2019 BAR EXAMINATIONS

FORECAST LECTURE IN CIVIL LAW BY

PROF. ELMER T. RABUYA
(PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS)
Preliminary title:
Company A manufactures plastics used as
spare parts of cars. Company B manufactures
plastics used as kitchen ware items. They are
neighbors. Company was actively pirating the
employees of Company A to learn the process
of manufacturing plastics that can be used as
spare parts of cars. After acquiring such
knowledge, B actively competed with A and
sold its products at a lower price resulting to
huge losses to A.
Willaware Plastic Corp. v.
Jesichris Manufacturing Corp.
Hence, A sued B for damages on the ground of
unfair competition. B denies liability on the
ground that A’s product was not patented. Is B
correct?

ANSWER: No. Because the concept of “unfair

competition” in the Civil Code is much
broader than that in Intellectual Property laws.
In the Civil Code, unfair competition may be
committed even if the product is not
protected by a patent.
Willaware Plastic Corp. v.
Jesichris Manufacturing Corp.
In the Civil Code, unfair competition is
committed if two requisites are present: (a)
an injury or loss is caused to a trade rival
or competitor; and (b) the act is contrary
to good conscience, shocking to judicial
sensibilities, or otherwise unlawful.
Art. 15: Silverio v. Republic (with
a twist)
Juan, a former Filipino citizen, became a
naturalized citizen of Switzerland. After
becoming a Swiss national, he underwent sex
reassignment surgery and had a female organ.
Pursuant to the laws of Switzerland, Juan had a
change of sex from “male” to “female” and
became Jane. Thereafter, Pedro, a Filipino
citizen and childhood love of Jane, followed
Jane in Switzerland where they got married. In
Switzerland, their marriage is considered valid.
Is their marriage also valid in the Philippines?
Art. 15: Silverio v. Republic (with
a twist)
ANSWER: YES. Following the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the
NCC, the matter of family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity of
persons shall be governed by the national
law of the person concerned. As such, in
determining the sexes of Jane and Pedro,
they shall be governed respectively by their
national laws.
Art. 15: Silverio v. Republic (with
a twist)
Applying Philippine laws, “Pedro” is a male;
while “Jane” is a female applying the law of
Switzerland. Hence, the marriage of Pedro
and Jane is a valid marriage because the
parties are a man and a woman even from
the point of view of Philippines laws.
Art. 4, FC: Absence of Consent
and Republic v. Olaybar
a) Republic v. Olaybar: “identity theft”, no
consent from true Olaybar
b) Hence, there was no marriage that took
place involving the true Olaybar (as
opposed to a void marriage).
c) Hence, remedy of Olaybar is a Petition
for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the Civil registry Under Rule
108
Void Marriage, Remedy: Braza v. City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental

a) Braza v. City Civil Registrar: A petition for

correction and/or cancellation of entries
was filed under Rule 108 to correct entries
in the birth certificate of child because not
legitimated, with a prayer for declaration of
nullity of the subsequent marriage on the
ground of bigamy.
b) SC ruled that a marriage may not be
declared void under Rule 108. Proper
remedy is Petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of the Marriage.
No Marriage v. Void Marriage
a) Absence of consent and marriage
ceremony is NO MARRIAGE; while
absence of legal capacity, authority of
solemnizer and marriage license is VOID
MARRIAGE.
b) If No Marriage, remedy is Petition for
cancellation/correction of entries in Civil
Registry under Rule 108; If Void Marriage,
remedy is Petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage.
c) If No Marriage, Article 40, FC does not
apply. If void marriage,Article 40 applies.
Art. 26, par. 2, FC: Republic v. Manalo
and Morisono v. Morisono
a) If decree of divorce is valid and capacitates
the foreigner spouse to remarry pursuant
to his national laws (or if the foreigner is
released from the marriage), the Filipino
spouse also regains his/her capacity to
remarry, REGARDLESS OF WHO
OBTAINED THE DIVORCE.
Reason: The rationale behind Art. 26, par. 2 is
that if the foreigner spouse is already released
from the marriage, the Filipino spouse should
also be released from the marriage.
Art. 26, par. 2, FC: Republic v. Manalo
and Morisono v. Morisono (Bernabe)
b) Manalo and Morisono ruling applies only in
mix-marriage. If divorce is obtained by a
Filipino married to another Filipino, the
divorce decree is VOID.
c) RECKONING POINT: In determining
whether it is a mix-marriage or not, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the
parties at the time that the valid decree of
divorce is obtained and not their citizenship at
the time of the marriage (Republic v. Orbecido
III)
Art. 40, FC
a) Two kinds of bigamous marriages: Art. 35(4) v. Art.
40
35(4): prior marriage is valid or voidable
40 : prior marriage is void

