EH 404
Navarro's spouse/husband was not
SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS
LEGITIME TOPIC
#65 MANONGSONG
FACTS
1. Guevara and Lopez had 6 children
2. Contested property is a parcel of land on Las
Pinas, Metro Manila.
3. Petitioners Manongsong( son of Vicente Lopez
who is a child of Guevara and Lopez) filed a
complaint alleging that Maningsong and
respondents were owners pro indiviso of the
property
4. They prayed for partition and award to them
the area equivalent to 1/5 of property and its
market value
5. Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the
original owner of the property.
6. Since Dominador (one of the six children) died
without offspring, there were only 5 children
left as heirs of Guevarra and each of the five
children which included Vicente, the father of
the petitioner was entitled of the property
7. As Vicente’s sole heir, Manongsong claims her
father’s 1/5 share in the property by RIGHT OF
REPRESENTATION.
8. The respondents are the survicing spouses of
Guevara’s offspring and have been in
possession for so long and petitioenrs are the
only descendanrs who have not occupied any
portion of property
9. Compromise agreement was entered:
petitioners and Ortiz and Dela Cruz families
agreed that each group of heirs would receive
an equal share in the property.
10. Signatories to the agreement prayed further
before the court that "those who have
exceeded said one-8fth (1/5) must be reduced
so that those who have less and those who
have none shall get the correct and proper
portion.”
11. Jumaquio sisters opposed and contended that
Justina Navarro who is the mother of Guevarra
sold the property to Guevarra’s daughter
Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.
12. The sisters presented Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng
Lupa and invoked defense of acquisitive
prescription as they were possessing the land
for more than 30 years and prayed to charge
Petitioners guilty of laches
RTC
- Ruled in favour of petitioners
- Held that kasulatan was VOID because the
property conveyed had CONJUGAL character
as there was no evidence that it was solely
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Beaniza-Caballes-Cadelena-Dacalos-Estavilla-Fernandez-Kinaadman-Melendez
paraphernal property e name of Justina
mentioned and/or whether the husband was
still alive at the time the conveyance was made
to Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her
compulsory heir should have the legal right to
participate with the distribution of the estate
under question to the exclusion of others. She
is entitled to her legitime.
- The Deed of Sale did not at all provide for the
reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it
has no force and effect against Agatona
Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate children
including the grandchildren, by right of
representation, as described in the order of
intestate succession. The same Deed of Sale
should be declared a nullity ab initio.
COURT OF APPEALS
- Held that petitioners were bound by their
admission that Navarro was the original
owner of the property
- Held that trial court erred in assuming that
property was conjugal when Navarro sold it
- a settled rule that the party who invokes the
presumption that all property of marriage
belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first
prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coveture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership.
- not a single iota of evidence was submitted to
prove that the subject property was acquired
by Justina Navarro during her marriage
- records show that in 1949 the subject
property was declared, for taxation purposes
under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This
indicates that the land is the paraphernal
property of Justina Navarro
HELD:
VALIDITY OF THE KASULATAN
- The Kasulatan, being a document
acknowledged before a notary public, is a
public document and prima facie evidence of
its authenticity and due execution. To assail
the authenticity and due execution of a
notarized document, the evidence must be
clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.
- Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it
would be deemed an ancient document and
thus still presumed to be authentic. The
Kasulatan is:
(1) more than 30 years old,
(2) found in the proper custody, and
(3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its
face, to be genuine.
 - no evidence presented to establish that
Navaro
acquired the property during her marriage
- no basis for the court’s declaration that the
sale in the kasulatan deprived compulsory
heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes
- a valid sale for valuable consideration does
not diminish the estate of the seller. When the
disposition is for valuable consideration, there
is no diminution of the estate but merely a
substitution of values, 30 that is, the property
sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary
consideration.
WHETHER CA ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING THE
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY PET. FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL
- no error in the Court of Appeals' refusal to give
any probative value to the alleged birth
certi8cate of Guevarra and the affidavit of
Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.
- Petitioners admitted before the trial court that
Navarro was the mother of Guevarra.
However, petitioners denied before the Court
of Appeals that Navarro was the mother of
Guevarra.
- If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it
would only further undermine petitioners'
case. Absent any hereditary relationship
between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property
would not have passed from Navarro to
Guevarra, and then to the latter's children,
including petitioners, by succession. There
would then be no basis for petitioners' claim of
co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from
Guevarra. On the other hand, this would not
undermine respondents' position since they
anchor their claim on the sale under the
Kasulatan and not on inheritance from
Guevarra.
- Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of
greater weight which petitioners failed to
refute by clear and convincing evidence, this
Court holds that petitioners were not able to
prove by preponderance of evidence that the
Property belonged to Guevarra's estate.
#66 JOAQUIN VCA
FACTS
1. Spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana are
parents of plaintiffs. The married Joaquin
children are joined in the action to declare null
and void ab initio Deeds of Sale of real
property executed by defendant parents
Leonardo and Feliciana in favour of their co-
defendant children and certificates of title.
2. Defendants aver:
a. Plaintiffs have no cause of action
