of
minors from crime, there are other less
_______________
75 Supra note 72.

76 Id.
77 Id.
400
restrictive means for achieving the government’s interest.78In
addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours.79
Petitioner’s submissions are partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners’ invocation of the
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed
any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of
speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern
Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that “the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to
free speech cases,”81viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always
under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception
to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant
claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails,
the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permit-
_______________

79 Id., at pp. 21-23.
80 Supra note 48.
81 Id., at p. 490; p. 187; emphasis in the original omitted, citation omitted.
401
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 401
ted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of
third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,” not merely “as
applied for” so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the “chilling”; deterrent effect of
the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad law’s “very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An overbreadth
ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.82(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that “[i]n restricting
the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at
least two cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of
the First Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have
been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was
held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to
speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes
are justified
_______________
82 Id., at pp. 490-491; p. 188.

83 First Amendment (US Constitution). Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
84 539 U.S. 113; 123 S. Ct. 2191; 156 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2003) U.S. LEXIS 4782; 71 U.S.L.W. 4441; 2003
Cal. Daily Op. Service 5136; 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 347.
402
by the ‘transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression.’”85
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was
opined that “[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the
basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern
Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of
due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on
the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of
freedom of expression.”87
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an
overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed
curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court
finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict
scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a
fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. 6. Section Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the
Philippines to other countries or within
_______________
85 Supra note 48 at p. 491; pp. 188-189.

86 Supra note 38.
87 See Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen’s Dissenting Opinion; id., at pp. 583-584; p. 761;
emphases and underscoring supplied.
88 See Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 158-A Phil. 1; 59 SCRA 183 (1974); Kant Kwong v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, 240 Phil. 219; 156 SCRA 222 (1987).
403
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 403
the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept
of liberty.90 Liberty — a birthright of every person — includes the
power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to use their
faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or
where they can best pursue the ends of life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access
and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free
expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The interrelation
of the right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly
rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion,

speech, assembly, and association require one to move about, such
movement must necessarily be protected under the First
Amendment. Restricting movement in those circumstances to
the extent that First
_______________
89 In Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 497-498; 177 SCRA 668, 707 (1989), the Court ruled that
the right to travel under our Constitution refer to right to move within the country, or to another country,
but not the right to return to one’s country. The latter right, however, is provided under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a signatory.
90 UP Law Center Constitutional Revision Project 61 (1970). See Kent v. Dulles, 351 U.S. 116; 78 S.
Ct. 1113; 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (1958) U.S. LEXIS 814. See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.
660, 705-706 (1919), where the Court stated that the right of locomotion is one of the chief elements of the
guaranty of liberty.
91 See Duran v. Abad Santos, 75 Phil. 410, 431-432 (1945).
92 See Laurel, Salvador H., Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention. As Faithfully
Reproduced from the Personal Record of Jose P. Laurel, Vol. III, p. 652 (1966). See also Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, supra at p. 705.
93 See City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179 (1992) Iowa Sup. LEXIS 91.
94 Id.
404
Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to
a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot
walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any reason,
people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked.
If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a
community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of
movement is inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the First
Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public

interest justify restrictions even if made against fundamental
rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to
another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.95 As
the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose
limitations on the exercise of this right, provided, that
_______________
95 See Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) v.
Heusdens, 678 Phil. 328, 399; 662 SCRA 126, 148-149 (2011) and Mirasol v. Department of Public Works
and Highways, 523 Phil. 713, 752; 490 SCRA 318, 353-354 (2006). See also Marcos v.
Manglapus, supra note 89 at p. 504;
p. 719. In Silverio v. Court of Appeals (273 Phil. 128, 133; 195 SCRA 760, 765 [1991]), the Court held that
“the [State is] not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations [on this right],” and in Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (supra note 90 at p. 716), it was held that “citizens [do] not possess an
absolute freedom of locomotion.”
96 The State under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to executive officers or
administrative authorities (see Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA
633, 651).
405
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 405
they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the
promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime,
inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on
the minor’s movement and activities within the confines of their
residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is
perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims
of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the
second requirement, i.e., that the limitation “be provided by law,”
our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State’s duty
to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended,
RA 9775,99 RA 9262,100 RA 9851,101RA 9344,102 RA 10364,103
_______________
97 Silverio v. Court of Appeals, supra note 95 at p. 133; p. 765.

98 See Section 2 of RA 7610, entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL
PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS
VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST
CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT” (July 27, 1992).
99 See Section 2 of RA 9775, entitled “AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” otherwise known as the
“ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 2009,” approved on November 17, 2009.
100 See Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9262, entitled “AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” otherwise known as the “ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT
OF 2004” (March 27, 2004).
101 See Section 2 of RA 9851, entitled “AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING CRIMES AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, ORGANIZING
JURISDICTION, DESIGNATING SPECIAL COURTS, AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES” otherwise known as the
“PHILIPPINE ACT ON CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE, AND OTHER CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY,” approved on December 11, 2009.
406
RA 9211,104 RA 8980,105 RA 9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 603,107 as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which
explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:
139. ArticleCurfew Hours for Children.—City or municipal councils may
prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local
conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or
guardians and the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
_______________
102 See Section 2 of RA 9344.

103 See Section 3(a) and (b) of RA 10364, entitled “AN ACT EXPANDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9208,
ENTITLED ‘AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND
CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT
OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,’” otherwise
known as the “EXPANDED ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT OF 2012,” approved on February 6, 2013.
104 See Section 32(b) of RA 9211, entitled “AN ACT REGULATING THE PACKAGING, USE, SALE,
DISTRIBUTION AND ADVERTISEMENTS OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” otherwise known
as “TOBACCO REGULATION ACT OF 2003” (September 2, 2003).
105 See Sections 2 and 3 of RA 8980, entitled “AN ACT PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY AND A
NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD CARE AND DEVELOPMENT (ECCD), PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” otherwise known as “ECCD ACT” (May 22, 2001).
106 See Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9288, entitled “AN ACT PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY AND A
NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR ENSURING NEWBORN SCREENING,” otherwise known as the “NEWBORN SCREENING
ACT OF 2004” (May 10, 2004).
107 See Articles 1, 3, and 8 of PD 603, entitled “THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE,” approved on
December 10, 1974.
407
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 407
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew
ordinances (as what respondents have done in this case) and
enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD
603 provides sufficient statutory basis — as required by the
Constitution — to restrict the minors’ exercise of the right to
travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely
to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation,
this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy
constitutional rights,108 but the exercise of these rights is not
coextensive as those of adults.109 They are always subject to the
authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or
guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates
and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors’ exercise of their
rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote,111 the
right to execute contracts,112
_______________
108 See Bellotti, supra note 59. See also Assessing the Scope of Minors’
Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1163
(March 1984), stating that minors enjoy a myriad of constitutional rights shared
with adults. Indeed, the Bill of Rights under the Constitution is not for adults alone;
hence, the State should not afford less protection to minors’ right simply because
they fall below the age of majority.
109 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531; 338 U.S. App. D.C. 11
(1999) U.S. App. LEXIS 13635; Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, supra note 72,
citing Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675; 106 S. Ct. 3159; 92 L.
Ed. 2d 549 (1986) U.S. LEXIS 139; 54 U.S.L.W. 5054; Bellotti, id. Ginsberg v. New
York, supra note 61; and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 804; 64 S. Ct. 784; 88 L.
Ed. 1090 (1944) U.S. LEXIS 942.
110 See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646; 115 S. Ct. 2386; 132
L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995) U.S. LEXIS 4275; 63 U.S.L.W. 4653; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service
4846; 9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 229.
111 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article V, Section 1.
112 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1327.
408
and the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect to
the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance
from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before
they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person
other than their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the
State has broader authority over the minors’ activities than over
similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State’s general
interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose
limitations on the minors’ exercise of rights even though these
limitations do not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,117 the US Supreme Court identified three (3)
justifications for the differential treatment of the minors’
constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of
children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed and mature manner; andthird, the importance of the
parental role in child-rearing:118
_______________
113 LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as renumbered, Articles 137 and 138.
114 See Section 8(a) of RA 7610 and Section 5(f) of RA 8239, entitled “Philippine
Passport Act of 1996,” approved on November 22, 1996.
115 Supra note 72, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, supra note 109.
116 Id.
117 Supra note 59.
118 Bellotti, id.; to wit: “The unique role in our society of the family x x x
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to
the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three [(3)]
reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children
cannot be equated with those of adults: [1] the peculiar vulnerability of
children; [2] their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and [3] the importance of the parental role in child
rearing.” (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
409
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 409
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally
are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal
system to account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for
concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention. x x x
[On the second reason, this Court’s rulings are] grounded [on] the
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them. x x x
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of
their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State
commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from
their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
important decisions by minors. x x x
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of
the parental role, may be important to the child’s chances for the
full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court

acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as
compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure
_______________
119 Id.
120 Supra note 109.
410
this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils
most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more
especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all
the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation
appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state’s police power, whether
against the parent’s claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate
contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of
highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults.
And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may be
magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on

the minors’ exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are
singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial
scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a
classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental
rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
_______________
121 Id., citations omitted.

122 See Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531; 446
SCRA 299 (2004); White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444; 576 SCRA 416 (2009); Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, 632 Phil. 32, 77; 618 SCRA 32, 95 (2010), citing Bernas,
Joaquin S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, pp. 139-140 (2009). See
also Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil.
44, 124-127; 699 SCRA 352, 447-448 (2013); and Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 97-98; 716
SCRA 237, 350-351 (2014).
411
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 411
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 Theintermediate
scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve
suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened
scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other
subjects not covered by the first two tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our
legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution,
_______________
123 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng

Pilipinas (id., at pp. 693-696; pp. 491-494, citations omitted), it was opined that, “in
the landmark case of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (411
U.S. 1; 93 S. Ct. 1278; 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 [1973] U.S. LEXIS 91), the U.S. Supreme
Court in identifying a ‘suspect class’ as a class saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process, articulated that suspect classifications were not
limited to classifications based on race, alienage or national origin but could also be
applied to other criteria such as religion. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that suspect classifications deserving of Strict Scrutiny include those based on race
or national origin, [alienage], and religion while classifications based on gender,
illegitimacy, financial need, conscientious objection and age have been held not to
constitute suspect classifications.” See also Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers &
Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 189185 and 189305, August 16, 2016, 800
SCRA 313. See further White Light Corporation v. City of Manila (id., at p. 463; pp.
437-438), where it was held that “[s[trict scrutiny is used today to test the validity
of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race[,] as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
The [US] Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect
fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel.”
124 See Dissenting Opinion of Retired Chief Justice Artermio V. Panganiban
in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, id., at
p. 648; p. 529.
125 Id.
412
the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it
should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional
rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over
minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower
level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US
court illumined that:
_______________
126 See White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra note 122.
127 In the US, courts have made several, albeit conflicting, rulings in
determining the applicable level of scrutiny in cases involving minors’ constitutional
rights, specifically on the right to travel (see Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, supra note 51; Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 [1981] U.S.
App. LEXIS 16939; 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d [Callaghan] 879; McCollester v. City of
Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381 [1984] U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16647; Waters v. Barry, 711 F.
Supp. 1125 [1989] U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5707; Qutb v. Strauss, supra note 73; Hutchins
v. District of Columbia, supra note 109; Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935
[1997] U.S. App. LEXIS 13409; 97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4317, 97 Daily Journal
DAR 7221; Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, supra note 72; Ramos v. Town of
Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 [2003] U.S. App. LEXIS 25851; and Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355
F.3d 1048 [2004] U.S. App. LEXIS 910). These conflicting rulings spring from the
uncertainty on whether the right to interstate travel under US laws is a
fundamental right (see US v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281; 41 S. Ct. 133; 65 L. Ed. 270
[1920] U.S. LEXIS 1159; and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618; 89 S. Ct. 1322; 22
L. Ed. 2d 600 [1969] U.S. LEXIS 3190). In contrast, the right to travel is clearly a
fundamental right under Philippine law; thus, the strict scrutiny test is undeniably
the applicable level of scrutiny.
See also In Re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83; 394 N.E.2d 368 [1978] Ohio Misc. LEXIS
94; citing earlier cases involving curfew ordinances on minors; People in the Interest
of J.M., 768 P.2d 219 [1989] Colo. LEXIS 10; 13 BTR 93; City of Panora v.
Simmons, supra note 74; and City of Maquoketa v. Russell, supra note 93.
128 See In Re Mosier, id., citing People v. Chambers, 32 Ill. App. 3d 444; 335
N.E.2d 612 (1975) Ill. App. LEXIS 2993.
129 Nunez v. City of San Diego, supra.
413
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 413
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the
fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is
necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less “fundamental” for
minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has
long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of
children than of adults. x x x. Thus, minors’ rights are not coextensive with the rights of
adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors’ rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant
differential analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults:
x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny for
the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather,
the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a compelling
state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors
differently than adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is
appropriate to review burdens on minors’ fundamental rights. x x x.
Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x130 (Emphases
supplied)
_______________
130 Id.
414
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a
consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as
enumerated in Bellotti vis-à-vis the State’s duty as parens
patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the
compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act.
Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of
proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve
a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive
meansto protect such interest or the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132
a.Compelling
State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include

constitutionally declared policies.133 This Court has ruled that
children’s welfare and the State’s mandate to protect and
care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling
interests to justify regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for
_______________
131 Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 122 at p. 98; p. 301. See
also Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 282; 582 SCRA 254,
277-278 (2009).
132 Id. See also Dissenting Opinion of Ret. Chief Justice Panganiban and Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc.
v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 122 at pp. 644 and 688-689; p. 499,
respectively.
133 See The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1, 97-98, citing 1987 Constitution, Art. II, Secs. 12 and
13 and Soriano v. Laguardia, 605 Phil. 43, 106; 587 SCRA 79, 112 (2009).
134 Id.
415
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 415
which some individual liberties must give way.135 As explained
in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a
compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than
on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also
highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and care
for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the
ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of
public areas, so as to reduce — if not totally eliminate — their
exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal
pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As
denoted in the “whereas clauses” of the Quezon City Ordinance,
the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes
that:
x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and
guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug
addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses; [b]
xxxx
as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive
bystanders, street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or
meander in public or private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in
groups without lawful purpose or justification; [d]
xxxx
reports of [f] barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor
children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent
personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national laws;
_______________
135 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 131 at p. 298; p. 296.
416
it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of
minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect,
abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their
development; [g]
to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to
put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal
activities wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure
that the dissident elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering
their nefarious activities[.] [h]136
The US court’s judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the

information gathered by the City Council to support its passage of
the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost
to our own treatment of the present case. Significantly,
in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected
bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in relation to
the proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially life-
shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of
night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would
materially assist its first stated interest — that of reducing juvenile violence and crime.
The City Council acted on the basis of information from many sources, including records
from Charlottesville’s police department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data
from the United States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports
from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to
conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will
make for a safer community. The same streets may
_______________
136 Rollo, pp. 48-49.

137 Supra note 72.
417
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 417
have a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day.
Alone on the streets at night children face a series of dangerous and potentially
life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale.
Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation in violence. “[D]uring the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.” Those
who succumb to these criminal influences at an early age may persist in their
criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside
the point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home community
clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children to
come into contact with criminal influences, the City was directly advancing its first
objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local

governments of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data
in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of
crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in
their respective localities.139Based on these
_______________
138 Id.
139 In its Comment dated August 18, 2016 (see Rollo, pp. 270-313), the local government of Quezon
City attached statistical data on “Children in Conflict with Law” (CICL) incidents from the
various barangays of its six (6) districts for the years 2013, 2014, and 2015 (id., at pp. 330-333). The
information is summarized as follows:
418
_______________
In 2014 and 2015, most of the reported CICL incidents were related to Theft, Curfew violations, and
Physical Injury. The local government claimed that the decline of CICL incidents in 2015 was due to the
enforcement of the curfew ordinance (id., at p. 298).
Also, together with its Comment dated August 16, 2016 (id., at pp. 85-111), the local government of
Manila submitted data reports of the Manila Police District (MPD) on CICL incidents, in Manila from
2014, 2015, and half of the year 2016 (id., at pp. 116-197), as follows:
It includes a minor who violated RA 4136 or the “Land Transportation and Traffic
Code” (June 20, 1964) and RA 10586 or the “Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of
2013,” approved on May 27, 2013. ***
It includes the number of minors who violated curfew hours. **
A number from these reports involve incidents of Robbery (43), Theft (43), Physical Injuries (12), Rape (9),
and Frustrated Homicide (6).
The local government of Manila likewise attached the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s
(DSWD) report on CICL for the years 2015 and half of the year 2016, summed as follows (id., at pp. 198-
199):
Further, it attached DSWD’s report on minors who were at risk of running in conflict with law and CICL
as a result of the
419
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 419
findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew
ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general
welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted
to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare,
especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State
interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew
Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied,
the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in
the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least
restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest —
the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/

Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the
fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from
pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional
rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be
minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or
to address the State’s compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regu-
_______________
local government of Manila’s Campaign on Zero Street Dwellers in the City of

Manila for the year 2016 (id., at pp. 200-202):
*** For the period January to August 2016 only.

See also id., at pp. 98-99 and 298.
140 Id., at pp. 296-298.
420
lations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly
drawn.141
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard
applies to regulations on minors as they are still accorded the
freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be
social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the
ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal
constraint not only on the minors’ right to travel but also on their
other constitutional rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance
unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting
in unnecessary curtailment of minors’ rights to freely exercise their
religion and to free speech.145 It observed that:
_______________
141 See In Re Mosier, supra note 127.

142 See People in Interest of J.M, supra note 127.
143 Assessing the Scope of Minors’ Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1163 (March 1984).
144 Note that the court in this US case used “no compelling interest” as the ground to declare the
ordinance unconstitutional. The reasons set forth in its discussion, however, relates to the failure of the
ordinance to be narrowly drawn as to infringe on constitutional rights (see supra note 127).
145 See Qutb v. Strauss (supra note 73), wherein a US court ruled that the assailed curfew ordinance
employed the least restrictive means of accomplishing its objectives as it contained various defenses
or exceptions that narrowly tailored the ordinance and allowed the local government to meet
its goals while respecting the rights of minors. In effect, the ordinance placed only minimal burden
on the minors’ constitutional rights. It held:
Furthermore, we are convinced that this curfew ordinance also employs the least restrictive
means of accomplishing its goals. The ordinance contains various “defenses” that allow affected
minors to remain in public areas during curfew hours. x x x To be sure, the de-
421
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 421
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve
Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at
the various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending
the New [Year’s] Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit
grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives
of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the
city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his
views on the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52) was [a]
very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very
carefully drafted in an attempt to pass con-
_______________
fenses are the most important consideration in determining whether this ordinance is
narrowly tailored.
xxxx
x x x It is true, of course, that the curfew ordinance would restrict some late-night activities of
juveniles; if indeed it did not, then there would be no purpose in enacting it. But when balanced with
the compelling interest sought to be addressed — protecting juveniles and preventing juvenile
crime — the impositions are minor. x x x Thus, after carefully examining the juvenile curfew
ordinance enacted by the city of Dallas, we conclude that it is narrowly tailored to address the
city’s compelling interest and any burden this ordinance places upon minors’ constitutional
rights will be minimal.(Emphases supplied)
422
stitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment
rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from
religious, school, or voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances’ respective

provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance
meets the above discussed requirement, while the Manila and
Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the
coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their
parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those
running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like;
(c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their
employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence
after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146
_______________
146 Rollo, p. 44.

During curfew hours, no children and youths below eighteen (18) years of age
shall be allowed in the streets, commercial establishments, recreation centers, malls
or any other area outside the immediate vicinity of their residence, EXCEPT: 2.
Sec.
those accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or
guardian; (a)
those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (b)
students of night schools and those who, by virtue of their employment,
are required to stay in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 PM;
and (c)
those working at night: (d) PROVIDED, That children falling under
categories c) and d) shall secure a certification from their Punong
Barangay exempting them from the coverage of this Ordinance, or present
documenta-
423
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 423
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to
wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c)
those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination
with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home
during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the
supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age
having authority over them; (f) those involved in accidents,
calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew
during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day,
New Year’s eve, New Year’s day, the night before the barangay
fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints’ and All Souls’ Day, Holy
Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
_______________
tion/identification proving their qualification under such category.

147 Id., at p. 38.
Tuntunin 3. Mga Eksemsyon
a.Eksemsyon dahil sa Gawain [:]
a.1Mga mag-aaral na may klase sa gabi ;
a.2Mga kabataang naghahanapbuhay sa gabi;
a.3Mga kabataang dumalo sa gawain/pagtitipon ng paaralan o simbahan na may
pakikipag-ugnayan sa Tanggapan ng Sangguniang Barangay.
Ang lahat ng kabataan sa sakop ng Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila na nag-aaral o
naghahanapbuhay na ang oras ng pagpasok o pag-uwi ay sakop ng “curfew” ay kailangang kumuha ng
katibayan (certification) mula sa paaralan/tanggapan/pagawaan na pinapasukan ng may pagpapatunay
ng Punong Barangay na sumasakop sa mga kinauukulan, upang ito ay magamit sa oras ng “curfew” sa
kanilang pag-uwi o pagpasok.
b.Eskemsyong [sic] Insidental:
b.1Mga kabataang may mga gawain sa ilalim ng superbisyon o pamamahala ng
kanilang mga magulang /tagapag-alaga o mga indibiduwal na
424
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly
drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run
the risk of overly restricting the minors’ fundamental freedoms. To
be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful
employment, and to travel at night from school or
work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas
Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do
not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors’ rights of
association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble,
and of free expression, among others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and
thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas
Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights
than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides
insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church
activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate nonschool or
nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such
activities; thus, their freedom of association is
_______________
nasa hustong gulang (18 taon at pataas) na may awtoridad sa kanila;

b.2Mga kabataang napasama sa mga aksidente, kalamidad at mga tulad nito.
k.Eksemsyong tuwing may okasyon:
k.1Bisperas at Araw ng Pasko;
k.2Bisperas at Araw ng Bagong Taon ;
k.3Bisperas at Araw ng Pistang Barangay ;
k.4Araw ng Santo /Araw ng mga Kaluluwa;
k.5Huwebes Santo ;
k.6Biyernes Santo ;
k.7Sabado de Gloria ; at
k.8Pasko ng Pagkabuhay.
148 The Curfew Ordinances exempt minors from the curfews when they are engaged in night school,
night work, or emergency situations (id., at pp. 38, 44, and 53-54).
425
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 425
effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in
legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church,
also contributes to the minors’ social, emotional, and intellectual
development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the
Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the
curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively
prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities
(such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults,
similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate
activity done pursuant to the minors’ right to freely exercise their
religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues
for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city council
meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to
peaceably assemble and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to
engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds
no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate
activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance
the State’s compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers
of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of
criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered
without any reasonable relation to the State’s interest; hence, the
Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila
Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be
completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew
regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above
mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be
valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such,
_______________
149 In Re Mosier, supra note 127.
426
they cannot subsist independently despite the presence150of any
separability clause.151
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first
two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors’
constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:
4. SectionEXEMPTIONS. —Minor children under the following circumstances shall
not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious
mass,
_______________
150 See Tuntunin 4 of the Navotas Ordinance (Rollo, p. 42); and Section 12 of the Manila Ordinance
(Rollo, p. 46).
151 The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The
presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended
separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so
far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it
by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make
a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making
the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended
the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if
some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must
fall with them. (Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 371; 281 SCRA 330, 361-
362 [1997], citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 28-29, 1986 Ed.)
427
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 427
and/or other extra curricular activities of their school or organization wherein

their attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such
minors are out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their
control as verified by the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration,
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar
incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or
returning home from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no
violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school,
religious, recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private
activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private
civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that
supervises the activity or when the minor is going to or returning home from
such activity, without any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was
dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening
428
or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions

under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to
sufficiently protect the minors’ rights of association, free exercise of
religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of
exceptions guarantees the protection of these aforementioned
rights. These items uphold the right of association by
enabling minors to attend both official and extra curricular
activities not only of their school or church but also of
other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably
assemble and of free expression are also covered by these
items given that the minors’ attendance in the official
activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed
during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the
right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in
the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at
religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to
their right to travel, the ordinance allows the minor-
participants to move to and from the places where these
activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the
Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only
prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to
the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within
the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly
authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in
legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew
hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
_______________
152 Rollo, pp. 53-54.
429
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 429
Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission
is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a)
of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., “[t]hose accompanied by their
parents or guardian,” as accompaniment should be understood not
only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court
sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception
so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic
premise that State interference is not superior but only
complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the
Constitution itself prescribes, the parents’ right to rear their
children is not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in
passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare
of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper
consent due to their incapability to fully understand the import
and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale
that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.153
Under our legal system’s own recognition of a minor’s inherent
lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same against the
State’s compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the
Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly
drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these
exceptions are in no way
_______________
153 Malto v. People, 560 Phil. 119, 139-140; 533 SCRA 643, 662 (2007).
430
limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful
exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding,
or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as
the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as
applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the

Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper

— as it was raised — to further discuss the validity of its penal
provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the
parent/s or guardian under Section 8 thereof,154 does not impose
any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance
requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to
render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of —
should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the
fine imposed — or in addition to the fine imposed
therein.155Meanwhile, the Manila Or-
_______________
154 Rollo, pp. 57-59.

155 See amended Navotas Ordinance; id., at pp. 41-42.
1. TuntuninPAMPATAKARANG KAPARUSAHAN AT MULTA.
a) Unang Paglabag – ang mahuhuli ay dadalhin sa Tanggapan ng Kagalingang Panlipunan at
Pagpapaunlad (MSWDO). Ipapatawag ang magulang o tagapag-alaga sa kabataang lumabag at
pagkuha ng tala hinggil sa pagkatao nito (Pangalan, Edad, Tirahan, Pangalan ng Magulang o
Tagapag-alaga), at pagpapaalala, kasunod ang pagbabalik sa kalinga ng magulang o tagapagalaga ng
batang nahuli.
b) Pangalawang Paglabag – Ang batang lumabag ay [dadalhin] sa MSWDO, pagmumultahin ang
magulang/tagapag-alaga ng halagang P300.00 piso, dahil sa kapabayaan o apat (4) na oras na
gawaing sibiko-sosyal
431
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 431
dinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on
the age and frequency of violations, to wit:
4. SEC.Sanctions and Penalties for Violation.—Any child or youth violating this
ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of
a REP-
_______________
o pangkomunidad ng magulang/tagapag-alaga at ang batang nahuli.

k) Ikatlong Paglabag – pagmumulta ng magulang/tagapag-alaga ng halagang P300.00 piso dahil
sa kapabayaan at apat (4) na oras ng gawaing sibiko-sosyal o pangkomunidad ng magulang/tagapag-
alaga at ang batang nahuli.
d) Para sa pang-apat at paulit-ulit na lalabag ay papatawan ng kaparusahang doble sa itinakda
ng Tuntuning 1.k ng ordinansang ito.
1.1 Sa pagkakataong walang multang [maibibigay] ang magulang/tagapag-alaga ng
kabataang [nahuli], ang Tanggapan ng Kagalingang Panlipunan at Pagpapaunlad (MSDWO)
ay magpapataw ng gawaing sibiko-social o pangkomunidad sa magulang at ang
batang nahuli katumbas ng nasabing multa tulad ng mga sumusunod:
a. Apat (4) na oras na paglilinis ng kanal o lansangan na itinakda ng nasabing
tanggapan.
b. Apat (4) na oras na pagtatanim ng puno sa lugar na itatakda ng nasabing
tanggapan.
c. Apat (4) na oras na gawaing pagpapaganda ng komunidad bilang suporta sa
programang “Clean and Green” ng Pamahalaang Bayan. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
432
RIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender’s parent,
guardian or person exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning
about the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one
(1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That
the complaint shall be filed by the Punong Barangay with the office of the
City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, springs the question of whether local governments could

validly impose on minors these sanctions — i.e., (a) community
service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d)
imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344,
as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors
for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:
57. SEC.Status Offenses.—Any conduct not considered an offense or not
penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and
shall not be punished if committed by a child.
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156 Id., at p. 45.
433
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 433
57-A. SEC.Violations of Local Ordinances.—Ordinances enacted by local
governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew
violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as
light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to,
disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal
nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and
trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on
children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to
any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their
parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such
ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a “child at risk” and not as a “child in
conflict with the law.” The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as
counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in
parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of

regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar
conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e.,
status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition
of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations.
Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors,
without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of
Section 57-A.
434
“Penalty”157 is defined as “[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer
usually in the form of imprisonment or fine”;158“[p]unishment
imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a
deliberate or negligent act.”159 Punishment, in turn, is defined as
“[a] sanction — such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of
property, right, or privilege — assessed against a person who has
violated the law.”160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to
mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the
regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof
empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention
programs, such as community-based programs161 recognized
under Section 54162 of the same law.
_______________
157 Penalties (as punishment) are imposed either: (1) to “satisfy the community’s retaliatory sense of
indignation that is provoked by injustice” (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1270, 8th ed. — or for retribution
following the classical or juristic school of thought underlying the criminal law system (Boado, Notes and
Cases on the Revised Penal Code, p. 9, 2012 ed.); (2) to “change the character of the offender” (Black’s Law
Dictionary, p. 1270, Eight ed.) — or for reformation pursuant to the positivist or realistic school of thought
(Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, pp. 9-10, 2012 ed.); (3) to “prevent the repetition of
wrongdoing by disabling the offender” (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1270, 8th ed.) — following the
utilitarian theory (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, p. 11, 2012 ed.); or (4) for both
retribution and reformation pursuant to the eclectic theory (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal
Code, p. 11, 2012 ed.).
158 Black’s Law Dictionary, id., at p. 1168.
159 Philippine Law Dictionary, p. 688, 3rd ed.
160 Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1269, 8th ed.
161 Section 4(f) of RA 9344 reads:
4. SectionDefinition of Terms.—x x x.
xxxx
(f) “Community-based Programs” refers to the programs provided in a community setting
developed for purposes of intervention and diversion, as well as reha-
435
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 435
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community
service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately
adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one,
the community service programs provide minors an alternative
mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their
delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by jail
detention. In the same light, these programs help inculcate
discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More
importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive
members of society and thereby promote their integration to and
solidarity with their community.disapproval to the minor’s
misdemeanor. Admonition is gen-
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is
likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is
merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing
disapproval to the minor’s misdemeanor. Admonition is gen-
_______________
bilitation of the child in conflict with the law, for reintegration into his/her family and/or
community.
162 Section 54 of RA 9344 reads:
54. SectionObjectives of Community-Based Programs.—The objectives of community-based
programs are as follows:
(a) Prevent disruption in the education or means of livelihood of the child in conflict with the
law in case he/she is studying, working or attending vocational learning institutions;
(b) Prevent separation of the child in conflict with the law from his/her parents/guardians to
maintain the support system fostered by their relationship and to create greater awareness of
their mutual and reciprocal responsibilities;
(c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the child in conflict with the law and
encourage community support and involvement; and
(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in conflict with the law by preventing jail
detention.
436
erally defined as a “gentle or friendly reproof” or “counsel or
warning against fault or oversight.”163 The Black’s Law Dictionary
defines admonition as “[a]n authoritatively issued warning or
censure”;164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a
“gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder,
[counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of
authoritative advice or warning.”165 Notably, the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our
jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that “a
warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty.”166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based
programs and admonition are clearly not penalties — as they are
not punitive in nature — and are generally less intrusive on the
rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to
formally inform and educate the minor,
_______________
163 <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/admonition> (last accessed

on March 14, 2017).
164 p. 52, 8th ed.
165 p. 36, 3rd ed.
166 See Section 52(g), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (RRACCS) (promulgated on November 18, 2011), which states
that: “[a] warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty.” See also In the
Matter of the Contempt Orders Against Lt. Gen. Jose M. Calimlim and Atty.
Domingo A. Doctor, Jr., 584 Phil. 377, 384; 562 SCRA 393, 402 (2008), citing Tobias
v. Veloso, 188 Phil. 267, 274-275; 100 SCRA 177, 184 (1980); Re: Anonymous
Complaint against Ms. Hermogena F. Bayani for Dishonesty, 656 Phil. 222, 228; 641
SCRA 220, 222 (2011); and Dalmacio-Joaquin v. Dela Cruz, 690 Phil. 400, 409; 676
SCRA 55, 64 (2012), to name a few.
See also Section 58(i), Rule IV of Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999 or
the “Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service”
(RURACCS) (September 27, 1999). The RRACCS (Section 46(f), Rule 10) and its
predecessor RURACCS (Section 52(c), Rule IV), however, consider reprimand (or
censure) as a penalty imposed for light offenses.
437
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 437
and for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so
as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to
reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of
Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as “a severe
or formal reproof.”167 The Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “a
mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer’s
ability to practice law”;168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary
defines it as a “public and formal censure or severe reproof,
administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to
which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or
admonition.”169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public
pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed,
to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly
warn the erring individual including the public against repeating
or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the
erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp
disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our
jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a
penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably
constitute penalties — as provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence — that Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical,
and unambiguous. It states that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed
on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile
_______________
167 <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reprimand> (last accessed on

March 14, 2017).
168 p. 1329, 8th ed.
169 p. 818, 3rd ed.
170 See Section 52(f) Rule 10 of the RRACCS: “[t]he penalty of reprimand x x x.”
See also Tobias v. Veloso, supra note 166 at p. 275; p. 185.
438
status offenses].” Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand,
fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions
of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably
conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of
community service programs and admonition on the minors are
allowed as they do not constitute penalties.
Conclusion
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances
have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test — that is,
that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to
promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed
the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only
issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive
means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City
Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to
freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed
curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State’s
purpose. Section 4(a) of the said ordinance, i.e., “[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian,” has also been
construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of
accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew
measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the
discretion of the local government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared
unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City
Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in
accordance with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila
Ordinance’s penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of
439
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 439
RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances
should always conform with the law, these provisions must be
struck down as invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court
hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local
government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg.
No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13
issued by the local government of Navotas
City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while
Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local
government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance
with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires,
Tijam and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., See Separate Opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result. All of the assailed ordinances should have

been struck down for failing to ground themselves on demonstrated
rational bases, for failing to adopt the least restrictive means to
achieve their aims, and for failing to show narrowly tailored
enforcement measures that foreclose abuse by law enforcers. The
doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify these ordinances. While
this doctrine enables state intervention for the welfare of children,
its operation must not transgress the constitutionally enshrined
natural and primary right of parents to rear their children.
However, the adoption by this Court of the interpretation of
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance to the
440
effect that parental permission in any form for any minor is also an
exception will have the effect of narrowly tailoring the application
of that curfew regulation.
The assailed ordinances are not novel. Navotas City Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 99-021 was passed on August 26, 1999. City of
Manila Ordinance No. 80462 was passed on October 14, 2002.
Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-2301f3was passed on July 31, 2014.
The present controversy was spurred by the revitalized, strict
implementation of these curfew ordinances as part of police
operations under the broad umbrella of “Oplan Rody.” These
operations were in fulfillment of President Rodrigo Duterte’s
campaign promise for a nationwide implementation of a curfew for
minors.4
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), an
association of youths and minors for “the protection of the rights
and welfare of youths and minors,” and its members Joanne Rose
Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan
(Baccutan), Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), and Clarissa
Joyce Villegas (Villegas) filed the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the ordinances are
unconstitutional and in violation of Republic Act No. 9344.5
_______________
1 Entitled “Nagtatakda ng ‘Curfew’ ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong
Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila.” See Rollo, pp. 37-40.
2 Entitled “An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 PM to 4:00 AM of the Following Day as
‘Barangay Curfew Hours’ for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties
Therefor; and for Other Purposes.” Id., at pp. 44-47.
3 Entitled “An Ordinance Setting for a Disciplinary Hours [sic] in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00
PM to 5:00 AM, Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes.” Id., at pp. 48-60.
4 Id., at p. 6, Petition.
5 Id., at pp. 4-5, Petition.
441
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 441
I
Constitutional Challenges Against
Local Legislation
Petitioners submit a multi-faceted constitutional challenge

against the assailed ordinances.
They assert that the assailed ordinances should be declared
unconstitutional as the lack of expressed standards for the
identification of minors facilitates arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.6
Petitioners further argue that the assailed ordinances unduly
restrict a minor’s liberty, in general, and right to travel, in
particular.7
Likewise, petitioners assert that, without due process, the
assailed ordinances intrude into or deprive parents of their
“natural and primary right”8 to rear their children.
Ordinances are products of “derivative legislative power”9 in that
legislative power is delegated by the national legislature to local
government units. They are presumed constitutional and, until
judicially declared invalid, retain their binding effect. In Tano v.
Hon. Gov. Socrates:10
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units)
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumenta-
_______________

9 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 308; 455 SCRA 308, 327 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
10 343 Phil. 670; 278 SCRA 154 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
442
tive contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.11
The presumption of constitutionality is rooted in the respect that

the judiciary must accord to the legislature. InEstrada v.
Sandiganbayan:12
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is
forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of
another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial
branch accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.13
The same respect is proper for acts made by local legislative

bodies, whose members are equally presumed to have acted
conscientiously and with full awareness of the constitutional and
statutory bounds within which they may operate.
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 700-701; pp. 174-175, citing La Union Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon, 259 Phil.
457; 179 SCRA 828 (1989) [Per J.Gancayco, First Division], and Francisco v. Permskul, 255 Phil. 311; 173
SCRA 324 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
12 421 Phil. 290; 369 SCRA 394 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
13 Id., at p. 342; p. 431.
443
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 443
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City of
Manila14 explained:
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: “The presumption is all in favor of
validity . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of
their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject and necessitates action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in
effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.”15
The presumption of constitutionality may, of course, be

challenged. Challenges, however, shall only be sustained upon a
clear and unequivocal showing of the bases for invalidating a law.
In Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar:16
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to
invalidate [a law] based on . . . baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of
the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.” This presumption
of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required
majority may the Court pro-
_______________
14 128 Phil. 473; 20 SCRA 849 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

15 Id., at pp. 475-476; pp. 856-857.
16 727 Phil. 430; 716 SCRA 677 (2014) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
444
nounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be
struck down.17
Consistent with the exacting standard for invalidating

ordinances, Hon. Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College,18outlined
the test for determining the validity of an ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.19
The first consideration hearkens to the primacy of the

Constitution, as well as to the basic nature of ordinances as
products of a power that was merely delegated to local government
units. In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio:20
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to
the Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must
pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the
prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate exist-
_______________
17 Id., at p. 447; p. 696.

18 706 Phil. 138; 693 SCRA 141 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
19 Id., at p. 157.
20 Supra note 9.
445
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 445
ing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by
virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter.21 (Citations omitted)
II
Appraising due process

and equal protection challenges
At stake here is the basic constitutional guarantee that “[n]o

person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.”22 There are two (2) dimensions to this: first, is an
enumeration of objects of protection — life, liberty and
property; second, is an identification and delimitation of the
legitimate mechanism for their modulation or abnegation — due
process and equal protection. The first dimension lists specific
objects whose bounds are amorphous; the second dimension
delineates action, and therefore, requires precision.
Speaking of life and its protection does not merely entail
ensuring biological subsistence. It is not just a proscription against
killing. Likewise, speaking of liberty and its protection does not
merely involve a lack of physical restraint. The objects of the
constitutional protection of due process are better understood
dynamically and from a frame of consummate human dignity. They
are likewise better understood integrally, operating in a synergistic
frame that serves to secure a person’s integrity.
_______________
21 Id., at p. 308; p. 327.

22 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 1.
446
“Life, liberty and property” is akin to the United Nations’
formulation of “life, liberty, and security of person”23 and the
American formulation of “life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness.”24 As the American Declaration of Independence
postulates, they are “unalienable rights” for which “[g]overnments
are instituted among men” in order that they may be
secured.25 Securing them denotes pursuing and obtaining them, as
much as it denotes preserving them. The formulation is, thus, an
aspirational declaration, not merely operating on factual givens
but enabling the pursuit of ideals.
“Life,” then, is more appropriately understood as the fullness of
human potential: not merely organic, physiological existence, but
consummate self-actualization, enabled and effected not only by
freedom from bodily restraint but by facilitating an empowering
existence.26“Life and liberty,” placed in the context of a
constitutional aspiration, it then becomes the duty of the
government to facilitate this empowering existence. This is not an
inventively novel understanding but one that has been at the
bedrock of our social and political conceptions. As Justice George
Malcolm, speaking for this Court in 1919, articulated:
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a
civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others.
The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right
to be free
_______________
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 3.

24 American Declaration of Independence (1776).
25 In the words of the American Declaration of Independence: “We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men[.]”
26 See Maslow, Abraham H., A Theory of Human Motivation, Psychological
Review, pp. 50, 370-396 (1943).
447
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 447
from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject
only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long
array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in lawful ways; to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief
elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one’s employment,
the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.27
It is in this sense that the constitutional listing of the objects of

due process protection admits amorphous bounds. The
constitutional protection of life and liberty encompasses a
penumbra of cognate rights that is not fixed but evolves —
expanding liberty — alongside the contemporaneous reality in
which the Constitution operates. People v. Hernandez28 illustrated
how the right to liberty is multifaceted and is not limited to its
initial formulation in the due process clause:
[T]he preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not
satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the
Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8),
(11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1)29 to the protection of
several aspects of freedom.30
_______________
27 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 705 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
28 99 Phil. 515 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
29 CONST. (1935), Art. III, Sec. I provides:
448
_______________
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (1) 1. Section
....
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized. (3)
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired. (4)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise. (5)
The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged. (6)
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. (7)
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances. (8)
....
No (11) ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a p (12)oll tax.
No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. (13)
The privilege of the writ of (14) habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in
any of which
449
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 449
While the extent of the constitutional protection of life and
liberty is dynamic, evolving, and expanding with contemporaneous
realities, the mechanism for preserving life and liberty is
immutable: any intrusion into it must be with due process of law
and must not run afoul of the equal protection of the laws.
Appraising the validity of government regulation in relation to
the due process and equal protection clauses invokes three (3)
levels of analysis. Proceeding similarly as we do now with the task
of appraising local ordinances,White Light Corporation v. City of
Manila31 discussed:
_______________
events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall
exist.
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (15)
All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital
offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required. (16)
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. (17)
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. (18)
....
Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. (21)
30 People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 551-552 (1956) [Per J.Concepcion, En Banc]. This enumeration
must not be taken as an exhaustive listing of the extent of constitutional protection vis-à-visliberty.
Emphasis is placed on how the penumbra of cognate rights evolves and expands with the times.
31 596 Phil. 444; 576 SCRA 416 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
450
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is
best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme
Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged
that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a
“discrete and insular” minority or infringement of a “fundamental right.” Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom
of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for
economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted
by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy.
Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig, after the Court
declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. While the test may have first been articulated in equal
protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due
process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld
if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review,
governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling,
rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means
for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the
standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to
justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The
United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect
451
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 451
fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel. 32 (Citations
omitted)
An appraisal of due process and equal protection challenges

against government regulation must admit that the gravity of
interests invoked by the government and the personal liberties or
classification affected are not uniform. Hence, the three (3) levels
of analysis that demand careful calibration: the rational basis
tethe inefficacy of all possible alternatives. Here, it isst,
intermediate review, and strict scrutiny. Each level is typified by
the dual considerations of: first, the interest invoked by the
government; and second, the means employed to achieve that
interest.
The rational basis test requires only that there be a legitimate
government interest and that there is a reasonable connection
between it and the means employed to achieve it.
Intermediate review requires an important government interest.
Here, it would suffice if government is able to demonstrate
substantial connection between its interest and the means it
employs. In accordance with White Light, “the availability of less
restrictive measures [must have been] considered.”33 This demands
a conscientious effort at devising the least restrictive means for
attaining its avowed interest. It is enough that the means
employed is conceptually the least restrictive mechanism that the
government may apply.
Strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are fundamental
freedoms or what is involved are suspect classifications. It requires
that there be a compelling state interest and that the means
employed to effect it are narrowly-tailored, actually — not only
conceptually — being the least restrictive means for effecting the
invoked interest. Here, it does not suffice that the government
contemplated on the means available to it. Rather, it must show an
active effort at demonstrating the inefficacy of all possible
alternatives. Here, it is
_______________
32 Id., at pp. 462-463; pp. 436-438.

33 Id., at p. 463; p. 437.
452
required to not only explore all possible avenues but to even
debunk the viability of alternatives so as to ensure that its chosen
course of action is the sole effective means. To the extent
practicable, this must be supported by sound data gathering
mechanisms.
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas34 further explained:
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the “rational basis”
test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection,
judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the
abdication of this Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution
and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional
act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive
acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.35(Emphasis
supplied)
Cases involving strict scrutiny innately favor the preservation of

fundamental rights and the nondiscrimination of protected classes.
Thus, in these cases, the burden falls upon the government to
prove that it was impelled by a compelling state interest and that
there is actually no other less restrictive mechanism for realizing
the interest that it invokes:
_______________
34 487 Phil. 531; 446 SCRA 299 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
35 Id., at pp. 599-600; pp. 389-390.
453
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 453
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.36
III
The present Petition entails fundamental rights and defines
status offenses. Thus, strict scrutiny is proper.
By definition, a curfew restricts mobility. As effected by the

assailed ordinances, this restriction applies daily at specified times
and is directed at minors, who remain under the authority of their
parents.
Thus, petitioners correctly note that at stake in the present
Petition is the right to travel. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution provides:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law. 6. Section
While a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, this

right is not absolute. The Constitution itself states that
_______________
36 Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015, 777 SCRA
574 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], citing White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra note 31;
Concurring Opinion of J. Leonardo-De Castro in Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 112-143; 699 SCRA 352,
435-468 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]; and Separate Concurring Opinion of CJ. Reynato S.
Puno in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, 632 Phil. 32, 106; 618 SCRA 32, 93 (2010)
[Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
454
the right may be “impaired” in consideration of: national security,
public safety, or public health.37 The ponenciaunderscores that the
avowed purpose of the assailed ordinances is “the promotion of
juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime.”38 The assailed
ordinances, therefore, seem to find justification as a valid exercise
of the State’s police power, regulating — as opposed to completely
negating — the right to travel.
Given the overlap of the state’s prerogatives with those of
parents, equally at stake is the right that parents hold in the
rearing of their children.
There are several facets of the right to privacy. Ople v.
Torres39 identified the right of persons to be secure “in their per-
_______________
37 CONST., Art. II, Sec. 12.

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. 12.
Section
38 Ponencia, p. 405.
39 354 Phil. 948; 293 SCRA 141 (1998) [Per J. Puno, En Banc] states:
[T]he right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is
expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.” (1) 3. “Sec.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz.:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws. 1. “Sec.
455
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 455
sons, houses, papers, and effects,”40 the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures,41 liberty of abode,42the right to form
associations,43 and the right against self-incrimination44 as among
these facets.
While not among the rights enumerated under Article III of the
1987 Constitution, the rights of parents with respect to the family
is no less a fundamental right and an integral aspect of liberty and
privacy. Article II, Section 12 characterizes the right of parents in
the rearing of the youth to be
_______________
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. 2. Sec.
....
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law. 6. Section
....
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged. 8. Section
....
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” (Citations omitted)
17. Section
40 Id.
41 Id., Art. III, Sec. 2.
456
‘‘natural and primary.”45 It adds that it is a right, which shall
“receive the support of the Government.”46
Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,47 affirms the natural and primary rights of
parents in the rearing of children as a facet of the right to privacy:
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control
over their minor child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very
well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family
life, would result in the violation of one’s privacy with respect to his family.48
This Court’s 2009 Decision in White Light49unequivocally
characterized the right to privacy as a fundamental right. Thus,
alleged statutory intrusion into it warrants strict scrutiny.50
_______________
45 Id., Art. II, Sec. 12:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. 12.
Section
46 Id
48 Id., at p. 193; p. 352.
49 White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra note 31.
50 White Light is notable, not only for characterizing privacy as a fundamental right whose intrusions
impel strict scrutiny. It is also notable for extending a similar inquiry previously made by this Court in
1967, in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, supra note
14.
There, operators of motels assailed a supposed infringement of their property rights by an ordinance
increasing license fees for their motels. In upholding the validity of the ordi-
457
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 457
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to
its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed
by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the
petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard
— the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners
to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons — those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in
question.
....
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we
upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of
rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to
include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of
the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
faculties with which he has been endowed
_______________
nance, this Court distinguished between “freedom of the mind” and property rights and held that ‘‘if the
liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts
is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property,
the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.” Since the case only involved property rights, this
Court found that the state interest of curbing “an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals”
sufficed. White Light extended the consideration of rights involved in similar establishments by
examining, not only motel owners’ property rights but also their clientele’s privacy rights.
458
by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare.’’ . . . In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use
his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood
by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the
concept of liberty. . .
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of
sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments “have
gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they
provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became
the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’” Whether or not this depiction of a mise-
en-scéne of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among
consenting married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be
curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains
significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy
and interference demands respect. . .
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the
invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded
recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.51 (Citations
omitted)
_______________
51 White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra note 31 at pp. 464-466; pp. 440-441.
459
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 459
In determining that the interest invoked by the State was not
sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion of the patrons’ privacy
rights, this Court weighed the State’s need for the “promotion of
public morality” as against the individual patrons’ “liberty to make
the choices in [their] lives,” thus:
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court
is sworn to protect. . .
....
[T]he continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the
right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the
enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not
with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from
our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and
protected by the State.52 (Citation omitted)
Apart from impinging upon fundamental rights, the assailed

ordinances define status offenses. They identify and restrict
offenders, not purely on the basis of prohibited acts or omissions,
but on the basis of their inherent personal condition. Altogether
and to the restriction of all other persons, minors are exclusively
classified as potential offenders. What is potential is then made
real on a passive basis, as the commission of an offense relies
merely on presence in public places at given times and not on the
doing of a conclusively noxious act.
The assailed ordinances’ adoption and implementation concern a
prejudicial classification. The assailed ordinances are
demonstrably incongruent with the Constitution’s unequivo-
_______________
52 Id., at pp. 469-471; pp. 443-445.
460
cal nurturing attitude towards the youths and whose mandate is to
“promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social well-being.”53
This attitude is reflected in Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which
takes great pains at a nuanced approach to children. Republic Act
No. 9344 meticulously defines a “child at risk” and a “child in
conflict with the law” and distinguishes them from the generic
identification of a “child” as any “person under the age of eighteen
(18) years.”54 These concepts were
_______________
53 CONST., Art. II, Sec. 13.

54 4. SectionDefinition of Terms.—The following terms as used in this Act shall be defined as
follows:
....
(c) “Child” refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
(d) “Child at Risk” refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal
offenses because of personal, family and social circumstances, such as, but not limited to, the
following:
(1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical, psychological, mental, economic or
any other means and the parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or unable to provide
protection for the child;
(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;
(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and inquiry, the parent or
guardian cannot be found;
(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a parent or guardian;
(5) being out of school;
(6) being a streetchild;
(7) being a member of a gang;
(8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug abuse; and
(9) living in situations of armed conflict.
461
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 461
adopted precisely to prevent a lackadaisical reduction to a
wholesale and indiscriminate concept, consistent with the
protection that is proper to a vulnerable sector. The assailed
ordinances’ broad and sweeping determination of presence in the
streets past defined times as delinquencies warranting the
imposition of sanctions tend to run afoul of the carefully calibrated
attitude of Republic Act No. 9344 and the protection that the
Constitution mandates. For these, a strict consideration of the
assailed ordinances is equally proper.
IV
The apparent factual bases for the

assailed ordinances are tenuous at best.
To prove the necessity of implementing curfew ordinances,

respondents City of Manila and Quezon City provide statistical
data on the number of Children in Conflict with the Law
(CICL).55 Quezon City’s data is summarized as follows:56
_______________
(e) “Child in Conflict with the Law” refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or adjudged
as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws.
55 “Child in Conflict with the Law” refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or adjudged as,
having committed an offense under Philippine laws. Rep. Act No. 9344, Sec. 4(e).
56 Rollo, pp. 330-333.
462
The data submitted, however, is inconclusive to prove that the

city is so overrun by juvenile crime that it may as well be totally
rid of the public presence of children at specified times. While there
is a perceptively raised number of CICLs in Quezon City, the data
fails to specify the rate of these figures in relation to the total
number of minors and, thus, fails to establish the extent to which
CICLs dominate the city. As to geographical prevalence that may
justify a city-wide prohibition, a substantial number
of barangays reported not having CICLs for the entire year. As to
prevalence that stretches across the relative maturity of all who
may be considered minors (e.g., grade-schoolers as against
adolescents), there was also no data showing the average age of
these CICLs.
The City of Manila’s data, on the other hand, is too conflicting to
be authoritative. The data reports of the Manila Police
Department, as summarized in the ponencia,57 state:
The Department of Social Welfare and Development of the City
of Manila has vastly different numbers. As summarized in
the ponencia:58
_______________
57 Ponencia, p. 418, fn 139.

58 Id.
463
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 463
YEAR NUMBER OF CICL
2015 845
January to June 2016 524
The Department of Social Welfare of Manila submits that for
January to August 2016, there was a total of 480 CICLs as part of
their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign.59 Of the 480 minors, 210
minors were apprehended for curfew violations, not for petty
crimes.60 Again, the data fails to account for the percentage of
CICLs as against the total number of minors in Manila.
The ponencia cites Shleifer v. City of Charlottesville,61 a United
States Court of Appeals case, as basis for examining the validity of
curfew ordinances in Metro Manila. Far from supporting the
validity of the assailed ordinances, Shleiferdiscounts
it. Shleifer relies on unequivocally demonstrated scientific and
empirical data on the rise of juvenile crime and the emphasis on
juvenile safety during curfew hours inCharlottesville, Virginia.
Here, while local government units adduced data, there does not
appear to have been a well-informed effort as to these data’s
processing, interpretation, and correlation with avowed policy
objectives.
With incomplete and inconclusive bases, the concerned local
government units’ justifications of reducing crime and sweeping
averments of “peace and order” hardly sustain a rational basis for
the restriction of minors’ movement during curfew hours. If at all,
the assertion that curfew restrictions ipso facto equate to the
reduction of CICLs appears to be a gratuitous conclusion. It is
more sentimental than logical. Lacking in even a rational basis, it
follows that there is no support for the more arduous requirement
of demonstrating that the assailed ordinances support a compelling
state interest.
_______________
59 Rollo, p. 201, Annex 5 of City of Manila Comment.

60 Id., at p. 202, Annex 5 of City of Manila Comment.
61 159 F.3d 843 (1998).
464
V
It has not been demonstrated that the curfews

effected by the assailed ordinances are the least
restrictive means for achieving their avowed purposes.
The strict scrutiny test not only requires that the challenged law
be narrowly tailored in order to achieve compelling governmental
interests, it also requires that the mechanisms it adopts are the
least burdensome or least drastic means to achieve its ends:
Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of procreation,
the right to marry, the right to exercise First Amendment freedoms such as free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.
Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either classifies on the basis of an
inherently suspect characteristic or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the
presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is, such legislation is assumed to be
unconstitutional until the government demonstrates otherwise. The government must show
that the statute is supported by a compelling governmental interest and the means chosen
to accomplish that interest are narrowly tailored. Gerald Gunther explains as follows:
. . . The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two
demands a demand not only as to means but also as to ends. Legislation qualifying
for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory
purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal
protection: means had to be shown “necessary” to achieve statutory ends, not merely
“reasonably related.” Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as
well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by “com-
465
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 465
pelling” state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of “legitimate” state ends.
Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least burdensome or least drastic means
available for achieving the governmental objective.62 (Citations omitted)
The governmental interests to be protected must not only be

reasonable. They must be compelling. Certainly, the promotion of
public safety is compelling enough to restrict certain freedoms. It
does not, however, suffice to make a generic, sweeping averment of
public safety.
To reiterate, respondents have not shown adequate data to prove
that an imposition of curfew lessens the number of CICLs.
Respondents further fail to provide data on the frequency of crimes
against unattended minors during curfew hours. Without this
data, it cannot be concluded that the safety of minors is better
achieved if they are not allowed out on the streets during curfew
hours.
While the ponencia holds that the Navotas and Manila
Ordinances tend to restrict minors’ fundamental rights, it found
that the Quezon City Ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve its
objectives. The Quezon City Ordinance’s statement of its objectives
reads:
_______________
232 Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio-Morales in Central Bank Employees

Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 34 at pp. 697-701; pp.
496-500, citing Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990); Attorney General of New
York v. Soto Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903-904 (1986); Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 235 (1995); Chapter 9 of GUNTHER, G., Constitutional Law (12th ed., 1991);
and Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. pp. 1, 21 (1972).
466
WHEREAS . . . the children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their
proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which led them into
exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing
criminal offenses;
....
WHEREAS, as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth,
unproductive bystanders, street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam
around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly
or in groups, without lawful purpose or justification;
WHEREAS, to keep themselves away from the watch and supervision of
the barangay officials and other authorities, these misguided minor children preferred to
converge or flock together during the night time until the wee hours of the morning
resorting to drinking on the streets and other public places, illegal drug use and sometimes
drug peddling, engaging in troubles and other criminal activities which often resulted to
bodily injuries and loss of lives;
WHEREAS, reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that
minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent
personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national laws;
WHEREAS, it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the
movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them
from neglect, abuse, cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or
detrimental to their development;
WHEREAS, to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is
a need to put a restraint on the tendency of a growing number of the youth spending their
nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality
467
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 467
and to ensure that the dissident elements in society are not provided with potent avenues
for furthering their nefarious activities[.]63
In order to achieve these objectives,64 the ponencia cites the
ordinances’ exemptions, which it found to be “sufficiently
safeguard[ing] the minors’ constitutional rights”:65
4. SECTIONEXEMPTIONS.—Minor children under the following circumstances shall
not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance:
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or
other extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their
attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out
and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by
the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as
conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter,
and similar incidents;
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or
returning home from the same place of employment activity, without any detour or
stop;
(e) When the minor is in motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no
violation of this Ordinance;
_______________
63 Rollo, pp. 317-318.

64 It should be pointed out that the statement “most of minor children become out-of-school youth,
unproductive bystanders, street children, and member of notorious gangs” is an absurd generalization
without any basis.
65 Ponencia, pp. 426-427.
468
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity sponsored
by the city, barangay, school or other similar private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is going to
or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was
dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student. 66
The ponencia states:

[T]he Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly
contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a
time where danger is perceivably more prominent.67
The ponencia unfortunately falls into a hasty generalization. It
generalizes unattended minors out in the streets during curfew
hours as potentially, if not actually, engaging in criminal activities,
merely on the basis that they are not within the bounds of the
stated exemptions. It is evident, however, that the exemptions are
hardly exhaustive.
Consider the dilemma that petitioner Villegas faces when she
goes out at night to buy food from a convenience store because the
rest of her family is already asleep.68 As a Quezon
_______________
66 Rollo, pp. 322-323.

68 Rollo, p. 7, Petition.
469
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 469
City resident, she violates the curfew merely for wanting to buy
food when she gets home from school.
It may be that a minor is out with friends or a minor was told to
make a purchase at a nearby sari-sari store. None of these is
within the context of a “party, graduation ceremony, religious
mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their school and
organization” or part of an “official school, religious, recreational,
educational, social, community or other similar private activity.”
Still, these activities are not criminal or nefarious.night looking for
food to eat or scraps to sell. The Department To the contrary,
socializing with friends, unsavorily portrayed as mere loafing or
loitering as it may be, contributes to a person’s social and
psychological development. Doing one’s chores is within the scope
of respecting one’s elders.
Imposing a curfew on minors merely on the assumption that it
can keep them safe from crime is not the least restrictive means to
achieve this objective. Petitioners suggest street lighting programs,
installation of CCTVs in street corners, and visible police
patrol.69 Public safety is better achieved by effective police work,
not by clearing streets of children en masse at night. Crimes can
just as well occur in broad daylight and children can be just as
susceptible in such an environment. Efficient law enforcement,
more than sweeping, generalized measures, ensures that children
will be safe regardless of what time they are out on the streets.
The assailed ordinances’ deficiencies only serve to highlight their
most disturbing aspect: the imposition of a curfew only burdens
minors who are living in poverty.
For instance, the Quezon City Ordinance targets minors who are
not traditionally employed as the exemptions require that the
minor be engaged in “an authorized employment activity.” Curfew
violators could include minors who scour garbage at night looking
for food to eat or scraps to sell. The Department
_______________
470
of Social Welfare and Development of Manila reports that for 2016,
2,194 minors were turned over as part of their Zero Street Dwellers
Campaign.70 The greater likelihood that most, if not all, curfew
violators will be street children — who have no place to even come
home to — than actual CICLs. So too, those caught violating the
ordinance will most likely have no parent or guardian to fetch
them from barangay halls.
An examination of Manila Police District’s data on CICLs show
that for most of the crimes committed, the motive is poverty, not a
drive for nocturnal escapades.71Thus, to lessen the instances of
juvenile crime, the government must first alleviate poverty, not
impose a curfew. Poverty alleviation programs, not curfews, are
the least restrictive means of preventing indigent children from
turning to a life of criminality.
VI
The assailed ordinances give

unbridled discretion to law enforcers.
The assailed ordinances are deficient not only for failing to

provide the least restrictive means for achieving their avowed ends
but also in failing to articulate safeguards and define limitations
that foreclose abuses.
In assailing the lack of expressed standards for identifying
minor, petitioners invoke the void for vagueness doctrine.72
The doctrine is explained in People v. Nazario:73
_______________
70 Id., at p. 200, Annex 5 of City of Manila Comment.

71 Id., at pp. 116-197, Annexes “1,” “2,” and “3’’ of City of Manila Comment.
73 247-A Phil. 276; 165 SCRA 186 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].
471
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 471
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.’’ It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.74
While facial challenges of a statute on the ground of vagueness is

permitted only in cases involving alleged transgressions against
the right to free speech, penal laws may nevertheless be
invalidated for vagueness “as applied.” In Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan:75
[T]he doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American
law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that “one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.” As has been pointed out,
“vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a particular defendant.” Consequently, there
_______________
74 Id., at p. 286; p. 195, citing Tribe, American Constitutional Law,Tribe, p. 718 (1978) and Connally
v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
75 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 12.
472
is no basis for petitioner’s claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face
and in its entirety.76
The difference between a facial challenge and an as-applied

challenge is settled. As explained in Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council:77
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting
real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws
and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.78 (Citation omitted)
Thus, to invalidate a law with penal provisions, such as the

assailed ordinances, as-applied parties must assert actual
violations of their rights and not prospective violations of the
rights of third persons. In Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.:79
In relation to locus standi, the “as applied challenge” embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights.
The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court.
_______________
76 Id., at pp. 354-355; p. 466, citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529
(1960); Yazoo & Mississippi Valley RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 193 (1912);
and Constitutional Law, Gunther G. & Sullivan, K., p. 1299 (2001).
77 646 Phil. 452; 632 SCRA 146 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
78 Id., at p. 489; p. 186, citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705; 489 SCRA 160 (2006)
[Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
79 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 47.
473
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 473
This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.80
The ponencia states that petitioners’ invocation of the void for

vagueness doctrine is improper. It reasons that petitioners failed to
point out any ambiguous provision in the assailed ordinances. 81 It
then proceeds to examine the provisions of the ordinances, vis-à-
vis their alleged defects, while discussing how these defects may
affect minors and parents who are not parties to this case. In
effect, the ponencia engaged in a facial examination of the assailed
ordinances. This facial examination is an improper exercise for the
assailed ordinances, as they are penal laws that do not ostensibly
involve the right to free speech.
The more appropriate stance would have been to examine the
assailed ordinances, not in isolation, but in the context of the
specific cases pleaded by petitioners. Contrary to the ponencia’s
position, the lack of specific provisions in the assailed ordinances
indeed made them vague, so much so that actual transgressions
into petitioner’s rights were made.
The questioned Navotas and City of Manila Ordinances do not
state any guidelines on how law enforcement agencies may
determine if a person apprehended is a minor.
For its part, Section 5(h) of the Quezon City ordinance provides:
Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of this Act. (h)82
However, the Section 7 it refers to provides no guidelines on the
identification of age. It merely states that any member
_______________
80 Id., at p. 127; p. 284, citing the Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio inRomualdez v. Commission on
Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 406; 553 SCRA 370, 436 (2008) (Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
82 Rollo, p. 324.
474
of the community may call the attention of barangayofficials if they
see minors during curfew hours:
7. SECTIONCommunity Involvement/Participation.—Any person who has personal
knowledge of the existence of any minor during the wee hours as provided under Section 3
hereof, must immediately call the attention of the barangay.83
The ponencia asserts that Republic Act No. 9344, Section

7 addresses the lacunae as it articulates measures for
84
determining age. However, none of the assailed ordinances actually

refers law enforcers to extant statutes. Their actions and
prerogatives are not actually limited whether by the assailed
ordinances’ express provisions or by implied invocation. True,
Republic Act No. 9344 states its prescriptions but the assailed
ordinances’ equivocation by silence reduces these prescriptions to
mere suggestions, at best, or to mere afterthoughts of a
justification, at worst.
Thus, the lack of sufficient guidelines gives law enforcers
“unbridled discretion in carrying out [the assailed ordinances’]
provisions.”85 The present Petition illustrates how this has
engendered abusive and even absurd situations.
Petitioner Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), an 18-year-old
— no longer a minor — student, recalled that when he
_______________
83 Id., at p. 326.
84 7. Rep. Act No. 9344, Sec.Determination of Age.—The child in conflict with
the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of
a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or
older. The age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other
relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in
his/her favor.
85 People v. Nazario, supra note 73 at p. 286; p. 195.
475
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 475
was apprehended for violating the curfew, he showed the barangay
tanod his registration card. Despite his presentation of an official
document, the barangay tanodrefused to believe him. Delos Reyes
had to resort to showing the barangay tanod his hairy legs for
the tanodonly when there is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or
ex-to let him go.86
Petitioner Baccutan likewise alleged that he and his friends
were apprehended by 10 barangay tanods for violating curfew even
though he was already 19 years old at that time. He alleged that
he and his friends were told to perform 200 squats and if they
refused, they would be framed up for a crime. They were released
only when the aunt of one (1) of his friends arrived.87
These instances illustrate how predicaments engendered by
enforcing the assailed ordinances have not been resolved by
“simply presenting any competent proof of
identification” considering that precisely, the assailed ordinances
88
state no mandate for law enforcers to check proof of age before

apprehension. Clear and explicit guidelines for implementation are
imperative to foreclose further violations of petitioners’ due process
rights. In the interim, the assailed statutes must be invalidated on
account of their vagueness.
VII
The doctrine of parens patriae

does not sustain the assailed ordinances.
The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify the intrusions into

parental prerogatives made by the assailed ordinances. The State
acts as parens patriae in the protection of minors only when there
is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or ex-
_______________
86 Rollo, p. 7, Petition.
87 Id., at p. 6.
476
ploitation. It cannot, on its own, decide on how children are to be
reared, supplanting its own wisdom to that of parents.
The doctrine of parens patriae is of Anglo-American, common law
origin. It was understood to have “emanate[d] from the right of the
Crown to protect those of its subjects who were unable to protect
themselves.”89 It was the King’s “royal prerogative”90 to “take
responsibility for those without capacity to look after
themselves.”91 At its outset, parens patriae contemplated situations
where vulnerable persons had no means to support or protect
themselves. Given this, it was the duty of the State, as the
ultimate guardian of the people, to safeguard its citizens’ welfare.
The doctrine became entrenched in the United States, even as it
gained independence and developed its own legal tradition. In Late
Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ v. United States,92 the United
States Supreme Court explained parens patriae as a beneficent
state power and not an arbitrary royal prerogative:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to
those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarch to the great
detriment
_______________
89 Kindred, Kay, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a
State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO STATE L. J. 519, 526 (1996).
90 J., Ryan and D. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the State: A Parens Patriae
Primer, 86 Ill. Bar J. 684 (1998), citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
405 U.S. 251, 257 (172).
91 Margaret Hall, The Vulnerability Jurisdiction: Equity, Parens Patriae, and
the Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 2(1) CAN. J. OF COMP. & CONTEMP. L.
185, 190-191 (2016), citing Sir James Munby,Protecting the Rights of Vulnerable
and Incapacitous Adults – the Role of the Courts: An Example of Judicial Law-
making, 26 CHILD & FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 64, 66 (2014).
92 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
477
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 477
of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent
function, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the
prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.93(Emphasis supplied)
In the same case, the United States Supreme Court emphasized

that the exercise of parens patriae applies “to the beneficiaries of
charities, who are often incapable of vindicating their rights, and
justly look for protection to the sovereign authority.” 94 It is from
this reliance and expectation of the people that a state stands as
“parent of the nation.”95
American colonial rule and the adoption of American legal
traditions that it entailed facilitated our own jurisdiction’s
adoption of the doctrine of parens patriae.96Originally, the doctrine
was understood as “the inherent power and authority of the state
to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui
juris.”97
However, significant developments have since calibrated our
own understanding and application of the doctrine.
Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides:
_______________
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 J., Ryan and D., Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. BAR J.
684 (1998); see also Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,
G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017, 824 SCRA 164 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]
96 See Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728 (1916) [Per J. Trent,
Second Division].
97 Vasco v. Court of Appeals, 171 Phil. 673, 677; 81 SCRA 762, 766 (1978) [Per J. Aquino, Second
Division], citing 67 C.J.S. 624; andGovernment of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte de Piedad, id.
478
. . . The natural and 12. Section primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
It is only the 1987 Constitution which introduced the qualifier

“primary.” The present Article II, Section 12’s counterpart
provision in the 1973 Constitution merely referred to “[t]he natural
right and duty of parents”:
. . . The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the aid and support of the Government.
4. Section98
As with the 1973 Constitution, the 1935 Constitution also merely

spoke of “[t]he natural right and duty of parents”:
The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth fLorenzo,100 the
authority cited by ponencia in explaining theor civic efficiency should receive the aid and
support of the government. 4. Section99
The addition of the qualifier “primary” unequivocally attests to

the constitutional intent to afford primacy and preeminence to
parental responsibility. More plainly stated, the Constitution now
recognizes the superiority of parental prerogative. It follows, then,
that state interventions, which are tantamount to deviations from
the preeminent and superior rights of parents, are permitted only
in instances where the parents themselves have failed or have
become incapable of performing their duties.
Shifts in constitutional temperament contextualize Nery v.
Lorenzo,100 the authority cited by ponencia in explaining the
_______________
98 CONST. (1973), Art. II, Sec. 4.

99 CONST. (1935), Art. II, Sec. 4.
100 150-A Phil. 241; 44 SCRA 431 (1972) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
479
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 479
State’s role in the upbringing of children.101 In Nery, this Court
alluded to the State’s supreme authority to exercise parens
patriae. Nery was decided in 1972, when the 1935 Constitution was
in operation.102 It stated:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or individual[s] who because of age or incapacity are in an
unfavorable position, vis-à-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what
concerns them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This
obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust.103
This outmoded temperament is similarly reflected in the 1978

case of Vasco v. Court of Appeals,104 where, without moderation or
qualification, this Court asserted that “the State is considered
the parens patriae of minors.’’105
In contrast, Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,106 a cased decided by this Court
in 2014, unequivocally characterized parents’ rights as being
“superior” to the state:
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the
1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable
role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it
places more importance on the role of parents in
_______________

102 CONST. (1935), Art. II, Sec. 4 was worded almost as similarly as the 1973 Constitution.
103 Nery v. Lorenzo, supra note 100 at p. 248; p. 438.
104 Vasco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 97.
105 Id., at p. 677; p. 766.
106 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 47.
480
the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be “primary,” that is,
that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.107 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the State acts as parens patriae only when parents cannot
fulfill their role, as in cases of neglect, abuse, or exploitation:
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to
provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them
from everyone, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual development as
responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by
family acrimony.108
As it stands, the doctrine of parens patriae is a mere substitute

or supplement to parents’ authority over their children. It operates
only when parental authority is established to be absent or grossly
deficient. The wisdom underlying this doctrine considers the
existence of harmand the subsequent inability of the person to
protect himself or herself. This premise entails the incapacity of
parents and/or legal guardians to protect a child.
To hold otherwise is to afford an overarching and almost
absolute power to the State; to allow the Government to arbitrarily
exercise its parens patriae power might as well render the superior
Constitutional right of parents inutile.
_______________
107 Id., at p. 195; p. 355, citing Records, 1986 Constitutional Convention,
Volume IV, pp. 401-402.
108 Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, 505 Phil. 529, 546; 468 SCRA 438, 457
(2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]. See also Dela Cruz v. Gracia, G.R. No.
177728, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 649 [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Second Division].
481
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 481
More refined applications of this doctrine reflect this position. In
these instances where the State exercised its powers over minors
on account of parens patriae, it was only because the children were
prejudiced and it waswithout subverting the authority of the
parents themselves when they have not acted in manifest offense
against the rights of their children.
Thus, in Bernabe v. Alejo,109 parens patriae was exercised in order
to give the minor his day in court. This is a matter beyond the
conventional capacities of parents, and therefore, it was necessary
for the State to intervene in order to protect the interests of the
child.
In People v. Baylon110 and other rape cases,111 this Court held that
a rigorous application of the penal law is in order, since “[t]he
state, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the
risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully.”112 In these criminal cases
where minor children were victims, this Court, acting as the
representative of the State exercising its parens patriae power, was
firm in imposing the appropriate penalties for the crimes — no
matter how severe — precisely because it was the only way to
mitigate further harm to minors. Parens patriae is also the reason
why “a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any
_______________
109 424 Phil. 933; 374 SCRA 180 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
110 156 Phil. 87; 57 SCRA 114 (1974) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
111 See also People v. Cabodac, 284-A Phil. 303, 312; 208 SCRA 787, 794 (1992) [Per J. Melencio-
Herrera, Second Division]; People v. Dolores, 266 Phil. 724; 188 SCRA 660 (1990) [Per J. Melencio-
Herrera, Second Division]; People v. Cawili, 160 Phil. 25; 65 SCRA 24 (1975) [Per J.Fernando, Second
Division]; and People v. Evangelista, 346 Phil. 717; 282 SCRA 37 (1997) [Per J. Belosillo, First
Division]; Malto v. People, 560 Phil. 119; 533 SCRA 643 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
112 People v. Baylon, supra at p. 95; pp. 120-121.
482
lascivious act or sexual intercourse,” as this Court held in Malto
v. People.113 Again, these State actions are well outside the
conventional capabilities of the parents and in no way encroach on
the latter’s authority.
Such assistive and justified regulation is wanting in this case.
VIII
In my view, the interpretation that this Court gives to Section 4,

item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance will sufficiently narrowly
tailor its application so as to save it from its otherwise apparent
breach of fundamental constitutional principles. Thus, in
the ponencia of Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe:
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor
child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night,
notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case,
parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of
the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., “[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian,” as
accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive
sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so
as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is
not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution
itself prescribes, the parents’ right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.
Of course, nothing in this decision will preclude a stricter review

in a factual case whose factual ambient will be different.
_______________
113 People v. Malto, supra note 111.