35(4): property regime is Art. 148

40: property regime is either absolute, conjugal or
complete separation

b) Art. 40: Prior marriage is void (not NO MARRIAGE)

and another marriage is contracted without judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of prior marriage).
Art. 40, FC
c) Look into when second marriage contracted:
◆ If contracted before Aug. 19, 1986: rule, a void
marriage does not exist even for purposes of
remarriage and there is no need for judicial
declaration prior to contracting another marriage
(Odayat v. Amante)
◆ If contracted after Aug. 19, 1986 but before
effectivity of FC: rule, a void marriage subsists for
purposes of contracting another marriage unless
there has been a prior judicial declaration of
nullity (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy)
◆ If contracted after effectivity of FC: Apply Art. 40
Art. 41, FC: Exception to Bigamy
a) General rule: opening clause of Article 41,
marriage is bigamous under Art. 35(4)
b) Exception (Succeeding Clauses): Not
bigamous but marriage is valid if ---
▪ Spouse is absent for 4 or 2 years
▪ Spouse present has a well-founded belief
that absentee is already dead
▪ Spouse present obtained a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of
absentee spouse.
Art. 41, FC: If 3 requisites not
complied; Santos v. Santos (2014)
a) Second marriage is void for being
bigamous.
b) Remedy is Petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Second Marriage
(and not Recording of Affidavit of
Reappearance)
c) Aggrieved spouse in the prior marriage
has personality to file the petition if
ground is bigamy (Juliano-Llave v.
Republic and Fujiki v. Marinay).
Requirement of Judicial Declaration of
Presumptive Death: Tadeo-Matias v.
Republic
a) 2 applicable laws: Art. 41, FC and Arts.
390-391, NCC
b) Art. 41, FC apples if purpose is
remarriage; Arts. 390-391 apply if
presumptive death is for other purposes
c) A judicial declaration of presumptive
death can only be issued pursuant to
Art. 41, FC and cannot be issued under
Articles 390-391, NCC.
Property Relations: Arts. 103 and 130,
FC
a) If death is caused of termination of APC
or CPG, mandatory obligation of
surviving spouse to liquidate within 1
year from death, otherwise:
▪ His subsequent marriage is governed
mandatorily by complete separation; and
▪ Any disposition or encumbrance of
community or conjugal property is void.
Property Relations: Arts. 103 and 130,
FC; Heirs of Go v. Servacio and Domingo
v. Molina
b) IF CPG existed already during the Civil
Code, look into when one of the spouses
died:
▪ If died before effectivity of FC, there is no
mandatory obligation to liquidate. Hence,
effects in Art. 130 not applicable.
▪ If died during effectivity of FC, Art. 130
applies. Hence, the effects in Art. 130 will
now be applicable.
Property Relations: Obligations of
APC or CPG
a) If debtor-spouse does not have sufficient
property to pay the following:
▪ Ante-nuptial debt which did not redound to the
benefit of the family;
▪ Support of illegitimate children
▪ Civil liability for delict or quasi-delict.
❖ In APC, the property regime can be immediately
compelled to advance the payment subject to
reimbursement. (Art. 94[9], FC)
❖ But in CPG, the property cannot be immediately
compelled to advance the payment because the
other obligations of the CPG must first be
satisfied. (Art. 122, FC)
Property Relations: Obligations of
APC or CPG
b) But the property regime cannot be
compelled to advance the payment in the
following:

▪ Debts contracted during the marriage by

one without the consent of the other
“which did not redound to the benefit of
the family.”
▪ Support of ascendants and brothers and
sisters.
Property Relations: Presumption of
Conjugality (Art. 116, FC)
SC ruling: If property is registered in the name of “Juan
Dela Cruz, married to Juana Dela Cruz,” the property is
exclusively owned by Juan because the words “married
to” are merely descriptive of his civil status.

◆ Not applicable if property is proven to be acquired

during the marriage because it will be presumed
conjugal. Presumption applies if property is proven to
have been acquired “during the marriage,” regardless
of the manner of registration.

◆ In the absence of proof as to when acquired, the

ruling will apply because it cannot be presumed
conjugal.
Arts. 147 and 148, FC

a) Property regimes of:

▪ Void marriages, except Art. 40.
▪ Cohabitation between a man and woman
without the benefit of marriage.
b) As to Void Marriage, property regime is
Art. 147 if ground is not absence of legal
capacity, such as: Art. 35(2), (3), (5) and (6)
and Art. 36.
Arts. 147 and 148, FC

c) As to Void Marriage, property regime is

Article 148 if ground is absence of legal
capacity, such as: Art. 35(1) and (4), Art. 37
and Art. 38.
d) If void by reason of Art. 36, property
regime is Art. 147 even prior to the judicial
declaration.
Arts. 147 and 148, FC
d) The provisions of Arts. 50, 51, 52 and 53 are
applicable only to marriages which are
annulled (voidable) and declared void by
reason of Article 40. Hence, in other marriages
which are void by reason other than Article
40:
▪ There is no APC or CPG that will be
liquidated.
▪ Instead, the co-ownership in 147/148 need
be partitioned in the same proceeding.
Hence, the decree of nullity should
immediately be issued (Dino v. Dino)
Arts. 147 and 148, FC

▪ The obligation to deliver the presumptive

legitimes of the children is applicable only
when the marriage is annulled (voidable) or
declared void under Art. 40. Not applicable if
declared void by other grounds.
▪ The procedures required in Article 52 (in
relation to Art. 53) is applicable only when
the marriage is annulled (voidable) or
declared void under Art. 40. Not applicable if
declared void by other grounds.
Art. 147, FC and Buemer v. Amores
(Perlas-Bernabe)
Problem: A Dutch was married to a Filipina. Subsequently, marriage
was declared void under Art. 36 because of the former’s pyschological
incapacity. After the declaration of nullity, the Dutch filed a petition
for dissolution of the conjugal partnership praying for dissolution of
the 4 parcels of land acquired thru sale. The Filipina claimed that the
money used to acquire the lots came from her exclusive funds, except
the residential houses on the 2 lots which were acquired using
conjugal funds. The RTC dissolved the conjugal partership and
awarded all four lots to the Filipina but declared the 2 houses co-
owned by the parties. The Dutch appealed to the CA claiming that the
money used to acquire all properties came from him. He then prayed
for reimbursement of ½ of the amount he had paid.

