John Doe 1 V Wolf Brief of Appellants

Case: 19-1927 Document: 003113275070 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/26/2019
No. 19-1927
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
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JOHN DOE I; JOHN DOE II,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL

PENNSYLVANIA; COMMISSIONER PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE;
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE,
Defendants-Appellees.
─────────────♦─────────────
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Case No. 2:16-CV-06039-JHS
The Honorable Joel H. Slomsky
─────────────♦─────────────
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
JOHN DOE I AND JOHN DOE II
─────────────♦─────────────
Jonathan S. Goldstein John Parker Sweeney
Shawn M. Rodgers T. Sky Woodward
GOLDSTEIN LAW PARTNERS, LLC James W. Porter, III
11 Church Road BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP
Hatfield, PA 19440 1615 L Street N.W., Suite 1350
Telephone: (610) 949-0444 Washington, D.C. 20036
jonathan@goldsteinlp.com Telephone: (202) 719-8216
jsweeney@bradley.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs-Appellants John Doe I and John Doe II (“Plaintiffs”) respectfully
request oral argument in this case of first impression. Because this Court has not yet
analyzed the constitutionality of Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act (“PUFA”)
Section 6105(c)(4), insofar as its firearm-possession prohibition extends to
individuals certified committable under Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act
(“MHPA”) Section 302, counsel’s responses to inquiries from the Court may aid the
Court in its resolution of the important constitutional issue raised by this appeal. See
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(1).
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ........................................................................ i
Table of Authorities ................................................................................................. iv
Jurisdictional Statement .............................................................................................1
Standard of Review ....................................................................................................2
Statement of the Issue Presented for Review.............................................................3
Statement of Related Cases and Proceedings ............................................................4
Statement of the Case.................................................................................................5
I. Statement of the Facts......................................................................................5
A. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) deprives law-abiding, responsible

citizens of their Second Amendment rights, without pre-deprivation
process, if they are certified committable under MHPA Section 302.
...............................................................................................................5
1. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) prohibits possession of

firearms by everyone certified committable under
MHPA Section 302. ..........................................................5
2. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) provides no pre-deprivation

process before automatically prohibiting the exercise
of Second Amendment rights by everyone certified
committable under MHPA Section 302. ..........................9
3. Pennsylvania’s post-deprivation remedies are

insufficient to restore the Second Amendment rights
of anyone certified committable under MHPA Section
302. .................................................................................11
B. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) permanently deprived Plaintiffs of their

Second Amendment rights, without any pre-deprivation process,
solely because they were certified committable under MHPA
Section 302. .........................................................................................14
II. Course of Proceedings ...................................................................................17
ii
Summary of the Argument.......................................................................................20
Argument..................................................................................................................21
I. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is facially unconstitutional because it does not

provide the pre-deprivation procedural protections required by the
Constitution prior to depriving everyone certified committable under
MHPA Section 302 of their Second Amendment rights. ..............................26
A. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is an established state procedure that

provides no procedural protections before depriving everyone
certified committable under MHPA Section 302 of their Second
Amendment rights. ..............................................................................28
B. Application of the Supreme Court’s Mathews factors confirms that

Pennsylvania must provide procedural protections before depriving
a person certified committable under MHPA Section 302 of his
Second Amendment rights pursuant to PUFA Section 6105(c)(4)’s
established state procedure. .................................................................30
C. Pennsylvania’s post-deprivation remedies cannot substitute for pre-

deprivation process because PUFA Section 6105(c)(4)’s firearms
prohibition is an established state procedure, and not random,
exigent, or unforeseeable state action. ................................................34
II. Even if post-deprivation remedies could substitute for pre-deprivation

process, the available post-deprivation remedies are constitutionally
inadequate for anyone certified committable under MHPA Section 302. ....36
Conclusion ...............................................................................................................42
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................44
Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................45
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2000) ...........................................................35
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ..............................................2
Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106 (3d. Cir.
2018) .....................................................................................................................33
Benn v. Universal Health System, Inc., 371 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2004) .............. 27, 34
Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371 (1971) .....................................................................25
Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001) ............................... 27, 35
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) ...................................25
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) ...............................................................27
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ..............................................31
Foehl v. United States, 238 F.3d 474 (3d Cir. 2001) .................................................2
Franklin v. Sessions, 291 F. Supp. 3d 705 (W.D. Pa. 2017) ...................................37
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).....................................................................26
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) ........................................................................35
Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1996) ........................................ 36, 40
Hicks v. Feeney, 770 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1985) .................................................. 28, 29
Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2002) ................................................. 28, 29
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) ........................................................... 27, 34
In re Estate of S.G.L., 885 A.2d 73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) .........................................8
In re Hancock, 719 A.2d 1053 (Pa. 1998) .................................................................7
In re Keyes, 83 A.3d 1016 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) ....................................................37
iv
In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2017) ........................................................ 13, 39, 40
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) ............. 22, 25
Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) ..........................................................23
Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F..Supp.3d 702 (M.D. PA 2016)...................................... 37, 38
Keyes v. Sessions, 282 F. Supp. 3d 858 (M.D. Pa. 2017) ................................. 37, 38
Lawrence v. Nat’l Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1996) ......................2
Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007) ............................................................12
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ..................................................... passim
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) .........................................................33
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) .......................................... 3, 22
Med. Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1999) ..................................2
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) ..............................25
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) ...................................................................26
Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1984).............................. 21, 24
Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980)..................................... 21, 39
Stana v. Sch. Dist. of City of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1985) ............ 28, 34
United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012) ............................ 12, 23, 37
Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)..............................................................23
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ...............................................................22
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990)......................................................... passim
Statutes
16 Del. C. § 5004 .....................................................................................................28
16 Del. C. § 5005 .....................................................................................................28
v
16 Del. C. § 5008 .....................................................................................................28
16 Del. C. § 5009 .....................................................................................................28
18 Pa. C.S. § 6105 ......................................................................................................5
18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a) .................................................................................................5
18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a)(2)(i) .................................................................................. 9, 33
18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(b) .................................................................................................5
18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(c) .................................................................................................5
18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(c)(4)................................................................................... passim
18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(f)(1) .............................................................................. 11, 36, 38
18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1(e) ............................................................................... 11, 13, 39
18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2) .......................................................................... 12, 13, 39
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) ...................................................................................................37
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).............................................................................. 9, 10, 12, 37
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) ............................................................................................ 12, 37
28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................................................................1
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................................................................1
50 Pa. Stat. § 7109(d) .......................................................................................... 1, 10
50 Pa. Stat. § 7301(a) .................................................................................................6
50 Pa. Stat. § 7302(a) .................................................................................................6
50 Pa. Stat. § 7302(b) .................................................................................................5
50 Pa. Stat. § 7302(d) .................................................................................................6
50 Pa. Stat. § 7303 .....................................................................................................7
50 Pa. Stat. § 7303(c) .................................................................................................7
vi
50 Pa. Stat. § 7303(c)(1) ............................................................................................7
50 Pa. Stat. § 7303(c)(2) ............................................................................................7
50 Pa. Stat. § 7303(f) .................................................................................................7
50 Pa. Stat. § 7303(g) .................................................................................................8
50 Pa. Stat. § 7304 .....................................................................................................8
50 Pa. Stat. § 7304(e) .................................................................................................8
50 Pa. Stat. § 7304(e)(5) ............................................................................................8
50 Pa. Stat. § 7304(f) .................................................................................................8
50 Pa. Stat. § 7304(g)(1) ............................................................................................9
50 Pa. Stat. § 7305(a) .................................................................................................9
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)............................................................................................ 2, 19
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-3.1 ......................................................................................29
Other Authorities
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Open Letter to the
States’ Attorneys General (May 9, 2007), available at
https://gunowners.org/ne0703/ (last accessed June 26, 2019) .............................11
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ........................................................................... 21, 24
vii
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) arises under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Plaintiffs have Article III standing
to bring their challenge. The district court entered summary judgment for Defendant-
Appellee Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police (“Defendant”),1 and denied
Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on January 10, 2019. Plaintiffs filed a timely
post-judgment motion on February 7, 2019. After the post-judgment motion was
denied on April 8, 2019, Plaintiffs timely noticed this appeal on April 23, 2019. This
appeal is from a final judgment that disposes of all claims of all parties. This Court
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
The district court dismissed Defendant Pennsylvania State Police on sovereign
immunity grounds. (JA Vol. 2 at 105.) The district court dismissed Defendant
Governor of Pennsylvania and Defendant Attorney General Pennsylvania on the
grounds that they had no specific authority over or responsibility for administering
PUFA. (JA Vol. 2 at 106–09); see also 50 Pa. Stat. § 7109(d). Plaintiffs did not
appeal these rulings. The district court denied Defendant Commissioner
Pennsylvania State Police’s motion to dismiss. (JA Vol. 2 at 109, 122–23.)
Defendant did not appeal this ruling.
1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court exercises de novo review over a district court’s grant of summary
judgment,” Foehl v. United States, 238 F.3d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 2001), applying “the
same test as the district court should have applied initially,” Lawrence v. Nat’l
Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is
appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). “Material” facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law,” and a dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When reviewing the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, the Court must “view the facts in the light most favorable to the
party against whom summary judgment was entered.” Foehl, 238 F.3d at 477;
accord Med. Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999).
2
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to
provide adequate procedural due process prior to the deprivation of a constitutionally
protected liberty interest by operation of an established state procedure. See Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (collecting cases). The Second Amendment
rights to keep and bear arms are constitutionally protected liberty interests.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767, 791 (2010). PUFA Section
6105(c)(4) automatically and permanently deprives all law-abiding, responsible
citizens of their Second Amendment rights—without providing any pre-deprivation
process—solely because they were certified committable under MHPA Section 302.
(JA Vol. 2 at 144–44, 147.) The question presented is whether this established state
procedure is facially unconstitutional because it deprives Plaintiffs and similarly
situated individuals of their fundamental Second Amendment rights without due
process of law.
3
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiffs are unaware of any related cases or proceedings that have resolved
issues substantially similar to those involved in this appeal. This case has not
previously been before this Court, any other United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Statement of the Facts
A. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) deprives law-abiding, responsible citizens

of their Second Amendment rights, without pre-deprivation
process, if they are certified committable under MHPA Section
302.
1. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) prohibits possession of firearms by

everyone certified committable under MHPA Section 302.
Pennsylvania prohibits certain defined categories of individuals from
possessing firearms, including anyone convicted of specific enumerated criminal
offenses, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a)–(b), along with a broad class of “other persons,” id.
§ 6105(c). PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) applies the firearms prohibition to “[any]
person who has been . . . committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and
treatment under [MHPA] [S]ection 302, 303 or 304 of the . . . Mental Health
Procedures Act,” except “[t]his paragraph shall not apply to any proceeding under
[S]ection 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act unless the examining physician
has issued a certification that inpatient care was necessary or that the person was
committable.” Id. § 6105(c)(4). For convenience, Plaintiffs will refer to this standard
throughout as “certified committable under MHPA Section 302.”
Under MHPA Section 302, a person may be held involuntarily for emergency
mental health evaluation and treatment for up to 120 hours if a physician determines
that he “is severely mentally disabled . . . and in need of immediate treatment.” 50
Pa. Stat. § 7302(b). A person is “severely mentally disabled” under the statute
5
“when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment
and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own
personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to
others or to himself.” Id. § 7301(a).
MHPA Section 302 authorizes various people to initiate examinations for
temporary emergency commitment, including physicians, peace officers, and “other
responsible part[ies]” who claim a person is severely mentally disabled and in need
of immediate treatment. Id. § 7302(a). Once the person arrives at a treatment facility,
he must be examined by a physician within two hours, and the physician must make
a record of the examination and his findings. Id. § 7302(b). The person may be held
for up to 120 hours for additional evaluation and treatment if the physician certifies
the person committable under MHPA Section 302 by determining “that [he] is
severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency treatment.” Id. § 7302(b), (d).
If not certified committable, the person is immediately discharged. Id. § 7302(b).
Pennsylvania provides few procedural protections when determining whether
a person should be certified committable under MHPA Section 302. Most
significantly, there is never an opportunity to contest a physician’s MHPA Section
302 certification, or the involuntary commitment itself that may follow. See id. §
7302, et seq. A neutral arbiter does not review an MHPA Section 302 certification,
and the person certified committable has no opportunity to present evidence or cross-
6
examine witnesses who provide evidence against him, or to be represented by
counsel. See id.
In contrast, Pennsylvania provides significant procedural protections when
determining whether a temporary emergency commitment should be extended
beyond the initial 120 hours authorized by MHPA Section 302. Under Section 303,
a period of involuntary commitment may be extended only if the treatment facility
proves by clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of a state court judge that
the need for involuntary treatment persists. Id. § 7303; In re Hancock, 719 A.2d
1053, 1058 (Pa. 1998). The treatment facility must petition a Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas to order a hearing before a Court of Common Pleas judge or mental
health review officer. Id. § 7303(a)–(b). At the hearing, a person facing extended
commitment has the right to be represented by an attorney, to present evidence, and
to cross-examine witnesses. Id. § 7303(b)–(c). After conducting an independent
review of the available information, the judge or mental health review officer must
either find by clear and convincing evidence that the person is “severely mentally
disabled and in need of continued involuntary treatment” or direct the treatment
facility to discharge the person. Id. § 7303(c)(1). A contemporaneous written record
must be created to document the finding and what occurred at the proceeding. Id. §
7303(c)(2). If the judge or hearing officer finds that continued involuntary treatment
is necessary, the commitment may be extended up to 20 days. Id. § 7303(c), (f). If
7
the hearing is not conducted before a judge, and the person’s period of involuntary
commitment is extended, the person may petition a Court of Common Pleas to
review the certification and will receive a second hearing, this time before a judge.
Id. § 7303(g). Section 303(g) requires that the second hearing “‘include a review of
the [mental health review officer’s] certification and such evidence as the court may
receive or require.’” In re Estate of S.G.L., 885 A.2d 73, 74–75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(quoting 50 Pa. Stat. § 7303(g)).
In order to extend the involuntary treatment beyond the additional 20-day
period, the treatment facility must again petition a Court of Common Pleas for court-
ordered involuntary treatment under Section 304. Id. § 7304(b). Before authorizing
extended involuntary treatment under Section 304, the court must provide the
committed person a public hearing (which may be closed at the person’s request),
the right to counsel and the assistance of a mental-health expert, the right to not be
called as a witness without consent, the right to cross-examine witnesses and present
evidence, and the right to a decision within 48 hours of the hearing. Id. § 7304(e). A
contemporaneous written record is created to document what occurred at the
proceeding. Id. § 7304(e)(5). The court may order extended involuntary treatment
under Section 304 if it finds by “clear and convincing evidence that the person is
severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment.” Id. § 7304(f). Extended
commitment under Section 304 may only last up to 90 days, at which point the
8
treatment facility must either release the person or apply for another extension under
Section 305, requiring another court hearing. Id. §§ 7304(g)(1), 7305(a).
None of the procedural protections required under Sections 303, 304, and 305
are available to a person certified committable under MHPA Section 302.
2. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) provides no pre-deprivation

process before automatically prohibiting the exercise of
Second Amendment rights by everyone certified
committable under MHPA Section 302.
Once a person is certified committable under MHPA Section 302, he is
automatically prohibited from owning or possessing firearms under Pennsylvania
and, as a result, under federal law. 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(c)(4); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
The firearms prohibition attaches at the time of certification under MHPA Section
302—without Pennsylvania providing any further process or opportunity to contest
the certification. See id. Notwithstanding automatically and permanently losing his
right to own or possess firearms as a result, a person certified committable under
MHPA Section 302 may take up to 60 days from the date of his certification “to sell
or transfer [his] firearms to another eligible person” under Pennsylvania law. 18 Pa.
C.S. § 6105(a)(2)(i).
Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) maintains in the Pennsylvania Instant
Check System (“PICS”) database the records of those subject to PUFA’s firearms
prohibition. (JA Vol. 2 at 145–47.) The PICS database is a repository of the records
of people who are disqualified from possessing firearms under Pennsylvania law.
9
(JA Vol. 2 at 144.) The MHPA requires that reports of certifications under MHPA
Section 302 be transmitted to PSP within seven days of the certification. 50 Pa. Stat.
§ 7109(d). PSP promptly enters records of these MHPA Section 302 reports into
PICS. (JA Vol. 2 at 146–47.)
Federal law also prohibits people “who ha[ve] been committed to a mental
institution” from owning or possessing firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). In 2012,
PSP obtained an opinion from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (“ATF”), the agency tasked with interpreting federal firearms law, that
federal law also prohibits firearms possession by anyone certified committable under
MHPA Section 302 because PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) deems it to be a disqualifying
commitment. (JA Vol. 3 at 487–505.) ATF relied upon PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) in
concluding that everyone certified committable under MHPA Section 302 is also
prohibited under Section 922(g)(4). (JA Vol. 3 at 496.) Quoting PUFA Section
6105(c)(4) and noting that “Pennsylvania considers an involuntary detention under
[S]ection 302 to be a commitment for purposes of its own firearms laws if the
examining physician has issued a certificate that inpatient care was necessary or that
the person was committable,” ATF adopted the “view that an involuntary
commitment [under MHPA Section 302] is a commitment for purposes of [S]ection
922(g)(4) where the examining physician has issued a certificate that inpatient care
was necessary or that the person was committable[.]” (JA Vol. 3 at 502–03); contra
10
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Open Letter to the States’
Attorneys General (May 9, 2007), available at https://gunowners.org/ne0703/ (last
accessed June 26, 2019) (prior ATF informal opinion advising that Section 302
commitments would not be disqualifying events under federal law). Based on that
2012 ATF opinion, in 2013, PSP reported all of its prior mental health commitment
records—including all MHPA Section 302 commitment certification records—to
the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”). (JA Vol. 2 at
147.) NICS is a repository of the names of people who are disqualified from owning
or possessing firearms under federal law. (JA Vol. 2 at 144–45.) As a matter of
routine practice, all MHPA Section 302 reports recorded in PICS have been
automatically reported to and recorded in NICS since 2013. (JA Vol. 2 at 147.)
Defendant uses the PICS and NICS database to aid in the enforcement of
PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) when a background check is conducted as part of a firearm
transfer. (JA Vol. 2 at 144–45, 150.)
3. Pennsylvania’s post-deprivation remedies are insufficient to

restore the Second Amendment rights of anyone certified
committable under MHPA Section 302.
Pennsylvania law provides three post-deprivation remedies to seek recovery
of firearms rights lost by operation of PUFA Section 6105(c)(4): (1) restoration of
firearms rights under 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105 (f)(1) (“PUFA Section 6105(f)(1)”); (2) a
challenge to the accuracy of the mental health record under 18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1(e)
11
(“PUFA Section 6111.1(e)”); and (3) expungement of a commitment record under
18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2) (“PUFA Section 6111.1(g)(2)”). None of these post-
deprivation remedies provide meaningful relief.
PUFA Section 6105(f)(1) provides for restoration of firearms rights under
state law where “the court determines that the [person] may possess a firearm
without risk to [himself] or any other person,” but prevailing under PUFA Section
6105(f)(1) cannot restore a person’s federal firearms rights under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(4). (JA Vol. 2 at 205, 239.) Federal law provides that a person prohibited
from possessing firearms under federal law may apply to the United States Attorney
General for relief from his firearms prohibition. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). But Congress
has prohibited action on these applications since 1992, rendering this procedure
totally inoperable. See Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1 (2007); United
States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2012). Because no one can obtain
restoration under Section 925(c), restoration under PUFA Section 6105(f)(1) is no
remedy at all. If a person prevails under Section 6105(f)(1), PSP merely enters a note
in the PICS database that state firearms rights have been restored but leaves the
MHPA Section 302 record in both PICS and NICS and continues to enforce the
prohibition of PUFA Section 6105(c)(4). (JA Vol. 2 at 205, 239.) PUFA Section
6105(f)(1) provides no relief for anyone certified committable under MHPA Section
302.
12
Challenging the accuracy of the mental health record under Section 6111.1(e)
is available only to people who were never actually certified committable under
MHPA Section 302 but had incorrect records to that effect entered mistakenly into
the PICS database. If a person prevails under Section 6111.1(e), PSP will remove
that incorrect record of an MHPA Section 302 commitment certification from PICS
and NICS. (JA Vol. 2 at 238–39.) Section 6111.1(e) provides no relief for anyone
certified committable under MHPA Section 302. (JA Vol. 2 at 239.)
Finally, expungement of the MHPA Section 302 commitment certification
record under Section 6111.1(g)(2) can remedy both the state and federal firearms
prohibitions for people who were certified committable under MHPA Section 302,
but the expungement process itself denies Plaintiffs and similarly situated
individuals a meaningful opportunity to contest their status. In an expungement
proceeding, the court “review[s] only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
[MHPA Section] 302 commitment [certification], limited to the information
available to the physician at the time he or she made the decision to commit the
individual.” In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 237 (Pa. 2017). Expungement proceedings
defer to the determination of the certifying physician and do not allow presentation
of new evidence or an opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses. See id.
Expungement is unattainable for the overwhelming majority of persons who
are certified committable under MHPA Section 302. Fewer than one in 10,000 of
13
those persons certified committable under MHPA Section 302 who were potentially
eligible for post-deprivation relief obtained relief through Section 6111.1(g)(2)
expungement in 2017. (JA Vol. 3 at 376–85.) Defendant revealed that over the
course of seven years, more than 170,000 citizens had been prohibited from
exercising their Second Amendment rights solely because they were certified
committable under MHPA Section 302. (JA Vol. 3 at 385.) In 2017, only 17 of these
more than 170,000 people obtained expungement of their commitment certification
records and actually achieved restoration of their firearms rights. (JA Vol. 3 at 377–
81.) The vast majority (over 99.99%) of Pennsylvania citizens prohibited under
PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) solely because of a commitment certification under
MHPA Section 302 will never be able to obtain restoration of their Second
Amendment rights to own and possess firearms. Pennsylvania provides no post-
deprivation remedy for restoration of the Second Amendment rights of virtually
everyone certified committable under MHPA Section 302.
B. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) permanently deprived Plaintiffs of their

Second Amendment rights, without any pre-deprivation process,
solely because they were certified committable under MHPA
Section 302.
Plaintiffs John Doe I and John Doe II were presented for commitment under
MHPA Section 302 based on someone else’s fear that they may harm themselves.
(JA Vol. 2 at 247, 306.) Neither Doe I nor Doe II had harmed or threatened to harm
others at the time they were certified committable. (JA Vol. 2 at 247–49, 306–09.)
14
And neither Plaintiff presented a realistic threat of harm to himself. (JA Vol. 2 at
247–48, 251–52, 306–08, 311–12.)
Plaintiff Doe I, a minor when certified committable under MHPA Section 302
in 2011, became depressed after he experienced bullying following a break up of a
relationship in high school. (JA Vol. 2 at 247.) Concerned that he might harm
himself, Doe I’s mother took him to the emergency room, where he was evaluated.
(JA Vol. 2 at 247.) Despite remarking on Doe I’s merely “[q]uestionable suicidal
ideation,” the emergency room physician certified Doe I committable under MHPA
Section 302. (JA Vol. 2 at 247–48, 256–58.) Once certified under MHPA Section
302, Doe I left the emergency room with his mother without being treated or held
involuntarily for any length of time. (JA Vol. 2 at 248.) At no point was Doe I
actually committed under MHPA Section 302; he was just certified committable.
(JA Vol. 2 at 247–48, 256–58.) Doe I’s commitment certification record was
reported to and recorded in the PICS and NICS databases. (JA Vol. 2 at 248–49.)
Doe I has not been subsequently certified committable, committed, or arrested. (JA
Vol. 2 at 249.) He was examined by a psychiatrist in 2018, who determined that
“Doe I no longer suffers from the condition that was the basis for the [Section] 302
commitment [certification], does not require ongoing mental health care, and does
not pose a danger to himself or others.” (JA Vol. 2 at 253.)
15
Plaintiff Doe II became intoxicated and threatened to harm himself in 1996
after learning of rumors about his wife having an extramarital affair. (JA Vol. 2 at
306.) Doe II’s wife called the police and reported her husband’s threat. (JA Vol. 2 at
306.) When police arrived at Doe II’s home, they offered to either transport him to
the hospital or to a holding cell. (JA Vol. 2 at 306.) While at the hospital, Doe II
expressed to hospital staff that he regretted his conduct, which he described as a
“stunt” to compel his wife to tell him the truth about her affair. (JA Vol. 2 at 307.)
Doe II made it clear to hospital staff that he never intended to harm himself. (JA Vol.
2 at 307.) He waited in a room, slept, and was released the next day after only
minimal interaction with hospital staff. (JA Vol. 2 at 307.) Doe II’s commitment
certification record was reported to and recorded in PICS and NICS. (JA Vol. 2 at
308.) Doe II has not been subsequently certified committable, committed, or
arrested. (JA Vol. 2 at 308.) He also was examined by a psychiatrist in 2018, who
determined that his “transitory disturbance in 1995 has no implications for public
safety today,” “he is neither a danger to himself nor to others,” and he is “neither
mentally defective nor mentally disturbed.” (JA Vol. 2 at 313.)
Doe I and Doe II are prohibited from possessing firearms by PUFA Section
6105(c)(4) solely because they were certified committable under MHPA Section
302. (JA Vol. 2 at 249, 308.) Four years after his MHPA Section 302 certification,
Doe I tried to purchase a firearm to use in self-defense in his home because he had
16
never been advised of PUFA Section 6105(c)(4)’s firearms prohibition. (JA Vol. 2
at 249.) He was unable to do so when the seller discovered his MHPA Section 302
commitment certification record in the PICS database. (JA Vol. 2 at 249.) But for
PUFA Section 6105(c)(4)’s firearms prohibition, Doe I could possess a firearm for
lawful purposes including self-defense and hunting with his family, which is an
important family tradition. (JA Vol. 2 at 253.) Doe II tried to purchase a firearm for
purposes of self-defense the same year, 19 years after he was certified committable,
because he also had never been advised of PUFA Section 6105(c)(4)’s prohibition.
(JA Vol. 2 at 308.) He was also prohibited from doing so. (JA Vol. 2 at 308.) But for
PUFA Section 6105(c)(4)’s firearms prohibition, Doe II could possess a firearm for
lawful purposes including self-defense. (JA Vol. 2 at 308.)
II. Course of Proceedings