483
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 483
Accordingly, for these reasons, I concur in the result.
Petition partly granted, Ordinance No. 8046, issued by local
government of City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-
02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by
local government of Navotas City declared unconstitutional and
thus, null and void; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014,
issued by local government of Quezon City declared constitutional
and, thus, valid.
Notes.—To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as
the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been
used by the Court ― the rational relationship test and the strict
scrutiny test. (Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s College, 693 SCRA
141 [2013])
Existing Supreme Court (SC) rulings in the exercise of its
expanded jurisdiction have allowed the direct filing of petitions
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court to question, for grave
abuse of discretion, actions or the exercise of a function that violate
the Constitution. (Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas
Workers, Inc. [AMCOW] vs. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc., 812 SCRA 452 [2016])
December 8, 2015. G.R. No. 209271.*
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-

BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. GREENPEACE
SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT
SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA
(MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASIÑO, DR. BEN MALAYANG
III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III,
CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO
MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR.
WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE, JR.,
FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON,
MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN and EDWIN MARTHINE
LOPEZ, respondents,
CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention.
December 8, 2015. G.R. No. 209276.*
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, BUREAU OF
PLANT INDUSTRY and FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE
AUTHORITY of the Department of Agriculture,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GREENPEACE
WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE, JR.,
LOPEZ, respondents,
_______________
* EN BANC.
435
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 435
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-BiotechApplications, Inc. vs.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)
CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention.
December 8, 2015. G.R. No. 209301.*
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAÑOS

FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. GREENPEACE
WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. HARRY R. ROQUE, JR.,
LOPEZ, respondents.
December 8, 2015. G.R. No. 209430.*
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,

petitioner, vs. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA
(PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA
PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP.
TEODORO CASIÑO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA
GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN,
ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY
MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO KIAT,
ATTY. HARRY R. ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO
MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S.
HAGEDORN and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; The rule on standing is a matter of
procedure which can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.—Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” It
refers particularly to “a
436
party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a
generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a matter of procedure which can
be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. The
Court thus had invariably adopted a liberal policy on standing to allow ordinary citizens
and civic organizations to prosecute actions before this Court questioning the
constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, rulings or orders of various government agencies
or instrumentalities.
Environmental Law; Balanced and Healthful Ecology; The Supreme Court (SC)
recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law.”—Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), signaled an even more liberalized
policy on locus standi in public suits. In said case, we recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We held that such
right need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
Same; Citizen Suits; The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental
cases.—The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The
provision on citizen suits in the Rules “collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature,” and aims to “further
encourage the protection of the environment.” There is therefore no dispute on the standing
of respondents to file before this Court their petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of
continuing mandamus.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 437
Remedial Law; Actions; Moot and Academic; An action is considered ‘moot’ when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic
or dead, or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the
parties.—An action is considered ‘moot’ when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become academic or dead, or when the matter in dispute
has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the
issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. Time and again, courts have refrained
from even expressing an opinion in a case where the issues have become moot and
academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination
thereof would be of no practical use or value.
Same; Same; Same; Not only does this case fall under the “capable of repetition yet
evading review” exception to the mootness principle, the human and environmental health
hazards posed by the introduction of a genetically modified plant, a very popular staple
vegetable among Filipinos, is an issue of paramount public interest.—Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.” We find that the presence of the second and
fourth exceptions justified the CA in not dismissing the case despite the termination of Bt
talong field trials. While it may be that the project proponents of Bt talong have terminated
the subject field trials, it is not certain if they have actually completed the field trial stage
for the purpose of data gathering. At any rate, it is on record that the proponents expect to
proceed to the next phase of the project, the preparation for commercial propagation of
the Bt eggplants. Biosafety permits will still be issued by the BPI for Bt talong or other GM
crops. Hence, not only does this case fall under the “capable of repetition yet evading
review” exception to the mootness principle, the human and environmental health hazards
posed by the introduction of a genetically modified plant, a very popular staple vegetable
among Filipinos, is an issue of paramount public interest.
438
Genetic Manipulation; Genetic manipulation has long been practiced by conventional
breeders of plant or animal to fulfill specific purposes.—Genetic manipulation has long been
practiced by conventional breeders of plant or animal to fulfill specific purposes. The basic
strategy employed is to use the sexual mechanism to reorganize the genomes of two
individuals in a new genetic matrix, and select for individuals in the progeny with the
desirable combination of the parental characteristics. Hybridization is the conventional way
of creating variation. In animals, mating is effected by introducing the desired sperm donor
to the female at the right time. In plants, pollen grains from the desired source are
deposited on the stigma of a receptive female plant. Pollination or mating is followed by
fertilization and subsequently development into an embryo. The effect of this action is the
reorganization of the genomes of two parents into a new genetic matrix to create new
individuals expressing traits from both parents. The ease of crossing of mating varies from
one species to another. However, conventional breeding technologies are limited by their
long duration, need for sexual compatibility, low selection efficiency, and restricted gene
pool.
Genetic Engineering; Words and Phrases; Recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology, often
referred to as genetic engineering, allows scientists to transfer genes from one (1) organism to
any other, circumventing the sexual process.—Recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology, often
referred to as genetic engineering, allows scientists to transfer genes from one organism to
any other, circumventing the sexual process. For example, a gene from a bacterium can be
transferred to corn. Consequently, DNA technology allowed scientists to treat all living
things as belonging to one giant breeding pool. Unlike other natural genome
rearrangements phenomena, rDNA introduces alien DNA sequences into the genome. Even
though crossing of two sexually compatible individuals produces recombinant progeny, the
term recombinant DNA is restricted to the product of the union of DNA segments of
different biological origins. The product of recombinant DNA manipulation is called
a transgenic organism. rDNA is the core technology of biotechnology.
Same; Genetically Modified Organism; The organism that is created through genetic
engineering is called a genetically modified organism (GMO).—The organism that is created
through genetic engineering is called a genetically modified organism (GMO). Since
439
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 439
the production of the first GMOs in the 1970s, genes have been transferred between
animal species, between plant species, and from animal species to plant species. Some
genes can make an animal or plant grow faster or larger, or both. A gene produced by
flounder (anti-freeze) was transplanted into salmon so that salmon can be farmed in colder
climates. Many species of fish are genetically engineered to speed growth, to alter flesh
quality, and to increase cold and disease resistance. In farm animals such as cattle, genes
can be inserted to reduce the amount of fat in meat, to increase milk production, and to
increase superior cheese-making proteins in milk. Biotechnology has also modified plants to
produce its own pesticide, resist common diseases or to tolerate weed-killing herbicide
sprays.
Same; Genetically Modified Foods; The term genetically modified (GM) food refers to
crop plants created for human or animal consumption using the latest molecular biology
techniques.—The term GM food refers to crop plants created for human or animal
consumption using the latest molecular biology techniques. These plants are modified in
the laboratory to enhance desired traits such as increased resistance to herbicides or
improved nutritional content. Genetic modification of plants occurs in several stages: 1. An
organism that has the desired characteristic is identified and the specific gene producing
this characteristic is located and the DNA is cut off. 2. The gene is then attached to a
carrier in order to introduce the gene into the cells of the plant to be modified. Mostly
plasmid (piece of bacterial DNA) acts as a carrier. 3. Along with the gene and carrier a
‘promoter’ is also added to ensure that the gene works adequately when it is introduced into
the plant. 4. The gene of interest together with carrier and promoter is then inserted into
bacterium, and is allowed to reproduce to create many copies of the gene which are then
transferred into the plant being modified. 5. The plants are examined to ensure that they
have the desired physical characteristic conferred by the new gene. 6. The genetically
modified plants are bred with conventional plants of the same variety to produce seed for
further testing and possibly for future commercial use. The entire process from the initial
gene selection to commercial production can take up to ten years or more.
Same; The application of biotechnology in agricultural production promises to overcome
the major constraints being faced in farming such as insect pest infestation and diseases
which lead to sub-
440
stantial yield losses.—The application of biotechnology in agricultural production
promises to overcome the major constraints being faced in farming such as insect pest
infestation and diseases which lead to substantial yield losses. Pest-resistant crops could
substantially improve yields in developing countries where pest damage is rampant and
reduce the use of chemical pesticides. Crop plants which have been genetically engineered
to withstand the application of powerful herbicides using genes from soil bacteria
eliminates the time-consuming and not cost-effective physical removal of weeds by tilling.
The herbicides to which the GM crops are tolerant are “broad spectrum” weed-killers, which
means they can be sprayed over the entire field, killing all plants apart from the GM crop.
Herbicide-tolerant crops include transgenes providing tolerance to the herbicides
(glyphosate or glufosinate ammonium). These herbicides kill nearly all kinds of plants
except those that have the tolerance gene. Another important benefit is that this class of
herbicides breaks down quickly in the soil, eliminating residue carryover problems and
reducing adverse environmental impacts.
Same; Environmental Law; Genetically modified (GM) crops affect the environment in
many ways such as contaminating non-Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) plants,
creating super weeds and super pests, harming nontarget species, changing soil microbial
and biochemical properties, and threatening biodiversity.—Genetically modified crops affect
the environment in many ways such as contaminating non-GMO plants, creating super
weeds and super pests, harming nontarget species, changing soil microbial and biochemical
properties, and threatening biodiversity.
Same; Same; No one can make any accurate predictions about the long-term effects of
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) on human beings and the environment.—It has
been pointed out that the crux of the controversy surrounding GMOs lies in the very nature
of the technology itself. The process of combining inter-species genes, which is called
recombinant DNA technology, does not have the checks and balances that are imposed by
nature in traditional breeding. Because of this there is a risk of genetic instability. This
means that no one can make any accurate predictions about the long-term effects of GMOs
on human beings and the environment. Extensive testing in this regard is either very
expensive or impracti-
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 441
cal, and there is still a great deal about the process that scientists do not understand.
Environmental Law; It is essential to follow sustainable traditional farming practices
that keeps food production in the hands of small-scale farmers, thereby reducing corporate
control.—GM technology is thus seen as a failure in terms of addressing food security;
rather, it supports corporate control and impedes common persons’ access to adequate food.
The root cause of hunger is not a lack of food, GM critics say, but a lack of access to food.
The poor lack money to buy food and lack of land on which to grow it. It is essential to
follow sustainable traditional farming practices that keeps food production in the hands of
small-scale farmers, thereby reducing corporate control.
Biotechnology; The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and
Technology for Development (IAASTD) found little evidence to support a conclusion that
modern biotechnologies are well-suited to meeting the needs of small-scale and subsistence
farmers, particularly under the increasingly unpredictable environmental and economic
conditions that they face.—In 2008, a Global Report was released by the International
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD),
a three-year international collaborative effort (2005-2007) developed out of a consultative
process involving 900 participants and 110 countries from all over the world. This global
initiative assessed agricultural knowledge, science and technology (AKST) in relation to
meeting development and sustainability goals of (1) reducing hunger and poverty; (2)
improving nutrition, health and rural livelihoods; and (3) facilitating social and
environmental sustainability. The report concluded that a radical transformation of the
world’s food and farming systems — especially the policies and institutions that affect them
— is necessary if we are to overcome converging economic and environmental crises and
feed the world sustainably. It also warned that technologies such as high-yielding crop
varieties, agrochemicals and mechanization have primarily benefited the better-resourced
groups in society and transnational corporations, rather than the most vulnerable ones. In
general, the IAASTD found little evidence to support a conclusion that modern
biotechnologies are well-suited to meeting the needs of small-scale and subsistence
442
farmers, particularly under the increasingly unpredictable environmental and
economic conditions that they face.
Same; National Biosafety Framework; Executive Order (EO) No. 514 establishing the
National Biosafety Framework (NBF) clearly provides that the NBF shall “apply to the
development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety policies, measures and guidelines
and in making biosafety decisions concerning the research, development, handling and use,
transboundary movement, release into the environment and management of regulated
articles.”—It must be stressed that DAO 08-2002 and related DA orders are not the only
legal bases for regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO 514 establishing
the National Biosafety Framework (NBF) clearly provides that the NBF shall “apply to the
development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety policies, measures and
guidelines and in making biosafety decisions concerning the research, development,
handling and use, transboundary movement, release into the environment and management
of regulated articles.” The objective of the NBF is to “[e]nhance the decision-making system
on the application of products of modern biotechnology to make it more efficient,
predictable, effective, balanced, culturally appropriate, ethical, transparent and
participatory.” Thus, “the socio-economic, ethical, and cultural benefit and risks of modern
biotechnology to the Philippines and its citizens, and in particular on small farmers,
indigenous peoples, women, small and medium enterprises and the domestic scientific
community, shall be taken into account in implementing the NBF.” The NBF also mandates
that decisions shall be arrived at in a transparent and participatory manner, recognizing
that biosafety issues are best handled with the participation of all relevant stakeholders
and organizations who shall have appropriate access to information and the opportunity to
participate responsibly and in an accountable manner in biosafety decision-making process.
Same; Same; No provision of the National Biosafety Framework (NBF) shall be
construed as to limit the legal authority and mandate of heads of departments and agencies
to consider the national interest and public welfare in making biosafety decisions.—The
NBF contains general principles and minimum guidelines that the concerned agencies are
expected to follow and which their respective rules and regulations must conform with. In
cases of conflict in applying the
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 443
principles, the principle of protecting public interest and welfare shall always prevail,
and no provision of the NBF shall be construed as to limit the legal authority and mandate
of heads of departments and agencies to consider the national interest and public welfare in
making biosafety decisions.
Same; Environmental Law; All government agencies as well as private corporations,
firms and entities who intend to undertake activities or projects which will affect the quality
of the environment are required to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity.—All government agencies as well as
private corporations, firms and entities who intend to undertake activities or projects which
will affect the quality of the environment are required to prepare a detailed Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity. An
environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as “likely to have
significant adverse impact that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse” and which
“include activities that have significant environmental consequences.” In this context, and
given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the potential hazards of GMOs to
human health and the environment, their release into the environment through field
testing would definitely fall under the category of ECP.
Environmental Law; Precautionary Principle; In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.—The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing
the normative idea that governments are obligated to “foresee and forestall” harm to the
environment. In the following decades, the precautionary principle has served as the
normative guideline for policy-making by many national governments. The Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, the outcome of the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, defines the rights of the people to be
involved in the development of their economies, and the responsibilities of human beings to
safeguard the common environment. It states that the long term economic progress is only
ensured if it is linked with the protection
444
of the environment. For the first time, the precautionary approach was codified under
Principle 15, which reads: In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
Same; Same; By applying the precautionary principle, the court may construe a set of
facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction, with the goal of preserving and
protecting the environment.—Under this Rule, the precautionary principle finds direct
application in the evaluation of evidence in cases before the courts. The precautionary
principle bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be
achieved. By applying the precautionary principle, the court may construe a set of facts as
warranting either judicial action or inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the
environment. This may be further evinced from the second paragraph where bias is created
in favor of the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In
effect, the precautionary principle shifts the burden of evidence of harm away from those
likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring to change the status quo. An application of the
precautionary principle to the rules on evidence will enable courts to tackle future
environmental problems before ironclad scientific consensus emerges.
Same; For a biodiversity-rich country like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen
consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.—
Eggplants (talong) are a staple vegetable in the country and grown by small-scale farmers,
majority of whom are poor and marginalized. While the goal of increasing crop yields to
raise farm incomes is laudable, independent scientific studies revealed uncertainties due to
unfulfilled economic benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse effects on the environment
associated with use of GE technology in agriculture, and serious health hazards from
consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country like the Philippines, the natural
and unforeseen consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous
and irreversible.
445
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 445
VELASCO, JR.,J. , Concurring Opinion:
Environmental Law; Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System; View that as

part of the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS), Section 4 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1586 provides that “the President of the Philippines may, on his
own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council
(NEPC), by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as
environmentally critical.”—As part of the PEISS, Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that “the
President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the
National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical.” Pursuant thereto,
Proclamation No. 2146 was issued on December 14, 1981, declaring certain areas and types
of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental Impact
Statement System established under PD 1586. In connection therewith, the same provision
declares that “[n]o person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such
declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative.”
Same; Same; Environmental Compliance Certificate; View that under the Philippine
Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS), if the project is itself identified to be
environmentally critical or to be undertaken at an environmentally critical area, the
proponent has to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).—Under the
PEISS, if the project is itself identified to be environmentally critical or to be undertaken at
an environmentally critical area, the proponent has to secure an ECC. If, however, the
project is identified under the PEISS as environmentally noncritical and is not to be
undertaken in an environmentally critical area, then the proponent will secure a Certificate
of Non-Coverage (CNC) instead of an ECC. It is, however, well to note that even though a
project may be certified as not covered by the environmental impact assessment
requirement, still, there is nothing that will bar the government agencies concerned from
requiring from the proponent the adoption of additional environmental safeguards that
they may deem necessary.
446
Same; Same; Permit to Field Test; View that as it stands, application for field testing of
regulated articles is governed by Part III (Approval Process for Field Testing of Regulated
Articles) of Department of Agriculture Administrative Order (DA AO) No. 8, S. 2002, Section
7 of which states that: No regulated article shall be released into the environment for field
testing, unless: (i) a Permit to Field Test has been secured from the Bureau of Plant Industry
(BPI); and (ii) the regulated article has been tested under contained conditions in the
Philippines.—As it stands, application for field testing of regulated articles is governed by
Part III (Approval Process for Field Testing of Regulated Articles) of DA AO No. 8, S. 2002,
Section 7 of which states that: No regulated article shall be released into the environment
for field testing, unless: (i) a Permit to Field Test has been secured from the BPI; and (ii) the
regulated article has been tested under contained conditions in the Philippines. x x x It is
important, however, to emphasize that despite the issuance of DA AO No. 8, S. 2002, the
NBF, and the NCBP Guidelines, other statutory requirements or those required by
agencies remain in full force and effect. This is bolstered by the fact that EO 514, as
mentioned by the ponencia, requires the determination by the concerned departments or
agencies of whether the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) System should
be applied to biosafety decisions. EO 514 also requires the DENR, as a member of the
NCBP, to ensure that environmental assessments are done and impacts identified in
biosafety decisions.
Same; View that the subject matter of the instant petition –– that is, field testing of a
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) –– is truly of a highly complex nature and this
complexity is strongly demonstrated by the fact that the matter remains to be hotly debated
in the scientific community.—Anent the technical aspect of the case, it is clear from
the ponencia’s lengthy discussion that the safety or danger of introduction of GMOs, in
general, to the natural environment through field testing has yet to be settled with
scientific certainty, if it could indeed be settled. Furthermore, the subject matter of the
instant petition — that is, field testing of a GMO — is truly of a highly complex nature and
this complexity is strongly demonstrated by the fact that the matter remains to be hotly
debated in the scientific community. However, it is respectfully submitted that the instant
petition can be resolved, and the right to a balanced and healthful ecology sufficiently
protected, on a purely legal ground.
447
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 447
Same; Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases; View that anent the invocation of
the Precautionary Principle under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Court’s Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it is submitted that such is not necessary in the instant petition since,
as mentioned, it could be sufficiently settled on purely legal grounds and without a heavy, if
not complete, reliance on the scientific aspect of the case.—Anent the invocation of the
Precautionary Principle under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Court’s Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it is submitted that such is not necessary in the instant petition
since, as mentioned, it could be sufficiently settled on purely legal grounds and without a
heavy, if not complete, reliance on the scientific aspect of the case. As correctly mentioned
by the ponencia, it is an evidentiary rule that must be applied only as a last resort. Thus, if
an environmental case can be settled and the people’s environmental rights sufficiently
protected without applying this principle, then the courts should refrain from doing so.
Same; Genetically Modified Organisms; View that “making [biosafety] decisions
concerning the research, development, handling and use, transboundary movement, release
into the environment and management of regulated articles” include determining the
coverage or non-coverage of a Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) field trial under the
Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS), as well as the propriety of
issuing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) or a Certificate of Non-Coverage
(CNC) for a particular project.—EO 514 calls for the conduct of environmental assessments
and impact identification –– which precisely is the purpose of the PEISS –– whenever
biosafety decisions are to be made with respect to the research, development, handling and
use, transboundary movement, and release into the environment of regulated articles,
which are, to reiterate, GMOs. To my mind, “making [biosafety] decisions concerning the
research, development, handling and use, transboundary movement, release into the
environment and management of regulated articles” include determining the coverage or
noncoverage of a GMO field trial under the PEISS, as well as the propriety of issuing an
ECC or a CNC for a particular project.
Same; Same; View that it was also stated that an environmental assessment may be
required when a confined field test involves new species, organisms or novel modifications
that raise new
448
issues.—It was also stated that an environmental assessment may be required
when a confined field test involves new species, organisms or novel modifications
that raise new issues. Considering that data on the Bt talong, as admitted by the
proponents, is still being collected through research and field trials, and that its effects not
only on the environment but also on human health are yet to be determined with scientific
certainty, caution calls that the DENR-EMB should have applied the required standard of
precaution under EO 514, which requires that the precautionary approach shall guide
biosafety decisions in accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 and the
relevant provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Articles 1, 10 (par.
6) and 11 (par. 8) thereof.
Same; Same; Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System; View that it is but
timely to clarify that Department of Agriculture Administrative Order (DA AO) No. 8, S.
2002 did not expressly state that projects falling under its coverage are withdrawn from the
operation of the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS).—It is but
timely to clarify that DA AO No. 8, S. 2002 did not expressly state that projects falling
under its coverage are withdrawn from the operation of the PEISS. As a matter of fact, the
DENR-EMB itself recognizes that “the PEISS is supplementary and complementary
to other existing environmental laws.” This is further bolstered by the PEISS’ role in
relation to the functions of other government agencies. In this regard, it was highlighted
that it is inherent upon the EIA Process to undertake a comprehensive and integrated
approach in the review and evaluation of environment-related concerns of government
agencies (GAs), local government units (LGUs) and the general public. The subsequent EIA
findings shall provide guidance and recommendations to these entities as a basis for their
decision making process.
Same; Same; Same; View that the omission by the project proponents of securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) or Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC),
whichever is proper for its project, prior to the conduct of the field testing, and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental Management Bureau’s
(DENR-EMB’s) failure to evaluate Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) field trials within
the purview of the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS) and simply
allow-
449
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 449
ing the trials to be conducted without a prior determination of whether the conduct of
an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) or the prior securing of an ECC is a condition
sine qua non for its conduct, warrant the issuance of a permanent environmental protection
order.—It is respectfully submitted that the omission by the project proponents of securing
an ECC or CNC, whichever is proper for its project, prior to the conduct of the field testing,
and the DENR-EMB’s failure to evaluate GMO field trials within the purview of the PEISS
and simply allowing the trials to be conducted without a prior determination of whether the
conduct of an EIA or the prior securing of an ECC is a condition sine qua non for its
conduct, warrant the issuance of a permanent environmental protection order directing: a.
herein project proponents to cease and desist from continuing any pending Bt talong field
trials without first complying with other applicable environmental laws, including the
PEISS; and b. the DENR-EMB to apply the PEISS to GMO field trials.
LEONEN,J., Concurring Opinion:
Environmental Law; Biotechnology; View that the effect of the invalidity of

Administrative Order (AO) No. 8 is that petitioners cannot proceed further with any field
testing or propagation for lack of administrative guidelines.—Commercial propagation will
not happen immediately with Bt talong because Administrative Order No. 8 is null and
void. In its salient parts, it is inconsistent with the basic guidelines provided in our
Constitution, violative of our binding international obligations contained in the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biodiversity (Cartagena Protocol), and
effectively disregards the Executive Orders issued by the President in the fields of
biodiversity and biosafety. The effect of the invalidity of Administrative Order No. 8 is that
petitioners cannot proceed further with any field testing or propagation for lack of
administrative guidelines. Any test or propagation of transgenic crops should await valid
regulations from the executive or restatements of policy by Congress.
Same; Same; View that Administrative Order (AO) No. 8 recognizes three (3) stages
before genetically modified organisms (GMOs) — as products, ingredients, or processes —
may become commercially available.—Administrative Order No. 8 recognizes three (3)
stages before genetically modified organisms — as products, ingredients, or
450
processes — may become commercially available. The first stage is the Contained
Use where research on regulated articles is limited inside a physical containment facility
for purposes of laboratory experimentation. The second stage is Field Testing where
regulated articles are intentionally introduced into the environment in a highly regulated
manner also for experimental purposes. It is specifically recognized that in field testing, no
specific physical containment measures shall be undertaken “to limit that contact of the
regulated article with . . . the general population and the environment.” Prior to field
testing, the results of the contained experiments are taken into consideration. Finally,
the Propagation stage is where regulated articles are introduced into commerce. Each
stage is distinct. Subsequent stages can only proceed if the prior stage/s are completed and
clearance is given to engage in the next regulatory stage. This is evident from the requisites
for conducting each stage.
Same; Same; Genetically Modified Organisms; View that release for commercial
propagation will not be allowed unless “(i) a Permit for Propagation has been secured from
[the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI)]; (ii) it can be shown that based on field testing
conducted in the Philippines, the regulated article will not pose any significant risks to the
environment; (iii) food and/or feed safety studies show that the regulated article will not pose
any significant risks to human and animal health; and (iv) if the regulated article is a pest-
protected plant, its transformation event has been duly registered with the [Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority].”—Release for commercial propagation will not be allowed unless “(i) a
Permit for Propagation has been secured from [the Bureau of Plant Industry]; (ii) it can be
shown that based on field testing conducted in the Philippines, the regulated
article will not pose any significant risks to the environment; (iii) food and/or feed
safety studies show that the regulated article will not pose any significant risks to human
and animal health; and (iv) if the regulated article is a pest-protected plant, its
transformation event has been duly registered with the [Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority].”
Same; Same; View that currently, there is no legislation in relation to biotechnology or
biosafety.—Currently, there is no legislation in relation to biotechnology or biosafety. The
closest legislation is under Republic Act No. 8435, otherwise known as the Agriculture and
Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997. This law makes it an objec-
451
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 451
tive of the state “[t]o modernize the agriculture and fisheries sectors by transforming
these sectors from a resource-based to a technology-based industry.” In line with this,
Congress initially allocated 4% of the 10% research and development fund for agriculture to
be used to support the biotechnology program.
Same; Same; Police Power; View that health and ecological concerns are proper
purposes of regulation and, therefore, can be the basis of the state’s exercise of police
power.—Two constitutional provisions bear upon the issues relied upon by private
respondents in this case. Both are found in Article II, viz.15. The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Traditionally, these
provisions articulate the doctrine that health and ecological concerns are proper purposes of
regulation and, therefore, can be the basis of the state’s exercise of police power. Having
constitutionally ordained goals and principles are, : Section per se, compelling state
interests.
Same; Same; Same; View that Sections 15 and 16 of the 1987 Constitution impose on
the state a positive duty to “promote and protect” the right to health and to “promote and
advance” the right of “the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.”—The right to life is
textually broad to signal the intention that the sphere of autonomy is assumed to
encompass life both in terms of its physical integrity and in terms of its quality. Sections 15
and 16, however, impose on the state a positive duty to “promote and protect” the right to
health and to “promote and advance” the right of “the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.” With respect to health and ecology, therefore, the state is constitutionally
mandated to provide affirmative protection. The mandate is in the nature of an active duty
rather than a passive prohibition. These provisions represent, in no small measure, a shift
in the concept of governance in relation to society’s health. It is a recognition that if private
actors and entities are left to themselves, they will pursue motivations which may not be
too advantageous to nutrition or able to reduce the risks of traditional and modern diseases.
At best, the actors may not be aware of their incremental contributions to increasing risks.
At worse, there may be conscious efforts not to examine health consequences of products
452
and processes introduced in the market. It is expedient for most to consider such costs
as extraneous and affecting their final profit margins.
Same; Same; Cartagena Protocol; View that Article 23 of the Cartagena
Protocol stresses that the public must be consulted in the decision-making process regarding
living modified organisms, and that the decisions made with this regard must be
communicated to the public.—The Cartagena Protocol’s objective is to ensure “an adequate
level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified
organisms resulting from modern biotechnology. . . .” Article 23 of the Cartagena Protocol
stresses that the public must be consulted in the decision-making process regarding living
modified organisms, and that the decisions made with this regard must be communicated to
the public. The Cartagena Protocol emphasizes that risk assessment should be carried out
in a scientifically sound manner. In addition, Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol also
provides that risk assessment must also be done in a transparent manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that Executive Order (EO) No. 514, while not a statute,
provides binding policies and rules for the executive agencies of government in their task of
implementing its legal obligations under the Cartagena Protocol.—Executive Order No. 514,
while not a statute, provides binding policies and rules for the executive agencies of
government in their task of implementing its legal obligations under the Cartagena
Protocol. Hence, all actions of agencies involved in the execution of biosafety in the
Philippines must follow the Cartagena Protocol, the National Biosafety Framework, and
our Constitution.
Same; Same; View that Section 18 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 8 only covers
appeals for “[a]ny person whose permit has been revoked or has been denied a permit or
whose petition for delisting has been denied by the Director of [Bureau of Plant Industry
(BPI)].”—The insouciant approach to public participation during the application
process is obvious as there is no appeal procedure for third parties under
Administrative Order No. 8. The regulation does not consider that communities affected
may want to question the exercise of discretion by the Department of Agriculture or the
Bureau of Plant Industry. Section 18 of Adminis-
453
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 453
trative Order No. 8 only covers appeals for “[a]ny person whose permit has been
revoked or has been denied a permit or whose petition for delisting has been denied by the
Director of [Bureau of Plant Industry].” Procedural due process is taken away from the
public.
Same; Same; Bt Talong; View that the results of the field testing of Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) talong should still be subject to confirmatory tests involving the same
variables in order to attain a level of statistical reliability.—The results of the field testing
of Bt talong should still be subject to confirmatory tests involving the same variables in
order to attain a level of statistical reliability. However, these subsequent field testing must
be done under regulations consistent with our Constitution and international obligations.
They must be conducted under a regulatory agency that will have the competence to be
actively involved in the scientific inquiry.
Same; Same; View that environmental advocacy also requires an understanding of
science and the locating of the proper place of various norms such as the precautionary
principle.—If any, the resolution of this case implies rigor in environmental advocacy.
Vigilance and passion are the hallmarks of the public interest movement. There is no
reason that the members of this movement should not evolve the proper skills and attitudes
to properly work the legal system and understand the role of the judicial process.
Environmental advocacy also requires an understanding of science and the locating of the
proper place of various norms such as the precautionary principle. After all, representation
of marginalized community vices deserves excellent representation and responsible
leadership. Filing a judicial remedy almost two years too late and without the required
scientific rigor patently required by the allegations and the arguments misses these
standards.
Same; Same; View that by declaring Administrative Order (AO) No. 8 null and void,
there is now incentive for either Congress or our administrative bodies to review the present
regulatory framework and bring it not only to legal fiat but also to address all concerns
including those voiced by respondents in this case.—We cannot just leave things as they are
especially when patent unconstitutional provisions surface and where deference will
amount to a denial of the positive constitutional duties were required to discharge. There
are grave errors in Administrative Order No. 8 that stack decisions
454
made by the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Plant Industry in favor of
the commercial applicant. We have so far only evaluated the provisions in accordance with
law and found them wanting. By declaring Administrative Order No. 8 null and void, there
is now incentive for either Congress or our administrative bodies to review the present
regulatory framework and bring it not only to legal fiat but also to address all concerns
including those voiced by respondents in this case.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution

of the Court of Appeals.
Aldrich Fitz U. Dy for petitioner in G.R. No. 209271.
Rosalio A. Aragon, Jr. and Ricardo B. Lapesura, Jr. for
petitioner in G.R. No. 209430.
Filemon D. Nolasco for petitioner in G.R. No. 209301.
Zeldania DT Soriano, Jovencio H. Evangelista, Vanessa Q.
Maguigad, Joel Ruiz Butuyan and Roger R. Rayel for respondents.
Patricia-Ann T. Prodigalidad and Paolo Francisco B. Camacho
pro bono for FARMERS.
Rommel Cuison, Leonid C. Nolasco, Bryan Chester F.
Ocampo and Ron Michael B. Garcia for Biotechnology Coalition of
the Philippines, Inc.
Cruz, Marcelo & Tenefrancia for petitioner-intervenor CROP
LIFE.
Andresito X. Fornier, Themistocles A. Saño, Jr. and Maria Paz
Luna for movants-intervenors.
455
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 455
VILLARAMA, JR.,J.:
The consolidated petitions before Us seek the reversal of the

Decision1 dated May 17, 2013 and Resolution2 dated September 20,
2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00013
which permanently enjoined the conduct of field trials for
genetically modified eggplant.
The Parties
Respondent Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines) is the

Philippine branch of Greenpeace Southeast Asia, a regional office
of Greenpeace International registered in Thailand.3 Greenpeace is
a nongovernmental environmental organization which operates in
over 40 countries and with an international coordinating body in
Amsterdam, Netherlands. It is well known for independent direct
actions in the global campaign to preserve the environment and
promote peace.
Petitioner International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA) is an international nonprofit
organization founded in 1990 “to facilitate the acquisition and
transfer of agricultural biotechnology applications from the
industrial countries, for the benefit of resource-poor farmers in the
developing world” and ultimately “to alleviate hunger and poverty
in the developing countries.” Partly funded by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), ISAAA promotes
the use of agricultural biotechnology, such as genetically modified
organisms (GMOs).4
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 209271), pp. 135-159. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P.
Dicdican, with Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Nina G. Antonio-
Valenzuela, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 161-174.
3 CA Rollo (Vol. VI), Annex “O” of Biotech Petition.
4 <http://www.isaaa.org/inbrief//default.asp> (visited last November 7, 2014).
456
Respondent Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng
Agrikultura (MASIPAG) is a coalition of local farmers, scientists
and NGOs working towards “the sustainable use and management
of biodiversity through farmers’ control of genetic and biological
resources, agricultural production, and associated knowledge.”
The University of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB) is an
autonomous constituent of the University of the Philippines (UP),
originally established as the UP College of Agriculture. It is the
center of biotechnology education and research in Southeast Asia
and home to at least four international research and extension
centers. Petitioner UPLB Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) is a private
corporation organized “to be an instrument for institutionalizing a
rational system of utilizing UPLB expertise and other assets for
generating additional revenues and other resources needed by
[UPLB].” Its main purpose is to assist UPLB in “expanding and
optimally utilizing its human, financial, and material resources
towards a focused thrust in agriculture, biotechnology, engineering
and environmental sciences and related academic programs and
activities.” A memorandum of agreement between UPLBFI and
UPLB allows the former to use available facilities for its activities
and the latter to designate from among its staff such personnel
needed by projects.5
Petitioner University of the Philippines (UP) is an institution of
higher learning founded in 1908. Under its new charter, Republic
Act No. 9500,6 approved on April 29, 2008 by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, UP was declared as the national university
tasked “to perform its unique and distinctive leadership in higher
education and development.” Among others, UP was mandated to
“serve as a research university in various fields of expertise and
specialization by conducting
_______________
5 UPLBFI, “History” <http://uplbfi.org/?page_id=231/> (visited last November 7, 2014).

6 “An Act to Strengthen the University of the Philippines as the National University.”
457
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 457
basic and applied research and development, and promoting
research in various colleges and universities, and contributing to
the dissemination and application of knowledge.”7
The other individual respondents are Filipino scientists,
professors, public officials and ordinary citizens invoking their
constitutionally guaranteed right to health and balanced ecology,
and suing on their behalf and on behalf of future generations of
Filipinos.
Factual Background
Biotechnology is a multi-disciplinary field which may be defined
as “any technique that uses living organisms or substances from
those organisms to make or modify a product, to improve plants or
animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific uses.” 8 Its many
applications include agricultural production, livestock, industrial
chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
In 1979, President Ferdinand Marcos approved and provided
funding for the establishment of the National Institute for Applied
Microbiology and Biotechnology (BIOTECH) at UPLB. It is the
premier national research and development (R & D) institution
applying traditional and modern biotechnologies in innovating
products, processes, testing and analytical services for agriculture,
health, energy, industry and development.9
In 1990, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order
(EO) No. 430 creating the National Committee on Biosafety of the
Philippines (NCBP). NCBP was tasked, among others, to “identify
and evaluate potential hazards involved in initiating genetic
engineering experiments or the introduction
_______________
7 RA 9500, Sec. 3(c).

8 Barnum, Susan R., Biotechnology: An Introduction (1998).
9 University of the Philippines Los Baños National Institute of Molecular Biology and Biotechnology,
“About Us” <http://biotech.uplb.edu.ph/index.php/en/about-us> (visited last November 7, 2014).
458
of new species and genetically engineered organisms and
recommend measures to minimize risks” and to “formulate and
review national policies and guidelines on biosafety, such as the
safe conduct of work on genetic engineering, pests and their
genetic materials for the protection of public health, environment
and personnel and supervise the implementation thereof.”
In 1991, NCBP formulated the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines,
which governs the regulation of the importation or introduction,
movement and field release of potentially hazardous biological
materials in the Philippines. The guidelines also describe the
required physical and biological containment and safety procedures
in handling biological materials. This was followed in 1998 by the
“Guidelines on Planned Release of Genetically Manipulated
Organisms (GMOs) and Potentially Harmful Exotic
Species (PHES).”10
On December 29, 1993, the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) came into force. This multilateral treaty recognized that
“modern biotechnology has great potential for human well-being if
developed and used with adequate safety measures for the
environment and human health.” Its main objectives, as spelled
out in Article 1, are the “conservation of biological diversity, the
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
resources.”
In January 2000, an agreement was reached on the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol), a supplemental to the
CBD. The Cartagena Protocol aims “to contribute to ensuring an
adequate level of the safe transfer, handling and use of living
modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may
have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity, tak-
_______________
10 The Center for Media and Democracy, “GMOs in the Philippines”

<http:/www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/GMOs_in_the_Philippines> (visited last November 7, 2014).
459
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 459
ing into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing
on transboundary movements.”
On May 24, 2000, the Philippines signed the Cartagena Protocol,
which came into force on September 11, 2003. On August 14, 2006,
the Philippine Senate adopted Senate Resolution No. 92 or the
“Resolution Concurring in the Ratification of the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) to the UN Convention on Biological
Diversity.”
On July 16, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued a
policy statement reiterating the government policy of promoting
the safe and responsible use of modern biotechnology and its
products as one of several means to achieve and sustain food
security, equitable access to health services, sustainable and safe
environment and industry development.11
In April 2002, the Department of Agriculture (DA) issued DA-
Administrative Order (AO) No. 08 providing rules and regulations
for the importation and release into the environment of plants and
plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology.
DAO 08-2002 covers the importation or release into the
environment of: (1) any plant which has been altered or produced
through the use of modern biotechnology if the donor organism,
host organism, or vector or vector agent belongs to the genera or
taxa classified by the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) as meeting
the definition of plant pest or is a medium for the introduction of
noxious weeds; or (2) any plant or plant product altered through
the use of modern biotechnology which may pose significant risks
to human health and the environment based on available scientific
and technical information.
The country’s biosafety regulatory system was further
strengthened with the issuance of EO No. 514 (EO 514) on March
17, 2006, “Establishing the National Biosafety Frame-
_______________
11 Id. (See also CA Rollo, pp. 882-884)
460
work (NBF), Prescribing Guidelines for its Implementation, and
Strengthening the NCBP.” The NBF shall apply to the
development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety policies,
measures and guidelines and in making decisions concerning the
research, development, handling and use, transboundary
movement, release into the environment and management of
regulated articles.12
EO 514 expressly provides that, unless amended by the issuing
departments or agencies, DAO 08-2002, the NCBP Guidelines on
the Contained Use of Genetically Modified Organisms, except for
provisions on potentially harmful exotic species which were
repealed, and all issuances of the Bureau of Food and Drugs
Authority (FDA) on products of modern biotechnology, shall
continue to be in force and effect.13
On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking14 (MOU)
was executed between UPLBFI, ISAAA and UP Mindanao
Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in pursuance of a collaborative research
and development project on eggplants that are resistant to the
fruit and shoot borer. Other partner agencies involved in the
project were UPLB through its Institute of Plant Breeding,
Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company (MAHYCO) of India, Cornell
University and the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II
(ABSPII) of USAID.
As indicated in the Field Trial Proposal15 submitted by the
implementing institution (UPLB), the pest-resistant crop subject of
the field trial was described as a “bioengineered eggplant.” The
crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant (talong)
genome to produce the protein Cry1Ac which is toxic to the target
insect pests. Cry1Ac protein is said to be highly specific
to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and
12 EO 514, Sec. 2.1.
13 Id., Sec. 8.
14 CA Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 82-84.
15 Id., at pp. 85-86.
461
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 461
shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive insect pest of eggplant.
Under the regulatory supervision of NCBP, a contained
experiment was started in 2007 and officially completed on March
3, 2009. The NCBP thus issued a Certificate of Completion of
Contained Experiment stating that “During the conduct of the
experiment, all the biosafety measures have been complied with
and no untoward incident has occurred.”16
BPI issued Biosafety Permits17 to UPLB on March 16, 2010 and
June 28, 2010. Thereafter, field testing of Bt talong commenced on
various dates in the following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North
Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago
Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.
On April 26, 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual
respondents (Greenpeace, et al.) filed a petition for writ
of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamuswith prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO).
They alleged that the Bt talong field trials violate their
constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering
that (1) the required environmental compliance certificate under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1151 was not secured prior to the
project implementation; (2) as a regulated article under DAO 08-
2002, Bt talong is presumed harmful to human health and the
environment, and there is no independent, peer-reviewed study on
the safety of Bt talong for human consumption and the
environment; (3) a study conducted by Professor Gilles-Eric
Seralini showed adverse effects on rats who were fed Bt corn, while
local scientists also attested to the harmful effects of GMOs to
human and animal health; (4) Bt crops can be directly toxic to
nontarget species as highlighted by a research conducted in the US
which demonstrated that pollen from Bt maize was toxic to the
Monarch butterfly; (5) data from the use of Bt Cry1Ab maize
indicate
_______________
16 CA Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 885-886.

17 Id., at pp. 1058-1064.
462
that beneficial insects have increased mortality when fed on
larvae of a maize pest, the corn borer, which had been fed on Bt,
and hence nontarget beneficial species that may feed on eggplant
could be similarly affected; (6) data from China show that the use
of Bt crops (Bt cotton) can exacerbate populations of other
secondary pests; (7) the built-in pesticides of Bt crops will lead
to Bt resistant pests, thus increasing the use of pesticides contrary
to the claims by GMO manufacturers; and (8) the 200 meters
perimeter pollen trap area in the field testing area set by BPI is
not sufficient to stop contamination of nearby non-Bt eggplants
because pollinators such as honeybees can fly as far as four
kilometers and an eggplant is 48% insect-pollinated. The full
acceptance by the project proponents of the findings in the
MAHYCO Dossier was strongly assailed on the ground that these
do not precisely and adequately assess the numerous hazards
posed by Bt talong and its field trial.
Greenpeace, et al. further claimed that the Bt talong field test
project did not comply with the required public consultation under
Sections 26 & 27 of the Local Government Code. A random survey
by Greenpeace on July 21, 2011 revealed that ten households living
in the area immediately around the Bt talong experimental farm in
Bay, Laguna expressed lack of knowledge about the field testing in
their locality. The Sangguniang Barangay of Pangasugan in
Baybay, Leyte complained about the lack of information on the
nature and uncertainties of the Bt talong field testing in
their barangay. The Davao City Government likewise opposed the
project due to lack of transparency and public consultation. It
ordered the uprooting of Bt eggplants at the trial site and disposed
them strictly in accordance with protocols relayed by the BPI
through Ms. Merle Palacpac. Such action highlighted the city
government’s policy on “sustainable and safe practices.” On the
other hand, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo passed
a resolution suspending the field testing due to the following: lack
of public consultation; absence of adequate study to determine the
effect of Bt talong field testing on
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 463
friendly insects; absence of risk assessment on the potential
impacts of genetically modified (GM) crops on human health and
the environment; and the possibility of cross-pollination
of Bt eggplants with native species or variety of eggplants, and
serious threat to human health if these products were sold to the
market.
Greenpeace, et al. argued that this case calls for the application
of the precautionary principle, the Bt talong field testing being a
classic environmental case where scientific evidence as to the
health, environmental and socio-economic safety is insufficient or
uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates
reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially
dangerous effects on human health and the environment.
The following reliefs are thus prayed for:
Upon the filing [of this petition], a Temporary Environment
Protection Order should be issued: ( a.i) enjoining public
respondents BPI and FPA of the DA from processing for field
testing, and registering as herbicidal product, Bt talong in the
Philippines; (ii) stopping all pending field testing of Bt
talong anywhere in the Philippines; and (iii) ordering the
uprooting of planted Bt talong for field trials as their very
presence pose significant and irreparable risks to human
health and the environment.
Upon the filing [of this petition], issue a writ of continuing
b. mandamus commanding:
(iRespondents to submit to and undergo the process of
environmental impact statement system under the
Environmental Management Bureau; )
(iiRespondents to submit independent,
comprehensive, and rigid risk assessment, field tests
report, regulatory compliance reports and supporting
documents, and other material particulars of the ) Bt
talong field trial;
464
(iiiRespondents to submit all its issued certifications
on public information, public consultation, public
participation, and consent of the local government units
in the ) barangays, municipalities, and provinces
affected by the field testing of Bt talong;
(ivRespondent regulator, in coordination with
relevant government agencies and in consultation with
stakeholders, to submit an acceptable draft of an
amendment of the National Bio-Safety Framework of
the Philippines, and DA Administrative Order No. 08,
defining or incorporating an independent, transparent,
and comprehensive scientific and socio-economic risk
assessment, public information, consultation, and
participation, and providing for their effective
implementation, in accord with international safety
standards; and )
(vRespondent BPI of the DA, in coordination with
relevant government agencies, to conduct balanced
nationwide public information on the nature of ) Bt
talong and Bt talong field trial, and a survey of social
acceptability of the same.
Upon filing [of this petition], issue a writ of
c. kalikasan commanding Respondents to file their respective
returns and explain why they should not be judicially
sanctioned for violating or threatening to violate or allowing
the violation of the above enumerated laws, principles, and
international principle and standards, or committing acts,
which would result into an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of
petitioners in particular and of the Filipino people in general.
After hearing and judicial determination, to cancel all
d. Bt talong field experiments that are found to be violating
the above mentioned laws, principles, and international
standards; and recommend to Congress curative legislations
to effectuate such order.18
_______________
18 CA Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 67-69.
465
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 465
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued the writ of kalikasanagainst
ISAAA, Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)/BPI/Fertilizer
and Pesticide Authority (FPA) and UPLB,18-a ordering them to
make a verified return within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days, as provided in Sec. 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.19
ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLBFI and UPMFI filed their
respective verified returns. They all argued that the issuance of
writ of kalikasan is not proper because in the implementation of
the Bt talong project, all environmental laws were complied with,
including public consultations in the affected communities, to
ensure that the people’s right to a balanced and healthful ecology
was protected and respected. They also asserted that the Bt
talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental
Impact Statement (PEIS) Law and that Bt talong field trials will
not significantly affect the quality of the environment nor pose a
hazard to human health. ISAAA contended that the NBF amply
safeguards the environment policies and goals promoted by the
PEIS Law. On its part, UPLBFI asserted that there is a “plethora
of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed, on the safety of Bt
talong for human consumption.”20 UPLB, which filed an Answer21 to
the petition before the CA, adopted said position of UPLBFI.
ISAAA argued that the allegations regarding the safety of Bt
talong as food are irrelevant in the field trial stage as none of the
eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals, and all
materials that will not be used for analyses will be chopped, boiled
and buried following the Biosafety Permit
_______________
18-a Id., at p. 400.

19 A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC (2010).
20 CA Rollo (Vol. III), p. 2026.
21 Id., at pp. 2120-2123. UPLB was not served with the writ of kalikasan issued by this Court nor
furnished with copy of the petition of Greenpeace, et al. Its Answer, adopting the arguments and
allegations in the verified return filed by UPLBFI, was filed in the CA. See CA Resolution dated August
17, 2012, id., at pp. 2117-2119.
466
requirements. It cited a 50-year history of safe use and
consumption of agricultural products sprayed with
commercial Bt microbial pesticides and a 14-year history of safe
consumption of food and feed derived from Bt crops. Also
mentioned is the almost 2 million hectares of land in the
Philippines which have been planted with Bt corn since 2003, and
the absence of documented significant and negative impact to the
environment and human health. The statements given by
scientists and experts in support of the allegations of
Greenpeace, et al. on the safety of Bt corn was also addressed by
citing the contrary findings in other studies which have been peer-
reviewed and published in scientific journals.
On the procedural aspect, ISAAA sought the dismissal of the
petition for writ of kalikasan for nonobservance of the rule on
hierarchy of courts and the allegations therein being mere
assertions and baseless conclusions of law. EMB, BPI and FPA
questioned the legal standing of Greenpeace, et al. in filing the
petition for writ of kalikasanas they do not stand to suffer any
direct injury as a result of the Bt talong field tests. They likewise
prayed for the denial of the petition for continuing mandamus for
failure to state a cause of action and for utter lack of merit.
UPMFI also questioned the legal standing of Greenpeace, et al.
for failing to allege that they have been prejudiced or damaged, or
their constitutional rights to health and a balanced ecology were
violated or threatened to be violated by the conduct of Bt
talong field trials. Insofar as the field trials in Davao City, the
actual field trials at Bago Oshiro started on November 25, 2010 but
the plants were uprooted by Davao City officials on December 17-
18, 2010. There were no further field trials conducted and hence no
violation of constitutional rights of persons or damage to the
environment, with respect to Davao City, occurred which will
justify the issuance of a writ of kalikasan. UPMFI emphasized that
under the MOU, its responsibility was only to handle the funds for
the project in their trial site. It pointed out that in the Field Trial
Proposal, Public Information Sheet, Biosafety Permit for Field
467
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 467
Testing, and Terminal Report (Davao City Government) by
respondent Leonardo R. Avila III, nowhere does UPMFI appear
either as project proponent, partner or implementing arm. Since
UPMFI, which is separate and distinct from UP, undertook only
the fund management of Bt talong field test project the duration of
which expired on July 1, 2011, it had nothing to do with any field
trials conducted in other parts of the country.
Finally, it is argued that the precautionary principle is not
applicable considering that the field testing is only a part of a
continuing study being done to ensure that the field trials have no
significant and negative impact on the environment. There is thus
no resulting environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health, property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. Moreover, the issues raised by Greenpeace, et
al. largely involve technical matters which pertain to the special
competence of BPI whose determination thereon is entitled to great
respect and even finality.
By Resolution dated July 10, 2012, the Court referred this case
to the CA for acceptance of the return of the writ and for hearing,
reception of evidence and rendition of judgment.22
CA’s Proceedings and Judgment
At the preliminary conference held on September 12, 2012, the

parties submitted the following procedural issues: (1) whether or
not Greenpeace, et al. have legal standing to file the petition for
writ of kalikasan; (2) whether or not said petition had been
rendered moot and academic by the alleged termination of the Bt
talong field testing; and (3) whether or not the case presented a
justiciable controversy.
Under Resolution23 dated October 12, 2012, the CA resolved that:
(1) Greenpeace, et al. possess the requisite legal stand-
_______________
22 Id., at p. 2100.
23 Id., at pp. 2312-2324.
468
ing to file the petition for writ of kalikasan; (2)
assuming arguendo that the field trials have already been
terminated, the case is not yet moot since it is capable of repetition
yet evading review; and (3) the alleged noncompliance with
environmental and local government laws present justiciable
controversies for resolution by the court.
The CA then proceeded to hear the merits of the case, adopting
the “hot-tub” method wherein the expert witnesses of both parties
testify at the same time. Greenpeace, et al. presented the following
as expert witnesses: Dr. Ben Malayang III (Dr. Malayang), Dr.
Charito Medina (Dr. Medina), and Dr. Tushar Chakraborty (Dr.
Chakraborty). On the opposing side were the expert witnesses in
the persons of Dr. Reynaldo Ebora (Dr. Ebora), Dr. Saturnina
Halos (Dr. Halos), Dr. Flerida Cariño (Dr. Cariño), and Dr. Peter
Davies (Dr. Davies). Other witnesses who testified were: Atty.
Carmelo Segui (Atty. Segui), Ms. Merle Palacpac (Ms. Palacpac),
Mr. Mario Navasero (Mr. Navasero) and Dr. Randy Hautea (Dr.
Hautea).
On November 20, 2012, Biotechnology Coalition of the
Philippines, Inc. (BCPI) filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to
Intervene as Respondent.24 It claimed to have a legal interest in the
subject matter of the case as a broad-based coalition of advocates
for the advancement of modern biotechnology in the Philippines.
In its Resolution25 dated January 16, 2013, the CA denied BCPI’s
motion for intervention stating that the latter had no direct and
specific interest in the conduct of Bt talong field trials.
On May 17, 2013, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of
Greenpeace, et al., as follows:
_______________
24 CA Rollo (Vol. IV), pp. 2450-2460.

25 Id., at pp. 2864-2871.
469
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 469
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,
judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition
filed in this case. The respondents are DIRECTED to:
Permanently cease and desist from further conducting
(a) bt talong field trials; and
Protect, preserve, rehabilitate and restore the
environment in accordance with the foregoing judgment
of this Court. (b)
No costs.
SO ORDERED.26
The CA found that existing regulations issued by the DA and the

Department of Science and Technology (DOST) are insufficient to
guarantee the safety of the environment and health of the people.
Concurring with Dr. Malayang’s view that the government must
exercise precaution “under the realm of public policy” and beyond
scientific debate, the appellate court noted the possible irreversible
effects of the field trials and the introduction of Bt talong to the
market.
After scrutinizing the parties’ arguments and evidence, the CA
concluded that the precautionary principle set forth in Section 1,
Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases27 finds
relevance in the present controversy. Stressing the fact that the
“overall safety guarantee of the bt talong” remains unknown, the
appellate court cited the testimony of Dr. Cariño who admitted
that the product is not yet safe for consumption because a safety
assessment is still to be done. Again, the Decision quoted from Dr.
Malayang who
_______________
26 Rollo (G.R. No. 209271), Vol. I, pp. 157-158.

27 1. SECTIONApplicability.—When there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a
causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary
principle in resolving the case before it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of
the doubt.
470
testified that the question of Bt talong’s safety demands
maximum precaution and utmost prudence, bearing in mind the
country’s rich biodiversity. Amid the uncertainties surrounding
the Bt talong, the CA thus upheld the primacy of the people’s
constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology.
Denying the motions for reconsideration filed by ISAAA,
EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI, the CA in its Resolution dated
September 20, 2013 rejected the argument of UPLB that the
appellate court’s ruling violated UPLB’s constitutional right to
academic freedom. The appellate court pointed out that the writ
of kalikasan originally issued by this Court did not stop research
on Bt talong but only the particular procedure adopted in doing
field trials and only at this time when there is yet no law in the
form of a congressional enactment for ensuring its safety and levels
of acceptable risks when introduced into the open environment.
Since the writ stops the field trials of Bt talong as a procedure but
does not stop Bt talong research, there is no assault on academic
freedom.
The CA then justified its ruling by expounding on the theory
that introducing a genetically modified plant into our ecosystem is
an “ecologically imbalancing act.” Thus:
We suppose that it is of universal and general knowledge

that an ecosystem is a universe of biotic (living) and non-
biotic things interacting as a living community in a particular
space and time. In the ecosystem are found specific and
particular biotic and non-biotic entities which depend on each
other for the biotic entities to survive and maintain life. A
critical element for biotic entities to maintain life would be
that their populations are in a proper and natural proportion
to others so that, in the given limits of available non-biotic
entities in the ecosystem, no one population overwhelms
another. In the case of the Philippines, it is considered as one
of the richest countries in terms of biodiversity. It has so
many plants and animals. It also has many kinds of other liv-
471
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 471
ing things than many countries in the world. We do not
fully know how all these living things or creatures interact
among themselves. But, for sure, there is a perfect and
sound balance of our biodiversity as created or
brought about by God out of His infinite and absolute
wisdom. In other words, every living creature has been in
existence or has come into being for a purpose. So, we
humans are not supposed to tamper with any one element in
this swirl of interrelationships among living things in our
ecosystem. Now, introducing a genetically modified
plant in our intricate world of plants by humans
certainly appears to be an ecologically imbalancing
act. The damage that it will cause may be irreparable
and irreversible.
At this point, it is significant to note that during the
hearing conducted by this Court on November 20, 2012
wherein the testimonies of seven experts were given, Dr.
Peter J. Davies (Ph.D in Plant [Physiology]), Dr. Tuskar
Chakraborty (Ph.D in Biochemistry and Molecular Biology),
Dr. Charito Medina (Ph.D in Environmental Biology), Dr.
Reginaldo Ebora (Ph.D in Entomology), Dr. Flerida Cariño
(Ph.D in Insecticide Toxicology), Dr. Ben Malayang (Ph.D in
Wildland Resource Science) and Dr. Saturnina Halos (Ph.D in
Genetics) were in unison in admitting that bt talong is an
altered plant. x x x
xxxx
Thus, it is evident and clear that bt talong is a technology
involving the deliberate alteration of an otherwise natural
state of affairs. It is designed and intended to alter natural
feed-feeder relationships of the eggplant. It is a deliberate
genetic reconstruction of the eggplant to alter its natural
order which is meant to eliminate one feeder (the borer) in
order to give undue advantage to another feeder (the
humans). The genetic transformation is one designed to
make bt talong toxic to its pests (the targeted organisms). In
effect, bt talong kills its targeted organisms.
Consequently, the testing or introduction of bt
talong into the Philippines, by its nature and intent, is
a grave and present danger to (and an assault on) the
Filipinos’ consti-
472
tutional right to a balanced ecology because, in any
book and by any yardstick, it is an ecologically imbalancing
event or phenomenon. It is a willful and deliberate tampering
of a naturally ordained feed-feeder relationship in our
environment. It destroys the balance of our biodiversity.
Because it violates the conjunct right of our people to a
balanced ecology, the whole constitutional right of our people
(as legally and logically construed) is violated.
Of course, the bt talong’s threat to the human health of the
Filipinos as of now remains uncertain. This is because while,
on one hand, no Filipinos has ever eaten it yet, and so, there
is no factual evidence of it actually causing acute or chronic
harm to any or a number of ostensibly identifiable perms, on
the other hand, there is correspondingly no factual evidence
either of it not causing harm to anyone. However, in a study
published on September 20, 2012 in “Food and Chemical
Toxicology,” a team of scientists led by Professor Gilles-Eric
Seralini from the University of Caen and backed by the
France-based Committee of Independent Research and
Information on Genetic Engineering came up with a finding
that rats fed with Roundup-tolerant genetically modified corn
for two years developed cancers, tumors and multiple organ
damage. The seven expert witnesses who testified in this
Court in the hearing conducted on November 20, 2012 were
duly confronted with this finding and they were not able to
convincingly rebut it. That is why we, in deciding this case,
applied the precautionary principle in granting the petition
filed in the case at bench.
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, therefore, because
one conjunct right in the whole Constitutional guarantee is
factually and is undoubtedly at risk, and the other still
factually uncertain, the entire constitutional right of the
Filipino people to a balanced and healthful ecology is at risk.
Hence, the issuance of the writ of
473
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 473
kalikasan and the continuing writ of mandamus is justified and
warranted.28 (Additional emphasis supplied)
Petitioners’ Arguments
G.R. No. 209271

ISAAA advances the following arguments in support of its
petition:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CONTINUING MANDAMUS AND WRIT OF
KALIKASAN CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME IS
ALREADY MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
II
KALIKASAN CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME RAISES
POLITICAL QUESTIONS.
A. IN SEEKING TO COMPEL THE REGULATORY

AGENCIES “TO SUBMIT AN ACCEPTABLE DRAFT
OF THE AMENDMENT OF THE NATIONAL BIO-
SAFETY FRAMEWORK OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND
DA ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08,” AND IN
PRAYING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS
“RECOMMEND TO CONGRESS CURATIVE
LEGISLATIONS,” RESPONDENTS SEEK TO REVIEW
THE WISDOM OF THE PHILIPPINE REGULATORY
SYSTEM FOR GMOS, WHICH THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO DO SO.
474
B. WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN HELD

THAT THERE ARE NO LAWS GOVERNING THE
STUDY, INTRODUCTION AND USE OF GMOS IN
THE PHILIPPINES AND COMPLETELY
DISREGARDED E.O. NO. 514 AND DAAO 08-2002.
III
KALIKASAN CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS
FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
IV
KALIKASAN CONSIDERING THAT PRIMARY
JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME LIES WITH THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS EXHIBITED BIAS AND
PARTIALITY AND PREJUDGED THE INSTANT CASE
WHEN IT RENDERED THE ASSAILED DECISION DATED
17 MAY 2013 AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 SEPTEMBER
2013.
VI
GRANTING THE WRIT OF KALIKASAN IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS.
A. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWS THAT THE

PROJECT PROPONENTS OF THE BT TALONG
FIELD TRIALS COMPLIED WITH ALL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS, RULES AND
REGULATIONS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE
475
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 475
PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND
HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY ARE PROTECTED AND
RESPECTED.
B. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWS THAT

THE BT TALONG FIELD TRIALS DO NOT CAUSE
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND DO NOT
PREJUDICE THE LIFE, HEALTH AND PROPERTY
OF INHABITANTS OF TWO OR MORE PROVINCES
OR CITIES.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

APPLYING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN
THIS CASE DESPITE THE FACT THAT
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PRESENT AN IOTA OF
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THEIR CLAIM.
VII
GRANTING A WRIT OF
CONTINUING MANDAMUS AGAINST PETITIONER
ISAAA.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DATED 17 MAY
2013 AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 2013 IS
AN AFFRONT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS.29
G.R. No. 209276
Petitioners EMB, BPI and FPA, represented by the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) assails the CA Decision granting the
petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of
continuing mandamus despite the failure of Greenpeace, et al.
(respondents) to prove the requisites for their issuance.
Petitioners contend that while respondents presented purported
studies that supposedly show signs of toxicity in ge-
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 35-37.
476
netically engineered eggplant and other crops, these studies are
insubstantial as they were not published in peer-reviewed
scientific journals. Respondents thus failed to present evidence to
prove their claim that the Bt talong field trials violated
environmental laws and rules.
As to the application of the precautionary principle, petitioners
asserted that its application in this case is misplaced. The paper by
Prof. Seralini which was relied upon by the CA, was not formally
offered in evidence. In volunteering the said article to the parties,
petitioners lament that the CA manifested its bias towards
respondents’ position and did not even consider the testimony of
Dr. Davies who stated that “Seralini’s work has been refuted by
International committees of scientists”30 as shown by published
articles critical of Seralini’s work.
Petitioners aver that there was no damage to human health
since no Bt talong will be ingested by any human being during the
field trial stage. Besides, if the results of said testing are adverse,
petitioners will not allow the release of Bt talong to the
environment, in line with the guidelines set by EO 514. The CA
thus misappreciated the regulatory process as approval for field
testing does not automatically mean approval for propagation of
the same product. And even assuming that the field trials may
indeed cause adverse environmental or health effects, the
requirement of unlawful act or omission on the part of petitioners
or any of the proponents, was still absent. Respondents clearly
failed to prove there was any unlawful deviation from the
provisions of DAO 08-2002. The BPI’s factual finding on the basis
of risk assessment on the Bt talong project should thus be accorded
respect, if not finality by the courts.
Petitioners likewise fault the CA in giving such ambiguous and
general directive for them to protect, preserve, rehabilitate and
restore the environment, lacking in specifics which
_______________
30 Id., at p. 81.
477
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 477
only indicates that there was really nothing to preserve,
rehabilitate or restore as there was nothing damaged or adversely
affected in the first place. As to the supposed inadequacy and
ineffectiveness of existing regulations, these are all political
questions and policy issues best left to the discretion of the policy-
makers, the Legislative and Executive branches of government.
Petitioners add that the CA treads on judicial legislation when it
recommended the reexamination of country’s existing laws and
regulations governing studies and research on GMOs.
G.R. No. 209301
Petitioner UPLBFI argues that respondents failed to adduce the

quantum of evidence necessary to prove actual or imminent injury
to them or the environment as to render the controversy ripe for
judicial determination. It points out that nowhere in the
testimonies during the “hot-tub” presentation of expert witnesses
did the witnesses for respondents claim actual or imminent injury
to them or to the environment as a result of the Bt talong field
tests, as they spoke only of injury in the speculative, imagined kind
without any factual basis. Further, the petition for writ
of kalikasan has been mooted by the termination of the field trials
as of August 10, 2012.
Finding the CA decision as a judgment not based on fact,
UPLBFI maintains that by reason of the nature, character, scale,
duration, design, processes undertaken, risk assessments and
strategies employed, results heretofore recorded, scientific
literature, the safeguards and other precautionary measures
undertaken and applied, the Bt talong field tests did not or could
not have violated the right of respondents to a balanced and
healthful ecology. The appellate court apparently misapprehended
the nature, character, design of the field trials as one for
“consumption” rather than for “field testing” as defined in DAO 08-
2002, the sole purpose of which is for the “efficacy” of the eggplant
variety’s resistance to the FSB.
478
Against the respondents’ bare allegations, UPLBFI submits the
following “specific facts borne by competent evidence on record”
(admitted exhibits):31
118. Since the technology’s inception 50 years ago, studies

have shown that genetically modified crops, including Bt
talong, significantly reduce the use of pesticides by farmers in
growing eggplants, lessening pesticide poisoning to humans.
119. Pesticide use globally has decreased in the last [14-15]
years owing to the use of insect-resistant genetically modified
crops. Moreover, that insect-resistant genetically modified
crops significantly reduce the use of pesticides in growing
plants thus lessening pesticide poisoning in humans,
reducing pesticide load in the environment and encouraging
more biodiversity in farms.
120. Global warming is likewise reduced as more crops can
be grown.
121. Transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton has had
a major impact on the Australian cotton industry by largely
controlling Lepidopteran pests. To date, it had no significant
impact on the invertebrate community studied.
122. Feeding on Cry1Ac contaminated nontarget herbivores
does not harm predatory heteropterans and, therefore,
cultivation of Bt cotton may provide an opportunity for
conservation of these predators in cotton ecosystems by
reducing insecticide use.
123. The Bt protein in Bt corn only affects target insects
and that Bt corn pollens do not negatively affect monarch
butterflies.
124. The field trials will not cause “contamination” as
feared by the petitioners because flight distance of the
pollinators is a deterrent to cross pollination. Studies reveal
that there can be no cross pollination more than a fifty (50)-
meter distance.
479
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 479
xxxx
135. There is a 50-year history of safe use and consumption
of agricultural products sprayed with
commercial Bt microbial pesticides and a 14-year history of
safe consumption of food and feed derived from Bt crops.
xxxx
140. In separate reviews by the European Food Safety
Agency (EFSA) and the Food Standards Australia and New
Zealand (FSANZ), the “work” of one Prof. Seralini relied upon
by [respondents] was dismissed as “scientifically flawed,”
thus providing no plausible basis to the proposition that Bt
talong is dangerous to public health.
141. In a learned treatise by James Clive entitled “Global
Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2011,” the
Philippines was cited to be the first country in the ASEAN
region to implement a regulatory system for transgenic crops
(which includes DAO 08-[2]002). Accordingly, the said
regulatory system has also served as a model for other
countries in the region and other developing countries outside
of Asia.
On the precautionary principle, UPLBFI contends that the CA

misapplied it in this case. The testimonial and documentary
evidence of respondents, taken together, do not amount to
“scientifically plausible” evidence of threats of serious and
irreversible damage to the environment. In fact, since BPI started
regulating GM crops in 2002, they have monitored 171 field trials
all over the Philippines and said agency has not observed any
adverse environmental effect caused by said field trials. Plainly,
respondents failed to show proof of “specific facts” of environmental
damage of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases as to warrant sanctions over
the Bt talong field trials.
Lastly, UPLBFI avers that the Bt talong field trial was an
exercise of the constitutional liberty of scientists and other
480
academicians of UP, of which they have been deprived without
due process of law. Stressing that a possibility is not a fact,
UPLBFI deplores the CA decision’s pronouncement of their guilt
despite the preponderance of evidence on the environmental safety
of the field trials, as evident from its declaration that “the overall
safety guarantee of Bt talong remains to be still unknown.” It thus
asks if in the meantime, petitioners must bear the judicial stigma
of being cast as violators of the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology for an injury or damage unsubstantiated by
evidence of scientific plausibility.
G.R. No. 209430
Petitioner UP reiterates UPLBFI’s argument that the Bt

talong field testing was conducted in the exercise of UPLB’s
academic freedom, which is a constitutional right. In this case,
there is nothing based on evidence on record or overwhelming
public welfare concern, such as the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which would warrant restraint on
UPLB’s exercise of academic freedom. Considering that UPLB
complied with all laws, rules and regulations regarding the
application and conduct of field testing of GM eggplant, and was
performing such field tests within the prescribed limits of DAO 08-
2002, and there being no harm to the environment or prejudice
that will be caused to the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces, to restrain it from performing the
said field testing is unjustified.
Petitioner likewise objects to the CA’s application of the
precautionary principle in this case, in violation of the standards
set by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. It points
out that the Bt eggplants are not yet intended to be introduced into
the Philippine ecosystem nor to the local market for human
consumption.
Cited were the testimonies of two expert witnesses presented
before the CA: Dr. Navasero who is an entomologist
481
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 481
and expert in integrated pest management and insect taxonomy,
and Dr. Davies, a member of the faculty of the Department of Plant
Biology and Horticulture at Cornell University for 43 years and
served as a senior science advisor in agricultural technology to the
United States Department of State. Both had testified that based
on generally accepted and scientific methodology, the field trial
of Bt crops do not cause damage to the environment or human
health.
Petitioner assails the CA in relying instead on the conjectural
statements of Dr. Malayang. It asserts that the CA could not
support its Decision and Resolution on the pure conjectures and
imagination of one witness. Basic is the rule that a decision must
be supported by evidence on record.
Respondents’ Consolidated Comment
Respondents aver that Bt talong became the subject of public

protest in our country precisely because of the serious safety
concerns on the impact of Bt talong toxin on human and animal
health and the environment through field trial
contamination. They point out that the inherent and potential
risks and adverse effects of GM crops are recognized in the
Cartagena Protocol and our biosafety regulations (EO 514 and
DAO 08-2002). Contamination may occur through pollination,
ingestion by insects and other animals, water and soil run off,
human error, mechanical accident and even by stealing was
inevitable in growing Bt talong in an open environment for field
trial. Such contamination may manifest even after many years and
in places very far away from the trial sites.
Contrary to petitioners’ claim that they did not violate any law
or regulation, or unlawful omission, respondents assert that, in the
face of scientific uncertainties on the safety and effects of Bt
talong, petitioners omitted their crucial duties to conduct
environmental impact assessment (EIA); evaluate health impacts;
get the free, prior and informed consent of the people in the host
communities; and provide remedial and liability processes in the
approval of the biosafety permit and
482
conduct of the field trials in its five sites located in five
provinces. These omissions have put the people and the
environment at serious and irreversible risks.
Respondents cite the numerous studies contained in “Adverse
Impacts of Transgenic Crops/Foods: A Compilation of Scientific
References with Abstracts” printed by Coalition for a GMO-Free
India; a study on Bt corn in the Philippines, “Socio-economic
Impacts of Genetically Modified Corn in the Philippines” published
by MASIPAG in 2013; and the published report of the investigation
conducted by Greenpeace, “White Corn in the Philippines:
Contaminated with Genetically Modified Corn Varieties” which
revealed positive results for samples purchased from different
stores in Sultan Kudarat, Mindanao, indicating that they were
contaminated with GM corn varieties, specifically the herbicide
tolerant and Bt insect resistant genes from Monsanto, the world’s
largest biotech company based in the US.
To demonstrate the health hazards posed by Bt crops,
respondents cite the following sources: the studies of Drs. L.
Moreno-Fierros, N. Garcia, R. Gutierrez, R. Lopez-Revilla, and RI
Vazquez-Padron, all from the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de
Mexico; the conclusion made by Prof. Eric-Gilles Seralini of the
University of Caen, France, who is also the president of the
Scientific Council of the Committee for Independent Research and
Information on Genetic Engineering (CRIIGEN), in his review,
commissioned by Greenpeace, of Mahyco’s data submitted in
support of the application to grow and market Bt eggplant in India;
and the medical interpretations of Prof. Seralini’s findings by
Filipino doctors Dr. Romeo Quijano of the University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital and Dr. Wency Kiat, Jr. of
St. Luke’s Medical Center (Joint Affidavit).
According to respondents, the above findings and interpretations
on serious health risks are strengthened by the findings of a review
of the safety claims in the MAHYCO Dossier authored by Prof.
David A. Andow of the University of Minne-
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 483
sota, an expert in environmental assessment in crop science. The
review was made upon the request in 2010 of His Honorable Shri
Jairam Ramesh of the Ministry of Environment and Forests of
India, where MAHYCO is based. MAHYCO is the corporate creator
and patent owner of the Bt gene inserted in Bt talong.
The conclusions of health hazards from the above studies were
summarized32 by respondents, as follows:
_______________
32 Rollo, (G.R. No. 209271), Vol. IX, pp. 4111-4112. Citations omitted.
484
symptomatically indicate haz-

ards for human health.
Prof. David A.
The MAHYCO dossier is inadequate
Andow
to support the needed environmen-
tal risk assessment; MAHYCO’s
food safety assessment does not
comply with international standards;
and that MAHYCO relied on dubious
scientific assumptions and disregar-
ded real environmental threats.
As to environmental effects, respondents said these include the

potential for living modified organisms, such as Bt talong tested in
the field or released into the environment, to contaminate non-GM
traditional varieties and other wild eggplant relatives and turn
them into novel pests, outcompete and replace their wild relatives,
increase dependence on pesticides, or spread their introduced
genes to weedy relatives, potentially creating superweeds, and kill
beneficial insects.
Respondents then gave the following tabulated
summary33 of field trial contamination cases drawn from various
news reports and some scientific literature submitted to the court:
_______________
33 Id., at pp. 4112-4115. Citations omitted.
485
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 485
486
487
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 487
488
Refuting the claim of petitioners that contamination is nil or

minimal because the scale of Bt talong field trial is isolated,
restricted and that “each experiment per site per season consists of
a maximum net area planted to Bt eggplant of between 480 sq.
meters to 1,080 sq. meters,”34respondents emphasize that as shown
by the above, contamination knows no size and boundaries in an
open environment.
With regard to the required geographical coverage of
environmental damage for the issuance of writ of kalikasan,
respondents assert that while the Bt talong field trials were
conducted in only five provinces, the environmental damage
prejudicial to health extends beyond the health of the present
generation of inhabitants in those provinces.
On petitioners’ insistence in demanding that those who allege
injury must prove injury, respondents said that biosafety evidence
could not be readily contained in a corpus delicti to be presented in
court. Indeed, the inherent and potential risks and adverse effects
brought by GMOs are not like dead bodies or wounds that are
immediately and physically identifiable to an eyewitness and
which are resulting from a common crime. Precisely, this is why
the Cartagena Protocol’s foundation is on the precautionary
principle and development of sound science and its links, to social
and human rights law through its elements of public awareness,
public participation and public right to know. This is also why the
case was brought under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases and not under ordinary or other rules, on the grounds of
violation of the rights of the Filipino people to health, to a balanced
and healthful ecology, to information on matters of national con-
_______________
34 Rollo (G.R. No. 209271), Vol. IX, p. 4115.
489
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 489
cern, and to participation. The said Rules specifically provides
that the appreciation of evidence in a case like this must be guided
by the precautionary principle.
As to the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies being
raised by petitioners as ground to dismiss the present petition,
respondents said that nowhere in the 22 sections of DAO 08-2002
that one can find a remedy to appeal the decision of the DA issuing
the field testing permit. What is only provided for is a mechanism
for applicants of a permit, not stakeholders like farmers, traders
and consumers to appeal a decision by the BPI-DA in case of denial
of their application for field testing. Moreover, DAO 08-2002 is
silent on appeal after the issuance of the biosafety permit.
Finally, on the propriety of the writ of continuing mandamus,
respondents argue that EO 514 explicitly states that the
application of biosafety regulations shall be made in accordance
with existing laws and the guidelines therein provided. Hence,
aside from risk assessment requirement of the biosafety
regulations, pursuant to the PEISS law and Sections 12 and 13 of
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, an environmental impact
statement (EIS) is required and an environmental compliance
certificate (ECC) is necessary before such Bt crop field trials can be
conducted.
Petitioners’ Replies
G.R. No. 209271
ISAAA contends that the Precautionary Principle and the Rules

of Procedure for Environmental Cases do not empower courts to
adjudicate a controversy that is moot and academic. It points out
that respondents failed to satisfy all the requirements of the
exception to the rule on actual controversies. The Biosafety Permit
is valid for only two years, while the purported stages in the
commercialization, propagation and registration of Bt talong still
cannot confer jurisdiction on the CA to decide a moot and academic
case.
490
As to the propriety of the writ of continuing mandamus, ISAAA
maintains that public petitioners do not have “mandatory” and
“ministerial” duty to reexamine and reform the biosafety
regulatory system, and to propose curative legislation. The law (EO
514) cited by respondents does not impose such duty on public
petitioners. As for the Cartagena Protocol, it laid down a procedure
for the evaluation of the Protocol itself, not of the Philippine
biosafety regulatory system. ISAAA stresses that the CA is without
jurisdiction to review the soundness and wisdom of existing laws,
policy and regulations. Indeed, the questions posed by the
respondents are political questions, which must be resolved by the
executive and legislative departments in deference to separation of
powers.
On the availability of administrative remedies, ISAAA asserts
that respondents are mistaken in saying that these are limited to
appeals. The concerned public may invoke Section 8(G) of DAO 08-
2002 which grants them the right to submit their written
comments on the BPI regarding the field testing permits, or
Section 8(P) for the revocation and cancellation of a field testing
permit. Respondents’ failure to resort to the internal mechanisms
provided in DAO 08-2002 violates the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which warrants the dismissal of
respondents’ petition.
ISAAA points out that under Section 7 of DAO 08-2002, the BPI
is the approving authority for field testing permits, while under
Title IV, Chapter 4, Section 19 of the Administrative Code of 1987,
the DA through the BPI, is responsible for the production of
improved planting materials and protection of agricultural crops
from pests and diseases. In bypassing the administrative remedies
available, respondents not only failed to exhaust a less costly and
speedier remedy, it also deprived the parties of an opportunity to
be heard by the BPI which has primary jurisdiction and
knowledgeable on the issues they sought to raise.
491
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 491
Rejecting the scientific data presented by the respondents,
petitioners found Annex “A” of the Consolidated Comment as
irrelevant because it was not formally offered in evidence and are
hearsay. Majority of those records contain incomplete information
and none of them pertain to the Bt talong. Respondents likewise
presented two misleading scientific studies which have already
been discredited: the 2013 study by B.P. Mezzomo, et al. and the
study by Prof. Seralini in 2012. Petitioner notes that both articles
have been withdrawn from publication.
ISAAA further describes Annex “A” as a mere compilation of
records of flawed studies with only 126 usable records out of the
338 records. In contrast, petitioner cites the work of Nicolia, A., A.
Manzo, F. Veronesi, and D. Rosellini, entitled “An overview of the
last 10 years of genetically engineered crop safety research.” The
authors evaluated 1,783 scientific records of GE crop safety
research papers, reviews, relevant opinions and scientific reports
from 2002-2012. Their findings concluded that “the scientific
research conducted so far has not detected any significant hazards
directly connected with the use of GE crops.” In the article
“Impacts of GM crops on biodiversity,” in which scientific findings
concluded that “[o]verall, x x x currently commercialized GM crops
have reduced the impacts of agriculture on biodiversity, through
enhanced adoption of conservation tillage practices, reduction of
insecticide use and use of more environmentally benign herbicides
and increasing yields to alleviate pressure to convert additional
land into agricultural use.”
Debunking the supposed inherent risks and potential dangers of
GMOs, petitioner cites EUR 24473 – A decade of EU-funded GMO
research (2001-2010), concluded from more than 130 research
projects, covering a period of 25 years of research, and involving
more than 500 independent research groups, that “biotechnology,
and in particular GMOs, are not per se more risky than e.g.,
conventional plant breeding technologies.” Another article cited is
“Assessment of the health impact of GM plant diets in long-term
and multigenerational
492
animal feeding trials: A literature review” which states that
scientific findings show that GM crops do not suggest any health
hazard, and are nutritionally equivalent to their non-GM
counterparts and can be safely used in food and feed.
Addressing the studies relied upon by respondents on the alleged
adverse environmental effects of GM crops, petitioner cites the
article “Ecological Impacts of Genetically Modified Crops: Ten
Years of Field Research and Commercial Cultivation” which
concluded that “[T]he data available so far provide no scientific
evidence that the cultivation of the presently commercialized GM
crops has caused environmental harm.” A related article, “A Meta-
Analysis of Effects of Bt Cotton and Maize on Nontarget
Invertebrates,” states that scientific findings show that nontarget
insects are more abundant in GM crop fields like Bt cotton and Bt
maize fields than in non-GM crops that are sprayed with
insecticides.
The two tables/summaries of studies submitted by respondents
are likewise rejected by ISAAA, which presented the following
comments and criticisms on each of the paper/article cited, thus:
With respect to the study made by L. Moreno-Fierros, et al.,

the same should be rejected considering that this was not
formally offered as evidence by respondents. Hence, the same
may not be considered by the Honorable Court. (Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; Heirs of Pedro Pasag v.
Spouses Parocha, supra)
Further, the study is irrelevant and immaterial. The
Cry1Ac protein used in the study was from
engineered E.coli and may have been contaminated by
endotoxin. The Cry1Ac used in the study was notfrom Bt
talong. Hence, respondents’ attempt to extrapolate the
interpretation and conclusion of this study to Bt talong is
grossly erroneous and calculated to mislead and deceive the
Honorable Court.
Moreover, in a review by Bruce D. Hammond and Michael
S. Koch of the said study by L. Moreno-Fierros,
493
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 493
et al., which was published in an article entitled A Review
of the Food Safety of Bt Crops, the authors reported that Adel-
Patient, et al. tried and failed to reproduce the results
obtained by the study made by L. Moreno-Fierros, et al. The
reason is because of endotoxin contamination in the
preparation of the Cry1Ac protein. Further, when purified
Cry protein was injected to mice through intra-gastric
administration, there was no impact on the immune response
of the mice.
In addition, the biological relevance of the study made by L.
Moreno-Fierros, et al. to assessing potential health risks from
human consumption of foods derived from Bt crops can be
questioned because the doses tested in mice is irrelevant to
human dietary exposure, i.e., the doses given were “far in
excess of potential human intakes.”
With respect to the interpretation made by Prof. Eric-Gilles
Seralini, the same is not entitled to any weight and
consideration because his sworn statement was not admitted
in evidence by the Court of Appeals.
Further, Seralini’s findings are seriously flawed. Food
safety experts explained the differences observed by Seralini’s
statistical analysis as examples of random biological
variation that occurs when many measurements are made on
test animals, and which have no biological significance.
Hence, there are no food safety concerns. Further, petitioner
ISAAA presented in evidence the findings of regulatory
bodies, particularly the EFSA and the FSANZ, to controvert
Seralini’s findings. The EFSA and the FSANZ rejected
Seralini’s findings because the same were based
on questionable statistical procedureemployed in maize
in 2007.
In addition, it must be pointed out that the Indian
regulatory authority, GEAC, has not revised its earlier
decision approving the safety of Bt eggplant notwithstanding
the findings of Seralini’s assessment. In effect, Seralini’s
findings and interpretation were rejected by the Indian
regulatory agency.
With respect to the interpretation made by Drs. Romeo
Quijano and Wency Kiat, the same is not entitled
494
to any weight and consideration because the Court of
Appeals did not admit their sworn statement. Further, Drs.
Romeo Quijano and Wency Kiat sought to interpret a
seriously flawed study, making their sworn statements
equally flawed.
In an attempt to mislead the Honorable Court, respondents
tried to pass off the review of Prof. David A. Andow as the
work of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA. Such
claim is grossly misleading. In truth, as Prof. David A. Andow
indicated in the preface, the report was produced upon the
request of Aruna Rodriguez, a known anti-GM campaigner.
Further, Prof. David A. Andow’s review did not point to any
negative impact to the environment of Mahyco’s Bt
brinjal (Indian name for Bt talong) during the entire period of
conduct of field trials all over the country. He concluded,
however, that the dossier is inadequate for ERA. This is
perplexing considering this is the same gene that has been
used in Bt cotton since 1996. Scores of environmental and
food safety risk assessment studies have been conducted and
there is wealth of information and experience on its safety.
Various meta-analyses indicate that delaying the use of this
already effective Bt brinjal for managing this devastating
pest only ensures the continued use of frequent insecticide
sprays with proven harm to human and animal health and
the environment and loss of potential income of resource-poor
small farmers.
Notwithstanding the conclusions of Prof. David A. Andow,
to date, it is worth repeating that the Indian regulatory body,
GEAC, has not revised its earlier decision approving the
safety of Bt eggplant based on the recommendation of two
expert committees which found the Mahyco regulatory
dossier compliant to the ERA stipulated by the Indian
regulatory body. In effect, like Seralini, Andow’s findings and
interpretation were also rejected by the Indian regulatory
agency.35
_______________
35 Id., Vol. XI, pp. 5715-5717.
495
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 495
Petitioner reiterates that the PEIS law does not apply to field
testing of Bt talong and the rigid requirements under Section 8 of
DAO 08-2002 already takes into consideration any and all
significant risks not only to the environment but also to human
health. The requirements under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code are also inapplicable because the field testing is
not among the six environmentally sensitive activities mentioned
therein; the public consultations and prior local government unit
(LGU) approval, were nevertheless complied with. Moreover, the
field testing is an exercise of academic freedom protected by the
Constitution, the possibility of Bt talong’s commercialization in the
future is but incidental to, and fruit of the experiment.
As to the “commissioned studies” on Bt corn in the Philippines,
petitioner asserts that these are inadmissible, hearsay and
unreliable. These were not formally offered in evidence; self-
serving as it was conducted by respondents Greenpeace and
MASIPAG themselves; the persons who prepared the same were
not presented in court to identify and testify on its findings; and
the methods used in the investigation and research were not
scientific. Said studies failed to establish any correlation
between Bt corn and the purported environmental and health
problems.
G.R. No. 209276
EMB, BPI and FPA joined in objecting to Annex “A” of

respondents’ consolidated comment, for the same reasons given by
ISAAA. They noted that the affidavit of Prof. Seralini, and the joint
affidavit of Dr. Kiat and Dr. Quijano were denied admission by the
CA. Given the failure of the respondents to present scientific
evidence to prove the claim of environmental and health damages,
respondents are not entitled to the writ of kalikasan.
Public petitioners reiterate that in issuing the Biosafety Permits
to UPLB, they made sure that the latter complied with all the
requirements under DAO 08-2002, including the
496
conduct of risk assessment. The applications for field testing
of Bt talong thus underwent the following procedures:
Having completed the contained experiment on the Bt

talong, UPLB filed with BPI several applications for issuance
of Biosafety Permits to conduct multi-locational field testing
of Bt talong. Even before the proponent submitted its
application, petitioner BPI conducted a consultative meeting
with the proponent to enlighten the latter about the
requirements set out by DA AO No. 8.
Thereafter, petitioner BPI evaluated UPLB’s
applications vis-à-vis the requirements of Section 8 of DA AO
No. 8 and found them to be sufficient in form and
substance, to wit:
FirstThe applications were in the proper format and
contained all of the relevant information as required in
Section 8(A)(1) of DA AO No. 08. .
SecondThe applications were accompanied by a (i)
Certification from the NCBP that the regulated article
has undergone satisfactory testing under contained
conditions in the Philippines, (ii) technical dossier
consisting of scientific literature and other scientific
materials relied upon by the applicant showing that . Bt
talong will not pose any significant risks to human
health and the environment, and (iii) copy of the
proposed PIS for Field Testing as prescribed by Section
8(A)(2) of DA AO No. 08; and
Third. The applications contained the Endorsement of
proposal for field testing, duly approved by the majority
of all the members of the respective Institutional
Biosafety Committees (IBC), including at least one
community representative, as required by Section 8(E)
of DAAO No. 08.
Under Sections 1(L) and 8(D) of DA AO No. 08, the
IBC is responsible for the ini- a.
497
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 497
tial evaluation of the risk assessment and risk
management strategies of the applicant for field testing
using the NCBP guidelines. The IBC shall determine
if the data obtained under contained conditions
provide sufficient basis to authorize the field
testing of the regulated article. In making the
determination, the IBC shall ensure that field
testing does not pose any significant risks to
human health and the environment. The IBC may,
in its discretion, require the proponent to perform
additional experiments under contained conditions
before acting on the field testing proposal. The IBC shall
either endorse the field testing proposal to the BPI or
reject it for failing the scientific risk assessment.
Relatedly, UPLB had previously complied with
Section 1(L) of DA AO No. 08 which requires an
applicant for field testing to establish an IBC in
preparation for the field testing of a regulated article
and whose membership has been approved by the BPI.
Section 1(L) of DA AO No. 08, requires that the
b. IBC shall be composed of at least five (5) members,
three (3) of whom shall be designated as “scientist-
members” who shall possess scientific and technological
knowledge and expertise sufficient to enable them to
evaluate and monitor properly any work of the applicant
relating to the field testing of a regulated article, and
the other members are designated as “community
representatives” who are in a position to represent the
interest of the communities where the field testing is to
be conducted.
Before approving the intended multi-locations [field] trials,
petitioner BPI, pursuant to Section 8(F) of DA AO No. 08,
forwarded the complete documents to three (3) independent
Scientific Technical Review Panel
498
(STRP) members. Pending receipt of the risk assessment
reports of the three STRP members, petitioner BPI conducted
its own risk assessment.
Thereafter, on separate occasions, petitioner BPI received
the final risk assessment reports of the three STRP members
recommending the grant of Biosafety Permits to UPLB after a
thorough risk assessment and evaluation of UPLB’s
application for field trial of Bt talong.
Meanwhile, petitioner BPI received from UPLB proofs of
posting of the PISs for Field Testing in each
concerned barangays and city/municipal halls of the localities
having jurisdiction over its proposed field trial sites.
In addition to the posting of the PISs for Field Testing,
petitioner BPI conducted consultative meetings and public
seminars in order to provide public information and in order
to give an opportunity to the public to raise their questions
and/or concerns regarding the Bt talong field trials.36
Petitioners maintain that Sections 26 and 27 of the Local

