Delegation of Tariff Powers
226, which
Article 6, Section 28(2): The Congress may, by law,
authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
Delegation of Emergency Powers
Article 6, Section 23(2): In times of war or other
national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. NO. L-2044
August 26, 1949
Facts: The petitions challenge the validity of
executive orders of the President avowedly issued in
virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in
cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No.
62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. Antonio Araneta is under
prosecution in the CI of manila for the violation of
the provision of the EO.
Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to
compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office
and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the
exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both official
refuse to issue the required export license on the
ground that the exportation of shoes from the
Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order.
Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225,
which appropriates funds for the operation of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950,
and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ
of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines from disbursing this Executive Order.
In case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No.
appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in
connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of
the national elections to be held in November, 1949.
The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-
payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the
respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise
disposing of that amount or any part of it."
They pray for the proposition that CA 671 has
ceased to have any force and effect.
Issue: WON CA 671 is unconstitutional
Held: Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution
In time of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out a declared national policy.
No. It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act
No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view.
The opposite theory would make the law repugnant
to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle
that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers.
If a new and different law were necessary to
terminate the delegation, the period for the
delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would
be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain;
"that which was intended to meet a temporary
emergency may become permanent law,"
(Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might
not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal
might not meet the approval of the President, and
the Congress might not be able to override the veto.
Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that,
while Congress might delegate its powers by simple
majority, it might not be able to recall them except
by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to
take them back. This is not right and is not, and
ought not to be, the law.
CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in
regular session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos.
62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority
of law. In a regular session, the power of Congress
to legislate is not circumscribed except by the
limitations imposed by the organic law.
Rodriguez v Gella
GR. NO. L-6266
February 2, 1953
Facts: CA 671 was approved by the court "declaring
a state of total emergency as a result of war
involving the Philippines and authorizing the
President to promulgate rules and regulations to
meet such emergency."
The petitioners seek to invalidate Executive Orders
Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the
first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for
urgent and essential public works, and the second
setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the
provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods,
droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other
calamities.
Issue: WON EO 545 and 546 are unconstitutional
Held: Yes. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution
provides that "in times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1)
the national policy that "the existence of war
between the United States and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines
makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the
President, "during the existence of the emergency,
to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may
deem necessary to carry out the national policy
declared in section 1.
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the
constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that
the National Assembly intended it to be only for a
limited period. If it be contended that the Act has
not yet been duly repealed, and such step is
necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers
delegated to the President, the result would be
obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be
repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever
attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.
This eventuality has in fact taken place when the
President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing
all Emergency Powers Acts
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract
of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be
compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that
the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation
in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it
be suggested that the agency created under the Act
is coupled with interest.
As a matter of fact, the President, in returning to the
Congress without his signature House Bill No. 727,
did not invoke any emergency resulting from the last
world war, but only called attention to an impending
emergency that may be brought about by present
complicated and troubled world conditions, and to
the fact that our own soldiers are fighting and dying
in Korea in defense of democracy and freedom and
for the preservation of our Republic. The emergency
thus feared cannot, however, be attributed to the
war mentioned in Act No. 671 and fought between
Germany and Japan on one side and the Allied
Powers on the other; and indications are that in the
next world war, if any, the communist countries will
be aligned against the democracies. No departure
can be made from the national policy declared in
section 1 of Act No. 671. New powers may be
granted as often as emergencies contemplated in
the Constitution arise.
In summary, Act 671 may be likened to an ordinary
contract of agency whereby the consent of the
agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot
be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way,
that the principal cannot be forced to keep the
relation in eternity or the will of the agent. The
logical view consistent with constitutionality is to
hold that the power lasted only during the
emergency resulting from the last world war. That
emergency, which naturally terminated upon the
ending of the last world war, was contemplated by
the members of the National Assembly. Shelter may
not be sought in the proposition that the President
should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for
the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and
for the welfare of the people because we have the
Constitution designed to establish a government
under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,
and since our government is based on the system of
separation of powers. Wherefore, EO Nos. 545 and
546 are declared null and void.
David v Arroyo
G.R. NO. 171396
May 3, 2006
Facts: On February 2006, around the celebration of
the 20th anniversary of EDSA I, Pres. GMA issued
Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017). This was
due to the escape of some Magdalo members and
the discovery of Oplan Hackle I, or the plan to
assassinate PGMA. To implement PP 1017, PGMA
issued General Order No. 5 (GO 5). Both laws were
aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance
of these Magdalo members to dethrone the
government.
Based on PP 1017, PGMA cancelled all plans to
commemorate EDSA 1 and revoked all permits
involving rallies and other public organization or
movements.
Despite such revocation, Kilusang Mayo Uno, which
was headed by Randolf David, still conducted their
rally. This then resulted to their arrest in violation of
PP 1017.
The offices of ‘The Daily Tribune’ and ‘Malaya’, local
newspapers who were known to be anti-PGMA, was
raided by the CIDG. They seized and confiscated
anti-PGMA articles and write-ups.
Beltran, a member of Anakpawis, was also arrested.
His arrest was grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. On March 2006, GMA issued PP 1021 that
declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David et al. contended that PP1017
is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it
cannot be validly declared by the president for such
power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration
is actually a declaration of martial law.
Olivares-Cacho, the editor of “Malaya” contended
that the emergency contemplated in the
Constitution are those of natural calamities and that
such is an overbreadth. David et al. contended that
PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights.
OSG contended that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by
virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. Moreover, it
contended that PP 1017 is within the president’s
calling out power, take care power and take over
power.
Issue: WON PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional
Held: In this case, to determine the constitutionality
of the said laws, the SC divided the operative portion
of PP 1017 in 3 important provisions: (1) calling-out
power, (2) take care power, and (3) power to take
over.
Pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. 12 of the Constitution,
PGMA, during the state of national emergency
under PP 1017, can call the military not only to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees.
SC held that PGMA had the power to invoke such
because during the existence of the state of national
emergency, PP 1017 grants the President, without
any authority or delegation from Congress, to take
over or direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public
interest.
SC held that the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 23, Art. 6 of
the Constitution refers not only to war but also to
other national emergency.
SC held that the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a ‘state of national emergency’
pursuant to Sec. 18, Art. 7 (calling-out power) and
grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could
have provided so.

