The QRAQ Project Volume 26 Systematic AL PDF

Taylor Safety Engineering
The QRAQ Project

Volume 26
Systematic ALARP Analysis
Version 1 Issue 2
January 2017
J.R.Taylor
QRAQ 24 Systematic ALARP Analysis
© J.R.Taylor 2014 i
The QRAQ project

Quality of Risk Assessment for Process Plant
Lessons Learned Analysis
ITSA
Prunusvej 39,
3450 Allerød,
Denmark
Issue Date Author Approval Release
V1I1 Feb 2014 JRT
V1I2 Jan 2017 JRT
© J.R.Taylor 2014 ii
QRAQ publications
1. The QRAQ Project – Introduction
2. Quality and completeness of hazard identification
3. Consequence calculation models
4. Risk assessment frequency data
5. Risk analysis methodologies
6. Risk acceptance criteria
7. Ignition frequency
8. Jet fire models
9. Fire water monitors as a risk reduction measure
10. Boilover and fire induced tank explosion
11. Self evacuation as a risk reduction measure
12. Major hazards scenarios - Model validation against actual accidents
13. In preparation
14. Gas impoundment
15. Domino effects and escalation
16. Momentum jets
17. Fire and Gas Detection Mapping
18. Marine risk
19. Hydrogen Sulphide Release Modelling and Incidents
20. Human error in process plant operations and maintenance
21. SIL assessment using LOPA
22. Assessment of simultaneous operations
23. In preparation
24. Systematic ALARP Analysis
25. Safety Barrier and Bow Tie Diagrams
26. Lessons Learned Analysis
27. Closing the Gaps in Risk Analysis
28. Plant layout risk analysis
29. QRA for instrumented safety systems
30. Emergency Planning for Oil and Gas Installations
31. Cost benefit assessment of Risk Analysis
32. A catalogue of failure modes
© J.R.Taylor 2014 iii

© J.R.Taylor 2014 iv
Preface
This report is the 24th in the series of reports covering various aspects of the quality of
process risk assessment studies. ALARP assessment and ALARP demonstration have
become an important part of process plant risk assessment, but the analyses performed vary
greatly in quality. This report is based on results for about 30 such analyses for major process
plant, and is intended to provide a reproducible approach to such assessments
J.R.Taylor
Abu Dhabi 2014
© J.R.Taylor 2014 v
Updating history
Issue Date Affected Change
Initial version Dec 2012 Initial release
Issue 2 Jan 2017 Table 3.1 Improved data for costing
© J.R.Taylor 2014 vi
© J.R.Taylor 2014 vii

Contents
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................1
2. Examples ............................................................................................................................3
2.1 An oil/gas separation unit jet fire induced vessel explosion – back-fitting mitigation
measures .................................................................................................................................3
2.2 Example - Gasoline pipeline jet fire accident prevention ...........................................6
2.3 Lessons from the examples .........................................................................................8
3. Systematic ALARP Analysis..............................................................................................9
© J.R.Taylor 2014 viii

© J.R.Taylor 2014 ix
1. Introduction
ALARP assessment and ALARP demonstration have become an important part of process
plant risk assessment, but the analyses performed vary greatly in quality. This report is based
on results for about 30 such analyses for major process plant, and is intended to provide a
reproducible approach to such assessments.
Risk levels are now routinely assessed according to risk criteria such as those given in R2P2
or ADNOC COP V5-06.
Quantitative ALARP analysis is carried out as follows:
1. Hazard scenarios giving risk in the Medium zone, between acceptable and unacceptable
are identified, on an area by area basis.
2. All credible risk reduction measures are identified for each of the hazards identified in
step 1. The criterion for selection of measures at this stage is that they are recommended
in industry guidelines.
3. Where a measure is already incorporated into the design, this is noted and no further
analysis is performed for this measure, except that it is taken into account in the risk
assessment.
4. New measures are selected from a systematic check list, which is intended to cover all
loss prevention measures currently available and with demonstrated efficacy
5. The practicality of each new measure is measured. Measures may be impractical for
example due to:
a. Having no risk reduction effect in the actual case
b. Be unreliable in the actual environment
c. There being insufficient spaces, or difficulties of placement in the actual plant
(applies for plant already constructed, although cost benefit analysis may be
required taking into account backfitting engineering costs and loss of production
while modifications are made)
d. Interference with operations or operational safety
e. Possible hazards arising from the risk reduction measures itself (e.g. steam
curtains)
f. Other reasons
6. For the measures considered practical in an engineering sense, the following are
calculated:
a. The probabilities of loss of life (PLL) for the hazards of concern (i.e. the ones for
which risk is reduced by the measure) prior to risk reduction.
b. The asset risk prior to risk reduction
c. The environmental risk prior to risk reduction
d. The consequence reduction factor for each measure for human life, asset and
environmental ( a factor of 1.0 indicates no risk reduction)
© J.R.Taylor 2014 1
e. The frequency reduction factor for each measure for human life, asset and
environmental
f. The residual risk for human life, asset and environment once the measures are
implemented.
g. The maximum justifiable investment (MJS) for the risk reduction measure,
calculated as the reduction in annual loss multiplied by number of years over
which the investment in risk reduction is capitalized. For statistical loss of life, the
valuations specified in standards and guidelines are used
h. The cost of each risk reduction measure is estimated. (This can be done using
generic costing data () or using data developed for design costing.
i. The implied cost of averting a fatality (ICAF) is calculated.
j. Values of ICAF which are above the guideline levels are considered
disproportionate.
2. Examples
The following examples are based on actual cases from oil and gas industry applications.
2.1 An oil/gas separation unit jet fire induced vessel

explosion – back-fitting mitigation measures
The first example considered is for a separator unit in which gas is taken from a crude oil and
gas mixture.
The risk reduction potential for this project is restricted by the fact that the units are mainly
gas separation and compression facilities handing hydrocarbon gas.
If a release of gas occurs through a large hole, a fairly large inventory will be released,
irrespective of any shutdown etc. Also in case of large or full bore releases, the release will
be very rapid, forming fully developed gas jets in a few seconds. Shutdown by ESD will
have little effect on human risk in the immediate area, since ESD takes about 2 minutes for
detection, reaction and closure. Most lethal effects occur in a shorter period than this.
However if ESD valve close, the pressure in the separator vessels will begin to drop as soon
as closure is achieved. For this example, pressure has been calculated to drop by half in under
4 minutes due to discharge through the release hole. This is sufficiently fast to prevent
excessive jet fire heating of neighbouring vessels,
Long period releases from small and medium size holes can be subject to risk reduction by:
1. Detecting the gas release or fire