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) on its
face, to the extent it deprives Plaintiffs and all other persons certified committable
under only MHPA Section 302, of their fundamental Second Amendment rights
without due process of law. (JA Vol. 2 at 124–42.) Plaintiffs do not challenge the
constitutionality of the MHPA Section 302 commitment process itself, nor do they
seek to enjoin Pennsylvania from certifying people committable under MHPA
Section 302. (JA Vol. 2 at 124–42. Plaintiffs also do not challenge PUFA Section
6105(c)(4) insofar as it imposes a firearms prohibition on any ground other than a
17
certification under MHPA Section 302. (JA Vol. 2 at 124–42.) Plaintiffs seek only a
narrow declaration that PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is unconstitutional as to Plaintiffs
and others whose only disqualifying event is that they were certified committable
under MHPA Section 302, a permanent injunction preventing Defendant from
enforcing PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) against persons who are certified committable
under MHPA Section 302, and an affirmative injunction requiring Defendant to
remove from PICS and NICS the names of Plaintiffs and other persons certified
committable under MHPA Section 302. (JA Vol. 2 at 141–42.)
The district court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (JA. Vol. 2 at 122–
23.) The district court concluded correctly that the Second Amendment enshrines
under the Due Process Clause a protected liberty interest and that “some kind of
hearing is required before a person may be deprived of that interest.” (JA Vol. 2 at
111.) The district court rejected Defendant’s argument that an MHPA Section 302
certification weakens a person’s liberty interest in his fundamental Second
Amendment rights. (JA Vol. 2 at 111–15.) The district court also concluded that the
lack of procedural protection attendant to the deprivation of firearms rights under
PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) created a risk of erroneous deprivation and that “the post-
deprivation procedures available to cure the harm appear[] to be a remedy
disproportionate to restore the constitutional right in question.” (JA Vol. 2 at 118.)
After discovery and summary judgment briefing, however, the district court
18
denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and granted summary judgment in
favor of Defendant. (JA Vol. 1 at 48.) The district court again concluded correctly
that Plaintiffs’ firearms rights under the Second Amendment are protected liberty
interests under the Due Process Clause. (JA Vol. 1 at 29–33.) The district court also
again concluded correctly that PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) provides no procedural
protections prior to the deprivation of Second Amendment rights of persons certified
committable under MHPA Section 302. (JA Vol. 1 at 35–41.) Yet the district court
concluded that no pre-deprivation process is required, holding a physician’s
certification under MHPA Section 302 dilutes Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights.
(JA Vol. 1 at 35–41.)2
Plaintiffs agree that summary judgment is the appropriate disposition for this
case because “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Plaintiffs disagree with the district court’s holding because PUFA Section
6105(c)(4) does not provide the constitutionally mandatory pre-deprivation process,
and Plaintiffs are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
2
The district court concluded erroneously that the deprivation of the Second
Amendment rights occurs at the time the MHPA Section 302 commitment
certification records are reported to PICS and NICS (JA Vol. 1 at 15) and that no
pre-deprivation process is constitutionally necessary (JA Vol. 1 at 38–41). Plaintiffs
moved the district court to reconsider its summary judgment ruling because the
deprivation of the fundamental Second Amendment rights occurs at the time an
individual is certified committable under MHPA Section 302. (JA Vol. 3 at 554–
80.) The district court declined to alter its summary judgment ruling. (JA Vol. 1 at
49–52.)
19
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is facially unconstitutional insofar as it deprives all
persons certified committable under MHPA Section 302 of their fundamental
Second Amendment rights without pre-deprivation process. The Second
Amendment protects an individual’s rights to keep and bear arms, which are
protected liberty interests that cannot be deprived without due process of law. PUFA
Section 6105(c)(4)’s firearms prohibition is an established state procedure, requiring
Pennsylvania to provide meaningful procedural protections before the deprivation
occurs. Yet a person certified committable under MHPA Section 302 receives none,
and he has no opportunity to contest the determination that gives rise to that
prohibition. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is unconstitutional as it relates to Plaintiffs
and all persons certified committable under MHPA Section 302.
Even if post-deprivation remedies could substitute for pre-deprivation
process, none of the post-deprivation remedies available under Pennsylvania law
provide meaningful relief. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4)’s firearms prohibition is
permanent and irreversible for Plaintiffs and the overwhelming majority of the more
than 170,000 Pennsylvania citizens certified committable under MHPA Section 302.
20
ARGUMENT
Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Pennsylvania cannot
deprive “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is facially unconstitutional
because it deprives everyone certified committable under MHPA Section 302 of
their fundamental Second Amendment rights without adequate procedural
protections. To address Plaintiffs’ procedural due process challenge, the Court must
determine: (1) whether the asserted interest is a fundamental life, liberty, or property
interest; and (2) whether the available procedure constitutes adequate “due process
of law.” Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 1984). “Th[is]
Court has identified the following as elements of [procedural] due process: (1) notice
of the basis of the governmental action; (2) a neutral arbiter; (3) an opportunity to
make an oral presentation; (4) a means of presenting evidence; (5) an opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses or to respond to written evidence; (6) the right to be
represented by counsel; and (7) a decision based on the record with a statement of
reasons for the result.” Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.3d 680, 694 (3d Cir. 1980).
The first Robb point requires little discussion. In denying Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss, the district court correctly concluded that the Second Amendment
enshrines a constitutionally protected liberty interest that is not weakened by an
MHPA Section 302 certification. (JA Vol. 2 at 111–15.) But, in granting Defendant’s
21
Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court contradicted itself, erroneously
concluding that the Second Amendment rights of a person certified committable
under MHPA Section 302 are sufficiently weakened by that certification to justify
deprivation of that right without either pre-deprivation process or meaningful post-
deprivation remedies. (JA Vol. 1 at 35.) The logical flaw in this determination is
obvious: The absence of pre-deprivation process under PUFA Section 6105(c)(4)
can only be constitutionally justified where the prohibiting status is determined after
a person is afforded his full due process rights, as is the case with every status
deemed prohibiting under PUFA Section 6105(c) except an MHPA Section 302
certification. Whether certification under MHPA Section 302 can constitutionally
terminate a person’s Second Amendment rights cannot rest solely on whether the
person was certified committable under MHPA Section 302 where there was no
ability to contest that determination.
The district court got it right the first time around: The Second Amendment
does enshrine a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to keep and bear arms.3 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778, 791
3
PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) also implicates a protected property interest because a
person certified committable under MHPA Section 302 is required to relinquish his
firearms and is prohibited from owning or possessing firearms. Plaintiffs frame this
analysis only in terms of a protected liberty interest for convenience because the
standard governing applicable due process is the same for the deprivation of both
liberty and property. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974) (citing
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
22
(incorporating the Second Amendment rights into the concept of substantive due
process). Because it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,” id. at 767,
and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” id. at 768, the Second
Amendment rights are “specially protect[ed]” by the Due Process Clause. See Wash.
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). To this end, “the [fundamental] right
to possess arms . . . is no[t] . . . something that can be withdrawn by [the] government
on a permanent and irrevocable basis without due process.” Rehlander, 666 F.3d at
48 (recognizing the Second Amendment rights as “constitutional liberty or property
interest[s]” in a challenge brought by a previously committed individual).
The district court’s conclusion that Second Amendment rights are weakened
by an MHPA Section 302 certification is contradicted by the nature of the protected
liberty interest itself. Fundamental Second Amendment rights are not subject to
“virtue limitations.” Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 469 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J.,
dissenting). In other words, “all people have the right[s] to keep and bear arms,” see
id. at 452; “the government [simply] has the power to disable the exercise of [the]
right[s] that they otherwise possess,” id. at 453. Yet the government has no authority
to permanently disable a person’s Second Amendment rights absent sufficient
evidence that he “would pose a risk to the public safety if he possessed a gun.” Id.
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Plaintiffs are not waiving, but are expressly
preserving, any protected property interest they may also have at stake here.
23
at 469. Defendant has presented no evidence that a person previously certified
committable under MHPA Section 302 poses a risk to public safety through the
possession of firearms. The district court’s conclusion that a person is too dangerous
to possess firearms simply because he was certified committable under MHPA
Section 302 is contradicted by the undisputed material facts. (JA Vol. 2 at 249, 253,
308, 313.) For example, Plaintiffs Doe I and Doe II were never adjudicated to be a
risk to themselves or others. After their initial MHPA Section 302 certifications, Doe
I and Doe II were released without being adjudicated committable for a longer period
because they were at risk for harming themselves or others, and have not been
subsequently certified committable, committed, or arrested. (JA Vol. 2 at 249, 308.)
Both have been examined by a qualified expert psychiatrist, who determined that
Doe I and Doe II suffer no mental illnesses, pose no danger to themselves or others,
and should be qualified under the law to own or possess firearms. (JA Vol. 2 at 253,
313.) The Second Amendment rights of Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals
remain fully intact.
The second Robb point (whether the available procedure constitutes adequate
due process) is similarly straightforward. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) deprives
everyone certified committable under MHPA Section 302 of their Second
Amendment rights without the constitutionally required “due process of law.” See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. To determine whether procedural protections are
24
constitutionally adequate, the Court must balance: “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action” against “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards” as well as “the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. These
factors are used to assess whether procedural protections (including notice and
opportunity to contest the deprivation) must be provided before the deprivation of a
liberty interest, or whether post-deprivation remedies are constitutionally sufficient.
See id. at 335, 348–49.
As a general rule, states must provide procedural protections before depriving
anyone of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. “The ‘right to be heard before
being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind . . . is a principle basic to our
society.’” Id. at 333 (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)). As a result, the Supreme Court identifies “the root requirement” of the
Due Process Clause “as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a
hearing before he is deprived of any significant [protected] interest.’” Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S.
371, 379 (1971) (emphasis in original)); accord Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
127–28 (1990); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978);
25
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557–58; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–84 (1972). Mathews
and its progeny thus establish a per se rule: Where an established state procedure
deprives a person of a protected liberty or property interest, adequate pre-deprivation
process must be provided. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128.
Pennsylvania is constitutionally required to provide procedural protections
before depriving people of their Second Amendment rights under PUFA Section
6105(c)(4). See id. at 333. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is an established state procedure
through which everyone certified committable under MHPA Section 302
automatically loses their Second Amendment rights to keep and bear arms. Because
it provides no pre-deprivation process, PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is facially
unconstitutional insofar as it encompasses MHPA Section 302 certifications. And
even if pre-deprivation process were not constitutionally mandatory, the available
post-deprivation remedies do not provide meaningful relief and cannot save the
statute. The judgment of the district court should be reversed.
I. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is facially unconstitutional because it does not

provide the pre-deprivation procedural protections required by the
Constitution prior to depriving everyone certified committable under
MHPA Section 302 of their Second Amendment rights.
Where an “established state procedure” deprives a person of a protected
liberty interest, the state can predict when the loss will occur and can “provide a
meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place.” See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at
129 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), overruled on other grounds
26
by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)). Because deprivations pursuant
to established state procedures are foreseeable, it is both possible and practicable to
provide some measure of pre-deprivation process. See id.
PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) established a state procedure through which
everyone certified committable under MHPA Section 302 automatically and
permanently loses their firearms rights. Because the deprivation is foreseeable,
Pennsylvania is constitutionally required to provide pre-deprivation process. Only
in the context of random and unauthorized, exigent, or unforeseeable state action
would post-deprivation remedies suffice to cure the constitutional harm. See Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984) (holding that no pre-deprivation process was
necessary to address a prison guard’s destruction of an inmate’s property because it
was “a random, unauthorized act by a state employee” that could not be predicted);
Benn v. Universal Health System, Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding
that a person may be held involuntarily for up to 120 hours under MHPA Section
302 without a pre-deprivation hearing because MHPA Section 302 commitments
constitute “emergency situation[s]”); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205,
213–14 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that it would have been impossible to provide
procedural protections before a police officer shot the plaintiffs’ dog because his
need to do so was unforeseeable). But the operation of PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is
not random and unauthorized, exigent, or unforeseeable; it is an established state
27
procedure that operates predictably every time anyone is certified committable under
MHPA Section 302.
A. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is an established state procedure that

provides no procedural protections before depriving everyone
certified committable under MHPA Section 302 of their Second
Amendment rights.
This Court has developed a body of law demonstrating conclusively that states
must provide procedural protections before a person loses his liberty interest under
an established state procedure. E.g., Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 694 (3d Cir.
2002); Stana v. Sch. Dist. of City of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1985);
Hicks v. Feeney, 770 F.2d 375, 378–79 (3d Cir. 1985).
In Hicks, for example, this Court evaluated a procedural due process challenge
to Delaware’s tripartite involuntary commitment procedure. 770 F.2d at 377. In
Delaware, a person may be provisionally admitted for emergency mental health
evaluation and treatment for up to 48 hours upon belief that he is suffering from a
mental illness and presents a danger to himself or others. 16 Del. C. §§ 5004–05. A
provisional admission does not constitute involuntary commitment for any legal
purpose. Id. § 5005. During the 48-hour period of provisional admission, the hospital
must evaluate the person to determine if he should be hospitalized. Id. §§ 5005–06.
If so, the hospital must file a verified complaint for involuntary civil commitment,
and a probable cause hearing must be held within 8 working days of the filing of the
complaint. Id. §§ 5008-09. The deprivation of a person’s liberty under this scheme
28
occurs “pursuant to state law, custom, or usage,” so the state could have “provide[d]
a meaningful hearing before the deprivation [took] place.” Hicks, 770 F.2d at 378.
As a result, this Court determined that Delaware’s involuntary commitment
procedure “constituted an established state procedure” and that pre-deprivation
process was constitutionally required. Id. at 378–79.
This Court reached the same conclusion in Higgins, where prison employees
deducted funds from an inmate’s account to cover the cost of a court-ordered fine.
293 F.3d at 685–86, 694. A New Jersey statute specifically requires prison
employees to collect funds from inmate accounts for this purpose. Id. at 686 (citing
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-3.1). Where the employees acted according to an established
state procedure, the state feasibly could have provided pre-deprivation process
because the deprivation was a predictable consequence following a court-ordered
fine. Id. at 693–94 (quoting Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132). Thus, the plaintiff “was
entitled to notice and [a] hearing” before the deprivation occurred. Id. at 694.
As in Hicks and Higgins, Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals are
entitled to pre-deprivation process before being permanently deprived of their
Second Amendment rights. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is an established state
procedure through which every person certified committable under MHPA Section
302 immediately loses his firearms rights at the time of the certification. See 18 Pa.
C.S. § 6105(c)(4). The firearms prohibition arises as a matter of course every time a
29
person is certified committable under MHPA Section 302, making the deprivation
of Second Amendment rights a foreseeable consequence of the operation of PUFA
Section 6105(c)(4). (JA Vol. 2 at 147–49.) Because the deprivation is a regular and
predictable consequence flowing from an MHPA Section 302 certification, and
Pennsylvania could feasibly provide pre-deprivation process, it is constitutionally
required to do so. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128–29. Despite the fact that it would
be feasible to provide pre-deprivation process in the context of this established state
procedure, PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) provides none for people who are certified
committable under MHPA Section 302. (JA Vol. 2 at 147–49.) PUFA Section
6105(c)(4) is facially unconstitutional because it fails to provide the minimal due
process protections that the Constitution requires prior to the deprivation of a
protected liberty interest.
B. Application of the Supreme Court’s Mathews factors confirms that

Pennsylvania must provide procedural protections before
depriving a person certified committable under MHPA Section 302
of his Second Amendment rights pursuant to PUFA Section
6105(c)(4)’s established state procedure.
The rule requiring pre-deprivation process for established state procedures is
an application of the Mathews balancing test that the Supreme Court already has
conducted. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129. Applying the Mathews test here
demonstrates that pre-deprivation process is required. Under the Mathews test, the
Court must balance (1) the private interest at stake against (2) the risk of an erroneous
30
deprivation and the value of additional procedural protections and (3) the
government’s interest at stake. 424 U.S. at 335.
The first and second Mathews factors weigh in favor of providing pre-
deprivation process. All citizens have a protected liberty interest in their fundamental
Second Amendment rights to keep and bear arms. See District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008). But a person certified committable under MHPA
Section 302 has no way to contest PUFA Section 6105(c)(4)’s firearms prohibition
before it attaches (JA Vol. 2 at 145–49), creating a significant risk that he will suffer
an unjustified, permanent deprivation of his Second Amendment rights. Because
Pennsylvania provides no pre-deprivation procedural protections, Plaintiffs and
similarly situated individuals—who have not been subsequently certified
committable or arrested, are not mentally ill, and present no continuing threat of
danger to themselves or others (JA Vol. 2 at 249, 253, 308, 313)—are now forever
prohibited from purchasing and using firearms to defend themselves and their
families in their homes, in direct contravention of Heller’s mandate. See 554 U.S. at
635 (holding that the Second Amendment protects the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use firearms for lawful purposes like self-defense in the
home).
Instead of automatically and immediately depriving everyone certified
committable under MHPA Section 302 of their Second Amendment right,
31
Pennsylvania could minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation simply by providing
a hearing prior to the deprivation of Second Amendment rights comparable to the
hearings required by Sections 303, 304, and 305. Involuntary commitment under
those Sections requires a formal court hearing at which the mental health treating
facility bears the burden of proof, there is a meaningful opportunity to contest the
grounds asserted for commitment, and a court must find by clear and convincing
evidence on a written record that commitment is required because the individual
suffers from mental illness and is at risk harming others or himself. See supra at 7–
8. Yet the lifelong deprivation of fundamental rights is accomplished with no process
at all if a person is certified committable under MHPA Section 302.
Applying the third Mathews factor does not change the equation.
Pennsylvania’s interest in public safety does not justify its failure to provide the
requisite pre-deprivation process before depriving a person of the Second
Amendment rights solely because he was certified committable under MHPA
Section 302. Although the need for a brief involuntary mental health treatment under
MHPA Section 302 may present an emergency justifying a truncated process and a
temporary deprivation of liberty while an evaluation is made, Pennsylvania law
makes clear there is no similar exigent need to forfeit that person’s Second
Amendment rights. PUFA Section 6105 allows a person certified committable under
MHPA Section 302 up to 60 days from the date of certification to sell or transfer his
32
firearms. 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a)(2)(i). This 60-day window effectively stays the
enforcement of PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) for two months, belying any argument that
Pennsylvania has some exigent need immediately to deprive people certified
committable under MHPA Section 302 of their right to possess firearms. As Judge
Bibas recently noted, “the government may not impair a constitutional right simply
because doing so is convenient.” Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen.
N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 131 (3d. Cir. 2018) (Bibas, J., dissenting) (citing McCullen v.
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014)).
In any event, Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals present no threat of
danger to public safety and never did because they were released after their MHPA
Section 302 commitment certifications and were not subsequently adjudicated
committable under Sections 303 or 304. (JA Vol. 2 at 247–49, 253, 307. 313.) If
Pennsylvania determines that a person certified committable under MHPA Section
302 is a danger to himself or others, it may extend that person’s period of
commitment under Section 303 or 304—but only after providing a panoply of
procedural protections. See supra at 7–8. Having released Plaintiffs without seeking
to extend their commitments (JA Vol. 2 at 247–48, 307), Pennsylvania cannot now
claim that they continued to be a threat to themselves or others and declare their
Second Amendment rights forfeited.
33
Pre-deprivation process is constitutionally mandatory under Mathews and
Zinermon where, as here, an established state procedure predictably deprives a
person of his constitutionally protected liberty interest. Because PUFA Section
6105(c)(4) provides none, it is facially unconstitutional to the extent it permanently
deprives persons certified committable under MHPA Section 302 of their
fundamental Second Amendment rights. The judgment of the district court should
be reversed.
C. Pennsylvania’s post-deprivation remedies cannot substitute for

pre-deprivation process because PUFA Section 6105(c)(4)’s
firearms prohibition is an established state procedure, and not
random, exigent, or unforeseeable state action.
Post-deprivation remedies are constitutionally adequate only in “extremely
narrow” and “limited” circumstances, see Stana, 775 F.2d at 127, including
“random, unauthorized act[ion] by a state employee” (Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532),
“emergency situation[s]” that pose an imminent risk of danger (Benn, 371 F.3d at
174), and unforeseen events (Brown, 269 F.3d at 213–14). Under these limited
circumstances, pre-deprivation process is not required because the state could not
conceivably fashion a meaningful procedure before the deprivation takes place. Id.;
see also Stana, 775 F.2d at 130. For example, no pre-deprivation process is feasible
before a prison guard destroys an inmate’s property during a random “shakedown”
of his prison locker and cell. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 519, 532–33. Nor is pre-
deprivation process feasible before a police officer shoots a pet dog that escapes
34
from a backyard fence because that event is unforeseeable. See Brown, 269 F.3d at
213–14. Pre-deprivation process is neither feasible nor mandatory before certifying
a person committable under MHPA Section 302 in emergency situations where brief
involuntary mental health treatment is required. See Benn, 371 F.3d at 174; see also
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1975) (holding that students facing suspension
from school are not entitled to pre-deprivation process where their “presence poses
a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the
academic process”). Because pre-deprivation process is not feasible under these
circumstances, meaningful post-deprivation remedies are constitutionally adequate
only for these limited circumstances. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129.
PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) finds no sanctuary in this narrow exception for
random and unauthorized state action, or state action responding to an exigent
situation. Because PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is an established state procedure with
foreseeable consequences, pre-deprivation process is constitutionally required.
Where pre-deprivation process is required, as in this case, the existence of post-
deprivation remedies is irrelevant. “[I]f the Constitution requires pre-termination
procedures, [even] the most thorough and fair post-termination hearing cannot undo
the failure to provide such procedures.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 120 (3d Cir.
2000). Because PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is an established state procedure, requiring
pre-deprivation process, any post-deprivation remedies available under
35
Pennsylvania law are necessarily insufficient to redress the constitutional injury to
anyone certified committable under MHPA Section 302—regardless of how robust
the post-deprivation remedies may be. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132. PUFA Section
6105(c)(4) is unconstitutional on its face. The judgment of the district court should
be reversed.
II. Even if post-deprivation remedies could substitute for pre-deprivation

process, the available post-deprivation remedies are constitutionally
inadequate for anyone certified committable under MHPA Section 302.
Any remedy designed to restore a constitutionally protected interest must be
“meaningful.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333. A remedy is not “meaningful” if it is
“nonexistent” and cannot provide the relief guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. E.g., Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1996).
The limited remedies available under Pennsylvania law have been fashioned
for application to persons whose liberty interests have been deprived only after their
status was fully adjudicated such as by criminal conviction or after a judicial hearing
on mental health commitment. They might as well be nonexistent for all the relief
they provide persons certified committable under Section 302 who never had an
opportunity to contest their prohibiting status.
Restoration of a person’s rights under Section 6105(f)(1) cannot undo the
federal firearms disqualification that arises at the time a person is certified
committable. (JA Vol. 2 at 205–08, 239.) Even if a person’s firearms rights are
36
restored under state law, PSP does not remove the record of the person’s MHPA
Section 302 certification from the PICS or NICS database, and the prohibition of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) based on PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) continues. (JA Vol. 2 at 205–
08, 239.)
The United States Attorney General cannot grant relief from a federal firearms
prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) because Congress has not authorized funding
for restoration of rights under Section 925(c), In re Keyes, 83 A.3d 1016, 1029 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2013), and has prohibited action on restoration petitions since 1992,
Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 49. And mounting an as-applied challenge to 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) has little realistic chance of success. Only three people have mounted
successful as-applied challenges to Section 922(g) since 2011. See Franklin v.
Sessions, 291 F. Supp. 3d 705, 708 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (holding that Mr. Franklin’s
MHPA Section 302 commitment did not amount to “adjudication as a mental
defective” or “commitment to a mental institution” under federal law); Keyes v.
Sessions, 282 F. Supp. 3d 858, 878 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (reasoning that disarming a law
enforcement officer simply because he “went through a period of mental illness . . .
over a decade ago” does not “reasonably fit[] within the governmental interest to
promote safety”); Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 721–22 (M.D. Pa. 2016)
(reasoning that Section 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to a state correctional
37
officer because he had been granted an expungement under state law).4
This “remedy” provides no relief at all and serves only to underscore the
constitutional necessity of providing pre-deprivation relief where an established
state procedure creates a risk of erroneous deprivation. Restoration of firearms rights
under PUFA Section 6105(f)(1) cannot lift the federal prohibition, demonstrating
the risk that PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) will wrongfully and permanently deprive the
firearms rights of people certified committable under MHPA Section 302. Under
Pennsylvania law, a person whose firearms rights are restored by a Pennsylvania
court under PUFA Section 6105(f)(1) is adjudicated to not be a danger to himself or
others, but he remains a prohibited person because of the absence of a federal
restoration remedy. Pennsylvania’s restoration process does not provide a
“meaningful” remedy under Mathews for anyone certified committable under
MHPA Section 302.
Challenging the accuracy of the mental health record is only available to the
small number of people who were never actually certified committable under MHPA
Section 302 but had a record of certification erroneously entered into the PICS and
4
Keyes v. Sessions and Keyes v. Lynch resolved as-applied challenges to Section
922(g) as to two different plaintiffs, despite the named plaintiff being the same in
both cases. In Keyes v. Sessions, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff Michael Keyes. 282 F. Supp. 3d at 878. In Keyes v. Lynch, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of his co-plaintiff, Jonathan Yox. 195 F. Supp. 3d at
721–22.
38
NICS databases. 18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1(e). This so-called “remedy” is nothing more
than the correction of a clerical error that is statistically insignificant in the context
of the mass deprivation of rights created by the interplay of MHPA Section 302 and
PUFA Section 6105(c)(4). Because Plaintiffs and more than 170,000 similarly
situated individuals were, in fact, certified committable under MHPA Section 302,
this remedy is obviously unavailing and irrelevant to the case at hand.
Similarly, expungement of an MHPA Section 302 commitment certification
record under 18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2) cannot provide adequate procedural
protections. This Court has identified a neutral arbiter, the presentation of evidence,
and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses as necessary elements of procedural
due process, Rogin, 616 F.2d at 694—none of which are available in expungement
proceedings. Instead, expungement proceedings focus exclusively on determining
whether the record created by the certifying physician is sufficient to support the
MHPA Section 302 certification. Vencil, 152 A.3d at 237. Under this deferential
standard, a court hearing expungement proceedings is “predisposed” to find against
the person previously certified committable under MHPA Section 302, in violation
of his right to procedural due process. See Rogin, 616 F.2d at 694 (stressing the due
process requirement of a neutral arbiter).
These limitations make it nearly impossible for anyone certified committable
under MHPA Section 302 to obtain relief through expungement proceedings. Under
39
the Vencil standard, Doe I and Doe II would be hamstrung in their efforts to achieve
relief through expungement because neither would be permitted to present new
evidence to prove their mental health and wellbeing. See Vencil, 152 A.3d at 237.
Even if they were permitted to present new evidence, Doe II is doubly crippled
because the medical records from his MHPA Section 302 certification were
unavailable 19 years later when he first learned that he was prohibited under PUFA
Section 6105(c)(4) and could not be used to support an expungement proceeding.
(JA Vol. 2 at 317.) This means that Doe II, unjustly, cannot even avail himself of
what little process he would be afforded. In fact, the available data indicate that the
ratio of eligible people who obtain relief through expungement hovers around one
in 10,000 MHPA Section 302 committees (JA Vol. 3 at 376–85), making this remedy
virtually “nonexistent” and, therefore, meaningless. See Hamlin, 95 F.3d at 585. The
small number of successful expungements demonstrates that it is not a meaningful
remedy given that 177,740 people have been certified committable under MHPA
Section 302 since 2011 (JA Vol. 3 at 385), and very few people obtain expungements
each year (JA Vol. 3 at 377–81).
Because meaningful relief is not available to restore the firearms rights of
Plaintiffs and virtually everyone else automatically deprived by PUFA Section
6105(c)(4), the deprivation of Second Amendment rights upon an MHPA Section
302 certification is permanent for the overwhelming majority of MHPA Section 302
40
committees—none of whom are afforded the opportunity to contest the loss of their
constitutionally protected liberty interest before it occurs. The firearms prohibition
under PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is permanent and irreversible for all but a very few
MHPA Section 302 committees. Pennsylvania is responsible for the permanent
deprivation created by its established state procedure that lacks pre-deprivation
process and should be enjoined from further injuring Plaintiffs and others using that
unfair process. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is facially unconstitutional.
41
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court
reverse the district court and declare that PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
insofar as it prohibits persons from exercising their Second Amendment rights solely
because they were certified committable under MHPA Section 302. Plaintiffs also
request a permanent injunction preventing Defendant from enforcing PUFA Section
6105(c)(4) against Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals, an affirmative
injunction requiring Defendant to remove from PICS and NICS the records of
Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals; and a permanent injunction preventing
Defendant from entering into PICS and NICS the names of Plaintiffs and similarly
situated individuals.
Dated: June 26, 2019 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John Parker Sweeney