 Clearly, they did not intend that Congress
should first authorize the President before
he can declare a ‘state of national
emergency.’
 The logical conclusion then is that President
Arroyo could validly declare the existence of
a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment.
- But the exercise of emergency powers,
such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, is a different matter.
This requires a delegation from
Congress.
- SC held that Congress is the repository
of emergency powers
- This is evident in the tenor of Sec. 23(2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such
powers to the President. Certainly, a
body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, it may not be
possible or practicable for Congress to
meet and exercise its powers, the
Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
- (1) There must be a war or other
emergency.
- (2) The delegation must be for a limited
period only.
- (3) The delegation must be subject to
such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
- (4) The emergency powers must be
exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
- SC held that the President alone can declare
a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take
over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting
the take over of privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President
has no power to point out the type of
businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over.
- In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the
State under Sec. 17, Article 7 in the absence
of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.
In sum, PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL with regard to
(1) PGMA’s calling out power on the AFP to prevent
or suppress lawless violence and (2) PGMA’s power
to declare national emergency pursuant to Sec. 17,
Art. 7 of the Constitution. However, the latter does
not authorize the President to take over privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without prior legislation. However, the
provision of PP 1017 regarding the power to
command the AFP to enforce laws not related to
lawless violence are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a
standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence. However,
considering the acts of terrorism have not yet been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature,
such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Article 12, Section 12: The State shall promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods, and adopt measures
that help make them competitive.
AKBAYAN v Aquino
G.R. No. 170516
July 16, 2008
Facts: JPEPA case. Diplomatic negotiations are
privileged. Secrecy of on-going negotiations not violative
of Constitutional right to information (the President is
the sole organ of foreign relations).
Petitioners (non-government organizations,
Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers) filed a petition
for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from
respondents Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al. the full text of the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA)6 including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all
pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
On
 January 2005, Cong. Tañ ada and Aguja filed House
Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA,
then being negotiated by the PH government.
- In the course of its inquiry, the House Special
Committee on Globalization requested herein
respondent Usec. Aquino to furnish the
Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the
JPEPA.
- However, Usec Aquino did not heed the request
The same request was again made by Congressman
Aguja, but Usec. Aquino replied 
that a copy will be
provided only after negotiations have been completed.
In a separate move, the House Committee requested
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita to furnish it with “all
documents on the subject including the latest 
draft of
the proposed agreement, the requests and offers etc. 
 treaties and executive agreements may be
Secretary Ermita replied that it has been a work in
progress for three years and a 
copy will be gIven once
the negotiations are complete. 
Congressman Aguja also
requested NEDA Director-General Neri and Tariff 
 then on-going negotiations of the RP- US Military
Commission Chairman Abon for copies of the JPEPA. 
 Bases Agreement.
Chairman Abon replied, however, that the Tariff
Commission does not have a copy of 
the documents
being requested
In its third hearing, the House Committee was supposed
to issue a subpoena for the 
most recent draft of the
JPEPA, but the same was not pursued because by
Committee Chairman Congressman Teves’ information,
then House Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested him
to hold in abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until
the President gives her consent to the disclosure of the
documents.
JPEPA was signed on September 9, 2006 by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 
and Japanese Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki, Finland, following which
the President endorsed it to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution. 
To date (July 16, 2008), the JPEPA is still
being deliberated upon by the Senate. 
 countries and with other
This Petition is brought with the following contentions:
- The refusal of the government to disclose the
said agreement violates their right to
information on matters of public concern and of
public interest.

