#1 NOBLEJAS VS.

TEEHANKEE
G.R. No. L-28790

Facts:
Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he isentitled to the same
compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan
covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title. The Secretary of Justice,
Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring himto explain why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him. Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge,
he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the
Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, he was
suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES). Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of
the ES and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in
view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge).

Ruling:

No.

If the law had really intended to include the general grant of “rank and privileges equivalent to
Judges”, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then
such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of
powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory
control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto,the control of the Chief Executive
over such officials.

Petitioner’s theory that the grant of “privilege of a Judge of First Instance” includes by implication the
right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its
recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive
officials upon whom the legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. This include
(a) the Judicial Superintendent of the DOJ; (b) the Assistant Solicitors General; (c) the City Fiscal of
Quezon City; (d) the City Fiscal of Manila and (e) SEC Commissioner.

Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an
administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties
themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial
in character.Still, the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or
executive functions.

Petition is Dismissed.
#2 PO SUN TUN vs. W.S. PRICE and PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF LEYTE
G.R. NO. 31346
DECEMBER 28, 1929

PONENTE: MALCOLM, J.

FACTS:

On November 29, 1921, Gabino Po Ejap was the owner of a certain parcel of land situated in the
Tacloban, Leyte. On the same date, he sold the land to Po Tecsi for the sum of P8,000 and the latter
gave general power of attorney to the former including the right to sell. Gabino and Po Tecsi are
brothers, while Gabino and Po Sun Tun are father and son.

On June 21, 1923, Po mortgaged the land to W. S. Price in the amount of P17,000. The mortgage was
duly noted in the office of the RD on August 18th of the same year.

Acting under this power, Gabino sold the land on November 22, 1923, for P8,000 to Jose H. Katigbak.
On this document there appears on the upper right-hand margin the following: "Register of Deeds,
Received, Dec. 15, 1923, Province of Leyte."

On December 17, 1924, Po executed a deed of sale of the land to Price in consideration of P17,000.
This sale was recorded with the RD on January 22, 1925.

On February 16, 1927, Price with the consent of his wife, sold the land to the Province of Leyte for
P20,570. On March 17, 1927, the OCT was issued in the name of the spouses Price. Later, the proper
transfer certificate of title was provided for the Province of Leyte. On October 12, 1927, Katigbak
transferred the property to Po Sun Tun for P8,000.

Presently, the possession of the property has been under the control of Price and the Provincial
Government and has not been under the material control of Po Sun Tun. The latter filed an action to
gain the possession of the property before the CFI and decided in favor of Price.

On the appeal, it was found out that the deed in favor of Katigbak had not been registered in
the corresponding registry of property.

ISSUE:

Whether the deed in favor of Katigbak with the note “ Register of Deeds, Received December
23, 1923, Province of Leyte” can it be said to be recorded in the Registry of Deeds.

HELD:

No. the term "To register" it has been said that it means to "enter in a register; to record formally and
distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list"

The mere presentation to the office of the register of deeds of a document on which acknowledgment
of receipt is written is not equivalent to recording or registering the real property. Escriche says that
registration, in its juridical aspect, must be understood as the entry made in a book or public registry
of deeds.

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If any doubt remained on the subject, it would be dispelled by turning to Act No. 2837 amendatory of
section 194 of the Administrative Code, and recalling that it is therein provided that "No instrument
or deed establishing, transmitting, acknowledging, modifying or extinguishing rights with respect
to real estate not registered under the provisions of Act No. 496, entitled 'The Land Registration'
and its amendments, shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, until such instrument or
deed has been registered, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, in the office of the register of deeds
for the province or city where the real estate lies."

Hence, since the deed made by Gabino in favor of Katigbak was not only not first recorded in the
registry of deeds but never legally so recorded, and since the purchaser who did record his deed was
Price, who secured a Torrens title and transferred the same to the Province of Leyte, that Po Sun Tun,
the holder of a defeasible title, has no legal rights as against Price and the Province of Leyte, the
holders of indefeasible titles. Further, it could beruled that within the meaning of section 38 of the
Land Registration Law, Price and the Province of Leyte are innocent purchasers for value of the
disputed property.

#3 Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying

G.R. No. 144773, 16 May 2005

FACTS:
Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over Lot No. 4399
located in Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta died, so the Cadastral court issued a decision directing the
issuance of a decree of title in the name of her 8 children, namely: Juan, Celedonio,Emiliano,
Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. However, the certificate was
lost during the war.

