1 '1' he Nature of Moral

Theology

This kind of book-an exercise in fundamental moral theology-is

often mistaken for a work in moral philosophy, or ethics. Since moral theol-
ogy is a species of ethics, it will necessarily share an affinity with the formal
structure and the formal interests of that discipline. However, moral theol-
ogy is sufficiently different from philosophical ethics to warrant its being
treated separately. The purpose of this first chapter, then, is simply to pro-
vide a brief description of what we mean by moral theology, its relationship
both to moral philosophy and to theology, its nature, range of interest,
divisions, and structure. Perhaps such a description will also help focus the
larger project of this work as well.

The Range of Interest in Moral Theology

Christian theology itself is a discipline in which the commitment of faith
seeks to understand God's revelation of divine love in Christ Jesus and
through the Spirit. Systematic theology is the overarching discipline oftheol-
ogy which tries to work out a coherent view of the world by integrating the
truths of faith with all other truths we can know. Moral theology (sometimes
called Christian or theological ethics) is a particular expression of systematic
theology which focuses on the implications of faith for the way we live. As a
formal theological discipline, it is concerned with God's revelation of divine
love in Jesus and through the Spirit as an invitation calling for our response.
It regards the response to the initiative of God's offer of love as the very soul
of the moral life.
Moral philosophy, or philosophical ethics, can reflect quite well on the
nature of the moral life and what constitutes right and wrong behavior with-
out any reference whatsoever to God's revelation and to Christian beliefs.
Moral theology, however, as a "theological" discipline cannot. In short, Chris-

6
The Nature of Moral Theology 7

tian moral theology wants to know what difference being a Christian believer
makes for the way we live our lives. Therefore, it is interested in the implica-
tions of Christian faith for the sorts of persons we ought to be (this is often
called "the ethics of being" or "character ethics") and the sorts of actions we
ought to perform (this may also be called "the ethics of doing"). Both being
and doing, or character and action, constitute interdependent concerns and
must be taken together in any complete project of moral theology. The sort of
person one is depends to a great extent upon the sorts of decisions and actions
one has taken, and conversely, the sorts of decisions and actions which one
has taken depend in part upon the sort of person one is.l

Ethics of Being
Morality is often associated exclusively with behavior guided by rules.
But to focus on behavior and rules is not sufficient for understanding the
scope of moral reflection. If we talk too exclusively of actions, we are in
danger of regarding them as something outside ourselves and as having a
reality of their own. But actions are always expressions of a person. Moral
goodness is a quality of the person, constituted not by rule-keeping behavior
alone, but by cultivating certain virtues, attitudes, and outlooks. Moreover, if
we focus too much on rules, we lose sight of the Christian moral life as
pertaining to a way of life guided by the paradigmatic story of Jesus Christ.
While we are certainly called to do what is right as Christians, we are first of
all called to be loving persons in the imitation of Christ.
Morality, then, has a great interest in the interiority of the person, or the
person's character. In other words, who we are matters morally. For this
reason, moral theology must also pay attention to "character ethics" or the
ethics of being which focuses on what is happening to the person performing
actions rather than on the actions the person performs. It focuses on patterns
of actions, or the habits we acquire, the vision we have of life, the values and
convictions or beliefs we live by, the intentions we have, the dispositions
which ready us to act as well as the affections which move us to do what we
believe to be right. Here is where we locate the classical idea of the virtues-
those personal qualities disposing us to act in certain ways.2 The "ethics of
being" in a Christian context asks "What sort of person should I become
because I believe in Christ?"
Perhaps one of the reasons we have not paid enough attention to char-
acter in morality is that we have relegated the interiority of the person to
considerations of spirituality. When the manuals of moral theology were
introduced after the Council of Trent, spirituality and moral theology went
separate ways. Bringing them together again would be the natural result of
retrieving the tradition of virtue and addressing questions about who we are
8 Reason Informed By Faith

supposed to become. The unity of the moral and spiritual life is emerging
again through attention on the virtues and is in need of further development
in the Roman Catholic tradition.