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Beaniza-Caballes-Cadelena-Dacalos-Estavilla-Fernandez-Kinaadman-Melendez
b. Sales were sufficient considerations and made
voluntarily and in good faith and with full
knowledge of consequences of deeds of sale
c. Certificates of title were issued with sufficient
factual and legal basis
TRIAL COURT
1. Ruled in favour of defendants and
dismissed the complaint
2. The court finds the argument that
plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of
action since there is no legitime to speak of
prior to the death of their parents to be
tenable.
3. In determining the legitime, value of the
property left at the death of testator shall
be considered and the legitime of
compulsory heir is computed as of the time
of the death of decedent.
4. Plaintiffs cannot claim an impairment of
their legitime.
COURT OF APPEALS
1. Affirmed RTC decision
2. The right of plaintiffs to the properties as
compulsory heirs are merely INCHOATE and
vests only upon death of the decedent.
3. While still alive, defendant
parents are free to dispose of their properties,
provided that such dispositions are not made in fraud
of creditors.
4. Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties
to the deeds of sale in question. Neither do
they claim to be creditors of their defendant
parents. Consequently, they cannot be
considered as real parties in interest to assail
the validity of said deeds either for gross
inadequacy or lack of consideration or for
failure to express the true intent of the parties.
HELD
LEGAL INTEREST
- The strategy of the petitiomers was to have the
Deeds of Sale declared void so that the
ownership would revert to their parents and
thus they can have a claim by hereditary
succession
- They failed to show any legal right to the
properties; the courts should have dismissed
the action for this reason alone
- petitioners' right to their parents' properties is
merely inchoate and vests only upon their
parents' death. While still living, the parents of
petitioners are free to dispose of their
properties. In their overzealousness to
safeguard their future legitime, petitioners
forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to
their siblings does not affect the value of their
parents' estate. While the sale of the lots
reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value
replaced the lots taken from the estate
LACK OF CONSIDERATION
- petitioners asserted that the respondent
siblings did not pay the prices in the deed of
sale
- Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the
deeds of sale were simulated
- Petitioners' failure to prove absolute
simulation of price is magnified by their lack of
knowledge of their respondent siblings'
financial capacity to buy the questioned lots.
Not only did respondents' minds meet as to
the purchase price, but the real price was also
stated in the Deeds of Sale.
INADEQUACY OF THE PRICE
- petitioners failed to prove the ones mentioned
in the following:
Article 1355 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or
inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract,
unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue
Influence.
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a
contract of sale, except as may indicate a defect in the
consent, or that the parties really intended a donation
or some other act or contract.
- there is no requirement that the price be equal
to the exact value of the subject matter of the
sale
- In the instant case, the trial court found that
the lots were sold for a valid consideration,
and that the defendant children actually paid
the purchase price stipulated in their
respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of
the
- purchase price by the buyer to the seller is a
factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.
#67 Raymundo vs. Suarez
G.R. No. 149017
November 28, 2008
FACTS:
• Marcelo, Sr. and Teofista acquired numerous
properties governed by a conjugal partnership
of gains.
• After Marcelo, Sr. died, Teofista and
respondents executed an extrajudicial
settlement of estate
• Despite partition and settlement, the title of
the land remained in the couple’s name,
Teofista continued to administer the
properties.
Succession Team
Beaniza-Caballes-Cadelena-Dacalos-Estavilla-Fernandez-Kinaadman-Melendez
• Rizal Realty and Teofista, as stockholder was
sued by Valente for recission of contracts and
damages.
• The judgment of the CFI became final and
executory, properties of Teofista were sold
and levied in favour of Valente.
• Before expiration of redemption period,
respondents filed a revindicatory action
against Valente stating that they cannot be
liable for the judgment against their mother as
they were not impleaded.
• The RTC ordered Teofista and respondents to
vacate and surrender the property to Valente.
A certiorari was filed but it was denied by the
court.
• In another case, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued enjoining Valente to
transfer the properties to third persons.
Valente filed for petition for certiorari, the CA
granted it but the SC reversed the decision.
• In this case the SC opined that the wife and the
children are each entitled equally of their
legitimes making them as co-owners and thus
not barring the children’s right to annul the
sale.
• Due to the loss of the records, respondents
filed a motion for reconstitution of records.
Valente insisted that a declaration of heirship
should be made before respondents can annul
the sale.
• The RTC subsequently ordered the
nullification of the sale and required
respondents to submit evidence for proof of
their affiliation to the deceased.
• Both of parties filed for a motion for
reconsideration. After that the RTC decided
that declaration of heirship must be made in
another proceeding; a special proceeding. RTC
dismissed the case without prejudice for filing
the said special proceeding.
• The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and
reinstated the order in nullifying the sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a declaration of heirship is needed.
Whether or not the sale of the whole property is void.
RULING:
Issue on Heirship
 • NO. Herein respondents' status as legitimate
children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista — and
thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs — has been firmly
established, and confirmed by this Court in
Suarez v. Court of Appeals.
• This having been settled, it should no longer
have been a litigated issue when we ordered a
remand to the lower court. In short, petitioner
Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria
Concepcion's representation in the RTC that
our ruling in Suarez required herein
respondents to present evidence of their
affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is
wrong.
• The records of this case reveal a document, an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s
estate, which explicitly recognizes herein
respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate
children and heirs.
• The same document settles and partitions the
estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's
paraphernal properties, and separates the
properties she owns in common with her
children, herein respondents.
• Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia
and Maria Concepcion, became owners of the
subject properties only by virtue of an
execution sale to recover Teofista's judgment
obligation. This judgment obligation is solely
Teofista's, and payment therefor cannot be
made through an execution sale of properties
not absolutely owned by her.
• These properties were evidently conjugal
properties and were, in fact, even titled in the
name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus,
upon Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of
compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.'s share in
the conjugal partnership was transmitted by
operation of law to his compulsory heirs.
The Concept of Compulsory Succession
• Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of
succession, albeit not categorized as such in
Article 778 of the Civil Code. It reserves a
portion of the net estate of the decedent in
favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or
combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds
of succession.
• The portion that is so reserved is the legitime.
Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as
"that part of the testator's property which he
cannot dispose of because the law has
reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore,
called compulsory heirs."
• Herein respondents are primary compulsory
heirs, excluding secondary compulsory heirs,
and preferred over concurring compulsory
heirs in the distribution of the decedent's
estate.
Succession Team
Beaniza-Caballes-Cadelena-Dacalos-Estavilla-Fernandez-Kinaadman-Melendez
Issue on the sale of the whole property
• YES. Herein respondents' ownership of the
subject properties is no longer inchoate; it
became absolute upon Marcelo's death,
although their respective shares therein
remained pro indiviso.
• Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties
were sold on execution sale to answer for
Teofista's judgment obligation, the inclusion of
herein respondents' share therein was null
and void.
• Teofista's ownership over the subject
properties is not absolute. Significantly,
petitioner Valente does not even attempt to
dispute the conjugal nature of the subject
properties.
• Since Teofista owns only a portion of the
subject properties, only that portion could
have been, and was actually, levied upon and
sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of
Rizal.
• Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by
herein respondents is not necessary to annul
the judicial sale of their share in the subject
properties.
#68 De Papa v. Camacho
Tioco na Gatas or Gatas na Tongko? #Waley 
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant,
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came.
Facts
This case involves the application of Article 891 of the
Civil Code on reserve truncal, which was submitted in
the lower court by all the parties in a “Stipulation of
Facts and Partial Compromise” (note: only pertinent
facts included):
1. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the
plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being
said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.
2. They have as a common ancestor the late Balbino
Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco),
father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant.
3. Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously
donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia
Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs).
4. Toribia Tioco died intestate, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate
children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother
of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving
the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the
inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-
indiviso shares.
5. Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among
them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate,
three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had
predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three
(3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate
children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal
pro-indiviso shares.
6. Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without
issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in
the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his
father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who
received the said property subject to a reserva truncal.
7. Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her
rights and interests in the parcels of land
abovementioned were inherited by her only
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her
surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only
legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho.
9. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns
one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother,
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims,
upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7)
parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the
reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of
Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate
succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice,
oppose her said claim because they claim three-
fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in
said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by
Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights
(3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their
being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties submit for judicial determination in
this case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay
D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the
seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the
plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon
are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the
one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino
Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-
half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said
seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-
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eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected
by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the
tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses
and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs'
share in the rentals.
Lower Court
The lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco
Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the
defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of
land in dispute, in equal proportions, as follows:
Fracisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco – ¾ of
½ pro-indiviso shares or 3/8 of the 7 parcels of land
and entitled to 3/8 of the rentals collected and to be
collected by the defendant Dalisay from the tenants of
the parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real
estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs’ share in the
rentals.
Not satisfied, defendant appealed to the Court.
Issue
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the
plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court, all
relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in
the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the
reservable property upon the death of
the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the
Civil Code or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant,
the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should
be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
Ruling
The issue has already been answered in Padura v.
Baldovino, which declared the principles of intestacy
declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling,
and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood
were each entitled to a share double that of each of the
nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with
Article 1006 of the Civil Code.
We have concluded that the position of the appellants
is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule
designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property
originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and
by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant
(reservista).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed
by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-
appellees must be held without any right thereto
because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino
Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the
succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant,
although they are related to him within the same
degree as the latter.
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also
made in the Padura case that as to the reservable
property, the reservatarios do not inherit from
the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus.
Further, in Cano vs, Director of Lands, it was ruled that
intestacy proceedings to determine the right of
a reservatario are not necessary where the final
decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in
the name of the reservista over property subject
to reserva troncal Identifies the reservatario and there
are no other claimants to the latter's rights.
Had the reversionary property passed directly from
the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-
appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-
appellant under the rules of intestate succession.
There is no reason why a different result should obtain
simply because "the transmission of the property was
delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" i.e., the
property took a "detour" through an ascendant-
thereby giving rise to the reservation before its
transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings
already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
reversionary property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs-appellees.
The appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed
and set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with
costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
#69 GONZALES v. CFI of MANILA
1. Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito
Legarda y Tuason, died in Manila on June 17, 1933.
He was survived by his widow Filomena and their
seven children: four daughters and three sons.
2. The real properties left by Benito Legarda y
Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions
by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs
of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who
were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
3. Filomena Legarda died intestate and without issue
on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda.
4. Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an
affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties,
which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
Filomena Legarda, which were the properties in
litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of
adjudication, Filomena Roces Legarda succeeded
her deceased daughter as co-owner of the
properties held pro indiviso by her other
six children.
5. Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten identical
documents wherein she disposed of the
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properties, which she inherited from her daughter
in favor of her son’s children, a total of 16
grandchildren all in all.
6. Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving
children partitioned all the properties consisting
of the 1/3 share in the estate of Benito Legarda
y Tuason, which the children inherited, in
representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De
la Paz.
7. Mrs. Legarda died and her will was admitted to
probate as a holographic will. In the testate
proceeding, Beatriz Legarda, a daughter of the
testatrix filed a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother’s estate the properties,
which she inherited from her deceased daughter
on the ground that said properties are
reservable properties, which should be inherited
by Filomena Legarda.
8. Without awaiting the resolution on the motion,
Beatriz filed an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her
mother’s estate for the purpose of serving a
declaration that said properties are reservable
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath
in her will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of
her sons and daughters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties are subject to
Reserva Troncal.
RULING:
In reserva troncal:
A descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title
property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister.
The same property is inherited by another ascendant
or is acquired by him by operation of law from said
descendant.
The said ascendant should reserve the said property
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree from the deceased descendants (prepositus)
and who belong to the line from which the said
properties came.
So three transmissions are involved:
1. First transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or
donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister
to the deceased descendant.
2. Posterior transmission, by operation of law
(intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserva) in