Government Code are inapplicable to the Bt talong field testing
considering that its subject matter is not mass production for
human consumption. The project entails only the planting
of Bt eggplants and cultivation in a controlled environment;
indeed, the conduct of a field trial is not a guarantee that the Bt
talong will be commercialized and allowed for cultivation in the
Philippines.
On the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies by the
respondents, petitioners note that during the period of public
consultation under DAO 08-2002, it is BPI which processes written
comments on the application for field testing of a regulated article,
and has the authority to approve or disapprove the application.
Also, under Section 8(P), BPI may revoke a biosafety permit issued
on the ground of, among oth-
499
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 499
ers, receipt of new information that the field testing poses
significant risks to human health and the environment. Petitioners
assert they were never remiss in the performance of their
mandated functions, as shown by their immediate action with
respect to the defective certification of posting of PIS in Kabacan,
North Cotabato. Upon receiving the letter-complaint on January
24, 2012, BPI readily ordered their re-posting. The same incident
occurred in Davao City, where BPI refused to lift the suspension of
biosafety permits until “rectification of the conditions for public
consultation is carried out.”
To underscore respondents’ blatant disregard of the
administrative process, petitioners refer to documented instances
when respondents took the law in their own hands. Greenpeace
barged into one of the Bt talong field trial sites at Bgy. Paciano
Rizal, Bay, Laguna, forcibly entered the entrance gate through the
use of a bolt cutter, and then proceeded to uproot the experimental
crops without permission from BPI or the project proponents.
Petitioners submit that the non-observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of
action, one of the grounds under the Rules of Courtjustifying the
dismissal of a complaint.
Petitions-in-Intervention
Crop Life Philippines, Inc. (Crop Life)

Crop Life is an association of companies which belongs to a
global (Crop Life International) as well as regional (Crop Life Asia)
networks of member-companies representing the plant science
industry. It aims to “help improve the productivity of Filipino
farmers and contribute to Philippine food security in a sustainable
way.” It supports “innovation, research and development in
agriculture through the use of biology, chemistry, biotechnology,
plant breeding, other techniques and disciplines.”
500
On procedural grounds, Crop Life assails the CA in rendering
judgment in violation of petitioners’ right to due process because it
was prevented from cross-examining the respondents’ expert
witnesses and conducting redirect examination of petitioners’ own
witnesses, and being an evidently partial and prejudiced court. It
said the petition for writ of kalikasan should have been dismissed
outright as it effectively asks the Court to engage in “judicial
legislation” to “cure” what respondents feel is an inadequate
regulatory framework for field testing of GMOs in the Philippines.
Respondents also violated the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and their petition is barred by estoppel
and laches.
Crop Life concurs with the petitioners in arguing that
respondents failed to specifically allege and prove the particular
environmental damage resulting from the Bt talong field testing. It
cites the scientific evidence on record and the internationally
accepted scientific standards on GMOs and GMO field testing, and
considering the experience of various countries engaged in testing
GMOs, telling us that GMO field testing will not damage the
environment nor harm human health and more likely bring about
beneficial improvements.
Crop Life likewise assails the application of the Precautionary
Principle by the CA which erroneously equated field testing of Bt
talong with Bt talong itself; failed to recognize that in this case,
there was no particular environmental damage identified, much
less proven; relied upon the article of Prof. Seralini that was
retracted by the scientific journal which published it; there is no
scientific uncertainty on the adverse effects of GMOs to
environment and human health; and did not consider respondents’
failure to prove the insufficiency of the regulatory framework
under DAO 08-2002.
On policy grounds, Crop Life argues that requiring all
organisms/plants to be considered absolutely safe before any field
testing may be allowed, would result in permanently placing the
Philippines in the shadows of more developed nations (whose
economies rest on emerging markets import-
501
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 501
ing products from them). It points out that the testing of Bt
talong specifically addresses defined problems such as the need to
curb the misuse of chemical pesticides.
Biotechnology Coalition
of the Philippines (BCP)
BCP is a non-stock, nonprofit membership association, a broad-

based multi-sectoral coalition of advocates of modern biotechnology
in the Philippines.
Reversal of the CA ruling is sought on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE KALIKASAN PETITION IN THE
ABSENCE OF ANY JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.
II.
EXISTING LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS ALREADY INCORPORATE THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AS A GUIDING
PRINCIPLE IN RELATION TO GMOs.
III.
THE CA DECISION AND THE CA RESOLUTION
IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ ERRONEOUS
APPLICATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, IF
SUSTAINED, WOULD PRODUCE A DANGEROUS
PRECEDENT THAT IS ANTI-PROGRESS, ANTI-
TECHNOLOGY AND, ULTIMATELY, DETRIMENTAL TO
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE.37
_______________
37 Rollo (G.R. No. 209271), Vol. V, pp. 2386-2387.
502
BCP argued that in the guise of taking on a supposed justiciable
controversy, despite the Bt talong field trials having been
terminated, the CA entertained a prohibited collateral attack on
the sufficiency of DAO 08-2002. Though not invalidating the
issuance, which the CA knew was highly improper, it nonetheless
granted the petition for writ of kalikasan on the theory that “mere
biosafety regulations” were insufficient to guarantee the safety of
the environment and the health of the people.
Also reiterated were those grounds for dismissal already raised
by the petitioners: failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
finality of findings of administrative agencies.
BCP further asserts that the application of a stringent“risk
assessment” process to regulated articles prior to any release in the
environment for field testing mandated by AO No. 8 sufficiently
complies with the rationale behind the development of the
precautionary principle. By implementing the stringent provisions
of DAO 08-2002, in conjunction with the standards set by EO 514
and the NBF, the government preemptively intervenes and takes
precautionary measures prior to the release of any potentially
harmful substance or article into the environment. Thus, any
potential damage to the environment is prevented or negated.
Moreover, international instruments ratified and formally adopted
by the Philippines (CBD and the Cartagena Protocol) provide
additional support in the proper application of the precautionary
principle in relation to GMOs and the environment.
On the “misapplication” by the CA of the precautionary
principle, BCP explains that the basic premise for its application is
the existence of threat of harm or damage to the environment,
which must be backed by a reasonable scientific basis and not
based on mere hypothetical allegation, before the burden of proof is
shifted to the public respondents in a petition for writ
of kalikasan. Here, the CA relied heavily on its observation that
“… field trials of bt talong could not be declared…as safe to human
health and to ecology, with full
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 503
scientific certainty, being an alteration of an otherwise natural
state of affairs in our ecology” and “introducing a genetically
modified plant in our intricate world of plants by humans certainly
appears to be an ecologically imbalancing act,” among others. BCP
finds that this pronouncement of the CA constitutes an indictment
not only against Bt talong but against all GMOs as well. The
appellate court’s opinion is thus highly speculative, sweeping and
laced with obvious bias.
There being no credible showing in the record that the conduct
of Bt talong field trials entails real threats and that these threats
pertain to serious and irreversible damage to the environment,
BCP maintains that the precautionary principle finds no
application in this case. While Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases states that “[w]hen there is a lack of full
scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human
activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the case before it,” the CA
failed to note that the element of lack of full scientific certainty
pertains merely to the causal link between human activity and
environmental effect, and not the existence or risk of
environmental effect.
BCP laments that sustaining the CA’s line of reasoning would
produce a chilling effect against technological advancements,
especially those in agriculture. Affirming the CA decision thus sets
a dangerous precedent where any and all human activity may be
enjoined based on unfounded fears of possible damage to health or
the environment.
Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the Court is presented with the

following issues for resolution:
1. Legal standing of respondents;
2. Mootness;
3. Violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies;
504
4. Application of the law on environmental impact
statement/assessment on projects involving the introduction and
propagation of GMOs in the country;
5. Evidence of damage or threat of damage to human health and
the environment in two or more provinces, as a result of the Bt
talong field trials;
6. Neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public
respondents in connection with the processing and evaluation of
the applications for Bt talong field testing; and
7. Application of the Precautionary Principle.
The Court’s Ruling

Legal Standing
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a

given question.”38 It refers particularly to “a party’s personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and
“calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”39
However, the rule on standing is a matter of procedure which
can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.40 The Court thus had invariably
_______________
38 Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011, 641 SCRA 244,
254, citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755; 489 SCRA 160, 216
(2006).
39 Id., citing Jumamil v. Cafe, 507 Phil. 455, 465; 470 SCRA 475, 487 (2005).
40 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 591 Phil. 393, 404;
570 SCRA 410, 421 (2008); Tatad v. Secretary of the
505
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 505
adopted a liberal policy on standing to allow ordinary citizens
and civic organizations to prosecute actions before this Court
questioning the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, rulings or
orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.41
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.42 signaled an even more liberalized policy
on locus standi in public suits. In said case, we recognized the
“public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We held that such
right need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to
exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.
Since the Oposa ruling, ordinary citizens not only have legal
standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they
can do so in representation of their own and future generations.
Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their

generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Such
_______________
Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321; 281 SCRA 330 (1997); and De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420, 422.
41 Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 137.
42 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 804-805.
506
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources
to the end that their exploration, development and utilization
be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.43(Emphasis supplied)
The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of

Procedure for Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a
citizen suit in environmental cases.44 The provision on citizen suits
in the Rules “collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature,” and
aims to “further encourage the protection of the environment.”45
There is therefore no dispute on the standing of respondents to
file before this Court their petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of
continuing mandamus.
Mootness
It is argued that this case has been mooted by the termination of

all field trials on August 10, 2012. In fact, the validity of all
Biosafety permits issued to UPLB expired in June 2012.
_______________
43 Id., at pp. 802-803.

44 Rule 2, Sec. 5 reads in part:
5. SEC.Citizen suit.—Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. x x x
45 See Annotation on A.M. 09-6-8-SC.
507
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 507
An action is considered ‘moot’ when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead, or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the
parties.46 Time and again, courts have refrained from even
expressing an opinion in a case where the issues have become moot
and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak
of, so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use or
value.47
Nonetheless, courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.”48 We find that
the presence of the second and fourth exceptions justified the CA in
not dismissing the case despite the termination of Bt talong field
trials.
While it may be that the project proponents of Bt talonghave
terminated the subject field trials, it is not certain if they have
actually completed the field trial stage for the purpose of data
gathering. At any rate, it is on record that the proponents expect to
proceed to the next phase of the project, the preparation for
commercial propagation of the Bt eggplants. Biosafety permits will
still be issued by the BPI for Bt talong or other GM crops. Hence,
not only does this case fall under the “capable of repetition yet
evading review” exception
_______________
46 Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 792, 800; 285 SCRA 16, 21 (1998).
47 Barbieto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184645, October 30, 2009, 604 SCRA 825, 840.
48 Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon v. Francisco, Sr., G.R. No. 172553, December 14, 2011,
662 SCRA 439, 449, citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 38 at p. 754; pp. 214-215.
508
to the mootness principle, the human and environmental health
hazards posed by the introduction of a genetically modified plant, a
very popular staple vegetable among Filipinos, is an issue of
paramount public interest.
Primary Jurisdiction and

Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies
In Republic v. Lacap,49 the Court explained the related doctrines

of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies,
as follows:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the

intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues
which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a
court without first giving such administrative agency the
opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is,
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the
_______________
49 546 Phil. 87, 96-98; 517 SCRA 255, 265-266 (2007).
509
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 509
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the
amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is
purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g)
when its application may cause great and irreparable
damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when
strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo
warranto proceedings. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Under DAO 08-2002, the public is invited to submit written

comments for evaluation by BPI after public information sheets
have been posted (Section 7[G]). Section 7(P) also provides for
revocation of field testing permit on certain grounds, to wit:
P. Revocation of Permit to Field Test.—A Permit to Field

Test may be revoked for any of the following grounds:
1. Provision of false information in the Application to
Field Test;
2. Violation of SPS or biosafety rules and regulations
or of any conditions specified in the permit;
3. Failure to allow the inspection of the field testing
site;
4. Receipt by BPI of new information that the field
testing of the regulated article poses significant risks to
human health and the environment;
5. Whether the regulated article was imported,
misdeclaration of shipment; or
510
6. Such other grounds as BPI may deem reasonable to
prevent significant risks to human health and the
environment.
Respondents sought relief under the Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases, claiming serious health and environmental
adverse effects of the Bt talong field trials due to “inherent risks”
associated with genetically modified crops and herbicides. They
sought the immediate issuance of a TEPO to enjoin the processing
for field testing and registering Bt talong as herbicidal product in
the Philippines, stopping all pending field trials of Bt
talong anywhere in the country, and ordering the uprooting of
planted Bt talong in the field trial sites.
In addition to the TEPO and writ of kalikasan, respondents also
sought the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus commanding the respondents to: (1) comply
with the requirement of environmental impact statement; (2)
submit comprehensive risk assessments, field test reports,
regulatory compliance reports and other material documents on Bt
talong including issued certifications on public consultation with
LGUs; (3) work with other agencies to submit a draft amendment
to biosafety regulations; and (4) BPI, in coordination with relevant
government agencies, conduct balanced nationwide public
information on the nature of Bt talong field trial, and a survey of
its social acceptability.
Clearly, the provisions of DAO 08-2002 do not provide a speedy,
or adequate remedy for the respondents “to determine the
questions of unique national and local importance raised here that
pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus [they
were] justified in coming to this Court.”50 We take judicial notice of
the fact that genetically modified food is an intensely debated
global issue, and despite the entry of GMO crops (Bt corn) into the
Philippines in the last decade, it
_______________
50 See Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 555,
608.
511
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 511
is only now that such controversy involving alleged damage or
threat to human health and the environment from GMOs has
reached the courts.
Genetic Engineering
Genetic manipulation has long been practiced by conventional

breeders of plant or animal to fulfill specific purposes. The basic
strategy employed is to use the sexual mechanism to reorganize
the genomes of two individuals in a new genetic matrix, and select
for individuals in the progeny with the desirable combination of
the parental characteristics. Hybridization is the conventional way
of creating variation. In animals, mating is effected by introducing
the desired sperm donor to the female at the right time. In plants,
pollen grains from the desired source are deposited on the stigma
of a receptive female plant. Pollination or mating is followed by
fertilization and subsequently development into an embryo. The
effect of this action is the reorganization of the genomes of two
parents into a new genetic matrix to create new individuals
expressing traits from both parents. The ease of crossing of mating
varies from one species to another. However, conventional breeding
technologies are limited by their long duration, need for sexual
compatibility, low selection efficiency, and restricted gene pool.51
Recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology, often referred to
as genetic engineering, allows scientists to transfer genes from one
organism to any other, circumventing the sexual process. For
example, a gene from a bacterium can be transferred to corn.
Consequently, DNA technology allowed scientists to treat all living
things as belonging to one giant breeding pool. Unlike other
natural genome rearrangements phenomena, rDNA introduces
alien DNA sequences into the genome. Even
_______________
51 George Acquaah, Understanding Biotechnology: an integrated and cyber-based approach (Pearson

Education, Inc., 2004) at pp. 62, 64, 69 and 70.
512
though crossing of two sexually compatible individuals produces
recombinant progeny, the term recombinant DNA is restricted to
the product of the union of DNA segments of different biological
origins. The product of recombinant DNA manipulation is called
a transgenic organism. rDNA is the core technology of
biotechnology.52
The organism that is created through genetic engineering is
called a genetically modified organism (GMO). Since the
production of the first GMOs in the 1970s, genes have been
transferred between animal species, between plant species, and
from animal species to plant species. Some genes can make an
animal or plant grow faster or larger, or both. A gene produced by
flounder (anti-freeze) was transplanted into salmon so that salmon
can be farmed in colder climates. Many species of fish are
genetically engineered to speed growth, to alter flesh quality, and
to increase cold and disease resistance. In farm animals such as
cattle, genes can be inserted to reduce the amount of fat in meat, to
increase milk production, and to increase superior cheese-making
proteins in milk. Biotechnology has also modified plants to produce
its own pesticide, resist common diseases or to tolerate weed-
killing herbicide sprays.53
Despite these promising innovations, there has been a great deal
of controversy over bioengineered foods. Some scientists believe
genetic engineering dangerously tampers with the most
fundamental natural components of life; that genetic engineering
is scientifically unsound; and that when scientists transfer genes
into a new organism, the results could be unexpected and
dangerous. But no long-term studies have been done to determine
what effects GMO foods might have on human health.54
_______________
52 Id., at p. 72.
53 Harris, Nancy, Genetically Engineered Foods, pp. 5-6 (Greenhaven Press,
2004).
54 Id., at p. 7.
513
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 513
Genetically Modified Foods
The term GM food refers to crop plants created for human or

animal consumption using the latest molecular biology techniques.
These plants are modified in the laboratory to enhance desired
traits such as increased resistance to herbicides or improved
nutritional content.55Genetic modification of plants occurs in
several stages:
1. An organism that has the desired characteristic is

identified and the specific gene producing this characteristic
is located and the DNA is cut off.
2. The gene is then attached to a carrier in order to
introduce the gene into the cells of the plant to be modified.
Mostly plasmid (piece of bacterial DNA) acts as a carrier.
3. Along with the gene and carrier a ‘promoter’ is also
added to ensure that the gene works adequately when it is
introduced into the plant.
4. The gene of interest together with carrier and promoter
is then inserted into bacterium, and is allowed to reproduce to
create many copies of the gene which are then transferred
into the plant being modified.
5. The plants are examined to ensure that they have the
desired physical characteristic conferred by the new gene.
6. The genetically modified plants are bred with
conventional plants of the same variety to produce seed for
further testing and possibly for future commercial use. The
entire process from the initial
_______________
55 Sheweta Barak, Deepak Mudgil and B.S. Khatkar, “Genetically modified food: benefits, safety
aspects and concerns” Asian Journal of Food and Agro-
Industry <www.ajofai.info/Abstact/Genetically%2food%20benefits,%20safety%20aspects%2concerns.pdf>
(visited last November 7, 2014).
514
gene selection to commercial production can take up to ten years
or more.56
Benefits of GM Foods
The application of biotechnology in agricultural production

promises to overcome the major constraints being faced in farming
such as insect pest infestation and diseases which lead to
substantial yield losses. Pest-resistant crops could substantially
improve yields in developing countries where pest damage is
rampant and reduce the use of chemical pesticides. Crop plants
which have been genetically engineered to withstand the
application of powerful herbicides57 using genes from soil bacteria
eliminates the time-consuming and not cost-effective physical
removal of weeds by tilling. The herbicides to which the GM crops
are tolerant are “broad spectrum” weed-killers, which means they
can be sprayed over the entire field, killing all plants apart from
the GM crop. Herbicide-tolerant crops include transgenes providing
tolerance to the herbicides (glyphosate or glufosinate ammonium).
These herbicides kill nearly all kinds of plants except those that
have the tolerance gene. Another important benefit is that this
class of herbicides breaks down quickly in the soil, eliminating
residue carryover problems and reducing adverse environmental
impacts.58
Some plants are genetically engineered to withstand cold
climates such as GM strawberries or soybeans, expressing the anti-
freeze gene of arctic flounder, to protect themselves against the
damaging effects of the frost; and GM tobacco and potato with anti-
freeze gene from cold water fish. Crops could also be genetically
modified to produce micronutrients vital to
_______________
56 Id., at p. 550.
57 Herbicide is defined as “a poisonous substance used to destroy unwanted plants.” (Compact Oxford
English Dictionary, p. 473 [3rd ed. 2005]).
58 Supra note 55 at pp. 551-552.
515
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 515
the human diet such as the “golden rice” genetically modified to
produce beta-carotene, which can solve Vitamin A deficiency and
prevent night blindness in preschool children. Other efforts to
enhance nutritional content of plants include the genetic
modification of canola to enhance Vitamin E content or better
balance fatty acids, cereals for specific starch or protein, rice for
increased iron to reduce anemia, and plant oils to adjust
cholesterol levels. There are also food crops engineered to produce
edible vaccines against infectious diseases that would make
vaccination more readily available to children around the world.
For example, transgenic bananas containing inactivated viruses
protecting against common developing world diseases such as
cholera, hepatitis B and diarrhea, have been produced. These
vaccines will be much easier to ship, store and administer than
traditional injectable vaccines.59
Overall, biotechnology is perceived as having the potential to
either help or hinder reconciling of the often opposing goals of
meeting the human demand for food, nutrition, fiber, timber, and
other natural resources. Biotech crops could put more food on the
table per unit of land and water used in agriculture, thus resulting
in decreased land and water diverted to human uses. Increasing
crop yields and reducing the amount of cultivated land necessary
would also reduce the area subject to soil erosion from agricultural
practices, which in turn would limit associated environmental
effects on water bodies and aquatic species and would reduce loss
of carbon sinks and stores into the atmosphere.60
_______________
59 Id., at pp. 552-553.

60 Indur M. Goklany, “Applying the Precautionary Principle to Genetically Modified Crops” Policy
Study Number 157 (2000): 4-5, 8 and 10. Print.
516
Adverse Health Effects of GMOs
Along with the much heralded benefits of GM crops to human

health and environment, there emerged controversial issues
concerning GM foods. In 1999, it was found that genetically
engineered foods can have negative health effects. Based on
scientific studies, these foods can unleash new pathogens, contain
allergens and toxins, and increase the risk of cancer, herbicide
exposure, and harm to fetuses and infants.61 Independent studies
conducted went as far to conclude that GM food and feed are
“inherently hazardous to health.”62
A widely reported case is that of the Brazil nut gene expressed in
soybean in order to increase the methionine content for animal
feed. The protein was subsequently shown to be an allergen and
the product was never marketed. Genetically modified foods can
introduce novel proteins into the food supply from organisms that
are never consumed as foods, which may pose a health risk. This
may elicit potentially harmful immunological responses, including
allergic hypersensitivity.63
A feeding experiment conducted by Dr. Arpad Pusztai also
demonstrated that potatoes genetically altered to produce lectins,
natural insecticides, to protect them against aphids, damaged the
animals’ gut, other organs, and immune system. Dr. Pusztai found
that “the damage originated not from the
_______________
61 Verzola, Roberto, “Genetically Engineered Foods Have Health Risks,” reproduced with permission
in Genetically Engineered Foods, supra note 53 at pp. 38-42.
62 Mae-Wan Ho, “Ban GMOs Now,” Lecture by at conference on Traditional Seeds Our National
Treasure and Heritage – Traditional and Organic Agriculture. Bewelder, Warsaw, Poland, April 6, 2008.
<http://www.i-sis.org.uk/Ban_GMOs_Now.php> (visited last December 4, 2014).
63 Anita Bakshi, “Potential Adverse Health Effects of Genetically Modified Crops” Journal of
Toxicology and Environmental Health B (2003) <http://globalseminarhealth.wdfiles.com/local-
files.nutrition/Bakshi.pdf> (visited last December 4, 2014).
517
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 517
transgene and its expressed product but from the damage caused
by the insertion of the transgene, probably due to insertional
mutagenesis.”64 If confirmed, Pusztai’s conclusions will reinforce
concerns that gene insertion itself may create new toxins; it will
also implicate the toxin commonly used in other genetically
engineered crops — the Bt toxin which, Pusztai says, is also a
lectin.65
The use of antibiotic resistance marker (arm) gene, inserted into
a plant or microbe, that helps determine if the foreign gene has
successfully spliced into the host organism, is another cause of
grave concern among scientists. These arm genes might
unexpectedly recombine with disease-causing bacteria or microbes
in the environment or in the guts of animals or humans who eat
GM food, thus contributing to the growing public health danger of
antibiotic-resistance of infections that cannot be cured with
traditional antibiotics (e.g., new strains of salmonella, e-coli,
campylobacter and enterococci).66However, recent advances in
genetic engineering indicate that use of such selection markers is
likely to diminish with the anticipated development of alternative
types of marker genes.67
Increased cancer risk is another critical issue in the consumption
of GM foods. A growth hormone genetically modified to stimulate
milk production in cows was found to elevate levels of IGF-1
(insulin-like Growth Factor-1, identical versions of which occurs in
cows and humans) in cow’s milk by 80%. IGF-1 is reported to be a
key factor in prostate cancer,
_______________
64 Ken Roseboro, ed. “Arpad Pusztai and the Risks of Genetic Engineering” The Organic and Non-
GMO Report (June 2009) <http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_18101.cfm> (visited last
December 6, 2014).
65 Verzola, supra note 61 at p. 40.
66 Barak, Mudgil and Khatkar, supra note 55 at p. 555.
67 Bakshi, supra note 63 at p. 217; Barak, Mudgil and Khatkar, id.
518
breast cancer and lung cancer.68 Dr. Samuel Epstein of the
University of Illinois warned of the danger of high levels of IGF-1
contained in milk cows injected with synthetic bovine growth
hormone (rBGH), which could be a potential risk factor for breast
and gastrointestinal cancers.69
Glyphosate, the active ingredient in Monsanto’s Roundup®
herbicide, has been found to worsen modern diseases. A report
published in the journal Entropy argues that glyphosate residues,
found in most commonly consumed foods in the Western diet
courtesy of genetically engineered sugar, corn, soy and wheat,
“enhance the damaging effects of other food-borne chemical
residues and toxins in the environment to disrupt normal body
functions and induce disease.” Another research demonstrated a
connection between increased use of Roundup with rising autism
rates in the US.70
Adverse Effects of GMOs to the Environment
Genetically modified crops affect the environment in many ways

such as contaminating non-GMO plants, creating super weeds and
super pests, harming nontarget species, changing soil microbial
and biochemical properties, and threatening biodiversity.
There are two primary types of technology so far deployed: insect
resistance (Bt) and herbicide tolerance (HT). Both have drastic
modes of action to kill the target species at high efficiency. Bt crops
contain a toxin lethal to certain insects, and Bt sprays have been
used by organic farmers as a last option
_______________
68 Verzola, supra note 61 at p. 40.

69 Hans R. Larsen, “Milk and the Cancer Connection” International Health News (April 1998)
<http://www.notmilk.com/drlarsen.html>(visited last December 6, 2014).
70 Mercola, Monsanto’s Roundup Herbicide May Be Most Important Factor In Development of Autism
and Other Chronic Diseases<http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2013/06/09/monsanto-
roundup-herbicide.aspx> (visited last December 6, 2014).
519
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 519
to deal with certain pests like the corn borer. It is feared that
genetically modified Bt crops will speed up resistance
to Bt, thereby rendering the organic spray ineffective.71Lab and
field tests also indicate that common plant pests such as cotton
bollworms, living under constant pressure from GE crops, will soon
evolve into “superpests” completely immune to Bt sprays and other
environmentally sustainable biopesticides.72 In the case of HT, the
technology involves the combined use of a chemical herbicide and a
GM plant. The herbicide is generally a broad spectrum herbicide
(commonly glyphosate or glufosinate) which kills weeds while
leaving the crop plant alive as it is genetically engineered to be
resistant to the herbicide. The herbicide acts to inhibit an essential
enzyme that is found in all plants and as a result is able to
eliminate all weeds whereas most conventional herbicides are
selective in their action and target a limited number of weeds.
Concern has been raised regarding over-reliance on use of one or
two herbicides in increased amounts over time which leads to the
emergence of herbicide resistant weeds. Also, the transfer of an
herbicide-resistance gene into a weed can convert it into a
superweed. Pests and weeds will emerge that are pesticide or
herbicide resistant, which means that stronger, more toxic
chemicals will be needed to get rid of the pests.73
It is a well-accepted fact that genetically engineered plants can
move beyond the field sites and cross with wild relatives.74 It is by
nature a design of plants to cross pollinate to spread
_______________
71 Lilliston, Ben, “Genetically Modified Organisms are Contaminating Organic
Crops,” reproduced with permission in Genetically Engineered Foods, supra note 53
at p. 55.
72 Barak, Mudgil and Khatkar, supra note 55 at p. 555.
73 Id.
74 Andreas Bauer-Panskus, Sylvia Hamberger and Christoph Then, “Transgene
escape – Global atlas of uncontrolled spread of genetically engineered plants” Test
Biotech <https://www.testbiotech.org/sites/default/files/Testbiotech_Transgene_Esca
pe.pdf > (visited last December 6, 2014).
520
genes further afield. Maize, oil seed rape, sugar beet, barley,
among others, are wind and insect pollinated, allowing pollen to
travel large distances. In GM crop fields, pollen drift and insect
pollination create obvious problems for nearby non-GM or organic
crops.75 GM maize could cross-pollinate neighboring non-GM or
organic maize crops. Maize pollen can travel at least 500-700
meters and still be viable and distances of several kilometers have
even been reported.76 But many experiments showed varying
results and actual cross-pollinations were observed in Mexico up to
200 meters only, while in Oklahoma it was 500 meters. In crop
species that are outcrossers, many environmental factors influence
the maximum pollination distance such as the size of pollen grains,
the humidity in the air, and the wind speed.77 Brinjal is usually
self-pollinated, but the extent of cross-pollination has been
reported as high as 48% and hence it is classified as cross-
pollinated crop. The cone-like formation of anthers favors self-
pollination; but since the stigma ultimately projects beyond the
anthers, there is an ample opportunity for cross-pollination. The
rates of natural cross-pollination may vary depending on genotype,
location, and insect activity. The extent of outcrossing has been
reported from 3 to 7% in China and from 0 to 8.2% (with a mean of
2.7%) at Asian Vegetable Research Development Centre; however
the Indian researchers have reported 2 to 48% outcrossing
in brinjal varieties in India. Outcrossing primarily takes place
with the help of insects.78
_______________
75 “Contamination of Crops” <http://www.gmeducation.org/en-

vironment/p149075-contamination-of-crops.html> (visited last December 7, 2014).
76 Gene Watch UK, Fact Sheet No. 3 (Forage Maize), UK Farm Scale Trials
with GM Crops-2000, <http://www.genewatch.org/pub-537624> (visited last
December 7, 2014).
77 “Transgenic Crops: an Introduction and Resource Guide”
<http://cls.casa.colostate.edu/transgeniccrops/croptocrop.html>.
78 “Biology of Brinjal” <http://dbtbiosafety.nic.in/guidelines/brinjal.pdf>.
521
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 521
The StarLink incident is also a widely reported GM fiasco. In
June 2000, Starlink, a genetically modified yellow corn which
contains the pesticide Bt in every cell, was found in white corn
tortilla chips in Florida, USA. Starlink had been approved for
animal feed but not for human consumption due to concerns about
dangerous allergic reactions. The Starlink incident is often cited to
illustrate how difficult it is to keep genetically modified crops from
spreading.79
This gene flow to wild species is particularly alarming to
environmentalists. The wild species from which our agricultural
plants originate are an important genetic resource for further plant
breeding if, for example, there is a requirement for improved
resistance to climate change or plant pests. Future plant breeding
could be jeopardized if transgenes spread into these resources.
Similarly, agriculture in the centers of origin could be permanently
damaged if transgenes spread into regional landraces.80Invasive
species can replace a single species or a whole range of species, and
they can also change the conditions within ecological systems.
Crossing can cause losses in the genetic information of the original
species, a reduction in genetic diversity and an ongoing
incremental change of genetic identity in the original plants. It is
hard to predict which species will become invasive.81 Indeed, GM
_______________
79 Lilliston, supra note 71 at p. 54.

80 Testbiotech Report, supra note 74 at p. 7.
A landrace is defined as “a dynamic population(s) of a cultivated plant that has historical origin,
distinct identity and lacks formal crop improvement, as well as often being genetically diverse, locally
adapted and associated with traditional farming systems.” Tania Carolina Camacho Villa, Nigel Maxted,
Maria Scholten and Brian Ford-Lloyd, “Defining and Identifying crop landraces,” Characterization and
Utilization Plant Genetic Resources: Characterization and Utilization, Vol. 3, Issue 3 (December 2005)
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=689208>.
81 Id., at p. 39.
522
crops could threaten the centers of crop biodiversity or outgrow a

local flora to the detriment of native species.82
Bt gene in genetically modified crops might be toxic to nontarget
organisms that consume it. When Bt corn sheds its pollen, these
are cast into the wind, dusting nearby plants and trees. Concern
has been expressed about the potential toxicity of the Bt toxin in
corn pollen to the monarch butterfly because initial laboratory
studies showed increased mortality in larvae. However, in another
study it was believed that it is unlikely that a significant risk to
those butterflies exists.83
On the effect of transgene crops on soil, one study
investigated Cry1Ac and CpTI proteins and their effects on
microbial properties and enzyme activities. Results showed that
there was persistence of said proteins in soil under 4-year
consecutive cultivation of transgenic cottons. Soil microbial
biomass carbon, microbial activities, and soil enzyme activities
(except urease and phosphodiesterase) significantly decreased in
soil under transgenic cottons.84
In another review, it was stated that the direct effects of the
plant that has been modified is of the most concern since the
introduction of transgenic proteins for pest and disease resistance
can involve the production of chemical substances that are
potentially toxic to nontarget soil organisms, including mycorrhizal
fungi and soil microfauna that are involved in organic matter
decomposition. Experimental studies have shown that the
transgenic proteins Bt crystal toxin and T4 lysozyme, though used
to prevent insect damage to the above
_______________
82 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1046/J.0960-7412.2002.001607.x/full>.
83 Barak, Mudgil and Khatkar, supra note 55 at pp. 555-556.
84 Z.H. Chen, L.J. Chen, Y.L. Zhang, Z.J. Wu, “Microbial properties, enzyme activities and the
persistence of exogenous proteins in soil under consecutive cultivation of transgenic cottons (Gossypium
hirsutum L.)” PLANT SOIL ENVIRON., 57, 2011 (2): 67-74
<www.agriculturejournals.cz/publicFiles/35214.pdf> (visited last December 6, 2014).
523
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 523
ground plant parts, are not only present in root exudates but
that they maintain biological activity after entering the soil.85
As to the herbicide glyphosate, recent studies revealed its
negative effects on the soil, which include compaction and
resultant runoff, the killing of beneficial microbes and bacteria,
and the exhaustion of necessary minerals and nutrients that
plants require. It was found that glyphosate “locks up” manganese
and other minerals in the soil so that they can’t be utilized by the
plants that need them, and that it is toxic to rhizobia, the
bacterium that fixes nitrogen in the soil. There is likewise evidence
showing that glyphosates can make their way to groundwater
supplies.86In a study which tested the effects of the herbicide
Roundup on six species of larval amphibians from North America,
it was demonstrated that when we “use realistic exposure times
and the frequently occurring stress of predators found in natural
ecologic communities, one of our most widely applied herbicides
(Roundup) has the potential to kill many species of amphibians.”
At the same time, the study noted that Monsanto Corporation has
recently released “an additional formulation of glyphosate
(Roundup Biactive), which contains a different (but unspecified)
surfactant that is reported to be less toxic.”87
_______________
85 Biao Liu, Qing Zeng, Fengming Yan, Haigen Xu, and Chongren Xu, Review: Effects of Transgenic
Plants on Soil Microorganisms” <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11104-004-1610-
8#page2> (visited last December 6, 2014).
86 E. Vinje, “Is Monsanto’s Roundup Killing Our
Soil?” Planet Natural <http://www.planetnatural.com/roundup-killing-soil/> (visited last December 6,
2014) See also Stephanie Strom, “Misgivings About How a Weed Killer Affects the Soil” The New York
Times (September 19, 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/business/misgivings-about-how-a-
weedkiller-affects-the-soil.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> (visited last December 6, 2014).
87 R.A. Relyea, “The Lethal Impacts of Roundup and Predatory Stress on Six Species of North
American Tadpoles,” Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology, v. 48, n.3, (April 1, 2005).
524
Evidence of Damage or Threat of Damage
to Human Health and the Environment
Both petitioners and respondents submitted documentary

evidence consisting of reports of scientific studies and articles in
support of their respective positions on the benefits and risks of
GM plants.
Further, the parties presented their respective expert witnesses
who testified on the allegations raised in the petition concerning
damage or threat of damage to human health and the environment
resulting from the conduct of Bt talong field trials in the
Philippines. The CA conducted “hot tubbing,” the colloquial term
for concurrent expert evidence, a method used for giving evidence
in civil cases in Australia. In a “hot tub” hearing, the judge can
hear all the experts discussing the same issue at the same time to
explain each of their points in a discussion with a professional
colleague. The objective is to achieve greater efficiency and
expedition, by reduced emphasis on cross-examination and
increased emphasis on professional dialogue, and swifter
identification of the critical areas of disagreement between the
experts.88
On November 20, 2012, the parties’ expert witnesses testified in
a hot tub hearing before the chairman and members of the CA’s
Special Thirteenth Division. Dr. Chakraborty, Dr. Medina and Dr.
Malayang were presented by the petitioners while Dr. Davies, Dr.
Halos, Dr. Ebora and Dr. Cariño appeared for the respondents.
The following are summaries of the expert witnesses’ judicial
affidavits:
_______________
<http://www.mindfully.org/Pesticide/2005/Roundup-Tadpoles-Relyea1apr05.htm> (visited last

December 6, 2014).
88 Mr. Neil J. Young QC, “Expert Witnesses: On the stand or in the hot tub – how, when and why?
Formulating the Question for Opinion and Cross-Examining the Experts” Commercial Court Seminar,
Quezon City, October 27, 2010.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 525
For Petitioners
DR. DAVIES, Professor of Plant Physiology at Cornell

University, Jefferson Science Fellow serving as senior science
advisor on agricultural biotechnology in the US Department of
State, and editor for plant physiology for McGraw-Hill
Encyclopedia of Science and Technology.
In his review of agricultural biotechnology around the world, he
has not encountered any verifiable report of a field trial of any GM
crop that caused damage to the environment and to human health.
This involves more than 25,000 field trials in 20 years with crops
such as Bt eggplant, Bt cotton, Bt corn, and others. The same
applies to the commercial cultivation of Bt crops, which have been
grown in ever increasing quantities worldwide for 16 years and
now comprise the majority of the world acreage of maize and
cotton.
A recent European Union (EU) report which concludes that more
than 130 EU research projects covering a period of more than 25
years of research involving more than 500 independent research
groups, show that consuming foods containing ingredients derived
from GM crops is no riskier than consuming the same foods
containing ingredients from conventional crops. The World Health
Organization (WHO), American Medical Association, US National
Academy of Sciences, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) all
have come to the same conclusion.
GMOs have been proven safe as conventionally-bred crops in
animal studies. A small number of poorly done studies purportedly
claiming negative effects, should be viewed with great caution and
have been highly criticized for their veracity by the overwhelming
majority of highly respected scientists. Many hundreds of studies
show no harmful effects. To date, not a single rigorous study of GM
foods in animals has revealed any adverse effect; not a single case
of allergy, illness, cancer, or death have been shown to be
associated with foods derived from GM crops, despite the fact that
they have been consumed by Americans for 16 years.
526
Recent studies indicate that Bt crops enhance the ecological
diversity in the areas surrounding those where Bt crops are grown.
Over a period of 13 years, cultivation of Bt cotton in China results
in an increase in insect diversity and abundance and a decrease in
crop damaging insects not only in Bt crop fields but also in
surrounding non-Btfields.
GM crops deliver significant yield increases, result in less
exposure to pesticides, improve food security worldwide, protect
against devastating crop losses and famine, improve nutrition, and
some GM crop techniques help combat climate change.89
DR. HALOS, Ph.D. in Genetics, University of California

Berkeley, B.S. Agriculture, Major in Agronomy (Plant Breeding),
UPLB, and served as Instructor, Associate Professor, Chief Science
Research Specialist, Research Director at UPLB, UP Diliman, De
La Salle University, Forest Research Institute now Ecosystems
Research and Development Bureau of DENR and the
Biotechnology Coalition of the Philippines.
From her research, she gathered that the protein product of
the Bt gene Cry1Ac in Bt cotton that is also in Bt eggplant has been
found safe by many food and environmental safety regulatory
agencies such as those in Australia, New Zealand, USA, Canada,
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, Japan and
EU.
Since 2002, BPI has granted 95 biosafety permits for field trials.
Of these 70 field trial permits were for Bt corn, cotton and
eggplant. No adverse effect of any of these Bt crop field trials have
been reported. No report of adverse effects of Bt crop field trial
exists. All claims of adverse health and environmental effects
of Bt crops has not been scientifically validated. The yearly
expansion of GM crop areas in both the developing and
industrialized countries is an attestation of the preference of
farmers and the economic benefits that accrue to them.
_______________
89 CA Rollo (Vol. V), pp. 3482-3488.
527
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 527
GM crops have positive environmental impact. Currently
commercialized GM crops have reduced the adverse impacts of
agriculture on biodiversity. The use of Bt crops has significantly
reduced the use of pesticides, and also increased farmer incomes.90
DR. EBORA, Ph.D. in Entomology, Michigan State University;
B.S. Agriculture and M.S. Entomology (Insect Pathology/Microbial
Control), UPLB; Post-graduate trainings in microbiology and
biotechnology, Osaka University, Japan, and Intellectual Property
Management and Technology Transfer, ISAAA AmeriCenter,
Cornell University, USA. Director, and Research Associate
Professor, National Institute of Molecular Biology and
Biotechnology (BIOTECH), UPLB; Philippine Coordinator of the
Program for Biosafety Systems; former Executive Director,
Philippine Council for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology
Research and Development, DOST; former Chair, Biosafety
Committee, DOST; and was a Member of the Institutional
Biosafety Committees of UPLB and International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI); and was extensively involved in the isolation,
bioassay or efficacy testing and development of Bt as microbial
insecticides for the control of Asian corn borer and mosquito larvae
at BIOTECH.
The contained field trial experiments, among others, were
designed to address concerns on cross-pollination or horizontal
gene transfer, pollination distances, harm to beneficial organisms,
and development of insect resistance. To prevent cross-pollination,
an isolation distance of 200 meters from other areas where
eggplants are grown or wild relatives are present, was observed,
and with five (5) rows of non-transgenic eggplants that serve as
pollen trap plants. As to the flight distance of honeybees reaching 4
kilometers, what was not mentioned is the viability of pollen after
it was shed and travelled at a certain distance. Numerous
literatures have shown that isolation distances much less than 200
meters is sufficient to prevent cross-pollination. Two studies are
cited:
_______________
90 CA Rollo (Vol. III), pp. 1834-1836.
528
Sekara and Bieniasz (2008) noted that cross-pollination at a
distance of 50 meters was nonexistent; and the Asian Vegetable
Research and Development Center (AVRDC) indicated that
eggplants produce perfect flowers which may be cross-pollinated
but self-pollination is more common, the extent of natural crossing
depends upon insect activity and this can be avoided by isolating
each variety by 20 meters or with another tall flowering plant. The
isolation distance imposed by DA-BPI is 10x the recommended
isolation distance; the 200 meters distance was found sufficient for
pure seed production in India (the same recommendation by Chen
[2001] of AVRDC foundation for seed production purity standards);
field studies in 2 locations in India have shown that at a distance
beyond 30 meters no more outcrossing could be detected. Taking all
these data into account, the 48% outcrossing being raised by
petitioners is most likely for adjacent plants and therefore not a
valid argument for the ongoing field trials.
The Bt talong will not directly affect beneficial organisms like
pollinators, predators and parasites of insect pests because it is
toxic only to caterpillars or insects belonging to Order Lepidoptera
(butterfly and moths). The selective toxicity of Bt protein
in Bt talongis partly due to the fact that the gut physiology of these
insects is very different from caterpillars, and not all caterpillars
are affected by it. There is a significant number of literature
on Bt protein’s selectivity and specificity.
As to the development of insect resistance, this is not possible
during the multi-location field trials for Bt talong because of low
selection pressure and limited exposure of the insect pest
to Bt talong. Insect resistance is not unique to GM crops as it is a
commonly observed biological reaction of insect pests to control
measures like insecticides. In the event Bt talong is approved for
commercialization and will be widely used by farmers, this concern
could be addressed by insect resistance management (IRM); an
IRM strategy should be required prior to the commercial release
of Bt talong.
529
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 529
There is no compelling reason to stop the field trials; on the
contrary they should be allowed to proceed so that scientists and
researchers will be able to generate valuable data and information
which will be helpful in making informed decisions regarding the
usefulness of the technology.91
For Respondents
DR. MALAYANG III, Ph.D. in Wildland Resource Science,

University of California at Berkeley; M.A. Philosophy, M.A.
International Affairs (Southeast Asia Studies major in Economics),
Ohio University; AB Philosophy, UP Diliman; former
Undersecretary of Environment and Natural Resources; served as
Environmental Science representative in the National Biosafety
Committee of the Philippines and participated in the drafting of
the Philippines Biosafety Framework; and student, lecturer and
advocate of biodiversity, food security, biosafety and environmental
policy.
He is concerned with how GMOs are being introduced for
commercial-scale use (as against being used for academic research)
in the Philippines on the following grounds: (a) how they might
contaminate the indigenous genetic resources of the country; (b)
how they may cause an imbalance of predator-prey relationships in
ecosystems, so that certain species might dominate ecological
niches and erode their biodiversity and ecological stability; (c) how
they may erode the ability of farmers to control their genetic
resources to sustain their cropping systems; and (d) how much are
present biosafety protocols able to safeguard the long-term
ecological and economic interests of the Philippines as a
particularly biodiversity-rich country and which is, therefore,
highly sensitive to genetic pollution; to the extent that its
biodiversity is its long-term equity to advances in biotechnology,
the most robust measures must be taken so that such resources
will not be lost.
_______________
91 Id., at pp. 1940-1944.
530
Being a highly biodiversity-rich country, biosafety measures in
the Philippines must be adopted using a 3-stage approach: Stage 1
– Develop criteria for biosafety measures; meaning, first, adopt a
set of standards for determining the level of robustness of biosafety
measures and protocols that would be acceptable in the particular
case of the Philippines; include required scoping and internal and
external validity requirements of impact and safety assessments;
Stage 2 – Using the criteria produced in Stage 1, develop biosafety
measures and protocols to be adopted in the Philippines; and Stage
3 – Apply the protocol with the highest rigor.
Biosafety must be a public affair involving a broad spectrum of
the Filipino state rather than its considerations being restricted
only to specific professionals and sectors in the country; biosafety
must be based on an enactment of Congress and open to challenge
and adjudication against international laws; provisions must be
made to make it a crime against humanity to recklessly erode and
weaken genetic resources of our people.92
DR. MEDINA, Ph.D. in Environmental Biology, University of
Guelph, Canada; M.S. (Insect and Plant Ecology) and B.S.
Agriculture, UPLB; National Coordinator of MASIPAG; served as
resource person in more than a hundred trainings and seminars,
both local and abroad; served as member in international
agricultural assessment sponsored by Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP), WHO, and the World Bank; worked on a project for
development of resistance to corn borer in 1981 at the Institute of
Plant Breeding in UPLB, and served as researcher and later
Associate Professor of Environmental Management of the UP Open
University.
Based on her studies and extensive experience,
the Bt talong field testing poses the following risks or hazards: (a)
While natural Bt sprays used in organic farming have little effect
on nontarget organisms because the bacterial
92 CA Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 164-165.
531
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 531
‘pro-toxin’ is in an inactive state and only becomes toxic when
processed and reduced in the gut of certain (targeted) species of
insect larvae, in contrast, Bt plants contain an artificial,
truncated Bt gene and less processing is required to generate the
toxin because the toxin is already in its active form. It is therefore
less selective, and may harm nontarget insects that do not have
the enzymes to process the pro-toxin, as well as the pests for which
it is intended; (b) Bt proteins from natural Bt sprays degrade
relatively quickly in the field as a result of ultraviolet light and
lose most toxic activity within several days to two weeks after
application. In Bt crops, however, the Bt toxin is produced by the
internal system of the plants thus nondegradable by mere exposure
to sunlight and generated throughout the entire lifespan of the
plant; (c) Bt talong can also affect the environment by harming
important or beneficial insects directly or indirectly. Genetically
engineered Bt eggplant, like other Bt crops, could be harmful to
nontarget organisms if they consume the toxin directly in pollen or
plant debris. This could cause harm to ecosystems by reducing the
numbers of important species, or reducing the numbers of
beneficial organisms that would naturally help control the pest
species; (d) The evolution of resistance to Bt crops is a real risk and
is treated as such in ecological science throughout the world. If
enough individuals become resistant then the pest control fails; the
pest becomes abundant and affects crop yield. Granting the pest
control practice is successful, it may also simply swap one pest for
another, a phenomenon known as secondary pest outbreak. Several
studies have shown that other pest insects are filling the void left
by the absence of the one (or very few) insect pests that Bt crops
target, and this is now the problem with Bt maize.
Eggplant is 48% insect pollinated thereby any field release or
field testing of genetically modified Bt talongwill eventually lead to
contamination of non-genetically modified eggplant varieties.
Insects, particularly honeybees, can fly as far as 4 kilometers and
therefore the 200 meters perimeter pollen trap area in the confined
field testing set by BPI is not sufficient. And once contamination
532
occurs, genetic cleanup of eggplant or any other plant is
impossible. Moreover, intraspecific gene flow from Bt talong to
other varieties and populations of eggplants should be examined,
as cultivated eggplant (Solanum melongena) can cross breed with
feral populations of S. melongena, and it is possible that cultivated
varieties can revert to wild phenotypes. Additionally, there is likely
to be natural crossing between Bt talong and wild relatives.
Hybridization with perhaps as many as 29 wild relative species
needs to be evaluated carefully and the consequences of any
hybridization that occurs needs to be evaluated.
In 2010, the Minister of Environment and Forests of the
Government of India, in his decision for moratorium of Bt Brinjal,
listed potential contamination of eggplant varieties as one of the
reasons why the release of Bt Brinjal was not allowed. Dr. Andow
of the University of Minnesota also published an 84-page report on
the Environmental Risk Assessment of Bt Brinjal, and among his
conclusions is that several environmental risks were not
considered and nearly all the risk assessment done were
inadequate. He concluded that until the risks were understood or
managed, there seems to be little reason to approve Bt
Brinjal release.93
DR. CHAKRABORTY, Ph.D., M.S. Biochemistry, B.S. (Honors
in Chemistry), Calcutta University; Molecular Biologist, presently
Principal Scientist and Head of the Gene Regulation Laboratory in
the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research-Indian Institute
of Chemical Biology (CSIR-IICB); Member, Governing Body and
Executive Committee of the state council of Biotechnology,
Government of West Bengal and Chairman of the Biotechnology
group of the state council of Science and Technology, Government
of West Bengal; Visiting Professor of the National Institute of
Science, Technology and Development (CSIR-NISTAD); citizen of
India and resident of Kolkata, India.
_______________
93 Id., at pp. 329-332.
533
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 533
GMO is a classic example of “paradoxes of consequences,” where
human actions have unintended consequences, which are in direct
opposition to what was intended. The difference in controlled
laboratory condition and standards, and real life open field level
micro and macro-environment pushes the advantage towards the
target and nontarget living system, with time. The pest resistance
to Bt toxin and development of herbicide tolerance (HT) in weeds is
just a matter of time. The decade long experience in Bt and Ht
genes amply proves this point. If we ignore this now — we are
manufacturing a global environmental disaster — which will be a
crime against humanity. There is no way to recall these GMO from
the environment.
Even the short term benefits of GM agriculture are not scale
neutral, or location-independent. It will help the monopoly
agribusiness and the expenses of monopolistic competition or
cooperative organic farming. Hot climate and rich biodiversity is
detrimental towards the effectiveness of Bt constructs, and helpful
towards unintended gene flow. Moreover, the genetic manipulation
is no way fail safe or exact. Shotgun techniques are being adapted,
aided by focused laboratory based screen of traits — rather than
the host or the full natural product. The GM labeling is avoided to
cover up this major fault.
The tendency to avoid the available risk assessment, and test is
very clear in the GM agribusiness. Before going ahead with spread
of this technology, even in a batter form, the foremost task is to
establish rigorous test and assessment procedures. There are
excellent available tools of preteomics, transcriptomics, and
metabolomics for detailed compositional analysis in our hand to do
this. Please ask, why they are not being employed? In fact, there is
not a single centre to test GM products on behalf of the corporate
GM Agribusiness house. Thus, low level, long term toxicity of GM
foods are yet to be tested. I believe the time has come to establish a
standardization fa-
534
cility to carry out such test facility in any country before giving
permission to GM trial or cultivation.94
The relevant portions of the “hot-tub” hearing held on November