Q1: Is the property regime of the parties conjugal partnership?

ANSWER: No, because the marriage is void. Since the marriage is void
by reason of Art. 36, the proeprty regime is that provided in Article
36.
Art. 147, FC and Buemer v. Amores
(Perlas-Bernabe)
Q2: May the Dutch national be considered co-
owner of the 4 parcels of land and the 2 houses?
Answer: Only the 2 houses, but not the 4 parcels of
land because of the prohibition in the Constitution.

Q3: May the Dutch national be entitled to

reimbursement?
Answer: No, because of the principle of in pari
delicto. Secondly, he is not entitled to
reimbursement under the principle of unjust
enrichment because the latter principle does not
apply in case of violation of prohibitions under the
Constitution.
Art. 148, FC:
Problem: An Australian, married in Australia, was assigned to work
here in the Philippines. After 2 years, he married a Filipina and they
acquired a house and lot in Makati. The Filipina did not have the
money, property or work to acquire the property.

Q1: Who is entitled to the house and lot? ANSWER: The Filipina is
not a co-owner of the house and lot because she will not be able to
prove that she made actual contributions in its acquisition in the form
of money, property or industry. The foreigner is the exclusive owner
of the house but not the lot because of the prohibition in the
Constitution. Instead, the lot can be confiscated by the State thru
escheat proceedings.

Q2: What if the foreigner is indebted to a Filipino creditor and he

executed a deed of dacion en pago over the house and lot to pay off
his creditor, may the State recover the property from the
creditor?ANSWER: Not anymore because the defect is deemed
cured.
Arts. 150 and 151and Moreno v. Kahn
(Perlas-Bernabe)
Q: If the suit is between the nephews/nieces and their
uncle, is there a need for an earnest efforts towards a
compromise?

Answer: NO. In Art. 151 of the FC, earnest efforts

towards a compromise is required only when the suit is
exclusively among members of the same family. The
term “members of the same family” refer to the family
relations enumerated in Art. 150, as follows: (1)
between husband and wife; (2) between parents and
children; (3) among other ascendants and descendants:
and (4) among brothers and sisters, whether of the full
or half-blood. The other collateral blood-relatives are
considered strangers to the suit.
Family Home and Eulogio v. Bell, Sr.
a) Art. 155 vs. Art. 160
b) Sale of FH under Art. 160
▪ Judgment creditor is not those enumerated in Art.
155
▪ At the time of constitution, actual value did not
exceed 300,000 or 200,000
▪ After constitution, actual value increased to more
than 300,000 or 200,000.
▪ Reason for increase is “voluntary improvement.”
(if reason is “involuntary improvement,” it cannot
be sold and remains protected)
Paternity and Filiation
a) Artificial Insemination under FC; case of Scarlett Snow
Kho.
b) Registration of birth of child:
▪ If legitimate, the birth can be registered either by the father
or father.
▪ If illegitimate, the birth certificate must be signed always by
the mother. (Sec. 5, Civil Registration Law), otherwise the
birth certificate is void (Barcelote v. Republic)
▪ Thus, if the birth certificate was signed only by the
illegitimate father and he registered the child under his
surname, the birth certificate is void and the child cannot use
the void certificate to authorize him to use the father’s
surname. (Barcelote v. Republic [2017])
Paternity and Filiation

c) Grande v. Antonio: Use of father’s

surname is merely permissive and
discretionary upon the child.

d) Dela Cruz v. Gracia: If recognition is in

the illegitimate father’s handwriting but not
signed…
Adoption: Administrative Adoption
When Allowed
Requisites:
a) Purpose is to rectify simulated birth made before
effectivity of RA 11222;
b) Simulation is to the best interest of child and child
is treated as child of person responsible;
c) Adoption is filed within 10 years from effectivity of
RA 11222;
d) Child is living with the person who simulated the
birth certificate for at least 3 years before effectivity
of RA 11222; and
e) Child is declared legally available for adoption by
the DSWD (not required if child is already an adult
or relative by consanguinity/affinity within 4th
degree)
Adoption: Requirement of Joint
Adoption of Spouses
a) Rule: Mandatory, even if the child to be adopted is already of legal
age and freed from parental authority.
In re Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim: Spouses Primo
and Monina Lim simulated the birth certificates of Michael and
Michelle to make it appear that they were their children. When Primo
died, Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen. Availing of the
amnesty under DAA, Monina adopted Michael and Michelle, who were
already of legal age at that time. Angel Olario did not join in the
adoption but only executed a written consent to the adoption. The
trial court dismissed the petition for adoption because the spouses
did not jointly adopt. Monina contended that joint adoption is no
longer mandatory because it is needed only for the joint exercise of
parental authority and the children to be adopted were already of
legal age and freed from parental authority.