John Parker Sweeney
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
42
John Parker Sweeney

T. Sky Woodward
James W. Porter, III
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP
1615 L Street N.W., Suite 1350
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: (202) 393-7150
Jonathan S. Goldstein
Shawn M. Rodgers
GOLDSTEIN LAW PARTNERS, LLC
11 Church Road
Hatfield, PA 19440
Telephone: (610) 949-0444
jonathan@goldsteinlp.com
43
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 9,545 words.
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it has
been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in Times
New Roman 14-point font.
Dated: June 26, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

John Parker Sweeney
44
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 26, 2019, I filed the forgoing with the Clerk of
the Court via CM/ECF, which will serve the following counsel of record:
Claudia M. Tesoro
Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General
1600 Arch Street, Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
ctesoro@attorneygeneral.gov
Kathy Le
21 South 12th Street, 3rd Floor
kle@attorneygeneral.gov
Respectfully submitted,

John Parker Sweeney
45
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105 Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or
transfer firearms…………………………………………………………..A-1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111 Sale or transfer of firearms……………………………….A-10
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1 Pennsylvania State Police………………………………A-17
50 P.S. § 7301 Persons who may be subject to involuntary emergency examination
and treatment…………………………………………………………….A-23
50 P.S. § 7302 Involuntary emergency examination and treatment authorized by a
physician--Not to exceed one hundred twenty hours…………………….A-26
50 P.S. § 7303 Extended involuntary emergency treatment certified by a judge or
mental health review officer--Not to exceed twenty days………………..A-28
50 P.S. § 7304 Court-ordered involuntary treatment not to exceed ninety
days……………………………………………………………………... A-31
50 P.S. § 7305 Additional periods of court-ordered involuntary treatment…….A-39

§ 6105. Case:
Persons19-1927 Document:
not to possess, 003113275070
use, manufacture, Page:
control,..., PA ST 55 §...
18 Pa.C.S.A. Date Filed: 06/26/2019
Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes

Title 18 Pa.C.S.A. Crimes and Offenses (Refs & Annos)
Part II. Definition of Specific Offenses (Refs & Annos)
Article G. Miscellaneous Offenses (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 61. Firearms and Other Dangerous Articles (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter A. Uniform Firearms Act (Refs & Annos)
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105
§ 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms
Effective: April 10, 2019

Currentness
(a) Offense defined.--
(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this
Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall
not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or
manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.
(2)(i) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a person who is prohibited from possessing, using, controlling,
selling, transferring or manufacturing a firearm under paragraph (1) or subsection (b) or (c) shall have a reasonable
period of time, not to exceed 60 days from the date of the imposition of the disability under this subsection, in
which to sell or transfer that person's firearms to another eligible person who is not a member of the prohibited
person's household.
(ii) This paragraph shall not apply to any person whose disability is imposed pursuant to subsection (c)(6).
(iii) A person whose disability is imposed pursuant to subsection (c)(9) shall relinquish any firearms and firearm
licenses under that person's possession or control, as described in section 6105.2 (relating to relinquishment of
firearms and firearm licenses by convicted persons).
(iv) A person whose disability is imposed pursuant to a protection from abuse order shall relinquish any firearms,
other weapons, ammunition and firearm licenses under that person's possession or control, as described in 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 6108(a)(7) (relating to relief).
(a.1) Penalty.--
(1) Except as provided under paragraph (1.1), a person convicted of a felony enumerated under subsection (b) or a
felony under the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), 1 known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

A-1
§ 6105. Case:
Cosmetic Act, or any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any other state, who violates subsection (a)
commits a felony of the second degree.
(1.1) The following shall apply:
(i) A person convicted of a felony enumerated under subsection (b) or a felony under The Controlled Substance,
Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any other state, who
violates subsection (a) commits a felony of the first degree if:
(A) at the time of the commission of a violation of subsection (a), the person has previously been convicted of
an offense under subsection (a); or
(B) at the time of the commission of a violation of subsection (a), the person was in physical possession or control
of a firearm, whether visible, concealed about the person or within the person's reach.
(ii) The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 2154 (relating to adoption of guidelines for
sentencing), shall provide for a sentencing enhancement for a sentence imposed pursuant to this paragraph.
(2) A person who is the subject of an active final protection from abuse order issued pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108,
is the subject of any other active protection from abuse order issued pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(b) (relating to
hearings), which provided for the relinquishment of firearms or other weapons or ammunition during the period of
time the order is in effect, or is otherwise prohibited from possessing or acquiring a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(8) (relating to unlawful acts), commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he intentionally or knowingly fails to
relinquish a firearm or other weapon or ammunition to the sheriff or appropriate law enforcement agency as defined
in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102 (relating to definitions) as required by the order unless, in lieu of relinquishment, he provides
an affidavit which lists the firearms or other weapons or ammunition to the sheriff in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 6108(a)(7)(i)(B), 6108.2 (relating to relinquishment for consignment sale, lawful transfer or safekeeping) or 6108.3
(relating to relinquishment to third party for safekeeping).
(3)(i) A person commits a misdemeanor of the third degree if he intentionally or knowingly accepts possession of
a firearm, other weapon or ammunition from another person he knows is the subject of an active final protection
from abuse order issued pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108 or an active protection from abuse order issued pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(b), which order provided for the relinquishment of the firearm, other weapon or ammunition
during the period of time the order is in effect.
(ii) This paragraph shall not apply to:
(A) a third party who accepts possession of a firearm, other weapon or ammunition relinquished pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 6108.3; or

A-2
§ 6105. Case:
(B) a dealer licensed pursuant to section 6113 (relating to licensing of dealers) or subsequent purchaser from
a dealer licensed pursuant to section 6113, who accepts possession of a firearm, other weapon or ammunition
relinquished pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108.2.
(4) It shall be an affirmative defense to any prosecution under paragraph (3) that the person accepting possession of
a firearm, other weapon or ammunition in violation of paragraph (3):
(i) notified the sheriff as soon as practicable that he has taken possession; and
(ii) relinquished possession of any firearm, other weapon or ammunition possessed in violation of paragraph (3)
as directed by the sheriff.
(5) A person who has accepted possession of a firearm, other weapon or ammunition pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
6108.3 commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he intentionally or knowingly returns a firearm, other weapon
or ammunition to a defendant or intentionally or knowingly allows a defendant to have access to the firearm, other
weapon or ammunition prior to either of the following:
(i) The sheriff accepts return of the safekeeping permit issued to the party pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108.3(d)(1)(i).
(ii) The issuance of a court order pursuant to subsection (f)(2) or 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108.1(b) (relating to return of
relinquished firearms, other weapons and ammunition and additional relief) which modifies a valid protection from
abuse order issued pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108, which order provided for the relinquishment of the firearm, other
weapon or ammunition by allowing the defendant to take possession of the firearm, other weapon or ammunition
that had previously been ordered relinquished.
(b) Enumerated offenses.--The following offenses shall apply to subsection (a):
Section 908 (relating to prohibited offensive weapons).
Section 911 (relating to corrupt organizations).
Section 912 (relating to possession of weapon on school property).
Section 2502 (relating to murder).
Section 2503 (relating to voluntary manslaughter).
Section 2504 (relating to involuntary manslaughter) if the offense is based on the reckless use of a firearm.
Section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault).
Section 2703 (relating to assault by prisoner).

A-3
§ 6105. Case:
Section 2704 (relating to assault by life prisoner).
Section 2709.1 (relating to stalking).
Section 2716 (relating to weapons of mass destruction).
Section 2901 (relating to kidnapping).
Section 2902 (relating to unlawful restraint).
Section 2910 (relating to luring a child into a motor vehicle or structure).
Section 3121 (relating to rape).
Section 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse).
Section 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent assault).
Section 3301 (relating to arson and related offenses).
Section 3302 (relating to causing or risking catastrophe).
Section 3502 (relating to burglary).
Section 3503 (relating to criminal trespass) if the offense is graded a felony of the second degree or higher.
Section 3701 (relating to robbery).
Section 3702 (relating to robbery of motor vehicle).
Section 3921 (relating to theft by unlawful taking or disposition) upon conviction of the second felony offense.
Section 3923 (relating to theft by extortion) when the offense is accompanied by threats of violence.
Section 3925 (relating to receiving stolen property) upon conviction of the second felony offense.
Section 4906 (relating to false reports to law enforcement authorities) if the fictitious report involved the theft of a
firearm as provided in section 4906(c)(2).
Section 4912 (relating to impersonating a public servant) if the person is impersonating a law enforcement officer.
Section 4952 (relating to intimidation of witnesses or victims).
Section 4953 (relating to retaliation against witness, victim or party).
Section 5121 (relating to escape).
Section 5122 (relating to weapons or implements for escape).

A-4
§ 6105. Case:
Section 5501(3) (relating to riot).
Section 5515 (relating to prohibiting of paramilitary training).
Section 5516 (relating to facsimile weapons of mass destruction).
Section 6110.1 (relating to possession of firearm by minor).
Section 6301 (relating to corruption of minors).
Section 6302 (relating to sale or lease of weapons and explosives).
Any offense equivalent to any of the above-enumerated offenses under the prior laws of this Commonwealth or any
offense equivalent to any of the above-enumerated offenses under the statutes of any other state or of the United States.
(c) Other persons.--In addition to any person who has been convicted of any offense listed under subsection (b), the
following persons shall be subject to the prohibition of subsection (a):
(1) A person who is a fugitive from justice. This paragraph does not apply to an individual whose fugitive status is
based upon a nonmoving or moving summary offense under Title 75 (relating to vehicles).
(2) A person who has been convicted of an offense under the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any
other state, that may be punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years.
(3) A person who has been convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance as provided
in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or the former 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 3731, on three or more separate occasions within a five-year period. For the purposes of this paragraph only, the
prohibition of subsection (a) shall only apply to transfers or purchases of firearms after the third conviction.
(4) A person who has been adjudicated as an incompetent or who has been involuntarily committed to a mental
institution for inpatient care and treatment under section 302, 303 or 304 of the provisions of the act of July 9, 1976
(P.L. 817, No. 143), 2 known as the Mental Health Procedures Act. This paragraph shall not apply to any proceeding
under section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act unless the examining physician has issued a certification that
inpatient care was necessary or that the person was committable.
(5) A person who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the United States.
(6) A person who is the subject of an active final protection from abuse order issued pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108, is
the subject of any other active protection from abuse order issued pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(b), which provided for
the relinquishment of firearms during the period of time the order is in effect or is otherwise prohibited from possessing
or acquiring a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). This prohibition shall terminate upon the expiration or vacation
of the order or portion thereof relating to the relinquishment of firearms.

A-5
§ 6105. Case:
(7) A person who was adjudicated delinquent by a court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341 (relating to adjudication) or
under any equivalent Federal statute or statute of any other state as a result of conduct which if committed by an
adult would constitute an offense under sections 2502, 2503, 2702, 2703 (relating to assault by prisoner), 2704, 2901,
3121, 3123, 3301, 3502, 3701 and 3923.
(8) A person who was adjudicated delinquent by a court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341 or under any equivalent
Federal statute or statute of any other state as a result of conduct which if committed by an adult would constitute an
offense enumerated in subsection (b) with the exception of those crimes set forth in paragraph (7). This prohibition
shall terminate 15 years after the last applicable delinquent adjudication or upon the person reaching the age of 30,
whichever is earlier.
(9) A person who is prohibited from possessing or acquiring a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). If the offense which
resulted in the prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) was committed, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)
(relating to definitions), by a person in any of the following relationships:
(i) the current or former spouse, parent or guardian of the victim;
(ii) a person with whom the victim shares a child in common;
(iii) a person who cohabits with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent or guardian; or
(iv) a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent or guardian of the victim;
then the relationship need not be an element of the offense to meet the requirements of this paragraph.
(10) A person who has been convicted of an offense under subsection (a.1)(2). The prohibition shall terminate five
years after the date of conviction, final release from confinement or final release from supervision, whichever is later.
(d) Exemption.--A person who has been convicted of a crime specified in subsection (a) or (b) or a person whose conduct
meets the criteria in subsection (c)(1), (2), (5), (7) or (9) may make application to the court of common pleas of the
county where the principal residence of the applicant is situated for relief from the disability imposed by this section
upon the possession, transfer or control of a firearm. The court shall grant such relief if it determines that any of the
following apply:
(1) The conviction has been vacated under circumstances where all appeals have been exhausted or where the right
to appeal has expired.
(2) The conviction has been the subject of a full pardon by the Governor.
(3) Each of the following conditions is met:

A-6
§ 6105. Case:
(i) The Secretary of the Treasury of the United States has relieved the applicant of an applicable disability imposed
by Federal law upon the possession, ownership or control of a firearm as a result of the applicant's prior conviction,
except that the court may waive this condition if the court determines that the Congress of the United States has
not appropriated sufficient funds to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to grant relief to applicants eligible for
the relief.
(ii) A period of ten years, not including any time spent in incarceration, has elapsed since the most recent conviction
of the applicant of a crime enumerated in subsection (b), a felony violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug,
Device and Cosmetic Act or the offense which resulted in the prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
(e) Proceedings.--
(1) If a person convicted of an offense under subsection (a),(b) or (c) (1), (2), (5), (7) or (9) makes application to the
court, a hearing shall be held in open court to determine whether the requirements of this section have been met. The
commissioner and the district attorney of the county where the application is filed and any victim or survivor of a
victim of the offense upon which the disability is based may be parties to the proceeding.
(2) Upon application to the court of common pleas pursuant to paragraph (1) by an applicant who is subject to the
prohibition under subsection (c)(3), the court shall grant such relief if a period of ten years, not including any time
spent in incarceration, has passed since the applicant's most recent conviction under subsection (c)(3).
(f) Other exemptions and proceedings.--
(1) Upon application to the court of common pleas under this subsection by an applicant subject to the prohibitions
under subsection (c)(4), the court may grant such relief as it deems appropriate if the court determines that the applicant
may possess a firearm without risk to the applicant or any other person.
(2) If application is made under this subsection for relief from the disability imposed under subsection (c)(6), notice
of such application shall be given to the person who had petitioned for the protection from abuse order, and such
person shall be a party to the proceedings. Notice of any court order or amendment to a court order restoring firearms
possession or control shall be given to the person who had petitioned for the protection from abuse order, to the sheriff
and to the Pennsylvania State Police. The application and any proceedings on the application shall comply with 23
Pa.C.S. Ch. 61 (relating to protection from abuse).
(3) All hearings conducted under this subsection shall be closed unless otherwise requested to be open by the applicant.
(4)(i) The owner of any seized or confiscated firearms or of any firearms ordered relinquished under 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108
shall be provided with a signed and dated written receipt by the appropriate law enforcement agency. This receipt
shall include, but not limited to, a detailed identifying description indicating the serial number and condition of the
firearm. In addition, the appropriate law enforcement agency shall be liable to the lawful owner of said confiscated,
seized or relinquished firearm for any loss, damage or substantial decrease in value of said firearm that is a direct
result of a lack of reasonable care by the appropriate law enforcement agency.

A-7
§ 6105. Case:
(ii) Firearms shall not be engraved or permanently marked in any manner, including, but not limited to, engraving
of evidence or other identification numbers. Unless reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a particular firearm
has been used in the commission of a crime, no firearm shall be test fired. Any reduction in the value of a firearm
due to test firing, engraving or permanently marking in violation of this paragraph shall be considered damage, and
the law enforcement agency shall be liable to the lawful owner of the firearm for the reduction in value caused by
the test firing, engraving or permanently marking.
(iii) For purposes of this paragraph, the term “firearm” shall include any scope, sight, bipod, sling, light, magazine,
clip, ammunition or other firearm accessory attached to or seized, confiscated or relinquished with a firearm.
(g) Other restrictions.--Nothing in this section shall exempt a person from a disability in relation to the possession or
control of a firearm which is imposed as a condition of probation or parole or which is imposed pursuant to the provision
of any law other than this section.
(h) License prohibition.--Any person who is prohibited from possessing, using, controlling, selling, purchasing,
transferring or manufacturing any firearm under this section shall not be eligible for or permitted to obtain a license to
carry a firearm under section 6109 (relating to licenses).
(i) Firearm.--As used in this section only, the term “firearm” shall include any weapons which are designed to or may
readily be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive or the frame or receiver of any such weapon.
(j) Copy of order to State Police.--If the court grants relief from the disabilities imposed under this section, a copy of the
order shall be sent by the prothonotary within ten days of the entry of the order to the Pennsylvania State Police and
shall include the name, date of birth and Social Security number of the individual.
Credits
1972, Dec. 6, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, effective June 6, 1973. Amended 1995, June 13, P.L. 1024, No. 17 (Spec. Sess.
No. 1), § 2, effective in 120 days; 1995, Nov. 22, P.L. 621, No. 66, § 4, imd. effective; 1997, April 22, P.L. 73, No. 5,
§ 1, effective in 60 days; 1998, June 18, P.L. 503, No. 70, § 2, imd. effective; 1998, Dec. 3, P.L. 933, No. 121, § 4, imd.
effective; 1999, Dec. 15, P.L. 915, No. 59, § 4, effective in 60 days; 2002, June 28, P.L. 481, No. 82, § 5, effective in 60
days; 2002, Dec. 9, P.L. 1759, No. 218, § 5, effective in 60 days; 2003, Sept. 30, P.L. 120, No. 24, § 1, effective Feb. 1,
2004; 2005, Nov. 10, P.L. 335, No. 66, § 2, effective in 180 days [May 9, 2006]; 2008, Oct. 17, P.L. 1628, No. 131, § 1.2,
effective in 60 days [Dec. 16, 2008]; 2016, Nov. 3, P.L. 1052, No. 134, § 1, effective in 60 days [Jan. 3, 2017]; 2018, Oct.
12, P.L. 519, No. 79, § 1, effective in 180 days [April 10, 2019].
Notes of Decisions (157)
Footnotes
1 35 P.S. § 780-101 et seq.
2 50 P.S. §§ 7302 to 7304.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105, PA ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105

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§ 6105. Case:
Current through 2019 Regular Session Act 5. Some statute sections may be more current, see credits for details.
End of Document © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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§ 6111. Case: 19-1927
Sale or transfer Document:
of firearms, PA ST 18003113275070
Pa.C.S.A. § 6111 Page: 64 Date Filed: 06/26/2019

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111
§ 6111. Sale or transfer of firearms
Effective: December 24, 2012

Currentness
(a) Time and manner of delivery.--
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), no seller shall deliver a firearm to the purchaser or transferee thereof until 48
hours shall have elapsed from the time of the application for the purchase thereof, and, when delivered, the firearm
shall be securely wrapped and shall be unloaded.
(2) Thirty days after publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin that the Instantaneous Criminal History Records Check
System has been established in accordance with the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Public Law 103-159, 18
U.S.C. § 921 et seq.), no seller shall deliver a firearm to the purchaser thereof until the provisions of this section have
been satisfied, and, when delivered, the firearm shall be securely wrapped and shall be unloaded.
(b) Duty of seller.--No licensed importer, licensed manufacturer or licensed dealer shall sell or deliver any firearm to
another person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer or licensed collector, until the
conditions of subsection (a) have been satisfied and until he has:
(1) For purposes of a firearm as defined in section 6102 (relating to definitions), obtained a completed application/
record of sale from the potential buyer or transferee to be filled out in triplicate, the original copy to be sent to the
Pennsylvania State Police, postmarked via first class mail, within 14 days of the sale, one copy to be retained by the
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer or licensed dealer for a period of 20 years and one copy to be provided to
the purchaser or transferee. The form of this application/record of sale shall be no more than one page in length and
shall be promulgated by the Pennsylvania State Police and provided by the licensed importer, licensed manufacturer
or licensed dealer. The application/record of sale shall include the name, address, birthdate, gender, race, physical
description and Social Security number of the purchaser or transferee, the date of the application and the caliber, length
of barrel, make, model and manufacturer's number of the firearm to be purchased or transferred. The application/
record of sale shall also contain the following question:
Are you the actual buyer of the firearm(s), as defined under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102 (relating to definitions), listed on this
application/record of sale? Warning: You are not the actual buyer if you are acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of
another person, unless you are legitimately acquiring the firearm as a gift for any of the following individuals who
are legally eligible to own a firearm:

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§ 6111. Case: 19-1927
(1) spouse;
(2) parent;
(3) child;
(4) grandparent; or
(5) grandchild.
(1.1) On the date of publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin of a notice by the Pennsylvania State Police that the
instantaneous records check has been implemented, all of the following shall apply:
(i) In the event of an electronic failure under section 6111.1(b)(2) (relating to Pennsylvania State Police) for purposes
of a firearm which exceeds the barrel and related lengths set forth in section 6102, obtained a completed application/
record of sale from the potential buyer or transferee to be filled out in triplicate, the original copy to be sent to the
Pennsylvania State Police, postmarked via first class mail, within 14 days of sale, one copy to be retained by the
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer or licensed dealer for a period of 20 years and one copy to be provided
to the purchaser or transferee.
(ii) The form of the application/record of sale shall be no more than one page in length and shall be promulgated
by the Pennsylvania State Police and provided by the licensed importer, licensed manufacturer or licensed dealer.
(iii) For purposes of conducting the criminal history, juvenile delinquency and mental health records background
check which shall be completed within ten days of receipt of the information from the dealer, the application/record
of sale shall include the name, address, birthdate, gender, race, physical description and Social Security number of
the purchaser or transferee and the date of application.
(iv) No information regarding the type of firearm need be included other than an indication that the firearm exceeds
the barrel lengths set forth in section 6102.
(v) Unless it has been discovered pursuant to a criminal history, juvenile delinquency and mental health records
background check that the potential purchaser or transferee is prohibited from possessing a firearm pursuant to
section 6105 (relating to persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms), no information
on the application/record of sale provided pursuant to this subsection shall be retained as precluded by section 6111.4
(relating to registration of firearms) by the Pennsylvania State Police either through retention of the application/
record of sale or by entering the information onto a computer, and, further, an application/record of sale received
by the Pennsylvania State Police pursuant to this subsection shall be destroyed within 72 hours of the completion
of the criminal history, juvenile delinquency and mental health records background check.
(1.2) Fees collected under paragraph (3) and section 6111.2 (relating to firearm sales surcharge) shall be transmitted
to the Pennsylvania State Police within 14 days of collection.

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§ 6111. Case: 19-1927
(1.3) In addition to the criminal penalty under section 6119 (relating to violation penalty), any person who knowingly
and intentionally maintains or fails to destroy any information submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police for purposes
of a background check pursuant to paragraphs (1.1) and (1.4) or violates section 6111.4 shall be subject to a civil
penalty of $250 per violation, entry or failure to destroy.
(1.4) Following implementation of the instantaneous records check by the Pennsylvania State Police on or before
December 1, 1998, no application/record of sale shall be completed for the purchase or transfer of a firearm which
exceeds the barrel lengths set forth in section 6102. A statement shall be submitted by the dealer to the Pennsylvania
State Police, postmarked via first class mail, within 14 days of the sale, containing the number of firearms sold which
exceed the barrel and related lengths set forth in section 6102, the amount of surcharge and other fees remitted and a list
of the unique approval numbers given pursuant to paragraph (4), together with a statement that the background checks
have been performed on the firearms contained in the statement. The form of the statement relating to performance
of background checks shall be promulgated by the Pennsylvania State Police.
(2) Inspected photoidentification of the potential purchaser or transferee, including, but not limited to, a driver's
license, official Pennsylvania photoidentification card or official government photoidentification card. In the case of
a potential buyer or transferee who is a member of a recognized religious sect or community whose tenets forbid or
discourage the taking of photographs of members of that sect or community, a seller shall accept a valid-without-
photo driver's license or a combination of documents, as prescribed by the Pennsylvania State Police, containing the
applicant's name, address, date of birth and the signature of the applicant.
(3) Requested by means of a telephone call that the Pennsylvania State Police conduct a criminal history, juvenile
delinquency history and a mental health record check. The purchaser and the licensed dealer shall provide such
information as is necessary to accurately identify the purchaser. The requester shall be charged a fee equivalent to the
cost of providing the service but not to exceed $2 per buyer or transferee.
(4) Received a unique approval number for that inquiry from the Pennsylvania State Police and recorded the date and
the number on the application/record of sale form.
(5) Issued a receipt containing the information from paragraph (4), including the unique approval number of the
purchaser. This receipt shall be prima facie evidence of the purchaser's or transferee's compliance with the provisions
of this section.
(6) Unless it has been discovered pursuant to a criminal history, juvenile delinquency and mental health records
background check that the potential purchaser or transferee is prohibited from possessing a firearm pursuant to
section 6105, no information received via telephone following the implementation of the instantaneous background
check system from a purchaser or transferee who has received a unique approval number shall be retained by the
Pennsylvania State Police.
(7) For purposes of the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(9), (g)(1) and (s)(1) (relating to unlawful acts), in the
event the criminal history or juvenile delinquency background check indicates a conviction for a misdemeanor that
the Pennsylvania State Police cannot determine is or is not related to an act of domestic violence, the Pennsylvania
State Police shall issue a temporary delay of the approval of the purchase or transfer. During the temporary delay,

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§ 6111. Case: 19-1927
the Pennsylvania State Police shall conduct a review or investigation of the conviction with courts, local police
departments, district attorneys and other law enforcement or related institutions as necessary to determine whether or
not the misdemeanor conviction involved an act of domestic violence. The Pennsylvania State Police shall conduct the
review or investigation as expeditiously as possible. No firearm may be transferred by the dealer to the purchaser who
is the subject of the investigation during the temporary delay. The Pennsylvania State Police shall notify the dealer
of the termination of the temporary delay and either deny the sale or provide the unique approval number under
paragraph (4).
(c) Duty of other persons.--Any person who is not a licensed importer, manufacturer or dealer and who desires to sell
or transfer a firearm to another unlicensed person shall do so only upon the place of business of a licensed importer,
manufacturer, dealer or county sheriff's office, the latter of whom shall follow the procedure set forth in this section as if
he were the seller of the firearm. The provisions of this section shall not apply to transfers between spouses or to transfers
between a parent and child or to transfers between grandparent and grandchild.
(d) Defense.--Compliance with the provisions of this section shall be a defense to any criminal complaint under the laws of
this Commonwealth or other claim or cause of action under this chapter arising from the sale or transfer of any firearm.
(e) Nonapplicability of section.--This section shall not apply to the following:
(1) Any firearm manufactured on or before 1898.
(2) Any firearm with a matchlock, flintlock or percussion cap type of ignition system.
(3) Any replica of any firearm described in paragraph (1) if the replica:
(i) is not designed or redesigned to use rimfire or conventional center fire fixed ammunition; or
(ii) uses rimfire or conventional center fire fixed ammunition which is no longer manufactured in the United States
and which is not readily available in the ordinary channels of commercial trade.
(f) Application of section.--
(1) For the purposes of this section only, except as provided by paragraph (2), “firearm” shall mean any weapon which
is designed to or may readily be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive or the frame or receiver
of any such weapon.
(2) The provisions contained in subsections (a) and (c) shall only apply to pistols or revolvers with a barrel length of
less than 15 inches, any shotgun with a barrel length of less than 18 inches, any rifle with a barrel length of less than
16 inches or any firearm with an overall length of less than 26 inches.

