Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, WILLIAM T.
T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, There is no dispute as to the following facts:
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31, 1991
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF
SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD
OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO
MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC
Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T.
GATCHALIAN, respondents.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF
SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD
OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO
MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding
Judge, RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T.
GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON
T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T.
GATCHALIAN, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95612-13 May 31, 1991
vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et
al., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William
Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D.
Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the
Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated
September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la
Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners
from commencing or continuing with any of the
proceedings which would lead to the deportation of
respondent William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No.
90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge
Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No.
3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from
proceeding with the deportation charges against
respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent
judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.
On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his
Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos.
96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his
person with prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen,
or in the alternative, to remand the case to the trial court
for further proceedings.
On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment
to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court
considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian
as answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as
answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to
the petitions.
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the
citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian
(Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship
Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he
has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely:
Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco
Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian
(Annex "2", counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a
twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong
together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all
surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of
Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing
the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino
citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son,
respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and
Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino
citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence thereof,
William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate
No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16,
1961 (Annex "D", petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice
issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same
memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground
that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those
cases was that of William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after
a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the
Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the
latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others,
respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of
exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging
that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated
July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and executory
(Annex "F", petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board
of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or July 20,
1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967
case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this
Court sustained the validity of the decision of the new
Board of Commissioners having been promulgated on
July 6, 1962, or within the reglementary period for
review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as
the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of
Special Inquiry where the deportion case against them
was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry
recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the
then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the
warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5",
counter-petition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued
an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant
of arrest issued against him (Annex "6",
counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National
Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with
the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion
dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37
(a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and
(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also
known as the Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G",
petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the
recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action
(Annex "20", counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo
of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation * issued a mission order commanding the
arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18",
counter-petition). The latter appeared before
Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was
released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00
cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by
respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No.
90-54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that
respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of
Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the
assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the
motion to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent
Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br.
172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case
No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of preliminary
injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that
petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the
institution of deportation proceedings against William.
On the same day, respondent Capulong issued the
questioned temporary restraining order restraining
petitioners from continuing with the deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1)
respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners
(Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter
of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP
129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent
judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of
discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the
authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the
deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in
the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent
judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling
that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are
beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners,
thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs.
Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the
July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that
respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4)
respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil
Case No. 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among
others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on record is
not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners
have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case
until the courts shall have finally resolved the question of
his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously
and fairly resolve the question of respondent's
citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias,
pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the
ground for which he is sought to be deported has already
prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be
referred to in the order the petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the
Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of
quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as
the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special
Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners
are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in equal rank
with Regional Trial Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in
any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs
are vested with the power to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the Court of Appeals is vested with —
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, board or commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third
paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends
to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies
whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court
of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act
No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically
appealable to the Court of Appeals (Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171
SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160
SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it
is specifically provided that the decisions of the Land
Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security
Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the
Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra),
this Court clarified the matter when We ruled:
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial bodies shall
continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic
Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with
the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as
follows:
Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any
provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling,
award, order, or decision, or judgment of the Court of
Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section
7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also
known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of
Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight
hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial
Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the
Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board;
the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board,
may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the
period and in the manner herein provided, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact
and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of
questions. From final judgments or decisions of the
Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal
by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Because of subsequent amendments, including the
abolition of various special courts, jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently,
determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes.
Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the
National Labor Relations Commission are final and
executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court
through a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal.
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the
Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate
Court, and so are decisions of the Social Security
Commission.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from
decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of
Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the
Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and
logically, beyond the control of the latter. (Emphasis
supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor
Relations Commissions, whose decisions are directly
appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as
Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain
bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the
Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said
commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with
the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically
beyond the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not
among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law
whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly
appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions
are subject to judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25,
Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code,
which provides as follows:
Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be
subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter
and applicable laws.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court
specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in any
court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is
subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the
latter, provides that the decision of an agency like the
Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the
court specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it
is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction
in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules
of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial
bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those
specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As
the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the
RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be
reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by,
the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration
has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and
hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of
citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil.
531 [1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits
of an exception, at least insofar as deportation
proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to
citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory?
Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to
continue or should the question of citizenship be
ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs.
Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court
answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is
conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts should
promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is
entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any
official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a
deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right
to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ
of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground
that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and
evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor
justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to
continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board
has finished its investigation of his undesirability.
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at
all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent undue
harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed
administrative officials. Of what use is this much boasted
right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after
the Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it,
besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of public
opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board
of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is,
therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33
SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155
[1967]). Judicial intervention, however, should be
granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is
so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the
remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a
competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs.
Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78
SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that
respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We
shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could
properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by
respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the
Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view
of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former
jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line
with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua
Hiong and Co cases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the
Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at
bar.1âwphi1 Considering the voluminous pleadings
submitted by the parties and the evidence presented,
We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this
instance. And this course of action is not without
precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this
Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a
single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be
served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to
have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals
and from there to this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73
Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA
265 [1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135
SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146
[1975]).