All the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale conveying the lot in issue to the Aznar Brothers Realty Company. The deed was
registered with the ROD of Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1994 under Act. No. 3344 (the law governing
registration of unregistered land) and since then, the realty company religiously paid the real property
taxes on the property. Later, Aznar Brothers Realty Company filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the
Original Title since the original title of the lot was lost during the war. This was granted by the court
and the ROD of Lapu-Lapu was directed to issue a reconstituted title in the name of the Aying
Siblings. Thus, OCT No. RO-2856 was issued.

The Aznar Brothers Realty Company then sent out notices to vacate the lot to the persons occupying
the property, reasoning that they were the rightful owner. The occupants refused to vacate, hence an
ejectment case was filed against them before the MTC. The MTC ordered the occupants to vacate.
Eventually, this case reached the Supreme Court and a decision was rendered in favor of the realty
company declaring them as the rightful possessor of the land.

Meanwhile, persons claiming to be the descendants of the eight Aying siblings, numbering around
220 persons submitted an amended complaint before the RTC and alleged that they are co-owners of
the land being the descendants of the registered owners under OCT No. RO-2856; that they had been
in actual, peaceful, physical, open, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession in concept of
owner of subject parcel of land since time immemorial; and that the deed of absolute sale executed in
favor of the realty company by the alleged heirsof Crisanta Maloloy-on is a fraud and is null and void
ab initio because not all the co-owners of subject property affixed their signature on said document
and some of the co-owners who supposedly signed said document had been dead at the time of the

3
execution thereof; that Aznar Brothers Realty Company held the land in bad faith, knowing fully well
that it did nothave any right to the land and used force, threat and intimidation against them thus,
suffering moral damages.

Aznar Brothers Realty Company denied that the Ayings are the lawful owners of the land and alleged
it had been in actual possession of subject land as owner thereof by virtue of the extra-judicial
partition of real property and deed of absolute sale executed in its favor; that in fact, it had been
paying taxes thereon religiously. The realty company further alleged that they are barred by
prescription to file an action for recovery of property which should be instituted within 4 years from
discovery of the fraud. It took the Aying heirs 27 years to file their action against the realty company.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the realty company’s defense, that they acquired the entire parcel of land with the
mistaken belief that all the heirs have executed the document, entitle them to ownership over the land
by prescription.

RULING:
No, Aznar Brothers Realty Company cannot be entitled ownership over the land based on mistaken
belief. The law provides that if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it
is considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. Based on this rule, a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted
to him until and unless he repudiates the trust. However, in constructive implied trusts, prescription
may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said
trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.

#4 Teodoro Almirol v Registry of Deeds

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

FACTS

In June 1961, Petitioner Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated
in Esperanza, Agusan, and covered by OCT P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa
M. Abalo." Sometime in May 1962, Almirol will cause the registration of the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a TCT. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds since the property was a
conjugal one and that Agusan cannot dispose such property even if his wife has already died.

Almirol the filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Agusan to compel the
Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale, to issue the TCT and damages. It is Almirol's assertion
that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that Almirol
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

ISSUE
W/N a petition for mandamus is the remedy to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale
in question.

RULING

Yes. It is the ministerial duty of respondent Registry of Deeds to register the deed of sale in
question. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this

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function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.

The supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration, because
invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on
registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered.

The registry of deeds is precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal
judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or
instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the
proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration,
all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the
doubtful question.

#5 Tantoco

#6 Baranda vs. Gustilo

GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988

FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo
covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between petitioner
(Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan
Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land. However during the trial, it
was found that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was fraudulently acquired. So the
transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the
order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-
25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners.
However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was
annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of
Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion
for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?

HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand that
the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of
Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds,
encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did not
have any legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him to
cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It shall be the duty of the register of
deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.

If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the
presentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his
right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.” On the other hand, Sec 117 of
PD 117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken
or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him

5
for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register
of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of
Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest through the Register of Deeds.”

#7 Baranda v. Gustillo
G.R. No. L-81163 (September 26, 1988)

FACTS:
Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land, Lot No. 4517. The Court, after discovering that
private respondent’s TCT was fraudulently acquired, ordered a writ of possession against them and
issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents.
Another group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of
said lot, which
the court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the implementatio
n of the final decisions of the Court.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals prevents
the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in
the certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this
Court.
2. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul the notice of lis
pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title?