- The non-disclosure of the same documents
undermines their right to effective and
reasonable participation in all levels of social,
political and economic decision-making.

- Divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after
the agreement has been concluded will
effectively make the Senate into a mere rubber
stamp of the Executive, in violation of the
principle of separation of powers.

Issue: Are the documents and information being
requested in relation to the JPEPA covered by the doctrine
of executive privilege?
Held: Yes. The privileged character of diplomatic
negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction:
- Chavez v. PCGG: “information on inter-
government exchanges prior to the conclusion of
subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of
national interest.”
- PMPF v. Manglapus – petitioners therein were 

President’s representatives on the state of the


o The Court denied the petition, stressing
that “secrecy of negotiations with
foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information.” The
Resolution went on to state, thus: 

 The nature of diplomacy
requires centralization of
authority and expedition of
decision which are inherent in
executive action. Another
essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential
nature.
 Delegates from other countries
come and tell you in confidence
of their troubles at home and of
their differences with other
delegates; they tell you of what
they would do under certain
circumstances and would not do
under other circumstances ... If
these reports ... should become
public ... who would ever trust
 American Delegations in
another conference?
o Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v.
Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. that the
President is the sole organ of the nation
in its negotiations with foreign
countries
 The President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation.
 He makes treaties with the
advice and consent of the
Senate; but he alone negotiates.
 Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to
invade it.
 As Marshall said, “The President
is the sole organ of the nation in
its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign
nations.”
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it
is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be
kept perpetually confidential – since there should be
“ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during
the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the
JPEPA is published. 
 between those which involve matters of national
- It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that “historic confidentiality”
would govern the same. 
 and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
o Disclosing these offers could impair the
ability of the Philippines to deal not only
with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
- A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty
negotiations should now be open to public
scrutiny would discourage future Philippine
representatives from frankly expressing their
views during negotiations.
- While it appears wise to deter PH
representatives from entering into
compromises, it bears noting that treaty
negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter,
normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and
oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to
grant concessions in an area of
 lesser
importance in order to obtain more favorable
terms in an area of greater national interest.
Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives
to compromise, we may be jeopardizing higher national
goals for the sake of securing less critical ones.

- Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the
JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception.

- It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is
only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds,
recognizing a type of information as privileged
does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances.

- Only after a consideration of the context in
which the claim is made may it be determined if
there is a public interest that calls for the
disclosure of the desired information, strong
enough to overcome its traditionally privileged
status.
Communications can be privileged even if they don’t
involve national security
- Examples: “Informer’s privilege” – privilege of
the Gov not to disclose identity of a person or
persons who furnish info of law violations to law
enforcers. The suspect involved need not be so
notorious as to be a threat to national security
for privilege to apply.
- “presidential communications” which are
presumed privileged without distinguishing
security and those which do not. Privileged
because “frank exchange of exploratory ideas
and assessments, free from the glare of publicity
protect the independence of decision-making of
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative
and Judicial power.”
Closely related to pres. comms privilege is the
“deliberative process privilege,” which covers
documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies
are formulated.
- The privileged status of such documents rests,
not on the need to protect national security but,
on the obvious realization that officials will not
communicate candidly among themselves if
each remark is a potential item of discovery and
front page news, the objective of the privilege
being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.
 - The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a
close resemblance to the deliberative process
and presidential communications privilege.
o The privilege accorded to diplomatic
negotiations follows as a logical
consequence from the privileged
character of the deliberative process.
o Fullbright case: “Exposure of the pre-
agreement positions of the French
negotiators might well offend foreign
governments and would lead to less
candor by the U.S. in recording the
events of the negotiations process.
o xxx Finally, releasing these snapshot
views of the negotiations would be
comparable to releasing drafts of the
treaty, particularly when the notes state
the tentative provisions and language
agreed on. As drafts of regulations
typically are protected by the
deliberative process privilege, drafts of
treaties should be accorded the same
protection.”
- Since, in this jurisdiction, there is no counterpart
of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, nor is
there any statutory requirement similar to
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 5
in particular7, Philippine courts, when assessing
a claim of privilege for diplomatic negotiations,
are more free to focus directly on the issue of
whether the privilege being claimed is indeed
supported by public policy, without having to
consider if these negotiations fulfill a formal
requirement of being “inter-agency.”
The privileged character accorded to diplomatic
negotiations does not ipso facto lose all force and effect
simply because the same privilege is now being claimed
under different circumstances –
- The privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be
invoked not only against citizens’ demands for
information, but also in the context of legislative
investigations;
- It is the President alone who negotiates treaties,
and not even the Senate or the House of
Representatives, unless asked, may intrude upon
that process.
David v Arroyo
G.R. NO. 171396
May 3, 2006
Facts: On February 2006, around the celebration of
the 20th anniversary of EDSA I, Pres. GMA issued
Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017). This was
due to the escape of some Magdalo members and
the discovery of Oplan Hackle I, or the plan to
assassinate PGMA. To implement PP 1017, PGMA
issued General Order No. 5 (GO 5). Both laws were
aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance
of these Magdalo members to dethrone the
government.
Based on PP 1017, PGMA cancelled all plans to
commemorate EDSA 1 and revoked all permits
involving rallies and other public organization or
movements.
Despite such revocation, Kilusang Mayo Uno, which
was headed by Randolf David, still conducted their
rally. This then resulted to their arrest in violation of
PP 1017.
The offices of ‘The Daily Tribune’ and ‘Malaya’, local
newspapers who were known to be anti-PGMA, was
raided by the CIDG. They seized and confiscated
anti-PGMA articles and write-ups.
Beltran, a member of Anakpawis, was also arrested.
His arrest was grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. On March 2006, GMA issued PP 1021 that
declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David et al. contended that PP1017