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§ 6111. Case: 19-1927
(3) The provisions contained in subsection (a) shall not apply to any law enforcement officer whose current
identification as a law enforcement officer shall be construed as a valid license to carry a firearm or any person who
possesses a valid license to carry a firearm under section 6109 (relating to licenses).
(4)(i) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to any person who presents to the seller or transferor a written
statement issued by the official described in subparagraph (iii) during the ten-day period ending on the date of the
most recent proposal of such transfer or sale by the transferee or purchaser stating that the transferee or purchaser
requires access to a firearm because of a threat to the life of the transferee or purchaser or any member of the
household of that transferee or purchaser.
(ii) The issuing official shall notify the applicant's local police authority that such a statement has been issued. In
counties of the first class the chief of police shall notify the police station or substation closest to the applicant's
residence.
(iii) The statement issued under subparagraph (ii) shall be issued by the district attorney, or his designee, of the
county of residence if the transferee or purchaser resides in a municipality where there is no chief of police. Otherwise,
the statement shall be issued by the chief of police in the municipality in which the purchaser or transferee resides.
(g) Penalties.--
(1) Any person, licensed dealer, licensed manufacturer or licensed importer who knowingly or intentionally sells,
delivers or transfers a firearm in violation of this section commits a misdemeanor of the second degree.
(2) Any person, licensed dealer, licensed manufacturer or licensed importer who knowingly or intentionally sells,
delivers or transfers a firearm under circumstances intended to provide a firearm to any person, purchaser or transferee
who is unqualified or ineligible to control, possess or use a firearm under this chapter commits a felony of the third
degree and shall in addition be subject to revocation of the license to sell firearms for a period of three years.
(3) Any person, licensed dealer, licensed manufacturer or licensed importer who knowingly and intentionally requests
a criminal history, juvenile delinquency or mental health record check or other confidential information from the
Pennsylvania State Police under this chapter for any purpose other than compliance with this chapter or knowingly
and intentionally disseminates any criminal history, juvenile delinquency or mental health record or other confidential
information to any person other than the subject of the information commits a felony of the third degree.
(3.1) Any person, licensed dealer, licensed manufacturer or licensed importer who knowingly and intentionally obtains
or furnishes information collected or maintained pursuant to section 6109 for any purpose other than compliance with
this chapter or who knowingly or intentionally disseminates, publishes or otherwise makes available such information
to any person other than the subject of the information commits a felony of the third degree.
(4) Any person, purchaser or transferee commits a felony of the third degree if, in connection with the purchase,
delivery or transfer of a firearm under this chapter, he knowingly and intentionally:

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§ 6111. Case: 19-1927
(i) makes any materially false oral statement;
(ii) makes any materially false written statement, including a statement on any form promulgated by Federal or
State agencies; or
(iii) willfully furnishes or exhibits any false identification intended or likely to deceive the seller, licensed dealer or
licensed manufacturer.
(5) Notwithstanding section 306 (relating to liability for conduct of another; complicity) or any other statute to the
contrary, any person, licensed importer, licensed dealer or licensed manufacturer who knowingly and intentionally
sells, delivers or transfers a firearm in violation of this chapter who has reason to believe that the firearm is intended
to be used in the commission of a crime or attempt to commit a crime shall be criminally liable for such crime or
attempted crime.
(6) Notwithstanding any act or statute to the contrary, any person, licensed importer, licensed manufacturer or licensed
dealer who knowingly and intentionally sells or delivers a firearm in violation of this chapter who has reason to believe
that the firearm is intended to be used in the commission of a crime or attempt to commit a crime shall be liable in the
amount of the civil judgment for injuries suffered by any person so injured by such crime or attempted crime.
(h) Subsequent violation penalty.--
(1) A second or subsequent violation of this section shall be a felony of the second degree. A person who at the time
of sentencing has been convicted of another offense under this section shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum
sentence of imprisonment of five years. A second or subsequent offense shall also result in permanent revocation of
any license to sell, import or manufacture a firearm.
(2) Notice of the applicability of this subsection to the defendant and reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's
intention to proceed under this section shall be provided prior to trial. The applicability of this section shall be
determined at sentencing. The court shall consider evidence presented at trial, shall afford the Commonwealth and
the defendant an opportunity to present necessary additional evidence and shall determine by a preponderance of the
evidence if this section is applicable.
(3) There shall be no authority for a court to impose on a defendant to which this subsection is applicable a lesser
sentence than provided for in paragraph (1), to place the defendant on probation or to suspend sentence. Nothing
in this section shall prevent the sentencing court from imposing a sentence greater than that provided in this section.
Sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing shall not supersede the mandatory
sentences provided in this section.
(4) If a sentencing court refuses to apply this subsection where applicable, the Commonwealth shall have the right to
appellate review of the action of the sentencing court. The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the
case to the sentencing court for imposition of a sentence in accordance with this section if it finds that the sentence
was imposed in violation of this subsection.

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§ 6111. Case: 19-1927
(5) For the purposes of this subsection, a person shall be deemed to have been convicted of another offense under this
section whether or not judgment of sentence has been imposed for that violation.
(i) Confidentiality.--All information provided by the potential purchaser, transferee or applicant, including, but not
limited to, the potential purchaser, transferee or applicant's name or identity, furnished by a potential purchaser or
transferee under this section or any applicant for a license to carry a firearm as provided by section 6109 shall be
confidential and not subject to public disclosure. In addition to any other sanction or penalty imposed by this chapter,
any person, licensed dealer, State or local governmental agency or department that violates this subsection shall be liable
in civil damages in the amount of $1,000 per occurrence or three times the actual damages incurred as a result of the
violation, whichever is greater, as well as reasonable attorney fees.
(j) Exemption.--
(1) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to:
(i) sales between Federal firearms licensees; or
(ii) the purchase of firearms by a chief law enforcement officer or his designee, for the official use of law enforcement
officers.
(2) For the purposes of this subsection, the term “chief law enforcement officer” shall include the Commissioner of the
Pennsylvania State Police, the chief or head of a police department, a county sheriff or any equivalent law enforcement
official.
Credits
1972, Dec. 6, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, effective June 6, 1973. Amended 1995, June 13, P.L. 1024, No. 17 (Spec. Sess. No.
1), § 5, effective in 120 days; 1995, Nov. 22, P.L. 621, No. 66, § 4; 1997, April 22, P.L. 73, No. 5, § 1; 1998, June 18, P.L.
503, No. 70, § 4, imd. effective; 1998, Dec. 3, P.L. 933, No. 121, § 4, imd. effective; 1999, Dec. 15, P.L. 915, No. 59, §
6, effective in 60 days; 2000, Dec. 20, P.L. 728, No. 101, § 4, effective in 60 days; 2008, Oct. 17, P.L. 1628, No. 131, § 5,
effective in 60 days [Dec. 16, 2008]; 2012, Oct. 25, P.L. 1626, No. 199, § 1, effective in 60 days [Dec. 24, 2012].
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111, PA ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111


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Case:
§ 6111.1. 19-1927
Pennsylvania Document:
State Police, 003113275070
PA ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1 Page: 71 Date Filed: 06/26/2019

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1
§ 6111.1. Pennsylvania State Police
Effective: June 20, 2016

Currentness
(a) Administration.--The Pennsylvania State Police shall have the responsibility to administer the provisions of this
chapter.
(b) Duty of Pennsylvania State Police.--
(1) Upon receipt of a request for a criminal history, juvenile delinquency history and mental health record check of
the potential purchaser or transferee, the Pennsylvania State Police shall immediately during the licensee's call or by
return call forthwith:
(i) review the Pennsylvania State Police criminal history and fingerprint records to determine if the potential
purchaser or transferee is prohibited from receipt or possession of a firearm under Federal or State law;
(ii) review the juvenile delinquency and mental health records of the Pennsylvania State Police to determine whether
the potential purchaser or transferee is prohibited from receipt or possession of a firearm under Federal or State
law; and
(iii) inform the licensee making the inquiry either:
(A) that the potential purchase or transfer is prohibited; or
(B) provide the licensee with a unique approval number.
(2) In the event of electronic failure, scheduled computer downtime or similar event beyond the control of the
Pennsylvania State Police, the Pennsylvania State Police shall immediately notify the requesting licensee of the reason
for and estimated length of the delay. If the failure or event lasts for a period exceeding 48 hours, the dealer shall not
be subject to any penalty for completing a transaction absent the completion of an instantaneous records check for the
remainder of the failure or similar event, but the dealer shall obtain a completed application/record of sale following

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the provisions of section 6111(b)(1) and (1.1) (relating to sale or transfer of firearms) as if an instantaneous records
check has not been established for any sale or transfer of a firearm for the purpose of a subsequent background check.
(3) The Pennsylvania State Police shall fully comply, execute and enforce the directives of this section as follows:
(i) The instantaneous background check for firearms as defined in section 6102 (relating to definitions) shall begin
on July 1, 1998.
(ii) The instantaneous background check for firearms that exceed the barrel lengths set forth in section 6102 shall
begin on the later of:
(A) the date of publication of the notice under section 6111(a)(2); or
(B) December 31, 1998.
(4) The Pennsylvania State Police and any local law enforcement agency shall make all reasonable efforts to determine
the lawful owner of any firearm confiscated or recovered by the Pennsylvania State Police or any local law enforcement
agency and return said firearm to its lawful owner if the owner is not otherwise prohibited from possessing the firearm.
When a court of law has determined that the Pennsylvania State Police or any local law enforcement agency have
failed to exercise the duty under this subsection, reasonable attorney fees shall be awarded to any lawful owner of said
firearm who has sought judicial enforcement of this subsection.
(c) Establish a telephone number.--The Pennsylvania State Police shall establish a telephone number which shall be
operational seven days a week between the hours of 8 a.m. and 10 p.m. local time for purposes of responding to inquiries
as described in this section from licensed manufacturers, licensed importers and licensed dealers. The Pennsylvania State
Police shall employ and train such personnel as are necessary to administer expeditiously the provisions of this section.
(d) Distribution.--The Pennsylvania State Police shall provide, without charge, summaries of uniform firearm laws and
firearm safety brochures pursuant to section 6125 (relating to distribution of uniform firearm laws and firearm safety
brochures).
(e) Challenge to records.--
(1) Any person who is denied the right to receive, sell, transfer, possess, carry, manufacture or purchase a firearm as a
result of the procedures established by this section may challenge the accuracy of that person's criminal history, juvenile
delinquency history or mental health record pursuant to a denial by the instantaneous records check by submitting a
challenge to the Pennsylvania State Police within 30 days from the date of the denial.
(2) The Pennsylvania State Police shall conduct a review of the accuracy of the information forming the basis for the
denial and shall have the burden of proving the accuracy of the record. Within 20 days after receiving a challenge,
the Pennsylvania State Police shall notify the challenger of the basis for the denial, including, but not limited to, the

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§ 6111.1. 19-1927
jurisdiction and docket number of any relevant court decision and provide the challenger an opportunity to provide
additional information for the purposes of the review. The Pennsylvania State Police shall communicate its final
decision to the challenger within 60 days of the receipt of the challenge. The decision of the Pennsylvania State Police
shall include all information which formed a basis for the decision.
(3) If the challenge is ruled invalid, the person shall have the right to appeal the decision to the Attorney General within
30 days of the decision. The Attorney General shall conduct a hearing de novo in accordance with the Administrative
Agency Law. The burden of proof shall be upon the Commonwealth.
(4) The decision of the Attorney General may be appealed to the Commonwealth Court by an aggrieved party.
(f) Notification of mental health adjudication, treatment, commitment, drug use or addiction.--
(1) Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, judges of the courts of common pleas shall notify the Pennsylvania
State Police, on a form developed by the Pennsylvania State Police, of:
(i) the identity of any individual who has been adjudicated as an incompetent or as a mental defective or who has
been involuntarily committed to a mental institution under the act of July 9, 1976 (P.L. 817, No. 143), 1 known as
the Mental Health Procedures Act, or who has been involuntarily treated as described in section 6105(c)(4) (relating
to persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms) or as described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(4) (relating to unlawful acts) and its implementing Federal regulations; and
(ii) any finding of fact or court order related to any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
(2) The notification shall be transmitted by the judge to the Pennsylvania State Police within seven days of the
adjudication, commitment or treatment.
(3) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the Pennsylvania State Police may disclose, electronically or otherwise,
to the United States Attorney General or a designee, any record relevant to a determination of whether a person is
disqualified from possessing or receiving a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(3) or (4) or an applicable state statute.
(g) Review by court.--
(1) Upon receipt of a copy of the order of a court of competent jurisdiction which vacates a final order or an involuntary
certification issued by a mental health review officer, the Pennsylvania State Police shall expunge all records of the
involuntary treatment received under subsection (f).
(2) A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant to section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act 2 may
petition the court to review the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the commitment was based. If the court
determines that the evidence upon which the involuntary commitment was based was insufficient, the court shall order

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§ 6111.1. 19-1927
that the record of the commitment submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police be expunged. A petition filed under this
subsection shall toll the 60-day period set forth under section 6105(a)(2).
(3) The Pennsylvania State Police shall expunge all records of an involuntary commitment of an individual who is
discharged from a mental health facility based upon the initial review by the physician occurring within two hours of
arrival under section 302(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act and the physician's determination that no severe
mental disability existed pursuant to section 302(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act. The physician shall provide
signed confirmation of the determination of the lack of severe mental disability following the initial examination under
section 302(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act to the Pennsylvania State Police.
(h) Juvenile registry.--
(1) The contents of law enforcement records and files compiled under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6308 (relating to law enforcement
records) concerning a child shall not be disclosed to the public except if the child is 14 years of age or older at the time
of the alleged conduct and if any of the following apply:
(i) The child has been adjudicated delinquent by a court as a result of an act or acts which constitute any offense
enumerated in section 6105.
(ii) A petition alleging delinquency has been filed by a law enforcement agency alleging that the child has committed
an act or acts which constitute an offense enumerated in section 6105 and the child previously has been adjudicated
delinquent by a court as a result of an act or acts which included the elements of one of such crimes.
(2) Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection, the contents of law enforcement records and files concerning any
child adjudicated delinquent for the commission of any criminal activity described in paragraph (1) shall be recorded
in the registry of the Pennsylvania State Police for the limited purposes of this chapter.
(i) Reports.--The Pennsylvania State Police shall annually compile and report to the General Assembly, on or before
December 31, the following information for the previous year:
(1) number of firearm sales, including the types of firearms;
(2) number of applications for sale of firearms denied, number of challenges of the denials and number of final reversals
of initial denials;
(3) summary of the Pennsylvania State Police's activities, including the average time taken to complete a criminal
history, juvenile delinquency history or mental health record check; and
(4) uniform crime reporting statistics compiled by the Pennsylvania State Police based on the National Incident-based
Reporting System.

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(j) Other criminal information.--The Pennsylvania State Police shall be authorized to obtain any crime statistics necessary
for the purposes of this chapter from any local law enforcement agency.
(j.1) Delinquency and mental health records.--The provisions of this section which relate to juvenile delinquency and
mental health records checks shall be applicable when the data has been made available to the Pennsylvania State Police
but not later than October 11, 1999.
(j.2) Records check.--The provisions of this section which relate to the instantaneous records check conducted by
telephone shall be applicable 30 days following notice by the Pennsylvania State Police pursuant to section 6111 (a)(2).
(j.3) Immunity.--The Pennsylvania State Police and its employees shall be immune from actions for damages for the use
of a firearm by a purchaser or for the unlawful transfer of a firearm by a dealer unless the act of the Pennsylvania State
Police or its employees constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.
(k) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this
subsection:
“Firearm.” The term shall have the same meaning as in section 6111.2 (relating to firearm sales surcharge).
“Physician.” Any licensed psychiatrist or clinical psychologist as defined in the act of July 9, 1976 (P.L. 817, No. 143),
known as the Mental Health Procedures Act.
Credits
1995, June 13, P.L. 1024, No. 17 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 6, effective in 120 days. Amended 1995, Nov. 22, P.L. 621, No.
66, § 5, imd. effective; 1997, April 22, P.L. 73, No. 5, § 1, effective in 60 days; 1998, June 18, P.L. 503, No. 70, § 5, imd.
effective; 1998, Dec. 3, P.L. 933, No. 121, § 4, imd. effective; 2008, Oct. 17, P.L. 1628, No. 131, § 6; 2014, Nov. 6, P.L.
2921, No. 192, § 3, effective in 60 days [Jan. 5, 2015].
Editors' Notes
VALIDITY OF ACT 2014-192
<Act 2014, Nov. 6, P.L. 2921, No. 192, was held unconstitutional in its entirety by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Leach v. Com., 141 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2016), as having been enacted in violation of the single subject
requirement of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. 3, § 3. Accordingly, this Act is not given effect in setting
forth the text of this section.>
Footnotes
1 50 P.S. § 7101 et seq.
2 50 P.S. § 7302.

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Title 50 P.S. Mental Health
Chapter 15. Mental Health Procedures (Refs & Annos)
Article III. Involuntary Examination and Treatment (Refs & Annos)
50 P.S. § 7301
§ 7301. Persons who may be subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment

Currentness
(a) Persons Subject.--Whenever a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, he may be
made subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment. A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a
result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and
social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm
to others or to himself, as defined in subsection (b), or the person is determined to be in need of assisted outpatient
treatment as defined in subsection (c).
(b) Determination of Clear and Present Danger.--(1) Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by establishing
that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and that there
is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated. If, however, the person has been found incompetent to
be tried or has been acquitted by reason of lack of criminal responsibility on charges arising from conduct involving
infliction of or attempt to inflict substantial bodily harm on another, such 30-day limitation shall not apply so long as
an application for examination and treatment is filed within 30 days after the date of such determination or verdict. In
such case, a clear and present danger to others may be shown by establishing that the conduct charged in the criminal
proceeding did occur, and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated. For the purpose of
this section, a clear and present danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by proof that the person has made threats
of harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm.
(2) Clear and present danger to himself shall be shown by establishing that within the past 30 days:
(i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that he would be unable, without care, supervision and the
continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection
and safety, and that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation
would ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded under this act; or
(ii) the person has attempted suicide and that there is the reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate treatment
is afforded under this act. For the purposes of this subsection, a clear and present danger may be demonstrated by
the proof that the person has made threats to commit suicide and has committed acts which are in furtherance of the
threat to commit suicide; or
(iii) the person has substantially mutilated himself or attempted to mutilate himself substantially and that there is
the reasonable probability of mutilation unless adequate treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes of

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this subsection, a clear and present danger shall be established by proof that the person has made threats to commit
mutilation and has committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat to commit mutilation.
(c) Determination of Need for Assisted Outpatient Treatment.--(1) The need for assisted outpatient treatment shall be
shown by establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the person would benefit from assisted outpatient treatment
as manifested by evidence of behavior that indicates all of the following:
(i) The person is unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision, based on a clinical determination.
(ii) The person has a history of lack of voluntary adherence to treatment for mental illness and one of the following
applies:
(A) Within the 12 months prior to the filing of a petition seeking assisted outpatient treatment, the person's failure
to adhere to treatment has been a significant factor in necessitating involuntary inpatient hospitalization or receipt of
services in a forensic or other mental health unit of a correctional facility, provided that the 12-month period shall be
extended by the length of any hospitalization or incarceration of the person in a correctional institution that occurred
within the 12-month period.
(B) Within the 48 months prior to the filing of a petition seeking court-ordered assisted outpatient treatment, the person's
failure to adhere to treatment resulted in one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward others or himself or threats
of, or attempts at, serious physical harm to others or himself, provided that the 48-month period shall be extended by
the length of any hospitalization or incarceration of the person in a correctional institution that occurred within the 48-
month period.
(iii) The person, as a result of the person's mental illness, is unlikely to voluntarily participate in necessary treatment and
the person previously has been offered voluntary treatment services but has not accepted or has refused to participate on
a sustained basis in voluntary treatment, provided that voluntary agreement to enter into services by a person during the
pendency of a petition for assisted outpatient treatment shall not preclude the court from ordering assisted outpatient
treatment for that person if reasonable evidence exists to believe that the person is unlikely to make a voluntary sustained
commitment to and remain in a treatment program.
(iv) Based on the person's treatment history and current behavior, the person is in need of treatment in order to prevent
a relapse or deterioration that would be likely to result in substantial risk of serious harm to others or himself.
(2) An individual who meets only the criteria described in clause (1) shall not be subject to involuntary inpatient
hospitalization unless a separate determination is made that the individual poses a clear and present danger in accordance
with subsection (b).
Credits
1976, July 9, P.L. 817, No. 143, § 301, effective in 60 days. Amended 1978, Nov. 26, P.L. 1362, No. 324, § 1, effective in
60 days; 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 690, No. 106, § 5, effective in 180 days [April 22, 2019].

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§ 7302 Date Filed: 06/26/2019

50 P.S. § 7302
§ 7302. Involuntary emergency examination and treatment

authorized by a physician--Not to exceed one hundred twenty hours

Currentness
(a) Application for Examination.--Emergency examination may be undertaken at a treatment facility upon the
certification of a physician stating the need for such examination; or upon a warrant issued by the county administrator
authorizing such examination; or without a warrant upon application by a physician or other authorized person who
has personally observed conduct showing the need for such examination.
(1) Warrant for Emergency Examination.--Upon written application by a physician or other responsible party setting
forth facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate
treatment, the county administrator may issue a warrant requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace officer,
to take such person to the facility specified in the warrant.
(2) Emergency Examination Without a Warrant.--Upon personal observation of the conduct of a person constituting
reasonable grounds to believe that he is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, and physician
or peace officer, or anyone authorized by the county administrator may take such person to an approved facility for
an emergency examination. Upon arrival, he shall make a written statement setting forth the grounds for believing
the person to be in need of such examination.
(b) Examination and Determination of Need for Emergency Treatment.--A person taken to a facility shall be examined
by a physician within two hours of arrival in order to determine if the person is severely mentally disabled within the
meaning of section 301(b) 1 and in need of immediate treatment. If it is determined that the person is severely mentally
disabled and in need of emergency treatment, treatment shall be begun immediately. If the physician does not so find, or
if at any time it appears there is no longer a need for immediate treatment, the person shall be discharged and returned
to such place as he may reasonably direct. The physician shall make a record of the examination and his findings. In
no event shall a person be accepted for involuntary emergency treatment if a previous application was granted for such
treatment and the new application is not based on behavior occurring after the earlier application.
(c) Notification of Rights at Emergency Examination.--Upon arrival at the facility, the person shall be informed of
the reasons for emergency examination and of his right to communicate immediately with others. He shall be given
reasonable use of the telephone. He shall be requested to furnish the names of parties whom he may want notified of his
custody and kept informed of his status. The county administrator or the director of the facility shall:

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(1) give notice to such parties of the whereabouts and status of the person, how and when he may be contacted and
visited, and how they may obtain information concerning him while he is in inpatient treatment; and
(2) take reasonable steps to assure that while the person is detained, the health and safety needs of any of his dependents
are met, and that his personal property and the premises he occupies are secure.
(d) Duration of Emergency Examination and Treatment.--A person who is in treatment pursuant to this section shall be
discharged whenever it is determined that he no longer is in need of treatment and in any event within 120 hours, unless
within such period:
(1) he is admitted to voluntary treatment pursuant to section 202 of this act; 2 or
(2) a certification for extended involuntary emergency treatment is filed pursuant to section 303 of this act. 3
Credits
Footnotes
1 50 P.S. § 7301.
2 50 P.S. § 7202.
3 50 P.S. § 7303.
50 P.S. § 7302, PA ST 50 P.S. § 7302

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50 P.S. § 7303
§ 7303. Extended involuntary emergency treatment certified by a

judge or mental health review officer--Not to exceed twenty days

Currentness
(a) Persons Subject to Extended Involuntary Emergency Treatment.--Application for extended involuntary emergency
treatment may be made for any person who is being treated pursuant to section 302 1 whenever the facility determines
that the need for emergency treatment is likely to extend beyond 120 hours. The application shall be filed forthwith in the
court of common pleas, and shall state the grounds on which extended emergency treatment is believed to be necessary.
The application shall state the name of any examining physician and the substance of his opinion regarding the mental
condition of the person.
(b) Appointment of Counsel and Scheduling of Informal Hearing.--Upon receiving such application, the court of common
pleas shall appoint an attorney who shall represent the person unless it shall appear that the person can afford, and desires
to have, private representation. Within 24 hours after the application is filed, an informal hearing shall be conducted by
a judge or by a mental health review officer and, if practicable, shall be held at the facility.
(c) Informal Conference on Extended Emergency Treatment Application.--(1) At the commencement of the informal
conference, the judge or the mental health review officer shall inform the person of the nature of the proceedings.
Information relevant to whether the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment shall be reviewed,
including the reasons that continued involuntary treatment is considered necessary. Such explanation shall be made by a
physician who examined the person and shall be in terms understandable to a layman. The judge or mental health review
officer may review any relevant information even if it would be normally excluded under rules of evidence if he believes
that such information is reliable. The person or his representative shall have the right to ask questions of the physician
and of any other witnesses and to present any relevant information. At the conclusion of the review, if the judge or the
review officer finds that the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of continued involuntary treatment, either
as an inpatient or through less restrictive assisted outpatient treatment, he shall so certify. Otherwise, he shall direct that
the facility director or his designee discharge the person.
(2) A record of the proceedings which need not be a stenographic record shall be made. Such record shall be kept by the
court or mental health review officer for at least one year.
(d) Contents of Certification.--A certification for extended involuntary treatment shall be made in writing upon a form
adopted by the department and shall include:

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(1) findings by the judge or mental health review officer as to the reasons that extended involuntary emergency treatment
is necessary;
(2) a description of the treatment to be provided together with an explanation of the adequacy and appropriateness of
such treatment, based upon the information received at the hearing;
(3) any documents required by the provisions of section 302;
(4) the application as filed pursuant to section 303(a); 2
(5) a statement that the person is represented by counsel; and
(6) an explanation of the effect of the certification, the person's right to petition the court for release under subsection
(g), and the continuing right to be represented by counsel.
(e) Filing and Service.--The certification shall be filed with the director of the facility and a copy served on the person,
such other parties as the person requested to be notified pursuant to section 302(c), and on counsel.
(f) Effect of Certification.--Upon the filing and service of a certification for extended involuntary emergency treatment,
the person may be given treatment in an approved facility for a period not to exceed 20 days.
(g) Petition to Common Pleas Court.--In all cases in which the hearing was conducted by a mental health review officer,
a person made subject to treatment pursuant to this section shall have the right to petition the court of common pleas
for review of the certification. A hearing shall be held within 72 hours after the petition is filed unless a continuance is
requested by the person's counsel. The hearing shall include a review of the certification and such evidence as the court
may receive or require. If the court determines that further involuntary treatment is necessary and that the procedures
prescribed by this act have been followed, it shall deny the petition. Otherwise, the person shall be discharged.
(h) Duration of Extended Involuntary Emergency Treatment.--Whenever a person is no longer severely mentally disabled
or in need of immediate treatment and, in any event, within 20 days after the filing of the certification, he shall be
discharged, unless within such period:
(1) he is admitted to voluntary treatment pursuant to section 202; 3 or
(2) the court orders involuntary treatment pursuant to section 304. 4
Credits

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Footnotes
1 50 P.S. § 7302.
2 50 P.S. § 7303.
3 50 P.S. § 7202.
4 50 P.S. § 7304.
50 P.S. § 7303, PA ST 50 P.S. § 7303

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50 P.S. § 7304
§ 7304. Court-ordered involuntary treatment not to exceed ninety days

Currentness
(a) Persons for Whom Application May be Made.--(1) A person who is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment,
as defined in section 301(a), 1 may be made subject to court-ordered involuntary treatment upon a determination of
clear and present danger under section 301(b)(1) (serious bodily harm to others), or section 301(b)(2)(i) (inability to care
for himself, creating a danger of death or serious harm to himself), or 301(b)(2)(ii) (attempted suicide), or 301(b)(2)(iii)
(self-mutilation), or upon determination that a person meets the requirements under section 301(c) (determination of
need for assisted outpatient treatment).
(2) Where a petition is filed for a person already subject to involuntary treatment, it shall be sufficient to represent,
and upon hearing to reestablish, that the conduct originally required by section 301(b) in fact occurred, and that his
condition continues to evidence a clear and present danger to himself or others, or that the conduct originally required
by section 301(c) in fact occurred and that his condition continues to evidence a need for assisted outpatient treatment.
In such event, it shall not be necessary to show the reoccurrence of dangerous conduct, either harmful or debilitating,
within the past 30 days.
(b) Procedures for Initiating Court-ordered Involuntary Treatment for Persons Already Subject to Involuntary Treatment.--
(1) Petition for court-ordered involuntary treatment for persons already subject to treatment under sections 303, 304 and
305 2 may be made by the county administrator or the director of the facility to the court of common pleas.
(2) The petition shall be in writing upon a form adopted by the department and shall include a statement of the facts
constituting reasonable grounds to believe that the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment. The
petition shall state the name of any examining physician and the substance of his opinion regarding the mental condition
of the person. It shall also state that the person has been given the information required by subsection (b)(3).
(3) Upon the filing of the petition the county administrator shall serve a copy on the person, his attorney, and those
designated to be kept informed, as provided in section 302(c), 3 including an explanation of the nature of the proceedings,
the person's right to an attorney and the services of an expert in the field of mental health, as provided by subsection (d).
(4) A hearing on the petition shall be held in all cases, not more than five days after the filing of the petition.
(5) Treatment shall be permitted to be maintained pending the determination of the petition.

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(c) Procedures for Initiating Court-ordered Involuntary Treatment for Persons Not in Involuntary Treatment.--(1) Any
responsible party may file a petition in the court of common pleas requesting court-ordered involuntary treatment for
any person not already in involuntary treatment for whom application could be made under subsection (a).
(2) The petition shall be in writing upon a form adopted by the department and shall set forth facts constituting reasonable
grounds to believe that the person is within the criteria for court-ordered treatment set forth in subsection (a). The
petition shall state the name of any examining physician and the substance of his opinion regarding the mental condition
of the person.
(3) Upon a determination that the petition sets forth such reasonable cause, the court shall appoint an attorney to
represent the person and set a date for the hearing as soon as practicable. The attorney shall represent the person unless
it shall appear that he can afford, and desires to have, private representation.
(4) The court, by summons, shall direct the person to appear for a hearing. The court may issue a warrant directing a
person authorized by the county administrator or a peace officer to bring such person before the court at the time of
the hearing if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person will not appear voluntarily. A copy of the petition
shall be served on such person at least three days before the hearing together with a notice advising him that an attorney
has been appointed who shall represent him unless he obtains an attorney himself, that he has a right to be assisted in
the proceedings by an expert in the field of mental health, and that he may request or be made subject to psychiatric
examination under subsection (c)(5).
(5) Upon motion of either the petitioner or the person, or upon its own motion, the court may order the person to be
examined by a psychiatrist appointed by the court. Such examination shall be conducted on an outpatient basis, and the
person shall have the right to have counsel present. A report of the examination shall be given to the court and counsel
at least 48 hours prior to the hearing.
(6) Involuntary treatment shall not be authorized during the pendency of a petition except in accordance with section
302 or section 303.
(c.1) Procedures for Initiating Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons Already Subject to Involuntary Treatment.--(1)
Petition for assisted outpatient treatment for persons already subject to involuntary treatment under section 301(b)(1)
or (2), or persons with mental illness subject to treatment in a forensic facility or a correctional institution who are ready
for release, may be made by the county administrator or the director of the facility to the court of common pleas.
(2) The petition shall be in writing upon a form adopted by the department and shall include a statement of the facts
constituting reasonable grounds to believe that the person is:
(i) No longer determined to be in need of involuntary inpatient treatment under section 301(b)(1) or (2) or no longer
subject to treatment in a forensic facility or correctional institution.
(ii) Determined to be in need of assisted outpatient treatment under section 301(c).

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(3) The petition shall state the name of any examining psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist and the substance of
his opinion regarding the mental condition of the person. It shall also state that the person has been given the information
required by subsection (b)(3).
(4) Upon the filing of the petition, the county administrator shall serve a copy on the person, his attorney and those
designated to be kept informed, as provided in section 302(c), including an explanation of the nature of the proceedings,
the person's right to an attorney and the services of an expert in the field of mental health, as provided by subsection (d).
(5) A hearing on the petition shall be held in all cases not more than five days after the filing of the petition.
(6) Treatment shall be permitted to be maintained pending the determination of the petition.
(c.2) Procedures for Initiating Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons Not in Involuntary Treatment.--(1) Any
responsible party may file a petition in the court of common pleas requesting assisted outpatient treatment for any
person determined under section 301(c) to be in need of assisted outpatient treatment, who is not already in involuntary
treatment, and who is not already in assisted outpatient treatment for whom application could be made under subsection
(a).
(2) The petition shall be in writing upon a form adopted by the department and shall set forth facts constituting reasonable
grounds to believe that the person is within the criteria as defined under section 301(c) for a person in need of assisted
outpatient treatment. The petition shall be accompanied by a statement of a psychiatrist, or a statement signed by a
clinical licensed psychologist stating that the clinician who issued the statement has examined the person and is of the
opinion that the person is in need of assisted outpatient treatment, or shall be accompanied by a written statement by
the applicant, under oath, that the person has refused to submit to an examination by a psychiatrist or by a clinical
licensed psychologist.
(3) Upon a determination that the petition sets forth reasonable cause, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent
the person and set a date for the hearing as soon as practicable. The attorney shall represent the person unless it shall
appear that he can afford, and desires to have, private representation.
(4) The court, by summons, shall direct the person to appear for a hearing. The court may issue a warrant directing an
individual authorized by the county administrator or a peace officer to bring such person before the court at the time of
the hearing if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person will not appear voluntarily. A copy of the petition
shall be served on such person at least three days before the hearing together with a notice advising him that an attorney
has been appointed who shall represent him unless he obtains an attorney himself, that he has a right to be assisted in
the proceedings by an expert in the field of mental health and that he may request or be made subject to psychiatric
examination under clause (5).
(5) Upon motion of either the petitioner or the person, or upon its own motion, the court may order the person to be
examined by a psychiatrist or other qualified professional appointed by the court, provided that:

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(i) a qualified professional who is appointed by the court and is not a psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist
shall be selected from a panel of qualified professionals specifically designated by the county administrator for the
qualified professional's demonstrated expertise and ability to conduct court-ordered examinations for assisted outpatient
treatment consistent with the qualified professional's scope of practice;
(ii) the examination shall be conducted on an outpatient basis and the person shall have the right to have counsel present;
(iii) the written report prepared by the qualified professional under subclause (i) shall be reviewed and approved by a
psychiatrist or a licensed clinical psychologist prior to submission to the court; and
(iv) the written report on the results of the examination shall be given to the court and counsel at least 48 hours prior
to the hearing.
(6) Involuntary treatment shall not be authorized during the pendency of a petition except in accordance with sections
302 and 303.
(d) Professional Assistance.--A person with respect to whom a hearing has been ordered under this section shall have
and be informed of a right to employ a physician, clinical psychologist or other expert in mental health of his choice
to assist him in connection with the hearing and to testify on his behalf. If the person cannot afford to engage such a
professional, the court shall, on application, allow a reasonable fee for such purpose. The fee shall be a charge against
the mental health and mental retardation program of the locality.
(e) Hearings on Petition for Court-ordered Involuntary Treatment.--A hearing on a petition for court-ordered involuntary
treatment shall be conducted according to the following:
(1) The person shall have the right to counsel and to the assistance of an expert in mental health.
(2) The person shall not be called as a witness without his consent.
(3) The person shall have the right to confront and cross-examine all witnesses and to present evidence in his own behalf.
(4) The hearing shall be public unless it is requested to be private by the person or his counsel.
(5) A stenographic or other sufficient record shall be made, which shall be impounded by the court and may be obtained
or examined only upon the request of the person or his counsel or by order of the court on good cause shown.
(6) The hearing shall be conducted by a judge or by a mental health review officer and may be held at a location other
than a courthouse when doing so appears to be in the best interest of the person.

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(7) A decision shall be rendered within 48 hours after the close of evidence.
(8) If the person is believed to be in need of assisted outpatient treatment in accordance with section 301(c), a hearing on
the petition shall be conducted in accordance with the following additional requirements:
(i) No later than the date of the hearing, a treatment team shall provide a written proposed assisted outpatient treatment
plan to the court. The plan shall state all treatment services recommended for the person and, for each service, shall
specify a provider that has agreed to provide the service.
(ii) In developing a written proposed assisted outpatient treatment plan, the treatment team shall take into account, if
existing, an advance directive for mental health treatment and provide the following persons with an opportunity to
participate:
(A) the person believed to be in need of court-ordered assistant outpatient treatment;
(B) all current treating providers;
(C) upon the request of the person believed to be in need of court-ordered assistant outpatient treatment, an individual
significant to the person, including any relative, close friend or individual otherwise concerned with the welfare of the
person; and
(D) any authorized guardian or other surrogate decision-maker.
(iii) The written proposed assisted outpatient treatment plan shall include case management services or an assertive
community treatment team to provide care coordination and assisted outpatient treatment services recommended by the
treatment team. If the plan includes medication, the prescribing physician's order shall state whether such medication
should be self-administered or administered by a specified provider. In no event shall the plan recommend the use of
physical force or restraints to administer medication to the person.
(iv) A qualified professional, who has personally examined the person within ten days of the filing of the petition, shall
provide testimony in support of the finding that the person meets all of the criteria for assisted outpatient treatment and
in support of a written proposed treatment plan developed pursuant to this section, including:
(A) the recommended assisted outpatient treatment, the rationale for the recommended assisted outpatient treatment
and the facts that establish that such treatment is the least restrictive appropriate alternative;
(B) information regarding the person's access to, and the availability of, recommended assisted outpatient treatment in
the community or elsewhere; and

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(C) if the recommended assisted outpatient treatment includes medication, the types or classes of medication that should
be authorized, the beneficial and detrimental physical and mental effects of such medication and whether such medication
should be self-administered or administered by a specified provider and the ongoing process for management of such
medications in response to changes in the person's medical condition.
(9) A decision shall be rendered within 48 hours after the close of evidence.
(f) Determination and Order.--(1) Upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the person is severely mentally
disabled and in need of treatment and subject to subsection (a), an order shall be entered directing treatment of the person
in an approved facility as an inpatient or an outpatient, or a combination of such treatment as the director of the facility
shall from time to time determine. Inpatient treatment shall be deemed appropriate only after full consideration has been
given to less restrictive alternatives, including assisted outpatient treatment. Investigation of treatment alternatives shall
include consideration of the person's relationship to his community and family, his employment possibilities, all available
community resources, and guardianship services. An order for inpatient treatment shall include findings on this issue.
(2) If the person is found to be in need of assisted outpatient treatment in accordance with section 301(c) or as a result of
consideration of less restrictive settings under clause (1), the court shall order the person to receive assisted outpatient
treatment for a period not to exceed 90 days from any provider or facility approved by the department or the county
administrator for purposes of providing assisted outpatient treatment, provided that a jail or any other State or county
correctional institution shall not be an authorized facility.
(3) The facility or provider shall examine and treat the person in accordance with the assisted outpatient treatment plan.
If the person is receiving assisted outpatient treatment, or receives treatment in an outpatient setting during a subsequent
period of continued commitment under section 305, the facility or provider to whom the person is ordered shall determine
the appropriate assisted outpatient treatment plan for the person.
(4) If the approved court-ordered assisted outpatient treatment plan includes medications, the court order shall authorize
the treatment team, in accordance with their professional judgment and under supervision of the prescribing physician,
to perform routine medication management, including adjustment of specific medications and doses, in consultation
with the person and as warranted by changes in the person's medical condition.
(5) The provider or facility responsible for the assisted outpatient treatment plan shall inform the court if the person
fails materially to adhere to the treatment plan and comply with the court order. If the court receives information that
a patient is not complying with the court's order, the court may take any of the following actions:
(i) set a modification hearing to assess the person's failure to adhere to the assisted outpatient treatment plan;
(ii) amend the assisted outpatient treatment plan to foster adherence to necessary treatment by the person; or
(iii) issue an order for the person to be examined in accordance with section 302 for purposes of evaluation and, if
appropriate, file a petition that the person poses a clear and present danger under section 301(b), provided that a State
or county correctional institution may not be considered an authorized treatment facility.

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(6) If the court determines under clause (5) that the person has failed to adhere to the assisted outpatient treatment plan,
the court may not hold that person in contempt or otherwise sanction the person solely based on the failure to comply
with the assisted outpatient treatment plan.
(7) The person subject to assisted outpatient treatment may petition the court for enforcement of a service specifically
contained in that person's individualized treatment plan, provided that the petition must include clear and convincing
evidence demonstrating that the service is not being provided in accordance with that plan.
(8) A copy of the person's individualized treatment plan and related documents shall be made available to the court for
purposes of proceedings under clause (5) or (7).
(g) Duration of Court-ordered Involuntary Treatment.--(1) A person may be made subject to court-ordered involuntary
treatment under this section for a period not to exceed 90 days, excepting only that: Persons may be made subject to
court-ordered involuntary treatment under this section for a period not to exceed one year if:
(i) the person meets the criteria established by clause (2); and
(ii) the person may be subject to assisted outpatient treatment for a period not to exceed 180 days if the person meets
the criteria established by clause (5).
(2) A person may be subject to court-ordered involuntary treatment for a period not to exceed one year if:
(i) severe mental disability is based on acts giving rise to the following charges under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code: 4
murder (§ 2502); voluntary manslaughter (§ 2503); aggravated assault (§ 2702); kidnapping (§ 2901); rape (§ 3121(1) and
(2)); involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (§ 3123(1) and (2)); arson (§ 3301); and
(ii) a finding of incompetency to be tried or a verdict of acquittal because of lack of criminal responsibility has been
entered.
(3) If at any time the director of a facility concludes that the person is not severely mentally disabled or in need of
treatment pursuant to subsection (a), he shall discharge the person provided that no person subjected to involuntary
treatment pursuant to clause (2) may be discharged without a hearing conducted pursuant to clause (4).
(4) In cases involving involuntary treatment pursuant to clause (2), whenever the period of court-ordered involuntary
treatment is about to expire and neither the director nor the county administrator intends to apply for an additional
period of court-ordered involuntary treatment pursuant to section 305 or at any time the director concludes that the
person is not severely mentally disabled or in need of treatment, the director shall petition the court which ordered the
involuntary treatment for the unconditional or conditional release of the person. Notice of such petition shall be given
to the person, the county administrator and the district attorney. Within 15 days after the petition has been filed, the
court shall hold a hearing to determine if the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment. Petitions

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which must be filed simply because the period of involuntary treatment will expire shall be filed at least ten days prior to
the expiration of the court-ordered period of involuntary treatment. If the court determines after hearing that the person
is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment, it may order additional involuntary treatment not to exceed one
year; if the court does not so determine, it shall order the discharge of the person.
(5) A person may be subject to assisted outpatient treatment for a period of up to 180 days if the person continues to
meet the requirements of section 301(c) or is being discharged from involuntary inpatient treatment under this article.
Credits
Footnotes
1 50 P.S. § 7301.
2 50 P.S. §§ 7303, 7304 and 7305.
3 50 P.S. § 7302.
4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 101 et seq.
50 P.S. § 7304, PA ST 50 P.S. § 7304

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50 P.S. § 7305
§ 7305. Additional periods of court-ordered involuntary treatment

Currentness
(a) At the expiration of a period of court-ordered involuntary treatment under section 304(g) 1 or this section, the court
may order treatment for an additional period upon the application of the county administrator or the director of the
facility in which the person is receiving treatment. Such order shall be entered upon hearing on findings as required by
sections 304(a) and (b), and the further finding of a need for continuing involuntary treatment as shown by conduct
during the person's most recent period of court-ordered treatment. The additional period of involuntary treatment shall
not exceed 180 days; provided that persons meeting the criteria of section 304(g)(2) may be subject to an additional
period of up to one year of involuntary treatment. A person found dangerous to himself under section 301(b)(2)(i), (ii)
or (iii) 2 shall be subject to an additional period of involuntary full-time inpatient treatment only if he has first been
released to a less restrictive alternative. This limitation shall not apply where, upon application made by the county
administrator or facility director, it is determined by a judge or mental health review officer that such release would not
be in the person's best interest.
(b) The director of the facility in which the person is receiving treatment shall notify the county administrator at least
ten days prior to the expiration of a period of involuntary commitment ordered under section 304 or this section.
(c) At the expiration of a period of assisted outpatient treatment under section 304(g) or this section, the court may order
treatment for an additional period upon the application of the county administrator or the treatment team. Such order
shall be entered upon hearing on findings as required by sections 304(a) and (b) and the further finding of a need for
continuing assisted outpatient treatment. The additional period of involuntary treatment shall not exceed 180 days.
Credits
Footnotes
1 50 P.S. § 7304.
2 50 P.S. § 7301.
50 P.S. § 7305, PA ST 50 P.S. § 7305

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A-40
No. 19-1927
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
─────────────♦─────────────
JOHN DOE I; JOHN DOE II,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL

PENNSYLVANIA; COMMISSIONER PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE;
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE,
Defendants-Appellees.
─────────────♦─────────────
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Case No. 2:16-CV-06039-JHS
The Honorable Joel H. Slomsky
─────────────♦─────────────
JOINT APPENDIX VOLUME I
JA-001 THROUGH JA-052
─────────────♦─────────────
Jonathan S. Goldstein John Parker Sweeney
Shawn M. Rodgers T. Sky Woodward
GOLDSTEIN LAW PARTNERS, LLC James W. Porter, III
11 Church Road BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP
Hatfield, PA 19440 1615 L Street N.W., Suite 1350
Telephone: (610) 949-0444 Washington, D.C. 20036
jonathan@goldsteinlp.com Telephone: (202) 719-8216
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants

JOINT APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
District
Joint
Court
Description Appendix
Docket
Page:
No.:
VOLUME I
85 Notice of Appeal JA-001
Memorandum and Opinion on Motions for Summary
79 JA-004
Judgment
80 Order on Motions for Summary Judgment JA-048
84 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter Judgment JA-049
VOLUME II
District Court Docket JA-053
1 Complaint JA-065
Memorandum and Opinion on Defendant’s Motion to
33 JA-087
Dismiss
34 Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss JA-122
42 Amended Complaint JA-124
55 Stipulation of Facts Not in Dispute JA-143
61 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment JA-153
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
62 JA-158
Judgment
63 Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts JA-186
63-1 Exhibit A: Joint Stipulation of Undisputed Facts JA-214
63-2 Exhibit B: Major Price Deposition Transcript JA-224
63-3 Exhibit C: Bechtel Declaration JA-244
63-4 Exhibit D: Declaration of Plaintiff John Doe I JA-247
63-5 Exhibit E: Weiss Medical Report – John Doe I JA-251
63-6 Exhibit F: Declaration of Plaintiff John Doe II JA-306
63-7 Exhibit G: Weiss Medical Report – John Doe II JA-311
VOLUME III
65 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment JA-332
66 Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts JA-360
68 Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum JA-389
68-1 Exhibit 1: Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts JA-399
68-2 Exhibit 2: Weiss CV JA-427
68-3 Exhibit 3: Joint Stipulation of Undisputed Facts JA-436
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
69 JA-446
for Summary Judgment
i
JOINT APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
District
Joint
Court
Description Appendix
Docket
Page:
No.:
Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed
70 JA-473
Facts
Exhibit A: December 19, 2012 Letter from Pennsylvania
State Police (“PSP”) Commissioner Colonel Frank Noonan
70-1 JA-487
to Paul Wysopal, NICS Section Chief, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion
71 JA-506
for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
72 JA-511
Summary Judgment
72-1 Mental Health History of Seung Hui Cho JA-522
82 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment JA-554
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or
83 JA-557
Amend Judgment
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN DOE I and JOHN DOE II, )

)
Plaintiffs,
)
v. ) Case No.: 2:16-CV-6039
LIEUTENANT COLONEL )
ROBERT EVANCHICK, in his official )
capacity as Acting State Police )
Commissioner, )
)
Defendant. )
)
)
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that John Doe I and John Doe II, Plaintiffs in the above-named
case, hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from the District
Court’s Memorandum and Opinion (Docket No. 79), entered on January 10, 2019, and Final
Judgment (Docket No. 80), entered on January 10, 2019, granting Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiffs also appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from the
District Court’s Order (Docket No. 84) entered on April 8, 2019, denying Plaintiffs’ timely
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Docket No. 82), which was filed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e) on February 7, 2019.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs appeal both the District Court’s Final Judgment (Docket No. 80)
and Order (Docket No. 84) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).
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Dated: April 23, 2019 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jonathan S. Goldstein

Jonathan S. Goldstein, Esquire
Attorney I.D. 201627 (PA Atty. I.D).
Shawn M. Rodgers, Esquire
Attorney I.D. 307598 (PA Atty. I.D).
GOLDSTEIN LAW PARTNERS, LLC
11 Church Road
Hatfield, PA 19440
(610) 949-0444
jonathan@goldsteinlp.com

John Parker Sweeney (admitted Pro Hac Vice)
James W. Porter, III (admitted Pro Hac Vice)
T. Sky Woodward (admitted Pro Hac Vice)
1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 1350
(202) 393-7150
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

John Doe I and John Doe II
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I, John Parker Sweeney, Esquire, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Notice of Appeal to be served on the 23rd day of April, 2019, by electronic filing
at the following address:
VIA E-FILING:
Kathy Le
Deputy Attorney General
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
Telephone: (215) 560-1581
Fax: (717) 772-4526
Attorney for Defendant

John Parker Sweeney (admitted Pro Hac Vice)
1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 1350
(202) 393-7150
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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JOHN DOE I, et. al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION
v. NO. 16-6039
COLONEL ROBERT EVANCHICK,1 in his

Official Capacity as Acting Commissioner of
the Pennsylvania State Police
Defendant.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 3
II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................ 4
A. Emergency Involuntary Commitment Under the Pennsylvania Mental Health

Procedures Act (“MHPA”) .............................................................................................. 5
B. Section 6105(c)(4) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act ..................................... 9
C. MHPA Reporting Requirements to the Pennsylvania State Police ............................... 10
D. State Statutory Remedies .............................................................................................. 13
E. Plaintiffs’ Section 302 Commitments ........................................................................... 17
1. John Doe I ..................................................................................................................... 17
1
Plaintiffs originally filed this suit against Colonel Tyree Blocker in his official capacity as the
Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police. Colonel Blocker has since retired. On March
22, 2018, Colonel Robert Evanchick was appointed to serve as Acting Commissioner of the
Pennsylvania State Police. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), when a public officer
is a party to a suit in his individual capacity and the officer ceases to hold office while the action
is still pending, the officer’s successor is substituted in the suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Therefore,
Colonel Evanchick is substituted for Colonel Blocker.
1
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2. John Doe II.................................................................................................................... 20
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................... 21
IV. ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................... 24
A. An Individual Committed Under Section 302 of the MHPA has a Protected

Liberty Interest in the Right to Bear Arms............................................................ 26
B. Defendant’s Enforcement of Section 6105(c)(4) of PUFA Does Not Deprive

Section 302 Committees of Their Right to Bear Arms Without Due Process ...... 31
1. A Section 302 Committee is not Entitled to Additional Pre-Deprivation