2. Shutting down and depressurising
3. Setting up a cordon excluding all persons, vehicles etc. which could serve as
an ignition source
4. Possibly, using water spray from fire water monitors to help suppress release
and to lower the potential for ignition (Fire water monitors have little
effectiveness in suppressing H2S).
5. Self evacuation and the use of personal escape masks can significantly reduce
risk for those employees not immediately affected by very high
concentrations. The estimated success rate in the case where all carry full face
masks, or escape masks and goggles, is conservatively set to 95% (Ref 13:
Self Evacuation as a risk reduction measure, QRAQ report):
The processing facility is designed in order to minimize the likelihood of buildings being
subjected to flammable gas cloud in case of a gas release in the processing area. Operator
amenity rooms and substation are pressurized and gas tight buildings to minimize ingress of
gas in the building. As per dispersion modelling results, these buildings are not expected to
be subjected to flammable gas concentrations even in case of large releases in the plant.
As the plant is relative open and uncongested, high explosion overpressures are not expected
to be generated. The amenity room and substation building are designed as blast resilient
buildings.
2.1.1 Risk reduction measures for jet fire induced vessel explosion
A range of risk reduction measures were considered for this scenario. Some of these may be
implemented in the design.
Maximum Justifiable Investment (MJI) for assets and personnel is calculated. The expected
value of risk reduction in value of risk per year for personnel is calculated:
MJIhuman = 1 × 10-3 Per year, frequency of release

× 0.5 50% risk reduction
× $ 107 Maximum ICAF value
×8 Amortisation period selected by policy
×3 Persons
= $120,000
Here, the maximum reasonable ICAF value of $10 million is used. 50% risk reduction is
calculated, and accounts for the fact that some fatalities occur immediately in the case of
accidents, and are not therefore subject to risk reduction
Jet fire damage is the largest contribution for asset risk. MJI for business interruption risk is
significant and is calculated as:
MJIBI = 2×10-3 Frequency per year from LSAR map

× 0.2 Approximate probability of damage
(impingement probability)
×1 Year, expected downtime
×8 Amortisation period selected by policy
× 500,000,000 $ Value of Production Per Year
= Approx. US $ 1,600,000
Based on the MJS the following risk reduction measures are discussed.
2.1.2 Prevention of Jet fire induced explosion
Jet fire is one of the most probable causes of serious accident consequences in a oil/gas
separation plant. The possibilities exist for jet fires to impinge on other vessels and cause
these to rupture.
The active fire protection systems which may be installed:
• Firewater system with deluge spray system

• Fire hydrants and monitors
• Inert gas extinguishing system for protection of operator rooms, local substations
• Portable firefighting equipment and emergency response personel.
The time taken for a jet fire to cause vessel rupture is calculated as 4 to 10 minutes. If
operators in the area are not killed or seriously injured there is ample time for the operator to
evacuate to a safe distance provided that he is trained to do so. The fact that the operator can
evacuate when there is a possibility of fire induced explosion means that there is no human
risk benefit from the protection measure.
The cost of providing fire water monitors for the installation is estimated to be $10,000 per
separator vessel, that is $40,000
It is concluded that fire water monitor provision for the separators is cost beneficial. This
should be sufficient to conclude that no further protection is necessary, provided that the
fixed fire water monitors can be put into operation and aimed within about 4 minutes (Ref 14:
Birk).
2.1.3 Pre-aiming of fire water monitors

Pre-aiming of fire water monitor is a zero cost measure.
It is therefore recommended that fire water monitors should be pre aimed. The angle of attack
for the fire monitor streams should be checked to ensure that the line of attack is not
obstructed. Emergency plans emphasizing the need for rapid response are also recommended.
2.1.4 Provision of deluge system

A deluge system is often fitted to separators. However a deluge system is unable to provide
complete protection against jet fire (the jet fire blows the water away). However it has been
shown in experiments that a deluge system can increase the time for fire induced rupture to
occur. This would allow more time for fire response and for depressurisation.
The value of the deluge system is therefore only realised if there is also a good firefighting
service, an ability to fight jet fires despite high heat radiation, which requires powerful
portable fire water monitors, or if there is a good depressurisation system with pressure
reduction to a low level within 10 minutes.
2.1.5 Rapid depressurisation

For the actual case, rapid depressurisation was found to be not ALARP, since it would
require a very large increase in flare and flare piping size, costing several million dollars.
Worse, back fitting would require shutdown for the unit for some tens of days, resulting in a
very large business interruption cost.
2.1.6 Firefighting
Provision of rapid response firefighting was found to be practical, but would require a fire
tender with a large water capacity and a large mounted fire water monitor. The cost of this
was found to be $2.2 million, and therefore not justifiable on an ALARP basis. However the
investment could be determined to be beneficial if it could reduce risk in a wider range of

scenarios. This requires a plant wide analysis.
2.2 Example - Gasoline pipeline jet fire accident

prevention
A gasoline pipeline is to run close to a construction large worker construction camp, with
about 5000 workers living in container type caravans. The accident frequency level for the
worker group is calculated by standard QRA techniques to be about 5*10-5 per year, for a
number of fatalities calculated to be about 800 using standard QRA techniques, based on
simple affected area and assuming a uniform distribution of persons at the construction camp.
A more realistic estimate is about 200 persons, taking self-evacuation into account, based on
incident records. In either case, the risk levels are considered to be unacceptable, based on
national risk criteria. The risk is to be reduced.
The baseline ICAF value is calculated to be
ICAFbaseline = 800 ×5×10-5 × $10,000,000 × 8 = $ 3,200,000
Where 8 is the amortisation factor to convert loss per year into a capitalised value. It
corresponds to a yearly return on investment of about 10%. Note that the construction camp
is semi-permanent.
The possible risk reduction methods studied are:
• Provision of a leak detection and automatic shutdown system for the gasoline pumps
• Provision of a larger corrosion allowance for the pipeline
• Fencing of the pipeline right of way to reduce the probability of third party
interference
• Provision of a fire wall or a berm between the pipeline and the construction camp
2.2.1 Automatic shutdown system