favor of another ascendant, the reservor or
reservista, which two transmissions precede the
 reservation; and,
3. Third transmissions of the property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor
to the reserves (reservatarios) or the relatives
within the third degree from the deceased
descendant belonging to the line of the first
ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant.
Thus, if there is only two transmission there is no
reserva.
The persons involved in reserve troncal are:
1. The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by
lucrative or gratuitous title;
2. The descendant or prepositus who received the
property;
3. The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant
who obtained the property from the prepositus by
operation of law; and,
4. The reservee who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea
or tronco) from which the property came and for
whom the property should be reserved by the
reservor.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned
is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from
which the property came and upon whom the
property last revolved by descent. He is called the
propositus.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions,
namely:
a. The death of the ascendant obliged to reserve
b. The survival, at the time of his death, of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the property came.
The reservor has the legal title and dominion
to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if
the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor
is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon
the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of
the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor.
The reservor’s alienation of the reservable
property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning
that if at the time of the reservor’s death, there are
reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees
at the time of the reservor’s death, the transferee’s
title would become absolute.
On the other hand, the reservee has only an
Succession Team
Beaniza-Caballes-Cadelena-Dacalos-Estavilla-Fernandez-Kinaadman-Melendez
inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant
right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor.
It would become absolute should the reservor
predecease the reservee.
Even during the reservista’s lifetime, the
reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the
property, can already assert the right to prevent the
reservista from doing anything that might frustrate
their reversionary right, and, for this purpose,
they can compel the annotation of their right in the
registry of property even while the reservista is alive.
The reservable property is not part of the
estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them
by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing. The
reservatarios, therefore, do not inherit from the
reservista but frm the descendant prepositus, of
whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservista.
Hence, upon the reservista’s death,
thereservatario nearest to the propositus becomes
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of
the reservable property. The reservee CANNOT
impugn any conveyance made by the reservor BUT he
can require that the reservable character of the
property be recognized by the purchaser.
In this case, the properties in question were
indubitably reservable property in the hands of Mrs.
Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The
reservaton became a certainty when at the time of her
death the reservees or relatives within the third
degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living
or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
#70 Intestate of the late Filomena Jardin. ANDRES
JARDIN and others, applicants-appellants, against
SEVERINA VILLAMAYOR, opponent-appellant.
Nature:
This is an appeal certified by the CA to the SC as only
pure questions of law are involved.
Facts:
Applicants initiated the intestate proceeding
in the CFI Tayabas. In their application they requested
that Andres Jardin be appointed Administrator which
was eventually granted and scheduled the matter for
the declaration of heirs and the determination of
whether the summary distribution of the deceased's
assets should proceed.
In the hearing there was opposition by
persons with interest (or interested persons? Di ko
sure sa translation huhuhu) after hearing from both
parties the Court issued another order granting 5 days
to the applicants to amend their request and 15 days
for each party to discuss, perhaps in writing, the
question of whether the property left by the decedent
is part of the reservables, in view of the fact that
Severina Villamayor (mother of the decedent), one of
the opponents according to the order, alleges that said
property were inherited from the late Leoncia
Filomena Jardin (daughter).
The Court declared that the assets of the
deceased had ceased to be the legitime because the
decedent is not survived by any relative within the
third degree and that the applicants, Canuto Jardin is a
relative of the deceased within the fourth degree and
Andres Jardin within the fifth degree, thus the
properties should go to them.
It is admitted by the parties that all the assets
left by the late Leoncia Filomena Jardin are in the
hands of the opposition Severina Villamayor, who
claims to be the absolute owner of them for inheriting
them from her daughter, the late Leoncia Filomena
Jardin, who in turn died without offspring and when
she was only 10 years old; that Juan Jardin was the
great-grandfather of the deceased; that Canuto Jardin,
who passed away during the appeal, was the great
uncle of the decedent for being her grandfather's
brother, her grandfather is named Vicente; and that
Andres Jardin, is the uncle of the deceased for being
brother of the father of this called Januario Jardin,
already deceased.
(note that Severina Villamor was married to Januario
Jardin, father of Filomena. Ang properties gi awayan
diri kay nakuha ni Filomena from her father. so
basically ang applicants nag ingon na wala may ni
survive na relative ni Filomena within the third degree
so dili na reserved ang assets therefore mu adto na nila
Andres ug Canuto so there’s a question of how to
interpret the law)
Issue:
Are the assets/properties left by the decedent
considered reserved assets?
Held:
(so in this case, take note as to how to compute pila ka
degree away ang mga relatives)
Yes but they ceased to be so, being that no
relative within the third degree survived BUT since
Severina Villamor is the compulsory heir of her
daughter she is the true owner of the assets and
properties left by the decedent.
According to article 811 they have the
character of a legitime;,the goods that an ascendant
inherits from his descendant, when he has acquired it