Ethics of Doing
Yet, interiority, such as good intentions and sensitive dispositions, does
not cover the whole territory. Interiority gets expressed in behavior. The
biblical metaphor that the good tree bears good fruit and the bad tree bears
bad fruit teaches that right actions come from good persons. An "ethics of
being" focuses on the good person; an "ethics of doing" focuses on right
actions. In a Christian context, it asks, "What sort of action should I perform
because I believe in Christ?"l
The interest of the ethics of doing is with making a decision to resolve
conflicts of moral values so that we might do the right action. From this
perspective, moral theological reflection attends not only to the duties and
obligations of the person acting but also to the circumstances which make up
the moral situation. These are considered in light of the moral norms or
principles which guide us through the resolution of conflicting values. In
some respects, the interest of the ethics of doing has affinity with the interests
of canon law and jurisprudence in general, and, in fact, moral theology was
governed for a long time by a juridical perspective.
In sum, moral theology as a whole seeks to relate Christian faith to the
complex realities of living in the world. It asks, "What sorts of persons ought
we to be, and what sorts of actions ought we to perform by virtue of being
believers in Christ?" As a discipline of theology, it presupposes a commit-
ment of faith by which we accept the mystery of Christ as the full revelation
of God and accept the sources of faith as valid sources of coming to the truth
about God, being human, and living in the world. Moreover, since the
incarnational principle, or the principle of mediation, tells us that only
through the human, always and everywhere already graced by God, do we
come to know God and respond to what God is enabling and requiring us to
be and to do, moral theology also takes seriously critical reflection on human
experience as a valid source for coming to know what is morally required.

Divisions of Moral Theology

From the time it became a separate theological discipline after the Coun-
cil of Trent (1545-1563), moral theology has included concerns of a general
or fundamental nature as well as those of a particular or special nature. These
two types of concerns have given rise to the twofold division of the discipline
of moral theology into fundamental moral theology and special moral theology.
While these two need to be carefully related, they can be treated sepa-
The Nature of Moral Theology 9

rately. This book is an example of fundamental moral theology. As such it

will not address the concrete moral issues which arise pertaining to sexuality,
medical practice, business relations, or social living, for example. The particu-
lar treatment of issues of this sort pertains to works of special moral theology.
Since fundamental moral theology is intricately related to special moral theol-
ogy, this book will, from time to time, refer to concrete issues to show the
implications of the foundational concerns of moral theology.
One of the objectives of fundamental moral theology is to show the
"why" behind the "what" of special issues. Moreover, disagreement at the
level of concrete issues often can be traced to different understandings of the
foundational concerns of morality, such as those which make up this book. So
anyone who wants to participate in or, at least, to follow the debates on
special issues will need to keep pace with the developments occurring at the
foundational level of moral theology.

Structure of Moral Theology

The outline of this book reflects the formal structure of the discipline of
ethics according to one of America's leading Protestant ethicians, James M.
Gustafson. 4 Since moral theology is a species of ethics, it shares the same
formal structure. According to Gustafson this entails a dialectical relationship
of theory and practice, or more specifically, of ethics and morals.? However,
not everyone adheres to Gustafson's distinctions, and so wc frcquently find
these terms used interchangeably.
Ethics, according to Gustafson, explores the theoretical foundations of
moral theology. It involves a level of thinking prior to making a decision and
taking action. It develops the standards or provides the framework, or presup-
positions, for answering the practical question of morals, "What should I do?"
According to Gustafson, ethics is made up of three formal elements: (1) an
understanding of the good as the goal of the moral life and the basic reason for
being moral; (2) an understanding of the human person as a moral agent; (3) and
the points of reference which serve as the criteria for a moral judgment.6
Morals, in Gustafson's definition, is the practical level of moral theology.
Morals is concerned with giving direction to human behavior in light of what
one believes to be right or good. The fundamental concern of morals is to
answer the practical question, "What should I do?" To answer this question
adequately, one must consider the relevant aspects of at least the following
four points: (1) fundamental convictions or religious beliefs-these influence
the interpretation the agent makes of the moral situation and the direction the
agent takes in life; (2) the character of the moral agent who must decide and
act-this involves a consideration of the agent's uniqueness as manifest in
capacities, dispositions, intentions, affections, and the like; (3) the situation in
10 Reason Informed By Faith