The automatic shutdown system can be implemented very simply in an ordinary DCS or a
safety computer. A simple temperature compensated mass balance detection system is
sufficient for the purpose, since small leaks are not a large threat to the construction camp.
The cost involved may be for an additional safety computer, two mass flow meters, and
temperature sensors, with a total cost of about $40,000. (This assumes that the DCS
communications system will be used to transmit the signals). This cost would certainly be
justified, provided that the safety measure is effective.
The response time of the safety system depends on the time for the pressure wave due to the
pipe leak to reach the end of the pipeline (For the present case about 50 seconds) and the time
for the pump to run down in speed and stop, about 90 seconds in this case. The response time
could be shortened by fitting an ESD valve at the pump discharge, together with a minimum
flow bypass valve back to the gasoline storage tank. The response time for ESD is estimated
to be about 30 seconds in all.
With an overall response time of about 2 minutes there is a possibility of significant fuel loss,
and of a fire affecting part of the construction camp, but the possibility of a large flow
through the camp is eliminated. The extent of the fire could be calculated by calculating the
spread of a running pool. This requires more advanced modelling than is typical for QRA,
but is quite feasible.
The implementation described above could be made to satisfy a SIL 1 requirement, i.e.
capable of reducing risk by a factor of 10. The risk reduction is far larger than the cost, and
the residual average loss is reduced to $320,000.
It would be possible to improve the reliability of the shutdown system to SIL2 level, by
duplicating the instruments, or using SIL2 rated types, and providing a SIL2 rated
communication. The cost of this is estimated to be much less than the residual average loss.
Improvement of the reliability to a 2oo3 system might be preferred anyway, in order to

reduce the probability of unwanted pipeline shyutdowns.
2.2.2 Provision of piping with a higher corrosion allowance

One approach to prevention of release is to increase pipe thickness, by selecting a higher pipe
schedule. Increasing the schedule from 40 to 80 for example, reduces the failure rate due to
corrosion by a factor of about 12 (see QRAQ report 27), at a cost of about $30000 for one
kilometre of pipe.
This measure reduces risk only for corrosion related failures however, typically about 30 to
40% of the total failures. The cost is nevertheless significantly less than the benefit in risk
reduction.
AN INCREASED CORROSION ALLOWANCE WILL ONLY REDUCE RISK IF THE

INSPECTION INTERVAL IS KEPT LOW. IF THE IMPROVED CORROSION
RESISTANCE IS USED AS A REASON FOR REDUCING INSPECTION INTERVAL,
THEN THERE WILL BE LESS OR NO RISK REDUCTION.
2.2.3 Provision of right of way fencing

Provision of fencing for the right of way is feasible in the desert environment considered, and
may be feasible for new pipelines in most places, with sufficient planning. For the half
kilometer of pipeline concerned here, fencing is straightforward. The cost is about $50,000.
This measure reduces the likelihood of third party interference with pipelines to nearly
nothing, but interference by the company’s own contractors when installing other pipes is
still possible.
This measure reduces risk only for Third party interference related failures however,
typically about 45% of the total failures. The cost is nevertheless significantly less than the
benefit in risk reduction.
2.2.4 Provision of a berm protecting the camp from the pipeline
A 3 m. high berm can be constructed at the actual cost at the location of about $100,000 (The
price varies widely from location to location, depending on availability of materials and
transport cost).
Ideally, the risk reduction is 100%. The jet fire risk is reduced effectively to zero. This
though requires CFD modelling to confirm.
There is a possibility of mist and vapour from the release drifting over the berm, and then
igniting, causing an explosion. This illustrates that a full range of scenarios needs to be
considered when evaluating risk reduction measures.
2.2.5 Overall assessment for the scenario
Overall, the provision of the berm provides inherent safety for the scenario. Automated
shutdown though is preferred, because it reduces the explosion risk, as well as the jet fire
risk.
The increased pipeline schedule and fencing options may be preferred by the company
because they also reduce business interruption risk as well as human risk. However, a much
larger project is involved in this case, because it would probably make sense for the entire
pipeline, not just for the section threatening the construction camp.
2.3 Lessons from the examples

One of the lessons from the example is that ALARP analysis requires expertise in detailed
scenario consequence analysis and loss prevention engineering, and in cost estimating.
Standard cost estimating tables may be used for some solutions, but for others, local costs
need to be taken into account.
A second lesson is that scenario by scenario analysis alone may not produce a result which is
ALARP. Some measures will be able to reduce risk for several scenarios. If such measures
are considered, a plant wide analysis may be required.
A third lesson is that ALARP assessment may require considerable effort, with careful
assessment of all safety measures. A QRA is needed as a basis, but most regulatory QRA’s
(COMAH type) will not be adequate for the detailed assessments. For example, impingement
probabilities for jet fires, engulfment probabilities for pool fires, and smoke obscuration
calculation for evacuation etc. are needed (see QRAQ 27 Living Risk Analysis). In example
2, a CFD calculation was needed to validate effectiveness for the berm.
Overall, there is a considerable amount of work required in true cost benefit analysis. It will
be noted that for each measure, there were several aspects to be taken into account in
assessing the practicality, not just the hypothetical cost and benefit. Practicality and overall
pros and cons need to be considered.
3. Systematic ALARP Analysis

One of the main problems with carrying out ALARP assessment has been that the persons
able to make the risk assessment are only rarely experienced loss prevention engineers, and
even loss prevention engineers are rarely experienced in accident prevention and equipment
integrity assessment. Risk reduction requires a multi-disciplinary effort. ALARP workshops
have only recently been introduced, and are difficult because the calculations needed take too
long to be usable in a workshop, using conventional risk assessment approaches. The
workshops can provide risk reduction proposals, which can later be evaluated.
One of the biggest problems with ALARP assessment at present is that it is not repeatable. If
two teams or two consultants are assigned to make the assessment they will generally arrive
at very different suggestions.
A further problem is the underlying model in process plant QRA, which assumes that any
accident results from a release, and that the release occurs at a random point in time,
independent of the presence of persons. This ignores the fact that about 30% of accidents are
caused by latent failures and latent design errors, and that these are often triggered by
persons. It also ignores the fact that about 20% of accidents are caused by human error in the
field. This problem will be addressed in a separate report.
The approach taken here to ensure reproducibility of ALARP assessments is to provide an

exhaustive list of risk reduction measures, along with:
• Description of the applicability of the measures, according to scenario, equipment

type and process fluid.
• Description of the features which can make the measures impractical.
• Description of limitations of the measures.
• Description of the way in which risk is reduced
• Approach to calculation of the risk reduction.
• Guidance on calculation of the cost
In use, the scenarios are identified and the measures which can be used to reduce risk are
selected from the check list. The check list can be applied by an individual analyst, or can be
used as an aid in an ALARP workshop.
The check list is based on the risk reduction and ALARP assessment sections of 85 QRAs
and safety cases, covering a wide range of plant types.
Applicability for
Risk
Equipment Hazard Applicability Human Assets and Practicality
S.No. Reduction Effectiveness JI Calculation Cost calculation Reference
Applicability applicability Risk Business Assessment
Measures
Interruption
Will have some impact
in reducing domino Full QRA with
Effectiveness
Has little impact on effects. Generally Depends on different
Layout depends on the
All types with human risk, except considered to have availability of layouts or Site land value
spacing All range of jet fire, pool
1 flammable perhaps by reducing little impact because land/space. sensitivity and additional QRAQ 28
between flammables fire and explosions
content the possibility of practical distances Otherwise easily study for a piping
equipments versus spacing
domino effects. correspond to small applied. range of
distances
releases only. See items.
reference
Reduces risk to Full QRA with