from another ascendant, or from a brother, for a
lucrative title; and provides that in such a case the heir
is obliged to reserve said assets in favor of the
relatives that are within the third grade and belong to
the same line from which the assets originate. Since,
according to the provisions of article 918(this article
talks about how to compute the degree chu2x), Canuto
Jardin was a relative within the fourth grade of the late
Leoncia Filomena Jardin and Andres Jardin within the
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Beaniza-Caballes-Cadelena-Dacalos-Estavilla-Fernandez-Kinaadman-Melendez
fifth grade, it is clear that the disputed assets have
ceased to be reserved and the applicants have no right
to them. The true current owner of them is the
opposition, Severina Villamayor, for being the forced
heir of her daughter Leoncia Filomena Jardin.
#71. Padura v. Baldovino
G.R. NO. 11960, 27 December 1958
NATURE: Appeal on a pure question of law from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna
FACTS:
Agustin Padura contracted two marriages
during his lifetime. With his first wife, Gervacia Landig,
he had one child whom they named Manuel Padura,
and with his second, Benita Garing; he had two
children named Fortunato Padura and Candelaria
Padura.
Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving
a last will and testament, duly probated in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, wherein he bequeathed his
properties among his children, Manuel, Candelaria
and Fortunato, and his surviving spouse, Benita
Garing. Under the probate proceedings, Fortunato was
adjudicated four parcels of land.
Fortunato Padura died unmarried, without
having executed a will; and not having any issue; the
said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her
mother, Benita Garing. She applied for and later was
issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, but
subject to the condition that the properties were
reservable in favor of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which said property
came.
Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only
heirs, her four legitimate children, Cristeta, Melania,
Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino. Six years
later, Manuel Padura also died. Surviving him are his
legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio,
Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all surnamed Padura.
Upon the death of Benita Garing (the
reservista), appellants and appellees took possession
of the reservable properties. The legitimate children of
the deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria
Baldovino were declared to be the rightful reservees,
and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the
original reservees Candelaria Padura and Manuel
Padura, having predeceased the reservista).
RTC:
The lower court rendered judgment declaring
all the reservees (without distinction) "co-
owners, pro-indiviso, equal shares of the parcels of
land" subject matter of the suit.
APPELLANTS CONTENTION (whole blood):
The appellants contend that notwithstanding
the reservable character of the property under Art,
891 of the new Civil Code (Art. 811 of the Code of
1889) the reservatarios nephews of the whole
blood are entitled to a share twice as large as that of
the others, in conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Arts. 949 and 951 of the
Code of 1889) on intestate succession.
ISSUE:
In a case of RESERVA TRONCAL, where the
only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the
reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are
nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some
are nephews of the half blood and the others are
nephews of the whole blood,
1. Should the reserved properties be
apportioned among them EQUALLY?; or
2. Should the nephews of the whole blood take a
share twice as large as that of the nephews of
the half-blood?
RULING:
After mature reflection, we have concluded
that the position of the appellants is
correct. The RESERVA TRONCAL is a special rule
designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
To this end, the Code provides:
"Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant,
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (811)"
The stated purpose of the reserva is
accomplished once property has devolved to the
specified relatives of the line of origin.
HOWEVER, there is no further occasion for
its application.
In the relations between one reservatario and
another of the same degree, there is no call for
applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the reversionary
property should be governed by the ordinary rules
of INTESTATE SUCCESSION.
Therefore, upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should
pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to
those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus) , excluding those reservatarios of more
remote degree. And within the third degree of
relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the
right of representation operates in favor of nephews.
(Note: you can end here sa recits)
Succession Team
Beaniza-Caballes-Cadelena-Dacalos-Estavilla-Fernandez-Kinaadman-Melendez
FURTHER RULING (and/or questions for recits):
Proximity of degree and right of
representation are basic principles of ordinary
intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood
brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double
that of brothers and nephews of half-blood.
If in determining the rights of
the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to apply,
the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of
the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely
determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to
whom the property should be returned; but within
that group, the individual right to the property should
be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary
intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify
otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the
circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional
case, its application should be limited to what is
strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.
There is a THIRD POINT that deserves
consideration. Even during the reservista's lifetime,
the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of
the property, can already assert the right to prevent
the reservista from doing anything that might
frustrate their reversionary right: and for this purpose
they can compel the annotation of their right in the
Registry of Property even while the reservista is
alive. This right is incompatible with the mere
expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of
the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable
property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who
may not dispose of them by will, so long as there