HELD:
1. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand. He
forgot the par 1 of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides: Cancellation of lis pendens –
“Before the final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the
Court after proper showing that … it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to
be registered. …”

2. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that, “It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds
to immediately register an instrument presented for registration. If the instrument cannot be
registered, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground therefore, and
advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta.”

#8 Gallardo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of the private
respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The
subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of
81,300 square meters, more or less, initially covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262,
issued on April 2, 1924owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10,
1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them in a private document, an

6
unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva
conveying and transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners. Subsequently, the
Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the
petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On
November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto
R.Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Laguna. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to settle
said controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners instituted court suit against the private
respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and
Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale of August 10,
1937, as well as the reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio.

Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court. However, the
Intermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. RT-6293 (No.
23350) issued in the names of petitioners.

HELD:
No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance be executed
"before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the
peace, who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated” was
violated.

The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the
private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private
document of sale. With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496
“Deeds of Conveyance, affecting lands, whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be
sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as
effective to convey, encumber or bind the lands as though made in accordance with more prolix forms
heretofore in use.”

It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely not registerable under the Land
Registration Act. Also, the contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary
successors.

#9 SEVERO SALES v. CA

#10 ANA GONZAGA VS. CA

7
#11 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSEFINO O. ALORA and OSCAR O. ALORA,
G.R. No. 210341, July 1, 2015

FACTS:
On 6 June 2010, the respondents file a verified application for registration of title before the RTC.
Among other pieces of evidence, the respondents presented the certification of CENRO that the land
applied for registration in an alienable and disposable land. The RTC granted the application and
further ruled that the applicable jurisprudence is the case of Republic v. Serrano promulgated on 24
February 2010, wherein the SC allowed the approval of a land registration even without the
submission of certification from the DENR Secretary, and not the case of Rep. v. T.A.N, promulgated
on 26 June 2008, which categorically requires all applicants for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. The petioner appealed with the CA, however, the latter affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE: Whether the certification by the CENRO is sufficient evidence to show that the subject parcel
of land falls within the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain.

HELD:
No.
Admittedly, we declared in Republic v. Vega that trial courts may grant applications for registration
despite the absence of a certification from the DENR Secretary. It should be emphasized, however,
that Republic v. Vega applies on a pro hac vice basis only. After Republic v. Vega, we pointed out in
Republic v. San Mateo 27 that:

In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial court rendered its decision on November 13,
2003, way before the rule on strict compliance was laid down in T.A.N Properties on June 26, 2008.
Thus, the trial court was merely applying the rule prevailing at the time, which was substantial
compliance. Thus, even if the case reached the Supreme Court after the promulgation of T.A.N
Properties, the Court allowed the application of substantial compliance, because there was no
opportunity for the registrant to comply with the Court's ruling in T.A.N Properties, the trial court
and the CA already having decided the case prior to the promulgation of T.A.N Properties.
In the case here, however, the RTC Decision was only handed down on November 23, 2010, when the
rule on strict compliance was already in effect. Thus, there was ample opportunity for the respondents
to comply with the new rule, and present before the RTC evidence of the DENR Secretary's approval
of the DENR-South CENRO Certification. This, they failed to do.

#12 Secretary of DENR vs Yap

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed
by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a
tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an
application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that

8
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No.
705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption
of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

#13 Collado vs. CA G. R. No. 107764 October 4, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of
land with an approximate area of 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in
Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the
application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, "[t]his survey
is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." Then petitioner Collado filed an Amended Application to
include additional co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as
"petitioners" for brevity).

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo,
through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’
application.

Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been
open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando
Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.

ISSUES:

9
Whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.

HELD:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources belong to
the State. Watersheds are considered natural resources which are not susceptible of occupancy,
disposition, conveyance or alienation. The statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State.

#14 Heirs of Amunategui vs. Dir. of Forestry125 SCRA 69, Gr. No. L-127873, November
29, 1983

Facts:

Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the
title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and
registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.The Director of Forestry, through the
Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming
that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public
domain.The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land
because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove
swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as
first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot
885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the
property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was
already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and
not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.

Issue:

whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the
private applicants.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit.A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is
10
part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon the
other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered
moot by this finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioners

#15 G.R. No. L-3714 January 26, 1909

ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL, petitioner-appellee,

vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL., respondents.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, appellant..