which the conflict of values arises-this involves a careful gathering of data in

order to get the lay of the moral land; (4) appropriate norms-this enlightens
and guides the agent by drawing on the accumulated wisdom of the moral
community in order to ensure that significant values are properly respected.?
Moral theology, then, is a twofold enterprise of ethics and morals. It is
concerned with clarifying the foundations of the moral life on the basis of
Christian religious convictions (ethics) and with interpreting how to judge and
act in light of these convictions (morals). Perhaps an example can show their
interrelationship. At the level of practice (morals), we appeal to the norm "life
is sacred and ought to be respected" to give a reason for not taking innocent
life. At the level of theory (ethics), we try to show the accuracy of this position
by giving some account of the good (life is a gift of God), of the nature of the
human person (an especially sacred being made in the image of God), and of
criteria of judgment (in the situation of an unjust attack on innocent life, the
norm of protecting life applies).
Moral theology, or Christian ethics, is not unique by virtue of having
convictions about the good, the human person, or criteria of judgment. Moral
theology is distinguished as Christian, and even more specifically as Catholic
or Protestant, on the basis of the sources of ethical wisdom to which one
appeals to give content to the formal elements of ethics and morals. Insofar as
these formal elements are informed, in part at least, by Christian experience
and beliefs, we have Christian ethics or morals. If they are informed, in part
at least, by a particular Catholic experience or source of wisdom, such as the
magisterium, we have Catholic ethics or morals.
Characteristicall y, Catholic moral theology relies on "mediation" for
coming to know God and what faith requires. This means that it takes
seriously not only revelation and the tradition of the Church, but also critical
reflection on ongoing human experience as well. Both faith and reason, then,
are the fundamental sources to which we appeal in giving content to ethics and
morals within Catholic moral theology.
Because ethics and morals consider the same subject matter differently,
each perspective must be used and allowed to inform the other. This makes
the inquiry that constitutes the field of moral theology a dialectic of theory
and practice. This inquiry can be diagrammed as indicated in Figure 1. 8
The lines show the relationships of theory and practice. Solid lines indi-
cate direct relationships; dotted lines indicate other possibilities. Since all the
elements interrelate, we can begin our inquiry at anyone of the elements and
from either perspective. Only when we have interrelated the elements of both
perspectives, however, do we have a fully critical moral analysis. Although
this book cannot draw out all the possible correlations, I hope to give some
understanding of the content of these elements along with some correlations.
For example, Part One of the book shows some of the relationships between
The Nature of Moral Theology 11

MORAL THEOLOGY

ETHICS MORALS
(theoretical interests) (practical interests)

The Nature of 1o:---------::rI

the Good

Human Person

Criteria of Judgment

Situational Analysis

Figure #1

the nature of the good and religious beliefs in God; Part Two, between the
nature of the human person and being a moral agent; Part Three, between
criteria of judgment and the sources of moral guidance in scripture, Jesus,
church, natural law, positive law, moral norms, and the discernment of spirits.
In addition to a general description of the nature of moral theology, an
introduction to this discipline also needs to consider the tasks of one who
engages in moral theological reflection as well as the significant features of the
context in which moral theological reflection is being done today. These will
be the focus of the next two chapters.

Notes
1. For a further discussion of this distinction, see Bruce C. Birch and
Larry L. Rasmussen, Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life (Minneapolis:
Augsburg, 1976), pp. 79-123.
12 Reason Informed By Faith

2. On virtue in St. Thomas, see ST, I-II, qq. 55-67. For a review of
current literature reflecting the discussion on the nature of virtue and char-
acter, see John W. Crossan, What Are They Saying About Virtue? (Ramsey:
Paulist Press, 1985).
3. The distinction between the ethics of being and the ethics of doing
also helps us understand the distinction between a "right" action (or judg-
ment of moral rightness) and a "good" action (or judgment of moral good-
ness). The term "right" answers "What should I do?" by pointing to actions.
The term "good" answers the same question by pointing to what falls under
the notion of virtue-such as motives, dispositions, and intention. Morality
in the strict sense pertains to the person, to character. Actions are moral only
in a derived or secondary sense because the person expresses himself or
herself in actions. Strictly speaking, "good" and "bad" properly refer to the
person; "right" and "wrong" refer to the action. For a detailed discussion of
the moral goodness/moral rightness distinction, see Bernard Hoose, Propor-
tionalism (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1987), pp. 41-67; for a
briefer treatment of the same theme, see Josef Fuchs, "Morality: Person and
Acts" in Christian Morality: The Word Became Flesh, translated by Brian Mc-
Neil (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1987), pp. 105-117.
4. Gustafson's two most significant books which illustrate the struc-
ture and interrelationship of parts in the field of moral theology are Christ and
the Moral Life (New York: Harper and Row, 1968; reprint edition Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, Midway Reprint, 1976), and Can Ethics Be
Christian? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). For a succinct article
on this distinction, see "Theology and Ethics" in Christian Ethics and the
Community (Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1971), pp. 83-100.
5. "Theology and Ethics," in Christian Ethics and the Community, p. 85.
6. See especially Christ and the Moral Life, pp. 1-4.
7. Three articles by Gustafson in which these four base points appear,
although in slightly different form, are "Moral Discernment in the Christian
Life" in Theology and Christian Ethics (Philadelphia: United Church Press,
1974), pp. 99-119; "Context Versus Principles: A Misplaced Debate in Chris-
tian Ethics" in Christian Ethics and the Community, pp. 101-126; and "The
Relationship of Empirical Science to Moral Thought" in Theology and Chris-
tian Ethics, pp. 215-228.
8. This diagram is adapted from the doctoral dissertation of Charles
M. Swezey which examines the correlations more extensively. See What Is
Theological Ethics? A Study of the Thought of James M. Gustafson (Ann Arbor:
University of Microfilm International, 1978), pp. 26-33; see especially p. 30.
U sed by permission.