Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
India
May 2, 2011
UPDATE
BSE-30:19,136
Oil, coal or hole? Our holistic analysis of India’s energy supply and demand is
underwhelming, showing a rising energy deficit and increasing dependence on
expensive imports. These potential trends could derail India’s economic growth in the
absence of (1) swift deregulation of retail prices (both power and fuel), (2) enhanced
planning and coordination and (3) better demand management. We compute India’s
energy imports to rise to 41% of its total energy requirement and to US$162 bn (4%
of nominal GDP) by FY2017E.
We expect India’s energy demand to grow at 9% CAGR in FY2011-17E to 850 mtoe led by
strong real GDP growth of around 8-9%. The price of fuels, end-products and domestic
policies on pricing of fuels, power and end-products (subsidized or free market) will also
influence demand. Deregulation of fuel and power prices may not affect demand negatively;
on the other hand, it may remove artificial constraints on demand in the power sector.
Downstream deregulation: Critical reforms to control fiscal deficit and CAD Sanjeev Prasad
sanjeev.prasad@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1229
India’s fiscal deficit and current account deficit (CAD) could deteriorate significantly without
reforms in the downstream part of the energy chain—(1) deregulation of prices of regulated Gundeep Singh
products such as cooking and transportation fuels and (2) free-market pricing of power. India gundeep.singh@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1286
would do well to introduce its pricing reforms given (1) the energy deficit and subsidies could
soon reach unmanageable levels, (2) high inflation is inevitable with high subsidies and fiscal Murtuza Arsiwalla
deficits and (3) subsidized prices subvert market economics, feeding nefarious practices like murtuza.arsiwalla@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1125
corruption and black money.
Tarun Lakhotia
Company data and valuation summary tarun.lakhotia@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1188
Upside/
Price Target price (downside) Market cap. Shubham Satyarth
Rating (Rs) (Rs) (%) (US$ mn) shubham.satyarth@kotak.com
Reliance Industries REDUCE 984 1,080 9.8 66,153 Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1320
ONGC BUY 308 360 17.0 59,465
Coal India BUY 380 390 2.6 54,256
Cairn India REDUCE 349 335 (4.0) 14,952
Oil India BUY 1,397 1,550 11.0 7,585 Kotak Institutional Equities
Research
NHPC BUY 26 28 8.3 7,186
Important disclosures appear
Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates at the back
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India Energy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The prices in this report are based on the market close of April 29, 2011.
2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Energy demand
Coal (mn tons) 493 555 581 607 711 775 847 929 1,022 1,124
Natural gas (bcm) 43 44 60 65 69 77 90 96 102 112
Petroleum products (mn tons) 125 135 141 148 155 163 170 177 185 194
Electricity (hydro+nuclear) (bn KwH) 140 128 126 137 146 155 173 187 196 206
Total demand (mtoe) 416 456 488 513 574 620 674 727 785 853
Energy supply
Coal (mn tons) 454 490 513 527 564 607 654 705 753 801
Natural gas (bcm) 32 33 48 52 52 58 65 66 68 77
Crude oil (mn tons) 34 33 34 38 42 45 45 45 45 44
Electricity (hydro+nuclear) (bn KwH) 140 128 126 137 146 155 173 187 196 206
Total supply (mtoe) 287 303 326 342 364 392 422 449 473 504
Total energy shortfall (mtoe) 129 153 162 171 210 228 251 278 312 349
Energy deficit (%) 31 33 33 33 37 37 37 38 40 41
Notes:
(a) We assume that natural gas demand will be constrained by supply. We do not assume any incremental demand for gas from the power sector.
Exhibit 2 shows historical correlation between real GDP growth and energy growth. In our
view, historical energy consumption may not fully reflect actual demand given supply
restrictions, particularly in power, which in turn would have led to lower consumption of
fuels versus actual demand. In our view, demand is quite inelastic and less dependent on
price of fuels and power; we note that gasoline demand has continued to grow strongly
(9.5% yoy growth over the past six months) despite a 21% increase in retail gasoline prices
since June 25, 2010—when the government last attempted deregulating gasoline prices.
Exhibit 2: Correlation between India’s real GDP growth and energy growth
India’s energy growth versus GDP growth, March fiscal year-ends, 1986-2011E (%)
(%)
12
Energy growth GDP growth
10
0
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011E
Source: Kotak Institutional Equities
In contrast with rising demand for energy, we expect the domestic supply of oil, gas, coal
and other forms of energy to rise to around 500 mtoe, leading to a massive deficit of 350
mtoe by FY2017E. India is not blessed geologically except for coal. Exhibit 3 ranks India with
resource-rich countries in terms of reserves of oil, gas and coal. We also see a fair degree of
risk to our supply estimates, which we detail in subsequent sections.
` Coal. We see downside risks to our forecasts for domestic coal supply without the
development of coal resources in areas that are currently forbidden for exploitation for
environmental reasons or concurrent development of railway and evacuation
infrastructure. We forecast incremental coal production of 273 mn tons in FY2011-17E. In
contrast, incremental domestic coal production has been only 96 mn tons in FY2007-11.
In addition, we see environmental infrastructure and logistical bottlenecks that may
prevent the use of domestic coal. Finally, inadequate import capacity may prevent imports
of requisite quantities of coal. We project coal imports to rise to ~325 mn tons in
FY2017E from 80 mn tons in FY2011E.
We note that coal supply is very critical to India’s energy situation since it dominates India’s
energy mix and will likely continue to do so (see Exhibit 4 that shows India’s energy mix
over various periods). India has large amounts of coal reserves (the fifth-largest in the world)
in contrast to limited resources of oil and gas.
Exhibit 5 gives the breakdown of reserves of coal by major states and categories. As can
be seen, India has large amounts of proved coal reserves that are yet to be exploited fully
and resources that are yet to be ‘discovered’. However, the exploitation of abundant
reserves would require better coordination between various government bodies and
timely strategic planning. India’s coal production in FY2011E was 527 mn tons only in
contrast to proved reserves of almost 110 bn tons.
` Gas. We see downside risks to our estimates of domestic natural gas production in light
of (1) production problems at Reliance Industries’ KG D-6 block and (2) continued delay in
E&P activity in several NELP blocks where companies have already made discoveries. In
addition, India’s inability to sign long-term LNG contracts and pricing issues in the end-
user industries such as power and fertilizers may result in inadequate demand for
imported spot LNG. We expect most of the incremental imports of gas to be in the form
of spot LNG; the availability and pricing of spot LNG cargoes may result in lower-than-
expected supply from LNG imports.
Exhibit 6: Fuel imports to increase significantly over the next few years
Energy imports, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-17E (US$ bn)
2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Energy imports (net basis)
Coal (mn tons) 38 65 68 80 146 169 193 224 270 323
LNG (bcm) 11 11 12 13 17 20 25 30 33 34
Crude oil (mn tons) 102 113 120 122 127 132 139 147 157 167
Total imports (mtoe) 129 153 162 171 210 228 251 278 312 349
Price assumptions
Coal (US$/ton) 169 154 130 123 130 114 114 114 114 114
LNG prices (US$/mn BTU) 4.2 5.1 4.4 6.5 9.3 10.5 11.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
Crude prices (US$/bbl) 79 89 67 84 105 95 90 90 90 90
Value of energy imports (US$ bn)
Coal 6 10 9 10 19 19 22 26 31 37
LNG 2 2 2 3 6 8 10 13 15 15
Oil 55 64 56 75 97 91 91 97 103 110
Total imports 64 76 67 88 122 118 124 136 148 162
Notes:
(a) Price of imported coal has been adjusted down to reflect its higher calorific value.
(b) In the case of crude oil, data represents net imports of crude oil.
Notes:
(a) Price of imported coal has been adjusted down to reflect its higher calorific value.
(b) In the case of crude oil, data represents net imports of crude oil.
` Coal India (BUY, CMP: `380, TP: `390). Coal India with 52 bn tons of proved coal
reserves (48% of total proved reserves in India) and annual production of 443 mn tons is
ideally positioned to increase its production. However, various factors have constrained
production. Also, CIL should benefit from eventual increase in its coal prices that are
substantially below global levels (see Exhibit 8). Exhibit 9 gives our key assumptions on
volumes and pricing over the next few years.
Exhibit 8: CIL’s energy-adjusted realizations are at a steep discount to average FOB price of South
African coal
Average realization of CIL and average FOB price of imported coal, March fiscal year-ends, 2006-10 (Rs/ton)
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
-
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Source: CIL, Bloomberg
Exhibit 9: CIL’s profitability will likely improve to US$11/ton (EBITDA/ton) in FY2015E from US$6/ton in FY2010
Key operational and financial assumptions for CIL, March fiscal year-ends, 2009-17E
` Reliance Industries Ltd (REDUCE, CMP: `984, TP: `1,080). RIL can enhance India’s gas
production significantly if it can accelerate development work at some of its discoveries
and bring them into production. Continued delays in exploration activity in blocks such as
MN D-4, KG D-3 and KG D-9 and development work in KG D-6 (other zones apart from
current production zones) and NEC-25 will likely push gas production from the new
discoveries to FY2016E, potentially later. Most of the blocks are at an early stage of
exploration or appraisal (NEC-25). KG D-6 gas block’s production problems are well
known now and its volumes can surprise negatively versus our estimates if RIL and its
proposed partner, BP, are unable to fix technical problems in the block. Exhibit 10 gives
our estimated production of gas from RIL’s various blocks through FY2020E.
Exhibit 10: We assume gas production over 200 mcm/d by FY2020E from RIL’s blocks but risks exist
Gas production from RIL’s blocks, March fiscal year-ends, 2010-20E (mcm/d)
200
160
120
80
40
-
2010
2011E
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Source: Company, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates
` Oil and Natural Gas Corp. (BUY, CMP: `308, TP: `360). ONGC’s likely flat crude oil
production volumes over the next few years may not improve India’s energy situation. Its
mature fields and largely steady reserves over the past few years may preclude a ramp-up
in production from current levels. Exhibit 11 shows that ONGC’s proved reserves (broken
down by oil, gas, domestic and overseas assets) have remained largely constant over the
past few years.
Exhibit 11: Proved reserves for ONGC have remained stable over the past few years
Proved oil and gas reserves of ONGC (including share of PSCs), March fiscal year-ends, 2003-10
However, ONGC should benefit from fuel price deregulation as and when the
government deregulates the pricing of auto and cooking fuels and/or restricts subsidies to
needy households. Exhibit 12 shows the gap between global crude oil prices and ONGC’s
net realized price (after payment of subsides to downstream oil companies as part of a
government-devised subsidy-sharing formula) and our volume assumptions.