RULING: Joint adoption is still mandatory even if the adoptee is

already of legal age because parental authority is merely one of the
effects of adoption.
Adoption: Requirement of Joint
Adoption of Spouses
b) Exception to rule of joint adoption by
spouses:
▪ If one is adopting the legitimate child of
the other spouse;
▪ If one is adopting his/her illegitimate child
but the consent of the other spouse is
mandatory; or [Corpuz v. Gregorio]
▪ If the spouses are legally separated.
Adoption: Effect of death of both adopting
parents during minority of adopted
Bartolome v. SSS
▪ Applying by analogy Sec. 20 of DAA, the
parental auhtority of the biological parent
is automatically restored
Parental Authority

Who is entitled to exercise parental authority

(or custody over a minor) in case of
controversy?
A. If legitimate, applicable law is Art. 213:
▪ If below 7, mother under the tender-age
presumption rule, which is mandatory
▪ If not below 7, best welfare of the child.
A. If Illegitimate, applicable law is Art. 176
(but illegitimate father is entitled to visitation
right)
2019 BAR EXAMINATIONS

FORECAST LECTURE IN CIVIL LAW BY

PROF. ELMER T. RABUYA
(SUCCESSION)
FAMILY CODE PROVISIONS
a) If the marriage is void, the surviving is not a spouse
entitled to inherit and the absolute nullity of the
marriage can still be questioned after the death of one
of the spouses (Ninal v. Bayadog).
b) If a decree of legal separation is issue, the right of the
innocent spouse to inherit from the guilty spouse is
not affected. If the innocent spouse is the decedent:
▪ The guilty spouse is disqualified to inherit by intestate
succession.
▪ In testamentary succession, any testamentary provision
in the will of the innocent (existing at the time of the
issuance of the decree) naming the guilty spouse as
voluntary heir, devisee or legatee is revoked by
operation of law.
FAMILY CODE PROVISIONS

c) Effect of subsequent reconciliation: In the

absence of decree of reconciliation, no
effect. If a decree of reconciliation is issued,
the decree of legal separation is set aside.
Hence:
▪ The right of the guilty spouse to inherit
from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession is automatically restored.
▪ The testamentary disposition in favor of
the guilty spouse is automatically revived.
FAMILY CODE PROVISIONS

If the subsequent valid marriage in Art. 41 is

terminated by recording of affidavit of
reappearance or by a judicial declaration of
its dissolution/termination and the second
spouse contracted the marriage in bad faith,
he/she is disqualified to inherit from the
spouse present, whether the succession is
testamentary or intestate. [Art. 43(5), FC]
FAMILY CODE PROVISIONS

In order for an illegitimate child to inherit thru

operation of law (as compulsory or legal heir),
the illegitimate filiation must be proven after
the death of the decedent. Hence, the child
must rely on the following proof:
▪ Birth certificate signed by the decedent.
▪ Birth certificate not signed by the decedent
but he participated in its preparation
▪ Public or private instrument of admission of
filiation signed by the decedent.
FORMALITIES: Requirement of Stating
Number of Pages in Attestation Clause
Q1: The acknowledgment portion stated
that the will consists of 7 pages including
the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written, but the actual
physical count reveals 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion. May the rule on
substantial compliance under Article 809 be
applied?
FORMALITIES: Requirement of Stating
Number of Pages in Attestation Clause
 ANSWER: No, the will is void. The statement
in the Acknowledgment portion of the
subject last will and testament that it
“consists of 7 pages including the page on
which the ratification and acknowledgment
are written”cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8
pages including its acknowledgment which
discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the
presentation of evidence aliunde. (Lopez v.
Lopez [Perlas-Bernabe Case])
PROBATE: IF ISSUE IS PRETERITION

Can probate court rule on issue of

“preterition”?
▪ If there are devises/legacies in the will NO.
Because there is still a need to conduct
probate even if there is preterition. Practical
consideration does not demand it.
▪ If NO devises/legacies YES. Because if
preterition really exists, there is no need for
probate. Practical consideration demands it.
RESERVA TRONCAL: 3 LINES OF
TRANSMISSION
RESERVA TRONCAL: Reservatario

1) He is legal heir of Prepositus. But must

be 3rd degree relative by blood of P.
2) He comes from same blood line where
property came from.
3) Related by blood also to the Origin.
4) If there several, apply rules of intestate
succession.
RESERVA TRONCAL: Who among X,
Y or Z is the Reservatario?
RESERVA TRONCAL: Effect of Sale
by Reservista
Q1: If “S” sold the property to “F,” a third
person, is the sale valid?

