Heinz R. Heck vs. Judge Anthony E.

Santos

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 23, 2004

FACTS:

In 2001, Heinz Heck filed a complaint, praying for the disbarment of Judge Anthony Santos, a
Cagayan de Oro RTC judge who retired from service on May 22, 2002. The complaint alleged
that Judge Santos subscribed and forwarded, on a non-regular basis, notarized documents since
January 1980, when in fact, it was only until January 9, 1984, that he became a duly
commissioned notary public. The respondent did not object to the complaint’s evidence neither
did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980-1983, nor deny the
accuracy of such. He merely answered that there was no proper recording of the commissioned
lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro or of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial
Register.

Issue:

May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary commission
more than twenty years ago be disciplined thereof?

Held:

Yes. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis; neither purely civil nor purely
criminal. If the rule was otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the
very oath they took as lawyers. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice
of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the
time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint,
erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This
categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter
them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of
Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering
the seriousness of the matter involved - the respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial
documents.

Syllabus: Pursuant to Resolution No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on 1 October 2002,
administrative cases against erring justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan,
judges, and lawyers in the government service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases;
The new rule shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not yet
been required to comment on the complaints. Heck vs. Santos, 423 SCRA 329, A.M. No. RTJ-
01-1657 February 23, 2004

It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the Court itself,
and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for
investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor General, any officer of the court or a
judge of a lower court, on which the Court will thereafter base its final action. Although the
respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar
and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article
VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the complaint,
the respondent was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19; Cagayan de
Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule mandates that in
case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the complaint
shall be filed with the Supreme Court. Heck vs. Santos, 423 SCRA 329, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657
February 23, 2004

–The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not
necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the
complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the bench. As we held in
Gallos v. Cordero: The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the
pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public
official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught
with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications . . . If innocent, respondent
public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he
has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a
penalty proper and imposable under the situation. Heck vs. Santos, 423 SCRA 329, A.M. No.
RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004

The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounded duty as well. Heck vs. Santos, 423
SCRA 329, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004

Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
execution. Heck vs. Santos, 423 SCRA 329, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004

he Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the requisite
commission therefor as “reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the
crime of falsification of public documents.” Heck vs. Santos, 423 SCRA 329, A.M. No. RTJ-01-
1657 February 23, 2004

Any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings–there can
be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and
doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and
from which conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.
Heck vs. Santos, 423 SCRA 329, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases Heck vs. Santos, 423 SCRA 329, A.M. No.
RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004

An administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge,
albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by
prescription–no matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and
bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court; Even the lapse of considerable time from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase
the administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the requisite
authority therefor. Heck vs. Santos, 423 SCRA 329, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004.

TABANG v. GACOTT
A.C. No. 6490
July 9, 2013

FACTS: Complainant Lilia Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land
as she already owned other parcels. Hence, Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the
parcels under the names of fictitious persons, thus she purchased 7 lands under his advice.

Later, Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels for their medication and other expenses. Atty.
Glenn Gaccot offered the parcels to prospective buyers to help her sell thus he borrowed from
Tabang the TCTs.

Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels and
caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and
announced that these were for sale and succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a total
of P3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.

Hence, pettioners alleged that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit
filed a case before the IBP.

Respondent, contended that the names were not fictitious and petitioners only demanded a balato
of 20% from the proceeds which in his refusal, he was threatened to be defamed and disbarred.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.

RULING: Yes, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of
Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors.

While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the
complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s
offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the
highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of
him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to
prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated
it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, the Court imposes upon
respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.

Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and
skill of the law as well as took advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for
himself and to inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the course of several years in a
sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more
detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in
these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’ plight.
Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting
himself from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his
Appeal despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to him, thus
inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity,
respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.

Syllabus: This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that “a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State-—the administration of justice—as an officer of the court.” Accordingly,
“[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.” Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly
short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him.

Recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this Court noted in Moran v.
Moron: Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his
serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is the most severe
form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with
great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe-— such as a
reprimand, suspension, or fine — would accomplish the end desired.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated

the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct,
is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Joselano Guevarra Vs Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala

FACTS:
Joselano Guevarra filed a complaint for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
(respondent) for “grossly immoral conduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath.”

The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant’s) then- fiancée
Irene Moje introduced respondent Noli Eala to him as her friend who was married to Mary Ann
Tantaco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which real “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you
at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home vey late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. Complainant also had
seen Irene and respondent together in two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

The complainant later found out in the master’s bedroom, a folded card bearing the wods “I love
you” on its face, dated October 7, 2000, the day of hi wedding to Irene. It was also revealed that
Irene gave birth to a girl in 2002, naming respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl’s
father.

In the respondent’s answer to complainant’s allegations, he specifically denies having ever

flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene, that their relationship was low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their respective families. He also said that his special
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be disbarred from the practice of law

HELD:

Yes, the respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law as it involves the relationship
between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his spouse even though the affair was
carried out discretly.

While it was been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
consenting adults is not sufficient an administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.

Respondent also violated the lawyer’s oath he took before practicing law, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prescribes a lawyer from engaging in
“unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.” And Rule .03 of Canon 7 of the same code
which prescribes a lawyer from engaging in any “conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law.”
Syllabus:

Adultery is defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that “committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has
carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void”; A negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party—it is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the plead-ing.+

Quantum of Evidence; Clearly preponderant evidence—that evidence adduced by one party

which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater
weight than the other—which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case
against a lawyer.+

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides the grounds for disbarment or
suspension uses the phrase “grossly immoral conduct,” not “under scandalous circumstances.”

The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is
not his wife—it is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.

A lawyer, in carrying on an extra-marital affair with a married woman prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage was null and void, and despite such lawyer himself being married,
showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law—he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.

Adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio; Administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own—they are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28,
2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DIS-BARRED for grossly immoral
conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.