Exhibit 12: Sharp increase in ONGC’s net crude price realization over the next few years
Key assumptions for ONGC, March fiscal year-ends, 2006-2014E
` Oil India Ltd (BUY, CMP: `1,397, TP: `1,550). OIL is in a similar position to ONGC but is
theoretically in a better position to ramp up production from its oil and gas fields given its
large 2P and 3P reserves compared to 1P reserves (see Exhibit 13). However, the location
of OIL’s oil and gas fields in the north-eastern part of the country with inadequate
refining, gas-consuming industries and evacuation infrastructure may limit its production
in the short term. As with ONGC, OIL should benefit from a deregulation of the oil sector
as its net realization for crude oil is significantly below global levels (see Exhibit 14 that
also gives our volume assumptions for OIL).
Exhibit 13: 2P reserves are 84% higher than proved reserves for Oil India
Reserves of Oil India, March fiscal year-ends, 2007-10 (mn boe)
Exhibit 14: Sharp increase in OIL’s net crude price realizations over the next few years
Key assumptions for Oil India, March fiscal year-ends, 2006-2014E
` Cairn India (REDUCE, CMP: `349, TP: `335). Cairn’s large in-place reserves and
resource base of 6.5 bn boe in its key Rajasthan block (RJ-ON-90/1) can theoretically allow
it to ramp up production from the current production level of 125,000 bpd. We model
peak production at 230,000 bpd from FY2013E although this figure can be higher if
Cairn can bring additional resources into play. Cairn has production infrastructure for
240,000 bpd. Exhibit 15 gives the company’s estimates of resources, proved and probable
reserves.
Exhibit 15: Cairn India’s estimate of its reserves and resources in the key Rajasthan block
Estimate of hydrocarbon reserves and resources of Cairn India in RJ-ON-90/1 block (mn boe)
` NHPC (BUY, CMP: `26, TP: `28). NHPC is currently executing 4.5 GW of hydropower
capacity. These projects are due over the next four years but they have seen delays due to
various reasons. NHPC has 5.2 GW of power capacity currently. Exhibit 16 gives our
assumptions for NHPC’s installed capacity and gross generation through FY2017E.
40
9
30
6
20
3
10
0 0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011E
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
Source: NHPC, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates
` Mundra Ports and SEZ (BUY, CMP: `144, TP: `160). MPSEZ will likely play a key role in
importing energy into India, both coal and oil. Based on the company’s current plans, we
expect coal import volumes to ramp up to 43 mtpa by FY2015E and crude oil imports to
27 mtpa by FY2015E. Exhibit 17 gives details of import volumes of key fuel items over the
next few years. More important, we believe MPSEZ is ideally placed to expand its capacity
and cater to India’s rising energy deficit given its superb location and deep-water port.
` Petronet LNG (SELL, CMP: `132, TP: `105). Petronet LNG should theoretically benefit
from enhanced LNG imports. However, PLNG’s inability to sign long-term contracts for
the bulk of incremental volumes and structural rigidities in the downstream fertilizer and
power sector will preclude the use of spot LNG (or high-priced LNG) from the crucial
fertilizer and power segments. More on this later in this report. Exhibit 18 gives our major
assumptions behind our earnings model for PLNG.
We give the financial summaries of the abovementioned companies in the Appendix (see
Exhibits 84-91).
Exhibit 19: Rising demand for transportation fuels to drive overall oil demand
Demand of major oil products in India, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-17E (mn tons)
2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
LPG 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Gasoline 10 11 13 14 15 17 18 20 22 24
Naphtha 14 14 12 13 14 14 14 14 14 14
Jet fuel 5 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 9
Kerosene 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8
Diesel 48 52 56 61 65 69 74 78 83 88
Light diesel oil 1 1 0 — — — — — — —
Fuel oil 8 9 9 8 8 7 7 6 6 6
Low Sulfur heavy stock 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Bitumen 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 7
Total demand 114 120 124 130 138 145 152 159 168 176
Growth rate (%) 8.2 5.0 3.8 4.8 5.7 5.2 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.3
` Gasoline. Gasoline demand has accelerated over the past few years led by increasing
sales of four-wheelers and two-wheelers in India and we expect the trend to continue
over the next few years (see Exhibit 20). The penetration of four-wheelers is still quite low
in India compared to developed and emerging economies. Exhibit 21 compares
penetration of four-wheelers (latest data available) in major economies. Exhibit 22 shows
the explosion in the number of vehicles in China over the past 10 years. India seems to be
about nine years behind China in the four-wheeler cycle.
Exhibit 20: Strong growth in sales of passenger cars and two-wheelers in India
Sales of passenger cars and two-wheelers in India, March fiscal year-ends, 2003-17E (mn units)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
Exhibit 21: Penetration of four-wheelers is quite low in India Exhibit 22: Strong growth in sales of passenger cars in China
compared to developed and emerging economies over the past decade
Passenger car penetration in major economies (Units per 1,000 Sales of passenger cars in China, calendar year-ends, 2000-10 (mn
people) units)
Japan
China
India
US
Russia
S.Korea
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Notes:
(a) Data for India and China corresponds to CY2010.
Source: Kotak Institutional Equities
Source: ACEA, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates
We expect gasoline demand to likely grow ahead of real GDP growth as we expect
disposable income (even adjusted for inflation) to grow faster led by rising salaries in
manufacturing and services sector and wealth creation. We note that gasoline
consumption is a function of the total number of four-wheelers and two-wheelers in the
economy and distance traveled by vehicles. The poor quality of public transportation will
likely continue to drive the trend of private ownership of vehicles.
` Diesel. We expect diesel demand to grow slightly below real GDP growth over the next
few years. Exhibit 23 compares diesel growth with real GDP growth and manufacturing
GDP growth over the past 10 years. We note that diesel is the primary transportation fuel
in the country but it finds large use (~18% of total anecdotally) in the agriculture sector
also for irrigation purposes. We expect demand for diesel in the agriculture sector to
grow at a lower pace than demand for transportation.
Exhibit 23: Diesel consumption growth versus GDP growth over the past few years
Growth in diesel consumption versus real GDP growth and manufacturing GDP growth, March fiscal year-
ends, 2000-11E (%)
10
(5)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011E
Also, diesel demand will depend on the relative competitiveness of road transportation
versus railway transportation. We note that data is not available regarding haulage of
goods (weight and distance) by various modes (rail, road, sea, inland waterways) in India.
However, we would assume that the railways have lost market share to road given only
moderate growth in railways freight volumes over the past few years. Exhibit 24 shows
freight data of Indian Railways broken down by key products over the past few years.
Exhibit 24: Railway freight has increased at a CAGR of 5% over the past four years
Product-wise freight data of Indian Railways, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-11 (mn tons)
` Cooking fuels. We expect demand for cooking fuels to grow slowly given the high
penetration of LPG among urban and semi-urban households. Exhibit 25 shows that the
number of LPG households has increased steadily over the past few years. We see
substitution of kerosene by LPG as the primary cooking fuel in the balance households
over a period of time as income levels increase. Finally, we expect kerosene consumption
to drop off sharply whenever the government (1) deregulates kerosene pricing and/or
(2) restricts subsidy on kerosene to poor households. Various government studies estimate
that around 40% of kerosene is used for transportation after being diverted from the
public distribution system (PDS) and mixed with diesel. However, this will not impact
overall oil demand as diesel demand will decline proportionately.
Exhibit 25: Number of LPG households has increased at a CAGR of 9% over the past decade
LPG households, March fiscal year-ends, 2000-10 (# mn)
100 28
27
25
80 24
22
21 29
19 27
60 17 24 25
15 23
14 22
20
11 16 18
40 14
12 53 57
44 48 50
20 35 38 41
30 32
24
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
High crude prices and consequent high FO prices make even spot LNG attractive
compared to FO prices. However, FO is cheaper on a historical basis (we use a five-year
average price of crude oil of US$78/bbl and FO price of US$69/bbl for the purpose of
normalization) and thus, spot LNG prices would have to be fairly low to be competitive
with FO. Exhibit 26 compares the price of gas with that of FO in energy-equivalent terms.
Exhibit 26: Spot LNG is expensive compared to FO in energy-equivalent terms up to US$85/bbl crude
oil price
Energy-equivalent price of FO versus spot LNG (US$/mn kcal)
Notes:
(a) Price of FO is the average price for FY2007-11. Average crude oil price during this period was US$78/bbl.
We expect incremental demand for naphtha to be lumpy and increase in line with new
petrochemical capacity (naphtha-based steam crackers or PX plants). We see limited
scope of displacement of naphtha by natural gas in the fertilizer and power sectors. We
note that consumption of naphtha has already come off significantly over the past two
years with natural gas already displacing naphtha in most applications other than
petrochemicals. We note that naphtha will continue to be used by naphtha-based steam
crackers for production of olefins or by reformers for production of aromatics. Exhibit 27
gives the breakdown of naphtha by sectors for FY2008-10 and FY2011E (April 2010-
February 2011 data annualized).
Exhibit 27: Naphtha and fuel oil/LSHS consumption has been negatively impacted by gas; limited scope for further displacement of
naphtha by gas
Sector-wise consumption of various petroleum products, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-11E
Supply—stable at best
Exhibit 28 gives our estimates of domestic production of crude oil broken down by crucial
fields, basins and geographical regions. We expect domestic production of oil to remain
stagnant after FY2013E once Cairn’s Rajasthan block reaches peak production rate of
230,000 bpd. We see limited scope for potential surprises given that most of India’s oil
production comes from mature fields and new discoveries have been rare; the only notable
exception is Cairn’s large discoveries in pre-NELP RJ-ON-90/1 block. We discuss drivers of oil
production in India over the next few years.