Procedures Before the Pennsylvania State Police Enter His Mental Health
Record in the PICS and NICS Databases ......................................................... 32
2. PUFA’s Post-Deprivation Remedies Adequately Safeguard a Section 302

Committee’s Due Process Rights ...................................................................... 38
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 44
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OPINION
Slomsky, J. January 10, 2019
I. INTRODUCTION
The parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment present a single issue: whether
Defendant’s enforcement of a Pennsylvania law prohibiting an individual who has been
temporarily committed for mental health reasons from owning a firearm violates the United States
Constitution by depriving that individual of his right to bear arms without due process of law.
(Doc. Nos. 61, 65.)
On November 17, 2016, Plaintiffs John Doe I and John Doe II (“Plaintiffs”) filed this
procedural due process claim against Defendants Governor Thomas W. Wolf, Attorney General
Bruce R. Beemer, Colonel Tyree V. Blocker, and the Pennsylvania State Police.2 Plaintiffs are
individuals who attempted to purchase firearms for self-defense in their homes, but were
prohibited from doing so by Section 6105(c)(4) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act
(“PUFA”), which bans individuals who have been temporarily committed under Section 302 of
the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (“MPRA”) from possessing firearms. In this
procedural due process action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, Plaintiffs bring a facial
challenge to Section 6105(c)(4), alleging that it deprives them, and all other similarly-situated
individuals committed under Section 302, of their right to bear arms without due process of law.
(Doc. No. 1.)
2
On January 17, 2017, Josh Shapiro replaced Bruce R. Beemer as the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Attorney General. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Attorney
General Shapiro was substituted for Mr. Beemer as a defendant in this case. (Doc. No. 33 at
3.)
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Governor Wolf, the Attorney General, and the Pennsylvania State Police were dismissed
from this action at the Motion to Dismiss stage. (Doc. No. 34.) Now, only one Defendant remains:
Colonel Robert Evanchick (“Defendant”), who replaced Colonel Blocker as Commissioner of the
Pennsylvania State Police. (Doc. Nos. 61, 65.)
On March 12, 2018, several months after the Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
the parties filed a stipulation in which Defendant Colonel Evanchick consented to substitute the
original John Doe II with a new John Doe II. (Doc. No. 41.) That same day, Plaintiffs filed an
Amended Complaint in which they alleged facts pertaining to the new John Doe II. (Doc. No. 42.)
On October 29, 2018, the parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos.
61, 65). On November 19, 2018, both parties filed Responses in Opposition to the respective
Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 69, 70). Finally, on November 26, 2018, Plaintiffs
filed a Reply to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to their Motion. (Doc. No. 72.)
The Motions are now ripe for review.3 For reasons discussed infra, Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) will be denied, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 65) will be granted.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs mount a facial challenge to Section 6105(c)(4) of the PUFA. As such, they do
not merely assert that Section 6105(c)(4) is unconstitutional as it applies to them; rather, they
3
In reaching a decision, the Court considered Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 61), Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 62), Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of their Motion (Doc. No.
63), Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65), Defendant’s Statement of
Undisputed Facts in Support of His Motion (Doc. No. 66), Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition
to Defendant’s Motion (Doc. No. 69), Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s Statement of
Undisputed Facts (Doc. No. 70), Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
(Doc. No. 71), Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to their Motion (Doc.
No. 72), and the parties’ Joint Statement of Facts Not in Dispute (Doc. No. 55).
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contend that, on its face, the statute denies every individual committed under Section 302 of his
right to bear arms without procedural due process.4 (Doc. No. 61.) To address this contention, the
Court will first set forth the relevant statutory scheme, and then discuss Plaintiffs’ respective
Section 302 commitments and mental health history.
A. Emergency Involuntary Commitment Under the Pennsylvania Mental

Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”)
In Pennsylvania, an individual may be subjected involuntarily to a temporary emergency
commitment for up to 120 hours under Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures
Act (“MHPA”) if “the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment.”
50 Pa. Stat. § 7302. This is known as a Section 302 commitment. Section 301, which defines
persons subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment under Section 302, provides
as follows:
Whenever a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate

treatment, he may be made subject to involuntary emergency examination and
treatment. A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of mental
illness, his capacity to exercise self control, judgment and discretion in the conduct
of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened
that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.
50 Pa. Stat. § 7301. Section 301 also sets forth the standard for determining whether an individual
presents a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself:
Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by establishing that within the
past 30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on
another and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated.
. . . For the purpose of this section, a clear and present danger of harm to others
may be demonstrated by proof that the person has made threats of harm and has
committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm.
4
Plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of their Section 302 commitments or the constitutionality
of Section 302. (Doc. No. 42 ¶ 6.) According to the Amended Complaint, “[t]hey seek only
the narrow relief of preventing the automatic imposition of an indefinite loss of their Second
Amendment rights without due process of law that arises out of their Emergency Commitments
under Section 302.” (Id.)
5
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50 Pa. Stat. § 7301(b)(1). Under Section 301(b)(2), “clear and present danger” can be shown by
establishing that within the past 30 days:
(i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that he would be unable,
without care, supervision and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his
need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and
safety, and that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury
or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless adequate
treatment were afforded under this act; or
(ii) the person has attempted suicide and that there is the reasonable probability of
suicide unless adequate treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes of
this subsection, a clear and present danger may be demonstrated by the proof
that the person has made threats to commit suicide and has committed acts which
are in furtherance of the threat to commit suicide; or
(iii) the person has substantially mutilated himself or attempted to mutilate himself
substantially and that there is the reasonable probability of mutilation unless
adequate treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes of this subsection,
a clear and present danger shall be established by proof that the person has made
threats to commit mutilation and has committed acts which are in furtherance of
the threat to commit mutilation.
50 Pa. Stat. § 7301(b)(2).
A Section 302 commitment is initiated in one of two ways. First, a “physician or
responsible party”5 may make a written application to the county administrator “setting forth facts
constituting reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of
medical treatment.” 50 Pa. Stat. § 7302(a)(1). Upon receipt of the written application, “the county
administrator may issue a warrant requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace officer, to
take such person to the facility specified in the warrant.” Id. Second, “a physician or peace officer,
or anyone authorized by the county administrator may take such a person to an approved facility
for an emergency examination” upon “personal observation of the conduct . . . constituting
reasonable grounds to believe that he is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate
5
The term “responsible party” is not defined in the MHPA.
6
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treatment.” 50 Pa. Stat. § 7302(a)(2). If an individual is taken to a treatment facility without a
warrant, the person transporting the individual must “make a written statement setting forth the
grounds for believing the person to be in need of such examination.” Id.
An individual transported to a treatment facility under Section 302 must be examined by a
physician within two hours of his arrival to determine if he poses a clear and present danger to
himself or others and if he is in need of immediate treatment. 50 Pa. Stat. § 7302(b). If the
physician determines that the person is “severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency
treatment,” the treatment shall begin immediately. Id. If instead the physician finds that there is
no need for emergency treatment, or if at any time it appears that emergency treatment is no longer
required, the individual must be discharged. Id. Additionally, Section 302 requires the physician
to make a record of the examination and his findings. Id.
An individual temporarily committed under Section 302 must be notified of his rights.
Section 302 sets forth those rights as follows:
Upon arrival at the facility, the person shall be informed of the reasons for
emergency examination and of his right to communicate immediately with others.
He shall be given reasonable use of the telephone. He shall be requested to furnish
the names of parties whom he may want notified of his custody and kept informed
of his status. The county administrator or the director of the facility shall:
(1) give notice to such parties of the whereabouts and status of the person, how
and when he may be contacted and visited, and how they may obtain
information concerning him while he is in inpatient treatment; and
(2) take reasonable steps to assure that while the person is detained, the health
and safety needs of any of his dependents are met, and that his personal
property and the premises he occupies are secure.
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50 Pa. Stat. § 7302(c)(1)-(2). A mental health treatment facility notifies a Section 302 committee
of these rights by providing him with mental health provider forms, which have been developed
by the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services.6 (Doc. No. 55 ¶ 3.)
Sections 303 and 304 of the MPHA allow a treatment facility to extend a Section 302
commitment past 120 hours if the facility determines that the individual continues to need medical
treatment. 50 Pa. Stat. §§ 7303, 7304. A Section 303 commitment allows a facility to extend a
temporary commitment “for a period not to exceed 20 days.” 50 Pa. Stat. § 7303(f). To extend a
Section 302 commitment under Section 303, the facility must file an application in the court of
common pleas which states the grounds on which extended emergency treatment is believed to be
necessary. Id. “The application shall state the name of any examining physician and the substance
of his opinion regarding the mental condition of the person.” Id.
Upon receipt of the Section 303 application, the court of common pleas must appoint
counsel to represent the individual, unless the person can afford private representation. Within 24
hours of filing the application, “an informal hearing shall be conducted by a judge or by a mental
health review officer and, if practicable, shall be held at the facility.” 50 Pa. Stat. § 7303(b). At
the informal hearing, the committee has the following rights:
At the commencement of the informal conference, the judge or the mental health
review officer shall inform the person of the nature of the proceedings. Information
relevant to whether the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of
treatment shall be reviewed, including the reasons that continued involuntary
treatment is necessary. Such explanation shall be made by a physician who
examined the person and shall be in terms understandable to a layman. The judge
or mental health review officer may review any relevant information, even if it
would normally be excluded under rules of evidence if he believes that such
information is reliable. The person or his representative shall have the right to ask
6
The Pennsylvania State Police has no involvement in the procedures leading to a Section 302
commitment. The PSP is not responsible for notifying a Section 302 committee of his rights
under § 7302(c)(1)-(2). (Doc. No. 55 ¶¶ 1, 4.)
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questions of the physician and of any other witnesses and to present any relevant
information. At the conclusion of the review, if the judge or the review officer finds
that the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of continued involuntary
treatment, he shall so certify. Otherwise, he shall direct that the facility director or
his designee discharge the person.
50 Pa. Stat. § 7303(c)(1).
Like Section 303, Section 304 of the MPHA allows a treatment facility to extend a Section
302 commitment. Section 304 allows a facility to extend a temporary commitment “for a period
not to exceed 90 days” if the individual still continues to require emergency mental health
treatment. 50 Pa. Stat. §§ 7304(a)(1), (g). Before committing an individual under Section 304, a
judge or mental health review officer must hold a hearing, at which the individual is guaranteed
the right to counsel, the assistance of an expert in mental health, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, and the right to present evidence on his own behalf. 50 Pa. Stat. § 7304(e). If
the judge or mental health review officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the individual
is severely mentally disabled and in need of ongoing mental health treatment, the individual’s
Section 302 commitment may be extended for up to 90 days. 50 Pa. Stat. §§ 7304(f), (g).
B. Section 6105(c)(4) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act
The Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act (“PUFA”) regulates the use of firearms in
Pennsylvania. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6101, et seq. At issue here is Section 6105 of the
PUFA, which identifies individuals who are prohibited from possessing firearms. 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 6105. Section 6105(a) provides that a person “whose conduct meets the criteria in
subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to
possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 6105(a).
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18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105(a)(1). Under subsection (c)(4), the following persons “shall be
subject to the prohibition of subsection (a)”:
A person who has been adjudicated as an incompetent or who has been involuntarily
committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and treatment under section 302,
303 or 304 of the provisions of the act of July 9, 1976 (P.L. 817, No. 143), known
as the Mental Health Procedures Act. This paragraph shall not apply to any
proceeding under section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act unless the
examining physician has issued a certification that inpatient care was necessary or
that the person was committable.
Id. § 6105(c)(4). As a result of this subsection, a person temporarily committed and certified under
Section 302 of MHPA, as described above, is prohibited from possessing a firearm in
Pennsylvania. Id.
An individual prohibited from possessing a firearm under Section 6105(a) has a
“reasonable period of time, not to exceed 60 days from the date of the imposition of the disability
under this subsection, in which to sell or transfer that person’s firearms to another eligible person
who is not a member of the prohibited person’s household.” Id. § 6105(a)(2)(i). Essentially, if a
person temporarily committed under Section 302 owns a firearm at the time of his commitment,
he has 60 days to sell or transfer the firearm to someone outside his family.
C. MHPA Reporting Requirements to the Pennsylvania State Police
Section 6105 of the PUFA is enforced by the Pennsylvania State Police, which is
responsible for reporting a Section 302 commitment to the Pennsylvania Instant Check System
(“PICS”), the state firearms background check database maintained by the PSP, and the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”), the federal firearms background check
database maintained by the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
The MHPA requires that the PSP be notified of any individual who has been temporarily
committed under Section 302. Section 109 of the MPHA provides as follows:
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Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, judges of the courts of common pleas,
mental health review officers and county mental health and mental retardation
administrators shall notify the Pennsylvania State Police on a form developed by
the Pennsylvania State Police of the identity of any individual who has been
adjudicated incompetent or who has been involuntarily committed to a mental
institution for inpatient care and treatment under this act or who has been
involuntarily treated as described under 18 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 6105(c)(4)
(relating to persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer
firearms). The notification shall be transmitted by the judge, mental health review
officer or county mental health and mental retardation administrator within seven
days of the adjudication, commitment or treatment. Notwithstanding any statute to
the contrary, county mental health and mental retardation administrators shall notify
the Pennsylvania State Police on a form developed by the Pennsylvania State Police
of the identity of any individual who before the effective date of this act had been
adjudicated incompetent or had been involuntarily committed to a mental
institution for inpatient care treatment under this act or had been involuntarily
treated as described in 18 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 6105(c)(4).
50 Pa. Stat. § 7109(d). In short, whenever an individual is involuntarily committed under Section
302, a judge on the courts of common pleas, a mental health review officer, or a county mental
health administrator must notify the PSP within seven days of the individual’s commitment. (Doc.
No. 55 ¶ 9.)
Notice of a Section 302 commitment is sent to the PICS Unit of the PSP Firearm Division.
(Id. ¶ 11.) The notice must contain the committed individual’s name, date of birth or Social
Security number, physical description, date of commitment, and the name of the notifying mental
health treatment facility, agency, or county. (Id. ¶ 12.) The PSP does not examine the evidence
used by the treating physician to certify the Section 302 commitment. (Id. ¶ 16.) Nor does the
PSP confirm that the treating physician is licensed. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Instead, the PSP relies upon the
reporting entity to provide complete and accurate information, as required by 37 Pa. Code §
33.120(b).7 (Id. ¶ 16.)
7
37 Pa. Code § 33.120(b) provides as follows:
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When the PSP confirms that the Section 302 commitment notice contains the required
information, it creates a mental health record in the PICS database, the state firearms background
check database maintained by the PSP. (Id. ¶ 17.) The PSP then automatically transfers the
mental health record to NICS, the national firearms backgrounds check database.8 (Id. ¶ 21.) Once
the required information is posted in the PICS and NICS databases, the individual is prohibited
from possessing, using, controlling, selling, or transferring firearms in Pennsylvania and
nationwide. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6105(a), (c)(4); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).9 The PSP does not
It is the responsibility of the judges of the courts of common pleas, mental health
review officers and county mental health and mental retardation administrators to
ensure the notification provides complete and accurate information. The
notification shall include: The full name of the individual who was involuntarily
committed or adjudicated incompetent, at least one numeric identifier (date of birth
or Social Security number, or both), and physical description; notification of the
type of commitment and date of the commitment or adjudication of incompetence;
the county submitting the information, and name, address and telephone number of
the notifying official; examining physician’s certification on 302 commitments;
facility where the commitment occurred; court case number and date of court order,
where applicable. The notification shall be made to the State Police by the judges
of the courts of common pleas, mental health review officers and mental health and
mental retardation administrators within 7 days of the adjudication, commitment or
treatment, or determination by an examining physician of the lack of severe mental
disability following the initial commitment as set forth in subsection (a), by the
form and format prescribed by the State Police. Notification made by mail, shall be
directed to the Pennsylvania State Police, Attention: Firearm Division, PICS
Operations, 1800 Elmerton Avenue, Harrisburg, PA 17110. The envelope shall be
marked “Confidential.”
8
According to the Joint Stipulation of Facts Not In Dispute, federal law does not require the PSP
to transfer mental health records to NICS. Instead, “[b]eginning in 2013, [the Federal Bureau
of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives] began accepting mental health records from
PSP and PSP voluntary began transmitting previously created and new mental health records to
NICS, including mental health records for Section 302 committees.” (Doc. No. 55 ¶ 22, 23.)
9
Section 922(g)(4) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been adjudicated as a mental
defective or who has been committed to a mental institution . . . to ship or transport
in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm
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notify a Section 302 committee before it creates a mental health record of his Section 302
commitments in the PICS and NICS databases. (Doc. No. 55 ¶ 5.) Nor does the PSP notify a
Section 302 committee that he is prohibited owning a gun under state and federal law by virtue of
his Section 302 commitment. (Id. ¶ 4.) It is at this point in the statutory scheme that Plaintiffs
claim Defendant’s enforcement of Section 6105(c)(4) deprives a Section 302 committee of his
Second Amendment rights without due process of law. (Doc. No. 63 ¶¶ 80-81.)
D. State Statutory Remedies
There are three post-deprivation procedures available to an individual who seeks to lift the
firearm restriction imposed by Section 6105(c)(4) of PUFA as a result of a Section 302
commitment. (Id. ¶ 2.) First, under Section 6105(f)(1) of PUFA, an individual can file a petition
in the court of common pleas, asserting that he is no longer mentally ill and should be allowed to
own a gun. Section 6105(f)(1) provides the following:
Upon application to the court of common pleas under this subsection by an

applicant subject to the prohibitions under subsection (c)(4), the court may grant
such relief as it deems appropriate if the court determines that the applicant may
possess a firearm without risk to the applicant or any other person.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105(f)(1). A petition made pursuant to Section 6105(f)(1) is reviewed
in a civil proceeding in a state court of common pleas with a full evidentiary hearing. (Doc. No.
66 ¶ 49.) According to the declaration of PSP Major Scott Price, who is the Acting Deputy
Commissioner of Administration and Professional Responsibility, the parties at the evidentiary
hearing can present documentary and testimonial evidence and have the right to cross-examine
or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or

transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
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witnesses about the petitioner’s current mental health as it relates to his ability to safely possess a
firearm.10 (Id. at 15 ¶ 12.)
If the petitioner demonstrates that he can possess a firearm without risk to himself or
another person, the state firearm prohibition is lifted. The PSP logs into the PICS database and
makes a notation that the petitioner is no longer prohibited from possessing a firearm under
Pennsylvania law. Notably, a successful Section 6105(f)(1) petition cannot lift the petitioner’s
federal prohibition. (Id. ¶ 50.)
Second, under Section 6111.1(g)(2) of PUFA, an individual can attempt to have his Section
302 commitment expunged by petitioning the court to review the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which the commitment was based. In relevant part, Section 6111.1(g)(2) states the following:
A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant to section 302 of the Mental

Health Procedures Act may petition the court to review the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the commitment was based. If the court determines that the
evidence upon which the involuntary commitment was based was insufficient, the
court shall order that the record of the commitment submitted to the Pennsylvania
State Police be expunged. A petition filed under this subsection shall toll the 60-
day period set forth under section 6105(a)(2).
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6111.1(g)(2) (footnote citing to Section 302 omitted).11 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania recently addressed the standard of review under Section 6111.1(g)(2):
10
According to the transcript of Major Price’s deposition testimony, he was designated as the
representative of Colonel Robert Evanchick in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the
Pennsylvania State Police to give testimony on his behalf. (Doc. No. 63-2 at 6:9-23.) Prior to
his position as Acting Deputy Commissioner of Administration and Professional Responsibility,
Major Price served as Director of the PSP Bureau of Records and Identification and oversaw
the Firearms Division. (Id. at 9:8-14.)
11
The remainder of Section 6111.1(g) addresses when PSP must expunge an individual’s mental
health records. It provides:
(1) Upon receipt of a copy of the order of a court of competent jurisdiction which
vacates a final order or an involuntary certification issued by a mental health review
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[T]he plain language of section 6111.1(g)(2) directs a trial court to review the
physician’s findings, made at the time of the commitment, to determine whether the
evidence known by the physician at the time, as contained in the
contemporaneously-created record, supports the conclusion that the individual
required commitment under one (or more) of the specific, statutorily-defined
circumstances.
***
[U]nder section 6111.1(g)(2), a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a 302 commitment presents a pure question of law, and the court’s sole
concern is whether, based on the findings recorded by the physician and the
information he or she relied upon in arriving at those findings, the precise,
legislatively-defined prerequisites for a 302 commitment have been satisfied and
are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. We emphasize that the trial
court’s review is limited to the findings recorded by the physician and the
information he or she relied upon in arriving at those findings, and requires
deference to the physician, as the original factfinder, as the physician examined and
evaluated the individual in the first instance, was able to observe his or her
demeanor, and has particularized training, knowledge and experience regarding
whether a 302 commitment is medically necessary.
In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 242, 246 (Pa. 2017). Accordingly, a state court’s review of a Section
6111.1(g)(2) petition is limited and the court must give deference to the treating physician as the
original factfinder. Id. at 246.
If the petitioner demonstrates that the evidence upon which the Section 302 commitment
was based was insufficient to support the commitment, the court will order the record expunged.
officer, the Pennsylvania State Police shall expunge all records of the involuntary
treatment received under subsection (f).
***
(3) The Pennsylvania State Police shall expunge all records of an involuntary
commitment of an individual who is discharged from a mental health facility based
upon the initial review by the physician occurring within two hours of arrival under
section 302(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act and the physician’s
determination that no severe mental disability existed pursuant to section 302(b) of
the Mental Health Procedures Act. The physician shall provide signed confirmation
of the determination of the lack of severe mental disability following the initial
examination under section 302(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act to the
Pennsylvania State Police.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6111.1(g)(1), (3).