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:
Remand of the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is
in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records
before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public
interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has
resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding
them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as
where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the
remand of the case or when public interest demands an
early disposition of the case or where the trial court had
already received all the evidence of the parties
(Quisumbing vs. CA, 112 SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs.
The City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic vs. Security
Credit & Acceptance Corp., et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal
vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety & Insurance
Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100
[1988]), We said:
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which
avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the
parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the
disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 Phil.
592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is
that where the dictates of justice so demand . . . the
Supreme Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu
Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal vs.
CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.)
(Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of appeals, et al., Jan. 29,
1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176
SCRA 1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only
before the Regional Trial Court but also before Us in the
form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On
the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his
Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298,
counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration
already stated that there is no longer a need to adduce
evidence in support of the deportation charges against
respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke that this
Court's decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs.
Arca (supra), has already settled respondent's alienage.
Hence, the need for a judicial determination of
respondent's citizenship specially so where the latter is
not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines
(for the past thirty [30] years) and is being expelled
(Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra).
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been
conclusively settled by this Court in
the Arocha and Vivo cases, We disagree. It must be
noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein
was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962
decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e.,
whether the decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on
July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was
erased and over it was superimposed the figure "6"
thereby making the decision fall within the one-year
reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which the
decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely
pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that of
respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases.
The said cases originated from a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario
Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the
rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by
a decision rendered therein.
Neither can it be argued that the Board of
Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding
respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not
satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one
thing, said decision did not make any categorical
statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese.
Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on
Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs.
Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41
SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has
to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court
in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the
citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a
court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue
in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with the
active participation of the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative, and this finding or the
citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the
decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof
of such party's citizenship in any other case or
proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a
decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be
considered conclusive or binding in any other case or
proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the
procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be
applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a
material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution thereof,
and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set
forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases
relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William
Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the
arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence
based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962,
coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33),
the Court finds the same devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended,
otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon
the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis
supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in
matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as
deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner
of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid,
must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void
for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang,
67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62
SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155;
Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs.
Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs.
Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation
Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish
warrants between a criminal case and administrative
proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed
a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable
cause against him, by a judge, why should one
suspected of a violation of an administrative nature
deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the
alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If
the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to
determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it
cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges
can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated
August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued
by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates
that the same was issued only for purposes of
investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian
included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order
directs the Intelligence Agents/Officers to:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the
Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46
Administrative Code;
xxx xxx xxx
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and
immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after
warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent
and a right to counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of
respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962
warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on.
The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention
that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of
deportation or warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against
petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which petitioners
conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or
comment to the counter-petition of respondent,
respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously
covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion
for re-hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI)
sometime in 1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after
giving due course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted
a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition) recommending 1 the
reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then
Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6,
1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very
basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a
forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine
Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of
applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry
concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the
issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took the
place of a passport for their authorized travel to the
Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have
entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of
the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country."
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda
issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which
affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision
dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and
others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962
warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification
Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino
citizen is the last official act of the government on the
basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually
exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor
of respondent William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian,
grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As
a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6,
1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an
accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The
opening paragraph of said order states:
The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed
applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago
Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized
by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated July 12,
1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the
applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that they
are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago
Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a
Filipino was reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra) where
advertence is made to the "applicants being the
descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at
p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before
the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to
the Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he
reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the
illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana
Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in
Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued
Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on
November 18, 1960 by the Department of Foreign Affairs
in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex "5",
counter-petition), Santiago reiterated his claim of
Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his petition
for cancellation of his alien registry which was granted on
February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July
20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a Filipino and was issued Certificate No.
1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens,
Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr.,
proposing to re-open the question of citizenship of
Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is
not even put in issue, is quite much to late. As stated
above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show
that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been
declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that
forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later.
Petitioners do not even question Santiago Gatchalian's
Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of respondent
William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for
determination of the Court in this case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the
fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28)
years after the alleged cause of deportation arose.
Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in
the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years
after the cause of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs.
Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the
consequences of such inaction, thus:
There is however an important circumstance which
places this case beyond the reach of the resultant
consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the
mother of the minor when she admitted that she gained
entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name
of a Chinese resident merchant other than that of her
lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no
longer be the subject of deportation proceedings for the
simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from
the date of her admission. Note that the above
irregularity was divulged by the mother herself, who in a
gesture of sincerity, made an spontaneous admission
before the immigration officials in the investigation
conducted in connection with the landing of the minor on
September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the
part of the immigration authorities. And considering this
frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found
to be married to another Chinese resident merchant,
now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the
Philippines valued at P15,000 and which gives a net
profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then
must have considered the irregularity not serious enough
when, inspire of that finding, they decided to land said
minor "as a properly documented preference quota
immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder
why two years later the immigration officials would
reverse their attitude and would take steps to institute
deportation proceedings against the minor.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we
believe that much as the attitude of the mother would be
condemned for having made use of an improper means
to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire
permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say
unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed the
mother to remain even illegally to the extent of validating
her residence by inaction, thus allowing the period of
prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit
his deportation at this late hour would be to condemn
him to live separately from his mother through no fault of
his thereby leaving him to a life of insecurity resulting
from lack of support and protection of his family. This
inaction or oversight on the part of immigration officials
has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons
of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein
involved. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action
and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962.