Effectiveness
personnel in Will have some impact Depends on different
depends on the
Layout All types with neighbouring units or in reducing domino availability of layouts or
All range of jet fire, pool
2 spacing flammable trains to a limited effects. For land/space. sensitivity Site land value QRAQ 28
flammables fire and explosions
between units content extent. Practical effectiveness Otherwise easily study for a
versus spacing
distances have limited reference applied. range of
distances
effe items.
Effectiveness
Layout This can in some
Depends on depends on the Full QRA with Site land value
spacing to cases completely
All availability of range of toxic different may be an issue,
CR, eliminate risk, in
3 All types hazardous land/space. plumes, jet fire, pool locations of often a no cost QRAQ 28
workshops, otheres eliminates risk
materials Otherwise easily fire and explosions human groups issue for green
offices, due to mall and
applied. versus spacing is simplest. field sites.
dwellings medium releases
distances
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Can limit the duration

of a release. The
Effectiveness of
inventory may be small
ESD depends on
enough to reduce gas
purpose.
plume volumes and Limits the duration of Seldom effective in
release time and releases, and the reducing human risk
therefore toxic gas pressure once the Full QRA with
from fire, unless
exposure time. ESD valves are different
trapped inventory is Cost of valve,
Calculation is needed closed. This may be layouts or
very small. installation and
for exposure time shorter than the jet fire Battery limit sensitivity
All cabling. Small
Battery Limit versus escape time. In damage time, in which ESD's will study for a
4 All equipment hazardous Effective for human (2inch) valves QRAQ 29
ESD valves most cases the case, jet fire risk will usually be range of
fluids risk from toxics if about $400, 16
inventory will be too be reduced. Limits the practical items. QRA
inventory is limited, inc $8000, 46 inch
large to have much amount of liquid Pro calculates
check the pressure $2.5 m!
impact on human risk, release and therefore for bote ESD
fall over the person
because self pool size. and no ESC
escape time.
evavuation typically
Effective in
take less than 2
supporting fire
minutes whereas even
fighters to prevent
after ESD closure,
escalation
releases will generally
last longer than this.
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Limits the duration of

releases, and the
pressure once the Effectiveness of
Can limit the duration
ESD valves are inventory isolation
of a release. The Practical if there
closed. This may be ESD is twofold
inventory may be small is sufficient
shorter than the jet fire - Limits amount of
enough to reduce gas space to insert
damage time, in which release to piping Compare
plume volumes and the valve.
case, jet fire risk will inventory plus limited release
release time and
be reduced. Limits the release while ESD QRA with full Cost of valve,
therefore toxic gas Sometimes you
amount of liquid valves closing. inventory installation and
Storage exposure time. can achieve a
Inventory All release and therefore - Limits large release QRA cabling. Small
vessels, Calculation is needed good solution by
5 isolation ESD hazardous pool size. Generally inventory relese (In QRA Pro (2inch) valves QRAQ 29
tanks, for exposure time replacing a
valves fluids more effective than frequency to the select ESD an about $400, 16
columns versus escape time. block valve with
just battery limit ESD. failure rate for the No ESD inc $8000, 46 inch
Since most releases an ESD valve,
vessel. calculations $2.5 m!
are from piping or even by
When fitted at vessel can compare
reduces the frequency placing an
outlets, reduces the Effectiveness results
of large releases, since actuator on an
initial amount prior to calculation requires
most releases will be existing block
valve closure plus both ESD and No
limited to piping valve.
piping inventory, and ESD calculatio n to
inventory.
large inventory release be calculated
frequency to vesse
failure frequency.
Pipeline
Reduces the inventory Compare
sectioning
released from pipeline limited release
Rarely has an impact ESD's are
failures to that from It is necessary to QRA with full Cost of valve,
on human risk, almost always
the ESD shutdown calculate the trade inventory installation and
because ESD times practical for
Pipeline All time and section off between reduced release QRA cabling. Small
and inter valve single phase
6 sectioning Pipelines hazardous inventory. In this way, release inventory, (In QRA Pro (2inch) valves QRAQ 29
inventory self relief or pipelines.
ESD fluids reduces the extent of versus the increase select ESD an about $400, 16
drain down times are The can cause
consequences for frequency of release No ESD inc $8000, 46 inch
much longer than self hammer
liquid releases, and from flanges calculations $2.5 m!
evacuation times. problems for
the duration for all can compare
multiphase
releases. results
pipelines.
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Nearly always
practical in main
process plant. Cost of blw down
Reduces pressures
Can be valves and flare.
over a 15 to 30 minute
problematic on Blowdown is
No impact on human period, and can
small platforms Calculate the Calculate usually needed
risk from initial reduce the probability
All because of the difference in release dynamic QRA, for maintenance
accident, may reduce of escalation damage.
7 Blow Down pressurised All gases limitations on rates for the with blowdown though so usually
the likelihood or extent For unignited
process knock out blowdown versus no option no cost. Added
of escalation risk (see releases, reduces the
capacity Due to blowdown cases. selected capacity for rapid
asset column) period for which
long blowdown blow down is very
potential for ignition
times the main expensive
exists.
value is in typically >$10 m.
shortening fire
fighting duration.
Not needed
Completely effective
Usually a for full
Flammable No real impact on for overpressure
Allows blowdown and necessary capacity.
All process gas, in some human safety, (except protection within its
pressure relief of requirement. Determine
and pipelines cases in cases where vents capacity. Capacity
flammable material to Costly in land. probability of Cost of land plus
8 Flare system with ground flare are used as an may be for full fire
proceed safely i.e is a Reliability and extended flare system
flammable for alternative, and the engulfment,
necessary part of liquid entry vessel
gas flammable vents are a threat to staggered relief, or
blowdown and relief. calculations engulfment for
liquids human life or welfare). may be very high for
needed. staggered
hex tube rupture
relief
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Generally a
requirement.for Cost of
new plants. High escalation,
Reduces the capacity non domino effect
All process Process
No effect on human possibility of flame blocking types Capacity needs to calculation for
Flammable and storage
Flammable risk except via spread and the needed if there be matched to fire pool fire only. Civil engineering Safety
9 material with
liquids limitation of domino probability of BLEVE is a flammable water demand for (In Riskmap, calculations Engineering
drainage flammable
liquid
effects or FIVE due to fire oil or solvent largest fires. input pool fires Handbook.
engulfment (pool fires) scenario. onle then do
Extremely pool fire
difficult to back calculationn.
fit.
Eliminates an
escalation hazard
All process Reduces the Process
Rarely any effect on which has caused
and storage possibility of flame
Drain fire Flammable human risk, except Generally may sever Civil engineering Safety
10 with spread between fire As above
seals liquids possibly from practical accidents. Need to calculations Engineering
flammable zones, and therefore
liquid
unexpected escalation.
escalation potential.
be kept clear. Not Handbook.
practical in sanding
conditions.
Comparative
QRA with and
without
Can provide good Provides ability to QRAQ 17
evacuation,
alarm for persons who activate ESD and Effectiveness
All process Flammable fire fighting Flame Detector: Fire and
11 Fire Detection cannot see the fire, deluge if these are not Always practical depends on
and storage fluids response. 3812 USD Gas
improves self automatic, call out coverage calculation
evacuation probability. emergency personnel.
Fire and gas mapping
mapping for
probability
determination
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Quite effective when
located at the most
likely release points,
not subject to
Very little impact, Quite practical,
Especially at Flammable Good supplement to obstruction, not
because if the fire is although tubing
pumps, fluids, most UV/IR or IR3 alarms subject to
12 Melting plugs big enough to melt the is a nuisance
sometimes at effective for where visibility is obstruction
plug it is big enough to during
skids liquids obscured shadowing like
see. maintenance
optical detectors.
Plugs need
replacing at about
10 year intervals
Quite effective when