FACTS:

Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a piece of
land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery.

This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by the
entity known as Obras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the land in question
belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that it was the absolute owner of all
the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery.

The Court of Land Registration in its decision dismissed the said oppositions in favor of Isabelo
Montano y Marcial. From this decision only counsel for the Director of Public Lands appealed to this
court.

Issue:

The issue was, whether or not “government land” has the same meaning as “public land”.

Held:

Negative

In order to avoid misapprehension it was pointed out the phrase "public lands" is held to be
equivalent to "public domain," and does not by any means include all lands of Government
ownership, but only so much of said lands as are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement
by homestead and other like general laws.

Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items; the first includes not
only the second, but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or
subject to private right. In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public
lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof.

It was the object of Congress not to work such a result but, on the contrary, in furtherance of the
purposes of the treaty of Paris, to recognize and safeguard such property. Therefore, the judgment of
the Court of Land Registration is affirmed, without costs.

_____________________________________________________________
11
Government property was of two kinds — first, that of public use or service, said to be of public
ownership, and second, that of having a private character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.)
Lands of the first class, while they retain their public character are inalienable. Those of the second
are not. Therefore, there is much real property belonging to the Government which is not affected by
statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands. Examples in point are properties
occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or other governmental uses.

A marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong to the State and is not susceptible to
appropriation by occupation, has no application in the present case inasmuch as in said case the land
subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled.

#16 Chavez v Public Estate Authority

GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002

Facts:
On November 20, 1973, the government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a
contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.

On April 25, 1995 the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the
Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding.

The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the
conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of
the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA
cannot alienate these lands, the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void,
and the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, President Ramos created a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality
of the JVA. The Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions of the Senate
Committees.

On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands to
lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to
AMARI of lands of the public domains as blatant violation of Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution
prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Petitioner assert
that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billion of pesos in properties of the State that are of public
dominion.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit.

Ratio Decidendi:
12
The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to
comply with its constitutional duties. This duties are particularly in answer of the right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern, and of a constitutional provision intended to insure the
equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. Furthermore,
the court considered that the petition raised matters of transcendental importance tot eh public. The
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate
and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities if the issues raise are of paramount public interest and if they immediately affect the
social, economic and moral well being of the people.

The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic since this compels the court to insure
the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the
national patrimony. The content of the amended JVA seeks to transfer title and ownership of
reclaimed lands to a single corporation. The court does not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.

The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. The instant case is a
petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, PEA was
under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is
purely legal or constitutional question.

The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
agreement as required by the constitution.

The Supreme Court granted the petition. PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
permanently enjoined from implementing the amended JVA which is hereby declared null and void
ab initio.

#17 BALBIN V. REGISTER OF DEEDS

Where several co-owner’s duplicate of certificates of titles are issued, a voluntary instrument cannot
be registered without surrendering all the copies to the Register of Deeds so that every copy of
thereof would contain identical entries of the transactions affecting the land covered.

FACTS:
Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy of
the registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter
be annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-
vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being “legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law.” It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum
of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of
Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received their co-owner’s duplicate
CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s copies of CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the
register of deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Petitioners referred the matter to the
Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.
13
ISSUE:
W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is proper

HELD:

YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their integrity may be affected if an
encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. If different
copies were permitted to carry different annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would
cease to be available.
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is, property of donor Cornelio
and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina, “there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the
surviving spouse may make such a conveyance.” Assuming the conjugal nature of the property, the
donation bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact that
2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than ½ his share, not to say more than
what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.

Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelio’s civil status, character of land and
validity of conveyances are in issue, the registration may await the outcome of said case and parties
may protect their rights by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.

#18 SM Prime Holdings v. Madayag. G.R. No. 164687. February 12, 2009

Facts:
Madayag filed with the RTC of Pangasinan an application for registration of a parcel of land situated
in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM) filed an opposition to the application
alleging that Madayag’s survey plan encroached from their properties. Meanwhile, SM filed with the
DENR a petition for the cancellation of Madayag’s survey plan. SM filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings, alleging that the RTC should await the DENR resolution of the petition for the
cancellation of the survey plan. The RTC issued an Order granting the Motion. Madayag filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the RTC Order. CA granted the petition ordering the RTC
to continue proceedings. Thus, SM filed this Petition for Review.