are reservatarios existing. The latter, therefore, do
not inherit from the reservist, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are
the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservista. Had the nephews of
whole and half-blood succeeded
the prepositus directly, those of full-blood would
undoubtedly receive a double share compared to
those of the half-blood. Why then should the latter
receive equal shares simply because the transmission
of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the
reserva? The decedent (causante) the heirs and their
relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason
why the hereditary portions should vary.
FINALLY, the SC said that the trial court’s
opinion is supported by distinguished commentators
of the Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez
Román and Mucius Scaevola. The reason given by
these authors is that the reservatarios are called by law
to take the reservable property because they belong to
the line of origin; and not because of their
relationship. BUT the argument would lead to the
conclusion that the property should pass to any and all
the reservatarios, as a class, and in equal shares,
regardless of lines and degrees. In truth, such is the
thesis of Scaevola, that later became known as the
theory of reserva integral.
BUT, as we have seen, the Supreme Courts of
Spain and of the Philippines have REJECTED that
view, and consider that the reservable property
should be succeeded by the reservatario who is
nearest in degree, according to the basic rules of
intestacy.
72 Cano v. Director of Lands
FACTS:
Land Registration in CFI of Sorsogon decreed
the registration of Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the
Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre under the following
conditions: xx that the two parcels of land known as
Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of
Juban, with their improvements, be registered in the
name of Maria Cano (reservista), Filipina, 71 years of
age, widow and resident of Juban, province of
Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799
shall be subject to the right of reservation in favor of
Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil
Code xx.The decision being final, the decree and the
Certificate of Title were issued in the name of Maria
Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia
Guerrero. Counsel for the reservee (reservatorio)
Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court,
alleging the death of the original registered owner and
reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and
praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered
cancelled and a new one issued in favor of movant
Eustaquia Guerrero.
This was opposed by the sons (Jose and
Teotimo Fernandez) of the reservista, who contended
that the application and operation of the reserva
troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary
contentious proceeding, and that the Registration
Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the motion.
The lower court granted the petition for the reason
that the death of the reservista vested the ownership
of the property in the petitioner as the sole
reservatario troncal. The oppositors, heirs of the
reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order,
insisting that the ownership of the reservatario can
not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of
Act 496, but requires a judicial administration
proceedings. In this connection, appellants
(oppositors) argue that the reversion in favor of the
reservatario requires the declaration of the existence
of the following facts:
a.The property was received by a descendant by
gratuitous title from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister
b.Said descendant dies without issue;
c.The property is inherited by another ascendant by
operation of law; and
d.The existence of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came.
Succession Team
Beaniza-Caballes-Cadelena-Dacalos-Estavilla-Fernandez-Kinaadman-Melendez
ISSUE:
Whether or not Guererro is entitled to the land in
question.
HELD:
Yes, the requisites enumerated by appellants have
already been declared to exist by the decree of
registration wherein the rights of the appellee as
reservatario troncal were expressly recognized:
From the above-quoted agreed
stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot
No. 1799 was acquired by the
applicant Maria Cano by inheritance
from her deceased daughter, Lourdes
Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the
same from her father Evaristo
Guerrero and, hence falls squarely
under the provisions of Article 891 of
the Civil Code; and that each and
everyone of the private oppositors are
within the third degree of
consanguinity of the decedent Evaristo
Guerrero, and who belonging to the
same line from which the property
came.
It appears, however, from the agreed
stipulation of facts that with exception
of Eustaquia Guerrero, who is the only
living daughter of the decedent
Evaristo Guerrero, by his former
marriage, all the other oppositors are
grandchildren of the said Evaristo
Guerrero by his former marriages.
Eustaquia Guerrero, being the nearest
of kin, excludes all the other private
oppositors, whose degree of
relationship to the decedent is remoter
This decree having become final, all persons
are barred thereby from contesting the existence of
the constituent elements of the reserva. The only
requisites for the passing of the title from the
reservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of the
reservista; and (2) the fact that the reservatario
has survived the reservista. It is a consequence of
these principles that upon the death of the reservista,
the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the
appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by
operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. It is equally well settled that the reservable
property cannot be transmitted by a reservista to her
or his own successors mortis causa, (like appellants
herein) so long as a reservatorio within the third
degree from the prepositus and belonging to the line
whence the property came, is in existence when the
reservista dies. The rights of the reservataria
Eustaquia Guerrero have been expressly recognized,
and it is nowhere claimed that there are other
reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus
apparent that the heirs of the reservista are merely
endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the
reservable property to the detriment of the party • There was insufficient evidence that the
lawfully entitled thereto. purchase price of the land was paid after the
death of Maria. Also, the lot was titled in the
name of Anacleto “married to Maria.”
#73 Louis Aglibot vs. Andrea Mañalac
G.R. No. L-14530 • This indicates that the spouses acquired full
April 25, 1962 ownership during the lifetime of Maria.