20, 2012, are herein reproduced:
Dr. Cariño:
x x x This is to clarify something with the BT Talong and the BT Talong has its substance. It is not
supposed to be consumed at the moment still under field trial, so it is not supposed to be eaten at the
moment. It has not been released for food nor for feed and so in the context of a confined field test, it
has supposed to have it out in the field in a very controlled manner and any produce that comes out
from that area is supposed to be destroyed or kept from further safety and analysis only.
Chairperson:
So, actually, there is no full scientific certainty that it does not cause any harm pertaining to health?
Dr. Cariño:
BT Talong per se, has not been fully [e]valuated yet that is why it is undergoing trials. If reporting of
the BT toxin in BT Talong is Cry1Ac,there are numerous studies that had been actually published
on relative safety of Cry1Ac protein and it is actually considered as an additional protein and the
various reviews can be seen in the OECD Digest of risk assessments on Cry1Ac protein.
Alternatively, if you are looking at the possibility of harm coming from the introduced protein as yet,
we have not done a full blown assessment of it as of the moment. But we look at the protein
sequence and with a comparison of its sequence with other sequences in the data basis to see if it is
similar to this amino acid sequence of other known toxins and, so far, I have actually … in my
affidavit, I have actually
_______________
94 Id., at pp. 2444-2445.
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seen personally that it is not closely related to any of the known toxins that are found into its system.
Chairperson:
So, in effect, we can not really say that BT Talong is perfectly safe for human consumption?
Dr. Cariño:
Right now it is not meant to be consumed by human at this point. Let me just clarify one point. When any
GM material is supposed to be introduced for food and for feed and before it is actually utilized for
life skill production, it goes through several steps. The first step is actually the “lab,” laboratory
work and it is actually tested in this clean-houses, rolled-out confined limited field test and then it
goes to butyl abyss of field tests where it is like generating more and more informations. We are still
early on in this pathway, so we are only in the confined field test and, at the moment, the thing is
that it is still being tested. The focus is on its efficacy after doing a preliminary assessment of the
possible pathological and ecological effect, and that is the pathway that has been recommended by so
many academics as well as scientific institutions as well. And, that has been a tract followed by
almost all the genetically modified crops that is being introduced in the market today, but at the
moment BT Talong is not yet a commodity. It is not yet being evaluated as a commodity.
Chairperson:
So, no one in this country has yet eaten this BT Talong?
Dr. Cariño:
No, it has not been eaten, as far as I know. Even in India it has not been consumed by human beings
because it has not been introduced as a commodity.
Chairperson:
But what is the ultimate purpose of growing BT Talong? It is not for human consumption, of course?
536
Dr. Cariño:
If it passes the safety assessments. That there is always a peak condition that, if it would not to be
evaluated in a step of the way much like to evaluate any new product that is coming into the market
evaluation, goes on a step-by-step and at least day-to-day basis.
Dr. Davies:
Your Honor, may I interject, may I suggest with your permission? I would just like to make a little bit of
explanation.
Chairperson:
Proceed.
Dr. Davies:
I would like to address “BT” as a compound which is distinct from a plain in “Talong.” First of all, I think
of the name BT toxin is very fortunate. It is really a protein. A protein is an essential constituent of
life. It is an essential constituent of our food. In the human body, and in the body of other animals,
this protein is under the same as any other protein in food. It has no effect on the human body. This
has been shown for many, many years, knowing BT Talong but BT has been a constituent of “maize”
in commercial production for 16 years.
xxxx
Dr. Davies:
x x x So it has been in corn for 16 years after substantial trials. It has been consumed by Americans in
corn products and by any other people who in[g]est American maize corn products x x x. There is not
a single case of illness or toxicity or allergenicity that can be or that has been associated with this
protein and, therefore, any food containing this protein has been declared by authorities in all the
countries that was mentioned by my colleagues, including the European Union and the United
States x x x to be as safe as any food derived
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from the same plant species not containing this gene. I hope that explains a little bit about what it is.
Chairperson:
Are you aware of a study, Dr. Davies, released on September 20 of this year, saying that Monsanto’s
genetically modified corn is linked to cancer?
Dr. Davies:
Yes. Are you referring, your Honor, to a publication by a French Scientist named Gilles-Eric Seralini? I
think this is one of the publications by Seralini’s group. Dr. Seralini’s work has been refuted by
International committees of scientists…
xxxx
Dr. Chakraborty:
Your Honor, may I butt in? It is wrong that proteins can not be toxins. Think about the snake venoms.
They are poisons, so whether it is protein or not that is not the question. So proteins obviously
venoms and proteins and enzymes and they are poisons so protein can be a poison so that is now the
point at all to be considered. The second thing is, yeah, low level toxins long term in[g]estion of
this BT toxin in human or in any other animal have not been tested. So that is true so we do not
know direct consumption of this, because notice have been turned down, that is the objective fact.
The third point is about the “American Corn,” and if I can give you such anecdotes, “American GM
Corn” are not labelled, how do you know that? What is its effect? What is its toxicity? And, obviously,
there are more than a hundred of papers showing and published in very good journals. I can give
many references which have shown the detrimental effect of BT Toxin.
xxxx
538
Chairperson:
But before having this BT talong scheduled and allowed for field testing, is it not proper that it should be
first determined whether this food product is really safe for eating or not?
Dr. Cariño:
There is an initial assessment that is generally done and according to the Codex Alimentarius of the
WHO, the thing that you do at this early stage of development is to compare the sequence of the
protein that is being introduced with published sequence of allergens, as well as toxicants and
toxins. So that has been done. Then you have to look for instability under heat conditions because
there is seldom do we heat grow eggplants, so is it stable under heating. Is it stable in the presence
of digestive juices? And, if the answer is “yes,” there is at least fair certainty, a fair assurance that it
is likely to be safe but then you start thinking of what other component not present in the product,
does this. For example, any product that we consume today has something that is bad for you,
otherwise, you will not see it right now. Otherwise all the different herbivores will be eating it up,
right? It will be extinct if it does not have anything to protect itself and, so, the thing is one, to
quantify how much of that has changed when you lead the genetic modification. So “Talong” has
been known to have Solanine and glycoalkaloids whose level we’ll have to quantify. We have not
done that yet. They have not submitted the data for that and this as secondary metabolize whose
relative concentration will change depending on the environment to which you actually place the
system.
Dr. Chakraborty:
x x x In india, we have a very bad experience x x x in location field trial with the BT Cotton. You known
that BT Cotton was introduced in India through the back door black market entry. During the field
trial, some of those seeds were taken out and given to the
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 539
farmers for commercial cultivation to black market. Monsanto goes well, Monsanto’s BT Cotton, like
Monsanto, did not sue now apparently sue the company and they compelled the government that
farmers wanted those things and there was high…how they pressurized the government. Now, in
case of BT cotton is one thing, but BT Eggplant is completely a different thing. That is why [the]
Supreme Court in India has taken a very strong stand and, now, the parliamentary committee in
India. The Supreme Court has also taken steps stand with the field trial. The first thing in field trial
we had to see that whether there is a definite need of this kind of intervention, because the eggplant
is a very common vegetable in this part of the world. There are so many hundreds of varieties here,
these are the origins of these varieties of this kind of vegetable. It is cheap. It is available everyday.
So why you go on changing if there is no crisis in cultivating the eggplants at present. Therefore,
when you give it to this patented seeds technology, its prices will increase, lot of restrictions had to
be deal. So, who will consume this high price eggplant. Many will be exported, that was why the
proponents are looking into it. But, basically, that is the thing that in case of BT Brinjal, neighbor
partisan is being given. There is a moratorium in India from the Supreme Court and from the
government side on field trial of BT Brinjal. Now, if x x x the BT Eggplant is being taken to the
Philippines, we guess, to get in as a bypass, and who will guarantee that it will not go to the
farmers?
xxxx
Justice Antonio-Valenzuela:
And, I was wondering in the conduct of the tests, the field testing x x x what would be the effect of the
planting….of the existence of the genetically modified organism, for example, on insects, on the soil,
on the air? And then I was thinking, does this have this particular protein that result[s] due to
540
the genetic modification? Is it…how is it expelled, for example how does it go into the environment? Or, on
the other hand, how does it go inside and out of human system so that does it disintegrate or is it
just there forever? I am very curious, sir. You have to educate me.
Dr. Davies:
x x x Okay, the DNA is in every cell of the eggplant and, so, a very small amount to protein produced by
each cell will be this BT protein. It does not get into the environment in general. A very small
amount might be in the pollen or in the leaves that fall to the ground but it has been shown to be
broken down in the soil by organisms so it will not exist in the environment. The only way that it is
going to get into animals or insects is if they eat the fruit and this is what an insect that the
“talong” fruit and shoot borer will be trying to. But, if it eats it, it reacts with its intestine so that
they become toxic to the caterpillar but this is very specific to the digestive system of the caterpillar.
It does not affect bees. It does not affect animals. It does not affect humans.
xxxx
Dr. Davies:
At the scientific level, it gets changed by alkalinity of the insect gut and reacts with specific receptors of
the cells of the walls of the insect gut. But, this is very specific to the gut of these insects namely the
“Lepidoptera” and some “coleoptera” which are the butterflies and the beetles but it will only affect if
they try to eat the plant. Now, you are asking us if what is the effect on the environment. x x x I
would like to cite x x x a recent paper published in the journal “Nature” x x x the most prestigious
scientific journal in the world. x x x published in “Nature” in June this year and this is the result of a
study of “insects” in BT Cotton fields in China in 17 locations for 14 years of a long period study. And
these scientists revolt that they show a marked in-
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 541
crease in the abundance of three types of generalist arthropod predators (ladywings, lacewings and
spiders) and a decrease in abundance of aphid pests associated with widespread adoption
of Bt cotton. And they are referring to China and they conclude that such crops, x x x BT crops, can
promote beneficial control services in agricultural landscapes. And, it also showed that these effects
extend beyond the field. So, essentially x x x they found that there were more insects than in
conventionally grown cotton and the insect diversity was greater surrounded than being detrimental
to an agriculture ecosystem such BT cotton falls beneficial.
Dr. Chakraborty:
May I interject, your Honor. Now he is citing one paper they are. But in “Nature,” there was another news
article, “Battlefield.” One stream ecologist in United States itself, in a university, she has studied
the effect of growing BT Corn in the field and what is the effect on the stream ecology, the west
water, what is happening to other insects, insects in which it is getting that BT toxin will not go.
Yes, she has found that stream ecology…
xxxx
Dr. Chakraborty:
Why was it published in “Nature” when that stream ecologist from Loyola University Chicago in Illinois
published that paper, published that article in PNAS or Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, a prestigious journal? Now, they have to desert her. She was abused, so her file was taken
out. So people started e-mailing, threatening her. So “Nature” has to publish that. How dirty the
field has become so they entitled it “Battelfield.” If anybody produces any evidence that BT Toxin or
GM Technology is doing any harm to the environment then it will be battered by the entire English
lobby so there is the worst situation. But National Academy of Sciences in United States has taken a
542
strong decision and, in last year, there were six publications that published where strong evidences are
being produced about the environmental and ecological damage cause[d] by this technology. So, that
is the case.
Dr. Davies:
Can I respond to that, your Honors?
Dr. Malayang:
I think Filipinos should be able to talk also here.
Chairperson:
Can we give a chance to Dr. Malayang?
Dr. Malayang:
x x x My concern is on the process and participants in vetting the safety of GM crops, not necessarily the
intricacies of the science involved in genetic modification per se which, I think our international
friends, would like to focus on. xxx
One, I am concerned with the fallibility of technology. x x x even if it is much founded on or produced
from the most robust sciences, a technology could fail to be as useful as it was intended or its use
lead to an [un]intended harm to humans and the environment. This is so because science, by nature,
as many scientists will agree, is very probabilistic rather than absolutist. Many cases of common
knowledge illustrate this point. May I just refer, for the Court’s notice for, First, the Nuclear Power
Plants in Japan x x x. The best science and the best technology did not necessarily translate to
absolute safety.
Second example, the Union Carbide Plant in Bhopal, India. It was among the most advanced
production ton at its time, yet, we know what happened. x x x Union Carbide’s [hurry] to set up a
plant to take advantage of a large pesticide market in India to help the country’s farmers led to a
massive and deadly safety failure.
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The Third example is the green revolution. x x x involves, however, the wide [use] of synthetic
chemicals for fertilizer and pesticides that were [at] the time hailed as wonder technologies. Many
scientists in the world at that time argued for their wider use but they later turned out to harm
people, soils and water. They prove good then bad, so bad that scientists today are using their ill
effects as justification for adopting alternative technologies to get us out of the synthetic chemical
regime in agriculture.
And finally, the most common example would be the unintended effects of medicine. x x x Medicines
are technologies intended to do good but, with even the best science and the vetting processes using
rigid safety and risk assessment methods, they still could cause side effects entirely undesired and
many of which can cause chronic or acute threats to human life. This includes the use of “DDT” that
was used to control lice among soldiers after the II World War which, after all, proved to be very
bad.
x x x I am also concerned with the fragility, fragility of the Philippine environment as the place and
context, the particular place and context of the introduction of BT crops like BT talong. x x x the
Philippines is among the world’s biologically rich countries. x x x So, many of our insects are not
even fully known. We do not know how they all behave to influence the transfer of genetic materials
from plants to other plants. We do not fully know what we do not know about the intricate
interactions between plants and between insects and other living things that define the universe of
our healthful and balanced ecology. The universe of our healthful and balanced ecology certainly go
beyond specific crops. I am concerned that, absent a full as against partial understanding of the
intricate web of genetic flows and interactions among plants, animals and other living things in our
wet and tropical ecosystems, it will require extraordinary care to tamper
544
with any one element of this swirl of interrelationships. This is notwithstanding the seeming
preponderance of evidence of safety in other countries and environment that are certainly not the
same as ours. x x x we must be extra careful because the effects might be irreversible. Introducing a
genetically modified plant x x x could cause a string of changes across many plants that, like the
green revolution or in the case of medicine and the two other cases cited above, could turn out and
only to be realized much later to be harmful to humans and the environment more than they were
intended to be useful. x x x let us ensure that we adopt in the country a biosafety vetting protocol
that is: (1) sensitive to our high biodiversity this is a particular condition in the Philippines; and (2)
tested for error levels that are acceptable to or which can be tolerated by our people. My affidavit
states a three-stage approach to this. x x x the tests that we will be doing is a test process acceptable
to all as well rather than merely concocted or designed by just a few people x x x must be a product
of wider citizens’ participation and reflect both scientific and traditional knowledge and cultural
sensitivity of our people. It is in the NBF after all, x x x introducing BT Talong in the Philippines
must be decided on the grounds of both science and public policy and public policy, in this case, must
involve full public disclosure and participation in accepting both the potential gains and possible
pains of BT Talong. The stakes, both positive and negative, are so high that I believe BT
Talong would require more public scrutiny and wider democratic decision making beyond the
[realm] of science. x x x for the sake of our country and our rich biodiversity x x x prudence requires
that maximum efforts be exerted to ensure its safety beyond the parameters of science and into the
sphere of public policy. For to fail in doing so what might be highly anticipated to be beneficial may
in some twist of failure or precaution and prudence and failure for due diligence to establish the
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safety of Bt Talong beyond reasonable doubt, the BT Talong may turn out to be harmful after all.
This we certainly do not want to do. I submit these views to the Court.
xxxx
Dr. Davies:
x x x another thing I would like to point out to the Court is, if you come into a market in the Philippines
and you see nice Talong, it has probably been treated with various insecticides. So, there has been
insecticide spray on your tips in your crops which are going to be harm on your farmers, your
farmer’s children, the insect populations and also dangerous to the consumers as well. By
contrast, Bt Talong, if it is adopted, the BT has been shown to be beneficial to the insects and the
environment and also has been shown not to be toxic in food. Therefore, we are changing a highly
toxic chemical application for a much more benign modern technique that is beneficial to the
environment and beneficial to the consumers. That is my comment with the views just made by my
Filipino colleagues, your Honors.
Dr. Malayang:
x x x You know, in ecology and, I am sure you are aware of this, an expansion of anyone population or a
reduction of that population it would still be both not beneficial to the healthful and balanced
ecological health of the ecosystem. So to say that because the population of insects are exploded and
the diversity of insects exploded as a result of this particular intervention is not necessarily good.
That is my first point. The second one, you mentioned x x x the “talong” is laden with pesticide. The
same pesticide were advised by scientists from the USAID before for us to use in this country
because this is how to expand our production of food. This was part of the green revolution, the
systemic use of pesticides and fertilizer. Now, of course, they were mis-
546
used, I can guarantee that but, again, if that be the case, in the case of pesticide why can it not be in
the case of BT that it can also be misused? x x x we are talking here not of the science or of the
technology but on the policy aspect of the adoption of the technology. As I said, I am talking about
the bakery not of a baked-bread.
Dr. Saturnina Halos:
Well, the use of pesticide in the eggplant, right now, is very much abused. x x x In terms of the use of Bt
Talong, then, that kind of misuse is not going to happen x x x. Now, in the Philippines, we have a
very strict highly monitored field testing and I think Dr. Malayang knows about that because he was
one of those who prepared the guidelines for the field testing. So that is not going to happen, it is a
very strict regulatory system. We are known for that, actually, and…
xxxx
Dr. Saturnina Halos:
No, no. It does not happen because we have a risk management plan x x x.
xxxx
Dr. Halos:
x x x As far as do we know what is happening after we have given approval, yes, we are monitoring. We
are monitoring as far as BT corn is concerned. We are monitoring, continuously monitoring, not only
for the beneficial insects but also the effects that is continuing, we are also continuing to monitor the
weeds, weed population. In weed we decide to spray…
Dr. Malayang:
And why is this, ma’am, why are we monitoring? Because they could be harmful?
Dr. Halos:
No we have to know what is happening.
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Dr. Malayang:
Yes, why? Because if you are sure that they are safe, if you are sure that they are safe, why monitor?
Dr. Halos:
Well, we are going to give you the data for that because you keep on asking, you know, you asked for a
long term and we are going to give you that complete data.
xxxx
Dr. Medina:
I would like to raise several issues because I feel they are misleading sometimes. Dr. Davies mentioned
that the BT protein is a protein, therefore, it is safe. Are you sure that all proteins are safe, Dr.
Davies? Are you aware of anti-nutrients and allergens and other kinds of protein x x x it is a
misleading generalization. Secondly, I would like to say also that, when you say that BT crops is
beneficial to insect population but, how about humans? But, let me tell and inform the Honorable
Justices also that, in agriculture, there can be, the pests are there to reduce the yield. There are also
diseases so, that this Bt is only controlling one kind of pest and, in my monitoring of BT corn as an
example to this 2 years after the commercialization in 2003, at first planting in 2003, the corn is
attacked by about a dozen insect pests and six major diseases. The Bt corn was attacked a “stem
rot,” a fungal disease. And, in this case in eggplant, there are many fungal diseases, “phomopsis”
x x x So in that case it is not field safe that you will not be using pesticide anymore
with BT eggplant. When you use the BT eggplant, assuming that there is no more insect pests
x x x There are many other methods of control and, therefore, do not assume that you do not use
pesticide therefore, BT is the only solution. That is also a risky and wrong generalization or
statement. x x x Dr. Halos x x x says that field tests are safe. I intend to disagree with that. Safe to
what? Espe-
548
cially to contamination. If I may use this picture of the field testing of the Bt eggplant x x x it was
encircled with cyclone wire with a diameter of something like approximately 10 cm. by 7 cm. hole.
While bees that can pollinate that, the size is about 1 cm. in length and .5 cm. in diameter of the
insect. The bees and, in that case, they can easily get in and get out and when they settle into the
flowers and snip nectars and the fall of the pollen then they can bring out the pollen to contaminate
outside that. In fact, even assuming that the fence is very small in size of the mess, the holes, still
the insects can fly above that fence because the fence is only about 5 feet in height. So, in that case it
is not safe. Some arguments say that “well the pollen will be dead” but, according to this technical
manual of the Training Workshop On Data Collection for Researchers And Collaborators of Multi-
Location Trials of Fruit and Shoot Borers Resistant Eggplant, that is the Bt Eggplant produced by
the Institute of Plant Breeding in UPLB who is one of the main researchers the datas, here say
according to “Rasco,” cited by Dr. Narciso, is that the pollen can live 8 to 10 days pollen by ability at
20 to 22 degrees centigrade, with a relative humidity of 50 to 55. x x x Meaning to say, that pollen
can survive. This can fly as fast as something like 60 kilometers per hours so it just take may be 3
minutes and it can travel 4 kilometers and 4 kilometers is the effective flying distance of a bee in
their normal foraging.
xxxx
Dr. Medina:
x x x There is no data on the contamination so how come they argue, how can they conclude that it is safe
when they have not monitored any potential pollen flow by insect mitigated or insect mediated flow
pollen? So, in that case, the conclusion or the statement is really beyond what their data may be is if
their data is about safety.
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xxxx
Dr. Ebora:
xxxx
x x x I hope that we will be able to look at the experimental design and you will see that all the things are
properly addressed, our risk assessment was done step-by-step. x x x I beg to disagree with my
friend Dr. Medina because it is becoming … we are confusing 2 things. We are not referring to
contained trial. We are referring to confined field trial and in the design of this particular
experiment, you have your BT eggplant, your non-BT eggplant so that you can compare the
performance with the 2 crops. And, on design, you have 5 rows of plant BT eggplants that will serve
as a pollen trap. When we say pollen trap is that it just open the pollen from the transgenic. It is
going to be trapped by those plants, 5 rows, and then, after that, you have a space of 200 meters
surrounding the field which is the isolation distance. That means no eggplant should be present in
that particular distance because that is the isolation distance that is found to be safe. x x x we know
that Bt protein is very specific x x x effective only against caterpillar x x x if they are eaten by other
organism, they are not affected because it is very specific. The gut of the larva is very alkaline while
the gut of other insects is likely acidic and, in that case, it does not have any harmful effect. x x x So
another thing is we are saying that it seems to be ridiculous that you are saying that honeybee is
going to fly from the fence and the size were even indicated. I would like to indicate that, that is not
the purpose of the fence. It is not to contain the insects. It is to prevent vandalism which is quite,
unfortunately, being done by other groups who are against the technology. x x x We should be able to
have our own space, our own time, considering the given regulation. Follow them. But our
experimentation not be destroyed because it
550
is only then that we will be able to get the valuable data that is needed for an informed decision.
Without that we will not be able to proceed and I hope we can discuss this based on the merits of the
field trial, not from any other concern because the writ of kalikasan is about the effect of field trial in
the environment.
Dr. Medina:
Mr. Justice, can I give this immediate counteract to the one statement of Dr. [Ebora]? He said that the
“Cry1Ac” is specific to caterpillars and, in fact, only some kinds of caterpillar, some species, if you
can read by chemical and by physical research communications this is Volume 271, pages 54-58,
authored by Vasquez Pardonnet, published in 2000, publication under letter (b), “Cry1Ac protoxin”
binds to the mucosal surface of the mouse’ small intestine. Small intestine ay mammal po iyan so,
meaning, it is a proxy animal for safety [testing] to humans because we are also mammals so, the
mice are usually the mammals 12 years ago, the data has been already there that there is binding
site, therefore it is not only specific to insects but also to mammals. x x x he is saying that, by
working on the natural BT is the same as the transformed BT it is not true because the
natural BT has 1155 “base pairs” of nucleic acids. And the transformed GM Crop contains a
fragment of that BT gene which is only half of that. And the mechanism, by the way, x x x the
natural toxin is broken into smaller pieces inside the intestine of the insects because it is alkaline in
terms of its system “ph” and for humans acidic. So it does not work. But, because the transformed BT
is already half, almost half of the normal or natural[ly] occurring BT protein, it is already
activated and, in that case, that is the reason why there is a test and immediate effect to non-insect,
meaning, to mammal, so that is the explanation of scientist doing studies on that aspect.
xxxx
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Dr. Chakraborty:
The scientists have 3 problems: One, the sparks, we have a tunnel vision; the second, fear vision; x x x I
will give some example. Yes, BT toxin, was it really good biological control agent? But it is a
completely different gene when you produce it into an edible plant inside genetically. So, these are 2
different things. What will happen? We are scared that the efficacy, the use of BT toxin as a spray,
as biological control agent, will be vanished because now there will be resistance against those
in BT toxin. x x x resistance is coming very quickly, just like antibiotic resistance. x x x The second
thing, I have asked many plant biologists this simple question, simple honest question. Do you know
any plant that can kill a bee or a moth? No! There is no way, why? Because those are the
“pollinators.” Plant never kills a bee or a moth that goes against nature. x x x So, nature, for
thousands of years, farmers help select or adopt edible nontoxic plants. And, now, with the high
science we are converting them, nontoxic edible plant into a toxic plant. So not only toxic for the
human, for the root microorganisms. x x x Those eggplants are not only for humans to consume. So
human effect, we do not know but what will be the effect? Who will mind the effect? Is it the animal
which goes through it? x x x in India, x x x farmers x x x while growing BT cotton x x x the leaves
and other they use to attract animals to eat. x x x they found suddenly one thing that the BT cotton
plants are not touched by those buffalos, those cows, those [boars], but they can distinguish which
is BT and non-BT. x x x and when their animals started dying in some cases, they always blame, it
is this animal which has eaten that BT? x x x these are [going] against nature. Only few edible seed
plants are there and we are converting one safest plant into a poisonous and toxic plant and what is
the effect on the root microorganisms on the degrading animals and other? We do not know. That
hard thing is the tunnel vision, the confined field trial. x x x why im-
552
plement this confined field trial? Is this safe? Why do they have to do this x x x these things do good for a
normal hybrid that is something but for the gene concept we cannot follow the same separation
rules, same rules? So those are used, those separation distincts, those parameters are used not for
the gene. So, which is the safe field trial protocol for the gene plants? We do not know. So there goes
against [the] writ of kalikasan.
xxxx
Justice Antonio-Valenzuela:
How much is the increase in crop yield? x x x
Dr. Halos:
x x x The average increase yield is about 24% and that is for corn. And this data is actually taken by our
own Filipino scientists, Dr. Lluroge and Dr. Gonzales.
xxxx
Dr. Malayang:
x x x my question is for Ma’am Nina. I have not been up to date lately on the production of corn so, you
mean to say that corn production in the country has gone up and, because of that, you are saying
that 24% and the income of farmers had gone up as well? Do you mean to say that the price of corn
had also gone up as a result of the increase in the volume of corn production in the Philippines?
Dr. Halos:
Well, the price is dictated by the market.
Dr. Malayang:
That is precisely the point.
Dr. Halos:
Yes.
Dr. Malayang:
x x x I am just bringing, hopefully to the attention of the Court, that, when you talk of a technology such
as GM Corn or GM Talong affecting market
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 553
there is also not only the regulatory but economic regime that is attendant to it that makes adjustments.
So it may not be harmful to humans because we will not come out when we eat it but it might be
harmful to the economy of a particular agricultural crop. x x x
xxxx
Dr. Ebora:
x x x there are a lot of local studies being conducted now by entomologists from [UPLB] and those are
independent studies. And, precisely, this is to determine the effect on natural enemies and the
different insects x x x and some of those are already available. x x x you will be able to protect the
environment only if you know how to have a proper information in making the decision. So, again, I
am saying that, in field trial, you will be generating a lot of information that you will be able to use
in making a wise decision and informed decision.
x x x I would like to correct the impression lodged by the statement of Dr. Chakraborty regarding
butterflies and moths. Because they are not affected by BT because they are adult insects. The only
one that is affected are actually the larva, not even the pupa. So, we would like that to be clear
because it might create confusion.
The other thing in resistance. x x x even conventionally bred plant [loses] resistance after sometime and
that is the reason why we have a continuous breeding program. So, it is a natural mechanism by an
organism as mode of ad[a]potation. x x x are you telling us that we are going to stop our breeding
work because, anyway, they are going to develop resistance. I think it is a wrong message x x x.
The other thing is in terms of the study cited by Dr. Medina regarding the “binding.” In toxicology, you can
have the effect if you have, for example, the insects, you have a receptor. The toxin will bind into
554
the receptor. Toxin has to fall and then the toxin has reinsert into the membrane. If you eliminate one of
those steps you do not have any toxicity. So, that means binding by itself will not be toxicity. It is a
wrong impression that, since you have binding, there will be toxicity. It is simply wrong because, the
actuality that it should bind, it should fall then, it should insert, and it is a very common x x x. To
say that binding is equivalent to toxicity is simply not true.
The other one is natural BT toxin and activated toxin. When you were saying protoxin, protoxin is
basically the entire crystal protein. If it is already inside the gut of the insect it has to be clipped by
the purchase coming from the gut and you have it activated and you have the toxin. So what you
have in plant is already the toxin since the anther and the toxin, and the toxin in microorganisms,
the anther which are already clipped by a purchase are the same. So, to say that they are different is
actually wrong. You are comparing protoxin and toxin.
x x x regarding the protein. x x x do you know a lot of proteins of another characteristics and that is why
you have to characterize them and you have to separate the protein that are causing problem and
protein that are not causing problem. That is why you have allergen and, as explained by Dr.
Cariño, you have to check the sequence. x x x
xxxx
Dr. Chakraborty:
x x x the field trial wanted to basically go to the protocol. This is the efficacy, the efficiency of the production
not that much into the safety. You have to look into it carefully that how much will get this efficacy,
not the safety to that extent x x x. Second point x x x there is this already mentioned that European
Union there is no consensus. x x x they have published and submitted the systemic list of genetically
modified crop need for new approach in
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 555
risk assessment. So that is what is needed. There is another article, how does scientific risk assessment of
GM crop fit within wider risk analysis. x x x This is genetic engineering. The production process is
very precise in selecting the inserted gene but not in its enhancement. x x x they are never looking
into it. The second thing, they do not look into that from the laboratory condition to what is the real
life situation. They do not take that into account x x x so this assessment protocol has to be modified
or changed. x x x in the IAASTD or International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science
and Technology for Development. There is a supreme body, so many nations, so many experts,
scientists x x x. Only sustainable agricultural practice and that is the only alternative. This GM
technology is not going to help them x x x In my country also, when the BT toxin evaluation was
there, everybody was telling that this is pro-poor, this is scale neutral so, everybody will be
benefitted by that. So, we started questioning. x x x “What are the actual economic analysis indeed?
Just show me.” Then, they come up with an answer. Scale neutral means that even small farmers
initially wanted BT cotton and big farmers also wanted BT cotton. They are partisans. It is not the
economic benefit because, economically, it is not going to be beneficial so it is very much scale
dependent its benefit. So, only the big farmers, large farmers and x x x the vegetable field you never
can give separation. Chances you never can give refuge. The 1/5 of the land given for growing pests
so that you cannot do. So it cannot help technology. They have developed this technology for partisan
large scale farming to completely automated for BT technology where no label will be there. But the
failed experiments, the contracts whose patent will be over within 2-3 years, they are testing them
in our country. So that is the bottom line.
556
xxxx
Chairperson:
Let us put, probably, a close to this hot tub proceeding now.
The issue that the Court is really interested to resolve is whether or not the conduct of the field trial
of BT Talong by the respondents has violated or has threatened to violate the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology. Is there absolute certainty that it has not so violated such right.
Because that is the requirement for applying or not applying the precautionary principle. x x x
Dr. Cariño:
Yes. The answer to that is we have not violated, you know, the right of the people…
Chairperson:
But there is no absolute certainty?
Dr. Cariño:
Well, quite certain, your Honor, because we have placed all the necessary measures and they did not show
us, you know, there is no evidence of harm that has been shown to this Court. There is no evidence at
all.
Chairperson:
That is your opinion.95
As shown by the foregoing, the hot tub hearing has not yielded
any consensus on the points of contention between the expert
witnesses, i.e., the safety of Bt talong to humans and the
environment. Evidently, their opinions are based on contrasting
findings in hundreds of scientific studies conducted from the
time Bt technology was deployed in crop farming. These divergent
views of local scientists reflect the continuing international debate
on GMOs and the varying degrees of
_______________
95 TSN, November 20, 2012, pp. 34-117; CA Rollo (Vol. V), pp. 4511-4594.
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acceptance of GM technology by states especially the developed
countries (USA, EU, Japan, China, Australia, etc.).
Before proceeding to the current state of global GMO research,
we briefly address the strong objection of petitioners to the CA’s
reliance on the research conducted by Prof. Seralini, the French
scientist whose study was published in September 2012 in Food
and Chemical Toxicology, which was criticized as a “controversial
feeding study.” Seralini studied rats consuming Monsanto’s
Roundup Ready treated corn for two years (using the same kind of
rats prone to tumors used by Monsanto in obtaining original
approval for its product and the same methodologies, but did it for
2 years which is longer than the 90-day experiment period done by
Monsanto). The rats formed massive cancerous tumors. All three
test groups of rats, with 10 rats in each group, died more
frequently, suffered from liver problems, and had a pronounced
number of tumors specifically with grotesque mammary and
testicular tumors.96
Seralini’s findings created an uproar and the study was
expunged from the publication in November 2013 even though the
Editor-in-Chief found no evidence of fraud or intentional
misrepresentation of the data. Seralini stood by his work and
further conducted similar laboratory experiments. Critics faulted
the experimental method, saying the number of rats studied was
too small and their diet was skewed when compared with their
natural food intake. But over 300 scientists condemned the
retraction, they said that the retraction lacked scientific integrity
and requested to reinstate the study. Last June 2014, Seralini’s
controversial study was republished
_______________
96 Plotner, Becky, “Retracted Scientific Study On GMO Rats REPUBLISHED!!!!,” Nourishing

Plot<http://nourishingplot.com/2014/06/24/retracted-scientific-study-on-gmo-rats-republished/> (visited
last December 6, 2014); Plotner, Becky, “GMO Rat Study Forcibly Retracted,” Nourishing
Plot<http://nourishingplot.com/2014/01/05/gmo-rat-study-forcibly-retracted/> (visited last December 6,
2014).
558
and has passed a third peer review arranged by the journal that
is republishing the study, Environmental Sciences Europe. The
republished version contains extra material addressing criticisms
of the original publication and the raw data underlying the study’s
findings, and accompanied by a separate commentary by Prof.
Seralini’s team describing the lobbying efforts of GMO crop
supporters to force the editor of the Food and Chemical
Toxicology to retract the original publication.97
The aforesaid incident serves to underscore the crucial role of
scientists in providing relevant information for effective regulation
of GMOs. There can be no argument that “[s]ince scientific advice
plays a key role in GMO regulations, scientists have a
responsibility to address and communicate uncertainty to policy
makers and the public.”98
GMOs: The Global Debate
The uncertainties generated by conflicting scientific findings or

limited research is not diminished by extensive use at present of
GM technology in agriculture. The global area of GM crops has
reached over 175 million hectares in 2013, more than a
hundredfold increase from 1.7 million hectares in 1996. 99 However,
the worldwide debate on safety issues involving GM foods
continues.
It has been pointed out that the crux of the controversy
surrounding GMOs lies in the very nature of the technology itself.
The process of combining inter-species genes, which is
_______________
97 Id.; “Republication of the Seralini study: Science speaks for itself,”
<http://www.gmoseralini.org/republication-seralini-study-science-speaks/>(visited last December 6, 2014).
98 Ingeborg Myrh, Anne and Traavik, Terje, “The Precautionary Principle: Scientific Uncertainty and
Omitted Research in the Context of GMO Use and Release,” <https://www.cbd.int/doc/articles/2008/A-
00637.pdf> (visited last December 6, 2014).
99 James Clive, 2013. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech GM Crops: 2013. ISAAA Brief No. 46.
ISAAA: Ithaca, NY.
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called recombinant DNA technology, does not have the checks
and balances that are imposed by nature in traditional breeding.
Because of this there is a risk of genetic instability. This means
that no one can make any accurate predictions about the long-term
effects of GMOs on human beings and the environment. Extensive
testing in this regard is either very expensive or impractical, and
there is still a great deal about the process that scientists do not
understand.100
The basic concepts for the safety assessment of foods derived
from GMOs have been developed in close collaboration under the
auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the United Nations’ World Health
Organization (WHO) and Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO). The OECD’s group of experts on biosafety recommended
conducting the safety assessment of a GM food on case-by-case
basis through comparison to an existing food with a long history of
safe use. Thus, the concept of substantial equivalence was
developed that is widely used by national and international
agencies, including the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
the WHO, OECD and the FAO.101
“Substantial equivalence embodies the concept that if a new food
or food component is found to be substantially equivalent to an
existing food or food component, it can be treated in the same
manner with respect to safety (i.e., the food or food component can
be concluded to be as safe as the
_______________
100 Sonal Panse, “The Advantages & Disadvantages of Genetically Modified

Food: Both Sides of the Debate,” <http://www.bright-
hub.com/science/genetics/articles/23358.aspx> (visited last December 6, 2014).
101 Kuiper, Harry A., Kleter, Gijs A., Noteborn, Hub P.J.M., and Kok, Esther J.,
“Assessment of the Food Safety Issues Related to Genetically Modified Foods”,
<http://www.data.forestry.oregonstate.edu/orb/BiotechClass/2004%20materials/5AF
OOD%20REG/Plant%20Journal%202001.pdf>.
560
conventional food or food component).”102 The safety assessment
of a genetically modified food is directed by the results of a
comparison between the genetically modified food and its
conventional counterpart. It follows a stepwise process aided by a
series of structured questions. Factors taken into account in the
safety assessment include:
 identity;
 source;
 composition;
 effects of processing/cooking;
 transformation process;
 the recombinant DNA (e.g., stability of insertion, potential for
gene transfer);
 protein expression product of the novel DNA:
 effects on function;
 potential toxicity;
 potential allergenicity;
 possible secondary effects from gene expression or the disruption
of the host DNA or metabolic pathways, including composition of
critical macro, micro-nutrients, anti-nutrients, endogenous
toxicants, allergens, and physiologically active substances; and
 potential intake and dietary impact of the introduction of the
genetically modified food.103
The above factors are particularly pertinent to the assessment of

foods derived from genetically modified plants.104 However, the
concept of substantial equivalence as the starting point of risk
assessment was criticized for being “unscien-
_______________
102 Joint FAO/WHO Biotechnology and Food Safety Report, p. 4, 1996.

103 World Health Organization (WHO), “Safety Aspects of Genetically Modified Foods of Plant
Origin,” <http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/agns/pdf/topics/ec_june2000_en.pdf> (visited last
December 6, 2014).
104 Id., at p. 5.
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tific and arbitrary” and “intentionally vague and ill defined to be
as flexible, malleable, and open to interpretation as possible.” It is
likewise argued that “comparisons are designed to conceal
significant changes resulting from genetic modifications,” “the
principle is weak and misleading even when it does not apply,
effectively giving producers carte blanche,” and that there is
insufficiency of background information for assessing substantial
equivalence. A paper presented at a WHO workshop pointed out
that the main difficulty associated with the biosafety assessment of
transgenic crops is the unpredictable nature of transformation.
This unpredictability raises the concern that transgenic plants will
behave in an inconsistent manner when grown commercially.105
The method of testing GM foods was further described as
inadequate, as currently the testing procedures consist almost
exclusively of specific chemical and biochemical analytical
procedures designed to quantitate a specific nutrient or a specific
toxin or allergen. It was noted that in actual practice, the
investigator compares only selected characteristics of the
genetically engineered food to those of its non-genetically
engineered counterpart. These testing schemes are viewed as
completely incapable of detecting unsuspected or unanticipated
health risks that are generated by the process of genetic
engineering itself. Hence, clinical tests are recommended because
only such tests have the broad specificity and relevance to human
physiology needed to detect the wide range of allergens and toxins
that might result from unexpected side-effects of the genetic
engineering process.106
_______________
105 Mae-Wan Ho and Steinbrecher, Ricarda A., “Fatal Flaws in Food Safety Assessment: Critique of
The Joint FAO/WHO Biotechnology and Food Safety Report,” accessed at
<http://www.psrast.org/fao96.htm>(visited last December 6, 2014).
106 Fagan, John, Ph.D., “The Failings of the Principle of Substantial Equivalence in Regulating
Transgenic Foods,” <http://www.psrast.org/jfsbqsht.htm> (visited last December 6, 2014).
562
In another review article, it was pointed out that since a genetic
modification is aimed at introducing new traits into organisms, the
result will always be a different composition of genes and proteins.
The most reasonable interpretation therefore is that a food derived
from a GMO is considered substantially equivalent to its
traditional counterpart if the genetic modification has not resulted
in intended or unintended alterations in the composition of
relevant nutrients and inherent toxicants of the organism, and
that the new genes and proteins have no adverse impact on the
dietary value of the food and do not therefore pose any harm to the
consumer or the environment. It was thus concluded that
establishing substantial equivalence is not a safety assessment in
itself, but is a pragmatic tool to analyze the safety of a new food,
and hence in the testing of new foods, the latest scientific methods
have to be used. All conceivable efforts to protect consumers from
health risks should thus be made, and at the same time,
consumers should be adequately informed about the real extent of
risks and hazards.107
The GMO global debate has so intensified that each side has
accused the other camp of mounting “paid advocacy” and criticizing
studies adverse to their respective positions as flawed or
unscientific. Both the agri-business industry, and groups opposed
to GMOs including the organic farming industry, had utilized
enormous resources and funds for lobbying and media campaigns
locally and internationally.
What appears to be highlighted in the promotion of GM crop
production is the marked reduction in the use of harmful chemical
pesticides.108 The resulting increase in crop yields
_______________
107 Schauzu, Marianna, “The Concept of Substantial Equivalence in Safety Assessment of Foods
Derived From Genetically Modified Organisms” AgBiotech Net (April 2000)
<http://www.bfr.bund.de/cm/349/schauzu.pdf> (visited last December 6, 2014).
108 Phipps, R.H., Park, J.R., “Environmental Benefits of Genetically Modified Crops: Global and
European Perspectives on their Ability to Reduce Pesticide Use,” Journal of Animal and Feed Sci-
563
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 563
grown on relatively small parcels of land is also regarded as a
solution to the problem of feeding a fast growing world population.
Proponents of GM biotechnology insist that GM foods are safe to
humans and the environment based on scientific studies. On the
other hand, anti-GM activists disseminate adverse results of recent
studies confirming the health and environmental hazards of
genetically engineered crop farming. Also, some countries have
maintained a firm stance against genetically engineered crops or
GM foods, such as France and Austria. Over the years, however,
accumulated evidence of the dangers of GMOs, as well as
unrealized socio-economic benefits, has been increasingly
recognized by the scientific community.
That GE farming increases crop yield has been debunked by new
studies proving the contrary. In the article, “GM Crops Do Not
Increase Yield Potential,” the Institute for Responsible Technology
cited reports from actual field studies in different countries
revealing downward figures for Bt crops, as summarized below:
Bt corn took longer to reach maturity and produced up to

12% lower yields than non-GM counterparts.
Evidence for the “yield drag” of Roundup Ready soybeans has
been known for over a decade — with the disruptive effect
of the GM transformation process accounting for
approximately half the drop in yield.
Based on a comprehensive evaluation of yield since the
introduction of commercial GM crops, the International
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and
Technology for Development (IAASTD) noted that GM crop
yields were “highly variable” and in some cases, “yields
declined.”
_______________
ences (January 31, 2002), <http:///cib.org.br/wp-

content/uploads/2011/10/estudos.cientificos_ambiental_32.pdf> (visited last December 6, 2014).
564
 The Union of Concerned Scientists’ 2009 report Failure to Yield,

based on published peer-reviewed studies conducted by academic
scientists using adequate controls, concluded that genetically
engineered herbicide tolerant soybeans and herbicide-tolerant
corn has not increased yields while insect-resistant corn has only
marginally improved yields. Traditional breeding outperforms
genetic engineering hands down.
 In developing countries, crop failure can have severe
consequences as illustrated in India, where a large number of
cotton farmers, unable to pay back high interest loans, have
committed suicide. Several investigations have implicated the
unreliable performance of Bt cotton as a major contributor.
 Bt cotton was overrun by pests in Indonesia and China. In South
Africa, farmers faced pest problems and no increase in yield. The
100,000 hectares planted in 1998 dropped 80% to 22,500 by 2002.
As of 2004, 85% of the original Bt cotton farmers had given up
while those remaining had to be subsidized by the government.
Similarly in the US, Bt cotton yields are not necessarily
consistent or more profitable.109
GM technology is thus seen as a failure in terms of addressing

food security; rather, it supports corporate control and impedes
common persons’ access to adequate food. The root cause of hunger
is not a lack of food, GM critics say, but a lack of access to food. The
poor lack money to buy food and lack of land on which to grow it. It
is essential to follow sustainable traditional farming practices that
keeps food production in the hands of small-scale farmers, thereby
reducing corporate control.110
_______________
109 <http://responsibletechnology.org/docs/gm-crops-do-not-increase-yields.pdf>.
110 Human Rights Advocates, “Promoting Right to Food Through Food Sovereignty,”
<http://www.humanrightsadvocates.org/wp-content/
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As regards the existing uncertainties of potential long-
term effects of the release into the environment of GMOs, the
BEETLE (Biological and Ecological Evaluation towards Long-term
Effects) study of 2009,111 made for the European Commission,
analyzed more than 700 scientific publications from all over the
world about GMOs and their potential effects on environment
including biodiversity, and received contributions to online surveys
from 100 to 167 invited environmental experts. This study declared
the following uncertainties:
 increased fitness of GM plants;

outbreeding depression after hybridization with wild
relatives;
outcrossing between related species and the fate of a
transferred GM trait;
altered flower phenology;
altered fecundity, increasing seed (gene) flow;
increased frequency of horizontal gene flow;
resistance development of pests;
effects on nontarget organisms;
effects on nontarget organisms due to altered nutritional
composition of the GM plant;
effects on nontarget organisms due to accumulation of toxic
compounds;
effects on rhizosphere microbiota;
effects on symbiotic nontarget organisms;
changes in soil functions caused by GM traits;
effects on biological control;
altered use of agrochemicals;
_______________
uploads/2014/03/HRC-25-Promoting-Right-to-Food-Through-Food-Sovereignty.pdf> (visited last December

6, 2014).
111 <http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/reports_studies/docs/lt_effects_report_en.pdf>.
566
indirect changes in susceptibility of crops against pathogens;

adverse effects on agro-biodiversity;
indirect effects in fertilizer use;
potential changes in landscape structure;
increased production of greenhouse gases;
increased mineral nutrient erosion and fertilizer leaching;
altered chemical attributes of soil fraction;
emerging of stacked events;
the necessity of regional differentiation of risk assessments. 112
A critical observation was made on the argument that there is

not enough evidence to reject the hypothesis that GMO and GM
food is safe. The fact emphasized was that experiments designed to
clarify potential adverse effects on health or the environment are
nearly absent in peer-reviewed journals. Scientific uncertainty,
omitted research areas, and lack of basic knowledge crucial to risk
assessments have become apparent. The present uncertainty
warrants further research and it has been demonstrated that there
is a risk of bias relying on hypotheses that dominate mainstream
science. There is therefore a need for independent research that is
without prejudice and unbiased by economic and professional
interests.113 In another article it was noted that the clinical trials
carried out to ensure that negative externalities do not affect
humans and the environment are conducted by the
_______________
112 Prof. Dr. Ludwig Krämer, “Genetically Modified Living Organisms and the Precautionary
Principle,” <https://www.testbiotech.org/sites/default/files/GMO%20and%20precaution.pdf> (visited last
December 7, 2014).
113 Ingeborg and Traavik, supra note 98 at pp. 73, 80-81.
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same private firms that created the products, raising conflict of
interest concerns.114
While existing literature on health effects of GM foods indicates
that they are generally safe, and similar conclusions have been
drawn by government agencies and scientific organizations such as
FAO/WHO and Society of Toxicology, a growing number of
independent scientists have spoken strongly against such
generalizations from limited research mostly sponsored by biotech
companies.
In 1999, the Open Letter from World Scientists to All
Governments signed by 815 scientists from 82 countries expressed
that they are extremely concerned about the hazards of GMOs to
biodiversity, food safety, human and animal health, and demanded
a moratorium on environmental releases in accordance with the
precautionary principle. They are opposed to GM crops that will
intensify corporate monopoly, exacerbate inequality and prevent
the essential shift to sustainable agriculture that can provide food
security and health around the world, and called a ban on patents
of life forms and living processes which threaten food security,
sanction biopiracy of indigenous knowledge and genetic resources
and violate basic human rights and dignity.115
On May 10, 2003, dozens of prominent scientists from various
disciplines banded together as an Independent Science Panel on
GM at a public conference in London. On June 15, 2003, they
released a Final Report116 as their contribution to
_______________
114 Gortari, Marcelo, “GMOs, Risk and the Precautionary Principle,” Public Policy & Governance
Review (July 11, 2013) <http://ppgreview.ca/2013/07/11/gmos-risk-and-the-precautionary-
principle/> (visited last December 7, 2014).
115 “Open Letter from World Scientists to All Government Concerning Genetically Modified Organisms
(GMOs),” <http://www.i-sis.org.uk/list.php> (visited last December 7, 2014).
116 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development
(IAASTD), “Agriculture at a Crossroads,”
568
the National GM Debate in UK. In a summary117 of the final
report, these scientists declared the following:
The Case for a GM-Free Sustainable World — A Summary

Why GM-Free?
1.GM crops failed to deliver promised benefits
 No increase in yields or significant reduction in herbicide and

pesticide use
 United States lost an estimated $12 billion over GM crops
amid worldwide rejection
 Massive crop failures of up to 100% reported in India
 High risk future for agbiotech: “Monsanto could be another
disaster waiting to happen for investors”
2.GM crops posing escalating problems on the farm
 Transgenic lines unstable: “most cases of transgene

inactivation never reach the literature”
 Triple herbicide-tolerant volunteers and weeds emerged in
North America
 Glyphosate-tolerant weeds plague GM cotton and soya fields,
atrazine back in use
 Bt biopesticide traits threatening to create superweeds
and bt-resistant pests
3.Extensive transgenic contamination unavoidable

_______________
<http://www.unep.org/dewa/agassessment/reports/IAASTD/EN/Agriculture%20at%20a%20Crossroads_
Global%20Report%20(English).pdf> (visited last December 7, 2014).
117 “The Case for a GM-Free Sustainable World — A Summary,” <http://www.i-
sis.org.uk/isprsummary.php> (visited last December 7, 2014).
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 569
 Extensive transgenic contamination found in maize landraces

in remote regions of Mexico
 32 out of 33 commercial seed stocks found contaminated in
Canada
 Pollen remains airborne for hours, and a 35 mile per hour
wind speed is unexceptional
 There can be no coexistence of GM and non-GM crops
4.GM crops not safe
 GM crops have not been proven safe: regulation was fatally

flawed from the start
 The principle of ‘substantial equivalence,’ vague and ill
defined, gave companies complete licence in claiming GM
products ‘substantially equivalent’ to non-GM, and hence
‘safe’
5.GM food raises serious safety concerns
 Despite the paucity of credible studies, existing findings raise

serious safety concerns
 ‘Growth-factor-like’ effects in the stomach and small intestine
of young rats were attributed to the transgenic process or the
transgenic construct, and may hence be general to all GM food
6. Dangerous gene products are incorporated into food

crops
 Bt proteins, incorporated into 25% of all GM crops worldwide,

are harmful to many nontarget insects, and some are potent
immunogens and allergens for humans and other mammals
 Food crops are increasingly used to produce pharmaceuticals
and drugs, including cytokines known to suppress the
immune system, or linked to dementia, neurotoxicity and
mood and cognitive side effects; vaccines and viral se-
570
 quences such as the ‘spike’ protein gene of the pig

coronavirus, in the same family as the SARS virus linked to
the current epidemic; and glycoprotein gene gp120 of the
AIDS virus that could interfere with the immune system and
recombine with viruses and bacteria to generate new and
unpredictable pathogens
7.Terminator crops spread male sterility
 Crops engineered with ‘suicide’ genes for male sterility,

promoted as a means of preventing the spread of transgenes,
actually spread both male sterility and herbicide tolerance
traits via pollen.
8. Broad-spectrum herbicides highly toxic to humans and

other species
 Glufosinate ammonium and glyphosate, used with herbicide

tolerant GM crops that currently account for 75% of all GM
crops worldwide, are both systemic metabolic poisons
 Glufosinate ammonium is linked to neurological, respiratory,
gastrointestinal and haematological toxicities, and birth
defects in humans and mammals; also toxic to butterflies and
a number of beneficial insects, to larvae of clams and
oysters, Daphnia and some freshwater fish, especially the
rainbow trout; it inhibits beneficial soil bacteria and fungi,
especially those that fix nitrogen
 Glyphosate is the most frequent cause of complaints and
poisoning in the UK, and disturbances to many body
functions have been reported after exposures at normal use
levels; glyphosate exposure nearly doubled the risk of late
spontaneous abortion, and children born to users of
glyphosate had elevated neurobehavioral defects; glyphosate
retards development of the foetal skeleton in laboratory rats,
inhibits the synthesis of steroids, and is genotoxic in
mammals,
571
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 571
 fish and frogs; field dose exposure of earthworms caused at

least 50 percent mortality and significant intestinal damage
among surviving worms; Roundup (Monsanto’s formulation of
glyphosate) caused cell division dysfunction that may be
linked to human cancers
9.Genetic engineering creates super-viruses
 The most insidious dangers of genetic engineering are

inherent to the process; it greatly enhances the scope and
probability of horizontal gene transfer and recombination, the
main route to creating viruses and bacteria that cause
disease epidemics
 Newer techniques, such as DNA shuffling, allow geneticists to
create in a matter of minutes in the laboratory millions of
recombinant viruses that have never existed in billions of
years of evolution
 Disease-causing viruses and bacteria and their genetic
material are the predominant materials and tools of genetic
engineering, as much as for the intentional creation of bio-
weapons
10. Transgenic DNA in food taken up by bacteria in

human gut
 Transgenic DNA from plants has been taken up by bacteria

both in the soil and in the gut of human volunteers; antibiotic
resistance marker genes can spread from transgenic food to
pathogenic bacteria, making infections very difficult to treat
11.Transgenic DNA and cancer
 Transgenic DNA known to survive digestion in the gut and to

jump into the genome of mammalian cells, raising the
possibility for triggering cancer
572
 Feeding GM products such as maize to animals may carry

risks, not just for the animals but also for human beings
consuming the animal products
12. CaMV 35S promoter increases horizontal gene

transfer
 Evidence suggests that transgenic constructs with the CaMV

35S promoter could be especially unstable and prone to
horizontal gene transfer and recombination, with all the
attendant hazards: gene mutations due to random insertion,
cancer, reactivation of dormant viruses and generation of new
viruses
13. A history of misrepresentation and suppression of
scientific evidence
 There has been a history of misrepresentation and

suppression of scientific evidence, especially on horizontal
gene transfer. Key experiments failed to be performed, or
were performed badly and then misrepresented. Many
experiments were not followed up, including investigations on
whether the CaMV 35S promoter is responsible for the
‘growth-factor-like’ effects observed in young rats fed GM
potatoes
GM crops have failed to deliver the promised benefits and

are posing escalating problems on the farm. Transgenic
contamination is now widely acknowledged to be
unavoidable, and hence there can be no coexistence of GM
and non-GM agriculture. Most important of all, GM crops
have not been proven safe. On the contrary, sufficient
evidence has emerged to raise serious safety concerns, that
if ignored could result in irreversible damage to health and
the environment. GM crops should therefore be firmly
rejected now.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 573
The ISP further concluded that “[s]ustainable agricultural
practices have proven beneficial in all aspects relevant to health
and the environment. In addition, they bring food security and
social and cultural well being to local communities everywhere.
There is an urgent need for a comprehensive global shift to all
forms of sustainable agriculture.”118
In 2008, a Global Report119 was released by the International
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for
Development (IAASTD), a three-year international collaborative
effort (2005-2007) developed out of a consultative process involving
900 participants and 110 countries from all over the world. This
global initiative assessed agricultural knowledge, science and
technology (AKST) in relation to meeting development and
sustainability goals of (1) reducing hunger and poverty; (2)
improving nutrition, health and rural livelihoods; and (3)
facilitating social and environmental sustainability. The report
concluded that a radical transformation of the world’s food and
farming systems — especially the policies and institutions that
affect them — is necessary if we are to overcome converging
economic and environmental crises and feed the world sustainably.
It also warned that technologies such as high-yielding crop
varieties, agrochemicals and mechanization have primarily
benefited the better-resourced groups in society and transnational
corporations, rather than the most vulnerable ones. In general, the
IAASTD found little evidence to support a conclusion that modern
biotechnologies are well-suited to meeting the needs of small-scale
and subsistence farmers, particularly under the increasingly
unpredictable environmental and economic conditions that they
face.120
_______________
118 Id.
119 Supra note 116.
120 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development
(IAASTD), “Biotechnology and Sustainable Development,” <www.biosafety-
info.net/file_dir/4542994024ca566872c339.pdf> (visited last December 7, 2014).
574
More recently, in 2013, the European Network of Scientists for
Social and Environmental Responsibility (ENSSER), an
international group of more than 90 scientists, academics and
physicians, released a statement that there is no scientific
consensus on the safety of GM foods and crops.121 The
statement122 is herein reproduced:
10/21/13
Statement: No scientific consensus on GMO safety
As scientists, physicians, academics, and experts from
disciplines relevant to the scientific, legal, social and safety
assessment aspects of genetically modified organisms
(GMOs), we strongly reject claims by GM seed developers and
some scientists, commentators, and journalists that there is a
“scientific consensus” on GMO safety and that the debate on
this topic is “over.”
We feel compelled to issue this statement because the
claimed consensus on GMO safety does not exist. The claim
that it does exist is misleading and misrepresents the
currently available scientific evidence and the broad diversity
of opinion among scientists on this issue. Moreover, the claim
encourages a climate of complacency that could lead to a lack
of regulatory and scientific rigour and appropriate caution,
potentially endangering the health of humans, animals, and
the environment.
Science and society do not proceed on the basis of a
constructed consensus, as current knowledge is always open
to well-founded challenge and disagreement. We endorse the
need for further independent scientific inquiry and informed
public discussion on GM product safety and urge GM
proponents to do the same.
_______________
121 “No scientific consensus on safety of genetically modified organisms,”

<http://phys.org/news/2013-10-scientific-consensus-safety-genetically.html> (visited
last December 7, 2014).
122 European Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental
Responsibility, “Statement: No scientific consensus on GMO safety,”
<http://www.ensser.org/increasing-public-information/no-scientific-consensus-on-
gmo-safety/> (visited last December 7, 2014).
575
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 575
Some of our objections to the claim of scientific consensus
are listed below.
There is no consensus on GM food safety 1.
Regarding the safety of GM crops and foods for human and
animal health, a comprehensive review of animal feeding
studies of GM crops found “An equilibrium in the number [of]
research groups suggesting, on the basis of their studies, that
a number of varieties of GM products (mainly maize and
soybeans) are as safe and nutritious as the respective
conventional non-GM plant, and those raising still serious
concerns.” The review also found that most studies concluding
that GM foods were as safe and nutritious as those obtained
by conventional breeding were “performed by biotechnology
companies or associates, which are also responsible [for]
commercializing these GM plants.”
A separate review of animal feeding studies that is often
cited as showing that GM foods are safe included studies that
found significant differences in the GM-fed animals. While
the review authors dismissed these findings as not
biologically significant, the interpretation of these differences
is the subject of continuing scientific debate and no consensus
exists on the topic.
Rigorous studies investigating the safety of GM crops and
foods would normally involve animal feeding studies in which
one group of animals is fed GM food and another group is fed
an equivalent non-GM diet. Independent studies of this type
are rare, but when such studies have been performed, some
have revealed toxic effects or signs of toxicity in the GM-fed
animals. The concerns raised by these studies have not been
followed up by targeted research that could confirm or refute
the initial findings.
The lack of scientific consensus on the safety of GM foods
and crops is underlined by the recent research calls of the
European Union and the French government to investigate
the long-term health impacts of GM food consumption in the
light of uncertainties raised by animal feeding
576
studies. These official calls imply recognition of the
inadequacy of the relevant existing scientific research
protocols. They call into question the claim that existing
research can be deemed conclusive and the scientific debate
on biosafety closed.
2. There are no epidemiological studies investigating
potential effects of GM food consumption on human
health
It is often claimed that “trillions of GM meals” have been
eaten in the US with no ill effects. However, no
epidemiological studies in human populations have been
carried out to establish whether there are any health effects
associated with GM food consumption. As GM foods are not
labelled in North America, a major producer and consumer of
GM crops, it is scientifically impossible to trace, let alone
study, patterns of consumption and their impacts. Therefore,
claims that GM foods are safe for human health based on the
experience of North American populations have no scientific
basis.
3. Claims that scientific and governmental bodies
endorse GMO safety are exaggerated or inaccurate
Claims that there is a consensus among scientific and
governmental bodies that GM foods are safe, or that they are
no more risky than non-GM foods, are false.
For instance, an expert panel of the Royal Society of
Canada issued a report that was highly critical of the
regulatory system for GM foods and crops in that country.
The report declared that it is “scientifically unjustifiable” to
presume that GM foods are safe without rigorous scientific
testing and that the “default prediction” for every GM food
should be that the introduction of a new gene will cause
“unanticipated changes” in the expression of other genes, the
pattern of proteins produced, and/or metabolic activities.
Possible outcomes of these changes identified in the report
included the presence of new or unexpected allergens.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 577
A report by the British Medical Association concluded that
with regard to the long-term effects of GM foods on human
health and the environment, “many unanswered questions
remain” and that “safety concerns cannot, as yet, be
dismissed completely on the basis of information currently
available.” The report called for more research, especially on
potential impacts on human health and the environment.
Moreover, the positions taken by other organizations have
frequently been highly qualified, acknowledging data gaps
and potential risks, as well as potential benefits, of GM
technology. For example, a statement by the American
Medical Association’s Council on Science and Public Health
acknowledged “a small potential for adverse events … due
mainly to horizontal gene transfer, allergenicity, and toxicity”
and recommended that the current voluntary notification
procedure practised in the US prior to market release of GM
crops be made mandatory. It should be noted that even a
“small potential for adverse events” may turn out to be
significant, given the widespread exposure of human and
animal populations to GM crops.
A statement by the board of directors of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) affirming
the safety of GM crops and opposing labelling cannot be
assumed to represent the view of AAAS members as a whole
and was challenged in an open letter by a group of 21
scientists, including many long-standing members of the
AAAS. This episode underlined the lack of consensus among
scientists about GMO safety.
4. EU research project does not provide reliable
evidence of GM food safety
An EU research project has been cited internationally as
providing evidence for GM crop and food safety. However, the
report based on this project, “A Decade of EU-Funded GMO
Research,” presents no data that could provide such evidence,
from long-term feeding studies in animals.
578
Indeed, the project was not designed to test the safety of
any single GM food, but to focus on “the development of safety
assessment approaches.” Only five published animal feeding
studies are referenced in the SAFOTEST section of the
report, which is dedicated to GM food safety. None of these
studies tested a commercialised GM food; none tested the GM
food for long-term effects beyond the subchronic period of 90
days; all found differences in the GM-fed animals, which in
some cases were statistically significant; and none concluded
on the safety of the GM food tested, let alone on the safety of
GM foods in general. Therefore the EU research project
provides no evidence for sweeping claims about the safety of
any single GM food or of GM crops in general.
5. List of several hundred studies does not show GM
food safety
A frequently cited claim published on an Internet website
that several hundred studies “document the general safety
and nutritional wholesomeness of GM foods and feeds” is
misleading. Examination of the studies listed reveals that
many do not provide evidence of GM food safety and, in fact,
some provide evidence of a lack of safety. For example:
 Many of the studies are not toxicological animal
feeding studies of the type that can provide useful
information about health effects of GM food
consumption. The list includes animal production
studies that examine parameters of interest to the food
and agriculture industry, such as milk yield and weight
gain; studies on environmental effects of GM crops; and
analytical studies of the composition or genetic makeup
of the crop.
 Among the animal feeding studies and reviews of
such studies in the list, a substantial number found
toxic effects and signs of toxicity in GM-fed animals
compared with controls. Concerns raised by these
studies have not been satisfactorily addressed and the
claim that the body of research
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 579
 shows a consensus over the safety of GM crops and
foods is false and irresponsible.
 Many of the studies were conducted over short
periods compared with the animal’s total lifespan and
cannot detect long-term health effects.
We conclude that these studies, taken as a whole, are
misrepresented on the Internet website as they do not
“document the general safety and nutritional wholesomeness
of GM foods and feeds.” Rather, some of the studies give
serious cause for concern and should be followed up by more
detailed investigations over an extended period of time.
6. There is no consensus on the environmental risks
of GM crops
Environmental risks posed by GM crops include the effects
of Bt insecticidal crops on nontarget organisms and effects of
the herbicides used in tandem with herbicide-tolerant GM
crops.
As with GM food safety, no scientific consensus exists
regarding the environmental risks of GM crops. A review of
environmental risk assessment approaches for GM crops
identified shortcomings in the procedures used and found “no
consensus” globally on the methodologies that should be
applied, let alone on standardized testing procedures.
Some reviews of the published data on Bt crops have found
that they can have adverse effects on nontarget and beneficial
organisms — effects that are widely neglected in regulatory
assessments and by some scientific commentators. Resistance
to Bt toxins has emerged in target pests, and problems with
secondary (nontarget) pests have been noted, for example,
in Bt cotton in China.
Herbicide-tolerant GM crops have proved equally
controversial. Some reviews and individual studies have
associated them with increased herbicide use, the rapid
spread of herbicide-resistant weeds, and adverse health
effects in human and animal populations exposed to
580
Roundup, the herbicide used on the majority of GM crops.
As with GM food safety, disagreement among scientists on
the environmental risks of GM crops may be correlated with
funding sources. A peer-reviewed survey of the views of 62
life scientists on the environmental risks of GM crops found
that funding and disciplinary training had a significant effect
on attitudes. Scientists with industry funding and/or those
trained in molecular biology were very likely to have a
positive attitude to GM crops and to hold that they do not
represent any unique risks, while publicly-funded scientists
working independently of GM crop developer companies
and/or those trained in ecology were more likely to hold a
“moderately negative” attitude to GM crop safety and to
emphasize the uncertainty and ignorance involved. The
review authors concluded, “The strong effects of training and
funding might justify certain institutional changes
concerning how we organize science and how we make public
decisions when new technologies are to be evaluated.”
7. International agreements show widespread
recognition of risks posed by GM foods and crops
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was negotiated over
many years and implemented in 2003. The Cartagena
Protocol is an international agreement ratified by 166
governments worldwide that seeks to protect biological
diversity from the risks posed by GM technology. It embodies
the Precautionary Principle in that it allows signatory states
to take precautionary measures to protect themselves against
threats of damage from GM crops and foods, even in case of a
lack of scientific certainty.
Another international body, the UN’s Codex Alimentarius,
worked with scientific experts for seven years to develop
international guidelines for the assessment of GM foods and
crops, because of concerns about the risks they pose. These
guidelines were adopted by the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, of which over 160 nations are
581
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 581
members, including major GM crop producers such as the
United States.
The Cartagena Protocol and Codex share a precautionary
approach to GM crops and foods, in that they agree that
genetic engineering differs from conventional breeding and
that safety assessments should be required before GM
organisms are used in food or released into the environment.
These agreements would never have been negotiated, and
the implementation processes elaborating how such safety
assessments should be conducted would not currently be
happening, without widespread international recognition of
the risks posed by GM crops and foods and the unresolved
state of existing scientific understanding.
Concerns about risks are well-founded, as has been
demonstrated by studies on some GM crops and foods that
have shown adverse effects on animal health and nontarget
organisms, indicated above. Many of these studies have, in
fact, fed into the negotiation and/or implementation processes
of the Cartagena Protocol and Codex. We support the
application of the Precautionary Principle with regard to the
release and transboundary movement of GM crops and foods.
Conclusion
In the scope of this document, we can only highlight a few
examples to illustrate that the totality of scientific research
outcomes in the field of GM crop safety is nuanced, complex,
often contradictory or inconclusive, confounded by researchers’
choices, assumptions, and funding sources, and in general,
has raised more questions than it has currently answered.
Whether to continue and expand the introduction of GM
crops and foods into the human food and animal feed supply,
and whether the identified risks are acceptable or not, are
decisions that involve socioeconomic considerations beyond
the scope of a narrow scientific debate and the currently
unresolved biosafety research agendas. These decisions must
therefore involve the broader soci-
582
ety. They should, however, be supported by strong scientific
evidence on the long-term safety of GM crops and foods for
human and animal health and the environment, obtained in a
manner that is honest, ethical, rigorous, independent,
transparent, and sufficiently diversified to compensate for
bias.
Decisions on the future of our food and agriculture should
not be based on misleading and misrepresentative claims that
a “scientific consensus” exists on GMO safety.123
One of the most serious concerns raised against GM crops is that

expressed by one of our political analysts now serving in
Congress, viz.:
x x x patented GMO seeds concentrate power in the hands

of a few biotech corporations and marginalize small farmers.
As the statement x x x of the 81 members of the World Future
Council put it, “While profitable to the few companies
producing them, GMO seeds reinforce a model of farming that
undermines sustainability of cash-poor farmers, who make up
most of the world’s hungry. GMO seeds continue farmers’
dependency on purchased seed and chemical inputs. The most
dramatic impact of such dependency is in India, where
270,000 farmers, many trapped in debt for buying seeds and
chemicals, committed suicide between 1995 and 2012.”124
In sum, current scientific research indicates that the biotech
industry has not sufficiently addressed the uncertainties over the
safety of GM foods and crops.
_______________
123 Citations omitted.

124 Bello, Walden, “GMO Wars: The Global Battlefield,” Foreign Policy in Focus
and TheNation.com (October 28, 2013), <http://fpif.org/gmo-wars-global-battlefield/>
(visited last December 9, 2014).
583
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 583
Bt Brinjal Controversy in India
Brinjal (eggplant) is a major crop and a popular component of

food diet in India, an important ingredient in Ayurvedic medicine,
and is of special value for the treatment of diabetes and liver
problems. The attempted commercial propagation of Bt
brinjal spawned intense debate and suffered obstacles due to
sustained opposition from local scientists, academicians and
nongovernment organizations in India.
As in the case of the Philippines, proponents of Bt brinjal in
India, believed to be the origin of eggplant’s diversity, said that if
the new technology is adopted, decrease in the use of insecticides,
substantial increase in crop yields and greater food availability,
can be expected. But opponents argued, alongside food safety
concerns, that there is a potential for toxic effects on populations of
nontarget invertebrates, and potential replacement of traditional
landraces as farmers may move towards cultivation of a restricted
number of GE forms. In addition to these issues, there was the
additional concern raised over the transfer of Bt transgenes to non-
GE brinjal or its wild relatives, and the consequences for plant
biodiversity.125
Writ petitions were lodged before the Supreme Court of India to
stop the release into the environment of Bt brinjal(Aruna
Rodrigues and Ors, etc. v. Union of India). The Court formed a
Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) composed of experts
nominated by the parties to undertake a comprehensive evaluation
of the feasibility of allowing the open field trials of Bt brinjal and
submit a final report, and in the event the TEC is unable to submit
said final report, it was directed instead to submit an interim
report within the period set by the Court on the following issue:
“Whether there should or
_______________
125 Dr. John Samuels, “Genetically engineered Bt brinjal and the implications for plant biodiversity —
revisited,” <http://www.greenpeace.org/seaasia/ph/PageFiles/415937/GE-Bt-brinjal-revisited.pdf> (visited
last December 9, 2014).
584
should not be any ban, partial or otherwise, upon conducting of
open field tests of the GMOs? In the event open field trials are
permitted, what protocol should be followed and conditions, if any,
that may be imposed by the Court for implementation of open field
trials.” The Court also directed that the TEC would be free to
review report or studies authored by national and international
scientists if it was necessary.
In its Interim Report dated October 17, 2012, the TEC
recommended that, in view of its findings, all field trials should be
stopped until certain conditions have been met. A Final
Report126 was eventually submitted to the Court which noted
weaknesses in the conditions imposed by the regulatory agencies
for conduct of field trials, as follows: 1) post-release monitoring, an
important aspect of environmental and health safety (if the GE
crop is consumed as food) is not given adequate attention; 2) the
importance of need and socio-economic impact assessment of GM
products as one of the criteria that should be applied in the
evaluation at an early stage; and 3) need for additional tests not
currently done such as long-term feeding studies for assessment of
chronic and intergeneration toxicity in small animals, genomewide
expression analysis in the toxicity studies to screen for possible
unintended effects on host physiology. It was recommended that a
moratorium on field trials of herbicide tolerant crops until the
issue had been examined by an independent committee, and also
noted that said technology may not be suitable in the Indian socio-
economic context due to possible impact of extensive use of broad
spectrum herbicides on the environmental biodiversity and smaller
average farm size. Examination of the safety dossier of Bt
brinjal indicated certain concerns on the data, which had not been
addressed in the course of regulatory testing leading to approval
due to lack of full-time qualified personnel for the purpose. Overall,
it was found that the qual-
_______________
126 “CONFIDENTIAL: Final Report of the Technical Expert Committee (TEC),”

<http://www.greenpeace.org/india/Global/india/report/2013/TEC-report.pdf> (visited last December 9,
2014).
585
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 585
ity of information in several of the applications is far below what
would be expected and required for rigorous evaluation by a
regulatory body and is unlikely to meet international regulatory
guidelines.
On the mechanism of Cry1A proteins, the TEC cited studies
showing that it is possible under certain conditions
for Cry1A protein to kill insects that lack the cadherin receptor.
Also, while it is generally believed that Cry toxins do not exert an
effect on vertebrates as vertebrates lack the receptor for Cry
toxins, two studies (one in mice and the other in cows) have
provided evidence that Cry proteins can bind to mammalian
intestinal epithelial cells. The report also discussed the emergence
of resistance in insect pests, health and food safety
of Bt transgenics, and herbicide tolerant crops and their effect on
biodiversity and the environment. Specific recommendations were
made to address the foregoing issues and the report concluded
that:
The release of a GM crop into its area of origin or diversity

has far greater ramifications and potential for negative
impact than for other species. To justify this, there needs to
be extraordinarily compelling reasons and only when other
choices are not available. GM crops that offer incremental
advantages or solutions to specific and limited problems are
not sufficient reasons to justify such release. The TEC did not
find any such compelling reasons under the present
conditions. The fact is that unlike the situation in 1960s there
is no desperate shortage of food and in fact India is in a
reasonably secure position. The TEC therefore recommends
that release of GM crops for which India is a centre of origin
or diversity should not be allowed.127
In 2010, responding to large-scale opposition to Bt brinjal’s

introduction in India, former environment minister Jairam
Ramesh placed an indefinite moratorium on its further field
_______________
127 Id., at pp. 81-82.
586
testing. This was done after discussions with scientists, both pro
and anti-GM crops, activists and farmers across the country.
GMO Field Trials in the Philippines
As earlier mentioned, the conduct of field trials for GE plants

and crops in our country is governed primarily by DAO 08-2002
and implemented by the DA through the BPI. Petitioners EMB,
BPI and FPA all maintain there was no unlawful deviation from its
provisions and that respondents so far failed to present evidence to
prove their claim that Bt talong field trials violated environmental
laws and rules.
Within the DA-BPI, it is the Scientific and Technical Review
Panel (STRP) which, as an advisory body, was tasked to “evaluate
the potential risks of the proposed activity to human health and
the environment based on available scientific and technical
information.” Under DA Special Order 241 and 384 (2002) the
STRP membership was expanded to include “an independent pool
of experts…tapped by the [BPI] to evaluate the potential risks of
the proposed release of GMOs for field testing, propagation, food,
feed to human health and the environment based on available
scientific and technical information.”
DAO 08-2002 supplements the existing guidelines on the
importation and release into the environment of products of
modern biotechnology by institutionalizing existing operational
arrangements between DA-BPI and the NCBP. Effective July
2003, applications for field test are received and processed by DA-
BPI, but the approval process for projects on contained use
remains under the supervision of NCBP. A mandatory risk
assessment of GM plant and plant products is required prior to
importation or release into the environment. Experiments must
first be conducted under contained conditions, then the products
are tested in field trials the product is reviewed for commercial
release. Risk assessment is done according to the principles
provided for by the Cartagena
587
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 587
Protocol on Biosafety. Risk assessment is science-based, carried
out on a case by case manner, targets a specific crop and its
transformation event, adopts the concept of substantial
equivalence in identifying risk, allows review, and provides that
the absence of scientific information or consensus should not be
interpreted to indicate the absence or presence and level of risk.128
Greenpeace, however, claims there is actually only a committee
of three to five members which conducts the risk assessment, and
is aided by an informal group, the DA’s Biotech Advisory Team
(BAT), of representatives from government biotech regulatory
agencies: BPI, BAI, FPA, DENR, DOH and DOST. It also assails
the government regulatory agencies for their refusal to open to
scrutiny the names and qualifications of those incharge of
regulation and risk assessment, and for allowing the entry and use
of all GMO applications requested by multinational companies.129
It must be stressed that DAO 08-2002 and related DA orders are
not the only legal bases for regulating field trials of GM plants and
plant products. EO 514130 establishing the National Biosafety
Framework (NBF) clearly provides that the NBF shall “apply to
the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety
policies, measures and guidelines and in making biosafety
decisions concerning the research, development, handling and use,
transboundary movement, release into the environment and
management of regulated articles.”131 The objective of the NBF is to
“[e]nhance
_______________
128 The National Biosafety Framework FOR the Philippines. Department of Environment and
Natural Resources-Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau 2004. Quezon City, Philippines.
129 Greenpeace, “Ties that bind: regulatory capture in the country’s GMO approval process”
<http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/Global/seasia/report/2007/10/ties-that-bind-regulatory-cap.pdf>
(visited last December 7, 2014).
130 Approved on March 17, 2006.
131 EO 514, Sec. 2.1.
588
the decision-making system on the application of products of
modern biotechnology to make it more efficient, predictable,
effective, balanced, culturally appropriate, ethical, transparent and
participatory.”132 Thus, “the socio-economic, ethical, and cultural
benefit and risks of modern biotechnology to the Philippines and
its citizens, and in particular on small farmers, indigenous peoples,
women, small and medium enterprises and the domestic scientific
community, shall be taken into account in implementing the
NBF.”133 The NBF also mandates that decisions shall be arrived at
in a transparent and participatory manner, recognizing that
biosafety issues are best handled with the participation of all
relevant stakeholders and organizations who shall have
appropriate access to information and the opportunity to
participate responsibly and in an accountable manner in biosafety
decision-making process.134
Most important, the NBF requires the use of precaution, as
provided in Section 2.6 which reads:
2.6Using Precaution.—In accordance with Principle 15

of the Rio Declaration of 1992 and the relevant provisions of
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Articles 1,
10 (par. 6) and 11 (par. 8), the precautionary approach shall
guide biosafety decisions. The principles and elements of this
approach are hereby implemented through the decision-
making system in the NBF.
The NBF contains general principles and minimum guidelines

that the concerned agencies are expected to follow and which their
respective rules and regulations must conform with. In cases of
conflict in applying the principles, the principle of protecting public
interest and welfare shall always prevail, and no provision of the
NBF shall be construed as to
_______________
132 Id., Sec. 2.2.2.
133 NBF, Sec. 2.5.
134 Id., Sec. 2.7.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 589
limit the legal authority and mandate of heads of departments
and agencies to consider the national interest and public welfare in
making biosafety decisions.135
As to the conduct of risk assessment to identify and evaluate the
risks to human health and the environment, these shall be guided
by the following:
5.2.1 Principles of Risk Assessment.—The following

principles shall be followed when performing a RA to
determine whether a regulated article poses significant risks
to human health and the environment:
5.2.1.1 The RA shall be carried out in a scientifically
sound and transparent manner based on available
scientific and technical information. The expert
advice of and guidelines developed by, relevant
international organizations, including
intergovernmental bodies, and regulatory
authorities of countries with significant
experience in the regulatory supervision of the
regulated article shall be taken into account in
the conduct of risk assessment;
5.2.1.2 Lack of scientific knowledge or scientific
consensus shall not be interpreted as indicating a
particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an
acceptable risk;
5.2.1.3 The identified characteristics of a regulated
article and its use which have the potential to pose
significant risks to human health and the environment
shall be compared to those presented by the non-
modified organism from which it is derived and its use
under the same conditions;
5.2.1.4 The RA shall be carried out case-by-case and
on the basis of transformation event. The required
information may vary in nature and
_______________
135 Id., Sec. 2.13.
590
level of detail from case to case depending on the
regulated article concerned, its intended use and the
receiving environment; and
5.2.1.5 If new information on the regulated article and
its effects on human health and the environment
becomes available, and such information is relevant and
significant, the RA shall be readdressed to determine
whether the risk has changed or whether there is a need
to amend the risk management strategies accordingly.
5.2. 2Risk Assessment Guidelines.—The conduct of RA
by concerned departments and agencies shall be in
accordance with the policies and standards on RA issued by
the NCBP. Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol shall also
guide RA. As appropriate, such department and agencies may
issue their own respective administrative issuances
establishing the appropriate RA under their particular
jurisdictions.
5.3Role of Environmental Impact Assessment.—The
application of the EIA System to biosafety decisions shall be
determined by concerned departments and agencies
subject to the requirements of law and the standards
set by the NCBP. Where applicable and under the
coordination of the NCBP, concerned departments and
agencies shall issue joint guidelines on the matter. (Emphasis
supplied)
Considering the above minimum requirements under the most

comprehensive national biosafety regulation to date, compliance by
the petitioners with DAO 08-2002 is not sufficient. Notably,
Section 7 of the NBF mandates a more transparent, meaningful
and participatory public consultation on the conduct of field trials
beyond the posting and publication of notices and information
sheets, consultations with some residents and government officials,
and submission of written comments, provided in DAO 08-2002.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 7. SECTION
The concerned government departments and agencies, in

developing and adopting biosafety policies, guidelines and
measures and in making biosafety decisions, shall promote,
facilitate, and conduct public awareness, education, meaningful,
responsible and accountable participation. They shall incorporate
into their respective administrative issuances and processes best
practices and mechanisms on public participation in accordance
with the following guidelines:
7.1Scope of Public Participation.—Public participation
shall apply to all stages of the biosafety decision-making
process from the time the application is received. For
applications on biotechnology activities related to research and
development, limited primarily for contained use, notice of the
filing of such application with the NCBP shall be sufficient, unless
the NCBP deems that public interest and welfare requires
otherwise.
7.2Minimum Requirements of Public Participation.—In
conducting public participation processes, the following minimum
requirements shall be followed:
7.2.1Notice to all concerned stakeholders, in a language
understood by them and through media to which they have
access.—Such notice must be adequate, timely, and effective
and posted prominently in public places in the areas affected,
and in the case of commercial releases, in the national print
media; in all cases, such notices must be posted electronically
in the internet;
7.2.2Adequate and reasonable time frames for public
participation procedures.—Such procedures should allow
relevant stakeholders to understand and analyze the benefits
and risks, consult with independent experts, and make timely
interventions. Concerned departments and agencies shall
include in their appropriate rules and regulations specific
time frames for their respective public participation proc-
592
esses, including setting a minimum time frame as may be
appropriate;
7.2.3Public consultations, as a way to secure wide input
into the decisions that are to be made.—These could include
formal hearings in certain cases, or solicitation of public
comments, particularly where there is public controversy
about the proposed activities. Public consultations shall
encourage exchanges of information between applicants and
the public before the application is acted upon. Dialogue and
consensus-building among all stakeholders shall be
encouraged. Concerned departments and agencies shall
specify in their appropriate rules and regulations the stages
when public consultations are appropriate, the specific time
frames for such consultations, and the circumstances when
formal hearings will be required, including guidelines to
ensure orderly proceedings. The networks of agricultural
and fisheries councils, indigenous peoples and
community-based organizations in affected areas shall
be utilized;
7.2.4Written submissions.—Procedures for public
participation shall include mechanisms that allow public
participation in writing or through public hearings, as
appropriate, and which allow the submission of any
positions, comments, information, analyses or
opinions. Concerned departments and agencies shall include
in their appropriate rules and regulations the stages when
and the process to be followed for submitting written
comments; and
7.2.5Consideration of public concerns in the decision-
making phase following consultation and submission of
written comments.—Public concerns as reflected through the
procedures for public participation shall be considered in
making the decision. The public shall be informed of the final
decision promptly, have access to the decision, and shall be
provided with the reasons and considerations resulting in the
decision, upon request.
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We find that petitioners simply adhered to the procedures laid
down by DAO 08-2002 and no real effort was made to
operationalize the principles of the NBF in the conduct of field
testing of Bt talong. The failure of DAO 08-2002 to accommodate
the NBF means that the Department of Agriculture lacks
mechanisms to mandate applicants to comply with international
biosafety protocols. Greenpeace’s claim that BPI had approved
nearly all of the applications for GMO field trials is confirmed by
the data posted on their website. For these reasons, the DAO 08-
2002 should be declared invalid.
Significantly, while petitioners repeatedly argued that the
subject field trials are not covered by the EIS law, EO 514 clearly
mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most
particularly petitioners DENR-EMB, BPI and FPA, make a
determination whether the EIS system should apply to the release
of GMOs into the environment and issue joint guidelines on the
matter.
The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with
assessing the direct and indirect impacts of a project on the
biophysical and human environment and ensuring that these
impacts are addressed by appropriate environmental protection
and enhancement measures. It “aids proponents in incorporating
environmental considerations in planning their projects as well as
in determining the environment’s impact on their project.” There
are six stages in the regular EIA process. The proponent initiates
the first three stages while the EMB takes the lead in the last
three stages. Public participation is enlisted in most stages.136
Even without the issuance of EO 514, GMO field testing should
have at least been considered for EIA under existing
_______________
136 “The Role of Government Agencies in the Philippine Environmental Impact System: Under the
Revised Procedural Manual,”
<http://www.emb.gov.ph/portal/Portals/21/EIA/EIA%20FOLDER/For%20National%20Government%
20Agencies.pdf> (visited last December 9, 2014).
594
regulations of petitioner EMB on new and emerging
technologies, to wit:
Group V (Unclassified Projects): These are the projects not
listed in any of the groups, g) e.g., projects using new
processes/technologies with uncertain impacts. This is
an interim category — unclassified projects will eventually be
classified into their appropriate groups after EMB
evaluation.137(Emphasis supplied)
All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms

and entities who intend to undertake activities or projects which
will affect the quality of the environment are required to prepare a
detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to
undertaking such development activity.138 An environmentally
critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as “likely to have
significant adverse impact that may be sensitive, irreversible and
diverse” and which “include activities that have significant
environmental consequences.”139 In this context, and given the
overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the potential
hazards of GMOs to human health and the environment, their
release into the environment through field testing would definitely
fall under the category of ECP.
During the hearing at the CA, Atty. Segui of the EMB was
evasive in answering questions on whether his office undertook the
necessary evaluation on the possible environmental impact of Bt
talong field trials subject of this case and the release of GMOs into
the environment in general. While he initially cited lack of budget
and competence as reasons for
_______________
137 Section 7.g, Revised Procedural Manual for DAO 2003-30 on the Overview of the Philippine EISS
(PEISS).
138 RA 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code), Sec. 12.
139 Overview of the Environmental Impact Assessment Process, 25 September 2013, accessed at
<https://www.doe.gov.ph/microsites/ipo%20web/linked%20files/2013/MEIF2013/03_DENR_Procedures.pdf
>.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 595
their inaction, he later said that an amendment of the law
should be made since projects involving GMOs are not covered by
Proclamation No. 2146.140 Pertinent portions of his testimony before
the CA are herein quoted:
xxxx
ATTY. SORIANO:
Let us go back Mr. Witness to your answer in Question No. 5 regarding the list under the PEISS law.
Granting Mr. Witness that a certain project or undertaking is not classified as environmentally
critical project, how would you know that the BT talong field testing is not located in an
environmentally critical area this time?
ATTY. ACANTILADO:
Objection Your Honor, argumentative.
HON. J. DICDICAN:
Witness may answer.
ATTY. SEGUI:
As far as my recollection can serve me, in a reading of the Petition itself, somewhere along the Petition,
petitioners never alleged that the project, the subject matter rather of this instant petition, is within
an environmentally critical project.
ATTY. SORIANO:
Your Honor the Witness did not answer the question.
HON. J. DICDICAN:
Please answer the question.
_______________
140 Proclaiming Certain Areas and Types of Projects as Environmentally Critical and Within the
Scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System Established Under Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Issued December 14, 1981.
596
ATTY. SEGUI:
Personally I have conferred with our personnel from the Environmental Impact Assessment Division and
they intimated to me that the locations of the project, rather of this subject matter of the instant
petition, not within any declared environmentally critical area.
HON. J. BARRIOS:
In other words, you are aware of the area where the BT Talongexperiments are being conducted. Is that
the premise?
ATTY. SEGUI:
Judging from previous discussions we had . . . judging from the Petition, and showing it to the as I said
personnel from Environmental Impact Division at our office, as I said they intimated to me that it’s
not within declared environmentally critical area.
HON. J. BARRIOS:
That being the case, you did not act further? [You] did not make any further evaluation, on whether
the activity has an environmental impact? Is that the correct premise?
ATTY. SEGUI:
Well Your Honors I may be the Chief of the Legal Division of the EMB, I handle more of the legal aspects
of the Bureau’s affairs. But when it comes to highly technical matters, I have to rely on our technical
people especially on environmentally impact assessment matters.
ATTY. SORIANO:
I will just ask him another question, Your Honors. So did the Department of Agriculture Mr. Witness
coordinate with your Office with regard the field testing of BT Talong?
ATTY. SEGUI:
I’m sorry Your Honors I am not privy to that personally.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 597
ATTY. SORIANO:
Mr. Witness, the question is did the Department of Agriculture coordinate with your Office with regard
the field testing of BT Talong as required under the law?
ATTY. SORIANO:
Already answered your Honor, objection.
HON. J. DICDICAN:
The witness in effect said he does not know, he’s not in a position to answer.
xxxx
ATTY. SORIANO:
Did the EMB Mr. Witness perform such evaluation in the case of BTTalong field testing?
ATTY. ACANTILADO:
Your Honor that is speculative, the witness has just answered a while ago that the EMB has not yet
received any project with respect to that Your Honor. So the witness would not be in a position to
answer that Your Honors.
HON. J. DICDICAN:
Lay the basis first.
ATTY. SORIANO:
The earlier answer Your Honor of the witness is in general terms. My second question, my follow-up
question is specifically Your Honor the BT talong field testing.
ATTY. SEGUI:
Well from where I sit Your Honors, it would appear that it could be categorized as unclassified...
HON. J. VALENZUELA:
Unclassified?
ATTY. SEGUI:
As the section will initially provide. But there must be prior … may I continue to harp on that Your
598
Honors. There must be prior … let’s say conditions … there must be prior evaluation and assessment just
the same by the EMB.
HON. J. VALENZUELA:
Prior to what Mr. Witness?
ATTY. SEGUI:
We will categorize it as unclassified but there must be … (interrupted)
HON. J. VALENZUELA:
So initially you call it unclassified and then you say prior to…
ATTY. SEGUI:
I’m sorry Your Honors, may I reform.
HON. J. VALENZUELA:
Yes please.
ATTY. SEGUI:
Initially they will be considered/categorized as unclassified but there will be hopefully a subsequent
evaluation or assessment of the matter to see if we also have the resources and expertise if it can be
finally unclassified. I should say should fall within the fairview of the system, the EIA system. In
other words, it’s in a sort of how do you say that it’s in a state of limbo. So it’s unclassified, that’s the
most we can do in the meantime.
HON. J. VALENZUELA:
And Mr. Witness you also said that the agency the EMB is without the capability to evaluate the projects
such as this one in particular?
ATTY. SEGUI:
Yes, Your Honors as of now.
HON. J. VALENZUELA:
So therefore, when you say initially it’s unclassified and then you’re saying afterwards the
EMB needs evaluation but then you’re saying the EMB is without any capability to
evaluate then what happens?
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 599
ATTY. SEGUI:
Well Your Honors, I did not draft the regulation myself. As the Chief of the Legal of the EMB that’s how
we interpret it. But the truth of the matter is with all pragmatism we don’t have the
resources as of now and expertise to do just that.
HON. J. BARRIOS:
So in other words you admit that the EMB is without any competence to make a categorical or
initial examination of this uncategorized activity, is that what you mean?
ATTY. SEGUI:
It would appear, yes.
HON. J. BARRIOS:
What do you think would prompt your office to make such initial examination?
ATTY. SEGUI:
Well executive fee at the usual dictates . . . the Secretary of the DENR probably even by request of the
parties concerned.
HON. J. BARRIOS:
So that means you are waiting for a request? Are you not? Proactive in this activity in performing your
obligations and duties?
ATTY. SEGUI:
Well Your Honors, the national budget if I may . . . I attend budget hearings myself. The budget for the
environment is hardly . . . the ratio is . . . if we want to protect indeed the environment as
we profess, with all due respect if Congress speaks otherwise.
HON. J. BARRIOS:
May I interrupt, can we go into specifics. From what I have read so far, under No. 2 of your Judicial
Affidavit, [you] are saying that the EMB is tasked in advising the DENR on matters related to
600
environmental management, conservation and pollution control, right?
ATTY. SEGUI:
Yes.
HON. J. BARRIOS:
Thereafter you stated that you are tasked mainly with PD 1586 which refers to Environmental Critical
Areas of Projects and more specifically focused on Proclamation No. 2146. With respect to
this BTTalong, you mentioned that this is at first is uncategorized, it’s not within?
ATTY. SEGUI:
It’s not within Proclamation 2146, Your Honor.
HON. J. BARRIOS:
But you did mention that under the rules and regulations, even in an uncategorized activity, pertaining to
the environment, your Office has the mandate and then you later say that your Office is without
competence, do I follow your line of standing?
ATTY. SEGUI:
Yes, precisely it will be categorized as per Section 7 as unclassified because it doesn’t fall as of now within
Proclamation 2146.
HON. J. BARRIOS:
Yes, but under the implementing rules your Office has the mandate to act on other unclassified activities
and you answered that your Office has no competence.
ATTY. SEGUI:
Proclamation 2146 executed by then Pres. Marcos, the IRR pointed to was executed by I believe the
Secretary of DENR. We need an amendment of 2146.141 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
141 TSN, February 7, 2013, pp. 13-16, 18-20.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 601
The foregoing stance of the EMB’s Chief of the Legal Division is
an indication of the DENR-EMB’s lack of serious attention to their
mandate under the law in the implementation of the NBF, as
provided in the following sections of EO 514:
4.9Mandate of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources.—As the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development
and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) shall ensure that environmental
assessments are done and impacts identified in
biosafety decisions. It shall also take the lead in evaluating
and monitoring regulated articles intended for
bioremediation, the improvement of forest genetic resources,
and wildlife genetic resources.
xxxx
4.12Focal Point and Competent National
Authorities.
For purposes of Article 19 of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, the national focal point responsible for liaison with
the Secretariat shall be the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The competent national authorities, responsible for
performing the administrative functions required by the
Protocol, shall be, depending on the particular genetically
modified organisms in question, the following: 4.12.1
xxxx
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
for 4.12.1.4 biosafety decisions covered by the Protocol
that concern regulated organisms intended for
bioremediation, the improvement of forest genetic resources,
and wildlife genetic resources, and applications of modern
biotechnology with potential impact on the
conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity. (Emphasis supplied)
602
On the supposed absence of budget mentioned by Atty. Segui,
EO 514 itself directed the concerned agencies to ensure that there
will be funding for the implementation of the NBF as it was
intended to be a multi-disciplinary effort involving the different
government departments and agencies.
6. SEC.Funding.—The DOST, DENR, DA, and DOH
shall allocate funds from their present budgets to implement
the NBF, including support to the operations of the NCBP
and its Secretariat. Starting 2006 and thereafter, the funding
requirements shall be included in the General Appropriations
Bill submitted by each of said departments to Congress.
These concerned departments shall enter into agreement
on the sharing of financial and technical resources to support
the NCBP and its Secretariat.
All told, petitioners government agencies clearly failed to fulfill

their mandates in the implementation of the NBF.
Application of the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s,

expressing the normative idea that governments are obligated to
“foresee and forestall” harm to the environment. In the following
decades, the precautionary principle has served as the normative
guideline for policy-making by many national governments.142 The
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the outcome of
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development held in Rio de Janeiro, defines the rights of the
people to be involved in the development of their economies, and
the responsibilities of human beings to safeguard the common
environment. It states that the long term economic progress is only
ensured if
_______________
142 “GMOs, Risks and the Precautionary Principle” by Marcelo Gortari, supra note 114.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 603
it is linked with the protection of the environment.143For the first
time, the precautionary approach was codified under Principle 15,
which reads:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary

approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
Principle 15 codified for the first time at the global level the
precautionary approach, which indicates that lack of scientific
certainty is no reason to postpone action to avoid potentially
serious or irreversible harm to the environment. It has been
incorporated in various international legal instruments.144 The
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, finalized and adopted in Montreal on January 29, 2000,
establishes an international regime primarily aimed at regulating
trade in GMOs intended for release into the environment, in
accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development. The Protocol thus provides:
Article
10
DECISION PROCEDURE
xxxx
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant
scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of
the potential adverse effects 6. of a living modified
_______________
143 Principles 1, 2, 3 and 4.