Q2: If resolutory condition is fulfilled, can

reservatario “Y” recovery the property
from “F”?
BARRIER RULE: ART. 992, NCC

1) Applicable only in succession by law

(legitime and intestate succession).
2) No prohibition in succession by will.
3) The illegitimate child cannot inherit from
his legitimate brothers and sisters and
vice-versa.
4) The illegitimate child cannot inherit from
the legitimate relatives of the parents
and vice-versa. Hence, the parent of the
illegitimate child is LEGITIMATE.
BARRIER RULE APPLIES
BARRIER RULE DOES NOT APPLY
FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION
FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION

a) If FS is valid, 1st heir acquires the right of

usurfruct over the property while 2nd
heir acquires the naked ownership.
Hence, 2nd heir can sell the property
during lifetime of 1st heir.

a) If FS not valid, the institution of 1st heir

is still valid but there is no more
substitution.
PRETERITION: Requisites

1) Omitted heir is a compulsory heir in the

direct line.
2) Omission is total or complete.
3) Omitted CH survived the testator,
unless he can be represented.
4) Omission is unintentional (if deliberate,
it is a case of invalid disinheritance).
Effect of Preterition

1) Institution of voluntary heirs is annulled

in its entirety.
2) But the devises and legacies are not
affected. Remain valid.
3) In invalid disinheritance, the institution
of voluntary heirs is not annulled in its
entirety. But the invalidly disinherited
heir will still get what is due to him
under the law.
Preterition v. Invalid Disinheritance
Example: Testator has 4 LCs (A, B, C and D). In
his will, he instituted as sole heirs to his estate
of 1 Million A, B, C and his friend, F, omitting D.
a) If D is preterited, A, B, C and D will get
equal shares in intestate succession and F
will not get anything. Institution of heirs is
annuled.
b) If D is only invalidly disinherited, ½ of the
estate will go to A, B, C and D in equal
shares as their legitime. The other ½ will
go to the instituted heirs (A, B, C and F) in
equal shares.
Rules of Intestate Succession:
“illegitimate decedent”
1) Illegitimate Parents are excluded by any kind of
descendants of decedent, whether legitimate or
illegitimate.
2) If no descendants, Illegitimate Parents inherit
together with SS: SS (1/2); ILP (1/2)
3) If no ILP, other ascendants are no longer legal
heirs.
4) In the absence of descendants, SS and ILP, the
illegitimate B/S/N/N are the legal heirs.
5) In the absence of descendants, SS, ILP and
Illegitimate B/S/N/N, other collateral blood
relative are no longer legal heirs. State inherits.
2019 BAR EXAMINATIONS

FORECAST LECTURE IN CIVIL LAW BY

PROF. ELMER T. RABUYA
(PROPERTY)
Public Dominion/Patrimonial
1) Only patrimonial property of the State can be acquired thru
acquisitive prescription, citing Art. 1113, NCC (Heirs of
Malabanan v. Republic).

1) Agricultural lands of the public domain declared alienable and

disposable remain to be properties of public domain. To be
converted into patrimonial:
▪ There must be an express declaration that they are no longer
intended for public use, public service or for development of
national wealth, or express declaration of their conversion to
patrimonial.
▪ Such express declaration must be in the form of a law passed by
Congress or in the form of presidential proclamation in cases
where the President is expressly authorized by Congress to do so.
(Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic)
Public Dominion/Patrimonial: Sec. 14,
PRD (PD 1529): Heirs of Malabanan
Sec. 14(1) Sec. 14(2)
• Basis is possession and • Basis is acquisitive
occupation since June prescription (Civil
12, 1945 or earlier Code)
(Public Land’s Act) • Patrimonial lands of
• Agricultural land of State.
public domain (not • Prescriptive period is
patrimonial) 10 or 30 years.
• Already declared (Must be patrimonial
alienable and during entire 10 or 30
disposable at the time year period of
of application for prescription)
registration.
Industrial Accession: Builder in Good
Faith
Limited Definition Expanded Definition
▪ At the time of • At the time of
building, builder must building, builder
have title or mode of knew that he was
acquisition which is not the owner of the
invalid (but he was land BUT the
not aware that it was landowner “expressly
invalid at the time of consented” to the
building). construction.
Industrial Accession: Builder in Good
Faith (Art. 448, NCC)
2 Options of Landowner:
1) Appropriate building after payment of
indeminity (necessary and useful expenses);
or
2) Compel builder to buy land if price is not
considerably more than the value of
building.
◆ Initially, LO cannot compel demolition of
building. But after choosing option 2 and
builder paid to pay price of land, he can now
compel demolition of building even of
Builder acted in GF.
When lessee builds on lease
premises (Art. 1678)
1) Useful improvement
2) Ornamental improvement
Natural Accession: Alluvium