Exhibit 28: Crude oil production from domestic fields to remain stable after FY2013E
Crude oil production in India, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-17E (mn tons)
2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Crude supply
ONGC 25.9 25.4 24.9 24.5 24.7 25.0 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5
Mumbai High fields 18.0 17.8 17.3 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1
Other fields 7.9 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4
Oil India 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.2
Cairn India 2.6 2.4 2.5 6.9 10.3 12.7 12.8 12.5 12.0 11.3
Rajasthan block — — 0.4 5.1 8.6 11.3 11.5 11.5 11.1 10.5
Other fields 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.8
Reliance Industries (KG-DWN-98/3) — 0.1 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Private/JVC 2.5 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
Total 34.0 33.4 33.6 38.5 42.1 45.0 45.6 45.4 45.0 44.4
Source: Ministry of petroleum and natural gas, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates
Exhibit 29: Gross oil in place is about 4 bn barrels and 2P reserves is 1.1 bn barrels
Original oil in place and reserves of RJ-ON-90/1 block (bn bbls)
Orginal oil 2P
in place reserves
MBA 0.69
2.05
MBA EOR 0.31
Rajasthan other fields 1.98 0.15
Total RJ-ON-90/1 4.03 1.15
Cost
(Rs bn) Status Completion date Wells drilled
Completed projects
Mumbai High North Redevelopment Phase-I 32.4 Completed December-2006 73
Mumbai High South Redevelopment Phase-I 65.8 Completed May-2007 140
Projects under progress
Mumbai High North Redevelopment Phase-II 71.3 38.03% completed September-2012 19
Mumbai High South Redevelopment Phase-II 88.1 87.66% completed March-2013 63
Exhibit 31: Crude oil production from Mumbai High fields remain largely stable
Crude oil production from Mumbai High fields, March fiscal year-ends, 1984-2010 (mn tons)
(mn tons)
Mumbai High crude oil production
25
20
15
10
0
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
` Limited scope of positive surprise from other fields/blocks given low number of oil
discoveries in NELP or nominated blocks. We note that only three of the 241 blocks
awarded since 1998 under the eight rounds of NELP have started production. The key KG
D-6 block has seen disappointing output of late with both oil and gas production falling
well below expected levels. More important, operators seem to have gone very slow over
the past few years after the initial enthusiasm of exploration and discoveries. Exhibit 32
gives the number of discoveries by years since 2002 (when RIL made its first discovery in
KG D-6 block); the pace of discoveries has remained stable in the past five years despite a
steep increase in the number of blocks awarded under NELP. We note that out of the 81
discoveries in NELP blocks, only 15 are oil discoveries and 9 are oil/gas discoveries.
NELP I NELP II NELP III NELP IV NELP V NELP VI NELP VII NELP VIII NELP IX
1999 2000 2002 2003 2005 2006 2008 2009 2011 Total
Blocks offered 48 25 27 24 20 55 57 70 34 360
Blocks awarded 25 23 23 21 20 52 44 33 — 241
PSCs signed 24 23 23 20 20 52 41 32 — 235
Blocks under operation 9 4 23 19 20 52 41 32 — 200
Wells drilled 82 64 56 39 43 2 — — — 286
Discoveries 39 6 16 10 10 — — — — 81
Oil discoveries 2 1 2 4 6 — — — — 15
Gas discoveries 35 4 10 5 3 — — — — 57
Oil/gas discoveries 2 1 4 1 1 — — — — 9
Blocks with discoveries 5 4 6 5 3 — — — — 23
Blocks under production 1 2 — — — — — — — 3
Year-wise discoveries 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
NELP discoveries 3 6 2 13 11 9 16 10 11 81
Total discoveries 10 14 14 15 26 25 67 39 28 238
Even in the case of nominated blocks of ONGC and OIL, new discoveries have been fairly
rare. In our view, most of the upward revision in reserves over the past few years may
have been due to higher prices rather than contribution from new discoveries. Exhibit 33
shows the increase in 1P, 2P and 3P reserves of ONGC and OIL over the past few years.
The only exciting discovery seems to be Block-IG of ONGC, which may produce 150,000
b/d of oil by FY2017E.
Exhibit 33: Reserves of ONGC and OIL have remained flat over the past few years
Reserves of ONGC and OIL, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-11 (mn boe)
ONGC OIL
2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010
1P reserves
ONGC 5,256 5,380 5,355 Oil 296 285 282
5,577
PSC JV 285 292 272 Gas 233 247 239
OVL 1,387 1,358 1,256
Total 1P reserves 6,928 7,030 6,883 529 532 521
2P reserves
ONGC 6,789 7,074 7,023 Oil 588 575 580
PSC JV 321 321 304 Gas 345 399 377
OVL 2,708 2,606 2,885
Total 2P reserves 9,819 10,001 10,212 933 974 957
3P reserves
ONGC 8,151 8,315 8,578 8,515 Oil 1,039 999 915
PSC JV 954 336 336 320 Gas 472 543 522
OVL 2,047 2,971 2,905 3,188
Total 3P reserves 11,152 11,622 11,819 12,023 1,511 1,542 1,437
` Overseas oil assets of Indian companies. We discuss the supply of oil from overseas
assets of Indian companies in this section although equity oil does not really enhance
supply. India does not import significant quantities of oil produced by its companies
overseas and oil is anyway fungible to some extent. Nonetheless, equity oil does provide
some degree of energy security. It also increases the profits of Indian companies at high
levels of crude oil prices and provides some buffer to the country through higher profits
for the companies and dividends for the Indian government. Exhibit 34 shows that the
production of oil from overseas assets of Indian E&P companies will increase moderately
over the next few years. Exhibit 35 gives details of overseas assets of Indian companies.
Exhibit 34: Crude oil production from overseas assets to increase to 9 mn tons by FY2014E
Crude oil production from overseas assets of Indian companies, March fiscal year-ends, 2010-14E ('000 tons)
We discuss likely demand from key sectors and the factors in respective sectors that would
influence demand.
Exhibit 36: Current supply-constrained demand set to increase sharply if supply is available at right
prices
Segment-wise demand for natural gas, current versus potential (mcm/d)
250 214
200 164
150 127 118
89
100 63 63
48
35 40 3743
50 25 19 16171921 19 19 20 22 27
4 1014
0
Power Fertilizer Industrial Captive use Domestic Others Total
Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates
` Power. We estimate demand from the power sector at 127 mcm/d in FY2015E versus the
current 79 mcm/d. Our estimated demand is a collation of theoretical demand from all
gas-based power projects, operational, under-construction and planned. Exhibit 37 gives
the breakdown of demand among operating power plants and planned new capacity.
Notes:
(a) Gross demand estimated at 85% PLF assuming calorific value of gas at 9,000 kcal/m3 and a station heat rate of 1,850 kcal/kwh.
However, we would reiterate that the bulk of the incremental demand is largely on paper
since a large portion of the theoretical demand pertains to power projects that are yet to
sign gas supply and purchase agreements (GSPA) pending their inability to source gas at
reasonable prices. A more realistic assessment of demand would put it at 99 mcm/d in
FY2015E based on bottom-up consumption by power plants that are already operational
and a few more that may receive gas.
Price of gas relative to other fuels. In our view, the price of gas would largely
determine demand for gas from the power sector. We rule out power plants based on
imported spot LNG since the price of power (including a certain return on investment)
would exceed `5/kWh at current spot LNG rates. Potential power project developers
would be better off using imported coal (despite its high price currently versus
historical levels) versus using spot LNG to generate power. Exhibit 38 compares the
price of power (including capital charge of 15.5% pre-tax ROCE) based on various
fuels.
Exhibit 38: Power generated from spot LNG to cost significantly higher versus power generated from imported coal
Comparative cost of power generation using various fuels
Naphtha (a) Gas (b) Coal (e) Gas (c) Coal (f) Coal (g) Gas (d)
Unit Kg m3 Kg m3 Kg Kg m3
Fuel price (Rs/unit) 32.1 6.0 1.0 13.6 1.8 5.5 23.0
Calorific value (Kcal/unit) 10,500 9,000 3,500 9,000 3,500 6,500 9,000
Thermal efficiency (%) 54 54 37 54 37 37 54
Thermal requirement (kcal/kWh) 1,593 1,593 2,324 1,593 2,324 2,324 1,593
Cost of generation (Rs/kWh) 4.88 1.05 0.63 2.41 1.20 1.97 4.07
Other operating costs (Rs/kWh) 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.16
Plant load factor (%) 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
Fixed capital investment (Rs mn/MW) 30 30 45 30 45 45 30
Depreciation charge (%) 5.5 5.5 4.8 5.5 4.8 4.8 5.5
Depreciation charge (Rs/kWh) 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.22
Total cost (Rs/kWh) 5.26 1.44 1.12 2.79 1.69 2.46 4.45
Pre-tax capital charge (%) 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5
Fixed capital charge (Rs/kWh) 0.62 0.62 0.94 0.62 0.94 0.94 0.62
Price for end-consumer (Rs/kWh) 5.88 2.06 2.06 3.42 2.62 3.40 5.07
Notes:
(a) Naphtha price for CY2010.
(b) Gas price at US$3.5/mn BTU (delivered).
(c) Gas price at US$8/mn BTU (delivered).
(d) Gas price at US$13.5/mn BTU (delivered).
(e) Domestic coal at pithead.
(f) Domestic coal 1,000 kms from pithead.
(g) Imported coal price at US$100/ton (FOB).
Also, we believe that it is extremely unlikely that (1) power companies will set up
power plants on LNG given both availability and price issues, or (2) lenders will provide
debt to power projects that do not have firm fuel supply agreements. We doubt that
even ‘pooling’ of gas prices (see discussion below) will address the concerns of power
companies and lenders about availability of LNG or price of LNG in the long term;
pooling will only reduce the price of gas to more acceptable levels and there is no
guarantee that pooling will last in perpetuity.
Pooling of gas. India may implement pooling of gas from various sources (indigenous
and imported) in order to reduce the final price to customers. This may reduce the
price of imported LNG for a customer using spot LNG but will increase the price of gas
for others. Pooling may theoretically improve the economics of power producers based
on spot LNG; however, it is unlikely to address the basic issue of guaranteed supply of
gas and help a project achieve financial closure. As discussed above, lenders are
unlikely to lend funds to power projects without a firm fuel supply agreement.
Financial condition of state electricity boards (SEBs). We note that the poor financial
condition of SEBS will likely preclude them from purchasing high-priced power.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the SEBs are reluctant to procure merchant power at
high rates (around `4/kWh) and have resorted to blackouts in view of their precarious
financial condition. Exhibit 39 shows the yearly losses of the SEBs since FY2000.
Exhibit 39: Reported losses of SEBs have increased in the recent years
Finances of SEBs/Unbundled entities (Rs bn)
400
321
300 248 267
236
214 215 206
178 184
200 151 165
130 134 129
113 114 105
75 83
100
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
We suspect India’s reliance on imported urea may increase going forward; this need not
be a bad strategy as anyway the government has to subsidize urea at present. We do not
think security of supplies is a very big issue as there are enough suppliers of urea globally
and India has reasonable amount of domestic production. Exhibit 41 shows supply-
demand balance of urea over the past few years and next few years.