located over the
Low reliability
Very little impact, most likely release
Especially at Flammable Good supplement to due to damage
because if the fire is points, not subject
pumps, fluids, most UV/IR or IR3 alarms and bypassing
13 Melting links big enough to melt the to obstruction , not
sometimes at effective for where visibility is when
plug it is big enough to subject to
skids liquids obscured maintenance is
see. obstruction
carried out
shadowing like
optical detectors..
Very little impact, Quite effective when

because if the fire is located over the
Tank rim big enough to melt the Low reliability most likely release
Linear fire
seals, above Flammable detectors it is big Good supplement to due to damage points, not subject
detectors
small tanks, fluids, most enough to see. UV/IR or IR3 alarms and to to obstruction
14 (twin wire
kettle effective for Effective in unmanned where visibility is bypassing when shadowing like
with melting
reactors, liquids areas esp. at pumps.. obscured maintenance is optical detectors.
insulaion)
contactors etc Effective in floating roof carried out Plugs need
tanks but has reliability replacing at about
systems 10 year intervals
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Effectiveness
depends on
coverage
Compartive
Can provide good calculation. Limited
Provides ability to QRA with and Point Type Gas QRAQ 17
Flammable alarm for persons who number of suppliers
activate ESD and without
Gas All process and toxic cannot see hear or for open path toxic Detector: 2610 USD Fire and
15 deluge if these are not Always practical evacuation
Detection and storage gas, volatile smell the release, gas. H2S can be Open Path Gas
automatic, call out and
liquids improves self
emergency personnel.
detected by
emergency Detector: 9477 USD mapping
evacuation probability. flammable gas
shutdown
detectors if the
concentration is not
too high
Generally
practical if there
Pressure is a clean water Fully effective
vessels, supple e.g. from against pool fire if Comparative
tanks, Provides protection for a tank. well maintaine and QRA with and Process
Can provide protection
columns. Flammable vessels subject to pool Vulnerable to there are no dry without pool Safety
16 Deluge for escape routes, see
Can be used fluids, solids fire engulfment. blockage by spots. Some value fires. Also Engineering
below
on critical Provides limited contamination in delaying BLEVE dynamic QRA Handbook.
piping. when used with for the case of jet for jet fires
Transformers sea water, and fires
with rust. Need
frequent testing
Cannot be used
where there is
electrinic or
Flammable Little direct effect on electrical Process
fluids, human risk, but Provide protection for equipment, such Generally effective if Safety
17 Sprinklers Buildinngs
structural fire reduces risk by limiting buildings as control designed correctly, Engineering
hazards. fire spread. rooms, Handbook.
communications
rooms and cable
spreading rooms
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
API 14c level

is usually
One of the major aids
required as a
to avoilding major
minimum.
hazards accidents due Usually very
Extension to Process
Process Trips to process practical. Some
additional
(Level, All process disturbances. Note that A major part of plant measurements Safety
18 Flammable parametes,
temperature equipment these scenarios are asset protection may be difficult Engineering
SIL 2 or 3 on
and pressure) generally not included such as level in
the basis of Handbook.
in regulatory QRA, but a stirred reactor.
SIL review.
are an essential part of
Calculate by
a SIL review
LOPA based
SIL review.
All process Generally very Process