<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163> (visited last
December 7, 2014).
144 The Global Development Resource Center, “The Rio Declaration: Principle 15 – The Precautionary
Approach,” <http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/precaution-7.html> (visited last December 9, 2014).
604
organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to
human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision,
as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified
organism in question as referred to in paragraph 3 above, in order
to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.
xxxx
Article
11
PROCEDURE FOR LIVING MODIFIED ORGANISMS
INTENDED FOR DIRECT USE AS FOOD OR FEED,
OR FOR PROCESSING
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific

information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential
adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import,
taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent
that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to
the import of that living modified organism intended for direct use
as food or feed, or for processing, in order to avoid or minimize such
potential adverse effects. 8.
xxxx
Annex III
RISK ASSESSMENT
General principles
xxxx
Lack of scientific knowledge or scientific consensus should not
necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular level of risk,
an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk. 4.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 605
The precautionary principle applies when the following
conditions are met:145
 there exist considerable scientific uncertainties;

 there exist scenarios (or models) of possible harm that are
scientifically reasonable (that is based on some scientifically
plausible reasoning);
 uncertainties cannot be reduced in the short term without at the
same time increasing ignorance of other relevant factors by
higher levels of abstraction and idealization;
 the potential harm is sufficiently serious or even irreversible for
present or future generations or otherwise morally unacceptable;
 there is a need to act now, since effective counteraction later will
be made significantly more difficult or costly at any later time.
The Rules likewise incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule 20,

which states:
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
1. SEC.Applicability.—When there is a lack of full

scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between
human activity and environmental effect, the court shall
apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before
it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
2. SEC.Standards for application.—In applying the
precautionary principle, the following factors, among others,
may be considered: (1) threats to human life or
_______________
145 “The Precautionary Principle,” World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and
Technology (COMEST), March 2005, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/139578e.pdf>.
606
health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3)
prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of
the environmental rights of those affected.
Under this Rule, the precautionary principle finds direct

application in the evaluation of evidence in cases before the courts.
The precautionary principle bridges the gap in cases where
scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. By
applying the precautionary principle, the court may construe a set
of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction, with the
goal of preserving and protecting the environment. This may be
further evinced from the second paragraph where bias is created in
favor of the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology. In effect, the precautionary principle shifts the
burden of evidence of harm away from those likely to suffer harm
and onto those desiring to change the status quo. An application of
the precautionary principle to the rules on evidence will enable
courts to tackle future environmental problems before ironclad
scientific consensus emerges.146
For purposes of evidence, the precautionary principle should be
treated as a principle of last resort, where application of the
regular Rules of Evidence would cause in an inequitable result for
the environmental plaintiff — (a) settings in which the risks of
harm are uncertain; (b) settings in which harm might be
irreversible and what is lost is irreplaceable; and (c) settings in
which the harm that might result would be serious. When these
features — uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm,
and the possibility of serious harm — coincide, the case for the
precautionary principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be
resolved in favor of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology. Parenthetically, judicial adjudication is one of
the strongest
_______________
146 Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
607
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 607
fora in which the precautionary principle may find
applicability.147
Assessing the evidence on record, as well as the current state of
GMO research worldwide, the Court finds all the three conditions
present in this case — uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible
harm and the possibility of serious harm.
Eggplants (talong) are a staple vegetable in the country and
grown by small-scale farmers, majority of whom are poor and
marginalized. While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm
incomes is laudable, independent scientific studies revealed
uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from Bt crops
and plants, adverse effects on the environment associated with use
of GE technology in agriculture, and serious health hazards from
consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country like the
Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of
contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and
irreversible.
Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the nonimplementation of
the NBF in the crucial stages of risk assessment and public
consultation, including the determination of the applicability of the
EIS requirements to GMO field testing, are compelling reasons for
the application of the precautionary principle. There exists a
preponderance of evidence that the release of GMOs into the
environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the
field trial sites, and eventually the health of our people once
the Bt eggplants are consumed as food. Adopting the precautionary
approach, the Court rules that the principles of the NBF need to be
operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the concerned
departments and agencies before allowing the release into the
environment of genetically modified eggplant. The more prudent
course is to immediately enjoin the Bt talong field trials and
approval for its propagation or commercialization until
_______________
147 Id.
608
the said government offices shall have performed their
respective mandates to implement the NBF.
We have found the experience of India in the Bt brinjal field
trials — for which an indefinite moratorium was recommended by
a Supreme Court-appointed committee till the government fixes
regulatory and safety aspects — as relevant because majority of
Filipino farmers are also small-scale farmers. Further, the
precautionary approach entailed inputs from all stakeholders,
including the marginalized farmers, not just the scientific
community. This proceeds from the realization that acceptance of
uncertainty is not only a scientific issue, but is related to public
policy and involves an ethical dimension.148 For scientific research
alone will not resolve all the problems, but participation of
different stakeholders from scientists to industry, NGOs, farmers
and the public will provide a needed variety of perspective foci, and
knowledge.149
Finally, while the drafters of the NBF saw the need for a law to
specifically address the concern for biosafety arising from the use
of modern biotechnology, which is deemed necessary to provide
more permanent rules, institutions, and funding to adequately deal
with this challenge,150 the matter is within the exclusive
prerogative of the legislative branch.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated
May 17, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00013 is
hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
_______________
148 Ingeborg Myhr and Traavik, supra note 98.

149 Ingeborg Myhr, Anne and Traavik, Terje, “Genetically Modified (GM) Crops:
Precautionary Science and Conflicts of Interests”
<http://www.pages.drexel.edu/~ls39/peer review/Myhr.pdf> (visited last December
9, 2014).
150 Department of Environment and Natural Resources –Protected Areas and
Wildlife Bureau, “The National Biosafety Framework for the Philippines,”
<http://www.unep.org/biosafety/files/PHNBFrep.pdf-> (visited last December 9,
2014).
609
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 609
The conduct of the assailed field testing for 1. Bt talong is
hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED;
Department of Agriculture Administrative Order No. 08, Series
of 2002 is declared 2. NULL AND VOID; and
Consequently, any application for contained use, field testing,
propagation and commercialization, and importation of genetically
modified organisms is 3. TEMPORARILY ENJOINED until a
new administrative order is promulgated in accordance with law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., No part. Prior inhibition.
Velasco, Jr., J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Brion, J., On Official Leave.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., No part.
CONCURRING OPINION
VELASCO, JR.,J.:
Technological and scientific advances no longer involve raw

materials manipulation and transformation. It now embraces
changing the very genetic makeup of live organisms, altering and
even mixing characteristics of flora, fauna, microorganisms, among
others, for various purposes, including attempts to increase
agricultural yield and improve and develop sustainable pest
control.
610
The Philippines is not insulated from this genetic modification of
organisms as it is, in fact, a regulated activity in this jurisdiction.
But, in view of the possible dangers that the activity poses to the
biodiversity-rich environs of the country, environmental protection
in the Philippines has evolved to adapt to these progresses and is
still being further strengthened via executive, legislative, and
judicial efforts.
At bar are consolidated petitions seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 17, 2013, as well
as its Resolution dated September 20, 2013, in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
00013 which permanently enjoined the conduct of field trials for
the genetically modified eggplant, commonly known as “Bt
Talong,” on concerns for biosafety.
Biosafety is a condition in which the probability of harm, injury
and damage resulting from the intentional and unintentional
introduction and/or use of a regulated article is within acceptable
and manageable levels.1 “Regulated article” refers to genetically
modified organisms2 (GMOs), which are “living modified
organisms” under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and refers
to any living organism that possesses a novel combination of
genetic material obtained through the use of modern
biotechnology.3 Regulated articles also include the products of
GMOs.4
Prior, however, to the introduction of biotechnology and genetic
modification of organisms in the Philippines, one of the main
enactments governing environmental protection is Presidential
Decree No. 1151 (PD 1151) or the Philippine Environmental
Policy issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 6,
1977.
_______________
1 Item 3.3, Section 3, EO 514, S. 2006.

2 Sub-item 3.3.12, Item 3.3, Section 3, EO 514, S. 2006.
611
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 611
The Philippine Environmental Impact Statement
System (PEISS)
PD 1151, which put in place the use of Environmental Impact
Statements in this jurisdiction, declares as the State’s continuing
policy (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other; (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos; and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well-being.
In pursuit of its above stated policy, Section 4 of PD 1151
requires thusly:
[A]ll agencies and instrumentalities of the national

government, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and
entities shall prepare, file and include in every action, project
or undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the
environment a detailed statement on —
the environmental impact of the proposed action,
project or undertaking; (a)
any adverse environmental effect which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented; (b)
alternative to the proposed action; (c)
a determination that the short-term uses of the
resources of the environment are consistent with the
maintenance and enhancement of the long-term
productivity of the same; and (d)
whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or
non-renewable resources, a finding must be made that
such use and commitment are warranted. (e)
612
Before an environmental impact statement (EIS) is issued
by a lead agency, all agencies having jurisdiction over, or
special expertise on, the subject matter involved shall
comment on the draft environmental impact statement made
by the lead agency within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
same.
Thereafter, to give more teeth to the EIS requirement, PD

15865 was issued on June 11, 1978, establishing the EIS System
(PEISS), instituting a systems-oriented and integrated approach to
the filing of the EIS in coordination with the whole environmental
protection program of the State.6 Section 2 thereof states:
There is hereby established an Environmental Impact

Statement System founded and based on the environmental
impact statement required under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1151, of all agencies and instrumentalities of the
national government, including government-owned or -
controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms
and entities, for every proposed project and undertaking
which significantly affect the quality of the environment.
To reiterate, Section 4 of PD 1151, on the other hand, provides:
Environmental Impact StatementsPursuant to the above

enunciated policies and goals, all agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations, as well as
private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and
include in every action, project or undertaking which .
_______________
5 Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System Including Other

Environmental Management Related Measures and for Other Purposes.
6 Philippine Judicial Academy, A Sourcebook on Environmental Rights and
Legal Remedies, p. 58.
613
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 613
significantly affects the quality of the environment a
detailed statement on:
the environmental impact of the proposed action,
project or undertaking; (a)
any adverse environmental effect which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented; (b)
alternative to the proposed action; (c)
a determination that the short-term uses of the
resources of the environment are consistent with the
maintenance and enhancement of the long-term
productivity of the same; and (d)
whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or
nonrenewable resources, a finding must be made that
such use and commitment are warranted. (e)
Before an environmental impact statement is issued by a

lead agency, all agencies having jurisdiction over, or special
expertise on, the subject matter involved shall comment on
the draft environmental impact statement made by the lead
agency within thirty (30) days from receipt of the same.
As part of the PEISS, Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that “the

President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon
recommendation of the National Environmental Protection
Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or
areas in the country as environmentally critical.” Pursuant
thereto, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued on December 14, 1981,
declaring certain areas7 and types of pro-
_______________
7 Environmentally Critical Areas B.

All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves and sanctuaries;
1.
Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots; 2.
614
jects8 as environmentally critical and within the scope of the
Environmental Impact Statement System established under
_______________
Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species of
indigenous Philippine Wildlife (flora and fauna); 3.
Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests; 4.
Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes; 5.
Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards,
floods, typhoons, volcanic activity, 6. etc.);
Areas with critical slopes; 7.
Areas classified as prime agricultural lands; 8.
Recharged areas of aquifers; 9.
Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:
10.
a. tapped for domestic purposes;
b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate
authorities;
c. which support wildlife and fishery activities;
Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following
conditions: 11.
a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;
b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;
c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;
d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong winds and
storm floods;
e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.
Coral reefs, characterized by one or any combinations of the following conditions:
12.
with 50% and above live coralline cover; a.
spawning and nursery grounds for fish; b.
which act as natural breakwater of coastlines. c.
8 AEnvironmentally Critical Projects .
Heavy Industries I.
Non-ferrous metal industries a.
Iron and steel mills b.
615
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 615
PD 1586.9
In connection therewith, the same provision declares that “[n]o
person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any
such declared environmentally critical project or area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued
by the President or his duly authorized representative.”10
For those projects that are identified to be environmentally
noncritical, Section 5 of the same law provides that “[a]ll other
projects, undertakings and areas not declared by the Presidents as
environmentally critical shall be considered as
_______________
c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas

d. Smelting plants
Resource Extractive Industries II.
a. Major mining and quarrying projects
b. Forestry projects
1. Logging
2. Major wood processing projects
3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/
private forests
4. Forest occupancy
5. Extraction of mangrove products
6. Grazing
c. Fishery Projects
1. Dikes for/and fishpond development projects
Infrastructure Projects III.
a. Major dams
b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled, hydroelectric or geothermal)
c. Major reclamation projects
d. Major roads and bridges
9 Republic v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 148622, September 12, 2002, 388 SCRA
691.
10 Section 4, PD 1586.
616
noncritical and shall not be required to submit an environmental
impact statement.”
Thus and simply put, under the PEISS, if the project is itself
identified to be environmentally critical or to be undertaken at an
environmentally critical area, the proponent has to secure an ECC.
If, however, the project is identified under the PEISS as
environmentally noncritical and is not to be undertaken in an
environmentally critical area, then the proponent will secure a
Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) instead of an ECC.
It is, however, well to note that even though a project may be
certified as not covered by the environmental impact assessment
requirement, still, there is nothing that will bar the government
agencies concerned from requiring from the proponent the adoption
of additional environmental safeguards that they may deem
necessary.11
Hence, before the entry of biotechnology in Philippine
jurisdiction and the introduction of GMOs to its soil, and even after
such, it is the PEISS that primarily governs projects that have or
may have an impact on the country’s ecological balance and
makeup, whether the project involves biotechnology or not. And it
was only in 1990, or almost a decade after the issuance of
Presidential Proclamation No. 2146 identifying environmentally
critical areas and projects, when the government began regulating
Biotechnology research in the country.
Philippine Regulations on Biotechnology

and Biosafety
In 1987, scientists from the University of the Philippines Los
Baños (UPLB) and the International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI), the Quarantine Officer of the Bureau of Plant Industry
(BPI), and the Director for Crops of the Philippine
_______________
11 Sec. 5, PD 1586.
617
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 617
Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources
Research and Development (PCARRD), recognizing the potential
harm of the introduction of exotic species and genetic engineering,
formed a committee and formulated the biosafety protocols and
guidelines for genetic engineering and related research activities
for UPLB and IRRI researchers. The committee went on to draft a
Philippine biosafety policy, which was submitted to the Office of
the President.12
On the basis of said submission, on October 15, 1990, then
President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 430 (EO
430) constituting the National Committee on Biosafety of the
Philippines (NCBP) among other purposes.13 Said directive was
issued in recognition of the value of biotechnology and its high
potential to improve the quality of human life, as well as the
possible concomitant risks and hazards that biotechnology may
pose to health safety, environment, and society.14
_______________
12 Evolution of the Philippine Biosafety System, Department of Agriculture-Bureau of Plant

Industry, http://biotech.da.gov.ph/, last accessed December 7, 2015.
13 http://www.ncbp.dost.gov.ph/19-guidelines/24-executive-order-no-430-s-1990, last accessed
November 23, 2015.
14 WHEREAS, the impact of the new technologies on health, agriculture, chemical and
pharmaceutical, and environment and natural resources has been a continuing worldwide concern of
many countries;
WHEREAS, biotechnology has high potential to improve the quality of human life may have
concomitant risks and hazards to health safety, the environment and society;
WHEREAS, the hazards associated with the processes and the products of researches in biotechnology
may be minimized, if not totally eliminated, by the different containment levels and procedures observed
in the laboratories and greenhouses;
WHEREAS, most of the risks are associated with the field testing and eventual deliberate release of
genetically manipulated/
engineered organisms into the environment;
618
EO 430 created the National Committee on Biosafety of the
Philippines (NCBP) and vested upon it the following functions, to
wit:
Identify and evaluate potentials hazards involved in
initiating genetic engineering experiments or the introduction
of new species and genetically engineered organisms and
recommend measures to minimize risks; (a)
Formulate and review national policies and guidelines on
biosafety, such as the safe conduct of work on genetic
engineering, pests and their genetic materials for the
protection of public health, environment and personnel and
supervise the implementation thereof; (b)
Formulate and review national policies and guidelines in
risk assessment of work biotechnology, and supervise the
implementation thereof; (c)
Develop working arrangements with the government
quarantine services and institutions in the evaluation,
monitoring, and review of projects (d) vis-à-vis adherence to
national policies and guidelines on biosafety;
Assist in the development of technical expertise, facilities
and other resources for quarantine services and risk
assessments; (e)
Recommend the development and promotion of research
programs to establish risk assessment protocols and
assessment of long-term environmental effects of biological
research covered by these guidelines; (f)
Publish the results of internal deliberation and agency
reviews of the committee; (g)
Hold public deliberations on proposed national policies,
guidelines and other biosafety issues; (h)
_______________
WHEREAS, there is a need to constitute a body that shall undertake the study and evaluation of
existing laws, policies and guidelines on biotechnology and its related matters, and recommend such
measures for its effective utilization and prevention of possible pernicious effects in the environment. (EO
430, S. 1990)
619
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 619
Provide assistance in the formulation, amendment of
pertinent laws, rules and regulations; and (i)
Call upon the assistance of any government agency,
department, office, bureau including government-owned
and/or -controlled corporations. (j)15
Pursuant to its mandate, the NCBP published the first version of

the Philippine National Biosafety Guidelines in 1991 (1991
Guidelines). Said Guidelines governs regulating the
importation, transfer and use of GMOs and potentially harmful
exotic species in the Philippines, with focus on potentially
hazardous work performed under contained conditions. Since the
publication of the first edition, the NCBP has received and
evaluated more than eighty (80) project proposals, all of which
were to be performed under contained conditions. However,
recognizing the rapid advances in other countries in respect of field
trials of selected GMOs, the NCBP decided to look into the
adequacy and relevance of the Guidelines, particularly as it relates
to planned release.
In 1996, the NCBP started to review the Guidelines with the
view of revising it to address the concerns of both the scientific and
environmental communities. Hence, the second edition was issued
on May 15, 1998. Series No. 3 of the second edition contains the
guidelines on the deliberate release of GMOs and Potentially
Harmful Exotic Species (PHES) into the Philippine
Environment.16 Furthermore, it specifically repealed the provisions
of the 1991 Guidelines on field release of regulated materials which
are inconsistent therewith.17
From 1990 to 2002, the NCBP’s scope of mandate included
research and development in the laboratory, screenhouse and
_______________
15 Section 4, EO 430, S. 1990.

16 NCBP Monograph dated May 15, 1998.
17 9. SECTIONRepealing Clause.—All provisions of the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines (1991
edition), particularly Part III, paragraph 2.3 (Field release of Regulated Materials), which are inconsistent
with this Monograph are hereby repealed.
620
in the field.18 Regulation of field testing was later removed
from the NCBP’s mandate when the Department of Agriculture
(DA) issued Administrative Order No. 8 (AO No. 8, S. 2002) or the
“Rules and Regulations for the Importation and Release into the
Environment of Plants and Plant Products Derived from the Use of
Modern Biotechnology.”
AO No. 8, S. 2002 was approved on April 3, 2002 and became
operational in July 2003.19 It covers the importation or release into
the environment of:
1. Any plant which has been altered or produced through the
use of modern biotechnology if the donor organism, host
organism, or vector or vector agent belongs to any of the
genera or taxa classified by BPI as meeting the definition of
plant pest or is a medium for the introduction of noxious
weeds; or
2. Any plant or plant product altered or produced through the
use of modern biotechnology which may pose significant risks
to human health and the environment based on available
scientific and technical information.20
Furthermore, it specifically provides that it shall not apply to the

contained use of a regulated article, which is within the regulatory
supervision of the NCBP.21 With these, the administrative order
thus transferred regulation of field testing of
_______________
18 Biosafety Regulations in the Philippines: A Review of the First fifteen Years, Preparing for the Next
Fifteen, A Report of the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP), by the National
Academy on Science and Technology (NAST), Department of Science and Technology (DOST), NCBP, and
the Program for Biosafety Systems, p. 15 (2009).
19 Id.
20 Item A, Section 2, DA AO No. 8, S. 2002.
21 Item B, Section 2, DA AO No. 8, S. 2002.
621
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 621
biotech crops to the DA’s Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI), among
others.22
With DA AO No. 8, S. 2002, field tests and eventual commercial
propagation of biotech crops would be handled by the DA-BPI,
instead of the NCBP, starting July 2003. Thus, DA AO 8 redefined
the NCBP’s tasks to focus on contained facility R & D involving
genetically modified organisms. However, NCBP continued to
review and formulate policies on biotechnology as well as review
and modify the science-based risk assessment of protocols to be
used by the regulatory agencies implementing the commercial
guidelines. All applications for field tests received before July 1,
2003 remained under the supervision of the NCBP until their
completion.23
Meanwhile, or on September 11, 2003, the ratification by the
Philippines of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety entered into
force, prompting the issuance by then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo of Executive Order No. 514 (EO 514), Series of 2006 on
March 17, 2006. Said executive order established the National
Biosafety Framework (NBF), prescribed guidelines for its
implementation, strengthening the NCBP, among others.
EO 514 highlighted the need to enhance the existing biosafety
framework to better respond to the challenges presented by further
advances in modern biotechnology and to comply with the
administrative requirements of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety.24 Consistent with these, the NBF has the following
objectives, viz.:
_______________
22 Supra note 18 at pp. 29-30.

23 Id., at p. 15.
24 WHEREAS, there is a need to enhance the existing biosafety framework to better respond to the
challenges presented by further advances in modern biotechnology and to comply with the administrative
requirements of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
622
Strengthen the existing science-based determination of
biosafety to ensure the safe and responsible use of modern
biotechnology so that the Philippines and its citizens can
benefit from its application while avoiding or minimizing the
risks associated with it; 2.2.1.
Enhance the decision-making system on the application of
products of modern biotechnology to make it more efficient,
predictable, effective, balanced, culturally appropriate,
ethical, transparent and participatory; and 2.2.2.
Serve as guidelines for implementing international
obligations on biosafety. 2.2.3.
In order to put these objectives into action, EO 514 strengthened

the NCBP through the expansion of its composition25 and functions.
Anent its composition, EO 514 provides thusly:
The NCBP shall be composed of the following: The Secretaries of
the Departments of Science and Technology, Agriculture, Health,
Environment and Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs, Trade and
Industry, and Interior and Local Governments or their designated
representatives.
The DOST Secretary shall be the permanent Chair; A consumer
representative appointed by the President from a list submitted by
nationally recognized consumer organizations, serving for a term of
three (3) years, renewable for another term;
A community representative from the farmers, fisherfolk and
indigenous sector appointed by the President from a list submitted
by nationally recognized sectoral organizations, serving for a term
of three (3) years, renewable for another term;
A representative from industry appointed by the President from
a list submitted by the Secretary of Trade 4.2.4
_______________
25 Subsection 4.2 (Composition of the NCBP), Section 4 (Administrative Framework) (EO 514).
623
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 623
and Industry, serving for a term of three (3) years, renewable for
another term; and
A biological scientist, physical scientist, environmental

scientist, health scientist, and social scientist to be endorsed
by the DOST Secretary upon the recommendation of
recognized professional and collegial bodies such as the
National Academy of Science and Technology (NAST) and the
Philippine Social Science Council (PSSC), and appointed by
the President, each serving for a term of three (3) years,
renewable for another term.
This new NCBP was then directed to, among others:
1. set the national scientific and technical biosafety

standards on methods and procedures for ensuring biosafety
in the country, consistent with existing laws; and
2. to develop basic policies on addressing public interests on
biosafety, provided that the same are consistent with law and
if such policies are found insufficiently addressed in existing
mandates and regulations of pertinent agencies.26
_______________
26 4. SECTIONAdministrative Framework.—The administrative mechanism

for biosafety decisions shall be as follows:
National scientific and technical biosafety standards and standards on methods
and procedures for ensuring biosafety in the country shall be set by the NCBP
consistent with existing laws: Basic policies on addressing public interests on
biosafety shall be developed by the NCBP, provided the same are consistent with
law and if such policies are found insufficiently addressed in existing mandates and
regulations of pertinent agencies; (a)
Member-agencies of the NCBP shall continue to perform their regulatory
functions in accordance with their legal mandates, provided that their policies and
programs relating to biosafety shall be discussed in the NCBP for purposes of
harmonization with other agencies’ functions; (b)
624
The DA was designated as the agency that shall address
biosafety issues related to the country’s agricultural productivity
and food security.27 Additionally, the DA was directed to exercise
such jurisdiction and other powers that it has been conferred with
under existing laws, in coordination with other concerned
departments and agencies, and consistent with the requirements of
transparency and public participation as provided in Sections 6
and 7 of the NBF. Moreover, it was mandated to take the lead in
evaluating and monitoring plant and plant products derived from
the use of modern biotechnology, as provided in Department of
Agriculture Administrative Order No. 008, S. 2002.
The Department of Science and Technology (DOST), on the other
hand, is to take the lead in ensuring that the best available science
is utilized and applied in adopting biosafety policies, measures and
guidelines, and in making biosafety decisions. It also was tasked to
ensure that such policies, measures, guidelines and decisions are
made on the basis of scientific information that is of the highest
quality, multi-disciplinary, peer-reviewed, and consistent with
international standards as they evolve.28
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
was mandated to ensure that environmental assessments are
done and impacts identified in bio-
_______________
Other concerned agencies shall coordinate with NCBP on matters that may affect biosafety decisions
as provided in Sections 4.7 to 4.14; (c)
Administrative functions required under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety shall be performed by
agencies as provided in Sections 4.14 and 4.15; and (d)
The role of stakeholders and the general public shall be recognized and taken into account as provided
in Sections 6 and 7. (EO 514) (e)
27 Item 4.8, Section 4 [Administrative Framework], EO 514.
625
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 625
safety decisions. It shall also take the lead in evaluating and
monitoring regulated articles intended for bioremediation, the
improvement of forest genetic resources, and wildlife genetic
resources.29
With respect to its functions, Item 4.6, Section 4 of EO 514
provides thusly:
Powers and Functions of the NCBP 4.6As the lead

body in implementing the NBF, the NCBP shall have the
following powers and functions: .
Biosafety Policy Functions 4.6.1
Assist concerned departments and agencies in formulating,
reviewing, or amending their respective policies, measures
and guidelines on biosafety;
Hold public deliberations on proposed national policies,
guidelines, and other biosafety issues;
Provide assistance in the formulation, amendment of
pertinent laws, rules and regulations; 4.6.1.3
In coordination with concerned departments and agencies
and consistent with the requirements of transparency and
public participation as provided in Sections 6 and 7 of the
NBF, shall take the lead in periodically reviewing the NBF;
4.6.1.4
Issue detailed guidelines on the conduct of socio-economic
impact evaluation of biosafety decisions; and
Propose to Congress necessary and appropriate legislation.
Accountability Functions 4.6.2
Monitor the implementation of the NBF by concerned
departments and agencies; 4.6.2.1
Ensure coordination among competent national authorities
that have shared mandates; 4.6.2.2
_______________
626
4.6.2.3Ensure that NCBP guidelines, and the
principles and processes established in this
Framework are complied with by concerned
departments and agencies; and
Review procedures for accountability in biosafety decision-
making by competent national authorities, with particular
emphasis on ensuring independence and impartiality in such
decisions.
Scientific Functions 4.6.3
Facilitate the study and evaluation of biosafety research
and control and minimize the concomitant risks and hazards
associated with the deliberate release of regulated articles in
the environment; 4.6.3.1
Identify and evaluate potential hazards involved in modern
biotechnological experiments or the introduction of regulated
articles and recommend measures to minimize risks; 4.6.3.2
Recommend the development and promotion of research
programs to establish risk assessment protocols and
assessment of long-term environmental effects of regulated
articles; 4.6.3.3
Develop working arrangements with the government
quarantine services and institutions in the evaluation,
monitoring, and review of projects 4.6.3.4 vis-à-
vis adherence to national policies and guidelines on biosafety;
Review and develop guidelines in the risk assessment of
regulated articles for contained use; 4.6.3.5
4.6.3.6Assist other agencies in developing risk
assessment guidelines and procedures of regulated
articles for field trials and commercial release;
Review the appointment of the members of the
Institutional Biosafety Committees created by institutions
engaged in activities involving regulated articles, upon
recommendation by their respective heads of institutions;
4.6.3.7
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 627
Publish the results of internal deliberations and agency
reviews of the NCBP; 4.6.3.8
Hold, discussions on the comparative ecological, economic
and social impacts of alternative approaches to attain the
purposes/objectives of the proposed genetic modification
products and/or services; and 4.6.3.9
Perform such functions as may be requested by concerned
departments and agencies. 4.6.3.10
Capacity Building Functions 4.6.4
Assist in the development of technical expertise, facilities,
and other resources for quarantine services and risk
assessments; and 4.6.4.1
Take the lead in developing and implementing a national
capacity-building program for biosafety. 4.6.4.2
As to its effect on existing policies, rules, and issuances,

specifically DA AO No. 8, S. 2002, it is well to note that Section
830 of EO 514 specifically provided that DA AO No. 8, S. 2002
remains to be in force and effect.
Despite the issuance, however, of EO 514, new biosafety policies
or guidelines on GMO field testing have yet to be issued.
Furthermore, DA AO No. 8, S. 2002 has not been amended. As
such, it remains to be the rules that primarily govern the conduct
of field trials for genetically engineered plants and crops in our
jurisdiction, as noted by the ponencia.
_______________
30 8. SectionRepealing and Amending Clause.—All orders, rules and regulations or parts thereto
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Order are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly. For the avoidance of doubt, the following issuances, unless amended by the respective issuing
departments or agencies, shall continue to be in force and effect: Department of Agriculture
Administrative Order No. 008, S. 2002; the NCBP Guidelines on the Contained Use of Genetically
Modified Organisms, except for provisions on potentially harmful exotic species which are hereby
repealed; and all Bureau of Food and Drugs issuances on products of modern biotechnology.
628
As it stands, application for field testing of regulated articles is
governed by Part III (Approval Process for Field Testing of
Regulated Articles) of DA AO No. 8, S. 2002, Section 7 of which
states that:
No regulated article shall be released into the environment

for field testing, unless: (i) a Permit to Field Test has been
secured from the BPI; and (ii) the regulated article has been
tested under contained conditions in the Philippines. x x x
It is important, however, to emphasize that despite the issuance

of DA AO No. 8, S. 2002, the NBF, and the NCBP
Guidelines, other statutory requirements or those required
by agencies remain in full force and effect.31 This is bolstered
by the fact that EO 514, as mentioned by the ponencia, requires
the determination by the concerned departments or agencies of
whether the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
System should be applied to biosafety decisions.32 EO 514 also
requires the DENR, as a
_______________
31 The NCBP reviews proposals on modern biotechnology applications for the benefit of the final
approving bodies (agencies which have regulatory functions on specific areas such as the Department of
Agriculture’s Bureau of Plant Industry or the Department of Health or the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources which are official members of the NCBP). The NCBP’s actions of “approval” or
“disapproval” of biotechnology applications is restricted to “research and development, technical aspects
(whether or not, on the basis of existing science, safety risk are considered acceptable); scientific advice
(i.e., it is directed to pertinent line agencies to provide them a basis for acting on proposed applications);
its action (‘approved’ or ‘disapproved’) is not a final permission to do the application; its action does not
preclude any other requirements of laws or by line agencies; final permission is to be granted by
appropriate line agencies.” [Supra note 18]
32 Role of Environment Impact Assessment. The application of the EIA System to biosafety decisions
shall be determined by concerned departments and agencies subject to the requirements of law
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 629
member of the NCBP, to ensure that environmental assessments
are done and impacts identified in biosafety decisions.33
The Present Controversy
The Bt Talong is a type of eggplant bio-engineered to develop

resistance to lepidopteran larvae, through the incorporation of
crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) which triggers the production of the
protein Cry1Ac which is toxic to the said target insect pests.
Under the regulatory supervision of the NCBP, a contained
experiment was started in 2007 and officially completed on March
3, 2009. The NCBP, thus, issued a Certificate of Completion of
Contained Experiment stating that “During the conduct of the
experiment, all the biosafety measures have been complied with
and no untoward incident has occurred.”
After securing the necessary permits, the UPLB commenced the
field testing of Bt Talong on various dates, in the following
approved sites: Kabacan, North Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan;
Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.
Reacting to the conduct of the field testing, the Sangguniang
Barangay of Pangasugan, Baybay, Leyte complained about the
lack of information on the nature and uncertainties of the field
testing in their barangay. Too, the Davao City Government, in
opposition thereto due to lack of transparency and public
consultation, ordered the uprooting and disposal of
the Bt eggplants. Similarly, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta.
Barbara, Iloilo passed a resolution suspending the field testing due
to the following: lack of public consultation, absence of adequate
study to determine the effect of Bt talong field test-
_______________
and the standards set by the NCBP. Where applicable and under the coordination of the NCBP,
concerned departments and agencies shall issue joint guidelines on the matter. [Item 5.3, Section 5, EO
514].
630
ing on friendly insects, absence of risk assessment on the
potential impacts of GM crops on human health and the
environment, and the possibility of cross-pollination
of Bt eggplants with native species or variety of eggplants, and
serious threat to human health if these were introduced in the
market.
On April 26, 2012, respondents filed a petition for writ
of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO).
They allege that the Bt Talong field trials violate their
constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology considering
that:
1. The required environmental compliance certificate under
Presidential Decree No. 1151 was not secured prior to the project
implementation;
2. As a regulated article under DAO 8-2002, Bt Talong is
presumed harmful to human health and the environment, and
there is no independent, peer-reviewed study on its safety for
human consumption and on the environment;
3. A study conducted by Professor Gilles-Eric Seralini showed
adverse effects on rats who were fed Bt corn, while local scientists
also attested to the harmful effects of GMOs to human and animal
health;
4. Bt crops can be directly toxic to nontarget species as
highlighted by a research conducted in the US which demonstrated
that pollen from Bt Maize was toxic to the Monarch butterfly;
5. Data from the use of Bt Cry1Ab maize indicate that beneficial
insects have increased mortality when fed on larvae of a maize
pest, the corn borer, which had been fed on Bt, and hence
nontarget beneficial species that may feed on eggplant could be
similarly affected;
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 631
6. Data from China show that the use of Bt crops (Bt cotton) can
exacerbate populations of other secondary pests;
7. The built-in pesticides of Bt crops will lead to Bt-resistant
pests, thus increasing the use of pesticides, contrary to the claims
by GMO manufacturers;
8. The 200-meter perimeter pollen trap area in the field testing
set by BPI is not sufficient to stop contamination of nearby non-
Bt eggplants because pollinators such as honeybees can fly as far
as four (4) kilometers and an eggplant is 48% insect-pollinated; and
9. The field test project did not comply with the required public
consultation under Sections 26 & 27 of the Local Government
Code.
The full acceptance by the project proponents of the findings in

the MAHYCO Dossier was strongly assailed on the ground that
these do not precisely and adequately assess the numerous hazards
posed by Bt Talong and its field trial.
On these premises, the following reliefs were prayed for:
1. Upon the filing of the petition, a Temporary Environmental

Protection Order should be issued:
a. Enjoining Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) and Fertilizer
and Pesticide Authority (FPA) of the DA from processing for
field testing, and registering as herbicidal product Bt
talong in the Philippines;
b. Stopping all pending field testing of Bt talong anywhere
in the Philippines; and
c. Ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong for field
trials as their very presence poses significant and irreparable
risks to human health and the environment;
632
2. Upon the filing of the petition, issue a writ of
continuing mandamus commanding:
a. Respondents to submit to and undergo the process of
environmental impact statement system under the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB);
b. Respondents to submit independent, comprehensive, and
rigid risk assessment, field test report, regulatory compliance
reports and supporting documents, and other material
particulars of the Bt talong field trial;
c. Respondents to submit all its issued certifications on
public information, public consultation, public participation,
and consent of the local government units in the barangays,
municipalities, and provinces affected by the field testing
of Bt talong;
d. Respondent regulator, in coordination with relevant
government agencies and in consultation with stakeholders,
to submit an acceptable draft of an amendment of the
National Biosafety Framework of the Philippines, and DA
Administrative Order No. 08, defining or incorporating an
independent, transparent, and comprehensive scientific and
socio-economic risk assessment, public information,
consultation, and participation, and providing for their
effective implementation, in accord with international safety
standards; and
e. Respondent BPI of the DA, in coordination with relevant
government agencies, to conduct balanced nationwide public
information of the nature of Bt talong and Bt talong field
trial, and a survey of social acceptability of the same.
633
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 633
3. Upon filing of the petition, issue a writ
of kalikasan commanding respondents to file their respective
returns and explain why they should not be judicially sanctioned
for violating or threatening to violate or allowing the violation of
the above enumerated laws, principles, and international
principles and standards, or committing acts, which would result
into an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health, or property of petitioners in particular and of the
Filipino people in general;
4. After hearing and judicial determination, to cancel all Bt
talong field experiments that are found to be violating the above
mentioned laws, principles, and international standards; and
recommend to Congress curative legislations to effectuate such
order.
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued a writ of kalikasanagainst

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), EMB/BPI/FPA and UPLB, ordering
them to make a verified return within a non-extendible period of
ten (10) days, as provided in Sec. 8, Rule 7, of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases.
ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB Foundation, Inc., and UP
Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI) filed their respective verified
returns. They all argued that the issuance of writ of kalikasan is
not proper because in the implementation of the Bt talong project,
all environmental laws were complied with, including public
consultations in the affected communities, to ensure that the
people’s right to a balanced and healthful ecology was protected
and respected. They also asserted that the Bt talong project is not
covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)
Law and that Bt talong field trials will neither significantly affect
the quality of the environment nor pose a hazard to human health.
ISAAA contended that the NBF amply safeguards the environment
policies and goals promoted by the PEIS Law. For its part,
634
UPLBFI asserted that there is a “plethora of scientific works and
literature, peer-reviewed, on the safety of Bt talong for human
consumption.”
ISAAA argued that the allegations regarding the safety of Bt
talong as food are irrelevant in the field trial stage as none of the
eggplant will be consumed by humans or animals, and all
materials that will not be used for analyses will be chopped, boiled,
and buried following the Biosafety Permit requirements. Too, it
cited a 50-year history of safe use and consumption of agricultural
products sprayed with commercial Bt microbial pesticides and a
14-year history of safe consumption of food and feed derived
from Bt crops.
UPMFI contends that the Bt talong planted in Davao City have
already been uprooted by the City officials. And there having been
no further field trials conducted thereat, there is no violation of the
constitutional rights of persons or damage to the environment with
respect to Davao City that will justify the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan.
Finally, it is argued that the precautionary principle is not
applicable considering that the field testing is only a part of a
continuing study being done to ensure that the field trials have no
significant impact on the environment. There is, thus, no resulting
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
On July 10, 2012, the Court referred the case to the CA for
acceptance of the return of the writ and for hearing, reception of
evidence, and rendition of judgment. The following issues were
submitted for the CA’s resolution:
1. Whether or not Greenpeace, et al. have the legal
standing to file the petition for writ of kalikasan;
2. Whether or not the case presented a justiciable
controversy; and
635
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 635
3. Whether or not said petition had been rendered moot
and academic by the alleged termination of the Bt talong field
testing.
Under its Resolution dated October 12, 2012, the CA resolved

that: (1) Greenpeace, et al. possess the requisite legal standing to
file the petition; (2) assuming arguendo that the field trials have
already been terminated, the case is not yet moot since it is capable
of repetition yet evading review; and (3) the alleged noncompliance
with environmental and local government laws present justiciable
controversies for resolution by the court.
After trial on the merits, the CA, on May 17, 2013, rendered a
Decision in favor of Greenpeace, et al., thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,

Judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition
filed in this case. The respondents are DIRECTED to:
Permanently cease and desist from further conducting
(a) bt talong field trials; and
Protect, preserve, rehabilitate and restore the environment
in accordance with the foregoing judgment of this Court. (b)
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The CA found that existing regulations issued by the DA and

the DOST are insufficient to guarantee the safety of the
environment and the health of the people. It likewise applied the
precautionary principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases, stressing the fact that the
“over-all safety guarantee of the bt talong” and whether it poses a
threat to human health remain unknown. In view of said
uncertainty, the CA upheld the primacy of the people’s
constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology.
636
Then, in its September 20, 2013 Resolution, the CA rejected
UPLB’s argument that its ruling violated the latter’s constitutional
right to academic freedom. The CA held that the writ issued by the
Court did not stop the research on Bt talong but only the particular
procedure adopted in the conduct of the field trials and only at this
time when there is yet no law in the form of a congressional
enactment for ensuring its safety and levels of acceptable risks
when introduced into the environment.
The CA, in justifying its ruling, relied on the theory that the
introduction of a genetically modified plant into our ecosystem is
an “ecologically imbalancing act.” The CA noted that the Bt
talong is a technology involving a deliberate alteration of an
otherwise natural state of affairs, designed to alter the natural
feed-feeder relationships of the eggplant.
From the foregoing, the following issues were presented for this
Court’s resolution:
1. Legal standing of respondents;
2. Mootness;
3. Violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Application of the law on environmental impact
statement/assessment on projects involving the introduction and
propagation of GMOs in the country;
5. Evidence of damage or threat of damage to human health and
the environment in two or more provinces, as a result of the Bt
talong field trials;
6. Neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public
respondents in connection with the processing and evaluation of
the applications for Bt talong field testing; and
7. Application of the precautionary principle.
637
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 637
Anent the technical aspect of the case, it is clear from
the ponencia’s lengthy discussion that the safety or danger of
introduction of GMOs, in general, to the natural environment
through field testing has yet to be settled with scientific certainty,
if it could indeed be settled. Furthermore, the subject matter of the
instant petition — that is, field testing of a GMO — is truly of a
highly complex nature and this complexity is strongly
demonstrated by the fact that the matter remains to be hotly
debated in the scientific community. However, it is respectfully
submitted that the instant petition can be resolved, and the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology sufficiently protected, on a
purely legal ground.
Anent the invocation of the Precautionary Principle under A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC or the Court’s Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, it is submitted that such is not necessary in the instant
petition since, as mentioned, it could be sufficiently settled on
purely legal grounds and without a heavy, if not complete, reliance
on the scientific aspect of the case. As correctly mentioned by
the ponencia, it is an evidentiary rule that must be applied only as
a last resort. Thus, if an environmental case can be settled and the
people’s environmental rights sufficiently protected without
applying this principle, then the courts should refrain from doing
so.
Among the numerous issues presented for this Court’s
consideration are alleged neglect or unlawful omission committed
by the public respondents in connection with the processing and
evaluation of the applications for Bt talong field testing and the
applicability of the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement
System (PEISS) to GMO field trials. It is in these matters that, in
my opinion, the petitioner-agencies failed.
Petitioner-agencies maintain that the subject field trials are not
covered by the PEISS. It is submitted, however, that the PEISS
also covers GMO field trials on the following grounds:
First, as previously mentioned, EO 514 clearly requires the
DENR to ensure that environmental assessments are
638
done and impacts identified in biosafety decisions.34 This,
in itself, is a clear indication that GMO field trials fall within the
purview of our PEISS.
Under EO 514, “biosafety decisions” apply to the development,
adoption and implementation of all biosafety policies, measures
and guidelines and in making decisions concerning the
research, development, handling and use, transboundary
movement, release into the environment and management of
regulated articles.35
Thus, EO 514 calls for the conduct of environmental assessments
and impact identification –– which precisely is the purpose of the
PEISS –– whenever biosafety decisions are to be made with respect
to the research, development, handling and use, transboundary
movement, and release into the environment of regulated articles,
which are, to reiterate, GMOs. To my mind, “making [biosafety]
management of regulated articles” include determining the
coverage or noncoverage of a GMO field trial under the PEISS, as
well as the propriety of issuing an ECC or a CNC for a particular
project.
Second, the assessment of the direct and indirect impacts
of a project on the biophysical and human environment and
ensuring that these impacts are addressed by appropriate
environmental protection and enhancement measures is
the primary concern of the PEISS as declared in Article 1,
Section 1 (Basic Policy and Operating Principles) of the DENR AO
No. 30, S. 2003 (DAO 30, S. 2003) or the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) for the Philippine Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) System.
_______________
34 Id.
35 Item 3.3 [Definitions], Section 3 [Scope, Objectives and Definitions], EO 514.
639
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 639
Third, Section 4, paragraph 4.1, Article II of DAO 30, S. 2003,
provides that projects that pose potential significant impact to
the environment shall be required to secure an ECC.
Anent this possibility of negatively affecting the environs, it is
argued that the introduction of the Bt talong to the natural
environment in connection with the field trials will not adversely
affect the condition of the field trial sites, banking on the absence
of documented significant and negative impact of the planting of Bt
corn in the Philippines, among others. However, it is curious that
in blocking the application of the precautionary principle,
petitioners contradict this prior assertion when they maintained
that field testing is only a part of a continuing study being
done to ensure that the field trials have no significant and
negative impact on the environment. This, to my mind, only
goes to show that it is erroneous for them to maintain that the field
trials in question will not adversely affect the environment when
they themselves admit that such is not yet a scientific certainty,
hence the conduct of further research on the matter. And without
this certainty that the project will leave no footprint on the natural
environment, as well as a certification to that effect, it should be
presumed that the field trial poses a potential significant impact to
the environment for which an ECC is required.
Fourth, the Revised Procedural Manual for DENR AO No. 30, S.
2003 (Revised Manual) enumerates the projects that are covered
by the PEISS. Said enumeration, as the ponencia pointed out,
includes Group V (Unclassified Projects) which pertains to those
projects using new processes/technologies with uncertain impacts.36
_______________
36 See List of Covered Projects of the Philippine EIS System, item (g), Revised
Procedural Manual for DENR AO No. 30, S. 2003 [DAO 03-30].
640
Fifth, Item 8 of said Revised Manual, governing the EIA Report
Types and Generic Contents, requires a Project Description Report
(PDR) for Group V projects, to ensure new
processes/technologies or any new unlisted project does not
pose harm to the environment. The Group V PDR is a basis for
either issuance of a CNC or classification of the project into its
proper project group.
Lastly, there is no evidence that a Certificate of Non-
Coverage for the Bt talong field trials was issued by the
DENR, through its Environmental Management Bureau.
To my mind, the above grounds should have prompted the
DENR to require from the project proponents an EIA or at the very
least evaluated the project’s coverage or noncoverage as
precondition to the allowance of the field testing. In this
regard, the DENR –– as a member of the NCBP with the clear
mandate of making certain that environmental assessments
are done in the conduct of GMO research, and as the agency
tasked to enforce the PEISS –– may have been remiss in its
duty.
It may be that there is a confusion as to the requirements before
field testing a GMO may be allowed considering that the regulation
that governs applications therefor, that is, DA AO No. 8, S. 2002,
makes no mention of the necessity of an EIA or the applicability of
the PEISS. Additionally, per the NCBP’s Report,37 it was pointed
out that the applicability of the PEISS to field trials was a hotly
discussed issue. While securing an ECC or a CNC was the
perceived requirement for EIA in biosafety valuations, there were
those who argued that the EIA can take many years to conduct and
cost millions of pesos and could, therefore, delay field tests and
discourage proponents. It was likewise maintained that under the
present practice of the NCBP, the confinement afforded by the
screenhouse and/or contained fields already provides a means
_______________
37 Supra note 18.
641
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 641
to prevent or minimize any adverse environmental impact and,
thus, an EIA may not be required.
Per said Report, however, it was also stated that an
environmental assessment may be required when a
confined field test involves new species, organisms or novel
modifications that raise new issues. Considering that data on
the Bt talong, as admitted by the proponents, is still being collected
through research and field trials, and that its effects not only on
the environment but also on human health are yet to be
determined with scientific certainty, caution calls that the DENR-
EMB should have applied the required standard of precaution
under EO 514, which requires that the precautionary approach
shall guide biosafety decisions in accordance with Principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration of 199238 and the relevant provisions of the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Articles 1,39 10 (par.
6)40 and 11 (par. 8)41thereof.42 In this respect, EO 514 requires
thusly:
_______________
38 Principle 15 — In order to protect the environment, the precautionary

approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
39 Article 1 [Objective] — In accordance with the precautionary approach
contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of
protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified
organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account
risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary movements.
40 Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information
and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living
modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in
the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not 6.
642
5. SECTIONDECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
Biosafety decisions shall be made in accordance with
existing laws and the following guidelines:
Standard of Precaution. In accordance with Article 10 (par.
6) and Article 11 (par. 8) of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, lack of scientific certainty or consensus due
to insufficient relevant scientific information and
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential
adverse effects of a genetically modified organism on
the environment, particularly on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, and on human
health, shall not prevent concerned government
departments and agencies from taking the appropriate
decision to avoid or minimize such potential adverse
effects. In such cases, concerned government
department and agencies shall take the necessary
action to protect public interest and welfare.
Thus, in case there was, indeed, doubt as to the applicability or

non-applicability of the PEISS to biotechnology research, the
DENR-EMB, in accordance with its mandate, should have
observed such standard of precaution and applied
_______________
prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living
modified organism in question as referred to in paragraph 3 above, in order to avoid or minimize such
potential adverse effects.
41 Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge
regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human
health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to 8. the import
of that living modified organism intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, in order to avoid
or minimize such potential adverse effects.
42 Item 2.6, EO 514.
643
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 643
the PEISS to field trials of GMOs by requiring from project
proponents the prior securing of an ECC or a CNC.
Additionally, it is but timely to clarify that DA AO No. 8, S. 2002
did not expressly state that projects falling under its coverage are
withdrawn from the operation of the PEISS. As a matter of fact,
the DENR-EMB itself recognizes that “the PEISS is
supplementary and complementary to other existing
environmental laws.”43 This is further bolstered by the PEISS’
role in relation to the functions of other government agencies. In
this regard, it was highlighted that it is inherent upon the EIA
Process to undertake a comprehensive and integrated approach in
the review and evaluation of environment-related concerns of
government agencies (GAs), local government units (LGUs) and
the general public. The subsequent EIA findings shall provide
guidance and recommendations to these entities as a basis for their
decision making process.44
As such, it must be that whenever a project falls within the
purview of the PEISS and DA AO No. 8, S. 2002, as well as other
relevant laws, as Philippine biosafety regulations now stand and as
required by the NBF, the project proponent is required to
comply with all applicable statutory or regulatory
requirements, not just DA AO No. 8, S. 2002.
With these, it is respectfully submitted that the omission by the
project proponents of securing an ECC or CNC, whichever is
proper for its project, prior to the conduct of the field testing, and
the DENR-EMB’s failure to evaluate GMO field trials within the
purview of the PEISS and simply allowing the trials to be
conducted without a prior determination of whether the conduct of
an EIA or the prior securing of an ECC is a condition sine qua
non for its conduct, warrant the
_______________
43 Overview of the Philippine EIS System (PEISS), Revised Procedural Manual

for DENR AO No. 30, S. 2003, p. 3 [DAO 03-30].
44 Id.
644
issuance of a permanent environmental protection order
directing:
a. herein project proponents to cease and desist from
continuing any pending Bt talong field trials without first
complying with other applicable environmental laws,
including the PEISS; and
b. the DENR-EMB to apply the PEISS to GMO field trials.
On these premises, I vote to DENY the petition on the grounds

that the project proponents failed to comply with the requirements
under the PEISS and that the DENR-EMB failed to require from
the project proponents the securing of an ECC or a CNC prior to
the field testing of the Bt talong.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN,J.:
I concur in the result of the majority’s opinion.

The Petition for Writ of Kalikasan of Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), et al. (now respondents), insofar as it assails the field
testing permit granted to private petitioners, should have been
dismissed and considered moot and academic by the Court of
Appeals. The Petition for Writ of Kalikasan was filed only a few
months before the two-year permit expired and when the field
testing activities were already over. Thus, the pending Petitions
which assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals should be granted
principally on this ground. There was grave abuse of discretion
which amounts to excess of jurisdiction.
This does not necessarily mean that petitioners in G.R. No.
209271 can proceed to commercially propagate Bt talong. Under
Department of Agriculture Administrative Order No. 8, Series of
2002, the proponent should submit a new set of requirements that
will undergo a stringent process of evalua-
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 645
tion by the Bureau of Plant Industry and other agencies.
Completion of field testing by itself does not guarantee commercial
propagation.
To recall, the introduction of genetically modified products,
ingredients, and processes requires three (3) mandatory stages of
regulatory review. Propagation is not allowed until there is full
field testing. Field testing is not allowed unless there are
laboratory experiments under contained conditions.
Application for each stage has its own set of unique
requirements. The standards of review have their own level of
rigor. All the applications for each stage should be published.
Public participation in each stage must not only be allowed but
should be meaningful.
Furthermore, commercial propagation will not happen
immediately with Bt talong because Administrative Order No. 8 is
null and void. In its salient parts, it is inconsistent with the basic
guidelines provided in our Constitution, violative of our binding
international obligations contained in the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biodiversity (Cartagena Protocol),
and effectively disregards the Executive Orders issued by the
President in the fields of biodiversity and biosafety.
The effect of the invalidity of Administrative Order No. 8 is that
petitioners cannot proceed further with any field testing or
propagation for lack of administrative guidelines. Any test or
propagation of transgenic crops should await valid regulations
from the executive or restatements of policy by Congress.
Furthermore, the Petitions in this case should be granted
because the Court of Appeals, in adopting the “hot tub” method to
arrive at its factual findings, gravely abused its discretion. The
transcript of the proceedings presided by the Court of Appeals
Division shows how this method obfuscated further an already
complicated legal issue. Courts of law have a precise and rigorous
method to ferret out the facts of a case,
646
a method which is governed by our published rules of evidence.
By disregarding these rules, the Court of Appeals acted
whimsically, capriciously, and arbitrarily.
This is an important case on a novel issue that affects our food
security, which touches on the controversial political, economic,
and scientific issues of the introduction of genetically modified
organisms into the consumer mainstream. This court speaks
unanimously in narrowing down the issues and exercising
restraint and deference. This court must allow the competencies of
the administrative regulatory bodies and Congress to fully and
meaningfully evolve.
I
The cessation of the validity of all the biosafety permits issued to
the University of the Philippines Los Baños in June 2012 and the
termination of all field trials as of August 10, 2012 render the
Petition for Writ of Kalikasanmoot and academic.1 The Petition for
Writ of Kalikasanwas originally filed before us on April 26, 2012.2
A brief overview of the regulatory process outlined in
Administrative Order No. 8 will assist us in providing a framework
to put the Petition in context.
Administrative Order No. 8 recognizes three (3) stages before
genetically modified organisms — as products, ingredients, or
processes — may become commercially available.
The first stage is the Contained Use where research on
regulated articles is limited inside a physical containment facility
for purposes of laboratory experimentation.3
_______________
1 Ponencia, p. 506.
2 Id., at p. 461.
3 DA Adm. Order No. 8 (2002), Sec. 1(E):
“Contained Use” means the use of a regulated article for research and development inside a physical
containment facility intended to limit its contact with, and to provide for a high level of E.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 647
The second stage is Field Testing where regulated articles are
intentionally introduced into the environment in a highly
regulated manner also for experimental purposes. It is specifically
recognized that in field testing, no specific physical containment
measures shall be undertaken “to limit that contact of the
regulated article with . . . the general population and the
environment.”4Prior to field testing, the results of the contained
experiments are taken into consideration.
Finally, the Propagation stage is where regulated articles are
introduced into commerce.
Each stage is distinct. Subsequent stages can only proceed if the
prior stage/s are completed and clearance is given to engage in the
next regulatory stage. This is evident from the requisites for
conducting each stage.
For contained use, the importation or the removal from point of
entry of the material requires (i) authorization given by the Bureau
of Plant Industry; and (ii) a letter of endorsement issued by the
National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines.5 The National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines, on the other hand,
proceeds with its own processes for evaluation of the application
for contained use.
Field testing requires that “(i) a Permit to Field Test has been
secured from the [Bureau of Plant Industry]; and (ii) the
_______________
safety for, the general population and the environment and which has been inspected and approved by
NCBP.
4 Id., Sec. 1(I):
“Field testing” means any intentional introduction into the environment of a regulated article for
purposes of research and development and for which no specific physical containment measures are used
to limit the contact of the regulated article with, and to provide for a high level of safety for, the general
population and the environment. Field testing may be conducted in a single site or in multiple sites. I.
5 Id., Sec. 6.
648
regulated article has been tested under contained

conditions in the Philippines.”6
Release for commercial propagation will not be allowed unless
“(i) a Permit for Propagation has been secured from [the Bureau of
Plant Industry]; (ii) it can be shown that based on field
testing conducted in the Philippines, the regulated article
will not pose any significant risks to the environment; (iii)
food and/or feed safety studies show that the regulated article will
not pose any significant risks to human and animal health; and (iv)
if the regulated article is a pest-protected plant, its transformation
event has been duly registered with the [Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority].”7
Clearly, mere completion of a preceding stage is no guarantee
that the subsequent stage shall ensue. While each subsequent
stage proceeds from the prior ones, each stage is subject to its
unique set of requisites.
It is, thus, improper to rely on the expectation that commercial
propagation of Bt talong shall ensue after field testing. For the
process to proceed to commercial propagation, the concerned
applicants are still required to formally seek the permission of the
Bureau of Plant Industry by filing an application form. There is no
presumption that the Bureau of Plant Industry will favorably rule
on any application for commercial propagation. It is also not a valid
presumption that the results of field testing are always favorable
to the proponent for field testing let alone for those who will
continue on to propagation.
The alleged actual controversy in the Petition for Writ
of Kalikasan arose out of the proposal to do field trials. The reliefs
in these remedies did not extend far enough to enjoin the use of the
results of the field trials that have been completed. Essentially,
the findings should be the material
_______________
6 Id., Sec. 7.
7 Id., Sec. 9.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 649
to provide more rigorous scientific analysis of the various
claims made in relation to Bt talong.
The original Petition was anchored on the broad proposition that
respondents’ right to a healthful and balanced ecology was violated
on the basis of the grant of the permit. With the cessation of the
validity of the biosafety permits and the actual termination of all
field trials, the very subject of the controversy adverted to by
respondents became moot. Similarly because of the Petition’s
specificity, the case could not be considered capable of repetition
yet evading review and, thus, an exception to the rule on mootness.
II
Nevertheless, for the guidance of the bench and bar, the validity
of the biosafety permits is discussed. The biosafety permits should
have been declared null and void due to the invalidity of
Administrative Order No. 8.
Administrative Order No. 8 was created to facilitate agricultural
development and enhance the production of agricultural crops
through modern biotechnology.8 As early as October 15, 1990,
President Corazon Aquino recognized the importance of modern
biotechnology and issued Executive Order No. 4309 to create the
National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines. The National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines acts as the body that
studies and evaluates the laws, policies, and guidelines relating to
biotechnology.
The role of the National Committee on Biosafety of the
Philippines was further strengthened in 2006 under Executive
Order No. 514, which established the National Biosafety
Framework for the Philippines. The Framework applies “to
_______________
8 Id., first Whereas clause.

9 Exec. Order No. 430 (1990), otherwise known as Constituting the National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) and for Other Purposes.
650
the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety
policies, measures and guidelines and in making biosafety
management of regulated articles.”10
Currently, there is no legislation in relation to biotechnology or
biosafety. The closest legislation is under Republic Act No. 8435,
otherwise known as the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization
Act of 1997. This law makes it an objective of the state “[t]o
modernize the agriculture and fisheries sectors by transforming
these sectors from a resource-based to a technology-based
industry.”11 In line with this, Congress initially allocated 4% of the
10% research and development fund for agriculture to be used to
support the biotechnology program.12
A more recent law, Republic Act No. 10068, otherwise known as
the Organic Agriculture Act of 2010, also promotes the use of
biotechnology but specifically excludes genetically modified
organisms.13 The law does not provide regulatory standards for
genetically modified organisms.
_______________
10 Exec. Order No. 514, Sec. 2.1.
11 Rep. Act No. 8435, Sec. 3(a).
12 Id., Sec. 111(5).
13 Rep. Act No. 10068, Sec. 3(b).Organic agriculture includes all agricultural systems that promote
the ecologically sound, socially acceptable, economically viable and technically feasible production of food
and fibers. Organic agriculture dramatically reduces external inputs by refraining from the use of
chemical fertilizers, pesticides and pharmaceuticals. It also covers areas such as, but not limited to, soil
fertility management, varietal breeding and selection under chemical and pesticide-free conditions, the
use of biotechnology and other cultural practices that are consistent with the principles and policies of this
Act, and enhance productivity without destroying the soil and harming farmers consumers and the
environment as defined by the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movement
(IFOAM); Provided, That the biotechnology herein referred to
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 651
Aside from the enactment of domestic executive orders and laws,
Administrative Order No. 8 was enacted to comply with the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biodiversity.
The Convention on Biodiversity came into force on December 29,
1993, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety supplemented the
Convention on Biodiversity by providing policy standards for
biosafety in the use of living modified organisms.14
On April 3, 2002, then Department of Agriculture Secretary
Leonardo Q. Montemayor issued Administrative Order No. 8,
otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations for the Importation
and Release into the Environment of Plants and Plant Products
Derived from the Use of Modern Biotechnology. Administrative
Order No. 8, Series of 2002, is a regulatory mechanism issued
pursuant to the state’s police power. It is designed to minimize and
manage15 the risks both to human health and to the environment of
genetically modified organisms or plant products altered or
generated through “modern biotechnology.”16 These genetically
modified organisms or plant products are, in turn, results of
human ingenuity and legally recognized patentable inventions to
which their creators hold proprietary rights.
III
Two constitutional provisions bear upon the issues relied upon

by private respondents in this case. Both are found in Article
II, viz.:
_______________
shall not include genetically modified organisms or GMOs.(Emphasis supplied)

14 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
<https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf> (visited December 1, 2015).
15 DA Adm. Order No. 8 (2002), sixth Whereas clause.
16 Defined in DA Adm. Order No. 8 (2002), Sec. 1(N).
652
The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them. 15.
Section
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature. 16. Section
Traditionally, these provisions articulate the doctrine that

health and ecological concerns are proper purposes of regulation
and, therefore, can be the basis of the state’s exercise of police
power.17 Having constitutionally ordained goals and principles
are, per se, compelling state interests.18
Thus, restricting the rights to property and liberties does not
deny their holders their “due process of law” provided there is a
discernable rational relationship between the regulatory measure
and these legitimate purposes. We have, prior to the 1987
Constitution, adopted a fairly consistent deferential standard of
judicial review considering that the Congress has more leeway in
examining various submissions of a wider range of experts and has
the power to create the forums for democratic deliberation on
various approaches.
In recent times, we have included a higher degree of review of
regulatory measures by requiring that there shall be a
_______________
17 See Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

110120, March 16, 1994, 231 SCRA 292, 307-308 [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
18 See for example Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Election, G.R. No.
205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1, 97-98 [Per J. Leonen, En
Banc], citing Const., Art. II, Secs. 12 and 13; Soriano v. Laguardia, 605 Phil. 43,
106; 587 SCRA 79, 110 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc]. In Diocese of Bacolod,
we stated:
“Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally
declared principles. We have held, for example, that ‘the welfare of children
and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae,
constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating . .
. utterances in TV broadcast.’”
653
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 653
judicially discernable demonstration that the measure is least
restrictive of fundamental rights.
Thus, in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.,19this court
recognized “three levels of scrutiny”:
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court

reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a
law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally
related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-
tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must
show that the challenged classification serves an important
state interest and that the classification is at least
substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict
judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon
the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.
Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is
triggered by suspect classifications based on race or gender
but not when the classification is drawn along income
categories.20 (Citations omitted)
This exacting level of scrutiny has been considered in several

instances in recent jurisprudence. In Estrada v. Escritor,21 this
court required the state, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, to show that the means adopted to pursue the state’s
interest of preserving the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining
a high standard of morality and decency among its personnel was
the least restrictive means vis-à-vis
_______________
19 601 Phil. 245; 582 SCRA 255 (2009) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
20 Id., at pp. 282-283; pp. 277-278.
21 529 Phil. 110; 492 SCRA 1 (2006) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
654
respondent’s religious freedom. More recently, our Decisions
in Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections22 and Social
Weather Stations v. Commission on Elections23 considered the
propriety of measures adopted to regulate speech in the context of
political exercises.
The requirement of adopting the least restrictive means requires
that respondent agencies show that there were alternatives
considered within the democratic and deliberative forums
mandated by law and that clear standards were considered within
transparent processes. It is not for this court to consider the
validity of the standards chosen. We must, however, be convinced
that there is such a standard, that it was assiduously applied, and
the application was consistent.
IV
Sections 15 and 16 of Article II are, thus, not simply hortatory

rights. They are as much a part of the fundamental law as any
other provision in the Constitution. They add to the protection of
the right to life in Article III, Section 1.
To recall, this important provision states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law. 1. Section
This norm is phrased as a traditional limitation on the powers of

the state. That is, that the state’s inherent police powers cannot be
exercised arbitrarily but must be shown to have been reasonable
and fair.24
_______________
22 Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra note 18.

23 G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA 124 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
24 See City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308 [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc]; White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444; 576 SCRA 416 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
655
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 655
The right to life is textually broad to signal the intention that
the sphere of autonomy is assumed to encompass life both in terms
of its physical integrity and in terms of its quality.25
Sections 15 and 16, however, impose on the state a positive duty
to “promote and protect” the right to health and to “promote and
advance” the right of “the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.” With respect to health and ecology, therefore, the state is
constitutionally mandated to provide affirmative protection. The
mandate is in the nature of an active duty rather than a passive
prohibition.
These provisions represent, in no small measure, a shift in the
concept of governance in relation to society’s health. It is a
recognition that if private actors and entities are left to
themselves, they will pursue motivations which may not be too
advantageous to nutrition or able to reduce the risks of traditional
and modern diseases. At best, the actors may not be aware of their
incremental contributions to increasing risks. At worse, there may
be conscious efforts not to examine health consequences of products
and processes introduced in the market. It is expedient for most to
consider such costs as extraneous and affecting their final profit
margins.
_______________
25 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos.

204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478, 205491, 205720,
206355, 207111, 207172, and 207563, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146, 731-847
[Per J. Mendoza, En Banc] discussing that:
“The constitutional right to life has many dimensions. Apart from the protection
against harm to one’s corporeal existence, it can also mean the ‘right to be left
alone.’ The right to life also congeals the autonomy of an individual to provide
meaning to his or her life. In a sense, it allows him or her sufficient space to
determine quality of life. A law that mandates informed choice and proper access for
reproductive health technologies should not be presumed to be a threat to the right
to life. It is an affirmative guarantee to assure the protection of human rights.”
656
In short, the constitutional provisions embed the idea that there
is no invisible hand26 that guides participants in the economic
market to move toward optimal social welfare in its broadest
developmental sense.
Producers, by their very nature, participate in the market
motivated by their objective to recover costs and maximize their
profits. Costs for them usually refer to their pecuniary
expenditures. Costs suffered incidentally by the ecology of the
locations of their factories or by the health of their consumers are
not costs which producers readily and naturally internalize.27 In an
unregulated market, they do not spend their capital to mitigate or
remedy these types of damages.28 In many instances, there is the
tendency even to avoid incurring expenses to find out whether
these types of damages actually occur. Environmental damage and
health risks are, thus, externalities which are usually invisible to
them. Externalities are costs which remain unrecognized in the
private transaction between the producers and their consumers.
Of course, producers will respond to both the quantity and
quality of demand in a market. In an unregulated market,
collective consumer preferences will define the types of products
that producers will sell. In turn, this will provide the strongest
incentive for producers to specialize their products in an efficient
and economical manner.
Consumers, however, are also shaped by the incentives in the
market. The nature of the benefits which defines incentives is
likewise framed by the pervading culture.
Health and consciousness may evolve among consumers. There
are, for instance, those who will definitely purchase organic,
nontransgenic, and unadulterated food products as a matter of
personal choice. There will also be those who, like
_______________
26 See Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations (1776).

27 Stiglitz, Joseph E., Economics of the Public Sector, p. 215 (2000).
28 Id., at p. 223.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 657
many of the private respondents in this case, evolve movements
to convince the consumers to shift their tastes and their
preferences.
Choices of consumers also depend on the consciousness that the
present culture sponsors:
Consciousness can be defined as “the way people conceive of

the ‘natural’ and normal way of doing things, their habitual
patterns of talk and action, and their common sense
understanding of the world.”29
Legal consciousness, on the other hand, is simply “all the ideas

about the nature, function and operation of law held by anyone in
society at a given time.”30 This means that the culture and
framework of defining incentives and making choices among our
consumers also depend on the content of the law and its
interpretation in administrative regulatory issuances and judicial
decisions.
The imperative for the state’s more active participation in
matters that relate to health and ecology is more salient given
these perspectives and the pervasive impact of food on our
population.
At its bare minimum, Sections 15 and 16 imply that the
standard to be used by the state in the discharge of its regulatory
oversight should be clear. This is where Administrative
_______________
29 Engel, David M., How Does Law Matter in the Constitution of Legal Consciousness? in How Does
Law Matter, p. 112 (1998), citing Merry, Sally Engle, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal
Consciousness Among Working Class Americans, p. 5 (1990).
30 Id., citing Trubek, David, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 Stan. L.
Rev. 575, 592. He, however, refers to Sarat who “hastens to explain that he rejects the approach of ‘radical
individualization,’ that he studies consciousness rather than attitudes because the latter inappropriately
presents ‘a picture of persons influenced by a variety of factors, thinking, choosing, deciding autonomously
how and what to think.’”
658
Order No. 8 fails. While providing for processes, it does not refer
to any standard of evaluating the applications to be presented
before the Department of Agriculture or, in field testing, the
Scientific Review Technical Panel. There are many of such
standards available based on best practices. For instance, the
regulators may be required to evaluate applications so that there is
a scientific demonstration of a “reasonable certainty of no
harm”31 to both health and environment in all aspects in the
creation, testing, and propagation of genetically modified
ingredients, processes, or products.
Without these standards, Sections 15 and 16 become
meaningless. Hence, in this regard, Administrative Order No. 8 is
null and void.
In addition to constitutional provisions under Article II, the

Philippines also sources its environmental obligations from
conventions and subsequent protocols. On May 24, 2000, the
Philippines became one of the signatories to the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biodiversity.32 By
September 11, 2003, the Cartagena Protocol entered into force in
the Philippines.33
_______________
31 The United States’ Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act initially coined the
standard “reasonable certainty of no harm” with respect to food safety
evaluations. See Freedman, Daryl M., Reasonable Certainty of No Harm: Reviving
the Safety Standard for Food Additives, Color Additives, and Animal Drugs, p. 7
Ecology L.Q. (1978). <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/elq/vol7/iss2/2> (last
visited: December 1, 2015). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations reiterated this standard in their GMO Food Safety Assessment: Tool For
Trainers, p. 8. <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i0110e.pdf> (last visited: December 1, 2015).
32 Parties to the Protocol and signature and ratification of the Supplementary
Protocol <https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/> (visited December 1, 2015).
33 Preambular clause in Exec. Order No. 514 (2006).
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 659
The Cartagena Protocol’s objective is to ensure “an adequate
level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use
of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology.
. . .”34 Article 23 of the Cartagena Protocol35 stresses that the public
must be consulted in the decision-making process regarding living
modified organisms, and that the decisions made with this regard
must be communicated to the public.36
The Cartagena Protocol emphasizes that risk assessment should
be carried out in a scientifically sound manner.37 In
_______________
34 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity

<https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf> (visited December 1,
2015).
35 23. Cartagena Protocol, Art.Public Awareness and Participation.—1. The
Parties shall: (a) Promote and facilitate public awareness, education and
participation concerning the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified
organisms in relation to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity,
taking also into account risks to human health. In doing so, the Parties shall
cooperate, as appropriate, with other States and international bodies; (b) Endeavour
to ensure that public awareness and education encompass access to information on
living modified organisms identified in accordance with this Protocol that may be
imported.
The Parties shall, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations,
consult the public in the decision-making process regarding living modified
organisms and shall make the results of such decisions available to the public, while
respecting confidential information in accordance with Article 21. 2.
Each Party shall endeavour to inform its public about the means of public access
to the Biosafety Clearing-House. 3.
36 Cartagena Protocol, Art. 23.2.
37Risk assessments undertaken pursuant to this Protocol shall be carried out in
a scientifically sound manner, in accordance with Annex III and taking into account
recognized risk assessment techniques. Such risk assessments shall be based, at a
minimum, on information provided in accordance with Article 8 and other available
scientific evidence in order to identify and evaluate the possible adverse effects of
living modified organ- Cartagena Protocol, Art. 15.1.
660
addition, Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol also provides that
risk assessment must also be done in a transparent manner.38
Subsequent executive actions reflect the obligations of the
Philippines under the Cartagena Protocol. Executive Order No.
514, which established the National Biosafety Framework, was
enacted “to comply with the administrative requirements of the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,” among other reasons. 39 Executive
Order No. 514 restructured the National Committee on Biosafety
of the Philippines, an interagency, multisectoral body in charge of
the National Biosafety Framework.40
isms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, taking also into account risks to human health.
The National Biosafety Framework has provisions on Access to
Information (Section 6)41 and Public Participation
_______________
38 Cartagena Protocol, Annex III(3).