FACTS: • Defendants are obliged to deliver the harvest.

• Leona and Evarista filed a verified petition for
summary partition of Juliana’s estate. The
court declared them as the only heirs of
Juliana.
• Leona and Evarista commenced an action to
recover from Andrea, et al the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land.
• Considering the belief of appellants that the
property in controversy formed part of the
estate of Anacleto.
• Upon the latter's death ownership thereof was
transmitted to all his heirs, subject to the
usufructuary rights of the surviving spouse,
Maria.

• They alleged that they inherited the property
from their deceased niece Juliana
• That upon death of Juliana’s father, Anacleto,
Andrea, et al took possession of the property
as their own and appropriated some harvest
there. They refused to surrender the lot.
• Andrea, et al countered that the land was
purchased from Esteban by Anacleto and
Maria (1st marriage). The latter died.
• Their contention — not sufficiently rebutted
— that only the latter enjoyed possession of
the property since her husband's death and
received the annual share pertaining to the
landlord seems to be reasonable and logical.
• She should be the only one, therefore,
sentenced to pay the harvest.

• The remaining payment of the land was paid

during the marriage of Anacleto and Andrea
(2nd marriage).

• Juliana, Anacleto and Maria’s daughter died in

1920, while Anacleto died in 1942. Andrea
acquired the properties as sole heir.

• Anacleto became the heir of Juliana, after the

former’s death. Andrea acquired the property

• The trial court, ordered defendants to return

½ of the land to the plaintiffs and to deliver
palay harvest to plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Andrea et al is entitled of the

land/

RULING:

• The land in question is a reservable property.

It belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Anacleto and Maria.

• Upon Maria’s death Anacleto and Juliana

inherited the land ½ each.

• Upon Juliana’s death, Anacleto inherited ½ of

Juliana, and he is obliged to reserve the other
portion to Leona and Evarista, aunts of Juliana,
and her relatives within the 3rd degree.

Succession Team
Beaniza-Caballes-Cadelena-Dacalos-Estavilla-Fernandez-Kinaadman-Melendez