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Upon receipt of the court’s order, the PSP will remove any record of petitioner’s Section 302
commitment from the PICS database, which in turn will erase the Section 302 commitment from
the NICS database. (Id. ¶ 54; Doc. No. 63 ¶ 61.) Thus, a successful Section 6111.1(g)(2) petition
fully restores an individual’s right to possess a firearm under both state and federal law. (Doc. No.
63 ¶ 61.)
Finally, under Section 6111.1(e) of PUFA, an individual can submit a challenge to the PSP
that contests the accuracy of his mental health record. Section 6111.1(e) states:
(1) Any person who is denied the right to receive, sell, transfer, possess, carry,
manufacture or purchase a firearm as a result of the procedures established by this
section may challenge the accuracy of that person’s criminal history, juvenile
delinquency history or mental health record pursuant to a denial by the
instantaneous records check by submitting a challenge to the Pennsylvania State
Police within 30 days from the date of the denial.
(2) The Pennsylvania State Police shall conduct a review of the accuracy of the
information forming the basis for the denial and shall have the burden of proving
the accuracy of the record. Within 20 days after receiving a challenge, the
Pennsylvania State Police shall notify the challenger of the basis for the denial,
including, but not limited to, the jurisdiction and docket number of any relevant
court decision and provide the challenger an opportunity to provide additional
information for the purposes of the review. The Pennsylvania State Police shall
communicate its final decision to the challenger within 60 days of the receipt of the
challenge. The decision of the Pennsylvania State Police shall include all
information which formed a basis for the decision.
(3) If the challenge is ruled invalid, the person shall have the right to appeal the
decision to the Attorney General within 30 days of the decision. The Attorney
General shall conduct a hearing de novo in accordance with the Administrative
Agency Law. The burden of proof shall be upon the Commonwealth.
(4) The decision of the Attorney General may be appealed to the Commonwealth
Court by an aggrieved party.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6111.1(e). Under this provision, an individual has the right to appeal the
PSP’s decision to the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, where an Administrative Law
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Judge will hold a de novo hearing. § 6111.1(e)(3); (Doc. No. 66 ¶ 43). The Administrative Law
Judge’s decision may be appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. § 6111.1(e)(4).
According to statistics provided by the PSP, forty-one (41) Section 302 committees pursued
one or more of these procedures to attempt to restore their firearm rights between January 1, 2017
and December 31, 2017. Of that number, seventeen (17) committees were successful. (Doc. No.
65 at 26.) Here, neither Plaintiff has pursued any of the three post-deprivation remedies to restore
his firearm rights. (Doc. No. 63 ¶ 97.)
E. Plaintiffs’ Section 302 Commitments
1. John Doe I
John Doe I, who was 23 years old as of August 15, 2018, currently works in Somerset
County, Pennsylvania as an electrician. (Doc. No. 63-5 at 1.) When he was 16 years old, he
became “melancholy as a result of pervasive bullying at school.” (Doc. No. 63-4 ¶ 2.) Around
that time, administrators at his high school contacted John Doe I’s mother because they were
worried that he planned to harm himself after a romantic relationship soured. As a result, on
September 13, 2011, John Doe I’s mother took him to the emergency room of Somerset Hospital,
where he remained from 11 a.m. until 6 p.m. (Doc. No. 63 ¶ 99.)
Upon arriving at Somerset Hospital, John Doe I was evaluated by Dr. George Groftisza to
determine whether he should be committed under Section 302. In his medical examination report,
Dr. Groftisza wrote the following:
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS:
This is a[n] [individual] who presents to the emergency room with mom.
Apparently sent here by MH/MR. Apparently patient did see his high school
counsellor yesterday at [school]. Apparently he is sort of depressed, has been
having problems stating that he has emotional problems and people are not caring
enough for him. The patient did use a knife and cut himself. He has multiple small
superficial lacerations to the left forearm palmer aspect and again was seen by
MH/MR and sent here for further evaluation and management.
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PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:
Compatible with history of previous cutting behavior, however, I am not sure of the
date of this. The patient has never been seen by a psychiatrist. Has never gone to
a type of counsellor per se previously to this event. The patient is not really sure
why he is depressed but he tells me that he did want to hurt himself last night.
(Doc. No. 63-5 at 6.) After his evaluation, Dr. Groftisza concluded that John Doe I suffered from
“[d]epression with cutting behavior,” and [q]uestionable suicidal ideation,” and noted that his
forearm had multiple superficial lacerations. (Id. at 7.) Consequently, Dr. Groftisza determined
that John Doe I was “committable” under Section 302. He then completed and signed a Section
302 Application for Involuntary Examination and Treatment, in which he explained that John Doe
I was a clear and present danger to himself and that there was a reasonable probability that he
would commit suicide without emergency treatment. (Id. at 15.) Additionally, Dr. Groftisza
recommended that John Doe I be transferred to Aloysius Hall at the Conemaugh Medical Center
for Section 302 emergency inpatient treatment. (Id. at 7.) Summer McQuown, a County
Administrator, also signed John Doe I’s Section 302 Application for Involuntary Examination and
Treatment. (Id. at 16.)
Nevertheless, John Doe I left the Somerset Hospital later that evening with his mother
against medical advice. (Id. at 9.) In an addendum to his medical report, Dr. Groftisza noted the
following:
We were planning to send this patient to Aloysia for further evaluation and
management, however mom is completely against this, apparently she had a long
talk with her son and apparently the issues here do not involve suicidal intent
according to mom, apparently he just wanted to make sure people think of him a
little more often and again he tells me he in no way is considering basically killing
himself [sic]. He just wanted to release some emotion as per the patient. However,
I would strongly suggest to mom to reconsider, however, mom states that she knows
her son well, this is not a problem. She will be with him 24 hours a day until she
sees a counselor tomorrow . . . and does not want [John Doe I] sent to Aloysia. I
did have also MH/MR personnel here . . . and again mom is adamant and the patient
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himself tells me that he has no problems of actually killing himself, he just wanted
to apparently get some attention, but this is vague as well . . . . Subsequently mom
will be signing out against medical advice.
(Id.) After being discharged, John Doe I sought outpatient treatment and saw a mental health
counselor for six months. (Id. at 2.) He contends that he was told that the Section 302 commitment
would not appear on his record. (Id.)
At some point after Dr. Groftisza certified that John Doe I was committable under Section
302, a notice of his commitment was sent to the PSP. Pursuant to Section 6105(c)(4), the PSP
created a mental health record for John Doe I in the PICS database, and thereafter transmitted the
mental health record to the NICS database. John Doe I contends that he was never notified of the
legal consequences of his Section 302 commitment. (Id.) In the fall of 2015, John Doe I attempted
to purchase a firearm for “self-defense in [his] home,” but was prevented from doing so “when
[his] PICS/NICS background check revealed that [he] had been subject to an involuntary
emergency commitment under Section 302.” (Doc. No. 63-4 ¶¶ 15-16.)
On August 15, 2018, Kenneth J. Weiss, M.D., conducted a psychiatric evaluation of John
Doe I for the purposes of this litigation and to determine his fitness to possess a firearm. In his
report, he concluded as follows:
Having examined Mr. Doe I and reviewed pertinent records, the following opinions
are expressed within a reasonable degree of medical certainty: Mr. Doe I is mentally
healthy young adult, stable and functional, who has no subjective complaints and
shows no objective signs of mental disease. To this examiner’s knowledge, he has
had a life free of psychological traumas and issues, with the exception of the
psychosocial problems he described in 2011. His description of the events in
question are substantially congruent with the records. Mr. Doe I, as a troubled
teenager with no outlet for discussing the problems he faced, called for help by
scratching his wrist and presenting to the school counselor, whom he knew.
Unfortunately, his gesture was interpreted as self-destructive behavior, and his
declining to sign into the psychiatric unit of the hospital triggered the emergency
commitment. It is highly significant that, upon closer inspection by clinicians, his
condition was seen for what it was: reaching out for an entry point into mental
health care. Even the clinical record from Somerset indicates “questionable
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suicidal ideation.” The outpatient care he received was successful and, to this
examiner’s knowledge, he has not had a recurrence. Accordingly, there would be
no basis for considering him to be mentally ill or defective currently, and
considering the circumstances of the 2011 incident, he is mentally fit to have his
firearms rights restored. In my opinion, from a psychiatric perspective, Mr. Doe I
no longer suffers from the condition that was the basis for the 302 commitment,
does not require ongoing mental health care, and does not pose a danger to himself
or others.
(Id. at 3.)
2. John Doe II12
John Doe II, who was 47 years old as of August 16, 2018, currently works as a maintenance
manager at a power plant in Northampton County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 63-7 at 1.) In August
of 1996, John Doe II lived in Easton, Pennsylvania with his first wife. (Doc. No. 63-6 ¶ 2.) Around
that time, John Doe II and his wife began experiencing marital problems that stemmed from rumors
that John Doe II’s wife was having an affair. (Id. ¶ 3.) One evening, in an attempt to force the
truth from his wife, John Doe II got drunk, fashioned a noose, and threatened to hang himself. (Id.
¶¶ 4-5.) In response, his wife called the police and reported that John Doe II was threatening
suicide. (Id. ¶ 6.) When the police arrived at his home, they took him into custody and gave him
two options: either the police could take him to a prison holding cell, or they could transport him
to the hospital for an emergency medical evaluation. (Id. ¶ 7.) He chose the latter option. (Id.)
Later that evening, John Doe II was taken to Muhlenberg Hospital where he was confined
to a locked room for several hours. (Id. ¶¶ 8-13.) According to his declaration, he “waited in [his]
12
As noted above, on March 12, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation in which Colonel Evanchick
consented to the substitution of the original John Doe II with a new John Doe II. (Doc. No.
41.) In the Complaint, which was filed November 17, 2016, Plaintiff John Doe II was an
individual who had been committed under Section 302 after being intoxicated and
uncooperative at the Grandview Hospital in Sellersville, Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 1.) In the
Amended Complaint, which was filed March 12, 2018, Plaintiffs pled facts relating to the
current John Doe II. (Doc. No. 42.)
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room, slept, and was eventually released with almost no inquiry from hospital staff.” (Id. ¶ 12.)
He claims that while confined at Muhlenberg Hospital, no one informed him that he had been
involuntarily committed under Section 302. (Id. ¶ 14.) Furthermore, he claims that he did not
know about the Section 302 commitment or its legal consequences until 2015, when he attempted
to purchase a firearm for self-defense in his home but was denied after a PICS/NICS background
check. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.)
On August 16, 2018, Kenneth J. Weiss, M.D., conducted a psychiatric evaluation of John
Doe II for the purposes of this litigation and to determine his fitness to possess a firearm. In his
report, he concluded the following:
Having examined Mr. Doe II and reviewed pertinent records, the following
opinions are expressed within a reasonable degree of medical certainty: Mr. Doe II
underwent an adjustment problem (marital problems) in 1995, probably fueled by
alcohol, that led to his being overly dramatic. This, in turn, brought about a series
of events which, 20 years later were revealed as a 302 commitment. To the best of
this examiner’s knowledge, Mr. Doe II had no antecedent psychiatric history or
further adjustment problems since the 1995 incident.13 The records surrounding
the Easton/Muhlenberg medical care are not available as they were destroyed due
to the age of the records. However, the State Police have confirmed that Mr. Doe
II has no criminal convictions. Having considered the matter, I conclude that Mr.
Doe II’s transitory disturbance in 1995 has no implications for public safety today;
he is neither a danger to himself nor to others. Mr. Doe II is neither mentally
defective nor mentally disturbed. Accordingly, there is no psychiatric bar to his
being considered a proper and fit candidate for restoration of his firearm rights.
(Doc. No. 63-7 at 3.) As noted in Dr. Weiss’s psychiatric evaluation report, the medical records
from John Doe II’s Section 302 commitment have been destroyed. (Id.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Granting summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy. Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
13
In his declaration, John Doe II states that he threatened suicide in August 1996, but in the
medical report, Dr. Weiss states that the incident occurred in 1995. (Doc. No. 63-6 ¶ 2; Doc.
No. 63-7 at 3.)
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In reaching this decision,
the court must determine whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Favata v. Seidel, 511 F. App’x 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010)). A disputed
issue is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could
find for the non-moving party. Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). For a fact to be considered
“material,” it “must have the potential to alter the outcome of the case.” Favata, 511 F. App’x at
158. Once the proponent of summary judgment “points to evidence demonstrating no issue of
material fact exists, the non-moving party has the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor.” Id.
(quoting Azur, 601 F.3d at 216).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181
(3d Cir. 2009)). The Court’s task is not to resolve disputed issues of fact, but to determine whether
there exist any factual issues to be tried. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-249. Whenever a factual issue
arises which cannot be resolved without a credibility determination, at this stage the Court must
credit the nonmoving party’s evidence over that presented by the moving party. Id. at 255. If there
is no factual issue, and if only one reasonable conclusion could arise from the record regarding the
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potential outcome under the governing law, summary judgment must be awarded in favor of the
moving party.14 Id. at 250.
“The same standards and burdens apply on cross-motions for summary judgment.” Allah
v. Ricci, 12-4095, 2013 WL 3816043 (3d Cir. July 24, 2013) (citing Appelmans v. City of Phila.,
826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir.1987)). When the parties have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, as in this case, the summary judgment standard remains the same. Transguard Ins. Co.
of Am., Inc. v. Hinchey, 464 F.Supp.2d 425, 430 (M.D.Pa.2006). “When confronted with cross-
motions for summary judgment . . . ‘the court must rule on each party's motion on an individual
and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance
with the summary judgment standard.’” Id. (quoting Marciniak v. Prudential Fin. Ins. Co. of Am.,
184 F. App’x 266, 270 (3d Cir.2006)). “If review of [the] cross-motions reveals no genuine issue
of material fact, then judgment may be entered in favor of the party deserving of judgment in light
of the law and undisputed facts.” Id. (citing Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d
Cir.1998)).
14
In their Reply, Plaintiffs point out that although Defendant filed a Statement of Undisputed
Facts, he did not file a responsive factual statement that controverted Plaintiffs’ Statement of
Undisputed Facts or identified genuine issues of material fact to be tried. (Doc. No. 72.) As a
result, Plaintiffs argue that this Court’s procedures dictate that all of their Undisputed Facts “be
admitted.” (Id.) While the Court’s procedures do indeed state that “[a]ll material facts set forth
in the statement required to be served by the moving party shall be admitted unless controverted
by the opposing party,” the Court is not required to admit legal conclusions embedded in a
party’s statement of facts. JUDGE SLOMSKY’S SCHEDULING AND MOTION POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES, http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/procedures/slopol2.pdf (updated June
2016). Here, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should admit the statement that “[t]here is no
dispute that none of the post-deprivation procedures can remedy the resulting permanent
deprivation under PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) of Second Amendment rights.” (Doc. No. 72 at
3.) The Court will not grant Plaintiffs’ request. First, the Court is under no obligation to admit
a legal conclusion. Second, this legal conclusion is strongly opposed in the body of Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Doc. No. 65 at 18.)
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As noted above, Plaintiffs mount a facial challenge to Section 6105(c)(4). A facial
challenge “seeks to vindicate not only [plaintiff’s] own rights, but those of others who may also
be adversely impacted by the statute in question.” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55
n.22 (1999). In contrast, “[a]n as-applied . . . does not contend that a law is unconstitutional as
written but that its application to a particular person under particular circumstances deprived that
person of a constitutional right.” U.S. v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010). Courts
generally disfavor facial challenges. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). The Supreme Court has explained why:
Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons. Claims of facial invalidity
often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the risk of “premature
interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records.” Sabri v.
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted). Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of
judicial restraint that courts should neither “‘anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it’” nor “‘formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.’” Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v.
Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). Finally, facial challenges
threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the
will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the
Constitution. We must keep in mind that “‘[a] ruling of unconstitutionality
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.’” Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (quoting Regan v.
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion)).
Id.
IV. ANALYSIS
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s enforcement
of Section 6105(c)(4) deprives them, and all other similarly-situated individuals committed under
Section 302, of their right to bear arms without due process of law. (Doc. No. 62.) They argue
that due process requires that Defendant provide a Section 302 committee with notice and a hearing
before the PSP enters a mental health record of a person’s commitment into the PICS and NICS
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databases. (Id. at 10.) Furthermore, they claim that the post-deprivation remedies found in Section
6015(f)(1), Section 6111.1(g)(2), and Section 6111.1(e) do not adequately safeguard their rights.
(Id. at 17.) As a result, Plaintiffs contend that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that
they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendant Evanchick, the Acting Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner, rejects the
notion that the PSP’s enforcement of Section 6105(c)(4) divests a Section 302 committee of his
right to bear arms without due process, and therefore submits that he is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. (Doc. No. 65.) In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant first argues that
Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim fails because a Section 302 committee does not have a
protected interest in obtaining a firearm. (Id. at 8.) But even if a Section 302 committee does have
a protected interest in owning a gun, Defendant argues that due process does not require the PSP
to provide additional pre-deprivation procedures before it enters a Section 302 committees’ mental
health record in the PICS and NICS databases. (Id. at 13.) Finally, Defendant submits that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the three post-deprivation procedures available to
Section 302 committees satisfy the requirements of due process. (Id. at 18.)
The contentions the parties raise are purely legal questions. They do not involve any
disputed genuine issues of material fact. Indeed, when a statute is challenged on its face, factual
issues rarely are present. Because the law at issue favors the position of Defendant, summary
judgment in his favor is warranted.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits deprivations of life,
liberty, or property by a state without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Evaluating
whether a law violates this prohibition requires a two-prong analysis. First, the Court must ask
whether there is a protected life, liberty, or property interest at stake. Second, if a protected interest
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exists, the Court must decide whether the procedures afforded amount to “due process of law.”
Robb v. City of Phila., 733 F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 569-72 (1972)). The Court will first address whether a protected interest is at stake.
A. An Individual Committed Under Section 302 of the MHPA has a Protected

Liberty Interest in the Right to Bear Arms
As an initial matter, Defendant argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because an individual committed under Section 302 does not have a protected interest in owning
a firearm. (Doc. No. 65 at 8.) He contends that precedent from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
holds that the Second Amendment does not protect the right to bear arms by the mentally ill. (Id.
at 10.) Plaintiffs vehemently disagree. While they acknowledge the existence of a longstanding
prohibition on the possession of firearms by the mentally ill, they submit that a Section 302
committee does not fall into that prohibition, and for this reason has a protected liberty interest in
the right to bear arms. (Doc. No. 62 at 10.) For the reasons stated infra, the Court is persuaded by
Plaintiffs’ argument.
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that the “range of interests
protected by procedural due process is not infinite.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)
(quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 570)). To evaluate whether a plaintiff has a protected life, liberty, or
property interest, a court must look to the nature of the alleged interest at stake. Roth, 408 U.S. at
570-71. Traditionally, a liberty interest “consisted of the power of locomotion, or changing
situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct; without
imprisonment or restraint.” Kerry v. Din, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 2133 (2015). But on several occasions,
the Supreme Court has seen fit to expand this definition to include implied fundamental rights. Id.
In those instances, the Court has required “‘a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest,’ as well as a demonstration that the interest is ‘objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s
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history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed.’” Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720-21 (1997)). To determine whether an asserted interest constitutes a protected liberty interest,
a court must ask whether the asserted interest is supported by “this Nation’s history and practice.”
Id. (citing Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 724, 727-728).
Here, the asserted liberty interest at stake is the right to bear arms. The Second Amendment
states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In District of
Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court invalidated a law that “totally ban[ned] handgun possession
in the home” and “require[d] that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a
trigger lock at all times, rendering it inoperable.” 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). In so concluding, the
Court held that there was “no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second
Amendment conferred a right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 595. Further, the Court wrote that at
the “core” of the Second Amendment is the right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms
in defense of hearth and home.” Id. at 643-35.
Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court recognized that the
Second Amendment right articulated in Heller applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010). There, the Court explicitly held that the right to bear
arms is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Id. at 768 (citing Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 721). In incorporating the right to the states, McDonald explained that “the Framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” Id. at 778.
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From Heller and McDonald, it is clear that the right to bear arms is a protected liberty
interest. But in this case, the issue is not merely whether an individual has a protected liberty
interest in the right to bear arms; instead, the court must decide whether an individual who has
been temporarily committed for mental health reasons under Section 302 has a protected liberty
interest in the right to bear arms.
Despite its recognition of the right to bear arms, the Supreme Court in Heller enumerated
a non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” that can restrict the right. See
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. Relevant here, the Supreme Court explained that nothing in Heller
“should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill . . . .” Id. Although Heller articulated that the state has a public health and
safety interest in prohibiting the possession of firearms by the mentally ill, see id., there is an
absence of controlling precedent as to whether a Section 302 committee qualifies as mentally ill
for the purposes of the Heller mental illness exception, such that he would not have a protected
liberty interest in owning a gun.
Defendant argues that Heller announced a broad prohibition on the right to bear arms by
the mentally ill and that Section 302 committees fall within this prohibition. In support of this
argument, Defendant relies on the Third Circuit decision in United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
85 (3d Cir. 2010). But this reliance is unavailing. In Marzzarella, the defendant was indicted for
possession of a handgun with the serial number scratched off in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).
Id. He moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that § 922(k) unconstitutionally infringed upon
his Second Amendment right to bear arms. Id. The court denied the motion, and in dicta, stated
that “the Second Amendment affords no protection for the possession of dangerous and unusual
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weapons, possession by felons and the mentally ill, and the carrying of weapons in certain sensitive
places.” Id. at 92.
The decision in Marzzarella has little bearing here. First, the court in Marzzarella did not
address a situation in which an individual challenged a firearm prohibition based on his status as
mentally ill. The section of the court’s decision that explores whether the Second Amendment
protects the mentally ill is mere dicta. Second, that section does not expand upon Heller. As in
Heller, the court in Marzzarella only stated that there exists a longstanding prohibition on the right
to bear arms by the mentally ill. It does not delve into whether an individual temporarily
committed under Section 302 should be considered mentally ill under Heller. Essentially, the court
in Marzzarella does not explain how mentally ill an individual needs to be to fall into the
longstanding prohibition on the right to bear arms by the mentally ill endorsed in Heller, such that
he does not have a protected interest in owning a gun. Accordingly, the Court will turn to decisions
of other Courts of Appeal that squarely address this issue.
In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a temporary emergency commitment to a mental institution may not be enough to consider an
individual mentally ill for the purposes of the Heller mental illness exception. 837 F.3d 678, 699
(6th Cir. 2016) (en banc). There, the plaintiff was barred from purchasing a weapon under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) after he was involuntarily committed to a mental institution pursuant to a
Michigan statute much like Section 302. Id. at 699. In its decision, the Sixth Circuit cautioned
against categorically relying on the language of Heller with respect to the longstanding prohibition
on the possession of firearms by the mentally ill. Id. at 686-88. The court reasoned as follows:
To rely solely on Heller’s presumption here would amount to a judicial endorsement

of Congress’s power to declare, “Once mentally ill, always so.” This we will not
do. Heller’s presumption of lawfulness should not be used to enshrine a permanent
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stigma on anyone who has ever been committed to a mental institution for whatever
reason.
Id. at 688. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit held that “people who have been involuntarily
committed are not categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment.” Id. at 690.
Similarly, in United States v. Rehlander, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
temporary emergency commitment to a mental institution is not enough to permanently disqualify
a person from owning a firearm under federal law. 666 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2012). There, the
court explained that although the right established in Heller is a qualified right, “the right to possess
arms . . . is no longer something that can be withdrawn by government on a permanent and
irrevocable basis without due process.” United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2012).
Furthermore, the First Circuit has noted that “nothing [in Heller] suggests that the Court was there
addressing a permanent ex parte deprivation” of the right to bear arms of an individual only
temporarily committed to a mental health facility. Id. Implicit in this holding is the determination
that an individual subjected to a temporary commitment does not fall into the longstanding
prohibition on the right to own a gun by the mentally ill endorsed by Heller and therefore has a
protected liberty interest in the right to bear arms.
Relying on the logic of Tyler and Rehlander, the Court is persuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument.
Although the Supreme Court in Heller articulated that prohibition on the right to own a gun by the
mentally ill is presumptively lawful, a temporary emergency commitment to a mental institution
is not sufficient to consider the individual “mentally ill” for the purposes of the Heller mental
health exception. Thus, an individual committed under Section 302 still retains a protected liberty
interest in the right to bear arms.
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B. Defendant’s Enforcement of Section 6105(c)(4) of PUFA Does Not Deprive

Section 302 Committees of Their Right to Bear Arms Without Due Process
Having found that a Section 302 committee has a protected liberty interest in owning a
firearm, the Court will now proceed to the second step of the procedural due process analysis:
whether the statutory procedures followed by Defendant satisfy due process of law.
When a protected interest is implicated, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process
Clause “grants the aggrieved party the opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly
judged.” Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982). However, “due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The “timing and the nature of the required hearing will depend on
appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved.” Logan, 455 U.S. at 434. To
determine what procedural protection the Constitution requires in a particular situation, a court
must weigh several factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Plaintiffs first challenge Defendant’s lack of pre-deprivation procedures. They argue that
a Section 302 committee is entitled to notice and a hearing before the PSP records his mental health
record in the PICS and NICS databases. Second, even if due process does not require additional
pre-deprivation procedures in the instant case, Plaintiffs contend that the state statutory post-
deprivation remedies do not safeguard their rights.
Defendant refutes both contentions. First, he submits that the factors set forth in Mathews
weigh in his favor and that procedural due process does not require a pre-deprivation hearing in
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this context. Second, Defendant argues that Section 6105(f)(1), Section 6111.1(g)(2), and Section
6111.1(e)—the three post-deprivation remedies that allow a Section 302 committee to restore his
right to bear arms—satisfy due process. For the reasons stated infra, the Court is persuaded by
Defendant’s arguments.
1. A Section 302 Committee is not Entitled to Additional Pre-Deprivation

Procedures Before the Pennsylvania State Police Enter His Mental
Health Record in the PICS and NICS Databases
To determine whether Section 302 committees are entitled to any pre-deprivation
procedures, the Court must weigh the Mathews factors. As to the first Mathews factor, the private
interest at stake, a Section 302 committee has a protected liberty interest in the right to bear arms.
Of course, that interest is weakened by fact that the committee was considered a clear and present
danger to himself or others, if only for a short period of time. Additionally, while this private
interest surely exists, it must be noted that the right to own a gun is not one of life’s basic
necessities. See Potts v. City of Philadelphia, 224 F. Supp. 2d 919, 943 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“While
Potts may have a strong personal interest in his gun permit, the permit does not constitute a basic
necessity of life, such as income, or even employment, that would strongly militate in favor of a
predeprivation hearing.”). Compare with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (termination
of welfare benefits requires a pre-deprivation hearing because “welfare provides the means to
obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care”).
The second Mathews factor directs the Court to examine the risk of erroneous deprivation
of a Section 302 committee’s protected liberty interest through the procedures currently used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards. Turning to the first half of that
inquiry, the lack of a pre-deprivation hearing does not create a high risk of erroneous deprivation
of a Section 302 committee’s right to bear arms.
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First, there is a low risk that an individual committed under Section 302 was not a clear
and present danger to himself or others at the time of his temporary commitment. As stressed by
Defendant, the procedures used to commit individuals under Section 302 are stringent. For one,
at least two individuals must observe conduct indicating that the individual is a clear and present
danger to himself or others before he is temporarily committed. As noted above, there are two
methods of initiating a Section 302 commitment. First, a physician or other responsible party can
submit a written application to a county mental health administrator, stating the conduct that
necessitates emergency medical health treatment. Second, a physician, peace officer, or other party
can take the individual to a treatment facility after observing conduct that demonstrates he is in
need of treatment. Regardless of how the individual comes to the treatment facility, a physician
must examine him within two hours of his arrival and determine whether he is truly a clear and
present danger to himself or others. The individual is only committed if, within the last thirty days,
(1) he has acted in a way that suggests he cannot care for himself and death, injury, or debilitation
would ensure without treatment; (2) he has attempted suicide and there is a reasonable probability
that suicide would occur without treatment; or (3) he has mutilated himself and there is a
reasonable probability of future mutilation without treatment. 50 Pa. Stat. § 7301(b)(2)(i-iii).
Clearly, these procedures are designed to commit only those individuals who pose a clear and
present danger to themselves or others, if only for a short period of time.
Turning to the latter half of the second Mathews factor, the Court is not persuaded that
additional pre-deprivation safeguards—namely notice or a hearing—would be of value here. In
fact, a pre-deprivation hearing to determine whether a Section 302 committee is mentally ill
enough to divest him of his right to bear arms is irrelevant to the statutory scheme at hand. Several
courts in this circuit have recently discussed this issue.
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In Bell v. United States, 574 Fed. App’x. 59 (3d Cir. 2014), the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court’s holding that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which prohibits the possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, does not require a pre-deprivation hearing to determine the felon’s “future
dangerousness” to comport with the requirements of due process. On this issue, the Third Circuit
adopted the logic of the district court, which reads as follows:
“The plain language of [§ 922(g)(1)] makes clear Congress’ decision to bar all
convicted felons (not merely those with violent tendencies or who otherwise present
an ongoing danger to society) from possessing firearms.” Black v. Snow, 272 F.
Supp. 2d 21, 34 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d, Black v. Ashcroft, 110 Fed. App’x. 130 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (per curiam). As a result, “due process does not entitle [a felon] to a
hearing to determine whether he is currently dangerous because the results of such
a hearing would have no bearing on whether he is subject to the disability imposed
by § 922(g)(1).” Id. at 35; see also Conn. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1,
4 (2003) (“[D]ue process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not
material to the State’s statutory scheme.”). Accordingly, Bell’s procedural due
process claim fails.
Bell v. United States, No. 13-5533, 2013 WL 5763219, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2013). In Bell, the
plaintiff also brought a procedural due process challenge to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105(b), the
Pennsylvania law that prohibits convicted felons from owning firearms. Id. For the same reasons
given with respect to the federal statute, the court rejected the plaintiff’s Section 6105 challenge.
Id.
In Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 723 (M.D. Pa. 2016), the court extended the
reasoning of Bell to § 922(g)(4), the federal statute prohibiting an individual subject to an
involuntary commitment from owning a firearm. In Keyes, the plaintiff brought a procedural due
process challenge to § 922(g)(4), arguing that the federal government owed him notice and a pre-
deprivation hearing before depriving him of his right to own a gun because of his involuntary
commitment. Id. The court applied Bell and rejected his due process claim, finding that “the
statute subsection is clear that anyone who has been committed for mental health is subject to it;
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thus a hearing of whether the plaintiff is still dangerous is not in fact relevant.” Id. In 2017, yet
another district court agreed. In Jefferies v. Sessions, the district court explained itself as follows:
Congress enacted § 922(g)(4) to apply to all persons involuntarily committed. Mr.

