G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
As her common law husband, petitioner
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON.
ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy
Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan
de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the
petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas
Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ,
SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON.
ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS,
ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-
CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA
VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.
PADILLA, J.:
DOCTRINE: Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by
death. The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by
contract and by will.
BP Blg. 129 Section 19(5): “RTCs shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction [over]: …(5) in all actions
involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.”
Article 294: “The claim for support, when proper and two
or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in
the following order: Among descendants and
ascendants the order in which they are called to the
intestate succession of the person who has a right to
claim support shall be observed.”
FACTS:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana
Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein
private respondents filed on 27 September 1988, a
petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that
Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and confined by petitioner in his
palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite
her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived
of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the
petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25
years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas
Eugenio.
The RTC in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued
the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of
Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be
the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides,
according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial
permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of
Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle
of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure
due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28
August 1988.
claimed legal custody of her body. Two (2) orders dated
29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by
respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's
body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its
autopsy
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas
corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss
the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the
court over the nature of the action. A special proceeding
for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable
to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.
Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana
only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of
the habeas corpus petition), private respondents
(Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who
is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully
interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her.
Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the
Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the
Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead
body of their sister Vitaliana.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner
and held that the ultimate facts show that if the person
of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court
is being prayed to declare the Vargases as the persons
entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the
body of said deceased. The Court, considering the
circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on
August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on
September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not
lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of
this case because it may entertain this case thru the
allegations in the body of the petition on the
determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the
dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the
burial or interment thereof, for the reason that under the
provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the RTC then proceeded to
the matter of rightful custody over the dead body, (for
purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to
give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the
award. Since there was no surviving spouse,
ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters
were preferred over petitioner who was merely a
common law spouse, the latter being himself legally
married to another woman.
ISSUES:
1. W/N RTC had jurisdiction over such
proceedings and/or had authority to treat the
action as one for custody/possession/authority
to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.
YES, Court did not lose jurisdiction over the
nature and matter of the case because it could
entertain the case through allegations of the
petition as to who should be given the custody
of the deceased’s body by virtue of Batas
Pambansa Bld. 129.
2. W/N custody of the deceased’s body should be
given to the deceased’s siblings. YES, Article
294 used as basis; Since the deceased had no
surviving spouse, children, or ascendants,
custody of the body fell onto her siblings
 because Philippine law does not recognize
common law marriages.
RULING:
1.) Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what
controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition;
but the allegations therein determine the nature of the
action, and even without the prayer for a specific
remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by
the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the
evidence introduced so warrant.
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before
the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was
dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it
will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition.
Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such
facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the
petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima
facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court
may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient
in form and substance, the writ should issue if the
petition complies with the legal requirements and its
averments make a prima facie case for relief. However,
a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas
corpus need not be very critical in looking into the
petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this
jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into
the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to
correct any errors or defects in the petition.
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to
the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition
for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are
generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case may so
far as possible be determined on its real facts and in
order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of
action and unnecessary expense, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking
of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify
a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged
by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy
became moot and academic due to the death of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of
custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
2. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated
under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used
therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence,
in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful
custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and
sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does
not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years
as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may
be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the
fact that such relationships are present in our society,
and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in
case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership
requires that the man and woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law
relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability
in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal
Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a
couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a
sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband
and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to
the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions
of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-
vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her;
in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the
Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The
immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased
person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the
expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman,
or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall
devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they
be adults and within the Philippines and in possession
of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO C.
NAVARRO, respondent.
TUASON, J.:
Doctrine: Evidence of the survivorship need not be
direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential.
Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which
a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption
does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls.
FACTS: (From CA’s findings) On February 6, 1945,
while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging,
the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin,
together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion,
and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and
the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the
ground floor of the building known as the German Club,
at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of
this City. During their stay, the building was packed with
refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club
was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started
shooting at the people inside the building, especially
those who were trying to escape. The three daughters
were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon
the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not
convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and
son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr.,
and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and
former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the
burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground
in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets.
Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire,
collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably
including Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and
Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby, the stayed there about three days, until
February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the
shelter because the shelling tore it open. They flied
toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino
Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who
fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and
his daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was
aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years
old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was
two or three years older than her brother; while the other
sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin,
were between 23 and 25."
These finding were all taken from the testimony of
Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived the
holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined
that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the
son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the
survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the
statutory presumption must be applied. The reasoning
of the CA for its conclusion is that the testimony of the
sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the German
Club in the company of his father and the witness, and
that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after
the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we may
infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during
the appreciable interval from the instant his son turned
his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All
we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin
was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the
German Club; but she could have died almost
immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might
have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters,
killed by falling beams from the burning edifice,
overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters
from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No
evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is
that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside,
and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this
circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she
died later than her son, and we are thus compelled to
fall back upon the statutory presumption. Indeed, it
could be said that the purpose of the presumption of
survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to
uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived
his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above
60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules
of Court).
The main question represented in the RTC and CA
related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children. The trial court
found the deaths of this persons to have occurred in this
order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion
and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela
Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The
Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except
that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have
survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is
now being contested by the petitioner. The importance
of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died
before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact
that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon
Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and
adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C.
Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by
first marriage.
It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and
that on the assumption that there is total lack of
evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela
Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article
33, be held to have died at the same time.
ISSUE: WON Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his
mother Angela Joaquin. YES, based on the testimony
of Francisco Lopez, a fair inference can be arrived at
that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died before his mother. The
presumption that Angela Joaquin died before her son
was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by
the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which
civil cases are decided, this inference should
prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2)
indirect(3) circumstantial or (4) inferential.
RULING: Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules
of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is
not (1) shown who died first, and there are no
(2) particular circumstances from when it can be
inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and
ages of the sexes, according to the following
rules:
xxx xxx xxx
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the
first to die to the two or more persons who would
inherent one from the other, the persons who
alleges the prior death of either must prove the
allegation; in the absence of proof the
presumption shall be that they died at the same
time, and no transmission of rights from one to
the other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are
intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be
available when there are facts. With particular reference
to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it
present is one in which the facts are not only unknown
but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific
evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed
that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts
are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the
law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation
that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule
123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the
evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may
be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there
are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step
in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
It is our opinion that the testimony of Francisco Lopez
contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of
the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions
painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can
be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died
before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son
cannot be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility
is entirely speculative and must yield to the more
rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other
way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was
killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the
German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have
negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so
died within that interval from the time he dashed out of
the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his
father and wife started to flee from the clubhouse, the
old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the
Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come
along. She could have perished within those five or
fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she
did seem very remote. True, people in the building were
also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly
refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were
shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She
even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and
son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to
gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where
she was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a
condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the
moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her.
It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to
her, the perils of death from staying were not so
imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement
that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40
minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the
head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse
that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals
said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and
the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even
so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough
to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was
still alive when her son expired.
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes,
besides the collapse of the building, by which Mrs.
Navarro could have been killed. All these are
speculative, and the probabilities, in the light of the
known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese
sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to
follow the only remaining living members of her family,
she could not have kept away from protective walls.
Besides, the building had been set on fire trap the
refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the
Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those
who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela
Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams
because the building was made of concrete and its
collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes,
these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not
within the brief space of five seconds between her son's
departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that
are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not
require that the inference necessary to exclude the
presumption therein provided be certain. It is the
"particular circumstances from which it (survivorship)
can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested
by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the
rule cannot mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never
certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding
of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427,
citing Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E.
44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.)
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de
Navarro died before her son is based purely on
surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure
foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory — that
the mother outlived her son — is deduced from
established facts which, weighed by common
experience, engender the inference as a very strong
probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this
inference ought to prevail.
G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor
CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City
Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
DOCTRINE: Rules respecting the requirement of
affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any
private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of
filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is
the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument
is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.
FACTS: Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino
(Dominique) and petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz
(Jenie) were living together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but
unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie
gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino".
Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using
Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City
Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she
submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth,2 Affidavit
to Use the Surname of the Father3 (AUSF) which she
had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father
Domingo Butch Aquino.4 Both affidavits attested, inter
alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had
continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and
that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie
attached to the AUSF a document entitled
"AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his
lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent
portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS
OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.5 I
RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN,
TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE
ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS
AQUINO. MY FATHER’S NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO
AND MY MOTHER’S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO.
x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE
MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT
FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE
WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD
COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR
THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S
ALL.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
By letter,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City,
Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s
application for registration of the child’s name because
he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately
died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to
acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through
the back of Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the
Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for
injunction/registration of name against respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled
to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter
alia, the denial of registration of the child’s name is a
violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased
father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,10 which
provides that an illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. They maintained that
the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes
an admission of paternity in a "private handwritten
instrument" within the contemplation of the above-
quoted provision of law.
The trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause
of action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing
paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms)
of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004
(the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private
handwritten document" through which a father may
acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows: 2.2 Private
handwritten instrument – an instrument executed in the
handwriting of the father and duly signed by him where
he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. The trial
court held that even if Dominique was the author of the
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain
any express recognition of paternity.1avvphi1Hence,
this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code,
as amended, does not expressly require that the private
handwritten instrument containing the putative father’s
admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add
that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though
unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the
above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative
Order that the admission/recognition must be "duly
signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the
earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family
Code.16
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in
not finding that Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography
contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the
child’s paternity.17 The OSG, in its comment, submits
that Dominique’s Autobiography "merely acknowledged
Jenie’s pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child.
ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten statement of
the deceased father of minor Christian Dela Cruz can
be considered as a recognition of paternity in a "private
handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. NO.
9255, which entitles the said minor to use his father’s
surname. YES.
RULING: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly
recognized him/her as his offspring through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register, or through
an admission made in a public or private handwritten
instrument. The recognition made in any of these
documents is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no
separate action for judicial approval is necessary.19
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not,
indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be
signed by the putative father. This provision must,
however, be read in conjunction with related provisions
of the Family Code which require that recognition by the
father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. x x x x
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
XXX
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child
through a written instrument must affix his signature
thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family
Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of
2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not
"unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed by
petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances
exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though
unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement
of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the
child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by
Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenie’s
testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo
Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the
registration of the questioned recognition of the child.
These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity
of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE"
as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and
"NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER."
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier
quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography have
been made and written by him. Taken together with the
other relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique,
during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as
common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his
parents’ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa,
Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his
death, Jenie gave birth to the child – they sufficiently
establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court
sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is
the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument
is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein
be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be
the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions
affecting him.22 It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code
to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father
bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor
child’s best interests to allow him to bear the surname
of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth
certificate.
G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T.
BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN
CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK
ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON
TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C.
TITULAR,Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
DOCTRINE: In a special proceeding for correction of
entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy
and filiation.
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza
Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular
accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular
and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and
introduced themselves as the wife and son,
respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the
course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate
from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental
which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick
having acknowledged by the father on January 13,
1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the
subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name
was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina
likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing
that Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.
Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate
children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of Negros a
petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate
record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They
contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated
by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille
and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on
account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her
(Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in
Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the
name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the
use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon,
Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of
the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to
determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the
declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as
stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose,
the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as
bigamous.
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
the trial court, dismissed the petition without prejudice,
it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of
entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court
under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an
action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should
be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been
denied, they filed the present petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon
the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy
even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.
Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of
Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend that
even substantial errors, such as those sought to be
corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a
petition under Rule 108.14
ISSUE: May the court pass upon the validity of marriage
and questions on legitimacy in an action to correct
entries in the civil registrar? NO
RULING: In a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction
to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of
the Civil Code15 charts the procedure by which an entry
in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be
used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical
error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber;
a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change
such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled
or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed
only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is properly
observed.16
proper party, and not through collateral attack such as
the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is
misplaced.
Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife
against the first wife for the return of one-half of the
death benefits received by the first after the death of the
husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage
with the husband while the latter’s marriage to the first
wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity
of the two marriages, it being essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death
benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary
to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein
petitioners before the lower courts were actions to
impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that
the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok
Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish
that they are not the latter’s children, hence, there was
nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is
why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of
Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the
substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their
biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was
allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial
proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves
who sought the correction of the entries in their
respective birth records to reflect that they were
illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not
Chinese, because their parents were never legally
married. Again, considering that the changes sought to
be made were substantial and not merely innocuous,
the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be
adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of
the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are
vastly different from those obtaining in the present case.

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court

clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection
with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action

is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records 17 and that
the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action

is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn
Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of
the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition
should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided
in said Code.1avvphi1

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of

marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the