39 Exec. Order No. 514, Whereas clause.
40 Id., Sec. 4.1.
41 Id 6. ., Sec.Access to Information.
The right of the public and the relevant stakeholders to information related to biosafety decisions is
recognized and shall always be respected in accordance with guidelines to be issued by the NCBP, which
shall include, among others, the following:
Information on Applications.—Concerned departments and agencies shall, subject to reasonable
limitations to protect confidential information as provided below, disclose all information on such
applications in a prompt and timely manner. Such departments and agencies may require applicants to
provide the information directly to concerned stakeholders. 6.1
Confidential Information.—In all applications for approvals, whether domestic or foreign, concerned
departments and agencies shall ensure that it has procedures and regulations to determine and protect
confidential information; 6.2 Provided, however, that the concerned agencies may refuse declaring the
confidentiality of such information if it is necessary to enable the concerned stakeholders to effectively
conduct a scientific risk assessment.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 661
(Section 7).42 The provisions envision a culture of constant
communication and feedback from the public regarding bio-
_______________
Information on Biosafety Decisions.—The public and stakeholders shall have

access to all biosafety decisions and the information on which they are based,
subject to limitations set in Section 6.2 of this Framework. Such decisions shall
summarize the application, the results of the risk assessment, and other relevant
assessments done, the public participation process followed, and the basis for
approval or denial of the application. 6.3
Information on Risk Management, Product Monitoring, and Product
Identification.—All relevant stakeholders shall have access to information related
to risk management and product monitoring. Information on product identification
shall be provided to the general public. 6.4
42 Id 7. ., Sec.Public Participation
The concerned government departments and agencies, in developing and
adopting biosafety policies, guidelines and measures and in making biosafety
decisions, shall promote, facilitate, and conduct public awareness, education,
meaningful, responsible, and accountable participation. They shall incorporate into
their respective administrative issuances and processes best practices and
mechanisms on public participation in accordance with the following guidelines:
Scope of Public Participation.—Public participation shall apply to all stages of
the biosafety decision-making process from the time the application is received. For
applications on biotechnology activities related to research and development,
limited primarily for contained use, notice of the filing of such application with the
NCBP shall be sufficient, unless the NCBP deems that public interest and welfare
requires otherwise. 7.1
Minimum Requirements of Public Participation.—In conducting public
participation processes, the following minimum requirements shall be followed:
7.2
Notice to all concerned stakeholders, in a language understood by them and
through media to which they have access. Such notice must be adequate, timely,
and effective and posted prominently in public places in the areas affected, and in
the case of commercial releases, in the national print media. In all cases, such
notices must be posted electronically in the internet; 7.2.1
662
safety decisions, risk assessment processes, product monitoring,
and product identification.
Adequate and reasonable time frames for public participation

procedures. Such procedures should allow relevant stakeholders to
understand and analyze the benefits and risks, consult with
independent experts, and make timely interventions. Concerned
departments and agencies shall include in their appropriate rules
and regulations specific time frames for their respective public
participation processes, including setting a minimum time frame
as may be appropriate; 7.2.2
Public consultations, as a way to secure wide input into the
decisions that are to be made. These could include formal hearings
in certain cases, or solicitation of public comments, particularly
where there is public controversy about the proposed activities.
Public consultations shall encourage exchanges of information
between applicants and the public before the application is acted
upon. Dialogue and consensus-building among all stakeholders
shall be encouraged. Concerned departments and agencies shall
specify in their appropriate rules and regulations the stages when
public consultations are appropriate, the specific time frames for
such consultations, and the circumstances when formal hearings
will be required, including guidelines to ensure orderly
proceedings. The networks of agricultural and fisheries councils,
indigenous peoples and community-based organizations in affected
areas shall be utilized; 7.2.3
Written submissions. Procedures for public participation shall
include mechanisms that allow public participation in writing or
through public hearings, as appropriate, and which allow the
submission of any positions, comments, information, analyses or
opinions. Concerned departments and agencies shall include in
their appropriate rules and regulations the stages when and the
process to be followed for submitting written comments; and 7.2.4
Consideration of public concerns in the decision-making phase
following consultation and submission of written comments. Public
concerns as reflected through the procedures for public
participation shall be considered in making the decision. The
public shall be informed of the final decision promptly, have access
to the decision, and shall be provided with the reasons and
considerations resulting in the decision, upon request. 7.2.5
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Executive Order No. 514, while not a statute, provides binding
policies and rules for the executive agencies of government in their
task of implementing its legal obligations under the Cartagena
Protocol. Hence, all actions of agencies involved in the execution of
biosafety in the Philippines must follow the Cartagena Protocol,
the National Biosafety Framework, and our Constitution.
Like the National Biosafety Framework established by Executive
Order No. 514, Administrative Order No. 8 cites the Cartagena
Protocol as a source of obligation of the state to regulate transgenic
plants.43
Administrative Order No. 8 fails to meet certain standards
required under the Cartagena Protocol.
This Order requires an applicant for field testing of a regulated
article to create an Institutional Biosafety Committee. It is the
applicant who chooses the members of the Institutional Biosafety
Committee.
The composition of the Institutional Biosafety Committee
includes three scientist members and two community
representatives who “shall not be affiliated with the applicant
apart from being members of its [Institutional Biosafety
Committee] and shall be in a position to represent the interests of
the communities where the field testing is to be conducted.”44 As an
apparent assurance for the lack of bias of these community
representatives, the National Committee on Biosafety of the
Philippines must approve the composition of the Institutional
Biosafety Committee.45
The manner of choosing the composition of the Institutional
Biosafety Committee is problematic. It reduces meaningful
compliance in our commitments enunciated in the Cartagena
Protocol into mere artifice. It defies the guidelines set by the
National Biosafety Framework.
_______________
43 DA Adm. Order No. 8 (2002), Whereas clause.

44 Id., Sec. 1(L).
45 Id.
664
Both the Cartagena Protocol and National Biosafety Framework
require participation from community members. However, in
Administrative Order No. 8, the applicant has the initial choice as
to the community representatives who will participate as members
of the Institutional Biosafety Committee. The approval by the
National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines is not a
sufficient mechanism to check this discretion. This interagency
committee can only approve or disapprove community
representatives that were already selected by the applicant. The
applicant does not have any incentive to choose the critical
community representatives. The tendency would be to choose those
whose dissenting voices are tolerable. Worse, the National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines, apart from not being a
sufficient oversight for people’s participation, is a government
body. A government body is not the community that should
supposedly be represented in the Institutional Biosafety
Committee.
In addition, there are other problems with public participation in
Administrative Order No. 8. For field testing under Administrative
Order No. 8, the only opportunity for public participation is under
Sections 8(G) and 8(H). Under Section 8(G), the public consultation
on an application is prompted by the posting of the Public
Information Sheet on Field Testing, which shall be posted in three
conspicuous places in the barangay/city/municipality for three
consecutive weeks. The interested party is given thirty (30) days
within which to file a written comment on the application.
The posting of the Public Information Sheet in three conspicuous
places near the field testing site is not enough to raise awareness
regarding the field testing being applied for. The subject matter in
transgenic transformation is too complex and its consequences too
pervasive as to simply leave this through the fictional notice of
public posting. The positive duty of the state requires more in
terms of the creation of public awareness and understanding. For
instance, the Department of Agriculture is competent and large
enough so as to make actual face to face community meetings
reasonable.
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 665
Also, under the National Biosafety Framework, there must be
posting on the Internet to capture the attention of relevant
stakeholders.46 This is not required under Section 8(G).
The mechanism under Administrative Order No. 8 does not even
require that local government authorities be apprised about the
proposed field testing. Certainly, engaging local government
authorities invites more meaningful public discourse.
Section 8(H) requires the creation of a Scientific and Technical
Review Panel. This is a group of three independent scientists that
reviews the risk assessment conducted by the Institutional
Biosafety Committee. The Scientific and Technical Review Panel
does not have a community representative. It is also tasked to
evaluate — based on the individual scientist’s own standards —
whether the proposed field testing poses significant risks on
human health and the environment. How the points raised during
the mandatory public hearings will be considered in the issuance of
the field testing permits is not covered by Administrative Order
No. 8. In this regard, there is no standard or process.
The nonchalant attitude of the regulatory framework is best
seen in this case. Petitioners alleged that there was some public
consultation prior to field testing. These consultations, however,
were not documented. The only proof of such consultation was a
bare allegation made by Miss Merle Palacpac of the Department of
Agriculture in her judicial affidavit.47
The absence of an effective mechanism for public feedback
during the application process for field testing means that
Administrative Order No. 8 fails in meeting the public
participation requirement of the Cartagena Protocol and the
National Biosafety Framework. The current mechanisms
_______________
46 Exec. Order No. 514, Sec. 7.2.1.

47 Judicial Affidavit of Merle Bautista Palacpac dated Feb. 4, 2013, pp. 16-17, par. 56.
666
have all the badges of a “greenwash”:48 merely an exhibition of
symbolic compliance to environmental and biosafety policy.
The insouciant approach to public participation during
the application process is obvious as there is no appeal
procedure for third parties under Administrative Order No.
8. The regulation does not consider that communities affected may
want to question the exercise of discretion by the Department of
Agriculture or the Bureau of Plant Industry. Section 18 of
Administrative Order No. 8 only covers appeals for “[a]ny person
whose permit has been revoked or has been denied a permit or
whose petition for delisting has been denied by the Director of
[Bureau of Plant Industry].” Procedural due process is taken away
from the public.
VI
Due to these fundamental deficiencies, Administrative Order No.

8 is null and void. In its present form, it cannot be used as the
guidelines to regulate further field testing or commercial
propagation of Bt talong. Until a law or a new regulation is passed
consistent with the Constitution, our treaty obligations, and our
laws, no genetically modified ingredient process or product can be
allowed to be imported, field tested, or commercially propagated.
VII
Science is not just a body of knowledge; it is the result of the

application of the scientific methodology.49 The direction of
_______________
48 The term is often used in reference to businesses and corporations that mislead consumers about
the business’ environmental performance or the environmental benefits of a product. Delmas, Magali, A.,
Burbano, Vanessa Cuerel, The Drivers of Greenwashing <http://www.ioe.ucla.edu/media/files/Delmas-
Burbano-CMR-2011-gd-ldh.pdf> (visited December 1, 2015).
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 667
the methodology depends on the objective of each study or
research. The scientific methodology tests a hypothesis, or a
proposed statement of relationships between factors or variables
that acts as a tentative answer to a specific research question.50
From the hypothesis, a scientist reviews related literature and
records observations relating to the hypothesis. Sampling,
observations, and measurements must be accurate and
replicable. These areas are vulnerable to errors that may distort
a research’s conclusions.51 In order to confirm found observations, a
scientist can design tests in order to make observations under
controlled conditions.52
This basic process is also found in the environmental risk
assessments conducted for transgenic crops. There are four
important steps in Environmental Risk Assessments:
Initial evaluation — This step determines whether risk
assessment is required. (1)
Problem formulation — This step involves the formulation of
risk hypothesis to be tested in the laboratory and field. An example
of a risk hypothesis is whether the transgenic crop affects
nontargeted organisms. (2)
Controlled experiment and gathering information — These are
done first in the laboratory, and then under controlled field
conditions. (3)
Risk evaluation (4)53
_______________
49 Mother and Child Health: Research Methods, Chapter 1: Scientific Method, p.

1 <http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/tropej/online/ce_ch1.pdf> (visited
December 1, 2015).
50 Id., at p. 3.
51 Id., at p. 4.
52 Id., at p. 6.
53 Bartsch, Detlef, et al., Field Testing of Transgenic Plants in Plant
Biotechnology and Genetics: Principles, Techniques, and Applications, p. 313 (2008).
668
The results of scientific experimentation with transgenic crops
form part of science. However, these research articles must be
rigorously and deliberately examined to scrutinize their subject
matter, the hypothesis and methodology deployed, and the cogency
of the conclusions drawn from the observed findings.
Certainly, the conclusions in studies concerning Btmaize may
not always be valid with respect to Bt talong. Some of the variables
may be the same. Obviously, both transgenic crops include the
vector bacillus thuringiensis.However, there will also be obvious
differences because of the difference of the crops, their behavior in
various environments, the manner in which they reproduce, their
uses, and their consequences.
Currently, there is more literature regarding the viability and
safety of Bt maize because it is already being commercially
propagated. On the other hand, Bt talong is still being studied and
assessed and is not yet ready for commercial release. The
application for field testing for Bt talong under the correct
conditions is itself part of the scientific inquiry to test hypotheses
both for or against its propagation.
The Court of Appeals, instead of relying on these standards of
science, employed a “hot tub” examination of experts. It took into
account literature on Bt maize or Btcotton, and various arguments
and studies conducted for Btmaize. It then made conclusions,
without a rigorous explanation of its methodology and standards
for credibility, from these studies.
Without these rigorous explanations, the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it considered Bt maize
research. Ideally, the Court of Appeals should have scrutinized the
results of the contained experimentation with respect to Bt
talong because the results were the basis for the Bureau of Plant
Industry’s allowance of field testing.54 It should have examined
whether the experimentation con-
_______________
54 Petition of Environmental Management Bureau, et al., Annex “E.”
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 669
ducted may be replicated and whether it will yield the same
result.
The experts could have also been asked individually about the
results of contained experimentation and if the contained
experiments answered research objectives relating not only to the
viability of the product, but the impact to the environment should
the product undergo field testing. The first objective is in line with
the commercial interests of the applicant, while the latter objective
is more in tune with the state’s policy of protecting the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology. The imposition of the
latter objective should have been the role of the Bureau of Plant
Industry because it was the authorizing agency for field testing
permits.
The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion by
relying only on the study of Dr. Gilles-Eric Seralini who made a
study involving a completely different transgenic crop. This court
tasked the Court of Appeals to assess the propriety of the issuance
of field testing permits with respect to Bt talong, not to draw
conclusions about Bt talong based on one scientific literature
on Bt maize.
The results of the field testing of Bt talong should still be subject
to confirmatory tests involving the same variables in order to
attain a level of statistical reliability. However, these subsequent
field testing must be done under regulations consistent with our
Constitution and international obligations. They must be
conducted under a regulatory agency that will have the competence
to be actively involved in the scientific inquiry.
VIII
The results of this case are neither an endorsement nor a

repudiation of genetically modified ingredients, processes, and food
products. This should neither be interpreted as a rebuke of the
avowed mandates of respondents, many of whom have
distinguished themselves in their advocacies.
670
Certainly, there is a need for leaders, organizations, and
dedicated movements that amplify the concerns of communities,
groups, and identities which tend to be put in the margins of
forums dominated by larger and more politically connected
commercial interests. This includes forums that create and
implement regulatory frameworks. Liberal democratic
deliberations at times fail to represent the silenced majority as it
succumbs to the powerful minority.
While acknowledging this reality, we also need to be careful that
the chambers of this court do not substitute for the needed political
debate on public issues or the analytical rigor required by truths in
science. We are Justices primarily. While politics and science
envelope some of our important decisions, we should not lose the
humility that the Constitution itself requires of us. We are an
important part of the constitutional order: always only a part,
never one that should dominate. Our decisions have the veneer of
finality. It should never, however, be disguised superiority in any
form or manner.
Political debates indeed also mature when we pronounce the
nature of fundamental rights in concrete cases. Before cases ripen
— or, as in this case, when it has become moot — restraint will be
the better approach. We participate in the shaping of the content of
these fundamental rights only with the guidance of an actual case.
This, among others, distinguishes the judicial function from the
purely political engagement.
Restraint is especially required when the remedy chosen is a
Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan, which is designed
to prevent an actual or imminent environmental catastrophe.
Again, in this case, the field testing ended. There is yet no permit
to commercially propagate Bt talong. The results of the field
testing of the genetically modified food crop have not been
presented for evaluation by any of the relevant agencies charged
with its eventual regulation. Moreover, the
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VOL. 776, DECEMBER 8, 2015 671
results of the field testing have not been presented for proper
public scrutiny.
If any, the resolution of this case implies rigor in environmental
advocacy. Vigilance and passion are the hallmarks of the public
interest movement. There is no reason that the members of this
movement should not evolve the proper skills and attitudes to
properly work the legal system and understand the role of the
judicial process. Environmental advocacy also requires an
understanding of science and the locating of the proper place of
various norms such as the precautionary principle. After all,
representation of marginalized community vices deserves excellent
representation and responsible leadership. Filing a judicial remedy
almost two years too late and without the required scientific rigor
patently required by the allegations and the arguments misses
these standards.
But, we cannot just leave things as they are especially when
patent unconstitutional provisions surface and where deference
will amount to a denial of the positive constitutional duties were
required to discharge. There are grave errors in Administrative
Order No. 8 that stack decisions made by the Department of
Agriculture and the Bureau of Plant Industry in favor of the
commercial applicant. We have so far only evaluated the provisions
in accordance with law and found them wanting. By declaring
Administrative Order No. 8 null and void, there is now incentive
for either Congress or our administrative bodies to review the
present regulatory framework and bring it not only to legal fiat but
also to address all concerns including those voiced by respondents
in this case.
Food safety and food security are vital for the assurance of
human dignity. We can only hope that the complex issues relating
to genetic modification of the food we eat be debated deliberately,
vigorously, and with all the scientific rigor and rationality required
in the proper public forums. Food safety
672
and food security are complex issues requiring the benefit of all
the wisdom of all our people.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to declare Administrative Order No. 8,
Series of 2002, of the Department of Agriculture null and void,
being violative of the Constitution, our treaty obligations under the
Cartagena Protocol, and the instructions of the President under
Executive Order No. 514.
Petitions denied, judgment modified.
Note.—The right of the people “to a balanced and healthful
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.” (Ruzol vs. Sandiganbayan, 696
SCRA 742 [2013])
November 10, 2015. G.R. Nos. 217126-27.*
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, in her capacity as the

Ombudsman, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH
DIVISION) and JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; A
common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for
prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that
the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.—A common requirement to both a petition
for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Same; Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, a
motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to
resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
_______________
* EN BANC.
432
Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)
or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be
considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law; Exceptions.—As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must
first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may
still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity
for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. Jurisprudence states that “[i]t is [the]
inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine
the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and
adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects
of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. x x x.” In
this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a
prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari,
which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition. These are: (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; A court’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.—Albeit raised for the
first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum, it is nonetheless
proper to resolve the issue on the CA’s lack of subject
433
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 433
matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court’s
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred
by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Hence, it should be
preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction
over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as the same determines
the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy
to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be
heard on this issue, as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through
his comment to the Ombudsman’s Memorandum. That being said, the
Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.
Ombudsman Act; The first paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA)
No. 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court
[SC]) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.—The first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the
Supreme Court) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking,
“[i]njunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is
ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action
or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.”
Considering the textual qualifier “to delay,” which connotes a suspension
of an action while the main case remains pending, the “writ of injunction”
mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the
provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive
relief. The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
office’s jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and
its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only
of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious
misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for
impeachment, if warranted. Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction over certain adminis-
434
trative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or
administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any
act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
Same; The second paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770
provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme
Court (SC) on pure questions of law.—On the other hand, the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or
application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions
of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in
arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole
jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is
vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase “application for
remedy” or the word “findings” refers to; and (2) it does not specify what
procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be
taken only against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the
relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
Same; Statutory Construction; In case of doubt as to what a provision
of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted, albeit not controlling in the interpretation of
the law.—As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the
actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of
doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted, albeit not controlling in the interpretation
of the law.
Same; Same; As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14,
Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against
issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any
decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) “any application of remedy”
against the same.—As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of
the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or
finding of the Ombudsman,
435
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 435
and (b) “any application of remedy” (subject to the exception below)
against the same. To clarify, the phrase “application for remedy,” being a
generally worded provision, and being separated from the term “appeal” by
the disjunctive “or,” refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or
provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general
sense. By the same principle, the word “findings,” which is also separated
from the word “decision” by the disjunctive “or,” would therefore refer to
any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional),
except a decision. The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to
the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not
explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against “the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman,” a Rule 45 appeal, for the
reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court
on “pure questions of law,” whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Doctrine of Non-Interference; Appeals; Petition for Review on
Certiorari; Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it
cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory
“findings” issued by the Ombudsman.—Of course, the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770’s extremely limited restriction on remedies is
inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal — which is within the sphere of the
rules of procedure promulgated by this Court — can only be taken against
final decisions or orders of lower courts, and not against “findings” of
quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot
interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a
Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory “findings” issued by the
Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45
appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on
errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally
vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
also increased this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, without a showing,
however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very
similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above cited),
which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470
(1998).
436
Same; Judicial Power; The concept of Ombudsman independence
cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts.—The concept of Ombudsman
independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from
judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical
bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even
justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman’s notion that it can be exempt from
an incident of judicial power — that is, a provisional writ of injunction
against a preventive suspension order — clearly strays from the concept’s
rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
Remedial Law; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Certiorari; The Court of
Appeals’ (CA’s) certiorari jurisdiction is not only original but also
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) (under Section 21[1],
Chapter II of Batas Pambansa [BP] Blg. 129), and the Supreme Court (SC)
(under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view
of the concurrence of these courts’ jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed.—Note that the
CA’s certiorarijurisdiction, as above stated, is not only original but
alsoconcurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under Section 21[1],
Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of
these courts’ jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma, 172
SCRA 415 (1989), the doctrine was explained as follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according
to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. When a court has subject matter
jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court
may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is
called judicial power.
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Judicial Power; Words and Phrases; Judicial power, as vested in the
Supreme Court (SC) and all other courts established by law, has been
defined as the “totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes
jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.”—Judicial power, as vested in
the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been
defined as the “totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes
jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.” Under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes “the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”wor
Same; While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto
Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court (SC).—Judicial power
is never exercised in a vacuum. A court’s exercise of the jurisdiction it
has acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits and
parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this
Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial
power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil.
523 (1911), the Court elucidated that “[t]he power or authority of the court
over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given
cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or
authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully
and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not
exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely,
the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter.” While
the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court.
438
Remedial Law; Temporary Restraining Order; Preliminary Injunction;
It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI), whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quountil the merits of the case can be
heard.—A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the
pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are
mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It
is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear
that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of
them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an
act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the
controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In
other words, they are preservative remedies for the protection of
substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself,
but merely adjunct to a main suit. In a sense, they are regulatory
processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of
the parties.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) rules that when Congress
passed the first paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 and,
in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) to
enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon
the Court’s constitutional rule-making authority.—With these
considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from
the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this
Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances,
which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under
the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which
belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed
the means of implementing an existing right since it only provided for
temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant’s right in
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VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 439
esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending
litigation.
Political Law; Separation of Powers; When Congress creates a court
and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is
exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates.—That
Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article
VIII, supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article
VIII, supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court’s own power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5(5),
Article VIII, supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are
nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved
under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and
delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is
exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting
provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, because it does not define,
prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act
on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the
CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to
have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress
interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this
Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which
utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of
judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as
may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules
of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor,
there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers
principle.
Same; Judicial Power; To give true meaning to the judicial power
contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court’s duly
promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this,
even by statute.—It should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in
prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation
of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted
by supervening events if
440
no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is
hearing the same. Accordingly, the court’s acquired jurisdiction, through
which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the
force of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot
be enervated due to a court’s inability to regulate what occurs during a
proceeding’s course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the
subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its
exercise thereof should be unclipped. To give true meaning to the judicial
power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court’s duly
promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this,
even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive
writs in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure
duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.
Administrative Law; Preventive Suspension; A preventive suspension
order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure.—By nature, a
preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive
measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277
(2005), the Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to
prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and
the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him: Jurisprudential law establishes a
clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive
measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the
purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have
different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely
a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent
the accused from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the
case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established
and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This
is the penalty.
Same; Same; The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be
satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension
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pending an investigation.—The law sets forth two (2) conditions that

must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive
suspension pending an investigation, namely: (1) The evidence of guilt is
strong; and (2) Either of the following circumstances coexist with the first
requirement: (a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) The charge would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) The respondent’s continued stay
in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Same; Condonation; Words and Phrases; Generally speaking,
condonation has been defined as “[a] victim’s express or implied forgiveness
of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no
offense.”—Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as “[a]
victim’s express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by
treating the offender as if there had been no offense.” The
condonation doctrine — which connotes this same sense of complete
extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon — is not
based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated
from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (Pascual), which was therefore decided under
the 1935 Constitution.
Same; Condonation Doctrine; The Court, citing Civil Service
Commission v. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160 (2008), also clarified that the
condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to
them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.—The Court, citing Civil
Service Commission v. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160 (2008), also clarified that the
condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since,
as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
Civil Service; Public Officers; The 1987 Constitution strengthened and
solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by
commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times.—
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have
framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that “[t]he State
shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and
take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.” Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants
under the regime of a dictator,
442
the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More
significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has
been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public
officers to be accountable to the people at all times: Section 1. Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives. In Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1
(2013), it was explained that: [t]he aphorism forged under Section 1,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that “public office is a
public trust,” is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of
government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with
the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the
people’s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability x x x. (Emphasis supplied) The same mandate is found in
the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service
Commission, and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
Same; Same; For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to
discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated
in Section 60 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160,otherwise known as the “Local
Government Code of 1991” (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991,
and took effect on January 1, 1992.—For local elective officials like Binay,
Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local
official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No.
716060. , otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991”
(LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on
January 1, 1992: Section Grounds for Disciplinary Action.—An elective
local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any
of the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; (c) Dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d)
Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense
punishable by at least prisión mayor; (e) Abuse of authority; (f)
Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in
the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang
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VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 443
barangay; (g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or
residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and (h) Such
other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws. An elective
local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above
by order of the proper court.
Same; Same; Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC) states
that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall be
disqualified from running for any elective local position.—Related to this
provision is Section 40(b) of the LGC which states
that those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position: Section 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position: x x x x (b) Those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
Same; Same; Condonation Doctrine; The doctrine of condonation is
actually bereft of legal bases.—Section 52(a) of the RRACCS provides that
the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification from holding public office52. :
Section Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.—a. The
penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture
of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public
office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations. In contrast,
Section 66(b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not
exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar
to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the
office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of
the penalty and its effect on the official’s candidacy. Nothing therein
states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by
the fact of reelection: Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision.—x x x.
x x x x (b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term
of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative
offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent
so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above cited legal
provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of
condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
444
Same; Same; Same; Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a
different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from
an offense done during a prior term.—The concept of public office is a
public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off
by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another
elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different
term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising
from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in
light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 (1991), to apply to
administrative offenses.
Same; Same; Same; Nothing in Section 66(b) states that the elective
local official’s administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of
reelection. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the
theory that the liability is condoned.—At best, Section 66(b) of the LGC
prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the
unexpired portion of the elective local official’s prior term, and likewise
allows said official to still run for reelection. This treatment is similar
to People ex rel. Bagshaw v. Thompson, (55 Cal. App. 2d 147; 130 P.2d.237
[1942]), and Montgomery v. Nowell, (183 Ark. 1116; 40 S.W.2d 418 [1931]),
both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot
be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However,
as previously stated, nothing in Section 66(b) states that the elective local
official’s administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of reelection.
Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the
liability is condoned.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
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the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines.—This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this
discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back
in 1959 and thus, out of touch from — and now rendered obsolete by — the
current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to
abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212
SCRA 768 (1992), Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 257 SCRA 55 (1996), Mayor
Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 (1999), and GovernorGarcia, Jr. v. CA,
586 SCRA 799 (2009), which were all relied upon by the CA. It should,
however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospectivein application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this
Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution
means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained
in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council, 618 SCRA 639 (2010): Judicial
decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those
called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce
obedience to them.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; It is well-settled that an act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.—It is well-settled that an act of a court
or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. It has also been held
that “grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or
tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.”
446
Civil Service; Public Officers; Condonation Doctrine; The Supreme
Court (SC) deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding
the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case does not
preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment
of the condonation doctrine.—This Court deems it apt to clarify that the
mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension
order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing
determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation doctrine.
As explained in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., “‘the moot and academic principle’ is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in
resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first,
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.”
Same; Same; Same; It would be a violation of the Supreme Court’s
(SC’s) own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to
abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become
apparent.—It would be a violation of the Court’s own duty to uphold and
defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine
now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed,
the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply
impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which
explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public
officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.
Same; Same; Same; The condonation doctrine is a peculiar
jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials
to escape administrative liability.—The condonation doctrine is a peculiar
jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials
to escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal
intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a
situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately
resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle
against exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local
officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public
interest is involved.
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Same; Same; Same; In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is
wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own
jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to
uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening
events that render the subject of discussion moot.—The defense of
condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials
against the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a
sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that “for the period
of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and
24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of
condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of
alleged misconduct — involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression,
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct — were placed beyond the
reach of the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial powers.”
Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition
and must therefore, not evade review. In any event, the abandonment of a
doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is
its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its
mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding
supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.
Bersamin,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
The Ombudsman’s Act; View that Section 14 of Republic Act (RA) No.
6770 should be struck down for authorizing the undue interference with the
prerogatives of the courts of law to adopt whatever means were allowed by
law and procedure to exercise their jurisdiction in the cases properly
cognizable by them.—I am writing this separate opinion to memorialize my
concurrence with the declaration of the ineffectiveness of the first
paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770, and of the
unconstitutionality of the second paragraph thereof. The main opinion has
been written well by our esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe, who has exhibited her scholarly bent once again. But let
me assure my colleagues in the Majority that if I submit this concurrence,
I do not mean to diminish in any way or degree the forcefulness and
correctness of the justification for the declaration. I simply want to
underscore that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down
for authorizing the undue interference with the prerogatives of the courts
of law to adopt whatever means were allowed by law and
448
procedure to exercise their jurisdiction in the cases properly cognizable
by them.
Ombudsman; Preventive Suspension; Administrative Cases; View that
in line with the power to investigate administrative cases, the Ombudsman
is vested with the authority to preventively suspend respondent public
officials and employees pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act (RA) No.
6770.—In line with the power to investigate administrative cases, the
Ombudsman is vested with the authority to preventively suspend
respondent public officials and employees pursuant to Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6770, which provides: Section 24. Preventive
Suspension.—The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in
his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension
shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when
the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the
period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
Same; Same; View that the Ombudsman has no authority to issue the
preventive suspension order in connection with criminal investigations of
government officials or employees because such authority rests in the courts
in which the criminal cases are filed.—It is important to note, however,
that the Ombudsman has no authority to issue the preventive suspension
order in connection with criminal investigations of government officials or
employees because such authority rests in the courts in which the criminal
cases are filed.
Civil Service; Public Officers; Condonation Doctrine; View that
condonation shall apply only in case of the reelection of a public officer who
is sought to be permanently removed from office as a result of his
misconduct, not while such public officer is undergoing investigation.—It is
clear to me that, based on the language and the factual milieu
of Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 (1992), and Salalima v. Guingona,
Jr., 257 SCRA 55 (1996), which both cited
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Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (1959), and
of other akin rulings, condonation shall apply only in case of the reelection
of a public officer who is sought to be permanently removed from office as
a result of his misconduct, not while such public officer is undergoing
investigation. Condonation necessarily implies that the condoned act has
already been found to have been committed by the public officer. Hence,
condonation applies to the penalty or punishment imposed after the
conduct of an administrative investigation. Under the circumstances, the
pronouncements in Aguinaldo, Salalima and the others could not be
applicable to the preventive suspension order issued to Binay, Jr. pending
his administrative investigation because preventive suspension pending
the conduct of an investigation was not yet a penalty in itself, but a mere
measure of precaution to enable the disciplining authority to investigate
the charges by precluding the respondent from influencing the witnesses
against him.
Same; Same; Same; Suspension; View that the Supreme Court (SC)
notably stated in Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 586 SCRA 799 (2009),
and Joson III v. Court of Appeals, 482 SCRA 360 (2006), that “suspension
from office of an elective official would deprive the electorate of the services
of the person they voted into office” in the context of determining the
propriety of the issuance of the preventive suspension order.—As I see it,
the CA misconstrued the milieu in Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 586
SCRA 799 (2009), and Joson III v. Court of Appeals, 482 SCRA 360 (2006),
as an application of the doctrine of condonation. The Court notably stated
in Garcia, Jr. and Joson III that “suspension from office of an elective
official would deprive the electorate of the services of the person they voted
into office” in the context of determining the propriety of the issuance of
the preventive suspension order. In other words, the statement only
served to remind the Ombudsman to issue the preventive suspension
orders with utmost caution in view of the gravity of the effects of
suspending an incumbent elective local official. Hence, Garcia,
Jr. and Joson III did not apply the doctrine of condonation.
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; View
that a preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or
a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.—A preliminary injunction
is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final
order requiring a party or a
450
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. The
requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order are clearly set forth in Section 3, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court. The sole objective of the writ of preliminary injunction
is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
The writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and
incomplete evidence; hence, it should not determine the merits of a case, or
decide controverted facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to
prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or
injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.
Preventive Suspension; View that the preventive suspension order,
being an ancillary issuance, was dissolved upon the Ombudsman’s
resolution of the administrative charges on the merits.—In the meanwhile,
the Ombudsman found Binay, Jr. administratively liable, and dismissed
him from the service. By such dismissal, the questions raised against the
CA’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the
Ombudsman were rendered moot and academic. I join the Majority in
saying that the preventive suspension order, being an ancillary issuance,
was dissolved upon the Ombudsman’s resolution of the administrative
charges on the merits. Thus, to dwell on the preventive suspension of
Binay, Jr. and his co-respondents any further would be superfluous, for, as
the Court said in Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court,
686 SCRA 35 (2012): It is a rule of universal application that courts of
justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline
jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial
relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

Prohibition.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Claro F. Certeza and Maria Patricia L. Alvarez for respondent.
451
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 451
Yorac-Sarmiento, Arroyo, Chua-Coronel and Reyes Law
Firm collaborating counsel for private respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
“All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and
immemorially acknowledged so tobe[.]”1
– Jeremy Bentham
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed

on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio-Morales, in her
capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated
March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA)
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453, which granted private respondent
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.’s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation
of the Joint Order4 dated March 10, 2015 of the Ombudsman in
OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order)
preventively suspending him and several other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months
without pay; and (b) the Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of
_______________
2 With urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or a WPI. Rollo(Vol. I), pp.
6-36.
3 Id., at pp. 43-47. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with
Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., concurring.
4 Id., at pp. 53-65. Issued by petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.
5 Id., at pp. 50-51.
452
the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s
petition for contempt6 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139504.
Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a
writ of preliminary injunction8 (WPI) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453
which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive
suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a
supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.
The Facts
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty.

Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas “Ching” Enciso VI before the Office
of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al.),
accusing them of Plunder11and violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019,12 otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act,” in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati
Parking Building).13
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special
Panel of Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation,
submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if
warranted (1st Special Panel).15Pursuant to the
_______________
6 Dated March 18, 2015. Id., at pp. 362-373.

7 Id., at pp. 613-627.
8 Id., at pp. 629-630. Signed by Division Clerk of Court Miriam Alfonso
Bautista.
9 For certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or
WPI. Id., at pp. 606-611.
10 See Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 749-757.
11 RA 7080, entitled “An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder”
(approved on July 12, 1991).
12 Approved on August 17, 1960.
13 Rollo (Vol. II), p. 647.
14 Id.
15 Through Ombudsman Office Order No. 546, which was later on amended
through Officer Order No. 546-A dated November 18, 2014. Id., at pp. 758-759.
453
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 453
Ombudsman’s directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1stSpecial Panel
filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al.,
charging them with six (6) administrative cases17 for Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds,
and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).19
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was
involved in anomalous activities attending the following
procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking
Building project, committed during his previous and present terms
as City Mayor of Makati:
_______________
16 Dated March 3, 2015. Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 66-100.

17 Docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-
C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063. Id., at pp. 53-58.
18 Docketed as OMB-C-C-15-0059, OMB-C-C-15-0060, OMB-C-C-15-0061, OMB-
C-C-15-0062, OMB-C-C-15-0063, and OMB-C-C-15-0064. Id., at p. 66. See
also Rollo (Vol. II), p. 674.
19 As for Binay, Jr., only four (4) administrative cases and four (4) criminal
cases were filed against him, particularly: (a) for administrative cases (1) OMB-C-A-
15-0058; (2) OMB-C-A-15-0061; (3) OMB-C-A-15-0062; and (4) OMB-C-A-15-0063;
and (b) for criminal cases (1) OMB-C-C-15-0059, for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 and Malversation of Public Funds involving the design, architectural, and
engineering services of MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. covering the
Makati Parking Building project, (2) OMB-C-C-15-0062, for violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 and two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Documents under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with Phase III of the Makati Parking
Building project involving Hilmarc’s, (3) OMB-C-C-15-0063, for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 and two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Documents in
connection with Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project involving
Hilmarc’s; and (4) OMB-C-C-15-0064, for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and
two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Documents in connection with Phase V of
the Makati Parking Building project involving Hilmarcs. (Rollo [Vol. I], p.
12; Rollo [Vol. II], p. 647)
454
Binay, Jr.’s First Term (2010 to 2013)20
(aOn ) September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice

of Award21 for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building
project to Hilmarc’s Construction Corporation (Hilmarc’s),
and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design,24 and
approved the release of funds therefor in the following
amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15,
2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3)
P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51
on March 28, 2011;28 (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3,
2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30
(bOn ) August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of
Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building
_______________
20 Specific period covered by his first term is from Noon of June 30, 2010 to
Noon of June 30, 2013.
21 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 247.
22 Id., at pp. 248-250.
23 The original contract amount was P599,395,613.34. Due to a change order,
this was later increased to P599,994,021.05. See Disbursement Voucher; id., at p.
284.
24 Id., at pp. 86-87.
25 See Disbursement Voucher for 26% completion of Phase III; id., at p. 270.
26 See Disbursement Voucher for 52.49% completion of Phase III; id., at p. 273.
31 Id., at p. 312.
455
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 455
project to Hilmarc’s, and consequently, executed the
corresponding contract32 on August 18, 2011,33without the
required publication and the lack of architectural
design,34 and approved the release of funds therefor in the
following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97
on October 4, 2011;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,
2011;36 (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4)
P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;38 and (5)
P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39
(cOn ) September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of
Award40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project
to Hilmarc’s, and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design,43 and
approved the release of the funds therefor in
_______________
32 Id., at pp. 290-292.

33 The original contract amount was P649,275,681.73. This was later increased
to P649,934,440.96. See Disbursement Voucher; id., at p. 320.
34 Id., at p. 88.
35 See Disbursement Voucher for 33.53% completion of Phase IV; id., at p. 315.
39 See Disbursement Voucher for 100% completion of Phase IV; id., at p. 320.
40 Id., at p. 334.
41 Id., at pp. 323-325.
42 The original contract amount was P141,649,366.00. Due to a change order,
this was later increased to P143,806,161.00. See Disbursement Voucher; id., at p.
349.
43 Id., at p. 91.
456
the amounts of P32,398,220.0544 and
P30,582,629.3045 on December 20, 2012; and
Binay, Jr.’s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46
(dOn ) July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr.

approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the
September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc’s for Phase V of
the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of
P27,443,629.97;47and
(eOn ) July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of
funds for the remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA
Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design
and architectural services covering the Makati Parking
Building project in the amount of P429,011.48.49
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another
Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB
Cases (2nd Special Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the
2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for each of the
OMB Cases,
_______________
44 See Disbursement Voucher for 27.31% completion of Phase V; id., at p.

340. Id., at pp. 337-339.
45 See Disbursement Voucher for 52.76% completion of Phase V; id., at p.
344. Id., at pp. 341-343.
46 Specific period covered by his second term is from Noon of June 30, 2013 to
Noon of June 30, 2016.
47 See Disbursement Voucher for 100% completion of Phase V; Rollo, p. 349. Id.,
at pp. 346-349.
48 For the contract amount of P11,974,900.00. Dated November 28, 2007. Id., at
pp. 108-113.
49 See Disbursement Voucher for 100% completion of the MANA contract; id., at
p. 126.
50 Through Ombudsman Office Order No. 178, which was later on amended
through Office Order No. 180 dated March 9, 2015. See Rollo(Vol. II), pp. 647-648.
51 Not attached to the Rollos.
457
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 457
requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-
affidavits.52
Before Binay, Jr., et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits, the
Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel,
issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order,
placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more
than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the
preventive suspension of a public officer are present,54finding that:
(a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.’s guilt was strong given that (1)
the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards
Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities
attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents
on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement
vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds;
and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with
Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be
true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS); and (3)
Binay, Jr., et al.’s respective positions give them access to public
records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence,
their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation
relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.55Consequently, the
Ombudsman directed the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II
(Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the
same.56
_______________

53 See Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 62 and 480.
54 Id., at p. 61.
55 Id.
56 Id., at pp. 63 and 480. See also Ombudsman’s Indorsement letter dated
March 11, 2015; id., at p. 351.
458
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order
was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon
Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.’s staff.57
The Proceedings Before the CA
On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59before the

CA, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453, seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for
the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation.60 Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could
not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity
attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building
project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was
elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired
during his first term and that his reelection as City Mayor of
Makati for a second term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic.61 In any
event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman’s preventive
suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt
presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not
participate in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his
prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear
and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by
landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and
_______________
57 See Personal Delivery Receipt; id., at p. 350; p. 12.

59 Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 403-427.
60 Id., at pp. 425-426.
61 Id., at p. 404.
62 Id., at pp. 404-405.
459
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 459
that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from
office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of
the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.63
On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused
the implementation of the preventive suspension order through the
DILG National Capital Region-Regional Director, Renato L. Brion,
CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of
the Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on
Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were
closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati
Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City
Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon
assumed office as Acting Mayor.64
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65(dated
March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a
TRO,66 notwithstanding Peña, Jr.’s assumption of duties as Acting
Mayor earlier that day.67 Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v.
CA,68 the CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a
TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness
of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that the
acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation
doctrine, Binay, Jr.’s reelection meant that he can no longer be
administra-
58 See Binay, Jr.’s Comment/Opposition dated April 6, 2005; id.,
at p. 481. See also Binay, Jr.’s Memorandum dated May 21,
2015; Rollo (Vol. II), p. 806. The Ombudsman, however, claims that
the said petition was filed on March 12, 2015; see Rollo (Vol. II), p.
648.
_______________
63 Id., at pp. 424-425.

64 Id., at pp. 12-13. See also Director Brion’s Memorandum dated March 16,
2015; id., at pp. 352-353.
65 Id., at pp. 43-47.
66 Id., at p. 47.
67 Id., at p. 13.
68 604 Phil. 677; 586 SCRA 799 (2009).
460
tively charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to
comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for certiorari.70
On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO
did not state what act was being restrained and that since the
preventive suspension order had already been served and
implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.72
On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for
contempt,73 docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139504, accusing
Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine
National Police, and Peña, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the
CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the
administration of justice.74The Ombudsman and Department of
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded
as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.’s filing of the amended
and supplemental petition for contempt75(petition for contempt) on
March 19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the
Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and
maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the
preventive suspension order.77
In a Resolution78 dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the
consolidation of C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 and C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139504, and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay,
Jr.’s petition for contempt, directed the
_______________
69 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 46.

70 Which directive the Ombudsman complied with on March 30, 2015
(Rollo [Vol. II], p. 650). See also Rollo (Vol. I), p. 47.
71 See Manifestation dated March 17, 2015; Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 357-360.
72 Id., at p. 358.
73 Not attached to the Rollos.
74 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 14; Rollo (Vol. II), p. 649.
75 Dated March 18, 2015. Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 362-373.
76 Id.
77 Id., at p. 370.
78 Id., at pp. 50-51.
461
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 461
Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.79 The cases were set for
hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80
The Proceedings Before the Court
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on

March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before
this Court, assailing the CA’s March 16, 2015 Resolution, which
granted Binay, Jr.’s prayer for TRO in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453,
and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to file a comment
on Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139504.81 The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no
jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14
of RA 6770,82 or “The Ombudsman Act of 1989,” which states that
no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman’s
investigation unless there is prima facieevidence that the subject
matter thereof is outside the latter’s jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA’s
directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition
for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be
subjected to contempt proceedings.84
_______________
79 Which the Ombudsman complied with on March 26, 2015 (Rollo[Vol. II], p.
650). See also Rollo (Vol. I), p. 50.
80 The CA heard oral arguments with respect to Binay, Jr.’s application for a
WPI on March 30, 2015. On the other hand, the CA heard oral arguments with
respect to Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt on March 31, 2015 (see Rollo [Vol. II], p.
650). See also Rollo (Vol. I), p. 51.
82 Entitled “An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of
the Office of the Ombudsman, and for Other Purposes,” approved on November 17,
1989.
83 See Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 17-21.
84 Id., at pp. 21-24.
462
In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants
the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of government, including the Office of the
Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this
case when said office issued the preventive suspension order
against him.86Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the
Ombudsman to have been apprised of the condonation doctrine as
this would have weighed heavily in determining whether there was
strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive
suspension order.87 In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the
CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive
suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public
office, and that it is clear that he could not be held
administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his
subsequent reelection in 2013 operated as a condonation of any
administrative offenses he may have committed during his
previous term.88 As regards the CA’s order for the Ombudsman to
comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that
while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence,
cannot be removed from office except by way of impeachment, an
action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment,
without necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact
that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive
the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt.89
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015,
after the oral arguments before it were held,91granting
_______________
85 See Comment/Opposition dated April 6, 2015; id., at pp. 477-522.

86 Id., at pp. 478-479.
87 Id., at pp. 492-493.
88 Id., at pp. 497-505.
89 Id., at p. 511.
90 Id., at pp. 613-627.
91 Id., at p. 615.
463
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 463
Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the
implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling,
the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine,
citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it found that the
Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against
Binay, Jr. given that his reelection in 2013 as City Mayor of
Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from
anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building
project from 2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that,
although there were acts which were apparently committed by
Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments
on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services
of Hilmarc’s and MANA — still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held
administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,96 wherein the
condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the
payments were made after the official’s reelection, reasoning that
the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed
before said reelection.97 To this, the CA added that there was no
concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.’s participation for the alleged
payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.98
In view of the CA’s supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to
its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition99 before this Court, arguing that the
_______________
92 G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768.

93 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 619.
94 All of which pertains to the payment of Phase V. Id., at
pp. 346-349; p. 623.
95 326 Phil. 847; 257 SCRA 55 (1996).
96 372 Phil. 892; 314 SCRA 207 (1999).
97 See Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 619-620.
98 Id., at p. 623.
99 Id., at pp. 606-611.
464
condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing
preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained
that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense,
which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the
administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no
condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB
Complaint after his reelection in 2013.100
On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the
oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to
file their respective memoranda.102In compliance thereto, the
Ombudsman filed her Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while
Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum the following day.104
Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court
directed the parties to comment on each other’s memoranda, and
the OSG to comment on the Ombudsman’s Memorandum, all
within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.
On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to
each other’s memoranda.106 Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG
filed its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,107 simply stating that it
was mutually agreed upon that the
_______________
100 Id., at p. 609.

101 See Court Resolutions dated April 7, 2015 (id., at pp. 524-525) and April 14,
2015 (id., at pp. 634-638).
102 See Resolution dated April 21, 2015; id., at pp. 639-640.
103 Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 646-745.
104 Dated May 21, 2015. Id., at pp. 803-865.
105 Id., at pp. 951-952.
106 See Ombudsman’s Comment to Binay, Jr.’s Memorandum dated July 3,
2015; id., at pp. 1109-1161. See also Binay, Jr.’s Comment (to Petitioners’
Memorandum) dated July 3, 2015; id., at pp. 2203-2240.
107 Id., at pp. 959-960.
465
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 465
Office of the Ombudsman would file its Memorandum, consistent
with its desire to state its “institutional position.”108 In her
Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.’s Memorandum, the
Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the
condonation doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the parties’ respective pleadings, and as raised during

the oral arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues to
be resolved in seriatim are as follows:
I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for

reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139453 and C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139504, is the Ombudsman’s plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy;
II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over
the main petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453;
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to
issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139453 enjoining the implementation of
_______________
108 Id., at p. 959. See also Manifestation dated May 14, 2015; id., at p. 641.
109 See discussions on the condonation doctrine in the Ombudsman’s
Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 708-733 and in the Ombudsman’s Comment to
Binay, Jr.’s Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 1144-1149, 1153-1155, and 1158-1159.
466
the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to
comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139504 is improper and illegal.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
I.
A common requirement to both a petition for certiorariand a

petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and
2 thereof provide:
1. SectionPetition for certiorari.—When any tribunal,

board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxxx
2. SectionPetition for prohibition.—When the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
467
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 467
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first

be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for
the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or
agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by
the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case.110
Jurisprudence states that “[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the
mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure
of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,]
and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower
court or agency. x x x.”111
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule
requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a
petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply
_______________
110 See Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 313, 322-
323.
111 See Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013, 691
SCRA 269, 286, citing Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v.
Mores, 671 Phil. 346, 359; 655 SCRA 580, 594-595 (2011).
468
to a petition for prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorariproceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of
due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.113
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above highlighted
exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the
authority of the CA — and of this Court, for that matter — to
enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued
by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests
the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers
of key government institutions — namely, the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary — and hence,
involves an issue of transcendental public importance that
demands no less than a careful but
_______________
112 See AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Regional Trial Court, Marikina
City, Branch 193, 658 Phil. 68, 79; 642 SCRA 720, 725 (2011), citing Diamond
Builders Conglomeration v. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, 564 Phil. 756,
769-770; 540 SCRA 194, 210 (2007).
113 Supra note 110 at p. 323, citing Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution,
Inc., 653 Phil. 124, 136-137; 638 SCRA 457, 470 (2010).
469
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 469
expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue
on the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation
doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation
from administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman’s direct
resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court,
notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of
the assailed issuances in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 and C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 139504 before the CA, is justified.
II.
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her

Memorandum,114 it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the
CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition
for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453, in view of the well-
established rule that a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that
subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
render judgment on the action.115 Hence, it should be preliminarily
determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over
the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as the same
determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative
thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the
opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact,
duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the
_______________
114 See Ombudsman’s Memorandum dated May 14, 2015; Rollo (Vol. II), pp.
661-669.
115 Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 506 Phil. 407, 415; 469 SCRA 424, 431
(2005).
116 See Court Resolution dated June 16, 2015; Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 951-952.
470
Ombudsman’s Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court
perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.
The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject
matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer
for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA
6770, or the Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full:
14. Section Restrictions.—No writ of injunction shall be

issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except
the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition
against any court (except the Supreme Court)119 from issuing a writ
of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, “[i]njunction is a
judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to
do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or
merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main
action.”120 Considering the textual qualifier “to delay,” which
connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains
pending, the “writ of injunction” mentioned in this paragraph could
only
_______________
117 Id., at pp. 2203-2240.

118 Id., at pp. 662-666 and 98.
119 As the Ombudsman herself concedes; see Main Petition, Rollo (Vol. I), pp.
17-18; see also Ombudsman’s Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 661-666.
120 Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, 487 Phil. 335, 346; 446 SCRA 110,
122 (2004).
471
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 471
refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the
nature of a provisional injunctive relief.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the office’s jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members
of Congress, and the Judiciary.121Nonetheless, the Ombudsman
retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office
allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the
purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted. 122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction over certain
_______________
121 Section 21, RA 6770 states:

21. SectionOfficial Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.—The Office
of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or -con-
trolled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
122 Section 22, RA 6770 states:
22. SectionInvestigatory Power.—The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by
officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint
for impeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a
private person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include
such private person in the investigation and proceed against such private person as
the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be
tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.
472
administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary
jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.123
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be
heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the
exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This
paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in
arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main C.A-G.R.
S.P. No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has
the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or
findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the
phrase “application for remedy” or the word “findings” refers to;
and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a
pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant
principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
“The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of
the legislature should be sought in the words employed to express
it, and that when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the
words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then
perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to
ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was
enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was
taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd
where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and
in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this
construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is
entitled
_______________
123 See Alejandro v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence

Bureau, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 35, 44-46.
473
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 473
to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the
legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is
not conclusive.”124
As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the
actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute
of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a
statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the
legislative deliberations may be adopted,125 albeit not controlling in
the interpretation of the law.126
A. The Senate deliberations cited by

the Ombudsman do not per-
tain to the second paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770.
The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind
Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review
of her office’s decisions or findings, is supposedly clear from the
following Senate deliberations:127
Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara.

x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase “petition for” delete the word “review” and in
lieu thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the
Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for review, but on certiorari.
The President [Jovito R. Salonga].
What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision under
review?
_______________
124 Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167, 169 (1918).

125 See National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr., G.R. No. 106724,
February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA 801, 807.
126 See Espino v. Cleofe, 152 Phil. 80, 87; 52 SCRA 92, 98 (1973).
127 Records of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 6, August 2, 1998, pp. 174-187. As cited
also in Ombudsman’s Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), p. 662.
474
Senator Angara.
It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman
would be almost conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not
unnecessarily clog the docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in effect will be a very strict
appeal procedure.
xxxx
Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.].
Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent, the
respondent himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?
Senator Angara.
Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.
Senator Guingona.
And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari?
Senator Angara.
On question of law, yes.
Senator Guingona.
And no other remedy is available to him?
Senator Angara.
Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?
Senator Guingona.
Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the
respondent, if there is no certiorariavailable, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his
administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the appropriate action?
Senator Angara.
Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law principle that before one
can go to court, he must exhaust all administra-
475
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 475
tive remedies x x x available to him before he goes and seeks judicial review.
xxxx
Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales.
What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method of appeal from one of a petition
for review to a petition for certiorari?
Senator Angara.
To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the effect that
the finding of facts of the Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
Senator Gonzales.
A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by
certiorari, the appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on
the part of the court, whether to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright. Is
that not correct, Mr. President?
Senator Angara.
That is absolutely correct, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales.
And in a petition for certiorari, the issue is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has
acted without jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the consequence, Mr. President.
Senator Angara.
That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales.
And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to make it harder to have a
judicial review, but should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.
476
Senator Angara.
Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales.
I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a petition for review and a
petition for certiorari; because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or
decision of the COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under the Constitution it is now
by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the court exercising judicial review
will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into
the evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a determination of whether the
administrative agency acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of
discretion. So, I assume that that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Angara.
The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.
Senator Gonzales.
I just want to put that in the Record.
Senator Angara.
It is very well stated, Mr. President.
xxxx
The President.
It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions. Should it be the
Ombudsman or should it be the Supreme Court?
Senator Angara.
As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and has to be the Supreme
Court to make the final determination.
477
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 477
The President.
Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.
Senator Angara.
That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to introduce an appropriate
change during the period of Individual Amendments.
xxxx
The President.
All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of “review?”
[Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.128
Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is,

however, unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section
14, RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange
begins with the suggestion of Senator Angara to delete the word
“review” that comes after the phrase “petition for review” and, in
its stead, insert the word “certiorari” so that the “review or appeal
from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a
petition for review, but on certiorari.” The ensuing exchange
between Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose
of changing the method of review from one of a petition for review
to a petition for certiorari — that is, to make “the appeal x x x more
difficult.” Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording,
from “petition for review” to “petition for certiorari” was approved.
Noticeably, these references to a “petition for review” and the
proposed “petition for certiorari” are nowhere to be found in the
text of Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier men-
_______________
128 Records of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 10, August 9, 1988, pp. 282-286 (full
names of the senators in brackets supplied). See also Ombudsman’s
Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 662-665, emphases and underscoring in the
original.
478
tioned that this provision, particularly its second paragraph,
does not indicate what specific procedural remedy one should take
in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals
that the remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of
law. More so, it was even commented upon during the oral
arguments of this case129 that there was no debate or clarification
made on the current formulation of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 per the available excerpts of the Senate
deliberations. In any case, at least for the above cited deliberations,
the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the Ombudsman’s
entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over the
main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition.
On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that
these deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision,
namely Section 27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually
reflects the approval of Senator Angara’s suggested
amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman’s decision or finding may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth
paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive nature of
the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial
evidence (third paragraph):
27. SectionEffectivity and Finality of DecisionsAll
provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory. .—(1)
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within
five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which
materially affects the order, directive or decision;
_______________
129 See Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza’s interpellation; TSN of the Oral
Arguments, April 14, 2015, p. 7.
479
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 479
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been
committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The
motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three
(3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month’s
salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorariwithin ten (10) days from
receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office
of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally

ambiguous in stating that a “petition for certiorari” should be
taken in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is
well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules.
However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was
passed way back in 1989130 and, hence, before the advent of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.131 At that time, the governing 1964
Rules of Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to
the appeal
_______________
130 Approved on November 17, 1989.

131 Effective July 1, 1997.
132 Effective January 1, 1964.
480
taken thereunder as a petition for certiorari, thus possibly
explaining the remedy’s textual denomination, at least in the
provision’s final approved version:
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
1. SECTIONFiling of Petition with Supreme Court.—A

party may appeal by certiorari, from a judgment of the Court
of Appeals, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition
for certiorari, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration
filed in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of
said court the corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall
not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to
the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
B. Construing the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.

The Senate deliberations’ lack of discussion on the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other
principles of statutory construction can apply to ascertain the
meaning of the provision.
To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states
that “[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.”
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of
the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any
decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) “any application of
remedy” (subject to the exception below) against the same. To
clarify, the phrase “application for remedy,” being a generally
worded provision, and being separated
_______________
129 See Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza’s interpellation; TSN of the Oral
481
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 481
from the term “appeal” by the disjunctive “or,”133 refers to any
remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal,
following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda:
general words are to be understood in a general sense.134 By the
same principle, the word “findings,” which is also separated from
the word “decision” by the disjunctive “or,” would therefore refer to
any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or
provisional), except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the
foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not
explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable
remedy against “the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,” a
Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy
taken to the Supreme Court on “pure questions of
law,” whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure:
Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
xxxx
2. SectionContents of Petition.—The petition shall
contain a concise statement of the matters involved, the
assignment of errors made in the court below, and the
reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it
should be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment
sought to be reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of
_______________
133 “The word ‘or’ x x x is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and

independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.” (Dayao
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 193643 and 193704, January 29, 2013, 689
SCRA 412, 428-429)
134 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., p. 1720.
482
the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner’s brief as
filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date
when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for
reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the
petition.
Only questions of law may be raised in the
petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record on
appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals, the clerk of the
Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand
from the Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole record of
the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
1. SectionFiling of petition with Supreme Court.—A

party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may
file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies
and shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same
provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same
action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14,

RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964
Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that
defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law
that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not
errors of judgment to which the
483
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 483
classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c)
questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no
procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a
Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a
statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot
be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and
hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would render
legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to
uncertainty and unintelligibility.135 There should then be no
confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers
to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the
appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that
all remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are
prohibited, except the above stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on
pure questions of law.
C. Validity of the second paragraph

of Section 14, RA 6770.
Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770’s

extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a
Rule 45 appeal — which is within the sphere of the rules of
procedure promulgated by this Court — can only be taken against
final decisions or orders of lower courts,136and
_______________
135 Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 165 Phil. 909, 914-915; 74 SCRA 306, 312-313 (1976).
136 Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure states that a “party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.” (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
This is consistent with Item (e), Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
484
not against “findings” of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later
elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of
procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as
to apply to interlocutory “findings” issued by the Ombudsman.
More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45
appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari,
grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial
power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court’s
appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its
consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the
fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above cited), which
was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desierto137 (Fabian).138
In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect
_______________
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 5. Section

xxxx
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or (2) certiorari, as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (e)
137 356 Phil. 787; 295 SCRA 470 (1998).
138 Note that “[o]ur ruling in the case of Fabian v. Desierto invalidated Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07
and any other provision of law implementing the aforesaid Act only insofar as they
provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The only provision affected by
the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum
and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters
included in said Section 27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are
not affected and still stand.” (Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 236, 248; 334
SCRA 738, 750 [2000])
485
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 485
of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its
advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of
Procedure which, as above intimated, applies only to a review of
“judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court, or other courts authorized by law”; and not of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now
being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v.
Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court’s ratiocinations and ruling
in Fabian were recounted:
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created

in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman’s Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7
(Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the
availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to assail a
decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other
rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions
or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect,
not only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court without its advice and concurrence in violation
of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which provides that a petition for review
on certiorari shall apply only to a review of
“judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals,
_______________
139 No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. 30.
Section
140 587 Phil. 100; 565 SCRA 324 (2008).
486
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by
law.” We pointedly said:
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy
adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule
43.141 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the

remedy against “decision or findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule
45 appeal and thus — similar to the fourth paragraph of Section
27, RA 6770142 — attempts to effectively increase the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded that the former provision is
also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the
Ombudsman’s posturing,144 Fabian should
_______________
141 Id., at pp. 111-112; p. 335.

142 For ease of reference, the provision is restated:
“In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.”
143 There should be no statement on the Court’s lack of advice and concurrence
with respect to the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 since the deliberations
are, in fact, silent on the said provision.
144 See Ombudsman’s Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 666-667. Note that
nowhere does the fourth paragraph of Section 27 delimit the phrase “orders,
directives or decisions” to those rendered by the
487
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 487
squarely apply since the above stated Ombudsman Act
provisions are in pari materia in that they “cover the same specific
or particular subject matter,”145 that is, the manner of judicial
review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is
clearly determinative of the existence of the CA’s subject matter
jurisdiction over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition,
including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the
Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to
resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion).146 This
procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in
settled case law:
The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on

constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case,
neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an
inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the
judiciary and other departments of the government and the
judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not
at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or
countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute
transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is
the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not
the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment.
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon
constitutional questions which are not raised in the
pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain
exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its
own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judg-
_______________
Ombudsman at the conclusion of the administrative proceedings, as the

Ombudsman submits.
145 See Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction &
Development Corporation, 675 Phil. 846, 857; 659 SCRA 756, 764 (2011).
146 See Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., p. 615.
488
ment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on
which a court’s jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is
unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the
proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular
and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or
that of the appellate court is involved in which case it
may be raised at any time or on the court’s own
motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack
of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to
determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.147 (Emphasis
supplied)
D. Consequence of invalidity.
In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify
the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an
interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable.149
In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that
Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issu-
_______________
147 Fabian v. Desierto, supra note 137 at pp. 800-801; pp. 482-483.
148 A preventive suspension is a mere preventive measure, and not a penalty
(see Quimbo v. Gervacio, 503 Phil. 886, 891; 466 SCRA 277, 281 [2005]); and hence,
interlocutory in nature since it “does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally
dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by [the adjudicating body]
before the case is finally decided on the merits.” (Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 686, 694; 356 SCRA 563, 570 [2001]; see
also Bañares II v. Balising, 384 Phil. 567, 577; 328 SCRA 36, 44 [2000])
149 Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 409 Phil. 684, 689; 357 SCRA 599, 602 (2001).
489
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 489
ances150 of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not
directly before this Court:
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014),
wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman was — similar to this case — assailed through a Rule
65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA,
the Court held that “[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly
imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by
Section 1 of Rule 65.”152
In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013),
involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing a final and
unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case, the Court remarked that “petitioner employed
the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action
for certioraribefore the Court of Appeals.”154 In this relation, it
stated that while “a special civil action for Certiorari is within the
concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the
Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.” Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6,
2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and
unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an admin-
_______________
150 Includes interlocutory orders, such as preventive suspension orders, as well

as final and unappealable decisions or orders under Section 27, RA 6770 which
states that “[a]ny order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month’s salary shall be final and
unappealable.”
151 G.R. No. 201643, March 12, 2014, 719 SCRA 209.
152 Id., at p. 219.
153 G.R. No. 184083, November 19, 2013, 709 SCRA 681.
154 Id., at p. 693.
155 411 Phil. 204; 358 SCRA 575 (2001).
490
istrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict
was reached in Ruivivar156 (September 16, 2008).
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition. That
being said, the Court now examines the objections of the
Ombudsman, this time against the CA’s authority to issue the
assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the
preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.
III.
From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has
been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any
provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its
preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her
office’s independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances
the idea that “[i]n order to further ensure [her office’s]
independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,”157particularly, “from injunctive reliefs traditionally
obtainable from the courts,”158 claiming that said writs may work
“just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure
would.”159
A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the

independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:
_______________
156 Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 140.

157 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 18.
158 Id.
159 Id.
491
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 491
There is hereby created the 5. Section independent
Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to
be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least
one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A
separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)
In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the
Court traced the historical underpinnings of the Office of the
Ombudsman:
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established

several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people’s
medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against
abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately,
however, these agencies failed to fully realize their objective
for lack of the political independence necessary for the
effective performance of their function as government critic.
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the
Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to
give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce
its mandate. Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, President
Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating
the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It
was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu
proprio, any administrative act of any administrative agency,
including any government-owned or -controlled corporation.
When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979,
the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were
transferred to the Tanodbayanhimself. He was given the
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the
corresponding information, and control the prosecution of
these cases.
_______________
160 G.R. Nos. 196231 and 196232, January 28, 2014, 714 SCRA 611.
492
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of
the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike
in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was
expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives
are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the
standard of accountability in public service under Section 1,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions read:
The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption. 27. Section
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. 1. Section161 (Emphasis
supplied)
More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the

office’s mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its
independence:
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the

Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the “protector of
the people” against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
Government, to function essentially as a complaints and
action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an
authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses
and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No.
6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the
Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
21. SectionOfficial Subject to Disciplinary
Authority; Exceptions.—The Office of the Ombuds-
_______________
161 Id., at pp. 639-641.
493
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 493
man shall have disciplinary authority over all elective
and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-
owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an “activist
watchman,” the Court has upheld its actions, although not
squarely falling under the broad powers granted [to] it by the
Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are
reasonably in line with its official function and consistent
with the law and the Constitution.
The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary
powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the
Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To
support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the
pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan
politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it
an “independent” office. x x x.
xxxx
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of
the Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional
agency that is considered “a notch above other grievance-
handling investigative bodies.” It has powers, both
constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate with its
daunting task of enforcing accountability of public
officers.162(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of
the Ombudsman’s independence vis-à-vis the
_______________
162 Id., at pp. 641-642.
494
independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the
Court observed:
(1)“[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman
and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain
characteristics — they do not owe their existence to any act
of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general
terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these
‘independent’ bodies be insulated from political pressure to
the extent that the absence of ‘independence’ would result in
the impairment of their core functions”;163
(2 )“[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in
the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of
restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the
Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire
fabric of our constitutional system is based”;164 and
(3 )“[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the
Constitutional Commissions’ need for independence. In the
deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the
1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil
Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the
premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its
freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner,
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on
Audit highlighted the developments in the
_______________
163 Id., at p. 643 (emphases supplied).

164 Id., at p. 644, citing Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992, 208
SCRA 133, 150. (emphasis supplied)
495
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 495
past Constitutions geared towards insulating the
Commission on Audit from political pressure.”165
At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that
of the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from
control or supervision of the Executive Department:
[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been
consistently intended by the framers to be independent
from executive control or supervision or any form of
political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are
concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
“independence” granted to these bodies prevents
presidential interference.
In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18,
1990, 192 SCRA 358), we emphasized that the Constitutional
Commissions, which have been characterized under the
Constitution as “independent,” are not under the control of
the President, even if they discharge functions that are
executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional
the President’s act of temporarily appointing the respondent
in that case as Acting Chairman of the [Commission on
Elections] “however well-meaning” it might have been.
In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]),
the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the
commissioners of the independent Commission on Human
Rights could not be placed under the discretionary
power of the President.
xxxx
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the
Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior — but is similar in
degree and kind — to the independence similarly guaranteed
by the Constitution to the Constitu-
_______________
165 Id., at pp. 644-645. (emphases supplied)
496
tional Commissions since all these offices fill the political
interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its
existence and proper functioning.166(Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8(2), RA 6770,

which provides that “[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be
removed from office by the President for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due
process,” partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the
Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the President
for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity
of Section 8(2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of the
Special Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not
considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the
Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the
latter enjoys under the Constitution.167
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III,
the concept of Ombudsman’s independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the
office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified
functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law,
unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is
made;
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office may not
be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for
purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be
strategically decreased by officials of the
_______________
166 Id., at pp. 646-648.

167 Id., at pp. 648-657.
168 See Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the
Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1, 13.
497
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 497
political branches of government so as to impair said functions;
and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control,
which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be
disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the
Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and
pressure, so as to free it from the “insidious tentacles of
politics.”169
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence
cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from
judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are
apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals
and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman’s notion that
it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power — that is, a
provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension
order — clearly strays from the concept’s rationale of insulating
the office from political harassment or pressure.
B. The first paragraph of Section 14,

RA 6770 in light of the powers of
Congress and the Court under the
1987 Constitution.
The Ombudsman’s erroneous abstraction of her office’s

independence notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending
provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted
by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of
injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman herself
concedes that the prohibition does
_______________
169 See Gonzales III v. Office of the President, supra note 160 at p.
650, citing the Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 26, 1986, p.
294.
498
not cover the Supreme Court.170 As support, she cites the
following Senate deliberations:
Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda.
Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the record
whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy
against the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary to have a special paragraph
for that?
Senator Angara.
Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman
being issued.
Senator Maceda.
In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to
subject this only to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the
Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower courts should be allowed to interfere. We
had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no injunction is supposed to
be issued against the Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left by
RTC judges all over the country.
The President.
Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?
Senator Angara.
We would welcome that, Mr. President.
The President.
No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court.
_______________
170 See Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 670-671.
499
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 499
Senator Maceda.
I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.
The President.
Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.171
Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5(1),

Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman,
including interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme Court’s
power of judicial review. As a corollary, the Supreme Court may
issue ancillary injunctive writs or provisional remedies in the
exercise of its power of judicial review over matters pertaining to
ongoing investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.172
With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the
validity of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it
prohibits all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional
writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That
the constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this case
has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its
constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the
course of these proceedings.173 More importantly, its resolution is
clearly necessary to the complete disposition of this case.174
_______________
171 Records of the Senate, August 24, 1988, p. 619. See also Rollo (Vol. II), pp.
670-671 (emphases and underscoring in the original).
172 Rollo (Vol. II), p. 672.
173 See discussions in Ombudsman’s Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 670-678
and Binay, Jr.’s Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 825-833. See also TSN of the Oral
174 See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 82 (1937), citing McGirr v. Hamilton and
Abreu, 30 Phil. 563, 568 (1915); 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.
500
In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v.
The Electoral Commission (Angara),175 the “Constitution has
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power
to the executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of
the government.”176 The constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government is more commonly known as
the principle of separation of powers. In the landmark case
of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court held that “there is a
violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of
government unduly encroaches on the domain of another.” 178 In
particular, “there is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of
another department’s functions.”179
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial
power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower
courts:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 1.
Section
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
This Court is the only court established by the

Constitution, while all other lower courts may be established
by laws passed by Congress. Thus, through the passage of
_______________
175 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

176 Id., at p. 157.
177 G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493, and 209251, November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1.
178 Id., at p. 108.
179 Id.
501
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 501
Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as “The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980,” the Court of Appeals,181 the Regional
Trial Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts183 were established.
Later, through the passage of RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1486,185 the Court of Tax Appeals, and
the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.
In addition to the authority to establish lower courts,
Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers
Congress to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of all courts, except that it may not deprive
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5186 of the same Article:
_______________
180 Entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes” (approved on August 14, 1981).
181 See Section 3, Chapter I, BP 129.
182 See Section 13, Chapter II, BP 129.
183 See Section 25, Chapter III, BP 129.
184 Entitled “An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals” (approved on June 16,
1954), which was later amended by RA 9282 (approved on March 30, 2004) and RA
9503 (approved on June 12, 2008).
185 Entitled “Creating a Special Court to be Known as ‘Sandiganbayan’ and for
Other Purposes” (approved on June 11, 1978), which was later amended by PD 1606
(approved on December 10, 1978), RA 7975 (approved on March 30, 1995), and RA
8249 (approved on February 5, 1997).
186 The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 5. Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
502
The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof. 2. Section
xxxx
Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to

jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese of
Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,187subject matter jurisdiction
was defined as “the authority ‘to hear and determine cases of
the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court and defines its powers.’”
Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned
the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the
aforementioned constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals,
and the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as amended.
_______________
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or
toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
187 See G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1, citing Reyes v. Diaz, 73
Phil. 484, 486 (1941).
503
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 503
In this case, the basis for the CA’s subject matter
jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.’s main petition for certiorari in C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as
amended:
9. SectionJurisdiction.—The Court of Appeals shall

exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]
Note that the CA’s certiorari jurisdiction, as above stated, is not

only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts
(under Section 21[1], Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme
Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts’
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v.
Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be

taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all
a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of
the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.189
_______________
188 254 Phil. 418; 172 SCRA 415 (1989).

189 Id., at p. 427; pp. 423-424.
504
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a
particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may
then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is
called judicial power.
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other
courts established by law, has been defined as the “totality of
powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and
hears and decides a case.”190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, it includes “the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded
scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional

concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable
the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of
the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess
of jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of “grave
abuse of discretion,” which is a very
_______________
190 Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, p. 959, 2009 ed., as cited also in the Ombudsman’s
Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), p. 661.
191 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
505
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 505
elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary.192
Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A

court’s exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a
particular case conforms to the limits and parameters
of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In
other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial
power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-
General,193 the Court elucidated that “[t]he power or authority of
the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before
procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or
change that power or authority; it simply directs the
manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be
sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court
attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This
does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter.” 194
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested
unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs
exclusively to this Court. Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
5. SectionThe Supreme Court shall have the

following powers:
xxxx
_______________
192 Id., at p. 810, citing Cruz, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, pp. 226-227,
1991 ed.
193 20 Phil. 523 (1911).
194 Id., at pp. 530-531.
506
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court
traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the
1935196 and 1973 Constitutions,197 had been priorly
_______________
195 361 Phil. 73, 86-91; 301 SCRA 96, 109-111 (1999).
196 Article VIII, Section 13 of the 1935 Constitution provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing
laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court
to alter and modify the same. 13. Section The National Assembly shall
have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
197 Article X, Section 5(5) of the 1973 Constitution provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. 5. Section
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the
507
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 507
subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress.198As it now
stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old
provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to
amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court’s
rule-making powers, in line with the Framers’ vision of
institutionalizing a “[s]tronger and more independent
judiciary.”199
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission would show200 that the Framers debated on whether or
not the Court’s rule-making powers should be shared with
Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence
“The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said
rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court,” right
after the phrase “Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]” in
the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later,
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to
_______________
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the

Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
(Emphasis supplied)
198 See Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees, 626 Phil. 93, 106-109; 612
SCRA 193, 206-208 (2010).
199 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v.
Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil. 543, 549; 613 SCRA 733, 740 (2010).
200 See discussions as in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, July 14,
1986, pp. 491-492.
508
delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
“[under]privileged,” place a comma (,) to be followed by “the phrase
with the concurrence of the National Assembly.” Eventually, a
compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee
members agreed to Commissioner Aquino’s proposal to delete the
phrase “the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement
the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme
Court” and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to
withdraw his proposal to add “the phrase with the concurrence of
the National Assembly.” The changes were approved, thereby
leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form
of Congressional participation in Section 5(5), Article
VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that “both
bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their
inherent powers.”201
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure. As pronounced in Echegaray:
The rule-making power of this Court was expanded. This

Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the
1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically

passed various rules of procedure, among others, the current
_______________
201 Id., at p. 492.