However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued
by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 —
28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of
action has already prescribed and by their inaction could
not now be validly enforced by petitioners against
respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant
of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and
the Identification certificate of respondent, among others,
was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting
Commissioner Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs.
Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision
dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which
was found to be valid in Arocha should be applicable to
respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not
a party to said case. They also opined that under Sec. 37
(b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is
applicable only where the deportation is sought to be
effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses
2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is
applicable in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and
12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration
Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings
should be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of
the same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of
the offenses therein enumerated with a fine of "not more
than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than two
(2) years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
Penal Provisions
Sec. 45. Any individual who—
(a) When applying for an immigration document
personates another individual, or falsely appears in the
name of deceased individual, or evades the immigration
laws by appearing under an assumed name; fictitious
name; or
(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration
document, to any person not authorized by law to
receive such document; or
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document,
knowing it to be false; or
(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without
inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or
obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or
misleading representation or wilful concealment of a
material fact; or
(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose
represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to
evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or
(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under
oath any false statement or representations; or
(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines
without first securing an immigration clearance
certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act; or
(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of
the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an offense, and
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one
thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more than two
years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis
supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty
prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code);
correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92,
Revised Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No.
3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances)
"violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those
punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but
less than six years; . . ."
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent
deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in
the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the
eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being
a special legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting
deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of
exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are
not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of
prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss
of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after
the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the
penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the
right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a
certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p.
855).
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of
the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that
it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should
not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court
of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court
of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the
lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from
the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it
may be enforced only by a separate action subject to the
statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil
Code, an action based on judgment must be brought
within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule,
therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be
initiated within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation or exclusion arises when effected under any
other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and
of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and
2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37,
the prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion
proceedings is eight (8) years.
In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the
BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they
commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings
against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990.
Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already
prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or
enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted
after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961,
respondent William Gatchalian has continuously resided
in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1,
1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has
four (4) minor children. The marriage contract shows that
said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds
passports and earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes
"9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a registered
voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long
resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12,
counter-petition). He engaged in business in the
Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the
International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman International
Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14",
counter-petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims
that the companies he runs and in which he has a
controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He
continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship
and discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners
initiated the deportation proceedings against him.
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is
an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It
is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the
public good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao
Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who has
helped the economy of the country by providing
employment to some 4,000 people be considered
undesirable and be summarily deported when the
government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign
investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who
invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even
assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his
deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair,
if not downright illegal. The action taken by petitioners in
the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled
government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is
an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point out
that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in
China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of
William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China,
were not supported by any evidence other than their own
self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what
the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this
country, it should have been shown that they were valid
by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted.
There being none, petitioners conclude that the
aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence,
Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the
citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a
valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's
marriage not having been demonstrated, William and
Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a
Chinese national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We
find that it cannot be sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar,
there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage,
there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of
Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be
blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on
respondent William Gatchalian who was then a
twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate,
Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship
Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to
marriage, having been content with the testimony of
Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected
to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian
and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular
and immigration authorities regarding their marriages,
birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving
but are admissible in evidence as statements or
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in
matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore,
this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive
law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic
document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (See
also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago
Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned
are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation
(Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine
citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal
law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.

The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs.

Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis,
adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages
contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26
of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages
performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the
matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity
of such marriage may be extended to the consequences
of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code
in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor
the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law
or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage, the
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful
aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in mind the
"processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and
other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid
under our law bears the burden of proof to present the
foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid,
respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of
his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of
the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being
the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the
latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine
citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration
in an order dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the
class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1,
Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners.
The ruling arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the
case at bar for the simple reason that the parties therein
testified to have been married in China by a village
leader, which undoubtedly is not among those
authorized to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56
of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to
resolve the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED
and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino
citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined
from continuing with the deportation proceedings
docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction over
respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil
Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before
respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE
GARCIA-RECIO,, Petitioner, v. REDERICK
RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision 1 and the March 24, 1999 Order 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in
Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed
as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage
between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as
dissolved and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or both
parties.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the
above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband and
wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
J.