1) To become private property, it must take

place on rivers, creeks, streams or lakes. If
it takes place on a sea, additional soil
deposit remains public dominion. (Spanish
Law of Waters
2) It must be exclusively work of nature. If
nor, soil deposit is public dominion.
❑ If water level simply receded, the land thus
formed is dried up river bed which is
property of public dominion (and not
alluvium).
Co-ownership
1) Sale of the entire property without consent of
other co-owners is not void. Instead, the sale is
simply treated as a sale of the ideal share in the
co-ownership of the selling co-owner. Only his
ideal share is affected. (Remedy of others:
Demand for partition or legal redemption)
2) Sale of a concrete/definite portion in the co-
owned property without the consent of the
other co-owners is not void. Instead, the sale is
simply treated as a sale of the ideal share in the
co-ownership of the selling co-owner. Only his
ideal share is affected. (Remedy of others:
Demand for partition or legal redemption)
Co-ownership
3) A co-owner can sell/mortgage his ideal
share without the consent of the other co-
owners. Ergo, he cannot compel to sell his
ideal share. In case of sale of ideal share to a
stranger without the consent of the others,
their remedy is legal redemption.
4) In case of conflict between the procedural
rule of dismissal with prejudice (if an action
for partition is dismissed for failure to
prosecute) and the substantive right of a co-
owner to demand partition at anytime, the
latter right prevails.
2019 BAR EXAMINATIONS
FORECAST LECTURE IN CIVIL LAW
BY
PROF. ELMER T. RABUYA
(OBLICON & SPECIAL CONTRACTS)
Natural Obligation
1) Cannot be compelled in court.
2) But if voluntary fulfilled, creditor is authorized to
retain payment.
3) Can be novated and converted into civil obligation
(ex. A date that has prescribed can be the subject
matter of novation).
4) Can be the subject matter of guaranty, suretyship,
mortgage or pledge.
5) But it cannot be the subject of legal compensation
(because legal compesation requires that both debts
be demandable).
6) An agreement for the payment of monetary interest
must be in writing, otherwise it is only a natural
obligation.
 Mixed Conditional Obligation
Q1: What if obligation is subject to a suspensive condition
and the fulfillment of such condition is dependent partly
upon the will of the debtor and partly upon the will of a
third person, what will happen to the obligation if the
third complied with the condition but the debtor
intentionally prevents its fulfillment?

ANSWER: The obligation is valid and becomes due and

demandable because the condition is demed
constructively fulfilled. Under the doctrine of constructive
fulfillment of a suspensive condition in Article 1186, if the
debtor intentionally prevents the fulfillemnt of the
suspensive condition the same is deemed to be
constructively fulfilled.
Mixed Conditional Obligation
Q2: What if in the above problem, it was the debtor who
did all in his power to comply with the condition but the
third person failed to fulfill his part, what will happen to
the obligation?

ANSWER: The obligation is valid and it becomes due and

demandable because the condition is deemed
constructively fulfilled following the rule on constructive
fulfillment of mixed conditional obligation. Under said
rule, if in a mixed conditional obligation the debtor did
all in his power to comply with the condition the
condition is likewise deemed to have been satisifed.
[International Hotel Corp. v. Joaquin, Jr.]
Extinctive and Modificatory Novation
PROBLEM: MPTC offered to sell computer hardware
and equipment to Ace. Ace accepted the offer and issued
purchase order. Thereafter, MPTC delivered the products
and issued invoice receipt. In the invoice receipt, it was
stated: “title to said property is reserved to MPTC until
compliance with the terms and conditions and payment
of the price.” The invoice was received by a
representative of Ace upon delivery. When Ace failed to
pay after nine months from delivery, MPTC demanded
for payment of the price. Ace, however, decided to
return the products arguing that the contract was a
contract to sell because of the provision in the invoice
which according to Ace novated the contract from
contract of sale to contract to sell. Is Ace Correct?
Extinctive and Modificatory Novation

ANSWER: There is no novation, whether

extinctive or modificatory because the
imposition in the invoice receipt is merely a
unilateral proposition of MPTC done after
the perfection of the contract which was
not consented to by Ace. The invoice
receipt is merely acknowledgment of the
delivery of the things purchased. (Ace
Foods, Inc. v. Micro Pacific Technologies Co.,
Ltd.)
Novation by Substitution of Debtor

1) There must be a clear agreement for the

release of the old debtor and that a third
person will assume his place.

1) Expromision and Delegacion.

Conventional Subrogation v.
Assignment of Credit
1) As to extinguishment of obligation
2) As to requirement of debtor’s consent
Stipulation Pour Autrui

1) Requisites
2) Example
3) Exception to principle of relativity of
contracts
Option vs. RFR

1) Distinction
2) Rules in Option
3) Rules in RFR
ART. 1484: Sale of personal property thru
installments (ESB v. Palces) (Perlas)
Palces purchased a vehicle a motor vehicle from
Hyundai through a loan granted by ESB. The loan is
payable in 36 equal monthly installments and secured by
a chattel mortgage vehicle over the same motor vehicle.
When Palces defaulted in the payment of the loan, ESB
filed a complaint for replevin with alternative prayer for
sum of money and damages. Thereafter, the sheriff seized
the vehicle pursuant to a writ of replevin. The RTC ruled
in favor of ESB. On appeal, the CA modified the
judgment by requiring ESB to return the sum of
P103,000 to Palces and by deleting the award of
attorneys fees. The CA explained that by choosing to
recover the subject vehicle, ESB waived its right to
recover the unpaid installments pursuant to Article 1484
of the Civil Code. Is the CA correct? Is Art. 1484(3)
applicable?
ART. 1484: Sale of personal property thru
installments (ESB v. Palces) (Perlas)
ANSWER: CA not correct. Art. 1484(3) not
applicable because there is no vendor-vendee
relationship between ESB and Palces, because the
latter never bought the subject vehicle from
the former but from a third party. Instead, the
latter merely sought financing from the former for
its full purchase price. Hence, what was entered into
between the parties is a loan contract with the
accessory chattel mortgage contract --- and not a
contract of sale of personal property in installments.
Hence, Article 1484 is not applicable. Thus, the rights
of the parties shall be governed by the Chattel
Mortgage contract.
MACEDA LAW (RA 6552): AMOSUP
PTGWO-ITF v. Decena (Perlas)
AMOSUP entered into a contract under its
Shelter Program with one of its members,
Decena, allowing the latter to take possession
of a house and lot in Dasma, Cavite, with the
obligation to reimburse AMOSUP the cost
thereof in the amount of US$28,563 payable in
180 equal monthly payment. Contract provides
that upon completion of the payment
AMOSUP shall execute a Deed of
Transfer and shall cause issuance of TCT in
favor of Decena.
MACEDA LAW (RA 6552): AMOSUP
PTGWO-ITF v. Decena (Perlas)
Contract also provides that in case Decena fails to
remit 3 monthly reimbursement payments, he shall
be give a 3-month grace period, otherwise the
contract is automatically cancelled or revoked
without need of demand or judicial action. From
1995 up to July 1999, Decena had been remitting
payments but from August 1999 up to August 2001
Decena failed to remit 25 monthly installments.
Hence, AMOSUP cancelled the contract and treated
all his payments as rentals for his occupancy of the
premises. When Decena refused to vacate, AMOSUP
commenced an ejectment case against Decena.
MACEDA LAW (RA 6552): AMOSUP
PTGWO-ITF v. Decena (Perlas)
Q1: Is the Contract between the parties lease or
contract to sell?