Production
Year Demand Domestic OMIFCO Total Gap
2005 22.8 20.2 20.2 (2.6)
2006 23.5 20.1 1.3 21.4 (2.1)
2007 24.2 20.3 1.8 22.1 (2.1)
2008 26.2 19.8 1.9 21.7 (4.4)
2009 27.0 19.9 1.9 21.8 (5.1)
2010 27.0 21.1 2.3 23.5 (3.5)
2011E 27.5 22.0 2.3 24.3 (3.2)
2012E 28.0 22.5 2.3 24.8 (3.2)
Price of gas. We believe the price of gas would be critical for demand from the
fertilizer sector, especially for new units. Exhibit 42 shows that the price of natural gas
cannot exceed US$6/mn BTU if domestic urea has to compete with imported urea. We
note that urea prices have increased sharply over the past few months (see Exhibit 43)
and we use current high price in our hypothetical exercise. Even at the current high
prices of urea compared to historical levels, we note that the price of gas will need to
be below US$7/mn BTU for viable domestic production. We highlight that the cost of
urea based on current spot LNG prices would be prohibitively expensive.
Exhibit 42: It may be cheaper to import urea than produce it on imported LNG
Comparison of domestic urea cost with imported urea (US$/ton)
600
400
200
0
Jan-05
Jul-05
Jan-06
Jul-06
Jan-07
Jul-07
Jan-08
Jul-08
Jan-09
Jul-09
Jan-10
Jul-10
Jan-11
Regulations in the fertilizer sector. We note that regulations in the fertilizer sector
will determine (1) relative consumption of various fertilizers (N, P and K) and (2) the
ability of companies to raise prices for their end-consumers. The government is keen to
control the amount of subsidies on fertilizers and is studying various options to reduce
the subsidy burden over a period of time. It has recently decided to overhaul the
distribution system to monitor subsidies more closely.
Exhibit 44: We see delays in several domestic projects, which may delay domestic gas supply
Supply of natural gas in India, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-17E (mcm/d)
2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Mumbai High 45 46 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Gujarat 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
North-East 9 9 9 9 10 11 12 12 12 12
Rajasthan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TN/AP 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Eastern offshore
KG-D6 (RIL-Niko) — — 39 56 52 65 80 80 80 80
KG-D3 (RIL-Hardy) — — — — — — — — — 10
KG-D9 (RIL-Hardy) — — — — — — — — — 10
NEC-25 (RIL-Niko) — — — — — — — — 6 12
Deen Dayal (GSPC) — — — — — — 3 5 6 6
ONGC — — — — 2 3 5 5 5 5
PY-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ravva 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western offshore
Lakshmi 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 — — —
Panna-Mukta 6 5 5 4 6 5 5 5 4 4
Tapti 9 12 8 7 7 7 6 6 6 5
LNG and CBM
Petronet LNG - Dahej 24 24 30 33 38 38 38 46 44 44
Petronet LNG - Kochi — — — — — 3 12 15 18 18
RGPPL - Dabhol — — — — 1 2 6 8 15 18
Shell Total LNG - Hazira 8 6 3 4 8 11 14 14 14 14
CBM gas — — — — 1 2 3 5 5 5
Total gas supply 120 119 160 178 188 212 247 263 278 306
We are not sure about the solution to RIL’s production problems. We assume additional
wells can increase production and the DGH has recommended drilling additional wells as
a way to increase production. RIL is currently producing gas from 18 wells at its D1 and
D3 fields (other than 8-9 mcm/d of associated gas from MA-1 field), it has drilled two
wells that are yet to be connected to evacuation infrastructure and is due to drill another
two wells as part of the first phase of the approved Field Development Plan (FDP).
However, drilling of additional rigs and installing subsea infrastructure may take about
18-24 months. Also, we doubt RIL is going to drill additional wells without conducting
further studies on reservoir behavior; it may wait to complete its farming-out deal with BP
in 23 E&P blocks (including KG D-6 block) to benefit from BP’s global expertise in deep-
water development and production.
` Limited progress in other major blocks. We see limited progress in E&P activity in
blocks awarded under various rounds of NELP. Both RIL and ONGC have made discoveries
in several blocks. However, most of the blocks are in the early stages of exploration and
we do not think any of these blocks will start production of gas before FY2016E. Exhibit
46 gives the exploration status of various blocks where companies have made discoveries
or are considered prospective by the operators. Also, we note that purported problems in
RIL’s KG D-6 block raise issues about similar challenges in other deep-water blocks.
Exhibit 46: The progress on some of the key blocks has been tardy
Status of work on key E&P assets in India
Stipulated exploration
Date of Duration schedule Status of exploration Date of first
Block Operator contract Phase (years) 2D (GLK/LK) 3D (sq. km) Wells 2D (GLK/LK) 3D (sq. km) Wells discovery Comments
12-Apr-00 I 4 1,000 1,500 3 2,781 1,500 6 FY2006 DoC submitted for Southern Discovery
KG-DWN-98/2 ONGC II 3 2 258 4,676 9 Area in December 2009 and Northern
III 1 1 3,217 Discovery Area in July 2010
12-Apr-00 I 3 1,000 500 1 June-04
Ministry has denied extension for
NEC-OSN-97/2 RIL II 2 2 6,000 3,200 8
appraisal program
III 2 4
16-Aug-01 I 2 1,000 1,000 December-06
MN-OSN-2000/2 ONGC II 3 2 979 2 DoC submitted in December 2009
III 2 2 1,150 2
4-Feb-03 I 4 2,100 1,650 4 2
Two-well drilling program from July
KG-DWN-2001/1 RIL II 2 4 2,087 4,188
2011
III 2 4
4-Feb-03 I 2.5 1,250 14 1,636 June-05
KG-OSN-2001/3 GSPC II 2.5 4 16 Under development phase
III 1.5 2
23-Sep-05 I 4 2,100 6 1,150 4 February-08
Planning to undertake two-well
KG-DWN-2003/1 RIL II 3 4
exploratory program
III 1 4
23-Sep-05 I 4 2,100 1,800 3
Five-well drilling program postponed
MN-DWN-2003/1 RIL II 3 3 2,365 3,600
to August 2011
III 1 6
` Inability to source spot LNG at reasonable prices from global markets. We note that
46 mcm/d of our incremental growth in supply of 85 mcm/d in FY2011-15E is in the form
of LNG imports. Almost all of the incremental supply will be in the form of spot LNG as
India has not entered into long-term LNG contracts with LNG suppliers.
India has currently signed long-term contracts for 7.5 mtpa of LNG for PLNG’s Dahej
terminal and another 1.5 mtpa of LNG for PLNG’s Kochi terminal even though it will have
24 mtpa of LNG terminal capacity by end-CY2012E (see Exhibit 47). We note that India
will have to import the balance 15 mtpa of LNG imports as spot LNG. It is currently
importing 7.5 mtpa of contract LNG from RasGas, Qatar. Also, we note that contract LNG
supply for PLNG’s Kochi terminal is unlikely to commence before CY2014/15E (depending
on the completion of the upstream Gorgon LNG project) although the LNG import
terminal will likely start operations by end-CY2012E.
We see several challenges to importing large volumes of spot LNG over the next 3-4 years.
Availability of spot LNG. We are not sure if importing 10-11 mtpa of spot LNG is
feasible given global supply-demand balance of LNG. Most LNG liquefaction projects
are set up after the entire capacity has been tied up with off-takers. Typically, this
leaves very low volumes for spot LNG. Exhibit 48 gives details of LNG liquefaction
terminals that have commenced operations over the past few years, terminals that are
due over the next few years and their off-take arrangements. As can be seen, the
scope for spot LNG cargoes is fairly limited; the cargoes available currently reflect
diversion of contracted volumes away from the US market, which has seen a rapid
increase in domestic gas production driven by higher shale gas volumes.
We see the recent accident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear plant (9.1 GW generation
capacity) as potentially reducing the availability of spot LNG cargoes in global markets.
In our view, Japan will likely import additional LNG to make up for lost power
generation capacity following the accident. It has sufficient LNG import capacity (see
Exhibit 49) and gas-based power generation capacity (see Exhibit 50).
Exhibit 49: LNG imports capacity utilization of ~41% in 2010 Exhibit 50: Capacity utilization of gas-based power plants was
Capacity utilization of LNG terminals in Japan, 2008-10 (%) ~67% in 2009
LNG for power generation and capacity utilization of gas-based
(%) 2008 2009 2010 power plants in Japan, 2000-09
55
LNG for power generation [LHS]
50 Capacity utilization of gas-based power plants [RHS]
(mn tons) (%)
50 100
45
40 80
40
30 60
35
20 40
30
10 20
25
Jul
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
May
Nov
Dec
Mar
Apr
Oct
0 0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan), Kotak
Institutional Equities
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan), TEPCO,
Kotak Institutional Equities
Pricing of spot LNG. We see the pricing of spot LNG as another significant challenge
for imports of large quantities of spot LNG. Additional demand from Japan following
the nuclear power plant accident may push up prices of spot LNG. As discussed
previously, high prices of spot LNG effectively rule it out of the two biggest consuming
industries, power and fertilizer.
` Trans-national pipelines may not be realistic. The Indian government has periodically
examined the options of importing gas from neighboring gas-rich countries such as
Bangladesh, Iran, Myanmar and Turkmenistan. Most of these proposals have come to
naught due to geopolitical issues and strategic mistakes; the most notable one is gas from
Block A-1 in offshore Myanmar being exported to China despite two Indian companies
owning 30% stake in the block. The government had vacillated about building a gas
pipeline to India, which led to China securing the gas for itself through a Myanmar-China
pipeline.
The Indian government is currently pursuing a proposal to import natural gas from
Turkmenistan through a trans-national pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India,
TAPI) passing through Afghanistan and Pakistan. We are skeptical of this pipeline being
executed given that it will likely face the same geopolitical issues that led to the Iran-
Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline being finally aborted. Even before economic sanctions against
Iran by several developed countries ruled out gas imports from Iran, India and Pakistan
could not agree on the critical issues of (1) security of pipeline and guarantee of gas
supply by Pakistan up to India’s border and (2) transit fees to be paid by India to Pakistan.
Exhibit 51 highlights our overall assessment of demand for and supply of coal. We estimate
demand for coal based with a top-down approach factoring the requirement of electricity in
India based on GDP growth. However, theoretical demand based on aggregation of coal-
based capacities currently under construction, development or planning could be potentially
higher.