202 Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 195 at p. 88; p. 112.
509
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 509
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate
procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of
every court’s judicial power, the provisional remedies of
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction were thus provided.
A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during
the pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because
they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of
the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is
to preserve the status quo203 until the merits of the case can
be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear
that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one
of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy
the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had
on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative
remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and,
hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main
suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a
case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs
the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A prelimi
_______________
203 “Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which
precedes a controversy.” (See Dolmar Real Estate Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 570 Phil. 434, 439; 547 SCRA 114, 120 [2008] and Preysler, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, 527 Phil. 129, 136; 494 SCRA 547, 553 [2006])
204 See The Incorporators of Mindanao Institute, Inc. v. The United Church of
Christ in the Philippines, G.R. No. 171765, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 637, 647.
510
nary injunction is defined under Section 1,205 Rule 58, while
Section 3206 of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its
issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5207thereof, a TRO may
_______________
205 Section 1, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

1. SectionPreliminary injunction defined; classes.—A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to
the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person
to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance
of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction.
3. SectionGrounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.—A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act
or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or
is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
5. SectionPreliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception.—No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and
prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear
511
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 511
be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction under certain procedural parameters.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs
coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs,
processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired
jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the
Rules of Courtwhich reads:
6. SectionMeans to carry jurisdiction into effect.—When

by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer;
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law208 or by these
rules, any suitable
_______________
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or

irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on
notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as
herein provided. x x x.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a
single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only
seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately comply with the
provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the
documents to be served therewith. x x x.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
208 Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies may be
specifically pointed out by law and thus, remain effective unless the Supreme Court
disapproves the same pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution:
512
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which
appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving
“[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax
Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction”210 over “decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in
local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,” 211 the Court
ruled that said power “should coexist with, and be a complement
to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders
and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision
over the acts of the latter:”212
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is

included in it the power necessary to exercise it
effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the
subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to
protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the
court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and
incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when
necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act
which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.213(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 5. Section

(5) x x x. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
209 G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014, 715 SCRA 182.
210 Id., at p. 204.
211 Id., at p. 197.
212 Id., at p. 204.
213 Id., at pp. 204-205.
513
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 513
In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a
court endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:
[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction

should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act
effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be
regarded as powers which are inherent in its
jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order
to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any
abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted
thwarting of such process.
xxxx
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powerswhich
may be said to be implied from a general grant of
jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on
them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of
jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity
and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their
granted powers; and include the power to maintain the
court’s jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of
the litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates

the long-entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back
in the 1936 case of Angara, that “where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred.”215
In the United States, the “inherent powers doctrinerefers to
the principle by which the courts deal with diverse
_______________
214 Id., at p. 205.

215 Angara v. The Electoral Commission, supra note 175 at p. 177, citing
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 138-139.
514
matters over which they are thought to have intrinsic authority
like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping.
To justify the invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a court
must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to
achieve the specific purpose for which the exercise is
sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish
its constitutionally mandated functions.”216
In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the
constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from
enjoining the enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol
beverage license pending appeal,218 the Supreme Court of Kentucky
held:
[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain “inherent”
powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for
the administration of justice within the scope of their
jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering
_______________
216 http://definitions.uslegal.com/i/inherent-powers-doctrine/ (last visited July

27, 2015). See also Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., p. 798.
217 672 S.W.2d 62 (1984).
218 The particular statute [KRS 243.580(2) and (3)] reads:
If a license is revoked or suspended by an order of the board, the licensee shall at
once suspend all operations authorized under his license, except as provided by KRS
243.540, though he files an appeal in the Franklin Circuit Court from the order of
revocation of suspension. (2)
(3)No court may enjoin the operation of an order of revocation or
suspension pending an appeal. If upon appeal to the Franklin Circuit Court an
order of suspension or revocation is upheld, or if an order refusing to suspend or
revoke a license is reversed, and an appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals, no
court may enjoin the operation of the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court
pending the appeal. (See Smothers, id.; emphasis supplied)
515
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 515
the rule-making power and the judicial power to be one and
the same that “. . . the grant of judicial power [rule
making power] to the courts by the constitution
carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to
make that power effective in the administration of
justice.” (Emphases supplied)
Significantly, Smothers characterized a court’s issuance of

provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court’s inherent
power, and to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of
Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally
impermissible:
It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now

adopt the language framework of 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions,
Section 15, and once and for all make clear that a court, once
having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an
incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent power
to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of
justice in the case before it. In the exercise of this power,
a court, when necessary in order to protect or preserve
the subject matter of the litigation, to protect its
jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may
grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or
ancillary to the principal action.
The control over this inherent judicial power, in this
particular instance the injunction, is exclusively
within the constitutional realm of the courts. As such,
it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant
or deny the power nor is it within the purview of the
legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under
which this inherently judicial power may be or may
not be granted or denied.
This Court has historically recognized constitutional
limitations upon the power of the legislature to interfere with
or to inhibit the performance of constitutionally granted and
inherently provided judicial functions. x x x
516
xxxx
We reiterate our previously adopted language, “… a court,
once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as
incidental to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all
things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice
in the case before it…” This includes the inherent power
to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)
Smothers also pointed out that the legislature’s authority to

provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean
that it could control the appellate judicial proceeding:
However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided

for this appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon the
constitutionally granted powers of the judiciary. Once the
administrative action has ended and the right to
appeal arises the legislature is void of any right to
control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding.
The judicial rules have come into play and have
preempted the field.219 (Emphasis supplied)
With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when

Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in
so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO
and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-
making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature,
provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions
of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong
exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely
prescribed the means of implementing an existing right220 since it
only pro-
_______________
219 Id.
220 “Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action;
that part of the law which courts
517
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 517
vided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant’s
right in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of
a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,221 it was stated that:
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If

the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure.
Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of
Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the
Rules of Court, as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The
National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket
Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of
Legal Fees;223 and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes.224 While these
cases involved legislative enactments exempting government-
owned and -controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying
filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure225solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of
the legislative and executive
are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or

remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtain redress for their invasions.” (Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil.
446, 452 [1953], citing Bustos v. Lucero, [46 Off. Gaz., January
Supp., pp. 445, 448], further citing36 C. J. 27; 52 C. J. S. 1026); see
also Fabian v. Desierto, supra note 137.
_______________
221 Fabian v. Desierto, id., at p. 809; p. 492.

222 629 Phil. 1; 615 SCRA 1 (2010).
223 Supra note 198.
224 Supra note 199.
225 Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 506 Phil. 613, 626; 469 SCRA 633, 643-644
(2005).
518
branches of government. On this score, the Court described
its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and
procedure as exclusive and “[o]ne of the safeguards of [its]
institutional independence.”226
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
under Section 2, Article VIII, supra, as well as to create statutory
courts under Section 1, Article VIII, supra, does not result in an
abnegation of the Court’s own power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5(5), Article
VIII, supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are
nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be
preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress
creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure
for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court
through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the
Ombudsman misconceives,227 because it does not define, prescribe,
and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act
on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly
the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were
not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy
that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated
rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and
inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power.Without
the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be
manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules
of procedure through an administrative circular issued
therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle.
_______________
226 Supra note 199 at p. 550; p. 741.

227 See Ombudsman’s Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 668-669.
519
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 519
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress
in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the
constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a
court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a
particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events
if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the
court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court’s acquired
jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is
rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially
under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a
court’s inability to regulate what occurs during a proceeding’s
course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject
matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its
exercise thereof should be unclipped. To give true meaning to the
judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution,
the Court’s duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore
remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy
against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should
only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the
Court given its sole prerogative over the same.
The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario
Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General
Florin T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the
foregoing observations:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Rule 58, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under the
rubric of what is called provisional remedies, our resident expert because Justice Peralta is not
520
here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional remedy you have injunction. x x x.
xxxx
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, if you
have a copy of the Constitution, can you please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the
Judiciary, subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that provision?
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:
“Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts…”
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
This is the power, the competence, the jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?
The Supreme Court, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII, Sections 1 and 2 which we’ve already been
discussed with you by my other colleagues, is that not correct?
Correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct?
JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?
521
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 521
JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation in an
ordinary case?
It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be rendered
moot and academic, is that not correct?
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn’t Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?
No, Your Honor.
xxxx
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?
Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies. x x x.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the
supplemental pleading called the bill of particular[s]? It cannot, because that’s part of procedure…
That is true.
522
JUSTICE LEONEN:
…or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?
Correct.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what’s different with the writ of injunction?
Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that was
created by Congress. In the absence of jurisdiction… (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special agrarian court
it has all procedures with it but it does not attach particularly to that particular court, is that not
correct?
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:
When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court…
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of
procedure and the Rules of Court, is that not correct?
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular
injunction in a court, is that not correct?
x x x x228 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
228 TSN of the Oral Arguments, April 14, 2015, pp. 64-68.
523
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 523
In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the
Court instructed that “[i]t is through the Constitution that the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and
defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the
several departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount
law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer.” It would
then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall
be stricken down for being unconstitutional.230
However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of
powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy
considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770,
as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus,
pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the
Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of
procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition
against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing
provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure
(through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770)
without the Court’s consent thereto, it remains that the CA had
the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay,
Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely
ancillary to the exercise of the CA’s certiorari jurisdiction conferred
to it under Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and
which it had already acquired over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139453 case.
_______________
229 651 Phil. 374, 427; 637 SCRA 78, 137 (2010).
230 See Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 335 Phil. 82, 114; 267 SCRA 408, 444
(1997).
524
IV.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the

CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 against the preventive suspension order
is a persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs. For
its proper analysis, the Court first provides the context of the
assailed injunctive writs.
A. Subject matter of the CA’s injunctive writs is the

preventive suspension order.
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty

but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting
Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the Court explained the distinction,
stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be
suspended from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution
of the case against him:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction

between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as
penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of
the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different
ends sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive
measure, a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is
to prevent the accused from using his position and the
powers and prerogatives of his office to influence
potential witnesses or tamper with records which may
be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If
after such investigation, the charge is established and the
person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
_______________
231 Quimbo v. Gervacio, supra note 148.
525
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 525
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact
explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil
Service Laws.
Preventive suspension is 24. Section not a
punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is
considered to be a preventive measure. (Emphasis
supplied)
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under
preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual
penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV
provides:
The period within which a public officer or employee
charged is placed under preventive suspension shall
25. Section not be considered part of the actual
penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee
found guilty.232 (Emphases supplied)
The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are

explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:
24. SectionPreventive Suspension.—The Ombudsman or

his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of
_______________
232 Id., at pp. 891-892; pp. 281-282.
526
the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition
of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall
not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be
satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive
suspension pending an investigation, namely:
(1The evidence of guilt is strong; and )
(2Either of the following circumstances coexist with the first
requirement: )
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.233
B. The basis of the CA’s injunctive writs is the condonation
doctrine.
Examining the CA’s Resolutions in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453

would, however, show that the Ombudsman’s noncompliance with
the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis
for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.
The CA’s March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance
of the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor
Garcia, Jr. v. CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the
_______________
233 The Ombudsman v. Valeroso, 548 Phil. 688, 695; 520 SCRA 140, 146-147
(2007).
234 Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 68. See also Rollo (Vol. I), p. 45.
527
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 527
Court emphasized that “if it were established in the CA that the
acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed
committed during petitioner [Garcia’s] prior term, then, following
settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively
charged.”235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the
condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case,
that “it would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to
have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the
matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in
the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x”236 during the pendency
of the proceedings.
Similarly, the CA’s April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the
issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the condonation
doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos.237 The CA held
that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed
for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding
that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension
against Binay, Jr. given that his reelection in 2013 as City Mayor
of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from
anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building
project from 2007 to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that
although there were acts which were apparently committed by
Binay, Jr. beyond his first term, i.e., the alleged payments on July
3, 4, and 24, 2013,239corresponding to the services of Hilmarc’s and
MANA — still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable
therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona,
Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation
_______________
235 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 46.

236 Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 68 at p. 690; p. 811.
237 Aguinaldo v. Santos, supra note 92.
238 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 619.
239 All of which pertains to the payment of Phase V. Id., at
pp. 346-349; p. 623.
240 Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., supra note 95.
241 Garcia v. Mojica, supra note 96.
528
doctrine was applied by the Court although the payments were
made after the official’s election, reasoning that the payments were
merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said
reelection.242
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA
to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter
of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her
office during the administrative disciplinary
proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was
not precluded from considering the same given that it was material
to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in
conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the
subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was
duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that
although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt
against him was not strong in his petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139453,245 it appears that the CA found that the application of the
condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the
implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is
nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same case
of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject
of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during
Binay, Jr.’s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he
can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with
condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory
affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to
determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least
for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.
_______________
242 Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 619-620.

243 See Ombudsman’s Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 703-704.
244 See Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 410-415.
245 Id., at pp. 415-422.
529
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 529
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the
assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to
determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the
condonation doctrine.
C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as “[a]
victim’s express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by
treating the offender as if there had been no offense.”246
The condonation doctrine — which connotes this same sense of
complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated
upon — is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential
creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,247 (Pascual), which was
therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected
Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and
was later reelected to the same position in 1955. During his
second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial
Governor filed administrative charges before the Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and
usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint
in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In
defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for
the acts charged against him since they were committed during his
previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for
disciplining him during his second term. The Provincial Board, as
well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided
against Arturo Pascual, and when the case reached this Court on
appeal, it
_______________
246 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., p. 315.

247 106 Phil. 466 (1959).
530
recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue — that is,
whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful
act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of
office.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time,
the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and
“found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part,
probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions,
and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the
question of whether the subsequent election or appointment
condones the prior misconduct.”248 Without going into the
variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to
state that:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline

toward the rule denying the right to remove one from
office because of misconduct during a prior term, to
which we fully subscribe.249(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now

uncovered that there is really no established weight of authority in
the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which,
in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official’s reelection
denies the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct
during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral
arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US
have abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman
aptly cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as
literature published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the
doctrine is not uniformly
_______________
248 Id., at p. 471.

249 Id.
250 See Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno’s (Chief Justice Sereno)
Interpellation, TSN of the Oral Arguments, April 21, 2015, p. 191.
531
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 531
applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is
nuanced:
(1For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of
removing a public officer from his current term or office for
misconduct which he allegedly committed in a prior term of office
is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional
provision applicable to the facts of a particular case (see ) In Re
Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example, a Texas
statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act
committed during a present term: “no officer shall be prosecuted or
removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his
election to office” (see State ex rel. Rawlings v. Loomis).252 On the
other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from
office for “acts of commission, omission, or neglect committed, done
or omitted during a previous or preceding term of office” (see State
v. Bailey).253 Meanwhile, in some states where the removal statute
is silent or unclear, the case’s resolution was contingent upon the
interpretation of the phrase “in office.” On one end, the Supreme
Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute containing the
phrase “misfeasance of malfeasance in office” and thereby declared
that, in the absence of clear legislative language making, the word
“office” must be limited to the single term during which the offense
charged against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes
v.
_______________
251 155 Ohio St. 329; 98 N.E.2d 807 (1951); cited in Goger, Thomas,
J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during previous term, 42 A.L.R.3d
691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), p. 11.
252 Tex Civ App 29 SW 415 (1895), cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., id., at p. 16,
and in Silos, Miguel U., A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public
Officers, 84 Phil. L.J. 22, 33 (2009).
253 1956 OK 338; 305 P.2d 548 (1956); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., id., at p.
15.
532
Probate Court of Cuyahoga County).254 Similarly, the Common
Pleas Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided that the
phrase “in office” in its state constitution was a time limitation
with regard to the grounds of removal, so that an officer could not
be removed for misbehaviour which occurred prior to the taking of
the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman).255 The opposite was
construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view
that an officer’s inability to hold an office resulted from the
commission of certain offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to
continue in office, adding the fact that the officer had been
reelected did not condone or purge the offense (see State ex rel.
Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the
words “in office” to refer not to a particular term of office but to an
entire tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in
enacting the statute in question could easily be lost sight of, and
the intent of the lawmaking body be thwarted, if an unworthy
official could not be removed during one term for misconduct for a
previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257
(2For another, condonation depended on whether or not the
public officer was a successor in the same office for which he has
been administratively charged. The “own-successor theory,” which
is recognized in numerous States as an exception to condonation
doctrine, is premised on the idea that each term of a reelected
incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct, but rather,
regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions
committed in a previous term are grounds )
_______________
254 22 Ohio St. 2d 120; 258 N.E.2d 594 (1970); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., id.,
at pp. 11 and 22.
255 1946 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.; 56 Pa. D. & C. 393 (1946); cited in Goger, Thomas,
J.D., id., at p. 11.
256 45 La Ann 1350, 14 So 28 (1893); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., id., at p. 26.
257 236 App Div 371, 259 NYS 402 (1932); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., id., at
p. 27.
533
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 533
for removal because a reelected incumbent has no prior term to
speak of258 (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;259 State v.
Welsh;260 Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand Rapids;261 Territory
v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263
(3Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the
continuing nature of an offense in cases where the condonation
doctrine was invoked. In ) State ex rel. Douglas v.
Megaarden,264 the public officer charged with malversation of public
funds was denied the defense of condonation by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota, observing that “the large sums of money illegally
collected during the previous years are still retained by him.”
In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey,265 the Supreme Court of Kansas
ruled that “there is no necessity” of applying the condonation
doctrine since “the misconduct continued in the present term of
office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon defendant to restore this
money on demand of the county commissioners.” Moreover,
in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of
Kansas held that “insofar as nondelivery and excessive prices are
concerned, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of the
defendant to make restitution to the country x x x, this duty
extends into the present term, and neglect to discharge it
constitutes misconduct.”
_______________
258 See Ombudsman’s Memorandum p. 70, Rollo (Vol. II), p. 715, citing Silos,
Miguel U., supra note 252 at p. 69.
259 239 Mass. 458; 132 N.E. 322 (1921).
260 109 Iowa 19; 79 N.W. 369 (1899).
261 192 Mich. 276; 158 N.W. 953 (1916).
262 14 N.M. 493; 1908-NMSC-022 (1908).
263 125 Ga. 18; 53 S.E. 811 (1906).
264 85 Minn. 41; 88 N.W. 412 (1901), cited in Silos, Miguel U., supraat p. 69.
265 148 Kan. 166; 80 P.2d 1095 (1938); cited in Silos, Miguel U., id., at p. 70.
266 199 Kan. 403; 430 P.2d 304 (1967), applying State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey, id.
534
Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary
conclusion in Pascual that there is a “weight of authority” in the
US on the condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent
exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous
factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an outright adoption
of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been proper.
At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the
process of this Court’s decision-making. “[They] are not relied upon
as precedents, but as guides of interpretation.”267 Therefore, the
ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as
espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can
be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine
of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing
doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule
should not operate when there are powerful countervailing
considerations against its application.268 In other words, stare
decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist
to preclude reversal of standing precedent.269 As the Ombudsman
correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid,
atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and
devolves along with the society within which it thrives.270 In the
words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, “[w]hat we can
decide, we can undecide.”271
_______________
267 Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers Association of
the Philippines, 503 Phil. 485; 465 SCRA 532 (2005).
268 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 177.
269 See Ombudsman Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), p. 718, citing Cardozo,
Benjamin N., The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 149 (1921), cited in Christopher
P. Banks, Reversal of Precedent and Judicial Policy-Making: How Judicial
Conceptions of Stare Decisis in the U.S. Supreme Court Influence Social Change, 32
Akron L. Rev. 233 (1999).
270 Id., at pp. 722-723.
271 Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2401; 192 L. Ed.; 192 L.
Ed. 2d 463 (2015).
535
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 535
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since
the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically
shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935
Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience
of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the
sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability,
calls for Pascual’s judicious reexamination.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual’s ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the
term in which the public officer was elected for each term is
separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous

term are generally held not to furnish cause for
removal and this is especially true where the constitution
provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall
not extend beyond the removal from office, and
disqualification from holding office for the term for
which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S.,
p. 248, citing Rice v. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery v.
Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw v. Thompson,
130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com’rs of Kingfisher County v.
Shutler, 281 P. 222; State v. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula,
147 A. 67; State v. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217)
The underlying theory is that each term is separate
from other terms x x x.272
_______________
272 Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, supra note 247 at p. 471.
536
Second, an elective official’s reelection serves as a condonation
of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a

condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
(43 Am. Jur., p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. v. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63
So. 559, 50 L.R.A. [NS] 553).273 (emphasis supplied)
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed
to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to
elect officers:
As held in Conant v. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in

17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for
acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When the people have elected a
man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not
for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to
practically overrule the will of the people.274 (Emphases
supplied)
The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as

follows:
_______________
273 Id., at pp. 471-472.

274 Id., at p. 472.
537
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 537
(1 )Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) — wherein the
Court first applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the
above stated passages from Pascual in verbatim.
(2 )Ingco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) — wherein
the Court clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply
to a criminal case. It was explained that a criminal case is
different from an administrative case in that the former involves
the People of the Philippines as a community, and is a public
wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the
populace of the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the
Court noted that it is only the President who may pardon a
criminal offense.
(3 )Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) — a
case decided under the 1987 Constitutionwherein the
condonation doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan
Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his reelection merely
supervened the pendency of the proceedings.
(4 )Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) —
wherein the Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by
stating that the same is justified by “sound public
policy.” According to the Court, condonation prevented the
elective official from being “hounded” by administrative cases filed
by his “political enemies” during a new term, for which he has to
defend himself “to the detriment of public service.” Also, the Court
mentioned that the administrative liability condoned by reelection
covered the execution of the contract and the incidents related
therewith.279
_______________
275 123 Phil. 916; 17 SCRA 58 (1966).

276 129 Phil. 553; 21 SCRA 1292 (1967). See also Luciano v. The Provincial
Governor, 138 Phil. 546; 28 SCRA 517 (1969) and Oliveros v. Villaluz, 156 Phil. 137;
57 SCRA 163 (1974).
277 Aguinaldo v. Santos, supra note 92.
278 Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., supra note 95.
279 Id., at p. 921; pp. 115-116.
538
(5 )Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10,
1999) — wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then
Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively
charged for his involvement in an anomalous contract for the
supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4) days before
the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the
timing of the contract’s execution, the electorate is presumed to
have known the petitioner’s background and character, including
his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent reelection was deemed
a condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the
Court held that the determinative time element in applying the
condonation doctrine should be the time when the contract was
perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was
entered into during a prior term, acts which were done to
implement the same, even if done during a succeeding term,
do not negate the application of the condonation doctrine
in favor of the elective official.
(6 )Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman281(Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) — wherein the
Court explained the doctrinal innovations in
the Salalima andMayor Garcia rulings, to wit:
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon.

Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was
applied even if the administrative complaint was not
filed before the reelection of the public official, and
even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days
before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not
distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative
complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed
during the prior term, the precise timing or period of
which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the
wrongdoing that gave rise to the public offi
_______________
280 Garcia v. Mojica, supra note 96.

281 633 Phil. 325; 619 SCRA 313 (2010).
539
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 539
cial’s culpability was committed prior to the date of
reelection.282 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283also

clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to
appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will
to disenfranchise.
(7And finally, the above discussed case of ) Governor Garcia,
Jr. — wherein the Court remarked that it would have been
prudent for the appellate court therein to have issued a temporary
restraining order against the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in view of the
condonation doctrine.
A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among
others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia,
Jr. — all cited by the CA to justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6,
2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive
writs — would show that the basis for condonation under the
prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never
accounted for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases
is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was
— and still remains — the above cited postulates of Pascual, which
was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply
supported by their own state laws. With respect to its applicability
to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation — that is,
an elective official’s reelection cuts off the right to remove him for
an administrative offense committed during a prior term — was
adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because
the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal
norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is — as it should
be — dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating
jurisdiction. Hence, the Court
_______________
282 Id., at p. 335; p. 325.

283 577 Phil. 52, 72; 554 SCRA 160, 180 (2008).
540
undertakes an examination of our current laws in order to
determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the
doctrine of condonation.
The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It
is the supreme law of the land;284 thus, the unbending rule is that
every statute should be read in light of the
Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a
workable government; hence, its interpretation must take into
account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the
operation of the political branches of government.286
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in
1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935
Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability,
or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision
in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public
office is Section 2, Article II which states that “[t]he defense of the
State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
military or civil service.”287 Perhaps owing to the 1935
Constitution’s silence on public accountability, and considering the
dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the
variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring
objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the
condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases existing
at that time.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in
dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The
new charter introduced an entire article on accountability
_______________
284 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676
SCRA 579, 607.
285 Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, 646 (1945), citing 11 Am. Jur.,
Constitutional Law, Section 96.
286 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174,
113766, and 113888 August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506, 523.
287 See Silos, Miguel U., supra note 252 at p. 69; pp. 26-27.
541
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 541
of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof
positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that “[p]ublic
office is a public trust.” Accordingly, “[p]ublic officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall
remain accountable to the people.”
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino
People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets
forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article
II that “[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in
the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption.”288 Learning how unbridled power
could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the
Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More
significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified
what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by
commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all
times:
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees

1. Section must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
In Belgica, it was explained that:
[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the

1987 Constitution, which states that “public office is a public
trust,” is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality
of government should exercise their official functions only in
accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
embodies the parameters of the peo-
_______________
288 Section 27, Article II.
542
ple’s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis supplied)
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code

under the section of the Civil Service Commission,290 and also, in
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.291
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to
discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from
office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No.
_______________
289 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 177 at p. 131, citing Bernas, Joaquin G.,
S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p.
1108, 2003 ed.
290 1. SectionDeclaration of Policy.—The State shall insure and promote the
Constitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil Service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness; that the Civil Service Commission, as the central
personnel agency of the Government shall establish a career service, adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy in
the civil service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability; that public office is a
public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people; and that personnel functions shall be decentralized,
delegating the corresponding authority to the departments, offices and agencies
where such functions can be effectively performed. (Section 1, Book V, Title I,
subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987; emphasis supplied)
291 2. SectionDeclaration of Policies.—It is the policy of the State to promote
a high standard of ethics in public service. Public officials and employees shall
at all times be accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties
with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with
patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over
personal interest. (Emphasis supplied) See Section 2, RA 6713 (approved on
February 20, 1989)
543
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 543
7160,292 otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of
1991” (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took
effect on January 1, 1992:
60. SectionGrounds for Disciplinary Action.—An elective

local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from
office on any of the following grounds:
Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; (a)
Culpable violation of the Constitution; (b)
Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross
negligence, or dereliction of duty; (c)
Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude
or an offense punishable by at least (d) prisión mayor;
Abuse of authority; (e)
Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive
working days, except in the case of members of the
(f) sangguniang panlalawigan,sangguniang
panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang
barangay;
Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or
residence or the status of an immigrant of another
country; and (g)
Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code
and other laws. (h)
An elective local official may be removed from office on the
grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Related to this provision is Section 40(b) of the LGCwhich

states that those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case shall be disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
40. SectionDisqualifications.—The following persons are

disqualified from running for any elective local position:
_______________
292 Entitled “An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991” (approved
on October 10, 1991).
544
xxxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In the same sense, Section 52(a) of the RRACCS provides that

the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public
office:
52. SectionAdministrative Disabilities Inherent in

Certain Penalties.—
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation
of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from
taking the civil service examinations.
In contrast, Section 66(b) of the LGC states that the penalty of
suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective
local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he
meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that
the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its
effect on the official’s candidacy. Nothing therein states that
the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the
fact of reelection:
66. SectionForm and Notice of Decision.—x x x.

xxxx
The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired
term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the
candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets
the qualifications required for the office. (b)
545
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 545
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above cited
legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust
and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution,
is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected
to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election
is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and
there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a
different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability
arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses
may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted
in Llamas v. Orbos293to apply to administrative offenses:
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases

executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with
the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token,
if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases,
it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section
19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner’s proposed
interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically
excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve
criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and
convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
_______________
293 279 Phil. 920, 937; 202 SCRA 844, 857-858 (1991).
546
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly
less serious than criminal offenses.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the

grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be
invoked against an elective local official to hold him
administratively liable once he is reelected to office. In fact, Section
40(b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an
elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal
could not be reelected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard,
Section 52(a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the
penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided
by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of
administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or
statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot
be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous
term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the
_______________
294 In Fudula’s Petition (297 Pa. 364; 147 A. 67 [1929]), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania cited (a) 29 Cyc. 1410 which states: “Where removal may be made for
cause only, the cause must have occurred during the present term of the
officer. Misconduct prior to the present term even during a preceding
term will not justify a removal”; and (b) x x x Penal Code [Cal.], paragraph
772, providing for the removal of officers for violation of duty, which states
“a sheriff cannot be removed from office, while serving his second term, for
offenses committed during his first term.” (Emphases supplied)
In Board of Commissioners of Kingfisher County v. Shutler (139 Okla. 52;
281 P. 222 [1929]), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that “[u]nder Section
2405, C. O. S. 1921, the only judgment a court can render on an officer being
convicted of malfea
547
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 547
office does not extend beyond the term in which the
official’s delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296the absence of a
provision against the reelection of an officer removed — unlike
Section 40(b) of the LGC — was the justification behind
condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed
_______________
sance or misfeasance in office is removal from office and an officer cannot

be removed from office under said section for acts committed by him while
holding the same office in a previous term.” (Emphases supplied)
295 In State v. Blake (138 Okla. 241; 280 P. 833 [1929]), the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma cited State ex rel. Hill, County Attorney, v. Henschel, 175 P. 393, wherein
it was said: “Under the Ouster Law (Section 7603 of the General Statutes of
1915-Code Civ. Proc. 686a-), a public officer who is guilty of willful misconduct in
office forfeits his right to hold the office for the term of his election or
appointment; but the disqualification to hold the office does not extend
beyond the term in which his official delinquency occurred.” (Emphases
supplied)
296 In Rice v. State (204 Ark. 236; 161 S.W.2d 401 [1942]), the Supreme Court
of Arkansas cited (a) Jacobs v. Parham, 175 Ark. 86, 298 S.W. 483, which quoted a
headnote, that “Under Crawford Moses’ Dig. [(i.e., a digest of statutes in the
jurisdiction of Arkansas)] 10335, 10336, a public officer is not subject to removal
from office because of acts done prior to his present term of office in view of Const.,
Arts. 7, 27, containing no provision against reelection of officer removed
for any of the reasons named therein.” (Emphases supplied)
297 In State ex rel. Brickell v. Hasty (184 Ala. 121; 63 So. 559 [1913]), the
Supreme Court of Alabama held: “x x x If an officer is impeached and removed,
there is nothing to prevent his being elected to the identical office from
which he was removed for a subsequent term, and, this being true, a
reelection to the office would operate as a condonation under the
Constitution of the officer’s conduct during the previous term, to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him from subsequent term for said conduct during
the previous term. It seems to be the policy of our Constitution to make each term
independent of the other, and to disassociate the conduct under one term from the
qualification or right to fill another term, at least, so far as the same may apply to
548
that condonation through reelection was a policy under their
constitution — which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to
our present Constitution’s requirements on public accountability.
There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not
adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground; 298 while
in another case, which was not reported in full in the official series,
the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior
irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and
therefore, was deemed to be incompetent.299 Hence, owing to either
their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as
basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under
our existing laws.
_______________
impeachment proceedings, and as distinguished from the right to indict and

convict an offending official.” (Emphasis supplied)
298 In State Ex Rel. V. Ward (163 Tenn. 265; 43 S.W.2d. 217 [1931]), decided
by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Knoxville, it appears to be erroneously relied
upon in Pascual, since the proposition “[t]hat the Acts alleged in paragraph 4 of the
petition involved contracts made by defendant prior to his present term for which he
cannot now be removed from office” was not a court ruling but an argument raised
by the defendant in his demurrer.
299 In Conant v. Grogan (6 N.Y.S.R. 322 [1887]), which was cited in Newman
v. Strobel (236 A.D. 371; 259 N.Y.S. 402 [1932]; decided by the Supreme Court of
New York, Appellate Division) reads: “Our attention is called
to Conant v. Grogan (6 N.Y. St. Repr. 322; 43 Hun, 637) and Matter of King (25
N.Y. St. Repr. 792; 53 Hun, 631), both of which decisions are of the late General
Term, and neither of which is reported in full in the official series. While
there are expressions in each opinion which at first blush might seem to
uphold respondent’s theory, an examination of the cases discloses the fact
that the charge against each official related to acts performed during his
then term of office, and evidence of some prior irregularity was offered
which in no way pertained to the charge in issue. It was properly held that
such evidence was incompetent. The respondent was not called upon to answer
such charge, but an entirely separate and different one.” (Emphases supplied)
549
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 549
At best, Section 66(b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of
the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the
elective local official’s prior term, and likewise allows said official
to still run for reelection. This treatment is similar to People ex rel.
Bagshaw v. Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Nowell,301 both cited
in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot
be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term.
However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66(b) states that
the elective local official’s administrative liability is extinguished
by the fact of reelection. Thus, at all events, no legal provision
actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
Relatedly, it should be clarified that there is no truth
in Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be depriving the
electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were
not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the
process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to
hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal
basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation.
Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If
condonation of an elective official’s
_______________
300 In People ex rel. Bagshaw v. Thompson (55 Cal. App. 2d 147; 130
P.2d.237 [1942]), the Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District
cited Thurston v. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 P. 435), wherein it was ruled:
“The Constitution does not authorize the governor to suspend an incumbent of
the office of county commissioner for an act of malfeasance or misfeasance in office
committed by him prior to the date of the beginning of his current term of office as
such county commissioner.” (Emphasis supplied)
301 Montgomery v. Nowell (183 Ark. 1116; 40 S.W.2d 418 [1931]); decided by
the Supreme Court of Arkansas), the headnote reads as follows: “Crawford & Moses’
Dig., 10, 335, providing for suspension of an officer on presentment or indictment
for certain causes including malfeasance, in office does not provide for suspension
of an officer on being indicted for official misconduct during a prior term of office.”
(Emphasis supplied)
550
administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this
jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law
under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time
of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such
a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists.
Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said
that the electorate’s will has been abdicated.
Equally infirm is Pascual’s proposition that the electorate, when
reelecting a local official, are assumed to have done so with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any
statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human
experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a
public official’s misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the
reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in
secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed
by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost
always unknown to the electorate when they cast their
votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the
condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus,
there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. As
observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton304 decided by the New
Jersey Supreme Court:
Many of the cases holding that reelection of a public official

prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of
office are reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We
cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation,
implying as it does forgiveness, connotes
_______________
302 See Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno’s interpellation, TSN of the
Oral Arguments, April 14, 2015, p. 43.
303 See Ombudsman’s Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), p. 716, citing Silos, Miguel
U., supra note 252 at p. 69; p. 67.
304 117 N.J.L. 64; 186 A. 818 (1936).
551
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 551
knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no
condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has
no knowledge.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to

sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be
seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class
of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from — and
now rendered obsolete by — the current legal regime. In
consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in
the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the
CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of
the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for
the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.305 Unto this Court devolves the sole
authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all
persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De
Castro v. Judicial Bar Council:306
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute

itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon
to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce
obedience to them.307
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s

error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as
_______________
305 See Article 8 of the Civil Code.
306 632 Phil. 657; 618 SCRA 639 (2010).
307 Id., at p. 686; p. 658.
552
“good law” prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s
reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this
matter is People v. Jabinal,308wherein it was ruled:
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different

view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:
[P]ursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code “judicial decisions

applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.” But while
our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also
subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that
“laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided.” This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex
prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward.
The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that
have already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and hence, is unconstitutional.310
Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can

greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus,
while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren
of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a
considerable length of time, this Court, under a new membership,
takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.
_______________
308 154 Phil. 565; 55 SCRA 607 (1974).

309 G.R. Nos. 97973 and 97998, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515.
310 Id., at p. 527.
553
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 553
E. Consequence of ruling.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved
is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.311 It has also been held that “grave abuse of discretion
arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.”312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA’s resolutions
directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all
hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount,
the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject
TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April
6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was
based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and
again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled
precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time,
unwittingly remained “good law,” it cannot be concluded that the
CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attri-
_______________
311 Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 667 Phil. 474, 481-482; 652 SCRA 341, 348 (2011).
312 Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202,
March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574, 599-600.
554
bution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman’s
preventive suspension order was correctly issued.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the
CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman,
on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively
liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which
carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from
holding public office, for the present administrative charges
against him, the said CA petition appears to have been
mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is
only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of
assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It
therefore has no more purpose — and perforce, dissolves — upon
the termination of the office’s process of investigation in the
instant administrative case.
F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the

mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive
suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its
foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the
condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, “‘the moot and
academic principle’ is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth,
the case
_______________
313 See Press Release dated October 9, 2015 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&pressId=NzE3 (vi
sited November 9, 2015).
555
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 555
is capable of repetition yet evading review.”314 All of these
scenarios obtain in this case:
First, it would be a violation of the Court’s own duty to uphold
and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the
condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become
apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of
the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the
auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates
that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be
accountable to the people at all times.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential
creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to
escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal
intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is
a situation of exceptional character which this Court must
ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a
perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the
multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is
indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine
clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve
an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also puts
to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the
bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial
doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same
in view of its relevance on the parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently
invoked by elective local officials against the administrative
charges filed against them. To provide a sample size,
_______________
314 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 177 at p. 93.
556
the Ombudsman has informed the Court that “for the period of
July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office
and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground
of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred
cases of alleged misconduct — involving infractions such as
dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct
— were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman’s investigatory
and prosecutorial powers.”315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding
that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade
review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the
prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own
jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its
mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it
notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of
discussion moot.
V.
With all matters pertaining to C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 passed

upon, the Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not the
CA’s Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman
to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 139504 is improper and illegal.
The sole premise of the Ombudsman’s contention is that, as an
impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for
indirect contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and
the penalty therefor would result in her effective
_______________
315 See Ombudsman’s Memorandum, Rollo (Vol. II), p. 85.

316 Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 50-51.
317 See Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt dated March 18,
2015 wherein private respondent Binay, Jr. charged, inter alia, the Ombudsman for
acts constituting indirect contempt under Section 3(b), (c), and (d) of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court; id., at pp. 362-375.
557
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 557
removal from office.318 However, a reading of the aforesaid March
20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been
subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance, in fact,
makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the
Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not necessarily given
due course to Binay, Jr.’s contempt petition:
Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition
for Contempt, respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio-Morales,
in her capacity as the Ombudsman, and the Department of
the Interior and Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to
file Comment on the Petition/Amended and Supplemental
Petition for Contempt (C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139504) within an
inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt
hereof.319 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA’s directive by

filing a comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to
the contempt proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable
officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may
still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.’s contempt petition and
accordingly, dismiss the same. Simply put, absent any indication
that the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it
would then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The
submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under
the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:
(athe second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
declared ) UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the
issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts
_______________
318 See Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 734-743.

319 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 50.
558
other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first
paragraph of the said provision is declaredINEFFECTIVE until
the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued therefor;
(bThe condonation doctrine is ) ABANDONED, but the
abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;
(cThe Court of Appeals (CA) is ) DIRECTED to act on
respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.’s (Binay, Jr.) petition
for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 in light of the Office of
the Ombudsman’s supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated
October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six
(6) administrative complaints, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058,
OMB-C-A-15-0059’ OMB-C-A-15-0060’ OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-
A-15-0062 and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and
(dAfter the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-
Morales’s comment, the CA is ) DIRECTED to resolve Binay,
Jr.’s petition for contempt in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139504 with
utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta and Jardeleza, JJ., No part.
Brion, J., No part; On Leave.
Bersamin, J., Please see my Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion.
Mendoza, J., On Leave.
559
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 559
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BERSAMIN,J.:
I am writing this separate opinion to memorialize my

concurrence with the declaration of the ineffectiveness of the first
paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770, and of the
unconstitutionality of the second paragraph thereof. The main
opinion has been written well by our esteemed colleague, Associate
Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, who has exhibited her scholarly
bent once again. But let me assure my colleagues in the Majority
that if I submit this concurrence, I do not mean to diminish in any
way or degree the forcefulness and correctness of the justification
for the declaration. I simply want to underscore that Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down for authorizing the
undue interference with the prerogatives of the courts of law to
adopt whatever means were allowed by law and procedure to
exercise their jurisdiction in the cases properly cognizable by them.
My dissent focuses on the main opinion’s reexamination of the
doctrine of condonation. This controversy does not call for the
revisit of the doctrine, and does not warrant its eventual
abandonment. For the Court to persist in the reexamination, as it
does now, and to announce its abandonment of the doctrine despite
the lack of the premise of justiciability is to indulge in conjecture or
in unwarranted anticipation of future controversies. We should
refrain from the reexamination.
The Ombudsman’s supplemental petition raised condonation for
the first time but only to support her insistence that the CA could
not validly rely on the doctrine of condonation to justify its
issuance of the injunction. She maintained then that condonation
was a matter of defense to be properly raised only in the
appropriate administrative proceeding, viz.:
It must be further emphasized that the condonation

doctrine is irrelevant in the Ombudsman’s determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong in is- 6.
560
suing preventive suspension orders. Said doctrine does not
go into the heart of subject matter jurisdiction. Neither can it
oust the Ombudsman of her jurisdiction which she has
already acquired. Private respondent’s claim of condonation
doctrine is equally a matter of defense which, like any other
defense, could be raised in the proper pleading, could be
rebutted, and could be waived.
As a defense, condonation should be passed upon after a
decision on the administrative proceedings, not this early in
the proceeding.
The condonation doctrine, however, cannot abate the
issuance of a preventive suspension order, precisely because
an order of preventive suspension does not render a
respondent administratively liable. A respondent may be
preventively suspended, yet may be exonerated in the end.
7.
At all events, there is no condonation because private
respondent committed the acts subject of the complaint after
his reelection in 2013, as was argued by petition in public
respondent Court of Appeals. 8.
As mentioned earlier, there is no condonation. The assailed
act ( 9.i.e., payment), by private respondent’s own admission
during the proceedings before public respondent Court of
Appeals, took place during the period of June and July 2013,
which was after his reelection in May 2013.1
The Ombudsman again discussed the doctrine of condonation at

some length in her Memorandum as the fourth and last argument
presented on the issue of the propriety of the temporary
restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction.2 She
reiterated, however, that the doctrine was only a matter of defense
that was relevant only in imposing an administrative penalty on
the respondent public elective official, to wit:
_______________
1 Supplemental Petition for Certiorari, p. 4.

2 Memorandum, pp. 646-734.
561
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 561
Thus, in deciding that the evidence of respondent Binay’s
guilt is strong, petitioner did not take into consideration the
so-called “condonation doctrine” the way respondent Court of
Appeals did in its Third Resolution. The condonation doctrine
is applicable and relevant only to the imposition of an
administrative penalty, not to the issuance of a preventive
suspension, the latter being merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. 165.
Since a preventive suspension does not hold a public officer
liable, it will not be affected by any “condonation” that the
electorate may extend to the public officer. Verily, for
purposes of aiding an investigation, a public officer may be
preventively suspended even as, ultimately, he or she will be
exonerated from administrative liability due to the
condonation doctrine. CONDONATION IS A MATTER OF
DEFENSE — to be positively alleged and to be weighed
according to the evidence — during the administrative
proceedings, and not at the very preliminary stage thereof.
166.3
I agree with the Ombudsman. The question of grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the CA could be settled not by
reexamining and overturning the doctrine of condonation but by
reference to Section 24 of the Republic Act No. 6770. It would be
plain error for us to determine whether the Court of Appeals (CA)
gravely abused its discretion or not on the basis of the doctrine of
condonation.
The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed
by Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,4
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 703-704.
4The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties: 13. Sec.
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. x x x (1)
562
while her statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints
is founded on Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770, viz.:
19. SectionAdministrative complaints.—The Ombuds-

man shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to
acts or omissions which:
Are contrary to law or regulation; 1.
Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; 2.
Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s
functions, though in accordance with law; 3.
Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts; 4.
Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an
improper purpose; or 5.
Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
6.
In line with the power to investigate administrative cases, the

Ombudsman is vested with the authority to preventively suspend
respondent public officials and employees pursuant to Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6770, which provides:
24. SectionPreventive Suspension.—The Ombudsman or

his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such
563
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 563
delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
It is important to note, however, that the Ombudsman has no

authority to issue the preventive suspension order in connection
with criminal investigations of government officials or employees
because such authority rests in the courts in which the criminal
cases are filed.5
Under Section 24, supra, two requisites must concur to render
the preventive suspension order valid. The first requisite is unique
because it can be satisfied in only one way, which is that the
evidence of guilt is strong in the judgment of the Ombudsman or
the Deputy Ombudsman. But the second requisite may be
satisfied in three different ways, namely: (1) that the offense
charged involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; or (2) the charge would warrant
removal from the service; or (3) the respondent’s continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him or her.6
Respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., along with other
officers and employees of the City of Makati, were administratively
charged in the Office of the Ombudsman with grave misconduct,
serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.7 In her joint order dated March 10, 2015, the
Ombudsman stated that the requisites for the issuance of the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. and his
corespondents were satisfied, specifically:
The first requisite is present in these cases, as shown by

the supporting evidence attached as Annexes to the
Complaint. These Annexes include, among other
_______________
5 See Luciano v. Provincial Governor, No. L-30306, June 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 517.
6 Office of the Ombudsman v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 177211, March 13, 2009, 581
SCRA 350.
7 Docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-
C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, OMB-C-A-15-0063.
564
things, sworn statements of alleged losing bidders and of
some members of the Makati City BAC attesting to the
irregularities in the subject procurement; documents
negating the purported publication of bids; and disbursement
vouchers, checks, and official receipts showing disbursement
of public funds by the city government.
As regard the second requisite, all the circumstances
enumerated therein are likewise present. The Complaint
charges respondents with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service. If proven true, they constitute grounds for
removal from public service under the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Moreover, since the
respondents’ respective positions give them access to public
records and influence on possible witnesses, respondents’
continued stay in office may prejudice the cases filed against
them. Thus, their preventive suspension without pay for a
period of six (6) months is in order.
When he assailed the preventive suspension order by petition

for certiorari in the CA, Binay, Jr. alleged that the preventive
suspension order was illegal and issued with grave abuse of
discretion because: (1) it contravened well-settled jurisprudence
applying the doctrine of condonation; and (2) evidence of his guilt
was not strong. He prayed that a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the
implementation of the preventive suspension order.
The CA heeded Binay, Jr.’s prayer for injunctive reliefs chiefly
on the basis of the doctrine of condonation. In the resolution
promulgated on March 16, 2015, the CA, citing the pronouncement
in Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,8granted Binay, Jr.’s application
for the temporary restraining order, holding as follows:
_______________
8 G.R. No. 185132, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 799.
565
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 565
In Garcia v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 185132, April 24,
2009), the Supreme Court held that suspension from office of
an elective official, whether as a preventive measure or as a
penalty will undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and
voted into office.
The Supreme Court in said case likewise found serious and
urgent the question, among other matters, of whether the
alleged acts were committed in the previous term of office of
petitioner therein. This is because if it were established that
the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed
committed during petitioner’s prior term, then following
settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively
charged. It further declared imperative on the part of the
appellate court, as soon as it was apprised of the said
considerable grounds, to issue an injunctive writ so as not to
render moot, nugatory and ineffectual the resolution of the
issues in the certiorari petition. (Garcia, supra)
The Supreme Court also declared that it would have been
more prudent on the part of the CA, on account of the
extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the
issues raised in the certioraripetition, to issue a TRO while it
awaits the respective comments of the respondents and while
it judiciously contemplates on whether or not to issue a writ
of preliminary injunction. It pointed out that the basic
purpose of a restraining order is to preserve the status
quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction. That, it is a preservative remedy for the protection
of substantive rights and interests. (Garcia, supra)
In view of the seriousness of the issues raised in the
Petition for Certiorari and the possible repercussions on the
electorate who will unquestionably be affected by suspension
of their elective official, the Court resolves to grant
petitioner’s prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order
for a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof,
conditioned upon the posting by pe-
566
titioner of a bond in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).9
In ultimately granting the writ of preliminary injunction

through its April 6, 2015 resolution, the CA, relying on the doctrine
of condonation adopted in Garcia, Jr.; Joson III v. Court of
Appeals;10 Aguinaldo v. Santos;11 and Salalima v. Guingona,
Jr.,12 explained:
Garcia was simply an echo of teachings in Joson v. Court of

Appeals (G.R. No. 160652, February 13, 2006) where the High
Court declared that suspension from office of an elective
official would deprive the electorate of the services of the
person they have voted into office.
Along this line, the concept of condonation, as advocated by
petitioner and opposed by public respondent Ombudsman,
will assume resonance.
Premised on Aguinaldo, Salalima and Garcia, petitioner
asserted that the public respondent Ombudsman can hardly
impose preventive suspension of petitioner, given his election
in 2010 and reelection in 2013 as Makati City Mayor, relative
to his perceived illegal participation in anomalous activities
for the Makati City Hall Building II project from 2007 to
2013.
xxxx
To reiterate, there was no disagreement that petitioner was
elected in 2010 and reelected as City Mayor of Makati in
2013. The acts constitutive of the charges in the Complaint
pertained to events from November 8, 2007, when City
Ordinance No. 2007-A-015 appropriated P1,240,000,000.00 as
supplemental budget for 2007. From this budget,
P400,000,000.00 was allocated for the parking building. It
was allegedly during this time that a
_______________
9 CA Resolution dated March 16, 2015, pp. 4-5.

10 G.R. No. 160652, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 360.
11 G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768.
12 G.R. No. 117589-92, May 22, 1996, 257 SCRA 55.
567
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 567
Negotiated Contract for the architectural and engineering
services were negotiated and approved. Disbursements
allegedly favored Hilmarc and MANA amidst irregularities in
the bidding process during the term of petitioner as City
Mayor of Makati.
Yet, to subscribe to public respondent Ombudsman’s
submission that condonation can only be appreciated by the
investigating body after it is ventilated as an exculpation by
petitioner and considered solely by public respondent,
following the exercise of its investigatory power, will ignore
the Court’s constitutional power and duty to evaluate the
factual and legal foundations for, nay, impediments to, a
preventive suspension in an administrative case.13
In my view, however, the CA erroneously banked on the

pronouncements in Garcia, Jr., Joson III, Aguinaldo,
andSalalima to espouse the doctrine of condonation as the basis to
issue the injunctive writs under its resolutions promulgated on
March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015. In
both Aguinaldo and Salalima, the Court applied the doctrine of
condonation to avoid the imposition of administrative liability upon
reelected public officials. Specifically, the Court held
in Aguinaldo that:
Petitioner’s reelection to the position of Governor of

Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending before
Us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of
votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among
the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. x x x
xxxx
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to
_______________
13 CA Resolution dated April 6, 2015, pp. 6-10.
568
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
The foregoing rule, however, finds no application
to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may
have committed during the failed coup.14
while in Salalima, the Court maintained that:
x x x [A]ny administrative liability which petitioner

Salalima might have incurred in the execution of the retainer
contract in O.P. Case No. 5469 and the incidents related
therewith and in the execution on 6 March 1992 of a contract
for additional repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco
Public Market in O.P. Case No. 5450 are deemed
extinguished by his reelection in the 11 May 1992
synchronized elections. So are the liabilities, if any, of
petitioner members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
ng Albay, who signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing
petitioner Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in
question and who were reelected in the 1992 elections. This
is, however, without prejudice to the institution of
appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by
the attendant circumstances. x x x15
It is clear to me that, based on the language and the factual

milieu of Aguinaldo and Salalima, which both cited Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,16 and of other akin
rulings,17 condonation shall apply only in case of the reelection of a
public officer who is sought to be permanently removed from office
as a result of his misconduct, not while such public
_______________
14 Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768.
15 Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 117589-92, May 22, 1996, 257 SCRA 55,
116.
16 106 Phil. 467 (October 31, 1959).
17 Lizares v. Hechanova, No. L-22059, May 17, 1966, 17 SCRA 58; Office of the
Ombudsman v. Torres, G.R. No. 168309, January 29, 2008, 543 SCRA 46; Garcia v.
Mojica, G.R. No. 139043, September 10, 1999, 314 SCRA 207.
569
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 569
officer is undergoing investigation. Condonation necessarily
implies that the condoned act has already been found to have been
committed by the public officer. Hence, condonation applies to the
penalty or punishment imposed after the conduct of an
administrative investigation. Under the circumstances, the
pronouncements in Aguinaldo,Salalima and the others could not
be applicable to the preventive suspension order issued to Binay,
Jr. pending his administrative investigation because preventive
suspension pending the conduct of an investigation was not yet a
penalty in itself, but a mere measure of precaution to enable the
disciplining authority to investigate the charges by precluding the
respondent from influencing the witnesses against him.18
It is worth emphasis that preventive suspension is distinct from
the penalty of suspension. The former is imposed on a public
official during the investigation while the latter, as a penalty, is
served after the final disposition of the case.19 The former is not a
punishment or penalty for misconduct in office, but a merely
preventive measure, or a preliminary step in the administrative
investigation.20
As I see it, the CA misconstrued the milieu in Garcia,
Jr. and Joson III as an application of the doctrine of condonation.
The Court notably stated in Garcia, Jr. andJoson III that
“suspension from office of an elective official would deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they voted into office” in the
context of determining the propriety of the issuance of the
preventive suspension order. In other words, the statement only
served to remind the Ombudsman to issue the preventive
suspension orders with utmost caution in view of
_______________
18 Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System v. Velasco,

G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 372, 387.
19 Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA
658, 667.
20 Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).
570
the gravity of the effects of suspending an incumbent elective
local official. Hence, Garcia, Jr. and Joson III did not apply the
doctrine of condonation.
I further underscore that the CA was then only resolving Binay,
Jr.’s application for injunctive reliefs against the preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. At that point, the
CA’s application of the doctrine of condonation was irrelevant and
unnecessary.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or
acts.21 The requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order are clearly set forth in
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.22 The sole objective of the
writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be heard fully. The writ of preliminary
injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete
evidence;23 hence, it
_______________
21 Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

22 3. SectionGrounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.—A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually; (a)
That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or (b)
That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of
the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual. (c)
23 Unilever Philippines (PRC), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119280, August
10, 2006, 498 SCRA 334.
571
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 571
should not determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted
facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent
threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice
until the rights of the parties can be settled.24 As held in Saulog v.
Court of Appeals,25 it is sufficient that:
x x x for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of

facts affording a present right which is directly threatened by
an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the
right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be
conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted
to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need
not be conclusive or complete but need only be a sampling
intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification
for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the
case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern
here involves only the proprietary of the preliminary
injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with
the trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary
injunction, the private respondent needs only to show
that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed
for in its complaint x x x. (bold emphasis supplied)
By relying on the doctrine of condonation, therefore, the CA went

beyond the parameters for determining whether or not to issue the
injunctive writ. To recall, Binay, Jr. had filed his petition
for certiorari in the CA primarily to assail the validity of the
preventive suspension order. What was raised for the CA to
determine was whether or not the Ombudsman satisfactorily
complied with the requisites imposed by Section 24 of Republic Act
No. 6770 to establish that Binay, Jr. and
_______________
24 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hontanosas, Jr., G.R. No. 157163, June 25,
2014.
25 G.R. No. 119769, September 18, 1996, 262 SCRA 51.
572
his corespondents had the ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in their petition, which was the nullification or lifting of
the preventive suspension order. In this regard, the CA plainly
exceeded its jurisdiction.
In the meanwhile, the Ombudsman found Binay, Jr.
administratively liable, and dismissed him from the service. By
such dismissal, the questions raised against the CA’s issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman were
rendered moot and academic. I join the Majority in saying that the
preventive suspension order, being an ancillary issuance, was
dissolved upon the Ombudsman’s resolution of the administrative
charges on the merits. Thus, to dwell on the preventive suspension
of Binay, Jr. and his corespondents any further would be
superfluous, for, as the Court said in Philippine Savings Bank v.
Senate Impeachment Court:26
It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice

constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved; they
decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. There is no actual substantial
relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
In short, the Court should excuse itself from exercising

jurisdiction because the main case, the administrative proceeding
against the respondents, has already been decided by the
Ombudsman on the merits.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I VOTE to PARTIALLY
GRANT the petition for certiorari and prohibition, and,
accordingly, SET ASIDE the Resolution promulgated on April 6,
2015 by the Court of Appeals.
_______________
26 G.R. No. 200238, November 20, 2012, 686 SCRA 35.
573
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 573
I further VOTE to DISSOLVE the writ of preliminary
injunction issued on April 8, 2015 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453;
and to AFFIRM the Resolution promulgated on March 20, 2015 in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139504.
Petition partly granted.
Notes.—The long standing policy of the Supreme Court is
noninterference in the powers given by no less than the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. (Eijansantos vs.
Special Presidential Task Force 156, 724 SCRA 414 [2014])
The Supreme Court reiterates its policy of noninterference with
the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman, except in a clear case
of grave abuse of discretion. (Araullo vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
731 SCRA 346 [2014])
——o0o——
February 23, 2016. G.R. No. 188720.*
QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC.,

petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by
SECRETARY JESLI A. LAPUS, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court;

Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court (SC) will not entertain a direct
invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary
remedy of a writ of certiorari.—The Department of Education
correctly points out that the present Petition was filed in violation
of the principle of hierarchy of courts. On this score alone, the
Petition should be dismissed.
_______________
* EN BANC.
506
Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. vs. Department of Education
It is true that petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure fall under the original jurisdiction of this
court. However, this is also true of regional trial courts and the Court of
Appeals. “[T]his Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its
jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari.”
Indeed, “concurrence [of jurisdiction] does not allow unrestricted freedom
of choice of the court forum. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue this writ should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.”
Political Law; Delegation of Powers; The three (3) powers of government
— executive, legislative, and judicial — have been generally viewed as non-
delegable.—The three powers of government —executive, legislative, and
judicial — have been generally viewed as non-delegable. However, in
recognition of the exigencies that contemporary governance must address,
our legal system has recognized the validity of “subordinate legislation,” or
the rule-making power of agencies tasked with the administration of
government. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, 166 SCRA 533 (1988): The principle of non-
delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power
because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The
occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated
by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the
legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more
frequent, if not necessary. This has led to the observation that the
delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation
the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society
has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may
not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not
to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from
507
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 507
its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies.
With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out
the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of
subordinate legislation.” With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the
details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the
force and effect of law.
Schools; Education Act of 1982; Parents-Teachers Associations;
Parents-Teachers Community Associations; While the creation and/or
organization of Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) are statutorily
mandated, the same could not be said of Parents-Teachers Community
Associations (PTCAs).—As is evident from the Child and Youth Welfare
Code’s use of the word “shall,” it is mandatory for PTAs to be organized in
elementary and secondary schools. As against this, the Child and Youth
Welfare Code is silent on the creation of PTCAs. The Education Act of
1982 is equally silent on this. Hence, while the creation and/or
organization of PTAs are statutorily mandated, the same could not be said
of PTCAs.
Same; Same; Same; By ensuring fiscal transparency and
accountability, and by providing the basic framework for organization and
official recognition, the Department Order (DO) ensures that Parents-
Teachers Associations (PTAs) exist and function in a manner that remains
consistent with the articulated purposes of PTAs under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code and the Education Act of 1982.—By ensuring fiscal
transparency and accountability, and by providing the basic framework for
organization and official recognition, the Department Order ensures that
PTAs exist and function in a manner that remains consistent with the
articulated purposes of PTAs under the Child and Youth Welfare Code and
the Education Act of 1982. A framework for organization ensures that
PTAs are properly organized and are both adequately representative of
and limited only
508
to those interests that are appropriate to the education of children in
elementary and high school. Measures for fiscal transparency and
accountability ensure that PTAs are not hampered by pecuniary or
proprietary interests that have nothing to do with the effective
implementation of school programs. Finally, mechanisms for official
recognition ensure that only those associations that organize and conduct
themselves in a manner that is consistent with these purposes are
privileged with state sanction.
Administrative Agencies; Notice and Hearing; Notice and hearing are
not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-
making power.—Notice and hearing are not essential when an
administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-making power.
Same; Administrative Rules; All that is required for the validity of
rules promulgated by administrative agencies is the filing of three (3)
certified copies with the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center.—
Apart from claiming that no consultations were held, petitioner decries the
non-publication, by the Department of Education itself, of the assailed
Department Order. This does not invalidate the Department Order. As is
evident from the previously quoted provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of
the Administrative Code, all that is required for the validity of rules
promulgated by administrative agencies is the filing of three (3) certified
copies with the University of the Philippines Law Center. Within 15 days
of filing, administrative rules become effective.
Schools; Parents-Teachers Associations; Child and Youth Welfare Code;
Under Article 77 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, every elementary
school and high school is required to have a Parents-Teachers Association
(PTA).—The organizing of PTAs is mandated by statute. Under Article 77
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, every elementary school and high
school is required to have a PTA. School heads are bound by this
requirement. Moreover, the mandatory nature of organizing PTAs is
recognized by the assailed Department Order itself. Article I(1) of the
Department Order provides that “[e]very elementary and secondary
school shall organize a Parents-Teachers Association.” Likewise, Article I
of the assailed Department Order echoes the Child and Youth Welfare
Code and the Education Act of 1982 in providing for the purposes and
functions of PTAs. In doing so, it lays out the standards that are to guide
school
509
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 509
heads in deciding on whether official sanction shall be vested in a
group seeking recognition as a PTA.
Same; Same; The involvement of school heads is limited to the initial
stages of formation of Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs). Once
organized, the school heads hold no power over PTAs as they are limited to
acting in an advisory capacity.—The involvement of school heads is
limited to the initial stages of formation of PTAs. Once organized, the
school heads hold no power over PTAs as they are limited to acting in an
advisory capacity. Article IV(1)(d) of the Department Order categorically
provides: IV. Board of Directors and Officers 1. The administration of the
affairs and management of activities of the PTA is vested with the Board
of Directors and its officers in accordance with these guidelines or their
respective Constitution and By-Laws, if any, which shall adhere to the
following:
. . . . d. The School Head shall not serve as a member of the Board of
Directors but as adviser to the PTA[.]
Right to Organize; The right to organize does not equate to the state’s
obligation to accord official status to every single association that comes
into existence.—The right to organize does not equate to the state’s
obligation to accord official status to every single association that comes
into existence. It is one thing for individuals to galvanize themselves as a
collective, but it is another for the group that they formed to not only be
formally recognized by the state, but also bedecked with all the benefits
and privileges that are attendant to official status. In pursuit of public
interest, the state can set reasonable regulations — procedural, formal,
and substantive — with which organizations seeking
state imprimatur must comply.
Schools; Parents-Teachers Associations; According a parent-teacher
association (PTA) official status not only enables it to avail itself of benefits
and privileges but also establishes upon it its solemn duty as a pillar of the
educational system.—A parent-teacher association is a mechanism for
effecting the role of parents (who would otherwise be viewed as outsiders)
as an indispensable element of educational communities. Rather than
being totally independent of or removed from schools, a parent-teacher
association is more aptly considered an adjunct of an educational
community having a particular school as its locus. It is an “arm” of the
school. Given this view, the importance of regulation vis-à-vis investiture
of official
510
status becomes manifest. According a parent-teacher association
official status not only enables it to avail itself of benefits and privileges
but also establishes upon it its solemn duty as a pillar of the educational
system.
BRION,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Schools; Education Act of 1982; Parents-Teachers Associations;

Parents-Teachers Community Associations; View that the distinction
between Parents-Teachers Community Associations (PTCAs) and Parents-
Teachers Associations (PTAs) is more imagined than real, particularly for
PTCAs already in existence since they can be recognized as PTAs.—The
distinction between PTCAs and PTAs is more imagined than real,
particularly for PTCAs already in existence since they can be recognized
as PTAs. Thus, I find it misplaced to generalize and discriminate
against all PTCAs simply because the law only mentions “Parent-
Teachers Associations.” In my view, for purposes of this case, the
distinction the ponencia creates between PTAs and PTCAs is insignificant
and lacks materiality.
Political Law; Delegation of Powers; Subordinate Legislation; View
that with the increasing complexity of the government’s functions and the
growing inability of the legislature to address the myriad of problems
demanding its attention, Congress found it necessary to delegate its powers
to administrative agencies. This is the power of subordinate legislation.—
Delegation of powers is a rule that is widely recognized especially in the
legislative branch of government. With the increasing complexity of the
government’s functions and the growing inability of the legislature to
address the myriad of problems demanding its attention, Congress found
it necessary to delegate its powers to administrative agencies. This is the
power of subordinate legislation. “With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by ‘filling
in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide.” On this basis, administrative agencies may
promulgate supplementary regulations which have the force and effect of
law. In the DepEd’s case, its rule-making power finds its legislative basis
in Section 57 of BP 232. Under this provision, the DepEd has the authority
to “promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the
administration, supervision and regulation of the educational
system in accordance with declared pol-
511
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 511
icy.” Moreover, Section 70 of this law, in relation to EO 117 and RA
9155, expressly grants the DepEd Secretary the authority to administer
and enforce BP 232 and to promulgate its necessary implementing rules
and regulations.
Same; Same; Same; View that the power of subordinate legislation does
not mean the absolute transmission of legislative powers to administrative
agencies such as the Department of Education
(DepEd).—The power of subordinate legislation does not mean the
absolute transmission of legislative powers to administrative agencies
such as the DepEd. In order for a valid delegation to exist, two basic tests
must be complied with: the completeness test, and the sufficient
standard test. “Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature, such that, when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he would have to do is enforce it. On
the other hand, under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. These
two tests are both intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.” Also, these two
tests ensure that administrative agencies, in the exercise of their power of
subordinate legislation, create rules and regulations that are germane to
the objects and purposes of the law they implement; and are not in
contradiction, but in full conformity with the standards
prescribed by this law.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is a settled rule that administrative
agencies, in the exercise of their power of subordinate legislation, should
not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and
enforces, and should not engraft additional noncontradictory requirements
that the Congress did not contemplate.—The authority of administrative
agencies to create rules and regulations such as DO 54 is not an
absolute authority. This is limited by the express legislative purpose of
the law it implements, the standards set out in this law, and the express
wording of the provisions of the law. The rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate should not be ultra vires or beyond
the limits of the authority conferred to them. Also, it is a settled rule that
administrative agencies, in the exercise of their power of subordinate
legislation, should
512
not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers
and enforces, and should not engraft additional noncontradictory
requirements that the Congress did not contemplate. Thus, in formulating
rules and regulations, administrative agencies should not amend,
supplant, or modify the law which breathes life to it.
Schools; Parents-Teachers Associations; View that the provisions of
Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 232 and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 603
emphasize the clear mandate of schools to form their own Parents-Teachers
Associations (PTAs) consistent with the right of parents to be informed of
the school programs affecting their children, and to participate in the
formulation and implementation of these programs.—The provisions of BP
232 and PD 603 emphasize the clear mandate of schools to form their
own PTAs consistent with the right of parents to be informed of the school
programs affecting their children, and to participate in the formulation
and implementation of these programs. Section 8 of BP 232 even went one
step further when it provided that the parents may organize by
themselves when taking part in school matters that affect their children.
In other words, the parents, even without the
school’s involvement, may organize and coordinate among themselves
in exercising their right to a meaningful and proactive participation in the
school programs concerning their children’s welfare.
Same; Department Order No. 54; View that Department Order (DO)
No. 54 lessens the chances, if not totally precludes the organization of the
Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) by granting the school head the sole
power to determine and approve its organization.—The ponencia lost sight
of the glaring contradiction between the clear mandate of BP 232 and DO
54’s school head approval requirement. The initial stage that
the ponencia referred to is a crucial stage as it is the point when a
PTA is organized. How could the parents exercise their right to
organized participation if in the first place, they could not form the
medium by which they may do so? To my mind, DO 54 lessens the
chances, if not totally precludes the organization of the PTA by granting
the school head the sole power to determine and approve its
organization. Moreover, the approval requirement is not only contrary to
the rights of parents to organize and involve themselves in school
programs and matters affecting their children; it also contravenes the
declared policy of the State, as enunciated in Section 3 of BP 232, which
is to establish a
513
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 513
complete, adequate, and integrated education system that would
contribute to the achievement of an accelerating rate of economic
development and social progress, and would ensure the “maximum
participation of all the people in the attainment and enjoyment of
the benefits of such growth.”
Same; Same; View that by failing to provide the guidelines or even
outline the rules that must be considered in approving or disapproving
Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs), Department Order (DO) No. 54, in
effect, grants the school heads the authority to create their own rules and to
substitute their discretion in place of the Department of Education
(DepEd).—The school head’s approval comes at the PTA’s inception. At
that point, the PTA and its members have yet to perform any act as the
proposed PTA has yet to function. Thus, the school heads cannot use the
cited general policies unless the school heads operate based on a
presumption of the members’ future conduct. From this vantage point, it is
clear that the cited general policies cannot possibly guide the school heads
at the point they decide. In any case, even if these policies are assumed to
be standards, they would still be insufficient as there are simply no
guidelines in DO 54 that would guide school heads in approving one PTA
over the other. The absence of guidelines will consequently force school
heads to either: first, disclose their standards to interested
parties, i.e., the parents, the teachers, and the students; or second, keep
the standards to themselves. Should they keep the standards to
themselves, the school heads would be accused of arbitrariness because
the interested parties are not informed of the standards for approval. Such
arbitrariness would authorize the school heads to approve a PTA
according to whim, or in the opposite direction, deny parents (whose PTA
is disapproved) of the right to participate in the formation and
implementation of the total school program. Thus, to avoid any
accusations — and the appearance of — arbitrariness, the school heads are
more likely disclose their standards; in which case, the disclosure to
interested parties, whether oral or in writing, is no different from the
exercise of rule-making powers that — by force of the law that Congress
enacted — only the DepEd can exercise. In other words, DO 54 gives the
school heads a very broad, if not, an unbridled discretion in the formation
of the PTAs. By failing to provide the guidelines or even outline the rules
that must be considered in approving or disapproving PTAs, DO 54, in
effect, grants the
514
school heads the authority to create their own rules and to
substitute their discretion in place of the DepEd.
Same; Delegation of Powers; View that there is no express provision in
law granting the Department of Education (DepEd) the power to further
delegate its regulatory and rule-making powers, particularly to the school
heads.—When the DepEd, through DO 54, passed on to the school heads
the power to approve or disapprove the organization of the PTAs, thus
effectively devolving its regulatory powers to these persons, the DepEd
violated the administrative rule of non-delegation of delegated powers. To
repeat, “what has been delegated may not be delegated.” There is no
express provision in law granting the DepEd the power to further delegate
its regulatory and rule-making powers, particularly to the school heads.
The authority to issue rules that would affect the PTAs rests only with the
DepEd. On this basis, the school heads should not be allowed to determine
their own procedure and guidelines in approving or disapproving the
organization of a PTA.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

Prohibition.
Teddy Esteban F. Rigoroso and Roderick R. Rabino for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
LEONEN,J.:
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1praying

that respondent Department of Education’s Department Order No.
54, Series of 2009 (Department Order) be nullified for being
unconstitutional and contrary to law, and that a writ of prohibition
permanently enjoining the Depart-
_______________
1 The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
515
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 515
ment of Education and all persons acting on its behalf from
enforcing the assailed Department Order be issued.2
The Petition also prays that, in the interim, a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued,
restraining the enforcement of the Department Order.
On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former
Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued Department Order No. 54, Series
of 20093 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers
Associations (PTAs) at the School Level.
The Department of Education explained the reasons for the
issuance of the Department Order as follows:
The Department Order sought to address the limitations of the
guidelines set forth in D.O. No. 23, S. 2003 and was issued in
response to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or
members of PTAs, such as, but not limited to (1) officers
absconding with contributions and membership fees; (2)
nondisclosure of the status of funds and non-submission of
financial statements; and (3) misuse of funds.4 (Citations omitted)
The Department Order is divided into 11 articles: (I) General

Policy;5 (II) Organization of PTAs at the School Level;6 (III) General
Assembly;7 (IV) Board of Directors and Officers;8 (V) Recognition
and Monitoring of PTAs;9 (VI) Privileges of Recognized
PTAs;10 (VII) Activities;11 (VIII) Financial Mat-
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 7-24.

3 Id., at pp. 25-33.
4 Id., at p. 142, Respondent’s Memorandum.
5 Id., at p. 25.
6 Id., at p. 26.
7 Id., at pp. 26-27.
8 Id., at pp. 27-28.
9 Id., at pp. 28-29.
10 Id., at p. 29.
11 Id., at p. 30.
516
ters;12 (IX) Prohibited Activities and Sanctions;13 (X) Transitory
Provision;14 and (XI) Repealing Clause.15
More specifically, the Department Order provides for:
The approval of the school head as a prerequisite for PTAs to be
organized: (1)
II. Organization of PTAs at the School Level

....
2. Within fifteen (15) days from the start of the school
year the Homeroom Adviser and the Parents/Guardians
shall organize the Homeroom PTA with the approval of
the School Head.16
The terms of office and manner of election of a PTA’s board of

directors: (2)

....
3. The elected presidents of the Homeroom PTAs and
their respective Homeroom Advisers shall elect the
Board of Directors within thirty (30) days from the start
of the school year. The Board of Directors shall
immediately elect from among themselves the executive
officers of the PTA on the same day of their election to
the Board.17
....
IV. Board of Directors and Officers
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 30-32.

13 Id., at pp. 32-33.
14 Id., at p. 33.
15 Id.
16 Id., at p. 26.
17 Id.
517
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 517
1. The administration of the affairs and management of
activities of the PTA is vested [in] the Board of Directors and
its officers in accordance with these guidelines or their
respective Constitution and By-Laws, if any, which shall
adhere to the following:
....
e. The term of office of the Board of Directors and its
Officers shall be one (1) year from the date of election.
In no case shall a PTA Board Director serve for more
than two (2) consecutive terms.18
The cessation of recognition of existing parents-teachers

community associations (PTCAs) and of their federations effective
school year 2009-2010. The Department Order gave them until
June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities, submit financial
reports, and turn over all documents to school heads and schools
division superintendents: (3)
X. Transitory Provision
Existing and duly recognized PTCAs and its [sic]
Federations shall no longer be given recognition
effective School Year 2009-2010. They shall cease
operation at the end of School Year 2008-2009 and given
until June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities,
submit their financial reports and turn over all
documents to the School Heads and Schools Division
Superintendents, respectively.19
Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed the present
Petition in the belief that the above quoted provisions undermine
the independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively amend the
constitutions and bylaws of existing PTAs and PTCAs,
_______________
18 Id., at p. 27.
19 Id., at p. 33.
518
and violate its constitutional rights to organize and to due
process, as well as other existing laws.20
On November 17, 2009, the Department of Education filed its
Comment,21 and on February 9, 2010, Quezon City PTCA
Federation filed its Reply.22
In the Resolution23 dated January 8, 2013, this court gave due
course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their
memoranda. Quezon City PTCA Federation complied on March 22,
2013,24 and the Department of Education on May 15, 2013.25
For resolution is the central issue of whether the Department of
Education acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Department Order No. 54, Series
of 2009. Subsumed under this issue are:
First, whether the issuance of the Department Order was a valid
exercise of the Department of Education’s rule-making powers:
(a) Whether the Department Order contravenes any of the laws
providing for the creation and organization of parent-teacher
associations;
(b) Whether Department Order is invalid and ineffective as no
public consultations were (supposedly) held before its adoption,
and/or as it was not published by the Department of Education;
and
Second, whether the assailed provisions of the Department
Order (i.e., Article II[2] and [3], Article IV[1][e], and Article X)
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 7-24.