is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it
cannot be validly declared by the president for such
power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration
is actually a declaration of martial law.
Olivares-Cacho, the editor of “Malaya” contended
that the emergency contemplated in the
Constitution are those of natural calamities and that
such is an overbreadth. David et al. contended that
PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights.
OSG contended that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by
virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. Moreover, it
contended that PP 1017 is within the president’s
calling out power, take care power and take over
power.
Issue: WON PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional
Held: In this case, to determine the constitutionality
of the said laws, the SC divided the operative portion
of PP 1017 in 3 important provisions: (1) calling-out
power, (2) take care power, and (3) power to take
over.
Pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. 12 of the Constitution,
PGMA, during the state of national emergency
under PP 1017, can call the military not only to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees.
SC held that PGMA had the power to invoke such
because during the existence of the state of national
emergency, PP 1017 grants the President, without
any authority or delegation from Congress, to take
over or direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public
interest.
SC held that the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 23, Art. 6 of
the Constitution refers not only to war but also to
other national emergency.
SC held that the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a ‘state of national emergency’
pursuant to Sec. 18, Art. 7 (calling-out power) and
grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could
have provided so.
 Clearly, they did not intend that Congress
should first authorize the President before
he can declare a ‘state of national
emergency.’
 The logical conclusion then is that President
Arroyo could validly declare the existence of
a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment.
- But the exercise of emergency powers,
such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, is a different matter.
This requires a delegation from
Congress.
- SC held that Congress is the repository
of emergency powers
- This is evident in the tenor of Sec. 23(2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such
powers to the President. Certainly, a
body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, it may not be
possible or practicable for Congress to
meet and exercise its powers, the
Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
- (1) There must be a war or other
emergency.
- (2) The delegation must be for a limited
period only.
- (3) The delegation must be subject to
such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
- (4) The emergency powers must be
exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
- SC held that the President alone can declare
a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take
over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting
the take over of privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President
has no power to point out the type of
businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over.
- In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the
State under Sec. 17, Article 7 in the absence
of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.
In sum, PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL with regard to
(1) PGMA’s calling out power on the AFP to prevent
or suppress lawless violence and (2) PGMA’s power
to declare national emergency pursuant to Sec. 17,
Art. 7 of the Constitution. However, the latter does
not authorize the President to take over privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without prior legislation. However, the
provision of PP 1017 regarding the power to
command the AFP to enforce laws not related to
lawless violence are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a
standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence. However,
considering the acts of terrorism have not yet been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature,
such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Belgica v Ochoa
G.R. NO. 208566
November 19, 2013
This case involves the constitutionality of the
Congressional Pork Barrel (Priority Development Fund)
and the Presidential Pork Barrel (Malampaya Fund).
Because the subject matter is so complex, the Court
discussed the pork barrel system’s conceptual
underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the
constitutional challenge.
Facts:
- An appropriation of government spending
meant for localized projects
- Secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative’s district 