Exhibit 51: Coal imports set to rise sharply with incremental domestic supply lagging incremental
demand
Details of demand and supply for coal, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-17E (mn tons)
2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Demand
Power 364 374 386 390 470 507 551 603 663 728
Others 144 174 195 217 241 269 296 326 359 396
Total demand 507 549 581 607 711 775 847 929 1,022 1,124
Supply
CIL 375 401 415 426 453 475 497 516 534 548
SCCL 42 45 49 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Others 37 45 49 54 65 84 110 143 171 206
Domestic production 454 490 513 527 564 607 654 705 753 801
Surplus/(deficit) (53) (59) (68) (80) (146) (169) (193) (224) (270) (323)
Notes:
(a) We model demand and supply of coal on the basis of calorific value of domestic coal.
Demand to reflect strong GDP growth; demand from power sector key
Key drivers of demand for coal
Exhibit 52 gives our key assumptions for estimating demand for coal from the power
sector. We simply assume a link with real GDP growth for estimating demand for power
over the next few years. However, we note that pricing also plays a large role in a price-
sensitive market such as India. Demand can theoretically be higher if the price of power is
cheap enough. However, we rule out this utopian scenario as (1) most of incremental
power generation will be based on expensive imported coal and (2) domestic coal prices
will also rise in the future as they are increasingly realigned to global levels.
30 KOTAK INSTITUTIONAL EQUITIES RESEARCH
Energy India
India will require 118 GW of coal-based power generation by FY2017E based on our
demand scenario. We collate coal-based capacity addition of 75 GW over the next few
years (up to FY2015E), which would require incremental coal of 350 mtpa. We note that
75 GW of coal-based capacities are currently under construction, of which 40 GW is
dependent on linkages from Coal India, 23 GW is based on allocated captive mines and
the balance 11 GW on imported coal. In addition, another 70 GW of capacity is under
development; these projects are yet to start construction although they have tied up
necessary inputs. Exhibit 53 details coal-based power projects in various stages of
construction, development and planning. We are not sure about the eventual execution
of these projects as both demand for power and supply of coal may act as constraints.
Notes:
(1) Projects that are yet to commence construction but have tied necessary inputs have been classified
as under development.
(2) Projects that are yet to tie up necessary inputs have been classified as under planning.
` Cement—adjusting to parity prices of coal. We estimate demand for coal from the
cement sector to increase to 32 mn tons in FY2017E against 19 mn tons in FY2011E
(excluding demand from CPP). The cement sector consumed 27 mn tons of coal in
FY2011E (including 8.3 mn tons of CPP consumption) fueling 78% of its overall energy
requirements (see Exhibit 54). Of the 27 mn tons consumed, 12 mn tons was procured
from CIL under linkages, 5.3 mn tons was purchased under the e-auction format while
the balance 10 mn tons was imported. Cement companies consume ~0.2 mn tons of
thermal coal per ton of cement production—both directly in the kiln as well as indirectly
through the captive power plant.
Exhibit 54: Dependence on imported fuels will likely increase dramatically for the cement sector
Source-wise supply of coal to cement sector, March fiscal year-ends, 2009-17E (mn tons)
2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Coal
Linkage/FSA 14 11 12 11 12 14 15 16 18
E-auction 6 4 5 6 6 7 7 8 9
Import 7 7 10 12 13 15 16 18 19
Less: Consumption for CPP 8 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Total coal for process 20 15 19 20 22 24 27 29 32
Lignite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Petroleum coke 2 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 7
Total fuel for process 23 19 23 25 28 30 33 36 39
Fuel mix (%)
Linkage/FSA 63 56 50 45 45 45 45 45 45
E-auction 27 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Import 31 36 44 49 49 49 49 49 49
Less: Consumption for CPP 34 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Total coal for process 88 79 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
Lignite 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Petroleum coke 11 20 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Total fuel for process 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
We note that companies have to increasingly depend on imports as domestic supply has
not been enough to meet their demand. In fact, companies have received increasingly
lesser quantity of coal compared to their linkages as can be seen in Exhibit 55. Cement
companies have varying exposures to imported coal, depending on the location of their
plants and pricing and availability of coal. Ambuja Cements, India Cement and Ultratech
have a higher exposure to imported coal due to the coastal location of their plants that
facilitate imports. India Cements, with ~80% of its coal being imported, will be more
impacted by the rising prices of imported coal while the impact will be muted for ACC
due to its relatively lower dependence on imported coal. We also note that Shree
Cements, with almost 100% dependence on petroleum coke, will be severely impacted
as petroleum coke (used for both cement and power capacities) prices tend to follow the
pricing trends of global coal market.
Exhibit 55: Receipt of coal against linkages has been declining steadily for the cement sector
Coal receipts against linkages, March fiscal year-ends, 2006-10 (mn tons)
90
20
80
15 70
60
10
50
5 40
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Notes:
(a) Coal receipts and linkage quantity for 2010 does not include ACC and Ambuja Cement.
` Coal India—regulatory and infrastructure hurdles have affected ramp-up. CIL, with
48% of proven coal reserves in the country, will continue to bear the responsibility for
meeting a large portion of the incremental demand. We expect its production to increase
to 548 mn tons by FY2017E from 443 mn tons in FY2011E, implying a CAGR of 4.2%.
This may not seem very challenging but CIL may fall short of the targeted production of
648 mn tons in FY2017E owing to capacity constraints and delays in new mine
development. We estimate CIL’s FY2012E production at 458 mn tons and total coal
dispatches at 453 mn tons.
CIL is running a large ‘negative balance’ wherein the commitment for coal supplied far
exceeds CIL’s internal production target (see Exhibit 56). However, we note that
commitments under allocation of linkages unlike FSAs do not contractually oblige CIL to
supply coal. Amongst various subsidiaries of CIL, CIL’s two largest subsidiaries, SECL and
MCL, have the largest deficits (90-104% of their production targets), which will likely put
power projects that depend on coal from these subsidiaries at greater risk.
Exhibit 56: SECL and MCL have commitments far in excess of their production targets
Details of production targets and linkage commitments of subsidiaries of CIL, March fiscal year-end, 2013E
(mn tons)
250
200
150
100
50
0
ECL BCCL CCL NCL WCL SECL MCL NEC
As India improves its execution track record in the power sector during the current five-
year plan (tepid so far, see Exhibit 57), domestic supplies will need to significantly ramp
up to match higher capacity additions.
Exhibit 57: Actual capacity addition in the power sector has lagged the targeted addition by almost
50%
Actual capacity addition versus planned capacity addition (GW)
(GW)
80 Planned Achieved 79
60
40 41 40
40
31
19 21
20 17
0
1993-97 1997-02 2003-07 2008-12E
` Captive mines—limited progress so far. Captive coal mines currently contribute less
than 10% of the domestic coal production at 34 mn tons in FY2010. This is despite
allocation of 198 coal blocks allocated under the captive route, with reserves aggregating
50 bn tons. Only 20 of the 198 blocks are under production currently. In our view, the
production of coal from captive coal mines (extant production of 34 mn tons) will likely
fall short of the Ministry of Coal’s target of 96 mtpa by end-FY2012E. Exhibit 58
highlights the allocation of captive coal blocks to various end-user industries broken down
by ownership pattern.
Exhibit 58: 50 bn tons of coal resources have been allocated to various industry participants
Allocation of coal resources amongst various stakeholders (mn tons)
Central, 10,662
Private, 21,331
State, 19,280
In our view, development of captive coal blocks has been hindered by (1) difficulties in
acquisition of land and obtaining of environmental clearances, (2) absence of railway
connectivity to facilitate evacuation of coal, (3) land-locked nature of captive coal blocks,
which make them inaccessible, and (4) lack of coordination between central and state
governments to facilitate development of coal blocks. Exhibit 59 gives data on production
of coal broken down by captive blocks.
` Imports. Dependence on imported coal will likely increase from 80 mn tons in FY2011E
to over 300 mtpa by FY2017E as supplies from CIL and captive coal blocks will not be
sufficient to meet the demand of the power and other sectors. Low calorific value and
concentration of the domestic coal fields in the eastern region have made imported coal a
viable substitute for power plants located in coastal India. However, the current
configuration of power plants, which use high-ash domestic coal, limits the quantum of
blending with high-quality imported coal.
Indonesia has emerged as the natural choice for Indian companies due to its proximity to
India as compared to Australia, China and Russia. Indonesia exports 80% of its
production of 250 mtpa, making it one of the largest exporters of coal in the world. We
note that several Indian companies have bought overseas coal assets to secure supplies
for their power plants in India (see Exhibit 60).
Exhibit 60: Indian power companies have acquired overseas coal assets
Details of coal asset acquisitions by Indian power companies
Notes:
(a) Resource is based on JORC code of resource estimation.
Port capacity. We see challenges in handling higher imports of coals given the current
high capacity utilization at the major Indian ports. The major Indian ports handled
~560 mn tons of cargo in FY2010 and have been operating at near 100% capacity
utilization for the past few years (see Exhibit 61).
Exhibit 61: Inadequate import capacity may act as an impediment for importing coal
Capacity utilization at major and minor ports, March fiscal year-ends, 2005-09 (%)
(%)
Major ports Minor ports
120
97 93 96 95
100 90
78 82
80 72 74
64
60
40
20
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Private ports such as Mundra and Krishnapatnam will likely import the bulk of
incremental coal imports in the future. Several large power projects are being or have
been set up in close vicinity of these ports. For example, the Mundra port of Mundra
Ports and SEZ will likely import 21 mtpa of coal required for the capacity at Mundra
UMPP (12 mtpa for 4,000 MW) and for Adani Power (9 mtpa for 2,640 MW) by
FY2013E. Similarly, the Krishnapatnam port will import 12 mtpa of coal to meet the
requirement of Krishnapatnam UMPP of 4,000 MW.
Railway capacity. We also see challenges for dispatch of coal from ports to inland
locations or from coal mines to consumption centers across India. The Indian Railways
has been operating at over 100% capacity utilization in terms of freight capacity and
actual traffic for the past several years (see Exhibit 62). Indian Railways handled around
890 mn tons of cargo in FY2010, of which coal contributed 60% (500 mn tons).
Exhibit 63: Environmental hurdles will likely continue to be the biggest bane for development of coal mines
Illustration of stages involved in development of coal mines in India
z For unexplored coal z The stage involves z The stage involves z If the mine is to be z This could be a major
block, prepration of preparing a detailed taking up an developed over or hurdle as mining
geological report can mine plan including Environmental Impact below forest land, cannot start before
take 2-2.5 years the useful life of mine Assessment (EIA) forest clearnce is entire land acquisition
and plans for closure study followed by required which involves as per mining plan
public hearing in the determination of
affected areas damage and
identification of land
for forestation
We note that the development process gets further delayed due to local opposition for
land acquisition. Large infrastructure projects have faced delays and in some cases have
also been abandoned due to delayed environmental clearance or stiff local opposition for
the acquisition of large tracts of land.