ANSWER: The contract is a contract to sell and not a

contract of lease. Here, AMOSUP committed to
transfer ownership upon full payment of the price of
US$28,563, although the contract was in the guise of a
reimbursement scheme payments which are, in
actuality, installment payments for the value of the
house and lot. Considering that the basis for such
occupation is a contract to sell the premises on
installments, the contractual relations between the
parties are more than that of a lessor-lessee.
MACEDA LAW (RA 6552): AMOSUP
PTGWO-ITF v. Decena (Perlas)
Q2: Why is the contract one of contract to sell? Distinguish from
conditional contract of sale?

Q3: Is the cancellation of the contract valid?

ANSWER: No. Since the contract to sell involves sale of realty in

installments, the transaction is covered by the Maceda Law, R.A. No.
6552. Under the Maceda Law, if the buyer has paid at least 2 years
of installment payments, the contract can only be cancelled upon
compliance with two requisites: (1) the notice of cancellation or
demand for rescission must be by way of a notarial act; and (2)
there must be payment of the corresponding cash surrender value.
Here, there was no payment of the cash surrender value. Hence,
the cancellation is not valid.Therefore the action for ejectment fails.
DOUBLE SALE:ART. 1544
Requisites:
1) 2 or more valid sales
▪ Both must be contract of sale, no double
sale if one is a contract to sell
2) Same subject matter
3) Same seller [at the time of second sale,
must be the owner]
4) 2 or more buyers who do not share
same interest
DOUBLE SALE INVOLVING
UNREGISTERED LAND
PROBLEM: While pending registration of a
parcel of land, the applicant (Dambo) sold the
property to Bentot. The sale was not
registered but Bentot took possession of the
property. Subsequently, the OCT was issued in
the name of Dambo. Afterwhich a creditor of
Dambo levied upon the property, sold it at
auction sale to Berting and the latter
registered the sale. Berting filed an action
against Bentot for quieting of title. Is there
double sale? May the action filed by Berting
prosper?
DOUBLE SALE INVOLVING
UNREGISTERED LAND
ANSWER: There is no double sale under
Article 1544 because the prior sale involved
unregistered land. Hence, Article 1544 does
not apply. Therefore, the action filed by
Berting cannot prosper because at the time
of the levy and auction sale, Dambo was no
longer the owner of the parcel of land
because ownership was already Nemo dat
non quod habet.
DOUBLE SALE INVOLVING
UNREGISTERED LAND
Q2: What if the land that was sold to Bentot
was already registered under the Torrens
system, will your answer be the same?

ANSWER: No. In such a case, Article 1544

will apply. Thus, Berting possessed a superior
right than Bentot provided that he
registered the sale in good faith.
Contract to Sell v. Conditional contract of
Sale (Roque v. Aguado) (Perlas-Bernabe)
PROBLEM: Rivero, et. Al, the original owners of a parcel
of unregistered land sold to the Spouses Roque a
portion of lot 18089. The Deed of Conditional Sale
provides that a deed of sale will only be executed upon
full payment of the purchase price and upon the issuance
of the certificate of title. The Sps. Roque failed to pay the
final installment of the purchase price. In the meantime,
Sabug was able to apply for a free patent over the entire
Lot 18089 and was eventually issued OCT. Thereafter,
Sabug sold the entire Lot 18089 to Aguado, who
mortgaged the same with the LBP. Because of Aguado’s
failure to pay, the mortgage was closed and eventually
transferred in the name of LBP.
Contract to Sell v. Conditional contract of
Sale (Roque v. Aguado) (Perlas-Bernabe)
Sps. Roque filed an action for reconeyance. They claimed
ownership because they had been in possession of the
property since it was dealt to them by Rivero, et. Al…