- Some scholars on the subject use the term to
refer to legislative control of local
appropriations.
- Historically, its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed
with pork to a multitude of black slaves who
would cast their famished bodies into the
porcine feast to assuage their hunger with
morsels coming from the generosity of their
well-fed master.
- In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature, although, as will be later discussed,
its usage would evolve in reference to certain
funds of the Executive.
History of the Congressional Pork Barrel in the PH
Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922) is considered as
Pre-Martial the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel"
Law 1992- • Utilization of funds were subjected to post-
1972 enactment legislator 
approval 

The Pork Barrel System was discontinued due to the
era of one-man controlled legislature, but in 1982, the
Batasang Pambansa introduced a new item in the
GAA: the “Support for Local Development Projects”
 Practice of giving lump-sum allocations to
individual legislators 
began

Martial Law  Each assembylman receives ₱500k and
1972-1986 thereafter, would 
communicate their
project preferences to the Ministry of
Budget 
for approval

 Projects also began to cover not only hard
projects (public works) 
but also soft
projects (non-public works such as
education, health and livelihood) 

Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of
the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas
Development Fund"
• lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240
Post-Martial Million, respectively, for the funding of development
Law C. projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989
Aquino the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
1986-1992 legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation
of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF)
• integrated into the 1990 GAA with an initial funding
of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and
other priority community projects."
The pork barrel system was consistently adopted in
the GAAs
In 2000, the "Priority Development Assistance Fund"
(PDAF) appeared in the GAA.
Post-EDSA  The requirement of "prior consultation with
Revolution the respective Representative of the
District" before PDAF funds were directly
released to the implementing agency
concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000
PDAF Article
 Realignment of funds to any expense
category was allowed, provided no amount
shall be used to fund personal services and
other personnel benefits
 2002 GAA 
 Charter), Management Staff through which the
• Ordered release of funds directly to the Marcos; President provides direct assistance to
implementing agency or 
LGU concerned without amended by PD priority programs and projects not
further qualifications 
 2003 GAA 1993 funded under the regular budget
 Sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross
 Expansion of purpose 

earnings of PAGCOR
Macapagal-  Express authority to realign 

Arroyo 2001-  DPWH and DepEd projects required prior
2010 consultation with 
Members of Congress on
implementation delegation and project list
submission 
 2005 GAA 
 Controversies in the Philippines First Controversies
 PDAF shall be used to fund priority programs
and projects under 
the ten point agenda of  In 1996, former Marikina representative Candazo blew the
the national government 
 lid on huge sums of government money that regularly went
 It shall be released directly to implementing into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks
agencies 
  Kickbacks were SOP; ranged from 19-52% of the cost of
each project

Program menu concept—list of general programs and


implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF
project may be chosen by the identifying authority 
 LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management

2002 to 2010 GAA
 
• PDAF articles were silent as to the:
o Specific amounts allocated for individual legislators 
 misuse of PDAF in the 
form of kickbacks, the petition was
o Their participation in the proposal and identification

of PDAF projects 

o DPWH and DepEd School Building Program 
 NBI Probe (Napoles)
provisions explicitly required prior consultation 
with
the Member of Congress 
 • Allowed formal
participation of NGOs in the implementation of
projects
2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles
 "identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall conform to
the priority list, standard or design prepared
by each implementing agency (priority list
B. Aquino, III
requirement)." But as practiced, it would still
2010-
be the individual legislator who would
present
choose and identify the project from the
priority list
 Provisions for legislator allocations and fund
realignment were included 
 COA Report
 Allocation for the VP was deleted 

History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines
• special fund to help intensify, strengthen and
consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation and development of
PD 910, Marcos indigenous energy resources vital to economic
growth
PD 1869  Special funding facility managed and
(PAGCOR administered by the Presidential
Concerned citizens sought the nullification of PDAF in the
2004 GAA for being 
unconstitutional 

 For lack of pertinent evidentiary support as to the illegal
dismissed 

 Began because of allegations that the government has been
defrauded of some ₱10B over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers
and various government agencies for ghost projects

 6 whistleblowers declared that JLN Corporation swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for ghost projects
using 20 dummy NGOs
 The NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipient of PDAF,
the money was allegedly diverted into Napoles’ private
accounts
• After its investigation, criminal complaints were
filed
 (Plunder, Malversation, Direct Bribery,
Violation of the RA 3019)
 
Results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use
of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last
three (3) years of the Arroyo administration
 Determined the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF
and VILP (Various Infrastructures including Local Projects)
by the DBM

 Some of the highlights:
o Amounts released for projects identified by a number of
legislators exceeded their respective allocations 

o Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative
districts 

o Selection of NGOs was not compliant with law and
regulations 

o 82 NGOs entrusted with billions of pesos were either
 questionable, 
submitted spurious documents or failed to
liquidate their utilization of the 
funds
 o
 For the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistleblowers alleged that
at least ₱900M from royalties intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO The Procedural
Antecedents 
 appropriation and thus, the legislators have
 This case consolidated the petitions of Alcantara, Belgica,
and Nepomuceno.
Issue: Are the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate
constitutional provisions on: Non-delegability of Powers
Held: Yes. Legislative power should be exclusively
exercised by the body to 
which the Constitution has
conferred the same 
 Legislative power shall be vested in
Congress (SEC 1, ART 6, 
Constitution)
 Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
Only recognized exceptions:
- Delegation to LGUs which are allowed to
legislate on purely 
local matters
- Power of the President to:
o Exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy in
times of war and other national
emergency 