21 Id., at pp. 53-79.
22 Id., at pp. 104-109.
23 Id., at p. 116.
24 Id., at pp. 121-135.
25 Id., at pp. 141-160.
519
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 519
undermine the organizational independence of parent-teacher
associations.
Apart from these, the Department of Education assails the filing
of this Petition as being violative of the principle of hierarchy of
courts.
We sustain the position of the Department of Education. The
present Petition was filed in violation of the principle of hierarchy
of courts. Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 was validly
issued by the Secretary of Education pursuant to his statutorily
vested rule-making power and pursuant to the purposes for which
the organization of parent-teacher associations is mandated by
statute. Likewise, there was no fatal procedural lapse in the
adoption of Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009.
The Department of Education correctly points out that the

present Petition was filed in violation of the principle of hierarchy
of courts. On this score alone, the Petition should be dismissed.
It is true that petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure fall under the original
jurisdiction of this court. However, this is also true of regional trial
courts and the Court of Appeals.
“[T]his Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its
jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a
writ of certiorari.”26 Indeed, “concurrence [of jurisdiction] does not
allow unrestricted freedom of choice of the court forum. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
_______________
26 First United Constructors Corporation v. Poro Point Management Corporation

(PPMC), 596 Phil. 334, 342; 576 SCRA 311, 319 (2009) [Per J.Nachura, Third
Division].
520
jurisdiction to issue this writ should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out
in the petition.”27
In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:28
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so

remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned
to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing
with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised
only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose
acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the
Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or
a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the
specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented.
This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a
policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.29
Petitioner argues that the present Petition justifies direct

recourse to this court “considering the pervasive effect of the
assailed Department Order to all the different PTCAs or PTAs
across the country and in order to avoid multiple suits that would
only serve to further clog the court’s dockets.”30
This reason fails to impress.
_______________
27 Id., citing Page-Tenorio v. Tenorio, 486 Phil. 160; 443 SCRA 560 (2004)
[Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
28 240 Phil. 719; 156 SCRA 753 (1987) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
29 Id., at pp. 732-733; p. 766.
30 Rollo, p. 9.
521
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 521
That the effects of the Department Order extend throughout the
country is a concern that can be addressed by recourse to the Court
of Appeals. Its territorial jurisdiction, much like this court’s, also
extends throughout the country. Moreover, the Court of Appeals is
well-equipped to render reliable, reasonable, and well-grounded
judgments in cases averring grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Recourse to the Court of Appeals
is not a futile exercise that results to nothing more than the
clogging of court dockets.
II
Citing Article III, Section 8,31 Article II, Section 23,32and Article
XIII, Sections 1533 and 1634 of the 1987 Constitution,
_______________
31 Const., Art. III, Sec. 8 provides:

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged. 8. SECTION
32 Const., Art. II, Sec. 23 provides:
The State shall encourage nongovernmental, community-based, or sectoral
organizations that promote the welfare of the nation. 23. SECTION
33 Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 15 provides:
The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to
enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework,
their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means. People’s organizations are 15. SECTION bona
fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public
interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.
34 Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 16 provides:
The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making
shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of
adequate consultation mechanisms. 16. SECTION
522
petitioner asserts that PTCAs are “independent voluntary
organization[s]”35 “enjoying constitutional protection.”36
It adds that, pursuant to Section 8(1)37 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982, and Article
7738 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, the PTCA “promotes and protects the
welfare of . . . students all over the country and . . . serve[s] as a
forum for parents and the community to have an active role in the
efficient implementation of the . . . programs of the school [sic].”39
_______________
35 Rollo, p. 124, Petitioner’s Memorandum.
36 Id., at p. 125.
37 Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 (1982), Sec. 8 provides:
8. SectionRights of Parents.—In addition to other rights under existing laws,
all parents who have children enrolled in a school have the following rights:
The right to organize by themselves and/or with teachers for the purpose of
providing a forum for the discussion of matters relating to the total school program,
and for ensuring the full cooperation of parents and teachers in the formulation and
efficient implementation of such programs. 1.
38 Child & Youth Welfare Code, Art. 77 provides:
77. ArticleParent-Teacher Associations.—Every elementary and secondary
school shall organize a parent-teacher association for the purpose of providing a
forum for the discussion of problems and their solutions, relating to the total school
program, and for insuring the full cooperation of parents in the efficient
implementation of such program. All parents who have children enrolled in a school
are encouraged to be active members of its PTA, and to comply with whatever
obligations and responsibilities such membership entails.
Parent-Teacher Association all over the country shall aid the municipal and
other local authorities and school officials in the enforcement of juvenile
delinquency control measures, and in the implementation of programs and activities
to promote child welfare.
39 Rollo, pp. 124-125.
523
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 523
Petitioner assails the Department Order as an inordinate
exercise of the Department of Education’s rule-making power. It
claims that the Department Order contradicts the provisions of the
Education Act of 1982 and of the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
the statutes that provide for the creation of PTAs. It also alleges
that the Department Order was issued without prior consultation
and publication, contrary to the requirements for regulations
issued by administrative agencies.
Noting that the Department Order lends recognition only to
PTAs and not to PTCAs, petitioner assails the Department Order
as being contrary to the purposes of Republic Act No.
9155,40 otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act
of 2001, and of Republic Act No. 8980,41 otherwise known as the
Early Childhood Care and Development Act.
_______________
40 Rep. Act No. 9155 (2001), Sec. 3(d) provides:

3. SectionPurposes and Objectives.—The purposes and objectives of this Act
are:
....
To ensure that schools and learning centers receive the kind of focused attention
they deserve and that educational programs, projects and services (d) take into
account the interests of all members of the community[.]
41 Rep. Act No. 8980 (2000), Sec. 7 provides:
7. SectionImplementing Arrangements and Operational Structures.—The
implementation of the National ECCD System shall be the joint responsibility of the
national government agencies, local government units, nongovernment
organizations, and private organizations that are accredited to deliver the services
or to provide training and technical assistance.
Responsibilities of the National Government — National government agencies
shall be responsible for developing policies and programs, providing technical
assistance and support to the ECCD service providers in consultation with
coordinating committees at the provincial, city/municipal, and (a) barangay levels,
as provided for in Section 8 of this Act, and monitoring of ECCD service benefits
and outcomes. The Department of So-
524
Petitioner further claims that Article II(2) of the Department
Order, which provides for the organization of the Homeroom
PTA with the approval of the School Head, infringes upon the
independence of PTCAs and PTAs. It asserts that this provision
gives “unbridled discretion [to the school head] to disapprove the
organization of a PTA.”42Petitioner likewise
_______________
cial Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Education, Culture

and Sports (DECS), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and the National
Nutrition Council (NNC) shall jointly prepare annual ECCD for work plans that
will coordinate their respective technical assistance and support for the National
ECCD Program. They shall consolidate existing program implementing guidelines
that ensure consistency in integrated service delivery within the National ECCD
System.
The DECS shall promote the National ECCD Program in schools. ECCD
programs in public schools shall be under the joint responsibility of their respective
school principal/school head and (1) parents-teachers-community
association (PTCA) within the standards set forth in the National ECCD System
and under the guidance of the City/Municipal ECCD Coordinating Committee for
the effective and equitable delivery of ECCD services. It shall also make available
existing facilities of public elementary schools for ECCD classes.
Public and private pre-schools shall be registered by the Provincial or City ECCD
Coordinating Committee upon the recommendation of the respective division office
of the DECS. NGO-initiated, community, church, home, and workplace-based
service providers shall be registered upon the recommendation of the provincial/city
social welfare and development office. These public and private ECCD service
providers shall operate within the standards set forth in the National ECCD
System and under the guidance of the City/Municipal ECCD Coordinating
Committee for the effective delivery of ECCD services. (2)
42 Rollo, p. 126.
525
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 525
assails the Department Order’s provisions on the terms of office
of PTA officers as being violative of the right to due process.43
III
The three powers of government — executive, legislative, and

judicial — have been generally viewed as non-delegable. However,
in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary governance
must address, our legal system has recognized the validity of
“subordinate legislation,” or the rule-making power of agencies
tasked with the administration of government. In Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration:44
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to
all the three major powers of the Government but is
especially important in the case of the legislative power
because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial
powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they
legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however,
such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not
necessary. This has led to the observation that the delegation
of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To
many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to
provide the required direct and effica-
_______________
43 Id., at p. 128.
44 248 Phil. 762; 166 SCRA 533 (1988) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
526
cious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to
be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust
to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to
carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the “power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details
which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation
of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the
new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect
of law.45
Administrative agencies, however, are not given unfettered

power to promulgate rules. As noted in Gerochi v. Department of
Energy,46 two requisites must be satisfied in order that rules issued
by administrative agencies may be considered valid: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test:
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life,

delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this
principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in
today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate
laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to
the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies — the principal
_______________
45 Id., at pp. 772-773; pp. 544-545.

46 554 Phil. 563; c (2007) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
527
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 527
agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields
— the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that
is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate
legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as
the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test.47 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, in ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima:48
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative

power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard
must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce
the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which
it is to be implemented.49(Citations omitted)
In addition to the substantive requisites of the completeness test

and the sufficient standard test, the Administrative Code of 1987
(Administrative Code) requires the filing of rules adopted by
administrative agencies with the University of the Philippines Law
Center. Generally, rules filed with the University of the
Philippines Law Center become effective 15 days after filing.
Chapter 2 of Book VII of the Administrative Code provides:
_______________
47 Id., at pp. 584-585; pp. 719-720.

48 584 Phil. 246; 562 SCRA 251 (2008) [Per J. Corona, En Banc].
49 Id., at p. 272; p. 277.
528
CHAPTER 2
Rules and Regulations
3. SECTIONFilingEvery agency shall file with the

University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3)
months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons. .—(1)
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent
functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this
section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by
the issuing agency and shall be open to public
inspection.
4. SECTIONEffectivity.—In addition to other rule-
making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with
this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days
from the date of filing as above provided unless a different
date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of
imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the
existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons who
may be affected by them.
5. SECTIONPublication and Recording.—The University
of the Philippines Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarterly bulletin setting forth the text
of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus
published and remaining in effect, together with a
complete index and appropriate tables.
6. SECTIONOmission of Some RulesThe University of
the Philippines Law Center may omit from the .—(1)
529
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 529
bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would
be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient,
but copies of that rule shall be made available on application
to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain
a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule
and new copies thereof may be obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an
act which, pursuant to law is punishable as a crime or
subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full
text.
7. SECTIONDistribution of Bulletin and Codified
Rules.—The University of the Philippines Law Center shall
furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin
and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the
President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National
Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made
available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as
the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price
sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution
costs.
8. SECTIONJudicial Notice.—The court shall take
judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as
published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
9. SECTIONPublic ParticipationIf not otherwise
required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior
to the adoption of any rule. .—(1)
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be
valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least
two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases
shall be observed.
530
IV
The Education Act of 1982 vested in the then Ministry of

Education, Culture and Sports50 “[t]he administration of the
education system and . . . the supervision and regulation of
educational institutions.”51 Section 70 of the Education Act of 1982
vested rule-making authority in the Minister of Education who,
under Section 5552 of the same statute, was the head of the
Ministry:
_______________
50 The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports was renamed as the

Department of Education, or DepEd, through Rep. Act No. 9155.
54. SectionDeclaration of Policy.—The administration of the education
system and, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, the supervision
and regulation of educational institutions are hereby vested in the Ministry
of Education, Culture and Sports, without prejudice to the provisions of the
charter of any state college and university.
55. SectionOrganization.—The Ministry shall be headed by the
Minister of Education, Culture and Sports who shall be assisted by one or
more Deputy Ministers.
The organization of the Ministry shall consist of (a) the Ministry Proper
composed of the immediate Office of the Minister, and the Services of the
Ministry, (b) the Board of Higher Education, which is hereby established, (c)
the Bureau of Elementary Education, the Bureau of Secondary Education,
the Bureau of Higher Education, the Bureau of Technical and Vocational
Education, and the Bureau of Continuing Education, which are hereby
established, (d) Regional offices and field offices, (e) the National Scholarship
Center and such other agencies as are now or may be established pursuant to
law, and (f) the cultural agencies, namely: the National Library, the National
Historical Institute, the National Museum, and the Institute of National
Language. Such of the above offices as are created or authorized to be
established under this provision, shall be organized and staffed and shall
function, subject to the approval of the President, upon recommendation of
the Minis-
531
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 531
70. SectionRule-making Authority.—The Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate
the necessary implementing rules and regulations.
Apart from the Education Act of 1982, Book IV, Chapter 2 of the
Administrative Code provides for the rule-making power of the
secretaries heading the departments that comprise the executive
branch of government:
7 SECTIONPowers and Functions of the Secretary ..—The

Secretary shall:
....
(4) Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for
the efficient administration of the offices under the
Secretary and for proper execution of the laws relative
thereto. These issuances shall not prescribe penalties
for their violation, except when expressly authorized by
law.
It was pursuant to this rule-making authority that Former

Secretary of Education Jesli A. Lapus promulgated Department
Order No. 54, Series of 2009. As its title denotes, the Department
Order provided revised guidelines governing PTAs at the school-
level.
The Department Order does not exist in a vacuum. As
underscored by the Department of Education, the Department
Order was issued “in response to increasing reports of malpractices
by officers or members of PTAs.”53Among these “malpractices” are
those noted in a resolution adopted by the “Regional Education
Supervisors in-charge of THE [sic] Stu-
_______________
ter of Education, Culture and Sports in consultation with the Presidential

Commission on Reorganization.
53 Rollo, p. 144.
532
dent Government Program (SGP), selected Teachers-Advisers
and the Officers of the National Federation of Supreme Student
Governments (NFSSG)”54 during a conference held from February 4
to 8, 2008. This same resolution formally sought to “review and
[revise] the Guidelines Governing PTAs/PTCAs at the School Level
as contained in DepEd Order No. 23,
S. 2003.”55 The malpractices noted were:
PTA/PICA officers absconding with the [sic] contributions
and membership fees;
Non-remittance or turnover of collected funds in the name
of organizations such as SSG funds, STEP funds, School
Publication fee and the like;
Misuse of funds by rechanneling the amounts collected to
other activities and projects not within the intended purpose;
Non-deposit of funds in reputable banks;
Nondisclosure of the status of the funds collected and non-
submission of financial statements;
Fraudulent disbursements of funds due to the absence of
resolutions, vouchers and official receipts; and
Unliquidated cash advances of PICA officers[.]56
Thus, the Department Order rationalized the mechanism for the

organizing and granting of official recognition to PTAs. Its first to
seventh articles read:
I. General Policy
1. Every elementary and secondary school shall
organize a Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) for the
purpose of providing a forum for the discussion of issues
and their solutions related to the total school program
and to en-
_______________
54 Id., at p. 96.
55 Id.
56 Id., at pp. 96-97.
533
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 533
sure the full cooperation of parents in the efficient
implementation of such program.
Every PTA shall provide mechanisms to ensure
proper coordination with the members of the
community, provide an avenue for discussing relevant
concerns and provide assistance and support to the
school for the promotion of their common interest.
Standing committees may be created within the PTA
organization to coordinate with community members.
Regular fora may be conducted with local government
units, civic organizations and other stakeholders to
foster unity and cooperation.
2. As an organization operating in the school, the PTA
shall adhere to all existing policies and implementing
guidelines issued or hereinafter may be issued by the
Department of Education.
The PTA shall serve as support group and as a
significant partner of the school whose relationship
shall be defined by cooperative and open dialogue to
promote the welfare of the students.
1. Membership in a PTA is limited to parents, or in
their absence the guardian, of duly enrolled students,
and teachers in a given school.
For this purpose, a guardian is hereby defined as any
of the following: a) an individual authorized by the
biological parents to whom the care and custody of the
student has been entrusted; b) a relative of the student
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
provided that said relative has the care and custody
over the child; c) an individual appointed by a
competent court as the legal guardian of the student; or
d) in case of an
534
orphan, the individual/institution who has the care
and custody of the student.
A teacher-member refers to homeroom advisers,
subject teachers, and nonteaching personnel.
2. Within fifteen (15) days from the start of the school
year the Homeroom Adviser and the Parents/Guardians
shall organize the Homeroom PTA with the approval of
the School Head.
3. The elected presidents of the Homeroom PTAs and
their respective Homeroom Advisers shall elect the
Board of Directors within thirty (30) days from the start
of the school year. The Board of Directors shall
immediately elect from among themselves the executive
officers of the PTA on the same day of their election to
the Board.
4. The official name of the PTA shall bear the name of
the school (example: Parents-Teachers Association of
Rizal High School or Rizal High School Parents-
Teachers Association).
5. For representation in the Local School Board and
other purposes, the schools’ PTAs within a municipality
or city or province shall federate and select from among
the elected Presidents their respective officers. The
president-elect shall sit as representative of the
Federation to the said Local School Board.
III. General Assembly
1. The General Assembly shall be composed of all
parents of enrolled students of the school, Board of
Directors and Officers of the PTA, School Head,
Homeroom Advisers, Subject Teachers, and Non-
Teaching Personnel.
2. The General Assembly shall be convened by the
PTA Board of Directors immediately after
535
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 535
the PTA has been organized. The General Assembly
shall be convened as may be necessary but in no case
less than twice a year. The Board shall coordinate with
the School Head as to time, venue and other details of
the General Assembly.
3. The General Assembly shall be a venue for
presentation and discussion of the PTA’s programs,
projects, financial statements, reports and other
matters.
4. The General Assembly may invite or consult with
other members of the community such as local
government officials and civic organizations to solicit
their support or active participation in school activities.
1. The administration of the affairs and management
of activities of the PTA is vested [in] the Board of
Directors and its officers in accordance with these
guidelines or their respective Constitution and By-Laws,
if any, which shall adhere to the following:
a. The Board of Directors shall be composed of
fifteen (15) members who shall elect from among
themselves the association’s executive officers;
namely: President, Vice President, Secretary,
Treasurer, Auditor, or other equivalent positions,
who shall oversee the day-to-day activities of the
associations;
b. Parent-members shall comprise two-thirds
(2/3) and teacher-members one-third (1/3) of the
Board of Directors;
c. A teacher-member cannot hold any position in
the PTA except as a member of the Board of
Directors or as Secretary;
536
d. The School Head shall not serve as a member
of the Board of Directors but as adviser to the PTA;
e. The term of office of the Board of Directors

and its Officers shall be one (1) year from the date
of election. In no case shall a PTA Board Director
serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms;
f. In case of vacancy in the Board of Directors as
a result of expulsion, resignation or death, the
vacancy shall be filled, for the unexpired term of
the office, by a majority vote of the Board of
Directors from among the Presidents of Homeroom
PTAs in a special meeting called for such purpose.
g. Among the committees that may be formed to
handle specific activities of the PTAs are: a)
Committee on Finance; b) Committee on Programs
and Projects; c) Audit Committee; d) Election
Committee; e) Grievance Committee; f) Ways and
Means Committee; g) Committee on External and
Community Affairs;
h. The heads of the committees shall preferably
come from the Board of Directors, Homeroom
Presidents and Homeroom Advisers; and
i. The PTA may or may not be incorporated with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). If
incorporated, the registered entity shall, as far as
practicable, be used in the organization of the PTA
by the elected Board of Directors. In any event, the
formal notification by the elected Board of
Directors
537
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 537
outlined below and the issuance of the
Certificate of Recognition by the School Head shall
be the operative act to recognize the PTA.
V. Recognition and Monitoring of PTAs
1. There shall be only one PTA that will operate in a
school which shall be recognized by the School Head
upon formal notification in writing by the elected Board
of Directors. The recognition shall be valid for one year
from the date of election.
2. Together with the formal notification in writing,
the elected Board of Directors shall submit Oaths of
Office of the Board of Directors and Officers (Enclosure
No. 1) including a list of directors and officers.
3. A Division PTA Affairs Committee shall be created
in the Division Office to be composed of the following:
Chairperson - Schools Division Superintendent
Members - Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent
Division Administrative Officer
Division Education Supervisor (In- Charge of
PTA)
Division PESPA President (Elementary) or
Division
NAPSSHI President (Secondary)
President of the Division
Federation of PTA
President of the Division
Federation of SSG
4. The Division PTA Affairs Committee shall monitor
the activities of the PTAs and their compliance with
reports and other requirements, arbitrate disputes and
settle matters that may be submitted to it for resolution
especially on PTA representation issue.
538
VI. Privileges of Recognized PTAs
1. A PTA is authorized to collect voluntary

contributions from parents/guardian-members once it
has been duly recognized and given a Certificate of
Recognition by the School Head (Enclosure No. 2). Such
collections, however, shall be subject to pertinent
issuances of the DepEd and/or existing pertinent
ordinances of the local government unit concerned, if
any.
2. In addition, a duly recognized PTA shall have the
following privileges:
a. The use of any available space within the
school premises as its office or
headquarters, provided, that costs pertinent to
electricity, water and other utilities shall be for the
account of the PTA; provided, however, that should
the school need such space, the PTA shall so
vacate the space immediately. The maintenance
and improvement of the office shall be in
accordance with the School Improvement Plan.
The DepEd may allow the PTA to construct a
building or structure within the school premises
for its office, provided however, that the PTA shall
donate such building or structure and other
permanent fixtures to the school. Any
improvement made on such building, structure or
fixture that cannot be removed from such building
or structure without causing damage thereto shall
be deemed the property of the school. A written
agreement shall be executed before the
improvement or construction. A Deed of Donation
shall also be executed by and between the PTA and
the school immediately after
539
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 539
the completion of the improvement or
construction;
b. Representation in the School Governing
Council;
c. Authorization to undertake fund-raising
activities to support the school’s academic and
cocurricular programs, projects and activities
subject to pertinent DepEd guidelines;
d. Participation in the school’s inspection and
acceptance committee and as an observer in the
school’s procurement activities subject to the
provisions of R.A. No. 9184; and
e. Collaboration in relevant school activities.
VII. Activities
All PTA activities within the school premises or which
involve the school, its personnel or students shall be with
prior consultation and approval of the School Head.57
Moreover, the Department Order provides measures “to ensure

transparency and accountability in the safekeeping and utilization
of funds[.] . . . [S]tringent measures were introduced to eliminate
the increasing number of reported incidents wherein officers of
PTAs take undue advantage of their positions.”58 Specifically,
Article VIII (on financial matters) of the Department Order
provides for a detailed policy and conditions on collections of
contributions, safekeeping of funds, financial reporting, and other
measures for transparency and accountability:
_______________
57 Id., at pp. 25-30.

58 Id., at p. 145.
540
VIII. Financial Matters
1. Policy on Collection of Contributions
Cognizant of the need of an organization for adequate
funds to sustain its operations, a duly recognized PTA
may collect voluntary financial contributions from
members and outside sources to enable it to fund and
sustain its operation and the implementation of its
programs and projects exclusively for the benefit of the
students and the school where it operates. The PTA’s
programs and projects shall be in line with the School
Improvement Plan (SIP).
Such collections shall be made by the PTA subject to
the following conditions:
a. The contributions should be a reasonable
amount as may be determined by the PTA Board of
Directors;
b. Nonpayment of the contributions by the
parent-member shall not be a basis for
nonadmission or non-issuance of clearance(s) to
the child by the school concerned;
c. The contributions shall be collected by the
PTA Treasurer on a per parent-member basis
regardless of the number of their children in
school;
d. No collection of PTA contributions shall be
done during the enrollment period; and
e. No teacher or any school personnel shall be
involved in such collection activities.
If collection of the School Publications Fee, Supreme
Student Government (SSG) Developmental Fund and
other club membership fees and contributions is coursed
through the PTA as requested by the concerned
organization, the amount collected shall be remitted
immediately to the school, SSG or other student
organizations concerned on the day it was collected. The
541
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 541
pertinent organization shall deposit the funds with a
reputable bank on the next banking day under the
organization’s account. No service fee shall be charged
against any student organization by the PTA.
Noncompliance or any violation of the aforementioned
conditions shall be a ground for the cancellation of the
PTA’s recognition and/or the filing of appropriate
charges as the case may be.
2. Safekeeping of Funds
All collections of contributions or proceeds of
fundraising activities shall be deposited in a reputable
banking institution as determined by the Board of
Directors. The PTA’s Treasurer or a duly authorized
representative shall undertake the collection and shall
issue official receipts/acknowledgment
receipts.
In no case shall any school official or personnel be
entrusted with the safekeeping and disbursement of
collections made by the PTA. All disbursements of funds
shall be in accordance with generally accepted
accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
All disbursements shall be accompanied by
appropriate resolutions indicating thereof the purposes
for which such disbursements are made.
No cash advances shall be allowed without valid
liquidation of previous cash advances.
3. Financial Statement Report
The books of accounts and other financial records of
the PTA shall be made available for inspection by the
School Head and/or the Division PTA Affairs Committee
at any time.
An Annual Financial Statement signed jointly by the
PTA President, Treasurer and Auditor shall be
submitted to the School Head not later than thirty (30)
days after the last day of classes. Such financial
statement shall be audited by an external and
542
independent auditor, posted in the PTA Bulletin
Board, and presented to the General Assembly during
the next school year.
The PTA shall also submit to the School Head not
later than November 30, a mid-school year financial
statement report ending October 30 duly audited and
signed by the members of the PTA’s audit committee.
Failure to submit such financial statement report
shall be a ground for the cancellation of the recognition
of the PTA by the Division PTA Affairs Committee upon
the recommendation of the School Head.
4. Transparency and Accountability
For purposes of transparency and accountability, all
documents pertaining to the operations of the PTA shall
be open to public examination.
PTA[s] are required to install a PTA Bulletin Board
outside of its office where announcements, approved
resolutions, required reports and financial statements
shall be posted.59
Article IX of the Department Order’s details the acts and

practices in which PTAs are prohibited from engaging. It also
stipulates the cancellation of a PTA’s recognition as a consequence
of engaging in prohibited activities:
IX. Prohibited Activities and Sanctions

1. PTAs are prohibited from:
a. Interfering in the academic and
administrative management and operations of the
school, and of the DepEd, in general;
b. Engaging in any partisan political activity
within school premises;
_______________
59 Id., at pp. 30-32.
543
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 543
c. Operating a canteen/school supplies store, or
being a concessionaire thereof inside the school or
nearby premises, or offering these services to the
school as its client either directly or indirectly;
d. Selling insurance, pre-need plans or similar
schemes or programs to students and/ or their
parents; and
e. Such other acts or circumstances analogous to
the foregoing.
2. PTA Officers and members of the Board of Directors are
prohibited from collecting salaries, honoraria, emoluments or
other forms of compensation from any of the funds collected
or received by the PTA.
3. PTAs shall have no right to disburse, or charge any fees
as service fees or percentages against the amount collected
pertinent to the School Publication Fee, Supreme Student
Government (SSG) Developmental Fund and other club
membership fees and contributions.
4. In no case shall a PTA or any of its officers or members
of the Board of Directors call upon students and teachers for
purposes of investigation or disciplinary action.
5. The recognition of any PTA shall be cancelled by the
Division PTA Affairs Committee upon the recommendation of
the School Head concerned for any violation of the above
mentioned prohibited activities and these Guidelines.
Thereafter, the School Head may call for a special
election to replace the Board of Directors of the PTA
whose recognition was cancelled. Criminal, civil and/or
administrative actions may be taken against any
member or officer of the Board of the PTA who may ap-
544
pear responsible for failure to submit the necessary
annual financial statements or for failure to account the
funds of the PTA.60
Consistent with rationalizing the mechanism for granting official

recognition to PTAs, Article X of the Department Order provides
for the following transitory provision:
X. Transitory Provision
Existing and duly recognized PTCAs and its
Federations shall no longer be given recognition
effective School Year 2009-2010. They shall cease
operation at the end of School Year 2008-2009 and given
until June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities,
submit their financial reports and turn over all
documents to the School Heads and Schools Division
Superintendents, respectively.61
Petitioner insists that the Department Order is an invalid

exercise of the rule-making power delegated to the Secretary of
Education as it supposedly disregards PTAs’ and PTCAs’ purposes,
not only as partners of the Department of Education in the
implementation of programs, but also as a watchdog against
“abuses, mismanagement, inefficiency[,] and excesses of public
officials within the public school system.”62 Petitioner also assails
the Department Order’s limitation of official recognition to PTAs,
and no longer to PTCAs, as being contrary to law.
VI
Petitioner is in error for asserting that the assailed Department

Order is contrary to the statutes it aims to put into effect as it fails
to put PTCAs on the same footing as PTAs.
_______________
60 Id., at pp. 32-33.

61 Id., at p. 33.
62 Id., at p. 125.
545
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 545
Article 77 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides for the
organization and purposes of PTAs:
77. ArticleParent-Teacher Associations.—Every

elementary and secondary school shall organize a parent-
teacher association for the purpose of providing a forum for
the discussion of problems and their solutions, relating to the
total school program, and for insuring the full cooperation of
parents in the efficient implementation of such program. All
parents who have children enrolled in a school are
encouraged to be active members of its PTA, and to comply
with whatever obligations and responsibilities such
membership entails.
Parent-Teacher Association[s] all over the country shall aid
the municipal and other local authorities and school officials
in the enforcement of juvenile delinquency control measures,
and in the implementation of programs and activities to
promote child welfare. (Emphasis supplied)
The Education Act of 1982, a statute adopted subsequent to the

Child and Youth Welfare Code, expressly recognizes the right of
parents to organize by themselves and/or with teachers:
8. SectionRights of Parents.—In addition to other rights

under existing laws, all parents who have children enrolled in
a school have the following rights:
1. The right to organize by themselves and/or with
teachers for the purpose of providing a forum for the
discussion of matters relating to the total school
program, and for ensuring the full cooperation of parents
and teachers in the formulation and efficient
implementation of such programs.
2. The right to access to any official record directly
relating to the children who are under their parental
responsibility. (Emphasis supplied)
546
As is evident from the Child and Youth Welfare Code’s use of the
word “shall,” it is mandatory for PTAs to be organized in
elementary and secondary schools. As against this, the Child and
Youth Welfare Code is silent on the creation of PTCAs. The
Education Act of 1982 is equally silent on this. Hence, while the
creation and/or organization of PTAs are statutorily mandated, the
same could not be said of PTCAs.
However, petitioner argues differently. In support of its position,
it cites Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Basic
Education Act of 2001, more specifically its Section 3(d), on its
purposes and objectives:
3. SectionPurposes and Objectives.—The purposes and

objectives of this Act are:
....
(d) To ensure that schools and learning centers
receive the kind of focused attention they deserve and
that educational programs, projects and services take
into account the interests of all members of the
community[.]
Petitioner also cites Republic Act No. 8980, otherwise known as

the Early Childhood Care and Development Act. More specifically,
petitioner cites Section 7(a)(1) on implementing arrangements and
operational structures:
7. Sec.Implementing Arrangements and Operational

Structures.—The implementation of the National [Early
Childhood Care and Development or] ECCD System shall be
the joint responsibility of the national government agencies,
local government units, nongovernment organizations, and
private organizations that are accredited to deliver the
services or to provide training and technical assistance.
(a) Responsibilities of the National Government —
National government agencies shall be responsible for
developing policies and programs, providing technical
assistance and support to the ECCD service
547
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 547
providers in consultation with coordinating
committees at the provincial, city/municipal,
and barangay levels, as provided for in Section 8 of this
Act, and monitoring of ECCD service benefits and
outcomes. The Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), the Department of Health
(DOH), the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), the Department of Agriculture
(DA), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and the
National Nutrition Council (NNC) shall jointly prepare
annual ECCD for work plans that will coordinate their
respective technical assistance and support for the
National ECCD Program. They shall consolidate
existing program implementing guidelines that ensure
consistency in integrated service delivery within the
National ECCD System.
The DECS shall promote the National ECCD
Progman in schools. ECCD programs in public
schools shall be under the joint responsibility of
their respective school principal/school head and
parents-teachers-community association (PTCA)
within the standards set forth in the National
ECCD System and under the guidance of the
City/Municipal ECCD Coordinating Committee for
the effective and equitable delivery of ECCD
services. It shall also make available existing
facilities of public elementary schools for ECCD
classes. (1)
Neither Republic Act No. 9155 nor Republic Act No. 8980
supports petitioner’s contentions that PTCAs should stand on the
same footing as PTAs and that their existence is statutorily
mandated.
Republic Act No. 9155 does not even mention or otherwise refer
to PTCAs. All it does is exhort that the interest of all
548
members of the community should be taken into account in the
administration of the country’s basic education system. The
Department Order does not run afoul of this. On the contrary, the
Department Order specifically provides for PTAs’ collaboration
with members of the community:
I. General Policy
organize a Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) for the
purpose of providing a forum for the discussion of issues
and their solutions related to the total school program
and to ensure the full cooperation of parents in the
efficient implementation of such program.
Every PTA shall provide mechanisms to ensure proper
coordination with the members of the community,
provide an avenue for discussing relevant concerns and
provide assistance and support to the school for the
promotion of their common interest. Standing
committees may be created within the PTA organization
to coordinate with community members. Regular fora
may be conducted with local government units, civic
organizations and other stakeholders to foster unity and
cooperation.63 (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 8980 does mention PTCAs, but this is only in
the specific context of the National Early Childhood Care and
Development (ECCD) System. The ECCD System “refers to the full
range of . . . programs that provide for the basic holistic needs of
young children from birth to age six (6).”64 It is not even an
education program and does not in-
_______________
63 Id., at p. 25.
64 Rep. Act No. 8980, Sec. 4(a) provides:
4. SectionDefinitions.—For purposes of this Act:
549
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 549
volve the age range of students — elementary to high school —
that is relevant to the Department Order. In any case, an isolated
and passing mention does not equate to a mandate.
Petitioner’s invocation of Republic Act Nos. 9155 and 8980 only
serve to muddle the issues by entreating considerations that are
irrelevant to the purposes of the statute (i.e., the Child and Youth
Welfare Code) that actually pertains to and requires the
organization of PTAs.
From the previously quoted provisions of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code and the Education Act of 1982, the purposes for
which the organization of PTAs is mandated are clear. First, a PTA
is to be a forum for discussion. Second, a PTA exists to ensure the
full cooperation of parents in the implementation of school
programs. The assailed Department Order serves these purposes.
By ensuring fiscal transparency and accountability, and by
providing the basic framework for organization and official
recognition, the Department Order ensures that PTAs exist and
function in a manner that remains consistent with the
_______________
Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) System refers to the full
range of health, nutrition, early education and social services programs that
provide for the basic holistic needs of young children from birth to age six (6),
to promote their optimum growth and development. These programs include:
(a)
Center-based programs, such as the day care service established
under Republic Act No. 6972, public and private pre-schools,
kindergarten or school-based programs, community or church-based
early childhood education programs initiated by nongovernment
organizations or people’s organizations, workplace-related child care
and education programs, child-minding centers, health centers and
stations; and (1)
Home-based programs, such as the neighborhood-based play
groups, family day care programs, parent education and home visiting
programs. (2)
550
articulated purposes of PTAs under the Child and Youth Welfare
Code and the Education Act of 1982. A framework for organization
ensures that PTAs are properly organized and are both adequately
representative of and limited only to those interests that are
appropriate to the education of children in elementary and high
school. Measures for fiscal transparency and accountability ensure
that PTAs are not hampered by pecuniary or proprietary interests
that have nothing to do with the effective implementation of school
programs. Finally, mechanisms for official recognition ensure that
only those associations that organize and conduct themselves in a
manner that is consistent with these purposes are privileged with
state sanction.
VII
Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, the adoption of the

Department Order is not tainted with fatal procedural defects.
Petitioner decries the supposed lack of public consultations as
being violative of its right to due process.
Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative
agency acts pursuant to its rule-making power. In Central Bank of
the Philippines v. Cloribel:65
Previous notice and hearing, as elements of due process,

are constitutionally required for the protection of life or
vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its
limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past
act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is
not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations
promulgated to govern future conduct of a
_______________
65 150-A Phil. 86; 44 SCRA 307 (1972) [Per CJ. Concepcion, En Banc].
551
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 551
class of persons or enterprises, unless the law provides
otherwise[:]
....
“It is also clear from the authorities that where the
function of the administrative body is legislative, notice
of hearing is not required by due process of
law. See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R.
185, 204, supra, where it is said: ‘If the nature of the
administrative agency is essentially legislative, the
requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary.
The validity of a rule of future action which affects a
group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not
involved, is not determined according to the same rules
which apply in the case of the direct application of a
policy to a specific individual.’ . . . It is said in 73 C.J.S.
Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, Sec. 130,
pages 452 and 453: Aside from statute, the necessity of
notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding
depends on the character of the proceeding and the
circumstances involved. Insofar as generalization is
possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the administrative body
acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or
legislative functions; but where a public administrative
body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its
acts are particular and immediate rather than general
and prospective, the person whose rights or property
may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and
hearing.”66
_______________
66 Id., at pp. 101-102; pp. 315-316, citing Albert v. Public Service Commission,
120 A. 2d. 346, 350-351.
552
In any case, petitioner’s claim that no consultations were held is
belied by the Department of Education’s detailed recollection of the
actions it took before the adoption of the assailed Department
Order:
On March 1, 2003, pursuant to D.O. No. 14, S. 2004,
responde 1.nt DepEd created a task force to review, revise,
or modify D.O. No. 23, S. 2003 (the existing guidelines), in
order to address numerous complaints involving PTAs and
PTCAs and to resolve disputes relative to the recognition and
administration of said associations. The task force came up
with draft guidelines after consultations with parents,
teachers and students;
On May 3, 2003, pursuant to D.O. No. 28, 2.
S. 2007, the task force was reconstituted to evaluate the draft
guidelines prepared by the original task force and to review
the provisions of D.O. No. 23;
On February 2, 2009, the reconstituted task force, after
3. soliciting comments, suggestions and recommendations
from school heads and presidents of PTAs or PTCAs,
submitted a draft of the “Revised Guidelines governing
PTAs/PTCAs at the School Level”;
The draft was 4. submitted for comments and suggestions
to the participants to the Third National Federation Supreme
Student Governments (NFSSG) Conference held in February
2009. The participants, composed of regional education
supervisors, presidents of regional federations of Supreme
Student Governments (SSG), and representatives from the
SSG advisers, submitted another set of revised guidelines;
The draft was subjected to 5. further review and
consultations, which resulted in the final draft of D.O. No. 54,
S. 2009.67 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
67 Rollo, p. 151.
553
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 553
Apart from claiming that no consultations were held, petitioner
decries the non-publication, by the Department of Education itself,
of the assailed Department Order.
This does not invalidate the Department Order. As is evident
from the previously quoted provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the
Administrative Code, all that is required for the validity of rules
promulgated by administrative agencies is the filing of three (3)
certified copies with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
Within 15 days of filing, administrative rules become effective.68
_______________
68 1987 Adm. Code, Book VII, Chap. 2 provides:

CHAPTER 2
Rules and Regulations
3. SECTIONFilingEvery agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) c .—(1)ertified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three
(3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against
any party or persons.
The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out
the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (2)
A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be
open to public inspection. (3)
4. SECTIONEffectivity.—In addition to other rule-making requirements
provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective
fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is
fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health,
safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make
emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
554
VIII
Pointing to Article II(2) of the assailed Department Order, which

calls for the approval of the school head in the organizing of
homeroom PTAs, petitioner claims that the Department Order
undermines the organizational independence of PTAs. It claims
that the assailed Department Order lacks standards or guidelines
and effectively gives the school head unbridled discretion to impede
the organizing of PTAs.
This is erroneous.
To begin with, and as previously noted, the organizing of PTAs is
mandated by statute. Under Article 77 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, every elementary school and high school
is required to have a PTA. School heads are bound by this
requirement. Moreover, the mandatory nature of organizing PTAs
is recognized by the assailed Department Order itself. Article I(1)
of the Department Order provides that “[e]very elementary and
secondary school shallorganize a Parents-Teachers Association.”
Likewise, Article I of the assailed Department Order echoes the
Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Education Act of 1982 in
providing for the purposes and functions of PTAs. In doing so, it
lays out the standards that are to guide school heads in deciding on
whether official sanction shall be vested in a group seeking
recognition as a PTA:
I. General Policy
organize a Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) for
the purpose of providing a forum for the discussion of
issues and their solutions related to the total school
program and to ensure the full cooperation of
parents in the efficient implementation of
such program.
coordination with the members of
555
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 555
the community, provide an avenue for discussing
relevant concerns and provide assistance and support to
the school for the promotion of their common interest.
Standing committees may be created within the PTA
organization to coordinate with community members.
Regular fora may be conducted with local government
units, civic organizations and other stakeholders to
foster unity and cooperation.
2. As an organization operating in the school, the PTA
shall adhere to all existing policies and implementing
guidelines issued or hereinafter may be issued by the
Department of Education.
The PTA shall serve as support group and as a
significant partner of the school whose relationship shall
be defined by cooperative and open dialogue to promote
the welfare of the students.69 (Emphasis supplied)
The involvement of school heads is limited to the initial stages of

formation of PTAs. Once organized, the school heads hold no power
over PTAs as they are limited to acting in an advisory capacity.
Article IV(1)(d) of the Department Order categorically provides:

1. The administration of the affairs and management
of activities of the PTA is vested with the Board of
Directors and its officers in accordance with these
guidelines or their respective Constitution and By-Laws,
if any, which shall adhere to the following:
....
_______________
69 Rollo, p. 25.
556
d. The School Head shall not serve as a member of the
Board of Directors but as adviser to the
PTA[.]70 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner makes much of how “the assailed Department Order

provides that the recognition of the PTCA or any PTA shall be
cancelled by the Division PTA Affairs Committee upon the mere
recommendation of the School Head. And in case of cancellation of
the recognition of the PTA, the School Head is given the power the
[sic] call a special election to replace the Board of Directors of the
PTA whose recognition was cancelled.”71 It claims that this
buttresses its claim that the Department Order 2009 undermines
the organizational independence of PTAs.
In the first place, all that a school head has is recommending
authority. More importantly, petitioner overlooks the qualifier to
the school head’s recommending authority:
IX. Prohibited Activities and Sanctions

....
5. The recognition of any PTA shall be cancelled by
the Division PTA Affairs Committee upon the
recommendation of the School Head concerned for any
violation of the above mentioned prohibited activities
and these Guidelines.
Thereafter, the School Head may call for a special
election to replace the Board of Directors of the PTA
whose recognition was cancelled. Criminal, civil and/or
administrative actions may be taken against any
member or officer of the Board of the PTA who may
appear responsible for fail-
_______________
70 Id., at p. 27.
71 Id., at p. 13.
557
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 557
ure to submit the necessary annual financial
statements or for failure to account the funds of the
PTA.72 (Emphasis supplied)
It is evident that the recommending authority of the school head

is not as “unbridled” as petitioner claims it to be. On the contrary,
the assailed Department Order specifically limits a school head’s
competence to recommend cancellation of recognition to the
instances defined by Article IX as prohibited activities.
IX
Reference to an approving authority in order that an

organization may be given official recognition by state organs, and
thus vested with the competencies and privileges attendant to such
recognition, is by no means unique to PTAs. By way of example,
similar processes and requirements are observed and adhered to by
organizations seeking recognition as business organizations (e.g.,
corporations),73 government con-
_______________
72 Id., at pp. 32-33.

73 17. Corporation Code, Sec.Grounds when articles of incorporation or
amendment may be rejected or disapproved.—The Securities and Exchange
Commission may reject the articles of incorporation or disapprove any amendment
thereto if the same is not in compliance with the requirements of this
Code: Provided, That the Commission shall give the incorporators a reasonable time
within which to correct or modify the objectionable portions of the articles or
amendment. The following are grounds for such rejection or disapproval:
1. That the articles of incorporation or any amendment thereto is not
substantially in accordance with the form prescribed herein;
2. That the purpose or purposes of the corporation are patently
unconstitutional, illegal, immoral, or contrary to government rules and
regulations;
3. That the Treasurer’s Affidavit concerning the amount of capital stock
subscribed and/or paid if false;
558
tractors,74 legitimate labor organizations,75 and political parties
participating in the party-list system.76
_______________
4. That the percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by

citizens of the Philippines has not been complied with as required by existing
laws or the Constitution.
No articles of incorporation or amendment to articles of incorporation of banks,
banking and quasi-banking institutions, building and loan associations, trust
companies and other financial intermediaries, insurance companies, public utilities,
educational institutions, and other corporations governed by special laws shall be
accepted or approved by the Commission unless accompanied by a favorable
recommendation of the appropriate government agency to the effect that such
articles or amendment is in accordance with law.
74 23. Republic Act No. 9184, SectionEligibility Requirements for the
Procurement of Goods and Infrastructure Projects.—The BAC or, under special
circumstances specified in IRR, its duly designated organic office shall determine
the eligibility of prospective bidders for the procurement of Goods and
Infrastructure Projects, based on the bidders’ compliance with the eligibility
requirements within the period set forth in the Invitation to Bid. The eligibility
requirements shall provide for fair and equal access to all prospective bidders. The
documents submitted in satisfaction of the eligibility requirements shall be made
under oath by the prospective bidder or by his duly authorized representative
certifying to the correctness of the statements made and the completeness and
authenticity of the documents submitted.
A prospective bidder may be allowed to submit his eligibility requirements
electronically. However, said bidder shall later on certify under oath as to
correctness of the statements made and the completeness and authenticity of the
documents submitted.
75 234.A. Labor Code, ArticleRequirements of registration.—A federation,
national union or industry or trade union center or an independent union shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted
by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the
labor organization, the minutes of the or-
559
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 559
The demarcation of the broad right to form associations vis-à-
vis regulations such as registration, requisite approval by defined
authorities, and other such formalities is settled in jurisprudence.
_______________
ganizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such
meetings;
(c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all its
members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years,
copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution and bylaws of the applicant union,
minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who
participated in it. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21,
1981 and Section 1, Republic Act No. 9481 which lapsed into law on May 25,
2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007)
76 5. Republic Act No. 7941, Sec.Registration.—Any organized group of
persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-
list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: provided,
that the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within
fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later
than sixty (60) days before election.
560
In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of
Labor,77 this court was confronted with allegations that Section
2378 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the
_______________
77 136 Phil. 289; 27 SCRA 40 (1969) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].

78 Rep. Act No. 875, Sec. 23 provides:
23. SectionRegistration of Labor Organizations.—
There shall be in the Department of Labor a Registrar of Labor
Organizations (hereinafter referred to as the Registrar). (a)
It shall be the duty of the Register to act as the representative of the
Secretary of Labor in any proceeding under this Act upon any question of the
association or representation of employees, to keep and maintain a registry of
legitimate labor organizations and of their branches of locals, and to perform
such other functions as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe.
Any labor organization, association or union of workers duly organized for
the material, intellectual and moral well-being of its members shall acquire
legal personality and be entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by
law to legitimate labor organizations within thirty days of filing with the
office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its due organization and existence
and the following documents, together with the amount of five pesos as
registration fee, except as provided in paragraph “d” of this section: (b)
A copy of the constitution and bylaws of the organization together
with a list of all officers of the association, their addresses and the
address of the principal office of the organization; (1)
A sworn statement of all officers of the said organization,
association or union to the effect that they are not members of the
Communist Party and that they are not members of any organizations
which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any
illegal or unconstitutional method; and (2)
If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more
years, a copy of its last annual financial report. (3)
561
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 561
_______________
If in the opinion of the Department of Labor the applicant organization
does not appear to meet the requirements of this Act for registration, the
Department shall, after ten days’ notice to the applicant organization,
association or union, and within thirty days of receipt of the above mentioned
documents, hold a public hearing in the province in which the principal office
of the applicant is located at which the applicant organization shall have the
right to be represented by attorney and to cross-examine witnesses; and such
hearing shall be concluded and a decision announced by the Department
within thirty days after the announcement of said hearing; and if after due
hearing the Department rules against registration of the applicant, it shall
be required that the Department of Labor state specifically what data the
applicant has failed to submit as a prerequisite of registration. If the
applicant is still denied, it thereafter shall have the right within sixty days of
formal denial of registration to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which shall
render a decision within thirty days, or to the Supreme Court. (c)
The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be
cancelled by the Department of Labor, if the Department has reason to
believe that the labor organization no longer meets one or more of the
requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails to file with the Department of
Labor either its financial report within sixty days of the end of its fiscal year
or the names of its new officers along with their non-subversive affidavits as
outlined in paragraph (b) above within sixty days of their election; however,
the Department of Labor shall not order the cancellation of the registration
and permit without due notice and hearing, as provided under paragraph (c)
above, and the affected labor organization shall have the same right of
appeal to the courts as previously provided. (d)
The Department of Labor shall automatically cancel or refuse registration
and permit to the labor organization or the unit of a labor organization
finally declared under Sections five and six of this Act to be a company union
as defined by this Act. The restoration or granting of registration and permit
shall take place only after the labor organization petitions the Court and the
Court declares (1) that full remedial action has
562
Industrial Peace Act, which spelled out the requirements for
registration of labor organizations, “unduly curtail[ed] the freedom
of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.”79
Sustaining the validity of Section 23, this court put to rest any
qualms about how registration and approval, as requisites to the
acquisition of legal personality and the exercise of rights and
privileges that are accorded to an officially recognized
organization, are not incompatible with the right to form
associations. On the contrary, this court underscored that the
establishment of these requirements is a valid exercise of police
power as public interest underlies the conduct of associations
seeking state recognition:
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875
unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The
registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said Section is not a
limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be
exercised with or without said registration. The latter is merely a
condition sine qua nonfor the acquisition of legal personality by
labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession of
the “rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations.” The Constitution does not guarantee these rights
and privileges, much less said personality, which are mere
statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which
registration is required
_______________
been taken and (2) sufficient time has elapsed to counteract the unfair
labor practice which resulted in the company union status.
Provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Two hundred and thirteen
providing for registration, licensing, and cancellation of registration of
organizations, associations or unions of labor, as qualified and expanded by
the preceding paragraphs of this Act, are hereby amended. (e)
79 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of Labor, supra note 77
at p. 290; p. 44.
563
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 563
to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud,
or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly
accredited agents of the union they purport to represent.
Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power,
because the activities in which labor organizations,
associations and union of workers are engaged affect public
interest, which should be protected. Furthermore, the
obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for
the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a
reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the
organization, considering that the same generally solicits
funds or membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf
of its members, huge amounts of money due to them or to the
organization.80 (Citations omitted)
The right to organize does not equate to the state’s obligation to

accord official status to every single association that comes into
existence. It is one thing for individuals to galvanize themselves as
a collective, but it is another for the group that they formed to not
only be formally recognized by the state, but also bedecked with all
the benefits and privileges that are attendant to official status. In
pursuit of public interest, the state can set reasonable regulations
— procedural, formal, and substantive — with which organizations
seeking state imprimatur must comply.
In this court’s January 9, 1973 Resolution, In the Matter of the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,81 this court underscored
the importance of the state’s regulation of the collectivity (although
hitherto “unorganized and incohesive”)82 of those who, by their
admission to the bar, are burdened with responsibilities to society,
courts, colleagues, and clients. This court quoted with approval the
following statements made by the Commission on Bar Integration:
_______________
80 Id.
81 151 Phil. 132; 49 SCRA 22 (1973) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
82 Id., at p. 138; p. 29.
564
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures
has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
– Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the
practice of law.
– The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a
privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a
lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation;
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
– Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with
public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that
privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer’s
public responsibilities[.]83
For the same purpose of protecting and advancing public

interest, this court has sustained the validity not only of those
requirements relating to the establishment and registration of
associations, but also the substantive standards delimiting who
may join organizations. This is illustrated in United Pepsi-Cola
Supervisory Union v. Laguesma,84 where this court recognized the
validity of the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code,85 which
prohibits managerial employees from forming, assisting, or joining
labor organizations, in relation
_______________
83 Id., at pp. 137-138; p. 28.

85 Labor Code, Art. 245 provides:
245. Art.Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees.—Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist
or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join,
assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
565
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 565
to Article III, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. Here, this court
recognized that a classification distinguishing managerial
employees from rank-and-file employees permitted to form and join
labor organizations is grounded on identifiable and appreciable
differences. Thus, “there is a rational basis for prohibiting
managerial employees from forming or joining labor
organizations”;86 and “as to [managerial employees] the right of
self-organization may be regulated and even abridged.”87
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8

infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a
union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to the
condition that its exercise should be for purposes “not
contrary to law.” In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational
basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining labor organizations. As Justice Davide, Jr., himself a
constitutional commissioner, said in his ponencia in Philips
Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC:
In the first place, all these employees, with the
exception of the service engineers and the sales force
personnel, are confidential employees. Their
classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-
FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and
PEO-FFW explicitly considered them as confidential
employees. By the very nature of their functions, they
assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have
access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise
managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As
such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial
employees to form, assist or joint a labor union equally
applies to them.
_______________
86 United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, supra note 84 at p. 279; p.

44.
87 Id., at p. 278; p. 43.
566
In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto
Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus:
“. . . The rationale for this inhibition has been
stated to be, because if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a
Union, the latter might not be assured of their
loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of
interests. The Union can also become company-
dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in Union membership.”
To be sure, the Court in Philips Industrial was dealing
with the right of confidential employees to organize. But the
same reason for denying them the right to organize justifies
even more the ban on managerial employees from forming
unions. After all, those who qualify as top or middle
managers are executives who receive from their employers
information that not only is confidential but also is not
generally available to the public, or to their competitors, or to
other employees. It is hardly necessary to point out that to
say that the first sentence of Art. 245 is unconstitutional
would be to contradict the decision in that case.88
Our educational system demonstrates the integral role of

parents. It is a system founded not just on the relationship
between students on the one hand and educators or schools on the
other, but as much on the participation of parents and guardians.
Parents and guardians are foremost in the Education Act of 1982’s
enumeration of the “members and elements of the educational
community”:
_______________
88 Id., at pp. 279-280; pp. 44-45, citing Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 88957, June 25, 1992, 210 SCRA 339, 347-348 [Per J. Davide, Jr.,
Third Division].
567
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 567
6. SectionDefinition and Coverage.—“Educational
community” refers to those persons or groups of persons as
such or associated in institutions involved in organized
teaching and learning systems.
The members and elements of the educational community
are:
1. “Parents” or guardians or the head of the institution or
foster home which has custody of the pupil or student.
2. “Students,” or those enrolled in and who regularly attend
and educational institution of secondary or higher level of a
person engaged in formal study. “Pupils,” are those who
regularly attend a school of elementary level under the
supervision and tutelage of a teacher.
3. “School personnel,” or all persons working for an
educational institution, which includes the following:
a. “Teaching or academic staff,” or all persons engaged
in actual teaching and/or research assignments, either
on full-time or part-time basis, in all levels of the
educational system.
b. “School administrators,” or all persons occupying
policy implementing positions having to do with the
functions of the school in all levels.
c. “Academic nonteaching personnel,” or those persons
holding some academic qualifications and performing
academic functions directly supportive of teaching, such
as registrars, librarians, research assistants, research
aides, and similar staff.
d. “Nonacademic personnel,” or all other school
personnel not falling under the definition and coverage
of teaching and academic staff, school administrators
and academic nonteaching personnel.
4. “Schools,” or institutions recognized by the State which
undertake educational operations.
568
A parent-teacher association is a mechanism for effecting the
role of parents (who would otherwise be viewed as outsiders) as an
indispensable element of educational communities. Rather than
being totally independent of or removed from schools, a parent-
teacher association is more aptly considered an adjunct of an
educational community having a particular school as its locus. It is
an “arm” of the school. Given this view, the importance of
regulation vis-à-vis investiture of official status becomes manifest.
According a parent-teacher association official status not only
enables it to avail itself of benefits and privileges but also
establishes upon it its solemn duty as a pillar of the educational
system.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Petition
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I join the dissent of Justice Brion.
Brion, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Mendoza, J., On Leave.
Jardeleza, J., No part.
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION,J.:
Background
On June 1, 2009, respondent Department of Education (DepEd),

through then Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued Department Order
No. 54, Series of 2009 (DO 54), entitled the “Revised Guidelines
Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School
Level.”
569
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 569
DO 54 aimed to address the “increasing reports of malpractices
[of] officers or members of the PTAs, such as but not limited to (1)
[the absconding of officers] with contributions and membership
fees; (2) [the] nondisclosure of the status of funds and [the] non-
submission of financial statements; and (3) [the] misuse of funds.”1
To address these issues, DO 54 required that before any PTA
may be organized, the school head’s approval must first be
secured. Arguing that this prerequisite undermines the
independence of the PTAs, petitioner Quezon City PTCA
Federation, Inc. (QC PTCA) directly filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court to nullify DO 54.
The ponencia and the dissent

In ruling for the DepEd, the ponencia holds that the grant of
powers to the school heads to approve or disapprove a PTA’s
organization is consistent with the mandate of Batas Pambansa
Blg. (BP) 2322 and Article 773of Presidential Decree
(PD) 603.4 Under these laws, elementary and secondary
_______________
1 Ponencia, p. 515.
2 Education Act of 1982.
3 77 Article .Parent-Teacher Associations.—Every elementary and secondary
school shall organize a parent-teacher association for the purpose of providing a
forum for the discussion of problems and their solutions, relating to the total school
program, and for insuring the full cooperation of parents in the efficient
implementation of such program. All parents who have children enrolled in a school
are encouraged to be active members of its PTA, and to comply with whatever
obligations and responsibilities such membership entails.
Parent-Teacher Associations all over the country shall aid the municipal and
other local authorities and school officials in the enforcement of juvenile
delinquency control measures, and in the implementation of programs and activities
to promote child welfare.
4 The Child and Youth Welfare Code.
570
schools are mandated to organize their own PTAs.5Since DO
54 echoed the provisions of these statutes on the functions of the
PTAs, it effectively laid out the guidelines which the school heads
must observe in deciding whether or not to approve the
organization of a PTA.6
Furthermore, the ponencia explains that the involvement of
school heads is limited to the initial stages of a PTA’s constitution.
Once created, the school heads would only act as advisers and
could no longer intervene with the PTA’s affairs.7
Lastly, the ponencia asserts that while the law mandates the
creation and organization of PTAs, no such mandate extends to
Parent-Teacher Community Associations (PTCAs).
I disagree with the ponencia for the following reasons: first, the
distinction made by the ponencia between PTAs and PTCAs is
immaterial to this case; second, the DepEd exceeded its rule-
making power when it mandated in DO 54 that the PTAs in
elementary and secondary schools may only be organized upon the
school head’s approval; third and last, the approval
requirement is unreasonable and does not directly address the
issue of mismanagement of PTA funds.
I.The distinction between

PTCAs and PTAs is immaterial.
I disagree with the ponencia’s view that the law mandates the
creation and organization of “Parent and Teachers Associations”
but not Parent-Teachers Community Associations (PTCAs), as
neither BP 232 nor PD 603 mentions PTCAs.8
_______________
5 Ponencia, p. 545.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 As is evident from PD 603’s use of the word ‘shall,’ it is mandatory for parent-
teachers associations to be organized in elemen-
571
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 571
A Parent-Teacher Association is one whose purpose is to provide
a forum for the discussion of problems and solutions relating to the
total school program, and ensure that parents and teachers fully
cooperate in the efficient implementation of such program.9 It may
be organized by the parents themselves, or by the parents with the
teachers.10 An association that meets these criteria is a PTA in the
eyes of the law.
Hence, what makes an organization a Parent-Teacher Association
is its objective and composition, and not its appellation.
Apparently, the ponencia discriminated against the petitioner
QC PTCA when it assumed that the latter is not a Parent-Teacher
Association without distinguishing PTAs from PTCA, and without
discussing QC PTCA’s distinct circumstances that would
distinguish it from a PTA.
_______________
tary and secondary schools. As against this, Pres. Dec. 603 is silent on the
creation of parent-teachers community associations or PTCAs. Batas Pambansa
Blg. 232 is equally silent on this. From this, while the creation and/or organization
of PTAs are statutorily mandates, the same could not be said of PTCAs. Ponencia, p.
546.
9 77. PD 603 Art.Parent-Teacher Associations.—Every elementary and
secondary school shall organize a parent-teacher association for the purpose of
providing a forum for the discussion of problems and their solutions,
relating to the total school program, and for insuring the full cooperation
of parents in the efficient implementation of such program. All parents who
have children enrolled in a school are encouraged to be active members of its PTA,
and to comply with whatever obligations and responsibilities such membership
entails. (Emphasis and omissions supplied)
10 PD 603 is complemented by Section 8 of BP 232, which states that parents
have the “right to organize by themselves and/or with teachers for the purpose of
providing a forum for the discussion of matters relating to the total school program,
and for ensuring the full cooperation of parents and teachers in the formulation and
efficient implementation of such programs.”
572
Contrary to the ponencia’s observations,11 no less than the
respondent recognized that PTCAs stand on equal footing with
PTAs. On June 24, 2009, the DepEd issued Department Order No.
67, S. 2009 (DO 67)12 clarifying DO 54. It reads:
x x x DepED Order No. 54 is hereby clarified: (omission

supplied) x x x
Whereas, DepED Order No. 54, S. 2009 (X. Transitory
Provision) provides: “Existing and duly recognized PTCAs
and its Federations shall no longer be given recognition
effective School Year 2009-2010. They shall cease operation
at the end of School Year 2008-2009 and given until June 30,
2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities, submit their
financial reports and turn over all documents to the School
Heads and Schools Division Superintendents, respectively;
Whereas, there is a need to clarify the purpose and intent
of such provision to mean that PTCAs that do not conform to
these guidelines shall no longer be given recognition but in no
way to abolish the PTCAs;
Wherefore, the same Transitory Provision of DepED
Order No. 54, S. 2009 shall read as follows:
Transitory Provision X.
Existing PTCAs, whether SEC-registered or not, may
conform to these Guidelines effective School Year
2009-2010 in order to be recognized as the duly
constituted PTAs; provided, that PTAs already existing
and duly recognized at the time of the signing of this
Order shall continue to exist and operate as such
subject to this Order and other ex-
573
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 573
isting rules and regulations of
the Department. (Emphasis in the original, underscoring
supplied)
Thus, the distinction between PTCAs and PTAs is more

imagined than real, particularly for PTCAs already in existence
since they can be recognized as PTAs. Thus, I find it misplaced
to generalize and discriminate against all PTCAs simply because
the law only mentions “Parent-Teachers Associations.” In my view,
for purposes of this case, the distinction the ponencia creates
between PTAs and PTCAs is insignificant and lacks materiality.
II.The DepEd exceeded its
rule-making power.
Delegation of powers is a rule that is widely recognized

especially in the legislative branch of government. With the
increasing complexity of the government’s functions and the
growing inability of the legislature to address the myriad of
problems demanding its attention, Congress found it necessary to
delegate its powers to administrative agencies. This is the power
of subordinate legislation.
“With this power, administrative bodies may implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by ‘filling in’ the details which
the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide.”13 On this basis, administrative agencies may promulgate
supplementary regulations which have the force and effect of law.14
In the DepEd’s case, its rule-making power finds its legislative
basis in Section 5715 of BP 232. Under this provision, the
_______________
13 Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, No. L-76633, October 18, 1988, 166
SCRA 533.
14 Id.
15 57 Section .Functions and Powers of the Ministry.—The Ministry shall:
Formulate general education objectives and policies, and adopt long-range
educational plans; 1.
574
DepEd has the authority to “promulgate rules and
regulations necessary for the administration, supervision
and regulation of the educational system in accordance
with declared policy.” Moreover, Section 7016 of this law, in
relation to EO 11717and RA 9155,18 expressly grants the DepEd
Secretary the authority to administer and enforce BP 232 and to
promulgate its necessary implementing rules and regulations.
However, the power of subordinate legislation does not mean the
absolute transmission of legislative powers to administrative
agencies such as the DepEd.
In order for a valid delegation to exist, two basic tests must be
complied with: the completeness test, and the sufficient
standard test.
“Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature, such that,
_______________
Plan, develop and implement programs and projects in education and culture;
2.
Promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision
and regulation of the educational system in accordance with declared policy; 3.
Set up general objectives for the school system; 4.
Coordinate the activities and functions of the school system and the various
cultural agencies under it; 5.
Coordinate and work with agencies concerned with the educational and cultural
development of the national cultural communities; and 6.
Recommend and study legislation proposed for adoption. 7.
16 70 Section .Rule-making Authority.—The Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports charged with the administration and enforcement of this Act, shall
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.
17 Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports.
18 Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001.
575
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 575
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he would have to do
is enforce it. On the other hand, under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. These two tests are both intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.”19
Also, these two tests ensure that administrative agencies, in the
exercise of their power of subordinate legislation, create rules and
regulations that are germane to the objects and purposes of
the law they implement; and are not in contradiction, but in
full conformity with the standards prescribed by this law.20
In Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,21 the Court invalidated
Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution No. 7804 for being contrary to
RA 7941, the law governing our party-list system. The Court
explained:
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm

of the Government in the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, has neither the authority nor the license to
expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to
implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for
that purpose should always accord with the law to be
implemented, and should not override, supplant, or
modify the law. It is basic that
_______________
19 Vivas v. The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No.
191424, August 7, 2013, 703 SCRA 290, 312, citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
POEA, supra note 13.
20 Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, 554 Phil.
563, 585; 527 SCRA 696, 720.
21 635 Phil. 372, 380; 621 SCRA 385 (2010).
576
the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they
intend to carry out.22 [Emphasis supplied]
Guided by these rulings, I take the position that DO 54 is
invalid insofar as it grants to the school heads the power to
approve or disapprove the organization of a PTA, viz.:
Organization of PTAs at the School Level II.

xxx
2. Within fifteen (15) days from the start of the school year
the Homeroom Adviser and the Parents/
Guardians shall organize the Homeroom PTA with the
approval of the School Head.23
In my view, the approval requirement is contrary to the law and

to the state policy on the creation of PTAs, and transgresses the
prohibition on further delegation of delegated powers.
A. The approval requirement is

contrary to law and to state policy.
The authority of administrative agencies to create rules and

regulations such as DO 54 is not an absolute authority. This is
limited by the express legislative purpose of the law it implements,
the standards set out in this law, and the express wording of the
provisions of the law. The rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate should not be ultra vires or
beyond the limits of the authority conferred to them.24
_______________
22 Id., at p. 399; p. 411.

23 Department of Education Order No. 54, Series of 2009.
24 Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra note 21 at pp. 393-394; p. 405.
577
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 577
Also, it is a settled rule that administrative agencies, in the
exercise of their power of subordinate legislation, should not
enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers
and enforces, and should not engraft additional noncontradictory
requirements that the Congress did not contemplate.25 Thus, in
formulating rules and regulations, administrative agencies should
not amend, supplant, or modify the law which breathes life to it.
Under BP 232, the law which sets out the powers and functions
of the DepEd, as well as the rights and obligations of persons
comprising the country’s educational community, the parents
whose children are enrolled in schools have “the right
to organize by themselvesand/or with teachers for the purpose
of providing a forum for the discussion of matters relating to the
total school program, and for ensuring the full cooperation of
parents and teachers in the formulation and efficient
implementation of such programs.”26
Consistent with this legal right, Section 77 of PD 603 requires
every elementary and secondary school to “organize a [PTA] for the
purpose of providing a forum for the discussion of problems and
their solutions, relating to the total school program, and for
insuring the full cooperation of parents in the efficient
implementation of such program.”
The provisions of BP 232 and PD 603 emphasize the clear
mandate of schools to form their own PTAs consistent with the
right of parents to be informed of the school programs affecting
their children, and to participate in the formulation and
implementation of these programs.
Section 8 of BP 232 even went one step further when it provided
that the parents may organize by themselves when taking part in
school matters that affect their children. In other words, the
parents, even without the school’s in-
_______________
25 Id.
26 Section 8, BP 232.
578
volvement, may organize and coordinate among themselves in
exercising their right to a meaningful and proactive participation
in the school programs concerning their children’s welfare.
The ponencia itself recognized the mandatory nature of the
school’s PTA formation but justified the validity of the approval
requirement by explaining that the school head’s involvement
would be limited only to the initial stages of the PTA’s
organization; that once the PTA is created, the school head’s
participation would merely be in an advisory capacity.
However, the ponencia lost sight of the glaring contradiction
between the clear mandate of BP 232 and DO 54’s school head
approval requirement. The initial stage that the ponencia referred
to is a crucial stage as it is the point when a PTA is
organized. How could the parents exercise their right to organized
participation if in the first place, they could not form the medium
by which they may do so?
To my mind, DO 54 lessens the chances, if not totally precludes
the organization of the PTA by granting the school head the sole
power to determine and approve its organization.
Moreover, the approval requirement is not only contrary to the
rights of parents to organize and involve themselves in school
programs and matters affecting their children; it also
contravenes the declared policy of the State, as enunciated in
Section 327 of BP 232, which is to establish a complete,
_______________
27 3 Section .Declaration of Basic Policy.—It is the policy of the State to

establish and maintain a complete, adequate and integrated system of education
relevant to the goals of national development. Toward this end, the government
shall ensure, within the context of a free and democratic system, maximum
contribution of the educational system to the attainment of the following national
developmental goals:
579
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 579
adequate, and integrated education system that would
contribute to the achievement of an accelerating rate of economic
development and social progress, and would ensure the
“maximum participation of all the people in the
attainment and enjoyment of the benefits of such growth.”
B. The prohibition on the further

delegation of delegated powers.
The general rule is that “what has been delegated may not be
delegated.” This is based on the ethical principle that a delegated
power is not only a right but a duty that the delegate must perform
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through
the intervening mind of another.28 This is embodied in the Latin
maxim, potestas delegata non delegari potest.
The power to approve or disapprove PTAs is not a
perfunctory or mechanical act but requires the exercise of
the school head’s discretion. Notably, however, DO 54 did not
specify the procedure or the guidelines that the school heads
must observe in deciding whether to approve the
For instance, if parents divide themselves into two or more
factions, these factions might refuse to cooperate with one another,
and decide to organize separate PTAs. Since DO 54
_______________
To achieve and maintain an accelerating rate of economic development and social

progress; 1.
To ensure the maximum participation of 2. all the people in the attainment and
enjoyment of the benefits of such growth; and
To achieve and strengthen national unity and consciousness and preserve,
develop and promote desirable cultural, moral and spiritual values in a changing
world. 3.
28 Supra note 20 at p. 584; p. 719, citing Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita,
G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 and 168730, September 1, 2005, 469
SCRA 14, 115-116.
580
states that “there shall be only one PTA . . . which shall be
recognized by the School Head,”29 the latter will necessarily have to
approve only one of these PTAs.
In the same light, assuming a PTA is dissolved and a majority of
the parents decides to organize a new one, while the minority
agrees to maintain the existing PTA, which PTA should the school
head approve?
Unfortunately, only the school heads can supply the answer to
these questions because DO 54 does not provide answers.
The danger in a broad grant of discretion is neither unlikely nor
remote. In Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,30 Justice Cruz had
occasion to say:
It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and

abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still,
the limitations that the said officers must observe when they
make their distribution. There is none. Their options are
apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria
shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the
grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a “roving commission,” a
wide and sweeping authority that is not “canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing,” in short, a clearly
profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative
powers.
The ponencia disregards this possibility by relying on DO

54’s general policy which, to him, provides amplestandards to guide
the school heads’ discretion:31
_______________
29 Par IV(1)(e) of DO 54.

30 232 Phil. 615, 630; 148 SCRA 659, 674 (1987).
581
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 581
organize a Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) for
the purpose of providing a forum for the discussion of
issues and their solutions related to the total school
program and to ensure the full cooperation of
parents in the efficient implementation of such
program.
coordination with the members of the community, provide
an avenue for discussing relevant concerns, and provide
assistance and support to the school for the promotion of their
common interest. Standing committees may be created within
the PTA organization to coordinate with community
members. Regular fora may be conducted with local
government units, civic organizations and other stakeholders
to foster unity and cooperation. (Emphasis in the ponencia)
2. As an organization operating in the school, the
PTA shall adhere to all existing policies and
implementing guidelines issued or hereinafter may be
issued by the Department of Education.
The PTA shall serve as support group and as a significant
partner of the school whose relationship shall be defined by
cooperative and open dialogue to promote the welfare of the
students. (Emphasis in the ponencia)
I disagree with this view.

The school head’s approval comes at the PTA’s inception. At that
point, the PTA and its members have yet to perform any act as the
proposed PTA has yet to function. Thus, the school heads cannot
use the cited general policies unless the school heads operate based
on a presumption of the members’ future conduct. From this
vantage point, it is clear that the cited general policies cannot
possibly guide the school heads at the point they decide.
In any case, even if these policies are assumed to be standards,
they would still be insufficient as there are simply no
582
guidelines in DO 54 that would guide school heads in approving
one PTA over the other.
The absence of guidelines will consequently force school heads to
either: first, disclose their standards to interested parties, i.e., the
parents, the teachers, and the students; or second, keep the
standards to themselves.
Should they keep the standards to themselves, the school heads
would be accused of arbitrariness because the interested parties
are not informed of the standards for approval. Such arbitrariness
would authorize the school heads to approve a PTA according to
whim, or in the opposite direction, deny parents (whose PTA is
disapproved) of the right to participate in the formation and
implementation of the total school program.32
Thus, to avoid any accusations —– and the appearance of —
arbitrariness, the school heads are more likely disclose their
standards; in which case, the disclosure to interested parties,
whether oral or in writing, is no different from the exercise of rule-
making powers that — by force of the law that Congress enacted —
only the DepEd can exercise.
In other words, DO 54 gives the school heads a very broad, if not,
an unbridled discretion in the formation of the PTAs. By failing to
provide the guidelines or even outline the rules that must be
considered in approving or disapproving PTAs, DO 54, in effect,
grants the school heads the authority to create their own rules
and to substitute their discretion in place of the DepEd.
As I have earlier discussed, the DepEd through BP 232, received
from Congress not only the power to regulate but also the power to
formulate rules that would implement BP 232’s mandate.33 This
authority belongs solely to the DepEd as
_______________
32 Section 8, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.

33 Under Section 54 of BP 232, the DepEd is granted the powers of supervision
and regulation of educational institutions, as well as
583
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 583
the only recipient of the Congress’ delegated powers under BP
232.
When the DepEd, through DO 54, passed on to the school heads
the power to approve or disapprove the organization of the PTAs,
thus effectively devolving its regulatory powers to these persons,
the DepEd violated the administrative rule of non-delegation of
delegated powers. To repeat, “what has been delegated may not be
delegated.”
There is no express provision in law granting the DepEd the
power to further delegate its regulatory and rule-making powers,
particularly to the school heads. The authority to issue rules that
would affect the PTAs rests only with the DepEd. On this basis, the
school heads should not be allowed to determine their own
procedure and guidelines in approving or disapproving the
III.The approval requirement is unreasonable

and does not directly address the issue
of mismanagement of PTA funds.
To be valid, implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) must be

reasonable. Administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily
and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure
that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end
in view.34 If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable
relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be
issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck
down.35
_______________
the administration over the education system which includes the parents of
students enrolled in schools.
34 Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra note 21 at p. 400; p. 412,
citing Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, No. L-77372, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 848,
858-859.
35 Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, id.
584
DO 54 was issued primarily to address the problem of
mismanagement of the PTA funds by its members and
officers. Unfortunately, the school head approval requirement
does not address this problem.
The school heads’ approval comes at the PTA’s inception, i.e.,
even before the PTA is established and becomes operational. At
that point, the members of the proposed PTA have yet to perform
any act, much less, handle PTA funds. On the other hand,
mismanagement only happens when the PTA is already organized,
and not during its inception. There are no funds to be handled
when the PTA is yet to be formed.
In this sense, the approval requirement is unreasonable since it
has no relation to the mismanagement of PTA funds, and unduly
restricts the organization of the PTAs even before any irregularity
has arisen.
More importantly, the problem of PTA fund mismanagement had
already been adequately addressed in Part VIII36 (Financial
Matters) of DO 54, which outlined what the PTAs may or may not
do with their financial collections. Accord-
_______________
36 DO 54’s Paragraph VIII ensures, among others, that: (i) PTA collections and
contributions shall be remitted to the school, the student government, to the
student organization concerned, on the same day they were collected; (ii) PTA
contributions shall be reasonable; (iii) non-contribution shall not be a basis for
nonadmission or non-issuance of clearances to the students; (iv) contributions shall
be on a per-parent basis; (v) no PTA contributions are collected during enrolment
period; (vi) teachers, school personnel and officials are not involved in collecting, or
in safekeeping or disbursing PTA funds; (vii) contributions or proceeds of fund
raising activities shall be deposited in reputable banking institutions; (viii)
disbursements shall be in accord with generally accepted accounting and auditing
rules and regulations; (ix) disbursements shall be covered by appropriate PTA
resolutions; (x) the PTA’s financial records are made available for inspection at any
time; (xi) PTAs submit and post in bulletin boards annual and
midyear audited financial statements, including approved resolutions.
585
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 585
ingly, there is no necessity for the DepEd to transgress the law.
Under these circumstances, I opine that the approval
requirement does not deal with the evils that DO 54 aims to
address. Thus, this requirement is not only irrelevant to DO 54’s
policy and purpose, but also to the mandate and policy of BP 232
and PD 603 — the statutes which DO 54 seeks to implement.
As a final remark, I caution that this dissent is not intended to
grant the PTAs unrestrained powers in the exercise of their rights
under the law. As the ponencia does, I am aware that the approval
requirement is part of DepEd’s efforts to recognize only those
organizations that conduct themselves in a lawful manner. I am
not against DO 54’s lofty ideals. My disagreement with
the ponencia’s ruling stems from the fact that DO 54, insofar as it
mandates the school head’s approval before any PTA may be
organized, is invalid due to its violation of recognized
administrative law doctrines that the Court must uphold.
If the DepEd deems it best to completely overhaul the PTA
system, it can study, recommend, and propose the adoption of
appropriate legislation.37 It cannot, however, shortcut procedure by
the mere issuance of a Department Order.
In these lights, I vote that DO 54 should be nullified insofar as it
provides that a PTA may only be organized after the approval of
the school head.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—There are two accepted tests to determine whether or
not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz., the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test; Both tests are
intended to prevent a total transference of
_______________
37 Section 57(7), Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.
589
VOL. 784, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 589
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step
into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative. (Vivas vs. Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, 703 SCRA 290 [2013])
Delegated governmental power, no matter how miniscule, is not
to be abused. Rather, it is to be used with the expectation that it be
wielded justly in the interest of society in general and not for the
personal disposition of the public officer who wields it. (Abos vs.
Borromeo IV, 764 SCRA 78 [2015])
——o0o——
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August 8, 2017. G.R. No. 225442.

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN

LEONEN,J., Separate Opinion:

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the

1 Id., at pp. 3-36.

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to

8 Id., at pp. 5-6.

1. for the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution in this case is

The Court’s Ruling

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in

22 Id., at pp. 26-28.

A.Propriety of the Peti-

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of

Case law explains that the present Constitution has “expanded

23 Id., at pp. 243-248.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as

42 Supra note 34 at p. 527; p. 99; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

A.Void for Vagueness.

46 Supra note 40 at pp. 335-336; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

47 See Rollo, pp. 19-21.

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement

50 Dissenting Opinion of Retired Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga in Romualdez v. Commission on

This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew

52 Id., citation omitted.

54 Section 11 of RA No. 10630 provides:

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children

57 See Rollo, pp. 26-28.

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should

64 Supra note 59.

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and

68 150-A Phil. 241; 44 SCRA 431 (1972).

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew

75 Supra note 72.

78 See Rollo, pp. 23-25.

82 Id., at pp. 490-491; p. 188.

85 Supra note 48 at p. 491; pp. 188-189.

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion,

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public

97 Silverio v. Court of Appeals, supra note 95 at p. 133; p. 765.

102 See Section 2 of RA 9344.

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on

121 Id., citations omitted.

123 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include

The US court’s judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the

136 Rollo, pp. 48-49.

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local

b. Least Restrictive Means/

local government of Manila’s Campaign on Zero Street Dwellers in the City of

*** For the period January to August 2016 only.

141 See In Re Mosier, supra note 127.

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances’ respective

146 Rollo, p. 44.

tion/identification proving their qualification under such category.

nasa hustong gulang (18 taon at pataas) na may awtoridad sa kanila;

149 In Re Mosier, supra note 127.

and/or other extra curricular activities of their school or organization wherein

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions

152 Rollo, pp. 53-54.