Issue:
Whether the RTC should suspend the proceedings in the land registration case pending the resolution
of the petition for the cancellation of Madayag’s survey plan filed with the DENR.
Ruling:

There is no need to suspend the proceedings. When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the
latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. It
may, therefore, hear and determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration. The RTC
need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order to
determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already titled property.
Petition is denied. The RTC is directed to continue with the proceedings.

14
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

#1 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, G.R. No. 144057 (January 17, 2005) Case Digest
Alienation of Public Agricultural Lands

Facts:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The application
sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the land.

The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the petition. The court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to Angeles and the government.

The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming,
wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father
to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.

Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator
introduced improvements, planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to
60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land.

Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application
for registration.

The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be
alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not
have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable.

The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.

Issue:

Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject
land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership could even start.

Held:

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance

15
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section
14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands
as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent
state.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified
as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the
State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section 14(1) had been met by
Naguit. The parcel of land had been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land evidenced by
the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased the property; as well as the tax declarations
executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which strengthened one's bona fide claim of
ownership.

#2 ALOMO v. CA
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997

FACTS:
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916,
he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen
Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay

16
on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912,
3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot
Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct
Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was
never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither
susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the
Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real
estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts.
On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad
Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.

HELD:
The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing
natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands
are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here
forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of
improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the
registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing
improvements on the lots.

#3 LEONARDO ACABAL and RAMON NICOLAS, petitioners,

vs. VILLANER ACABAL, EDUARDO ACABAL, SOLOMON ACABAL, GRACE ACABAL,
MELBA ACABAL, EVELYN ACABAL, ARMIN ACABAL, RAMIL ACABAL, and BYRON
ACABAL, respondents.

G.R. No. 148376 - March 31, 2005 – Carpio-Morales, J.

FACTS: “Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasabas, owned a parcel of land situated in Barrio
Tanglad, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, containing an area of 18.15 hectares more or less, described in
Tax Declaration No. 15856. By a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 6, 1971, his parents transferred for
P2,000.00 ownership of the said land to [Villaner Acabal], who was then married to Justiniana
Lipajan.” On April 19, 1990, Villaner executed the deed in question, by which the lot was transferred
to his nephew and godson Leonardo Acabal, who later sold it to Ramon Nicolas. On October 11, 1993
Villaner filed a case for annulment of the sale to Leonardo and to Nicolas. Villaner claimed that he did
not know the contents of the deed he signed, which he claimed was a Deed of Sale (earlier in the
proceedings he said it was a Lease Contract). The RTC dismissed the complaint. Villaner appealed to
the CA, who reversed the RTC and held that the deed in question was simulated and fictitious.
Leonardo and Ramon thus appealed to the SC on certiorari.

ISSUE:
1) W/N the deed is valid
2) W/N the property in question is conjugal property

17
HELD/RATIO:
1) YES. The failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document does not
preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute
of limitations, estoppel, and want of consideration. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of
proof lies on the party who makes the allegations. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove it
by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that
of his opponent. Villaner failed to prove his allegations for he failed to adduce evidence to support his
claims of simulation and lack of knowledge as to the nature of the deed. Leonardo’s witness (the
drafter of the actual deed) on the other hand was able to prove that the deed was duly drafted, read
and signed by Villaner.
“Even assuming that the disposition of the property by Villaner was contrary to law, he would still
have no remedy under the law as he and Leonardo were in pari delicto, hence, he is not entitled to
afirmative relief – one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands. In pari
delicto potior est conditio defendentis.”