Jefferies does not challenge the propriety or accuracy of his involuntary
commitment. Rather he asks for an exemption in spite of it. Mr. Jefferies does not
have a Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process before the United States
applies § 922(g)(4) to him because of his involuntary commitment.
278 F. Supp. 3d 831, 846 (E.D. Pa. 2017).15
Because the same is true with respect to Section 6105(c)(4), the Pennsylvania statute
prohibiting an individual committed under Section 302 from owning a firearm, the same result
follows. Plaintiffs argue that “[a] pre-deprivation hearing is necessary to determine whether any
individual subject to Section 302 commitment suffers from a mental health condition sufficient to
require depriving them of a protected liberty interest.” (Doc. No. 62 at 7.) But the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted Section 6105(c)(4) to apply to all persons temporarily committed under Section
302. Nothing in the statute suggests that only Section 302 committees on the more dangerous or
severe end of the mental health spectrum are subject to the Section 6105(c)(4) prohibition. Thus,
a hearing to determine where a Section 302 committee falls on that spectrum is not relevant to the
statutory scheme and has no value.
Despite the line of cases noted supra, Plaintiffs still contend that a Section 302 committee
is entitled to pre-deprivation procedures before he is divested of his right to bear arms. To support
this contention, Plaintiffs cite to the procedures that protect an individual before his Section 302
commitment is extended under Sections 303 and 304, namely that he is entitled to an informal
hearing, the right to counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to question witnesses.
15
Both Jefferies and Keyes were decided after this Court issued its Opinion denying
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 32, 33.) Consequently, the Court did not
consider this reasoning in its decision.
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(Doc. No. 62 at 18-19.) Citing to the apparent feasibility of these procedures, Plaintiffs argue that
it is feasible to provide a Section 302 committee with additional procedures after he has already
been committed, but before he is divested of his right to bear arms. (Id.) But this comparison
lacks merit. The procedural safeguards cited by Plaintiffs protect an individual before he is
subjected to further involuntary commitment. The procedures are wholly irrelevant to whether a
Section 303 or 304 committee can later own a gun. Thus, the mere fact that an individual has the
right to a hearing before he is committed under Section 303 or Section 304 is immaterial to whether
a Section 302 committee should have a hearing before he loses his right to bear arms.
Finally, the Court will consider the third Mathews factor: the nature of the government
interest. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has a prevailing interest in public safety and
ensuring that potentially dangerous individuals are not permitted to own a deadly weapon. And as
noted above, nothing in Heller prevents the government from protecting this interest by prohibiting
the mentally ill from owning a firearm. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
In drafting Section 6105(c)(4), the Pennsylvania legislature explicitly stated that an
individual “adjudicated as an incompetent or who has been involuntarily committed to a mental
institution for inpatient care and treatment under section 302, 303, or 304” of the MHPA “shall not
possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture . . . a firearm . . . .” 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 6105(a),
(c)(4). This prohibition exists because at the time of his commitment a Section 302 committee is
“severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment” and has shown that “his capacity
to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations
or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of
harm to others or to himself.” 50 Pa. Stat. § 7301(a). The dangers inherent in the possession of a
deadly firearm by someone with such a lessened capacity for “self-control, judgment, and
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discretion” are manifest. Such an individual poses a grave threat to public safety. Given this
danger and Pennsylvania’s prevailing interest in public safety, the third Mathews factor weighs
against the necessity of a pre-deprivation hearing.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs contend that the government’s interest in divesting a Section 302
committee of his right to bear arms is not urgent, and that there is sufficient time to hold a pre-
deprivation hearing. (Doc. No. 62 at 19-20.) Typically, a state is required to provide pre-
deprivation remedies to satisfy due process. See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 542 (1985). But the Supreme Court has held that “either the necessity of quick action
by the State or the impracticality of providing any meaningful pre-deprivation process, when
coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the
State’s action at some time after the initial taking, can satisfy the requirements of procedural due
process.” Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981).
Plaintiffs argue that this case does not fall into either exception and point to the fact that
under PUFA, Section 302 commitments are not reported for seven days and Section 302
committees have 60 days following their commitments to sell or transfer firearms already in their
possession. (Doc. No. 62 at 18.) They contend that these procedures demonstrate that there is no
“necessity of quick action” that requires the PSP to enter a mental health record into the PICS and
NICS databases without first holding a hearing. (Id.) On this point, the Court agrees with
Plaintiffs. There appears to be sufficient time between a Section 302 commitment and the moment
at which the PSP creates a mental health record to hold some sort of hearing.
But Plaintiffs’ argument ignores the fact that a pre-deprivation hearing is impractical. As
noted above, Section 6105(c)(4) is clear that anyone who has been committed under Section 302
cannot own or possess a firearm. In drafting Section 6015(c)(4), the Pennsylvania legislature
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explicitly prohibited individuals temporarily committed under Section 302 from owning a gun,
signaling that the prohibition exists regardless of the temporary nature of the commitment, whether
the commitment was isolated, or whether the individual continues to pose an ongoing threat to
public safety. Thus, while there is sufficient time to hold a pre-deprivation hearing, such a hearing
would be impractical because it would have no bearing on whether a Section 302 is subject to
Section 6105(c)(4).
Weighing a Section 302 committee’s private interest in owning a gun against the
government’s prevailing interest in public safety, and given the negligible risk of erroneous
deprivation without a pre-deprivation hearing, the Court is not convinced that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a Section 302 committee to a pre-deprivation hearing
before he is divested of his right to own a gun. Even if a pre-deprivation hearing were practical or
relevant, the cost of allowing a potentially unstable individual to retain a dangerous weapon while
he waits for a pre-deprivation hearing far outweighs any potential benefits of a pre-deprivation
hearing, particularly in light of the post-deprivation remedies discussed infra. Thus, the Court is
persuaded by Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs do not have a right to a pre-deprivation hearing
before the PSP enters their mental health record into the PICS and NICS databases.
2. PUFA’s Post-Deprivation Remedies Adequately Safeguard a Section

302 Committee’s Due Process Rights
As noted above, a state is not required to provide pre-deprivation process where meaningful
post-deprivation remedies are available to assess the propriety of the state’s action. Parratt, 451
U.S. at 539. Accordingly, a state’s deprivation of liberty or property does not violate the Due
Process Clause where the state provides adequate post-deprivation remedies. Id. at 540-41. Here,
PUFA sets forth three post-deprivation remedies that a Section 302 committee can use to attempt
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to restore his right to bear arms. To evaluate whether these remedies comport with due process,
the Court turns to the test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.
Again, the private interest at stake is a Section 302 committee’s right to bear arms. As
discussed above, the government has a prevailing interest in keeping fatal weapons out of the hands
of potentially dangerous individuals for the sake of public safety. In this regard, the procedures at
issue at this point in the Court’s inquiry are the three post-deprivation remedies set forth in PUFA:
(1) Section 6105(f)(1); (2) Section 6111.1(g)(2); and (3) Section 6111.1(e)(1).
Plaintiffs argue that the second Mathews factor—risk of erroneous deprivation of their
private interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural
safeguards—weighs in their favor. (Doc. No. 62 at 24). Specifically, they take issue with the fact
that only one of the three state statutory remedies allow for the restoration of the right to bear arms
under both state and federal law. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiffs contend that the post-deprivation
procedures currently available to them are “inadequate to overcome the profound constitutional
harm to Plaintiffs and any other similarly situated individual,” such that they are “automatically
and permanently divested of their Second Amendment right.” (Id.)
Defendant disagrees. He submits that the three procedures provided by the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania satisfy the requirements of due process. (Doc. No. 65 at 18.) In support of his
argument, Defendant asserts that all three post-deprivation remedies allow a Section 302
committee to restore his state firearm rights, and one post-deprivation remedy allows a Section
302 committee to completely expunge his record, restoring both state and federal firearm rights.
(Id. at 21-23.) Defendant argues, and the Court agrees, that Due Process requires nothing more.
(Id. at 27.) For clarity, the Court will again summarize the three statutory remedies that a Section
302 committee can use to restore his right to own and possess a firearm.
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First, a Section 302 committee that submits that he is no longer committable or mentally
ill may petition the court of common pleas to restore his firearm rights pursuant to Section
6105(f)(1). 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105(f)(1). The committee may seek restoration of his rights
at any time after he is legally divested of his right to own or purchase a gun. Section 6105(f)(1)
permits restoration if “the court determines that the applicant may possess a firearm without risk
to the applicant or any other person.” Id. This process allows for a full evidentiary hearing in the
court of common pleas at which both parties have the right to present evidence and the right to
cross-examine witnesses. (Doc. No. 66 ¶ 49.) A successful 6105(f)(1) petition restores a
committee’s state firearm rights and the PSP will remove his mental health record from the state
PICS database. (Id. ¶ 50.) But Section 6105(f) cannot restore federal firearm rights. (Id.) Thus,
if an individual is only successful in restoring his state firearms rights, and has not petitioned to
have his federal rights restored, the PICS database will note that the individual is still prohibited
from possessing a gun under federal law. (Id.)
Second, a Section 302 committee can seek expungement of his Section 302 commitment
by petitioning a court of common pleas under Section 6111.1(g). Using this section, a committee
“may petition the court to review the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the commitment was
based.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6111.1(g)(2). As noted earlier, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recently explained what a sufficiency of the evidence review entails:
[A] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 302 commitment

presents a pure question of law, and the court’s sole concern is whether, based on
the findings recorded by the physician and the information he or she relied upon in
arriving at those findings, the precise, legislatively-defined prerequisites for a 302
commitment have been satisfied and are supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. We emphasize that the trial court’s review is limited to the findings
recorded by the physician and the information he or she relied upon in arriving at
those findings, and requires deference to the physician, as the original factfinder, as
the physician examined and evaluated the individual in the first instance, was able
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to observe his or her demeanor, and has particularized training, knowledge and
experience regarding whether a 302 commitment is medically necessary.
In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 242 (Pa. 2016). “If the court determines that the evidence upon which
the involuntary commitment was based was insufficient, the court shall order that the record of the
commitment submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police be expunged.” § 6111.1(g)(2). If an
individual successfully expunges his Section 302 commitment under this section, both his state
and federal rights are restored. (Doc. No. 63 ¶ 61.)
Finally, Section 6111.1(e) allows a Section 302 committee to challenge the accuracy of his
mental health record after he has been denied the right to purchase a firearm. 18 Pa. Cons. Ann. §
6111.1(e). The committee may challenge the record by submitting an administrative challenge to
the PSP. § 6111.1(e)(1). If the PSP finds rejects the challenge, the committee can appeal the
decision to the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, at which point an Administrative Law
Judge will hold a hearing de novo. § 6111.1(e)(3). The Administrative Law Judge’s decision may
be appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. § 6111.1(e)(4). The Commonwealth
Court’s scope of review is “limited to a determination of whether necessary findings are supported
by substantial evidence, an error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights were
violated.” Gorry v. Pennsylvania State Police, 144 A. 3d 214, 216-17 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting
Pennsylvania State Police v. Heggenstaller, 784 A.2d 853, 856 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)).
Having reviewed Section 6105(f), Section 6111.1(g)(2), and Section 6111.1(e), the Court
is persuaded by Defendant’s argument that these three post-deprivation procedures satisfy due
process. Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s enforcement of Section 6105(c)(4) “permanently”
divests a Section 302 committee of his right to bear arms. But this is incorrect. Indeed, the three
procedures set forth above provide a Section 302 committee with three different avenues to restore
his rights. First, under Section 6105(f), he may argue that he is no longer a danger to himself or
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public safety. Second, under Section 6111.1(g)(2), he may submit that he never should have been
committed in the first place. And finally, under Section 6111.1(e), he may claim that the PSP’s
records are inaccurate, and the firearm prohibition does not apply to him. These procedures are
not insignificant. As stated earlier, according to PSP statistics, forty-one (41) Section 302
committees pursued restoration through one of the three available post-deprivation procedures
between January 1, 2017 and December 31, 2017. Of that number, seventeen (17) individuals
were successful.16 (Doc. No. 65 at 26.) Thus, through these three procedures, there is nothing
“permanent” about Section 6105(c)(4).
Plaintiffs argue that these post-deprivation procedures do not satisfy due process because
a successful Section 6105(f)(1) petition only restores state rights, and not federal rights. (Doc. No.
62 at 23.) Further, although Plaintiffs concede that the federal right to bear arms can be restored
through Section 6111.1(g)(2), they contend that Section 6111.1(g)(2) is inadequate because the
sufficiency of the evidence standard of review at “expungement hearings amount[s] to little more
than review for plain error of an incomplete and inadequate record . . . .” (Id.) The Court disagrees.
The “sufficiency of the evidence” standard is a well-established standard of review that
courts employ in several contexts, including for example review of petitions for habeas corpus,
Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837 (3d Cir. 2013), and motions for acquittal under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29, United States v. Young, 334 Fed. App’x. 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2009). The
16
In their Response, Plaintiffs take issue with the fact that Defendant produced these statistics on
the last day of fact discovery, giving them no time to conduct additional discovery on the
numbers. (Doc. No. 69 at 13.) In support of their challenge, Plaintiffs cite to Elena Myers
Court v. Loews Philadelphia Hotel, Inc., No. 16-4848, 2017 WL 6406458, at *5 n.2 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 15, 2017). There, the court held that an affidavit was inadmissible because it was
produced after the close of discovery. Id. Here, however, the statistics were produced on the
final day of fact discovery. Although the statistics were supplied at the latter end of the
discovery period, they were not untimely. As a result, they are admissible.
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mere fact that this standard gives deference to the original fact-finder does not mean that it amounts
to “little more than review for plain error of an incomplete and inadequate record.” (See Doc. No.
62 at 23.) Instead, there are several justified reasons for employing this deferential standard. In
the context of a Section 302 commitment, the original fact-finder, who is the physician who first
examines and evaluates the individual, is in a unique position to observe his demeanor, actions,
and mental state at the time of the proposed involuntary commitment. This is not a fact-finding
exercise that is easily replicated months if not years later at an expungement hearing. Further, the
treating physician has particularized training, knowledge, and experience as to whether a Section
302 commitment is medically necessary. As such, a certain amount of deference is appropriate,
especially considering the strong and prevailing nature of the government’s interest in keeping
potentially fatal weapons out of the hands of potentially dangerous individuals.
Compare the procedures available here to the lack of procedures available in United States
v. Rehlander. In Rehlander, two individuals were involuntarily committed to psychiatric hospitals
for emergency, temporary treatment, and each were later convicted for possessing firearms in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 46. Both individuals moved to dismiss
their indictments on constitutional grounds, arguing that, as applied to them, Section 922(g)(4)
violated their Second Amendment right to bear arms and their Fifth Amendment right to due
process. Id. at 47. The district court denied the motion, but the First Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, noting the lack of post-deprivation means for temporarily committed individuals to
recover the right to bear arms. Id. at 49. The court reasoned as follows:
This would be a different case if section 922 addressed ex parte hospitalizations

and provided for a temporary suspension of the right to bear arms pending further
proceedings. It could also be different if section 922 permitted one temporarily
hospitalized on an emergency basis to recover, on reasonable terms, a suspended
right to possess arms on a showing that he now no longer posed a risk of danger.
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In all events, right now there is no recovery procedure in Maine that would avoid
the ban of section 922.
Id. (emphasis in original). In contrast to Rehlander, Pennsylvania law provides three statutory
remedies that allow a Section 302 committee to restore his right to own a gun. All three procedures
allow for the restoration of a state right to bear arms, and Section 6111.1(g)(2) allows for the
restoration of both state and federal rights.
Weighing Section 302 committees’ lessened private interest against the government’s
strong interest in public safety, and considering the negligible risk of erroneous of deprivation
through Section 6105(f), Section 6111.1(g)(2), and Section 6111.1(e), the Court is convinced that
these three post-deprivation remedies provide Section 302 committees with adequate due process.
Consequently, Defendant’s enforcement of Section 6105(c)(4) does not deprive a Section 302
committee of his right to bear arms without due process. As a result, Defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) will
be denied, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65) will be granted.
Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendant. An appropriate Order follows.
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JOHN DOE I, et. al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION
v. NO. 16-6039
COLONEL ROBERT EVANCHICK, in his

Defendant.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of January 2019, upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61), Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65),
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion (Doc. No. 69), Defendant’s Response in
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion (Doc. No. 71), Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 72), and in accordance with the Opinion of the Court issued this
day, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) is DENIED;
2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65) is GRANTED;
3. Judgment shall be entered in favor of DEFENDANT; and
4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case for statistical purposes.
BY THE COURT:
/ s/ J oel H. S l om sk y
JOEL H. SLOMSKY, J
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JOHN DOE I, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION
v. NO. 16-6039
COLONEL ROBERT EVANCHICK, in his

Defendant.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of April 2019, upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter
Judgment (Doc. No. 82), and Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Alter Judgement
(Doc. No. 83), it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter Judgment (Doc. No. 82) is
DENIED.1
1
On November 17, 2016, Plaintiffs John Doe I and John Doe II (“Plaintiffs”) filed a procedural
due process claim against Defendants Governor Thomas W. Wolf, Attorney General Bruce R.
Beemer, Colonel Tyree V. Blocker, and the Pennsylvania State Police. (Doc. No. 1.) Governor
Wolf, the Attorney General, and the Pennsylvania State Police were dismissed from the case at
the Motion to Dismiss stage, leaving Colonel Blocker as the only remaining Defendant. (Doc.
No. 34.) Colonel Blocker later retired from his position as the Commissioner of the
Pennsylvania State Police, and his successor, Colonel Robert Evanchick, replaced him as a
Defendant in this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). (See Doc. No. 79
at 1.)
Plaintiffs are individuals who attempted to purchase firearms for self-defense in their homes,
but were prohibited from doing so by Section 6105(c)(4) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms
Act (“PUFA”), which bans individuals who have been temporarily committed under Section
302 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (“MPRA”) from possessing firearms.
(Doc. No. 1.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs brought a facial challenge to Section
6105(c)(4) insofar as it applies to Section 302 committees, alleging that it deprives such
individuals of their right to bear arms without due process of law. (Id.)
On October 29, 2018, the parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 61,
65.) In their Motion, Plaintiffs contended that Section 6105(c)(4) deprived them, and all other
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similarly-situated individuals committed under Section 302, of the right to bear arms without
due process of law. (Doc. No. 62.) Specifically, they argued that Section 6105(c)(4) deprived
them of their rights without pre-deprivation procedures and that the three post-deprivation
remedies provided by the PUFA were insufficient. (Id. at 10, 17.) For his part, Defendant
submitted that (1) a Section 302 committee does not have a protected interest in owning a
firearm, (2) even if a Section 302 committee did have a protected interest in owning a gun, due
process does not mandate pre-deprivation procedures, and (3) the three post-deprivation
remedies provided by the Commonwealth adequately protected the rights of Section 302
committees. (Doc. No. 65 at 8-18.)
In an Opinion and Order dated January 10, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and entered
judgment in favor of Defendant. (Doc. Nos. 79, 80.) Although the Court found that a Section
302 committee has a protected, albeit weakened, interest in owning a firearm, it ultimately
concluded that Section 6105(c)(4) does not deprive a Section 302 committee of his right to bear
arms without due process because (1) a Section 302 committee is not entitled to additional pre-
deprivation procedures, and (2) the three post-deprivation remedies provided by the
Commonwealth adequately safeguard a Section 302 committee’s rights. (See Doc. No. 79.)
On February 7, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the present Motion to Alter Judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and an accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support of the
Motion. (Doc. Nos. 82, 83.) In the Motion, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he Court’s opinion includes
clear errors of both fact and law and would work a manifest injustice to Plaintiffs and similarly
situated individuals if not corrected.” (Doc. No. 83 at 1.) Defendant did not file a response to
the Motion to Alter Judgment, nor did he request additional time to do so. The Motion is now
ripe for review. For the reasons stated infra, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter Judgment will be denied.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is “a device . . . used to allege legal error,” United States
v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003), and may only be used to “correct manifest errors
of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v.
Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-
Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). Thus, a proper motion to alter
judgment “must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2)
the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.” Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591
F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010)).
A motion to alter judgment should only address “factual and legal matters that the Court may
have overlooked.” In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 637, 640 (E.D. Pa.
2010) (quoting Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa.
1993)). It is improper that such a motion ask the court to “rethink what it had already thought
through—rightly or wrongly.” Id. (quoting Glendon Energy Co., 836 F. Supp. at 1122). A
motion to alter judgment is not a tool to present new legal theories or arguments that could have
been asserted to support the first motion. Federico v. Charterers Mut. Assur. Ass’n, Ltd., 158
F. Supp. 2d 565, 578 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Furthermore, “[b]ecause reconsideration of a judgment
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after its entry is an extraordinary remedy, requests pursuant to these rules are to be granted
‘sparingly,’ and only when dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law were
brought to the court’s attention but not considered.” United States v. Meehan, No. 10-713,
2012 WL 12930581, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2012) (quoting Brunson Communications, Inc.
v. Arbitration, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 446, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2003)). It should not give a party a
“second bite at the apple.” Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1231 (3d Cir.
1995).
Plaintiffs advance three arguments in the Motion to Alter Judgment. They first argue that the
Court should alter its judgment because, in the Opinion, the Court misstated the point at which
a Section 302 committee is divested of his right to bear arms. (Doc. No. 83 at 5, 8.) As
explained above, Section 6105(c)(4) of the PUFA divests an individual who has been
temporarily committed under Section 302 of the right to own or possess a firearm. After an
individual is committed under Section 302, the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) receive a
notification of that commitment. The PSP then creates a mental health record of the
commitment in the PICS database, the state firearms background check database. Finally, the
PICS mental health record is automatically transferred to the NICS database, the national
firearms background check database. In its Opinion, the Court stated that Section 6105 (c)(4)
strips a Section 302 committee of his right to bear arms when the PSP creates a mental health
record in the PICS database, which is then transferred to the NICS database. (Doc. No. 79 at
12.) But in the Motion to Alter Judgment, Plaintiffs argue that the Court is incorrect, and a
Section 302 committee is actually deprived of his right to own a gun at the moment he is
temporarily committed.
When a moving party argues that a court overlooked certain facts or controlling decisions of
law which were previously presented, the court should grant a motion to alter judgment only if
the issues or facts overlooked might reasonably have resulted in a different conclusion. Cataldo
v. Moses, 361 F. Supp. 2d 420, 433 (D.N.J. 2004); see also Henry v. Smith, No. 16-5010, 2017
WL 4776753, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2017). Here, the Court held that a Section 302 committee
is not entitled to additional pre-deprivation procedures before he loses the right to own a gun.
This conclusion is the same whether that loss occurs at the moment the PSP creates a mental
health records in the PICS database, or whether that loss occurs at the moment he is temporarily
committed. Significantly, the Court’s analysis of this issue focused on procedures that occur
before an individual is committed under Section 302. Thus, even if Plaintiffs are correct that
the Court misstated or misapprehended the precise moment at which a Section 302 committee
loses his right to own a gun, Plaintiffs’ version of the facts would not have changed the Court’s
conclusion. Consequently, the alleged misstatement of fact is not a ground which requires the
Court to alter its judgment.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that the Court’s conclusion that a Section 302 committee is not
entitled to additional pre-deprivation procedures is the result of the misapplication of the test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In support
of this contention, Plaintiffs do not argue that the Court overlooked controlling law; rather, they
only assert that the Court should have afforded less weight to one Mathews factor and more
weight to another Mathews factor. But this assertion is little more than a repackaged recitation
of the argument made on this issue in Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which was
3
JA-051
Case: 19-1927
Document: 003113275070
Document 84Page:
Filed149
04/08/19
DatePage
Filed:4 06/26/2019
of 4
BY THE COURT:
/ s/ J oel H. S l om sk y
JOEL H. SLOMSKY, J.
fully considered and addressed by the Court in the Opinion issued January 10, 2019. As noted
above, it is improper for a motion to alter judgment to ask a court to “rethink what it had already
thought through—rightly or wrongly.” In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d
at 640 (quoting Glendon Energy Co., 836 F. Supp. at 1122). As a result, reconsideration of
whether a Section 302 committee is entitled to additional pre-deprivation procedures before
Section 6105(c)(4) divests him of his right to own a gun is not warranted.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the Court misapplied Mathews by concluding that the three post-
deprivation remedies provided by the PUFA sufficiently safeguard the due process rights of a
Section 302 committee. (Doc. No. 83 at 16.) But as noted above, Plaintiffs’ arguments in
support of this contention merely restate the arguments advanced on this issue in Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment. In fact, on this point, the arguments in the two Motions are
nearly identical. As explained previously, a motion to alter judgment does not function to give
a party a “second bite at the apple.” Bhatnagar, 52 F.3d at 1231. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ final
argument offers no basis for reconsideration.
For the reasons stated above, the arguments raised in Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter Judgment do
not change the Court’s decision that summary judgment in favor of Defendant was warranted.
As a result, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter Judgment will be denied.
JA-052
I hereby certify that on June 26, 2019, I filed the forgoing with the Clerk of
the Court via CM/ECF, which will serve the following counsel of record:
Claudia M. Tesoro
ctesoro@attorneygeneral.gov
Kathy Le
21 South 12th Street, 3rd Floor
kle@attorneygeneral.gov
Respectfully submitted,

John Parker Sweeney

John Doe 1 V Wolf Brief of Appellants

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Case: 19-1927 Document: 003113275070 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/26/2019

JOHN DOE I; JOHN DOE II,

GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

analyzed the constitutionality of Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act (“PUFA”)

Section 6105(c)(4), insofar as its firearm-possession prohibition extends to

individuals certified committable under Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(1).

Table of Authorities ................................................................................................. iv

Jurisdictional Statement .............................................................................................1

Standard of Review ....................................................................................................2

Statement of the Issue Presented for Review.............................................................3

Statement of Related Cases and Proceedings ............................................................4

Statement of the Case.................................................................................................5

I. Statement of the Facts......................................................................................5

A. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) deprives law-abiding, responsible

1. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) prohibits possession of

2. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) provides no pre-deprivation

3. Pennsylvania’s post-deprivation remedies are

B. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) permanently deprived Plaintiffs of their

II. Course of Proceedings ...................................................................................17

Summary of the Argument.......................................................................................20

I. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is facially unconstitutional because it does not

A. PUFA Section 6105(c)(4) is an established state procedure that

B. Application of the Supreme Court’s Mathews factors confirms that

C. Pennsylvania’s post-deprivation remedies cannot substitute for pre-

II. Even if post-deprivation remedies could substitute for pre-deprivation

Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................44

Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................45

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ..............................................2

Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371 (1971) .....................................................................25

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) ...................................25

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) ...............................................................27

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ..............................................31

Franklin v. Sessions, 291 F. Supp. 3d 705 (W.D. Pa. 2017) ...................................37

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).....................................................................26

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) ........................................................................35

Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1996) ........................................ 36, 40

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) ........................................................... 27, 34

In re Estate of S.G.L., 885 A.2d 73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) .........................................8

In re Hancock, 719 A.2d 1053 (Pa. 1998) .................................................................7

In re Keyes, 83 A.3d 1016 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) ....................................................37

In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2017) ........................................................ 13, 39, 40

Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) ..........................................................23

Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F..Supp.3d 702 (M.D. PA 2016)...................................... 37, 38

Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007) ............................................................12

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ..................................................... passim

McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) .........................................................33

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) .......................................... 3, 22

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) ...................................................................26

Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)..............................................................23

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ...............................................................22

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990)......................................................... passim

16 Del. C. § 5005 .....................................................................................................28

16 Del. C. § 5008 .....................................................................................................28

16 Del. C. § 5009 .....................................................................................................28

18 Pa. C.S. § 6105 ......................................................................................................5

18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a) .................................................................................................5

18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a)(2)(i) .................................................................................. 9, 33

18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(b) .................................................................................................5

18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(c) .................................................................................................5

18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(c)(4)................................................................................... passim