o Fix, within specified limits as Congress
may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and 
wharfage
dues and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national
development program of the
government
- Delegate rule-making—authority to
implementing agencies for the limited purpose
of either:
o Supplementary rule-making—filling up
details of the law for its enforcement
o Contingent rule-making—ascertaining
facts to bring the law into actual
operation
- SC: The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to INDIVIDUALLY exercise the power of
appropriation, which is lodged in Congress
- Individual legislators are given a personal lump-
sum fund from which they are able to dictate:
o How much from such fund would go to 

A specific project or beneficiary that they
determine 

- These two acts^ comprise the power of
been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not allow
Delegation to Local Government
LGC of 1991 Section 16: Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied there from, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage
and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
LGC of 1991 Section 19: A local government unit
may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant
to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment
of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may
not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner, and such offer
was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession
of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the
fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to
be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the
property.
Delegation to Administrative Bodies
Contingent Regulations
Cruz v Youngberg
G.R. NO. L-34674
October 26,1931
Facts: This is a petition brought at the CFI of Manila
against Stanton Youngberg as Director of the Bureau
of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit
for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the
petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The
petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No.
3155, which at present prohibits the importation of
cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine
Islands.
It asserts that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine
Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of
preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into
the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as
shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill
No. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature”
Issue: WON Act 3155 should be declared
unconstitutional
Held: No. The appellee contends that even if Act No.
3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact
alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the
petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from
Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155
were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would
automatically become effective.
The petitioner does not present any allegations in
regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity or
unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in
the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would
make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of
Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for
the importation of the cattle without the approval
of the head of the corresponding department.
The lower court did not err in holding that the power
given by Act 3155 to the Governor-General to
suspend or not the prohibition provided in the act
constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative
powers. The true distinction, therefore, is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made.
Eastern Shipping Lines v POEA
G.R. No. 76633
October 18, 1988
Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the MV
Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo in 1985. His widow, Respondent Kathleen
Saco sued for damages under EO 797 and Memo.
Circular No.2 of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., as owner of the vessel,
argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the
POEA but by the SSS and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund. Nevertheless,
POEA assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of Mrs.
Saco. She was awarded P192k for the death of her
husband (P180k as death benefits, P12k for burial
expenses).
Eastern Shipping filed the petition with the SC to
move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies. It argued that
Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the POEA was
violative of the principle of non- delegation of
legislative power.
Issue: Is Memorandum Circular No. 2 violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power
Held: Eastern contends that no authority had been
given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation’
and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.
BUT under Sec. 4(a) of EO 797, “the governing Board
of Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions
of the Administration (POEA).”
Similar authority had been granted the National
Seamen Board, which had itself prescribed a
standard shipping contract substantially the same as
the format adopted by the POEA.
What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what
the law shall be..
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
2 Tests to Determine Whether There is a Valid
Delegation of Legislative Power.
1. Completeness Test - the law must be
complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient Standard Test - there must
be adequate guidelines or stations in
the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative. The principle of non-delegation of
powers is applicable to all the 3 major powers of the
Govt but is especially important in the case of the
legislative power because of the many instances
when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are
rare when executive or judicial powers have to be
delegated by the authorities to which they legally
certain. In the case of the legislative power, such
occasions have become more and more frequent, if
not necessary.
This led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.
REASON: increasing complexity of the task of govt
and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the problems demanding its attention.
 The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature
cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend.
 Many of the problems attendant upon
present-day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say,
specific solutions.
 These solutions may, however, be expected
from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to
them.
These reasons are applicable to administrative
bodies.
 With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their peculiar problems, the
legislature has found it more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issues rules to carry out the
general provisions of the statute.
 This is called “the power of subordinate
legislation.”
With this power, admin bodies may implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in”
the details which Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide.’
 This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the DOLE on the Labor Code.
 These regulations have the force and effect
of law.
Delegation to the People
Article 6 Section 1: The legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
Article 6 Section 32: The Congress shall, as early as
possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact
laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative
body after the registration of a petition therefor
signed by at least ten per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
Test of Valid Delegation
Completeness Test
US v Ang Tang Ho
G.R. NO. 17122
February 27, 1922
Facts: The Philippine Legislature past Act No 2868
entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and
holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn
under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council
