DE LEON vs.

JUDGE CORPUZ (September 14, 2005)

Facts: Amado L. De Leon charged Judge Patrocinio Corpuz of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 44, San Fernando City (Pampanga), with grave abuse of authority. The complaint
alleges respondent judge approved the application for bail of Noe dela Fuente, accused of
fourteen (14) counts of swindling (estafa) and fourteen (14) violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Guagua, Pampanga. At the time respondent
approved the bail posted for the accused, Judge Jesusa Mylene C. Suba-Isip, Presiding Judge
of the MTC of Guagua, where the cases were filed, was in her court the whole day. Hence, she
should have been the one to act on the accused application for bail, not respondent judge.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of authority for approving
the application for bail.

Rulings: Yes, the Supreme Court held that Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:

SEC.17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case
is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city,
or municipality, If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the
case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge.

In the instant case, accused was arrested by virtue of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Isip of the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, where the cases were then pending. The accused was
arrested in the same municipality. Therefore, the application for bail should have been filed with
the MTC of Guagua. Significantly, respondent does not dispute that Presiding Judge Isip was
then present the whole day. If she was absent or unavailable, then the accused should have
filed his application for bail with another branch of the same court within the Province of
Pampanga or San Fernando City. Here, we cannot understand why respondent approved the
accused application without first determining whether MTC Judge Isip is absent or unavailable,
and if so, whether there are other MTC or MTCC Judges within the province of Pampanga or
San Fernando City. Considering his long service in the judiciary, he must have known he has no
authority to act on the accused application for bail.

In granting bail, it is imperative that a judge be conversant with the procedures provided by the
Rules and basic legal principles. A judge presiding over a court of law must not only apply the
law but must also live by it. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are
designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. [7] When
the judge himself becomes a transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his
office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary itself
Leviste vs. CA (March 17, 2010)

Facts: Jose Antonion Leviste was charged with homicide. He appealed with the CA regarding
the conviction. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for bail reasoning his health and
age.
CA denied citing that it is discretionary and be exercised with grave caution. Also, Leviste failed
to show that he has grave ailments to extend such privilege. Another reason is that the CA
found no substantial reason to overturn his guilt.

Leviste petitioned that bail must be granted if the circumstances in Rule 114, Sec. 5 of the Rules
of Court are complied.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for bail should be granted.

Rulings:

The SC denied his petition.

The SC reiterates that bail is a matter of judicial discretion. If none of the circumstances are
present as mentioned in the Rules of Court, the court still has the discretion to grant or deny
bail. By denying Leviste's bail, it is not an abuse of discretion.

One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this
where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s urgent application for admission to bail
pending appeal.

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA (April 19, 2007)

Facts:
Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong (HK) Court of three (3) counts ofaccep
ting advantage as an agent and seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrests
were issued against him [by the HK Court, not a court in the Philippines] which when convicted;
he would face 7 to 14 years of jail for each charge. The DOJ received a request
for the provisional arrest of Muñoz from the HK DOJ. The DOJ forwarded the request to the
NBI, which in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila an application to effect tsuch request. Thus, an
Order of Arrest was issued against Muñoz and he was arrested and detained thereafter.

[Note: the Philippines and HK signed an “agreement for the surrender of accused and
convicted persons” or a n extradition treaty in 1995 that is why, the HK was represented by the
DOJ] Government of HK filed a petition for extradition of Muñoz with the RTC. Muñoz for his
part filed a petition for bail. The said bail petition was initially denied by then Judge Bernardo
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail on extradition cases and Muñoz is a high
“flight risk.” On motion for reconsideration, a different judge (Judge Olalia, herein respondent)
took cognizance with the case and granted the motion of Muñoz to bail. Hence, this petition
reached the SC.

[Note: Sec. 2(a) of PD 1069 (Philippine Extradition Law) defines extradition as “the removal of
an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any
criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government”]

Issue: Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.

Rulings:

In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases, since it is available only in
criminal proceedings.

However the Supreme Court, recognized the following trends in International Law.

1. The growing importance of the individual person in publican international law who, in the 20th
century attained global recognition.

2. The higher value now being given in human rights in international sphere
3. The corresponding duty of countries to observe these human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations

4. The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one
hand, and the law on extradition on the other.

Bail is generally availed in criminal cases; however, an extradition proceeding -- although ostensibly
administrative -- bears all the earmarks of criminal process. A potential extradite may be subjected to
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. Since jurisprudence on extradition is but an infancy in this jurisdiction, the SC decided to
overturn its previous rulings of not granting bail in extradition cases. They held that

“it is a modern trend in public international law that primacy is placed on the worth of individual person
and sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be subject
of international law is now taking root.”

The Philippines as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This is
enshrined in Sec. II, Art. II of our

Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guaranteesfull
respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, is under the obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Indeed, there
is no law allowing the right to bail on extradition cases, but the Constitution is silent as to deprive
subject offenders for the same. Moreover, it is important to note that on several occasions, the SC
granted bail in deportation cases as this was sanctioned the UDHR as well as our obligation to comply
with other international conventions to uphold human rights. Thus, the SC said that there is no
justification why it should not be allowed in extradition cases.

Note: Since extradition is a “sui generis” (a kind of its own ) that is “merely administrative in character” ,
the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail is based onCLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.Thisis neither a criminal, civil, and administrative case. Thus such quantum of evidence is
somewhere between proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases and preponderance of evidence in
civil cases.