equipment practical, Safety
All One of the major One of the major
sequential especially if fail
hazardous protection devices for protection devices for Engineering
operation safe. Need to be
19 Interlocks materials, batch processes, with batch processes, with Handbook.
such as start designed to
reactive direct impact on many direct impact on many Risk
up. prevent
Batch
materials scenario types scenario types
unautorised analysis for
production. bypass. machinery.
Generally
required by
regulations for
All
pressure
pressurised All Comparative Process
Prevents injury and vessels etc. but
process hazardous Prevents injury and QRA with and
fatality due to dimensioning Safety
20 PSV's equipment, materials, fatality due to without
overpressure may be flexible. Engineering
boilers, water in overpressure explosion overpressure
hudraulics, boilers
explosion API 521 allows
explosion Handbook.
engineer to
pneumatics
specify the
overpressor
cases
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Generally not
used on oil and
Batch
gas systems
reactors,
because the
reciprocating
disk remains
compressors, Process
Prevents injury and open after
heat All Prevents injury and
fatality due to relieving. Is Safety
21 Burst Disk exchangures hazardous fatality due to
overpressure used though on Engineering
with high materials overpressure explosion
pressure
explosion some heat Handbook.
exchangers
tubing, cryo
because PSV's
tanks,
do not react fast
pentane tanks
enough for tube
rupture cases
Eliminates one cause Eliminates one cause
All
of pipeline rupture, of pipeline rupture, Generally a
piping subject hazardous
reduces risk probability reduces risk requirement for Process
to solar liquids
slightly. This is not probability slightly. vulnerable Usually completely Proper causal
Thermal heating, heat (usually not Safety
22 usually taken into This is not usually piping. May effective, reliability analysis
Relief Valves traced piping, relevant for Engineering
account in QRA, taken into account in introduce new high, see ref. based QRA
cryogenic gases or gas
because causal QRA, because causal risks of vapour Handbook.
piping. padded
analysis is not usually analysis is not usually or gas release
liquid).
made. made.
Eliminates one cause Eliminates one cause
Batch Process
of pipeline rupture, of pipeline rupture,
reactors, heat Safety
reduces risk probability reduces risk Is practical
exchangers, Fr, of explosion * Engineering
Design for All slightly. This is not probability slightly. where Inherently safe, Proper causal
continuous damage cost * 5 >
23 maximum hazardous usually taken into This is not usually accidental 100% effective analysis Handbook.
reactors, additional cost of
pressure materials account in QRA, taken into account in pressures are where feasible based QRA DOD
pump quench system
discharge
because causal QRA, because causal not too high. costing
piping
analysis is not usually analysis is not usually manual.
made. made.
Eliminates a major QRA for
Eliminates a limited Process
Buildings or asset and BI risk for runaway
risk for reciprocating Generally Cost of reactor, Safety
vessels reciprocating 100% effective reaction
compressors and for practical but possibly building Engineering
handling Flammable compressors and for where feasible and Fr, of
Explosion dust handling plant or there must be a
24 flammable dusts, lube dust handling plant or provided they are explosion * 5 * and cost of quench Handbook.
panels plant with a dust free area for
dust, oil mist plant with a dust dimensioned and damage cost vessel and piping. DOD
generation problem blast relief fire
compressor
(sugar, flour, coal,
generation problem
jet.
installed correctly > cost of costing
crank cases.
peat)
(sugar, flour, coal, quench manual.
peat) system
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
The speed
QRA for
rundown of Process
runaway
Applicable reactants needs Cost of reactor, Safety
Applicable to The solution is fully reaction
when the Eliminates a risk of Eliminates a risk of to be faster than possibly building Engineering
batch reactors effective provided Fr, of
Quench reactor reactor explosion and reactor explosion and the rate of
25 with that the run down is explosion * 5 * and cost of quench Handbook.
Tanks overheats or resulting operator resulting reactor and temperature rise
exothermic fast enough and the damage cost vessel and piping. DOD
temperature injury or fatality installation damage (determined
reactions
rise too fast from thermal
quench fluid can > cost of costing
rate rise
quench manual.
system
experiments)
The speed
QRA for
rundown of Process
runaway
Applicable reactants needs Cost of reactor, Safety
Applicable to The solution is fully reaction
when the Eliminates a risk of Eliminates a risk of to be faster than
batch reactors effective provided Fr, of possibly building Engineering
Quench reactor reactor explosion and reactor explosion and the rate of
26 with that the injection is explosion * 5 * and cost of quench Handbook.
Injection overheats or resulting operator resulting reactor and temperature rise
exothermic fast enough and the damage cost vessel and piping. DOD
temperature injury or fatality installation damage (determined
reactions
rise too fast from thermal
quench fluid can > cost of costing
rate rise
injection manual.
system
experiments)
Applicable for Applicable Cost is minimal Process
Snuffing for Eliminates a risk of fire
vent ducting when there Eliminates a risk of fire 100% effective if
activated and of possible duct sensors, a few runs Safety
with is a and of possible duct Readily properly designed
27 charcoal explosion. Eliminates of tubing and Engineering
flammable possibility of explosion, which may practical and there is
absorbers a risk of possible connection to Handbook.
VOC autoignition cause injury or fatality sufficient nitrogen
with nitrogen
absorbers in absorber
building explosion nitrogen supply
Always
applicable for Process
Snuffing for Reduces the risk from Necessary for Safety
liquid sulphur Reduces the risk of
sulphur tanks sulphur fire and Readily sulphur pits –
28 tanks. Not damage to the tank or Engineering
and pits with resulting sulphur practical. frequency of fires is
needed for pit. Handbook.
steam dioxide release otherwise high
closed sulphur
vessels.
Applicable
Applicable for vapour No impact from TSR Readily
where there is cloud as such but good practical. QRA and API 752
Temporary Reduces the human Commercial
a risk of explosions, protection for controls Complete TSR’s ICAF Safety
29 safe refuge consequences of major module prices
flammable or flammable if integrated with an are available as calculation Engineering
(TSR) hazards accidents. available
toxic gas and toxic instrument and commercial versus cost Handbook
release gas electrical room (IER). modules
releases
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Reduces the number
of people at risk from Justification About $4000 for
No impact for asset or dual flammable and API 752
VCE etc, and toxic risk not really
BI risk from TSR, but dual toxic gas and
TSR and CR Eliminates a) because operators Fully effective needed if TSR
Applicable good protection of
HVAC gas flammable can spend standby except for very and detectors, $500 for Process
30 for VCE, and local control if I&E Always practical
detection and and toxic gas time in the shelter highly toxic gases bunkerised HVAC circuit Safety
toxic gas rooms are in the TSR.
ESD ingress (permanent safe
Prevents damage to
such as MIC control rooms breakers and $800 Engineering
refuge) and b) provide
control ssystem
are for good HVAC duct Handbook
a safe location for implemented valve
emergency muster
Justification
not really
Highly effective if needed if TSR API 752
dimensioned and and
Fitted to TSR About $2000 per
TSR Blast Applicable correctly. Need to bunkerised Process
31 if there is an Always practical duct depending on
Valves for VCE have a very rapid control rooms Safety
explosion risk size
response in some are Engineering
cases implemented Handbook
for explosion
risk
Applicable Fr. of
Can be difficult
High velocity to chemical Very effective in explosion * Cost of blanket gas Process
May save lives if to obtain
air supply or process preventing explosion Highly effective if damage + Fr.
explosion indoors is adequate per kg * 5*vapour Safety
32 Vent Purging CO2 or venting and resulting damage dimensioned of fire *
possible, but usually blanket gas generation rate Engineering
nitrogen where and fire spread in correctly damage > gas
injection vapour is
minimal effect
ducts
supply at some
supply cost (kg/yr) Handbook
locations
flammable py.
About $1500 per Process
( Fr. of shutter depending Safety
Applicable Spacing of
Shutters close Very effective in explosion *
for vent shutters for Require explosion on duct size, but Engineering
Ducting Fire rapidly on fire Little impact on human preventing fire spread damage) *
33 ducts with effective detectors and very many may be Handbook
Shutters detection in safety and run up to amortisation
flammable suppression can rapid actuation
factor > needed depending
ducts explosion in ducts
vapour be difficult
shutter cost. on duct length. See
ref. for spacing
In some cases About $1000 per Process
Explosion
Applicable Very effective in
the appropriate
Requires panels
( Fr. of shutter depending Safety
rupture
for vent
May save lives if
preventing explosion
panel size is
speed at less than
explosion * on duct size, but Engineering
34
Vent Ducting discs at
ducts with
explosion indoors is
and resulting damage
larger than the
the explosion
damage) *
many may be Handbook
blast panels intervals to possible, but usually duct. In these amortisation
flammable and fire spread in pressure run up needed depending
limit pressure minimal effect cases a weak factor >
rise
vapour ducts
section of duct
distance
shutter cost. on duct length. See
can be installed ref. for spacing
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
outdoor in a safe
location
Evaluate the Effective if the wall Wall should be 20% Process
Protection of
pressure and is strong and high Fr. of design wider and higher Safety
critical VCR,
impulse for enough, and basis than the protected Engineering
installations BLEVE or Effective in limiting
Effective in limiting typical large buildings and explosions *
item. Wall cost Handbook
35 Blast Wall asset damage and BI explosions vs. protected tanks can damage cost*
e,g, CR or reactor human consequences including
consequences needed wall tolerate the behind amortisation
toxic fluid explosion
thickness and wall blast. Effective factor > cost reinforcement and
tanks
behind wall also in stopping of wall labour $100 per
pressure projectiles cubic m.
Wall cost including Process
reinforcement and Safety
labour $100 per Engineering
Protection of cubic m. Indoor Handbook
Fr. fire * Pr.
critical Can have relevance Generally wall 50% more than
Escalation *
installations for persons in applicable. Fire non protective wall
Effective for design cost of
e,g, CR or Pressurised otherwise CR and OR Effective in limiting walls require fire
basis fires for 30, 60 escalation
36 Fire Wall tanks flammable close to fire sources asset damage and BI doors and
or 120 minutes damage * Indoor $15 to $30
Separation of fluids e.g. in jet fire or flash consequences fireproof
units to fire range. Useful also penetration
depending on spec. amortisation pr m2 plus
prevent fire for seals
factor > cost installation
of wall
propagation
Mineral wool $25
per m2 plus $50 for
cladding installed
Protection of Generally Limited cost for Process
Fr. fire * Pr. berm if excavated Safety
critical Can have relevance practical. Needs
Escalation * soil can be used. Engineering
installations for persons in frequent
Completely effective cost of
e,g, CR or Pressurised otherwise CR and OR Effective in limiting inspection to Largest part of the Handbook
Protection for preventing liquid escalation
37 tanks flammable close to fire sources asset damage and BI ensure that fire cost is the land use.
berm spread and heat damage *
Separation of fluids e.g. in jet fire or flash consequences doors are kept
radiation protection. amortisation Needed height
units to fire range. Useful also closed, or use
factor > berm calculated from
prevent fire for automatic door
land valuation heat radiation
propagation closers. mapping
Protection of Little impact on human Fr. of Process
installations risk for humans except Generally Effective in cooling impinging Safety
Fixed Fire by cooling Flammable for firemen. Can have Effective in limiting applicable and suppression fire * Pr. Engineering
38 Water (with water) liquids and relevance for human if asset damage and BI provided that provided that they Escalation * Handbook
Monitors and by liquid gases used to create a water consequences activation can are adequately cost of
fire curtain for toxic gas be rapid. dimensioned escalation
suppression e.g, ammonia or HF, damage *
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
(with foam) Great care is needed amortisation
when applying water factor > Fire
curtains to prevent the system cost.
water causing more
evaporation of liquefied Generally
gases e.g. cryogenic there is no
ammonia, LPG or LNG doubt that a
system will be
installed, the
only question
is its design
basis and
capacity,
where risk
optimisation is
possible
Fr. of Process
Generally applicable
and more effective
impinging Safety
Protection of
than manually
fire * Pr. Engineering
vessels and
Flammable aimed monitors due
Escalation * Handbook
Pre-aimed tanks against Limited affect – self cost of
liquids and Effective in limiting to faster activation.
remotely escalation due evacuation is faster escalation
39 gases asset damage and BI Practical .
activated to flame than deployment. Can damage *
Jet fires consequences Effective in cooling
monitors impingement protect CRs amortisation
Pool fires and suppression
and heat factor > Fire
provided that they
radiation system cost.
are adequately
dimensioned
Limited affect – self Fr. of Process
evacuation is faster impinging Safety
than deployment. Can
Effective against
fire * Pr. Engineering
Protection of Flammable protect CRs
radiation and to
Escalation * Handbook
Tanks against liquids and Effective in limiting cost of
Oscillating some extent against
40 escalation due cryogenic asset damage and BI Practical escalation
Monitors flame impingement.
to flame gases consequences damage *
Care needed to
impingement Pool fires amortisation
ensure reliability
factor > Fire
system cost.
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Generally applicable Process
and more effective
Fr. of Safety
than manually
impinging Engineering
Protection of
Limited affect – self aimed monitors due
fire * Pr. Handbook
evacuation is faster to ability to activate
vessels and Flammable Escalation *
than deployment. Can and aim when heat
tanks against liquids and cost of
Remotely protect CRs Effective in limiting radiation field is
escalation due gases escalation
41 aimed Little impact on human asset damage and BI Practical intense.
to flame damage *
monitors risk for humans except consequences .
impingement Jet fires amortisation
for firemen. Can be Effective in cooling
and heat Pool fires factor > Fire
used as a water curtain and suppression
radiation system cost.
as described above provided that they
are adequately
dimensioned and
maintained
Fr. of Process
Protection of
vessels and
impinging Safety
tanks by
Limited affect – self fire * Pr. Engineering
cooling
Flammable evacuation is faster Escalation * Handbook
liquids and than deployment. Can Effective in limiting cost of
against Not fully effective
42 Deluge gases protect CRs asset damage and BI Practical escalation
escalation due against jet fires but
Jet fires Little impact on human consequences damage *
to flame do delay escalation
Pool fires risk for humans except amortisation
impingement
for firemen. factor > Fire
and heat
system cost.
radiation
Protection of Process
vessels and
Limited affect – self
Very effective but Safety
tanks by
Flammable evacuation is faster
requires care in Engineering
cooling
liquids and than deployment. Can Effective in limiting
refreshing foam Handbook
against solution. Dry types
43 Foam deluge gases protect CRs asset damage and BI Practical
escalation due have a slow
Jet fires Little impact on human consequences
to flame activation time,
Pool fires risk for humans except
impingement prefilled types are
for firemen.
and heat fast.
radiation
Virtually no effect on Process
Effective against Safety
Floating roof Crude oil human risk except Effective in limiting
rim fires. Ineffective
44 Foam pourers tank fires, esp and refined indirectly by reducing asset damage and BI Practical Engineering
against full surface
rim seal fires. products the probability of consequences Handbook
fires in large tanks
boilover
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Requires large Process