2) YES. The issue arose when Villaner’s co-heirs denied the validity of the transfer as to their shares
because they did not consent to such transfer. Art. 160 of the Civil Code gives rise to a presumption
that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal. In this case it was clear that Villaner was
married when he acquired the land. A tax declaration or “[r]egistration of the properties in the name
of the husband does not destroy the conjugal nature of the properties. What is material is the time
when the land was acquired by Villaner, and that was during the lawful existence of his marriage to
Justiniana”. Upon his wife’s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved and Villaner became
entitled to a ½ undivided share. The other share accrued to Justiniana’s heirs: Villaner and their 8
children. They are now the co-owners of the lot in question. “With respect to Justiniana’s one-half
share in the conjugal partnership which her heirs inherited, applying the provisions on the law of
succession, her eight children and Villaner each receives one-ninth (1/9) thereof. Having inherited
one-ninth (1/9) of his wife’s share in the conjugal partnership or one eighteenth (1/18) of the entire
conjugal partnership and is himself already the owner of one half (1/2) or nine-eighteenths (9/18),
Villaner’s total interest amounts to ten-eighteenths (10/18) or five-ninths (5/9). While Villaner owns
five-ninths (5/9) of the disputed property, he could not claim title to any definite portion of the
community property until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to partition, all
that he has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the property. Villaner, however,
as a co-owner of the property has the right to sell his undivided share thereof”, by virtue of NCC 493;
but such sale will only be valid as to the portion pertaining to Villaner. In effect, the buyer
becomes a co-owner of the property. “The proper action in cases like this is not for the
nullification of the sale or the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common
from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the
possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it.” The proper action is
partition under Rule 69. The rule in Cruz v. Leis, which held that “[w]here a parcel of land, forming
part of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a
widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in
the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of
the deceased spouse” does not apply because the land subject of that case was unregistered. “The issue
of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land
but not where the property is an unregistered land.”

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals February 15, 2001 Decision in CA-

18
G.R. CV No. 56148 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is rendered declaring the sale in favor
of petitioner Leonardo Acabal and the subsequent sale in favor of petitioner Ramon Nicolas valid but
only insofar as five-ninths (5/9) of the subject property is concerned.
No pronouncement as to costs.

#4 HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A,
which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC
approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should
the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as

19
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based
on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.

20
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in
particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

# 5 Ramos Vs. Director Of Land

Facts:
 In 1882, Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a tract of land located in the
municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija.
 Ponce obtained a possessory information title of the land (by taking advantage of the Maura Law
or Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1994) and registered the land in 1896.
 In 1907, the part of the land (Parcel 1) was sold by Ponce to petitioner Ramos and to his wife
Ambrosia Salamanca.
 Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
 The Director of Lands and Director of Forestry opposed the application on the following
grounds: Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government; The first parcel was
forest land.
 RTC and CA ruled against Ramos.
 It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to Ramos at least held this tract of land
under color of title.

Issue: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title
sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

Held: YES.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession
and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of
all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

Ramos has a color of title, is in good faith and had been in OPN possesion
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the
land was for his enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter
of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled
the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.

Important law: Act NO. 926

21
Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No.
1908, reads as follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as
defined by said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against
the Government, for a period of 10 years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen
hundred and four (July 26, 1904), except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to
have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions
of this chapter.

There was no satisfactory evidence to support the claim that the land is a forest land
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and
the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the
opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal
opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.

Ruling:
 Ramos proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the
provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with
reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and Ponce’s
possessory information.
 RTC shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in
plan Exhibit A.

#6
LIMCOMA MULTI-PURPOSECOOPERATIVE, Petitioner,
- versus -REPUBLIC OFTHEPHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 167652

" Applicant may acquire title by prescription under Sec. 14(2) of P.D. 1529even if he cannot prove
possession since June 12, 1945FACTS:

On September 24, 2001, petitioner Limcoma Multi-PurposeCooperative filed with the RTC an
application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land.

Petitioner alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject lot and theimprovements thereon,
and that it has been in the open, exclusive, peaceful, and continuous possession thereof for more than
30 years, reckoned from the time of possession of its predecessors-in-interest.
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At the ex-parte reception of evidence, petitioner presented the testimonies of Olivia P. Gomez,
Arsenia P. Alcantara, and Lorenzo P. Limbo.

The RTC granted the application in its Order dated April 10, 2003

On appeal, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision of the trial court

In reversing the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to demonstrate the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12,1945 or earlier, required by the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act;

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner acquired the property under Sec. 14 of P.D. 1529

RULING:

Yes, Prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership. The Court had occasion to rule in numerous
instances that open, exclusive, and continuous possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land
ipso jure converts the same to private property.

The conversion works to summon into operation Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
which, in turn, authorizes the acquisition of private lands through prescription.

It stands to reason, therefore, that the petitioner has acquired registrable title over the subject lot
anchored on its predecessors-in-
interest’s possession
traced back to 1938, and its own possession of 10 years, reckoned from 1991to the filing of
the application for registration in 2001.

The Court reversed the decision of CA and reinstated the Order of the RTC.