Exhibit 64: CEPI has affected coalfields that contributed to 68% of CIL's FY2010 production
Production and reserves profile of CIL coalfields, FY2010 data (mn tons)
Reserves (mn tons)
Coalfield Subsidiary Location Capacity Production Proved Indicated Inferred Reserves Extractable
BCCL
Jharia BCCL Dhanbad,Bokaro/Jharkhand 32.7 27.5 5,983 1,009 51 7,043 1,145
Total BCCL 32.7 27.5 5,983 1,009 51 7,043 1,145
CCL
Ranchi,Hazaribagh,Chatra,Palamu
North Karanpura CCL and Latehar/Jharkhand 23.7 23.6 4,458 35 — 4,493 2,072
East Bokaro CCL Bokaro/Jharkhand 10.5 12.7 2,116 1,110 — 3,227 692
West Bokaro CCL Ramgarh, Hazaribagh/Jharkhand 6.6 5.2 1,516 236 10 1,762 462
South Karanpura CCL Ramgarh, Hazaribagh/Jharkhand 5.0 4.0 1,550 196 7 1,753 308
Ramgarh CCL Ramgarh/Jharkhand 1.4 1.1 386 19 — 405 138
Giridh CCL Giridih/Jharkhand 0.9 0.6 18 — — 18 15
Total CCL 48.0 47.1 10,044 1,596 17 11,658 3,687
ECL
Burdwan,Bankura,Purulia,Birbhu
m/West Bengal
Raniganj ECL Dhanbad/Jharkhand 21.0 17.0 7,556 1,242 379 9,177 662
Rajmahal/Deogarh ECL Deograh and Godda/Jharkhand 11.1 13.1 1,378 382 579 2,339 546
Total ECL 32.1 30.1 8,934 1,624 958 11,516 1,208
MCL
Talcher MCL Angul/Orissa 69.3 59.7 7,568 1,721 640 9,929 5,893
Jharsugudah and
IB Valley MCL Sundergarh/Orissa 45.3 44.3 3,242 161 — 3,403 2,119
Total MCL 114.6 104.1 10,810 1,882 640 13,332 8,012
NCL
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar
Singrauli NCL Pradesh 77.4 67.7 3,270 212 — 3,482 1,891
Total NCL 77.4 67.7 3,270 212 — 3,482 1,891
NEC
Makum NEC Tinsukia/Assam 1.1 1.1 362 — — 362 239
Total NEC 1.1 1.1 362 — — 362 239
SECL
Korba SECL Korba/Chattisgarh 75.2 78.5 3,896 1,605 51 5,552 2,670
Central India Coalfields SECL Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh 28.6 24.7 2,665 892 123 3,681 774
Mand Raigarh SECL Raigarh/Chattisgarh 5.2 4.8 1,957 114 — 2,070 659
Total SECL 109.1 108.0 8,518 2,611 174 11,303 4,103
WCL
Chandrapur and
Wardha Valley WCL Yeotmal/Maharashtra 29.2 29.3 2,249 614 58 2,921 795
Kamptee WCL Nagpur/Maharashtra 4.8 5.0 817 121 — 938 214
Umrer Nand Bander WCL Nagpur/Maharashtra 4.3 4.3 558 1 — 558 215
Pench-Kanhan WCL Chindwara/Madhya Pradesh 5.0 3.9 693 199 44 936 148
Pathakhera WCL Betul/Madhya Pradesh 3.6 3.3 190 28 — 218 87
Total WCL 46.9 45.7 4,507 963 102 5,571 1,459
Total CIL 462 431 52,428 9,897 1,942 64,267 21,744
Coal mafia and Naxalite activity. Domestic coal mining has traditionally depended
on local contractors and intermediaries for support services; these ancillary service
providers have in several instances known to be working with the local ‘coal mafia’
involved in pilfering coal. Coal is diverted or stolen from coal stocks, coal washeries,
coal transfer and loading points and also in the transport routes.
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that most of India’s coal resources are
concentrated in East India, and the mines are in uninhabited Naxal-affected regions.
Naxalite activity in coal mining areas creates problems as coal pilferage is one of the
largest sources of funding the civil disobedience movement. Exhibit 65 highlights the
‘Red Corridor’—an euphemism for the contiguous region across several states in
central India rife with insurgency—along with geographical distribution of India’s coal
resources.
Exhibit 65: The Naxal belt closely corresponds with the coal belt of India
Naxal belt of India
Capacity
(MW) (%)
Capacity developed 38 0.0
Capacity under construction 15,542 10.5
Capacity yet to be developed 133,121 89.5
Identified capacity as per re-assessment study 148,701 100
Notes:
1. Data as on April 30, 2008 and excludes schemes below 3 MW up to March 2003
and up to 25 MW thereafter.
In our view, considerable work needs to be done to increase the share of hydropower
capacity in total generation. DPRs for only 23 projects have been prepared until March 2011
with a cumulative capacity of 8,262 MW (see Exhibit 67). Although the working group on
th
power for the XI plan also recommended a higher contribution of hydropower projects for
th
incremental capacity addition, slippages (of thermal capacity addition) from the X plan has
ensured that the proportion of hydropower capacity addition will remain lower than desired
th
in the XI plan as well.
Exhibit 67: DPR's ready for less than 9,000 MW of the 50,000 Hydroelectric initiative
Status of 50,000 MW Hydroelectric initiative as of March 2011
No. of Capacity
schemes MW
Preliminary feasibility reports (PFRs) 162 47,930
PFRs with tariff up to Rs2.5/unit 78 34,020
Schemes not taken up for DPR/implementation 1 69
Schemes taken up for DPR/implementation 77 33,951
DPRs prepared until March 2011 (reassessed capacity) 23 8,262
DPRs under prepration 21 16,059
Work held up due to:
- Non allocation by state government 10 2,364
- MOEF clearance 13 3,991
- Local agitation/other issues 10 2,894
Notes:
(1) Projects that are yet to commence construction but are in advance stages
of development have been classified as under development.
We expect the share of hydropower in India’s total power capacity will decline over the next
five years due to continued delays in execution of projects (see Exhibit 69). The share of
hydropower in the total installed generation capacity in India has declined to 22% in FY2011
from 34% in FY1985 (see Exhibit 70) and 44% in 1970. Hydropower projects are a
renewable, non-consumptive and environmentally benign source of energy and, therefore,
recognized as the most economical and preferred source of electricity. The ideal hydro-
thermal mix is 40:60 and the current imbalance in India is largely responsible for peak hour
deficits. We note that even resource-rich countries such as Norway and Brazil have a much
higher dependence on hydropower than India (see Exhibit 71).
Exhibit 69: Share of hydro capacity to fall to 19% from the current level of 22% in India
Hydropower capacity and share of total power capacity, March fiscal year-ends, 2011-17E
(GW) Hydro capacity (GW, LHS) Share in total capacity (%, RHS) (%)
60 22
50 21
20
40
19
30
18
20
17
10 16
0 15
2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Exhibit 70: Share of hydropower in installed capacity has Exhibit 71: Hydropower generation accounts for a large share
declined to 25% from 34% in the past two decades of generation in resource-rich countries
Installed capacity (GW) and share of hydropower in overall capacity, Share of hydropower in electricity generation, CY2008 (%)
March fiscal year-ends, 1985-2011 (%)
(%)
Hydro generation capacity (LHS) 100 98.5
Total installed capacity (LHS)
79.8 72.8
Share of hydropower in installed capacity (RHS) (%) 80
(GW)
200 40 58.7
60
46.1
160
30 40
120 16.0 16.2 16.9 13.8
20 7.7
20 6.5
80
0
USA
Brazil
Norway
Japan
Sweden
Canada
China
Venezuela
Russia
India
World average
10
40
0 0
1985
1990
1992
1997
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
We discuss key challenges that have prevented India from realizing its vast hydropower
potential.
Exhibit 72: Hydropower capacity addition has trailed targeted capacity addition
Target and actual capacity addition (MW)
Notes:
(1) For 2007-12 period, actual capacity addition is as of March 2011.
Exhibit 73: Delays and cost overruns are common in hydro projects
Delays and cost escalation of NHPC's projects under construction
Project
Total Design execution cost
capacity energy COD (Rs bn)
(MW) (mn units) Initial Revised Assumed Latest Original Remarks
Teesta Low Dam III 132 594 FY2007 FY2011 Jun-11 14.1 7.7 Work held up at site from May-July 2010 due to local issues; frequent interruption of work
Teesta Low Dam IV 160 720 FY2010 FY2012 Sep-11 14.6 10.6 Work held up at site from May-July 2010 due to local issues; frequent interruption of work
Uri II 240 1,124 FY2010 FY2011 Apr-12 17.0 17.2 Work affected by earthquake and landslides
Parbati II 800 3,109 FY2010 XIIth plan Mar-13 40.8 39.2 E&M work on power house has now been resumed
Chamera III 231 1,108 FY2011 FY012 May-11 19.4 14.1 T&G erection for Unit 3 in progress
Nimmo-Bazgo 45 239 FY2011 FY2012 Aug-11 9.1 6.1 Delay in supply of E&M and HM parts by BHEL due to civil disturbance in Kashmir
Parbati III 520 1,963 FY2011 FY2012 Sep-11 21.0 23.0 Delay in award of E&M contract
Chutak 44 213 FY2011 FY2012 Aug-11 9.8 6.2 Delay in supply of E&M and HM parts by BHEL due to civil disturbance in Kashmir.
Subansiri (Lower) 2,000 7,422 FY2011 XIIth plan Sep-13 81.6 62.9 Plagued by law and order problems
Kishanganga 330 1,350 FY2017 FY2017 Jun-16 36.4 36.4 Progress affected due to civil disturbance in Kashmir
Total 4,502 17,842 263.9 223.4
Source: NHPC
We highlight that high execution risks in hydropower projects from geological surprises
make it difficult to estimate project cost and timelines, hence making it difficult for the
developer to commit both, price (due to cost overruns) and time (due to delays) for the
eventual sale of power.