All process
Water Effective against heat Effective for heat quantities of Safety
equipment Pool fires
46 curtains for radiation if activated radiation from pool water, needs Effective Engineering
and process Jet fires
heat radiation
plant buildings
rapidly and jet fires careful drainage Handbook
design
Specific Process
hazards such Safety
Water
as HF, Flammable
Effective against
Effective against heat Requires very Engineering
47 curtains for
flammable and some
flammable and toxic
radiation and fast activation of
Difficult design Handbook
vapour toxic gas flammable gas ingress large quantities
gas diversion gas ingress to an area
dispersing releases to an area of water
towards fired
heaters etc.
Process
Water Specific Effective against heat Requires very
Safety
curtains for hazards such HF, radiation and Effective against toxic fast activation of
48 Difficult design Engineering
gas as HF, ammonia flammable and toxic gas ingress to an area large quantities
absorption ammonia gas ingress to an area of water Handbook
Process
Water spray Safety
49 for explosion Still experimental Engineering
suppression Handbook
Injection of Process
flame Safety
supressing
Flammable Effective in preventing Effective in preventing Engineering
50
Explosion vapour inside
gas and confined explosion confined explosion Practical Handbook
suppression vessels and
vapour consequences consequences
dry powder
pneumatic
transfer pipes
Process
Clean gas, Safety
Switch rooms Little impact on human
Energen or Electrical Effective in preventing
51 control rooms risk, can increase Practical Engineering
CO2 fire fires electrical fires
Server rooms human risk Handbook
suppression
Switch Process
In cabinet cabinets
Little impact on human Safety
51
smoke Cable terminal Electrical
risk, can increase
Effective in preventing
Practical Engineering
detection cabinets fires
human risk
electrical fires Handbook
ASD Server
cabinets
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Effectiveness Process
Little impact on initial
varies. There will Safety
Liquid fire
human risk, self
Effective if correctly always be fire sizes Engineering
52
Manual
Alll
suppression
evacuation is more
dimensioned and
Practical
which cannot be Handbook
firefighting Equipment response is fast handled. Needs a
effective. Rescue is
cooling enough fairly complex
important
effectiveness
calculation
Areas with Process
Flammable Effectiveness
flammable
gas and varies. Needs a Safety
53
Area gas and
liquids,
Reduces likelihood of
Effective Practical calculation of Engineering
Classification liquids,
flammable
ignition
ignition probabilities Handbook
flammable QRAQ vol 7
dust see QRAQ vol 7
dust
Fixed roof Process
tanks with Safety
Tank
volatile
Flammable Protects against tank Effective if Engineering
54
blanketing
flammables.
vapour explosion
Effective Practical
designed correctly Handbook
Slop tanks
Degassing
tanks
Process
Safety
Sub-surface
55 Engineering
foam injection
Handbook
Process
Toxic gas
Safety
Emergency vents and leak Effective if properly
56 Toxic gas Practical Engineering
Scrubber containment dimensioned
enclosures Handbook
Process
Depends on type Safety
Passive fire Vessels, Flammable Protects against FITE
57 Effective Practical and fire type and Engineering
protection piping gas or liquid and BLEVE
duration Handbook
Process
Safety
Steel Flammable Protects against
58 Fire proofing Effective Practical Engineering
structures gas or liquid structural collapse
Handbook
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Process
Reduces heat
Safety
Flame radiation intensity at
59 Flares Flares Engineering
shielding work areas at the flare
site Handbook
Process
Safety
60 Blast proofing Engineering
Handbook
Process
Safety
Blast
61 Engineering
Resilience
Handbook
Control room, QRA Pro