Q1: Was the contract in favor of the Sps. Roque a

conditional contract of sale or a contract to Sell?
ANSWER: The contract is actually in the nature of a
contract to sell and not a contract of conditional sale.
Where the seller promises to execute a deed of
sale upon the completion by the buyer of the
payment of the purchase price, the contract is only
a contract to sell even if their agreement is
denominated as a Deed of Conditoinal Sale.
Contract to Sell v. Conditional contract of
Sale (Roque v. Aguado) (Perlas-Bernabe)
Q2: Did the spouses Roque become the
owner of the subject property?
ANSWER: No because they failed to pay
the final installment of the purchase price. In
a contract to sell, ownership is retained by
the seller and is not pass to the buyer until
full payment of the purchase price. In
addition, the sellers have not yet executed a
deed of sale in favor of the buyers.
Contract to Sell v. Conditional contract of
Sale (Roque v. Aguado) (Perlas-Bernabe)
Q3: Was there double sale in this case?
ANS: None because of the two contracts is
a contract to sell and not a contract of sale.
In a contract to sell, there is no sale yet.
Hence, there is no double sale.
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
(Art. 1602)
◆ Pricein pacto de retro is UNUSUALLY
INADEQUATE
◆ After sale, vendor REMAINS IN POSSESSION
◆ After sale, vendor binds himself to PAY TAX on
thing sold
◆ After expiration of period for repurchase,
another period is granted or period is extended
◆ Vendee retains for himself part of purchase price
◆ In any instance, WHERE INTENTION IS
SECURITY
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
(Art. 1602)
PROBLEM: In 2015, Marco entered into a contract
of Deed of Sale with Lucio involving a parcel of land
at the price of P500,000. At the time of the
transaction, the market value of the land was P3 M.
In another agreement dated 5 days after the sale,
captioned Agreement to Buy Back, Marco was given
an option to repurchase the property on or before
December 31, 2016 at the same price plus expenses
incurred by Lucio in transferring the property to his
name. Marco remained in possession of the
property. After the period of repurchase, Marco
tried to redeem/repurchase the property but Lucio
refused arguing that his ownership over the
property becomes absolute. Is Lucio correct?
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
(Art. 1602)
ANSWER: No, because the transaction is
manifestly equitable mortgage. The contract
shall be presumed to be equitable mortgage
when the vendor remains in possession
after the sale or when the price of a sale
with right to repurchase is unusually
inadequate. Hence, automatic appropriation
of the collateral is invalid as it constitutes
pactum commissorium.
REM vs.ANTICHRESIS
1) Distinction
2) Formality Required

PROBLEM: In 1975, Adolfo mortgaged a parcel of land in

favor of Bangis for the sum of P12,500, who immediately
took possession of the property. The said transaction
was not reduced in writing. Upon the death of Adolfo,
his heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition over
the said property and manifested their intention to
redeem the property from Bangis. Bangis refused the
offer and claimed that the transaction between him and
Adolfo was one of sale. Bangis showed them a copy of
an alleged deed of sale and a copy of the title in his
name.
Bangis v.Adolfo (Perlas-Bernabe)

The Heirs of Adolfo filed an action for the

annulment of the deed of sale and the
declaration of the purported sale as as
antichresis. During the trial, the Heirs of
Bangis failed to prove the existence of the
sale between Adolfo and Bangis.

Q: What then is the nature of the

transaction? Was it antichresis or mortgage?
Bangis v. Adolfo (Perlas-
Bernabe)
ANSWER: The contract is not anticresis but merely
a mortgage contract. The essence of antichresis is
that there must be an express agreement
authorizing the creditor to receive the fruits of the
immovable with the corresponding obligation to
apply the same to the payment of the interest, if
owing, and to the principal. Here there is no such
agreement.
In addition, assuming the transaction to be
antichresis, the same is void. Under Article 2134, in
order for the contract of antichresis to be valid, it is
necessary that the amount of the principal and
interest should be specified in writing. Here, such
formality was not complied.
Legal Interest in Solutio
Indebiti (BPI v. Mendoza)
PROBLEM: Amado Mendoza and Maria Marcos Mendoza
had a foreign currency savings account with BPI-Gapan
Branch. They deposited a total amount of US$16,624,
broken down, as follows: (a) US$100.00 in cash and (b)
US$16,164 in US Treasury Check. After the 30-day
clearing period, the Mendozas withdrew US$ 16,244. In
the following month, BPI received a notice from the
correspondent bank in the US that the check was
dishonored due to “amount altered.” Thus, prompting
BPI to file an action for the recovery of P369,600.51. The
RTC ordered the Mendozas to pay the sum of
P369,600.51, the peso equivalent of the amount
withdrawn, plus legal interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from the time that the money was withdrawn.
Legal Interest in Solutio
Indebiti (BPI v. Mendoza)
Q: Is the RTC correct in applying the legal rate of 12%
per annum? Is the amount dur from the Mendozas in the
nature of a loan or forbearance of money?

ANSWER: The RTC is not correct. BPI’s payment of the

proceeds of the subject check was due to a mistaken
notion that such check was cleared, when in fact, it was
dishonored due to an alteration in the amount indicated
therein. Such payment on the part of BPI to the
Mendozas was clearly made by mistake, giving rise to the
quasi-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti under
Article 2154 . Not being a loan or forbearance of money,
an interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be
imposed on the amount to be refunded