Exhibit 74: Fuel imports to increase significantly over the next few years
Energy imports, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-17E (US$ bn)
2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Energy imports (net basis)
Coal (mn tons) 38 65 68 80 146 169 193 224 270 323
LNG (bcm) 11 11 12 13 17 20 25 30 33 34
Crude oil (mn tons) 102 113 120 122 127 132 139 147 157 167
Total imports (mtoe) 129 153 162 171 210 228 251 278 312 349
Price assumptions
Coal (US$/ton) 169 154 130 123 130 114 114 114 114 114
LNG prices (US$/mn BTU) 4.2 5.1 4.4 6.5 9.3 10.5 11.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
Crude prices (US$/bbl) 79 89 67 84 105 95 90 90 90 90
Value of energy imports (US$ bn)
Coal 6 10 9 10 19 19 22 26 31 37
LNG 2 2 2 3 6 8 10 13 15 15
Oil 55 64 56 75 97 91 91 97 103 110
Total imports 64 76 67 88 122 118 124 136 148 162
Notes:
(a) Price of imported coal has been adjusted down to reflect its higher calorific value.
(b) In the case of crude oil, data represents net imports of crude oil.
India’s exports (including of services) and repatriation from overseas Indians would need to
grow proportionately to keep its CAD under control. We already see India’s CAD at
uncomfortable levels with CAD likely to exceed 3% of GDP in FY2012E. India has
increasingly relied on portfolio flows to manage its BOP. However, this may not be
sustainable without adequate reforms in other areas of Indian economy and society. Exhibit
75 shows our estimates of trade balance, CAD and BOP for FY2012E at various levels of
crude oil prices and compares the same for the past few years.
` High interest rates and inflation both. We see high crude oil prices resulting in a large
negative impact on India’s fiscal deficit, government borrowing, interest rates and
inflation. As discussed in our report on the energy sector titled Oil on the boil will make
India toil dated March 18, 2011, India will have to contend with both high interest rates
and inflation as a result of high crude oil prices.
High interest rates. We expect the government’s borrowing program in FY2012E to
far exceed its budgeted `3.6 tn and potentially be as much as `4.5 tn if it fails to raise
the prices of diesel, kerosene and LPG significantly from current levels. Exhibit 76
shows likely government share of subsidies at various levels of crude oil prices (US$90-
130/bbl) without considering retail price increases for the three regulated products. In
Exhibit 77, we show that India’s fiscal position will deteriorate quite significantly at
high crude oil prices and without meaningful price increases.
KOTAK INSTITUTIONAL EQUITIES RESEARCH 45
India Energy
Exhibit 76: Under-recovery will be difficult to manage at current level of crude prices
Subsidy loss breakdown at various levels of crude oil price, March fiscal year-end, 2012E (Rs bn)
Exhibit 77: Government borrowing program and interest rates may shoot up without meaningful oil
price correction
Major budgetary items of the central government, March fiscal year-ends, 2010-2012E (Rs bn)
2012E
2010A 2011RE 2012BE Oil@95 Oil@105 Oil@115
Receipts
1. Revenue receipts (2 + 3) 5,728 7,838 7,899 7,845 7,858 7,872
2. Gross tax revenue (a + b ) 6,245 7,869 9,324 9,243 9,262 9,281
2.a. Direct taxes 3,792 4,479 5,346 5,223 5,223 5,223
2.a.1. Corporation tax 2,447 2,964 3,600 3,482 3,482 3,482
2.a.2. Income tax 1,323 1,491 1,720 1,714 1,714 1,714
2.a.3. Other taxes 21 25 26 26 26 26
2.b. Indirect taxes 2,454 3,390 3,978 4,020 4,039 4,058
2.b.1. Customs duty 833 1,318 1,517 1,588 1,607 1,626
2.b.2. Excise duty 1,036 1,378 1,641 1,612 1,612 1,612
2.b.3. Service tax 584 694 820 820 820 820
2.c Transfers to States and UTs 1,680 2,232 2,680 2,653 2,658 2,664
2.d Net tax revenue 4,565 5,637 6,645 6,590 6,604 6,617
3. Non-tax revenue 1,163 2,201 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254
4. Non-debt capital receipts (a + b) 332 317 550 550 550 550
4.a Recovery of loans 86 90 150 150 150 150
4.b Other receipts (Disinvestments) 246 227 400 400 400 400
5. Total receipts (1 + 4) 6,060 8,156 8,449 8,395 8,408 8,422
Notes:
(a) 2010A represents actual government financials for FY2010.
(b) 2012E represents FY2012 KIE estimates.
High inflation. Our hypothetical exercise in Exhibit 78 shows that India’s inflation
may remain above 8% for most of FY2012E even with very modest price increases in
diesel, kerosene and LPG. We model `4/liter price increase for diesel, `2/liter price
increase in the case of kerosene and `50/cylinder price increase for LPG. We note that
our assumed price increases are very small in the context of the current under-
recoveries on those products (see Exhibit 79). We have also factored a `3/liter price
increase for gasoline in May 2011 followed by another `3/liter in November 2011.
Gasoline prices have been deregulated on paper but government-owned companies
continue to sell gasoline below market prices; current losses exceed `9/liter.
Exhibit 78: Inflation will likely remain above 8% through FY2012E even with small fuel price
increases
Inflation scenario, March fiscal year-ends, 2006-12E (%)
(%) Inflation (with fuel price hikes) Inflation (without fuel price increases)
12
8.98
10
8 8.7
6 6
0
Dec-07
Apr-06
Apr-11
Nov-10
Sep-06
Sep-11
Feb-07
May-08
Jan-10
Oct-08
Aug-09
Feb-12
Jun-10
Mar-09
Jul-07
(2)
Notes:
1. In our scenario on inflation with fuel price increases, we assume the following:
(a) Rs1/liter price increase in diesel in May 2011, August 2011, November 2011 and February 2012.
(b) Rs3/liter increase in gasoline prices in May 2011 and another Rs3/liter in February 2012.
(c) Rs50/cylinder increase in LPG prices and Rs2/liter in kerosene prices
2. In our scenario without fuel price increases, we assume no change in prices of regulated fuels through FY2012E.
Exhibit 79: High under-recoveries on key petroleum products in the recent weeks
Computed under-recovery for key petroleum products
` Social ills reinforced by subsidies. Artificially low prices of fuels lead to other social ills
such as corruption, diversion of fuels and generation of black money. As discussed
previously, 40% of kerosene is diverted from the PDS and sold at market rates as
transportation fuel (mixed with diesel). This leads to severe economic loss for the
government (~US$2 bn in FY2011) and generates black money. As per Power Finance
Corporation, ATC losses in the power sector are estimated to be 28.4% in FY2009 with
the majority portion coming from distribution segment.
` Subversion of market forces. In our view, improper functioning of market forces also
leads to (1) lower incentives for companies to create capacity and (2) price collusion. The
situation is more acute in the power sector. In the oil and gas sector, government-owned
companies have no option but to sell fuels below market prices and depend on periodic
handouts from the government and upstream companies to finance their operations and
capex.
Power sector. Years of selling power below market prices have resulted in very poor
financial condition of most state electricity boards (SEBs). This has led to SEBs resorting
to frequent power shutdowns to curb consumption, which in turn leads to lower
productivity in the economy. We are not sure about the sustainability of this situation
since accumulated losses of SEBs have reached gargantuan proportions.
We note that most of the new power generation will be at significantly higher prices
based on imported fuels (coal) compared to current prices. Exhibit 80 compares the
price of domestic coal with imported coal adjusted for their different calorific values
while Exhibit 81 shows the sharp increase in blended power prices over the past few
years. Since NTPC has a large base of old capacity based on domestic coal its price
increases may not fully represent the price of incremental power. We expect it to be
much higher.
Exhibit 80: Bulk of domestic coal (Grade D,E and F) are at deep Exhibit 81: NTPC's average realization has increased at a CAGR
discount to imported parity price adjusted for calorific value of 8% in FY2005-10
Comparison of energy-adjusted notified prices of different grades of Average realization of NTPC (Rs/kWh), March fiscal year-ends, 2003-
domestic coal with price of imported coal (Rs/ton) 10 (Rs/kWh)
2,000 1.8
1,000 1.6
0
1.4
Imported
Grade C
Grade D
Grade A
Grade B
Grade F
Grade E
coal
1.2
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Notes:
(a) All prices have been adjusted to 6,200 kcal/kag.
(b) Richard Bay index (FOB price of South African coal)
has been used as price of imported coal. Source: NTPC, Kotak Institutional Equities
Finally, power companies are aggressively creating capacity to benefit from rising
demand for power but they may have to contend with lower ‘demand’ from SEBs if
SEBs are not in a position to purchase more expensive power. This will also have a
negative impact on power equipment companies that have ambitious plans and are
setting up large capacities (see Exhibit 82).
Exhibit 82: Power equipment capacity to increase by 50% over the next 2-3 years
Details of capacity expansion for power equipment for key domestic players (MW)
Capacity (MW)
Company Present Future Completion date Comment
L&T 5,000 5,000 NA Shelved expansion plan to 6 GW
BHEL 15,000 20,000 Mar-12 Capacity addition cost estimated around Rs540 mn
Cethar 8,000 12,000 Mar-14 Unlisted entity focussed on large-scale, low-cost model
BGR — 3,000 Mar-13 Capacity expansion though Hitachi JV
Thermax 1,500 4,500 Mar-13 3 GW capacity addition from B&W JV
Total 29,500 44,500
Downstream oil sector. The government-owned oil companies have been able to
maintain operations and create new marketing and refining capacities due to partial
compensation of their under-recoveries on selling cooking and transportation fuels
below market prices. Nonetheless, these companies have not been able to retain their
preeminent position in the energy sector given their inability to pursue capex as
aggressively as their private sector counterparts. Exhibit 83 gives the relative share of
refining of public and private companies in FY2000 and at present. On the other hand,
private companies have been unable to set up retail operations given large losses on
transportation fuels.
Private, 77
Public, 92 Private, 27
Public, 123
Gas sector. India may implement pooling of gas from various sources (indigenous and
imported) in order to reduce the final price to customers. This may reduce the price of
imported LNG for a customer using spot LNG but will increase the price of gas for
others. This may theoretically improve the economics of power producers based on
spot LNG.
In our view, the proposal is a retrograde one in that efficient domestic producers will
subsidize overseas LNG suppliers. It seems the pooling process is designed to help LNG
import companies that have not signed long-term LNG contracts and now face the
unattractive prospect of low utilization of LNG import terminals. The pooling process
will penalize domestic producers (who contribute to the bulk of the supply and
consumption) through a likely cap on their prices in the future or likely continuation of
prices below ‘market’ rates; they may not get meaningful price increases in the future
since the pooling concept is designed to keep overall prices ‘low’.