Human workshop, Effectiveness Handbook
Effective up to scenario
62 occupancy offices and All determined by
sizes at the design basis
separation operator room detailed QRA
locations
QRA Pro
Requires extensive
Limited Handbook
Zero manning design for design
63 human Process area All
operations phase consideration,
occupancy
expensive
Risk
analysis for
Self determined by
64 All All Possible Plant
evacuation detailed QRA
pipelines
including evacuation
and
Transport
Risk
analysis for
determined by
65 Rescue All All Possible Plant
detailed QRA
pipelines
including evacuation
and
Transport
Applicability for
Risk
Measures
Interruption
Process
Safety
Temporary
66 Engineering
gas refuge
Handbook
Process
Blast and fire Safety
proof
67 Engineering
operator
Handbook
rooms
Process
Safety
Personal gas
68 Engineering
alarm
Handbook
Process
Process About 95% for Safety
69 Escape mask equipment Practical positive pressure Engineering
with toxic gas types Handbook
Process
Safety
Low ignition
70 Engineering
probability
Handbook
Process
Prevention Safety
Storage Effective, but limited
71 Bunds of liquid Effective Engineering
areas applicability
spread Handbook
Process
Prevention Safety
Impoundment Storage Requires CFD
72 of gas Engineering
basins areas calculations
dispersion Handbook
Process
Hazardous
Safety
fluid Storage areas Limits potential heat Limits potential heat Practical if there
73 Pool fire Engineering
collecting for LPG, LNG radiation area radiation area is space
basins Handbook

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Taylor Safety Engineering

The QRAQ Project

The QRAQ project

© J.R.Taylor 2014 iii

Issue Date Affected Change

Initial version Dec 2012 Initial release

Issue 2 Jan 2017 Table 3.1 Improved data for costing

© J.R.Taylor 2014 vii

© J.R.Taylor 2014 viii

Quantitative ALARP analysis is carried out as follows:

2.1 An oil/gas separation unit jet fire induced vessel

1. Detecting the gas release or fire

MJIhuman = 1 × 10-3 Per year, frequency of release

MJIBI = 2×10-3 Frequency per year from LSAR map

2.1.2 Prevention of Jet fire induced explosion

The active fire protection systems which may be installed:

• Firewater system with deluge spray system

2.1.3 Pre-aiming of fire water monitors

2.1.4 Provision of deluge system

2.1.5 Rapid depressurisation

investment could be determined to be beneficial if it could reduce risk in a wider range of

2.2 Example - Gasoline pipeline jet fire accident

The baseline ICAF value is calculated to be

ICAFbaseline = 800 ×5×10-5 × $10,000,000 × 8 = $ 3,200,000

The possible risk reduction methods studied are:

2.2.1 Automatic shutdown system

Improvement of the reliability to a 2oo3 system might be preferred anyway, in order to

2.2.2 Provision of piping with a higher corrosion allowance

AN INCREASED CORROSION ALLOWANCE WILL ONLY REDUCE RISK IF THE

2.2.3 Provision of right of way fencing

2.2.4 Provision of a berm protecting the camp from the pipeline

2.2.5 Overall assessment for the scenario

2.3 Lessons from the examples

3. Systematic ALARP Analysis

The approach taken here to ensure reproducibility of ALARP assessments is to provide an

• Description of the applicability of the measures, according to scenario, equipment

Reduces risk to Full QRA with

Can limit the duration

Limits the duration of

Quite effective when

Very little impact, Quite effective when

API 14c level

All process Generally very Process

Requires large Process

Control room, QRA Pro

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