of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations
therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose. Section 3 defines what shall constitute a
monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within
the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the
price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
A complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang
Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price. The undersigned accuses Ang Tang
Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the
Governor-General of the Philippines. Ang Tang Ho,
voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro
Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that
fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-
General of the Philippines.
He was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five
months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500.
Issue: WON Act 2868 is constitutional in so far as
it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price
at which rice should be sold and delegates him
legislative power
Held: No. it fails to provide definitely and clearly
what the standard policy should contain, so that it
could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others, without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in
respect to maters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated,
and without which the act could not possibly be put
in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire
insurance policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law
must be complete, in all its terms and provisions,
when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government, and nothing must be left to the
judgement of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but
which may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act
No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in
rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per
"ganta," and that he would not commit a crime,
because there would be no law fixing the price of
rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a
crime. That is to say, in the absence of a
proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any
price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-
General issued the proclamation. There was no act
of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any
price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at
any price was to a crime.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the
maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant
may demand." The law is a general law and not a
local or special law.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general
law and does not authorize the Governor-General to
fix one price of rice in Manila and another price in
Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him to fix the
price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law,
which is General and uniform, and not local or
special.
Tablarin v Guitierrez
G.R. NO. 78164
July 31, 1987
Facts: The petitioners sought admission into
colleges or schools of medicine for the school year
1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not
take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the
Board of Medical Education. The filed a petition
seeking to enjoin CEM from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking
the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a
writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to
enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the
issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and
administrative order.
Issue: WON Sections 5(a) and (f) of RA 2382
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
Held: No. When one reads Section 1 in relation to
Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot
but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to
be read with absolute literalness. The State is not
really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make
quality education "accessible to all who might for
any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such
education accessible to all who qualify under "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If
the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards
are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act:
"the standardization and regulation of medical
education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same
Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these
considered together are sufficient compliance with
the requirements of the non-delegation
principle.chanrobles law library
Sufficient Standard Test
Ynot v IAC
G.R. No. 74457
March 20, 1987
Facts: Petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,
when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo.
Marcos issued E.O. 626 prohibiting the transfer of
carabao and carabeefs from one province to
another. The EO also provides that the meat and
animals confiscated and forfeited in violation
thereof shall be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions or deserving farmers
as the Chairman of National Meat Inspection
Commission “may see fit.”
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is here
by amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive
Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as
the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the
case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the RTC of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
After considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and,
since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond.
The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by
the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its
presumed validity.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, assailing that:
- The E.O. is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported
across provincial boundaries.
- The penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be
heard before a competent and impartial
court as guaranteed by due process.
- There was an improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President
under Amendment No, 6 of the 1973
Constitution.
Issue: WON there was lawful means? Was there a
valid delegation of authority when the EO provided
for the manner of distributing the confiscated
carabao and meat?
Held: No. The ban on the transportation of carabaos
from one province to another (E.O. 626-A), their
confiscation and disposal without a prior court
hearing is violative of due process for lack of
reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose to be achieved and for
being confiscatory.
- The original measure, E.O. No. 626-A
imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement, providing that "no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another.”
- SC: The object of the prohibition escapes us.
Furthermore, even if a reasonable relation between
the means and the end were to be assumed, due
process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard
in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished.
- The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers.
o The penalty is outright confiscation of
the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the
executive authorities, usually the police
only.
- In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after
trial and conviction of the accused.
o Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed,
and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police
and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
There is also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
- It is subject to abuse and corruption.
- There is no sufficient standard in the law on
how the authority may affect the
disposition of the confiscated property.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the
answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Just like in People v. Vera, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,"
in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.