#7 G.R. No. L-27088 July 31, 1975

HEIRS OF BATIOG LACAMEN vs. HEIRS OF LARUAN

Facts:
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals. "... declaring the contract of
sale between Lacamen and Laruan null and void [for lack of approval of the Director of the Bureau of Non-
Christian Tribes] ..." Petitioners-appellants are the surviving heirs of Batiog Lacamen, while respondents-
appellants are the heirs of Laruan.
Laruan executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Batiog Lacamen. Laruan delivered the certificate of title to
Lacamen. Thereupon, Lacamen entered in possession and occupancy of the land without first securing the
corresponding transfer certificate of title in his name. He introduced various improvements and paid the proper
taxes. His possession was open, continuous, peaceful, and adverse.
Later on, after the death of Laruan, his heirs discovered that Laruan’s heirs were able to obtain a new owner’s
certificate of title. Hence, they sued Laruan’s heirs for reconveyance. The Trial Court rendered a decision in
favor of the heirs of Laruan whose decision was affirmed by the CA.
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Issue:
WON estoppel by laches applies?
Ruling:

Laruan’s sale of the subject lot to Lacamen could have been valid were it not for the sole fact that it lacked the
approval of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes considering that there was impressed upon its face full faith and
credit after it was notarized. However, notwithstanding the invalidity of the sale, the fact that when the
Lacamens succeeded to the estate of their father, the Laruans kept silent, never claiming that the lot is their own.
Even granting that no prescription lies against their father’s record title, their inaction for almost 30 years
commands the imposition of laches. Hence, the Lacamens were declared as the owners of the land.

#8 SPOUSES PANG-ODEN vs. ISABEL LEONEN et. Al

Facts:
• Petitioners and respondents are the owners of two (2) adjoining parcels of land located at Sudipen, La
Union. Petitioners' land is at the eastern portion while that of the respondents is at the western side.

• The two properties have a common boundary: a creek which ran from south to north, such that
petitioners' property was bounded by said creek on the west, while that of respondents was bounded by
the same creek on the east.

• Due to constant heavy rains and flood, water from the creek overflowed and destroyed the irrigation
canal located at the north of the property in dispute. In order to minimize the damage to the irrigation
canal, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) diverted the course of the creek so rain water will not
go directly to the irrigation canal.

• As a result, the course of the creek which originally ran from south to north and which used to separate
the respective properties of the parties was instead diverted to run from south to northwest, passing
through the middle portion of the respondents' property and resulting to the formation of a new creek
• The portion segregated by the new creek, consisting of 1,336.5 square meters, is the strip of land subject
of this controversy.

• In 1976, Manuel Leonen saw the carabao of petitioner Alejandro Pang-oden devouring the Leonens'
sugar cane crops planted on the property in question. It was then that Manuel Leonen discovered that
petitioners had encroached on the 1,336.5-square meter portion of their property and had in fact occupied
the same.

• Despite Repeated demands from respondents, Alejandro Pang-oden refused to surrender possession of
said land. So the respondents filed a complaint for the Recovery of Possession Based on Ownership.

• Petitioners contend that no new creek was created and that the present creek is the same creek which
bounds their property on the west, thus making them the owners of the property in question.

• RTC and CA ruled in favor of the Leonens and ordered the Pang-odens to vacate said lot. Thus this
petition.

Issue: Who between the petitioners and the respondents, own the strip of land subject of the suit.|||
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Ruling:
The SC ruled that the owners of the subject strip of Land are the respondents herein.
The CA and the trial court relied on the testimonies of two (2) disinterested witnesses: Gregorio Libao, a retired
employee of the NIA, and Anacleto Dicta-an, a resident of Sudipen, La Union. Both testified as to the existence
of an old creek which served as the common boundary of the respective properties of the parties, and of the
subsequent diversion of the creek to its present position which now cuts through the middle portion of the
respondents' property. The witnesses' testimonies were amply supported by the report and sketch plan prepared
by the court-appointed commissioner, which revealed the existence of an old creek running from south to north,
and the creation of a new creek from south to northwest.
According to Article 434 of the Civil Code: "In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim."
Hence, in order that an action for the recovery of property may prosper, it is indispensable that the party who
prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same.
The evidence presented in this case showed that the property subject of the dispute rightfully belongs to the
respondents, as it was established that the same is part of the parcel of land declared under the name of
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Dionisio Leonen. Indeed, the verification survey of the contested property
conducted by Juvenal Quitoriano, a geodetic engineer, revealed that it was in the name of Dionisio Leonen.

#9

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