Exhibit 84: Cairn India: Profit model, balance sheet and cash model, calendar year-ends, 2006-07, March fiscal year-ends, 2009-14E (Rs mn)
Key assumptions
Gross production ('000 boe/d) 91.0 75.4 68.1 64.3 153.7 218.6 265.4 265.2
Net production ('000 boe/d) 25.1 19.4 17.8 21.0 89.4 132.5 167.9 170.0
Dated Brent (US$/bbl) 65.3 70.3 87.4 67.0 86.7 105.0 95.0 90.0
Discount of Rajasthan crude to Dated Brent (US$/bbl) — — — 5.0 10.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
Note:
(a) 15 months period starting from January 1, 2008 to March 31, 2009.
Exhibit 85: Coal India: Profit model, balance sheet and cash model, March fiscal year-ends, 2009-2015E (Rs mn)
Balance sheet
Paid-up common stock 63,164 63,164 63,164 63,164 63,164 63,164 63,164
Total shareholders' equity 191,651 257,952 322,126 414,539 522,474 645,068 783,874
Minority interest 19 236 236 236 236 236 236
Total borrowings 21,485 20,869 17,869 15,469 13,148 12,540 12,140
Shifting and rehab fund 12,238 14,774 18,092 21,301 25,922 31,319 37,449
Total liabilities and equity 225,393 293,831 358,323 451,544 561,780 689,163 833,698
Net fixed assets 110,212 120,354 115,756 146,101 164,366 172,769 170,307
Capital work-in progress 19,195 22,107 56,269 52,601 52,477 48,958 45,430
Investments 15,052 12,823 12,823 12,823 12,823 12,823 12,823
Cash 296,950 390,778 444,750 543,421 666,031 822,239 1,009,152
Current assets (excl. cash) 174,009 152,466 170,403 200,071 216,933 234,720 251,653
Current liabilities and provisions 399,293 414,316 451,437 512,681 559,656 610,257 663,023
Deferred tax asset 9,268 9,604 9,759 9,208 8,804 7,910 7,354
Misc. expenditure — 15 — — — — —
Total assets 225,393 293,831 358,324 451,544 561,780 689,163 833,698
Ratios
Net debt/equity (%) (143.7) (143.4) (132.5) (127.4) (125.0) (125.5) (127.2)
Return on equity (%) 11 43 38 36 35 33 31
Book value per share (Rs) 30 41 52 64 80 98 118
ROCE (%) 11 43 39 43 39 36 33
Exhibit 86: Mundra Ports and SEZ : Consolidated profit model, balance sheet and cash model, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-15E (Rs mn)
Balance sheet
Shareholders funds 26,216 29,306 34,637 41,609 52,794 68,824 92,126 123,468
Share capital 4,035 4,035 4,035 4,035 4,035 4,035 4,035 4,035
Reserves and surplus 22,164 25,261 30,602 37,574 48,759 64,789 88,091 119,433
Loan funds 20,680 28,957 37,062 43,932 30,908 29,808 30,907 30,906
Amount received under LT lease 6,568 6,505 6,291 6,075 5,924 5,773 5,622 5,470
Deferred tax liability (net) 1,771 2,296 2,817 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812
Total sources of funds 55,252 67,156 81,629 95,087 93,312 108,145 132,520 164,032
Total fixed assets 36,673 51,792 67,682 72,110 74,670 76,929 78,509 92,473
Investments 8,886 2,072 2,249 5,219 5,219 5,219 5,219 5,219
Cash and bank balance 9,029 12,951 9,997 17,942 13,520 25,806 48,656 65,975
Net current assets excl. cash 663 321 1,701 (183) (96) 190 137 365
Total application of funds 55,252 67,156 81,629 95,087 93,312 108,144 132,520 164,032
Key ratios
Debt/equity (X) 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3
Net debt/equity (X) 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.1 (0.2) (0.3)
RoAE (%) 12.5 15.6 21.1 22.6 29.0 34.5 37.2 36.8
RoACE (%) 6.5 9.2 9.7 12.0 16.8 22.8 26.7 28.2
Exhibit 87: NHPC: Profit model, balance sheet and cash model, March fiscal year-ends, 2009-2015E (Rs mn)
Balance sheet
Paid-up common stock 111,825 123,007 123,007 123,007 123,007 123,007 123,007
Total shareholders' equity 197,678 251,072 264,331 278,922 296,330 314,984 337,555
Advance against depreciation (AAD) 14,245 15,398 14,255 13,112 11,968 10,825 9,682
Minority interest 14,944 15,895 18,049 20,503 23,152 25,748 28,451
Total borrowings 149,310 163,515 201,389 217,340 215,561 200,693 185,825
Deferred tax liabilities — 2,521 3,672 6,263 7,684 11,562 12,933
Total liabilities and equity 376,177 448,402 501,696 536,140 554,695 563,813 574,446
Net fixed assets 238,323 223,016 222,404 283,631 284,192 387,314 365,165
Capital work-in progress 105,050 140,620 183,888 160,841 170,277 56,824 65,420
Investments 17,912 33,455 12,783 10,219 7,654 5,090 2,525
Miscellaneous expenses not w/o 23 — — — — — —
Cash 26,061 61,895 100,755 97,658 110,942 120,047 153,562
Net current assets (incl. cash) 14,868 51,311 82,621 81,449 92,572 114,585 141,335
Total assets 376,177 448,402 501,696 536,140 554,695 563,813 574,446
Ratios
Net debt/equity (%) 34 33 26 25 23 22 20
Return on equity (%) 6.5 10.3 7.5 8.2 9.2 9.3 10.6
Book value per share (Rs) 17 20 21 22 24 26 28
ROCE (%) 5.7 7.4 5.3 6.3 7.0 8.1 9.0
Exhibit 88: OIL: Profit model, balance sheet and cash model, March fiscal year-ends, 2007-2014E (Rs mn)
Ratios (%)
Debt/equity 11.9 2.2 0.6 0.3 1.3 — — —
Net debt/equity (32.8) (31.9) (31.9) (38.3) (39.4) (36.3) (37.8) (39.4)
RoAE 23.2 21.8 22.8 20.9 21.4 20.1 21.3 17.9
RoACE 23.0 21.5 22.7 20.9 21.3 20.1 21.3 17.9
Key assumptions
Rs/dollar rate 45.3 40.3 45.8 47.4 45.6 45.5 44.0 44.0
Crude fob price (US$/bbl) 64.8 78.9 83.0 67.1 84.0 95.0 90.0 85.0
Ceiling/actual natural gas price (Rs/'000 cm) 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 6,783 7,500 7,500 7,500
Subsidy loss (Rs bn) 19.9 23.1 30.2 15.5 26.2 36.2 17.5 15.9
Exhibit 89: ONGC: Consolidated profit model, balance sheet and cash model, March fiscal year-ends, 2007-2014E (Rs mn)
Ratios (%)
Debt/equity 3.3 2.8 7.9 6.0 4.9 7.0 7.2 4.9
Net debt/equity (27.5) (29.0) (16.3) (15.7) (18.7) (18.6) (27.9) (37.9)
RoAE 25.5 24.9 21.2 18.6 21.9 22.5 22.2 19.0
RoACE 22.1 22.0 18.2 16.1 17.8 20.0 20.0 17.4
Key assumptions
Rs/dollar rate 45.3 40.3 45.8 47.4 45.6 45.5 44.0 44.0
Crude fob price (US$/bbl) 64.8 78.9 83.0 67.1 84.0 95.0 90.0 85.0
Ceiling/actual natural gas price (Rs/'000 cm) 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 6,783 7,500 7,500 7,500
Subsidy loss (Rs bn) 170.2 220.0 282.3 115.5 197.5 272.0 131.3 119.9
Exhibit 90: Petronet LNG: Profit model, balance sheet and cash model, March fiscal year-ends, 2007-2014E (Rs mn)
Ratios (%)
Debt/equity 91 84 101 98 106 108 126 104
Net debt/equity 68 65 72 84 101 103 122 100
RoAE 23.6 27.8 25.0 16.8 22.2 21.3 18.7 16.1
RoACE 14.5 17.0 14.7 11.0 13.3 12.5 10.7 10.8
Adjusted CROCI 29.6 33.2 28.7 19.2 24.4 26.8 14.2 15.9
Key assumptions
Contract LNG volume (mn tons) 5.1 4.8 4.8 7.1 7.5 7.5 8.4 10.7
LNG purchase price (FOB) (US$/mn BTU) 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.7 5.7 8.4 9.5 10.4
Base re-gasification charges (US$/mn BTU) 0.58 0.69 0.64 0.65 0.71 0.74 0.81 0.85
Sales price (US$/mn BTU) 4.4 4.9 5.4 5.9 7.1 10.0 11.2 12.3
Rupee/US dollar exchange rate 45.3 40.1 45.8 47.4 45.6 45.5 44.0 44.0
Exhibit 91: RIL: Profit model, balance sheet, cash model, March fiscal year-ends, 2007-2014E (Rs mn)
Ratios (%)
Debt/equity 44.8 53.2 54.3 42.2 41.3 18.3 5.1 5.0
Net debt/equity 42.3 48.6 38.0 33.1 24.7 3.5 (7.3) (16.2)
RoAE 20.3 18.9 13.6 11.8 13.1 12.9 12.3 12.4
RoACE 13.9 12.7 11.2 9.3 10.4 10.4 10.7 11.3
"I, Sanjeev Prasad, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately
reflect my personal views about the subject company or companies and its or their securities.
I also certify that no part of my compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly, related
to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report."
60%
Percentage of companies within each category for which
Kotak Institutional Equities and or its affiliates has provided
50%
investment banking services within the previous 12 months.
Analyst coverage
Sanjeev Prasad, the lead analyst in this report, also covers the following companies
BUY. We expect this stock to outperform the BSE Sensex by 10% over the next 12 months.
ADD. We expect this stock to outperform the BSE Sensex by 0-10% over the next 12 months.
REDUCE. We expect this stock to underperform the BSE Sensex by 0-10% over the next 12 months.
SELL. We expect this stock to underperform the BSE Sensex by more than 10% over the next 12 months.
Other definitions
Coverage view. The coverage view represents each analyst’s overall fundamental outlook on the Sector. The coverage view will consist of one of the following
designations: Attractive, Neutral, Cautious.
Other ratings/identifiers
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and/or Kotak Securities policies in circumstances when Kotak Securities or its affiliates is acting in an advisory capacity in a merger or strategic transaction involving
this company and in certain other circumstances.
RS = Rating Suspended. Kotak Securities Research has suspended the investment rating and price target, if any, for this stock, because there is not a sufficient
fundamental basis for determining an investment rating or target. The previous investment rating and price target, if any, are no longer in effect for this stock and
should not be relied upon.
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