A.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian
Citizenship issued by the Australian
government. 6 Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent
were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. 7 In
their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as single and Filipino. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia. 9cräläwvirtualibräry
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a quo, on
the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as
1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution. 11 He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained
in Australia in 1989; 12 thus, he was legally capacitated
to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity
was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because
the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken
down. 13cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent. 15 The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties. 16 After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution. 17cräläwvirtualibräry
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the
ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage
ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged
lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its
Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus,
there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition. 18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce
decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson
thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage
with the petitioner.
2 Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized
Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26
of the Family Code in this case.
4 were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the
The trial court patently and grievously erred in
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5 At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry,
without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our
courts.19cräläwvirtualibräry
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this
Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was
proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.
Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha
Samson
divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 20 petitioner argues
that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment,
may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon
proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish
these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to
show the conformity of the marriage in question to the
legal requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law
does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. 21 A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 22 and 17 23 of the Civil Code. 24 In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 25 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. 26 A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws. 27cräläwvirtualibräry
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. 28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it. 29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be
admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of
the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of
the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the following:
xxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has
been previously married, the applicant shall be required
to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has
been previously married, the applicant shall be required
to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate
of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x
x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the
Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore,
it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence. 30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. 31 The decree purports to
be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country. 32cräläwvirtualibräry
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand,
a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested 33 by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 34cräläwvirtualibräry
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility,
but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court
ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification. 37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure
to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia. 38cräläwvirtualibräry
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of
the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. 39 Naturalization
is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove
Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she
is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment.
He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original
of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in
that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus,
judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the
party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action. 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have
the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden
of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws
are not among those matters that judges are supposed
to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power
of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof
of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to
marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their
marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree,
which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian
law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are
of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce.
It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the
lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected. 46cräläwvirtualibräry
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage
may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a
divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery
may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior. 47cräläwvirtualibräry
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy.48cräläwvirtualibräry
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed
that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce
decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
39 49 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the
divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity
required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract
marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license. 50cräläwvirtualibräry
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only
the following exhibits were presented before the lower
court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; 51 (b)
Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino)
on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson
(Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of
annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D.
Samson was in its records; 54 and (e) Exhibit E
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recio; 55 (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended
Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi
of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; 58 (d) Exhibit 4 Decree
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A.
Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995. 60cräläwvirtualibräry
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce
decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian
law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe
that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in
that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE , in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its
Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the
plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against his
wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees,
Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño,"
respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the
following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948
in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she
was then enrolled as a second year student of
commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a
well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32
years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of
undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares,
in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The
marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair
and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the
marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker
and go-between, they had planned out their marital
future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their
first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A
few weeks before their secret marriage, their
engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the
engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling
Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his
return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get
married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement,
Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of
Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their
marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize
because when Vicente went back to her classes after the
marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended
nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college.
Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she
had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño
were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the
hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would
provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following
morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice.
Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate
what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the
standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority
from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did
not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto
Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims
he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from
San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel;
Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter
would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor
met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents
while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22
March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her
husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous
letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable
disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her
being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her
parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh.
"1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the
days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone
to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There,
a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not
sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the
hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she
applied for a passport, indicating in her application that
she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she
was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to
return after two years. The application was approved,
and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950,
she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the
State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and
absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with
the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's
marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954,
Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh.
"D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American,
Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She
acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded
and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff
and an equally valid marriage to her present husband,
Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they
had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal
separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife
and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It
allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this
Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the
following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano
and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay
the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief
sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor
Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño,
were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of
our civil law, is clearly established by the record before
us. Both parties were then above the age of majority,
and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the
marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest
(army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent
witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not
duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical
authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not
only because of the separation of Church and State but
also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature
(which was the marriage law in force at the time)
expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for
marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties
and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus
only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential
to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized
by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No
marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements of
this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of
them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do
so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and
hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed
until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim,
45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448).
It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to
the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after
the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very
act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for
annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and
binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she
contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have
been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even
granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention,
and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by
fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her
marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the
marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent
civil court. This was never done, and admittedly,
Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance
of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage
between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine
law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that
the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from
the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was
issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law,
and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep.
Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not
admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in
fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on
grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the
husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil
Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1,
Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be
severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give
recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent
violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the
Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to
such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to
an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of
our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn
abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the
Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant
Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada
divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law
cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil
Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the
mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot
confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none
(Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows
as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction
Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not
entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, and her denial
of consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for
which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous
letter charging immorality against the husband constitute,
contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her
marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is
technically "intercourse with a person not her husband"
from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal
separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a
marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject,
particularly those that were rendered under our laws
prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act
2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal
history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective;
and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in
disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted
to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710.
The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior
to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of
these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is
of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be
ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not
legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they
afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland
until her death is wholly without legal significance. The
claims of the very children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to
inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and
acknowledged natural children. The children of
adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word
"descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code
cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born
of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the
children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran
after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at
bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that
such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and,
therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the
part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that
stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring,
the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous
situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the
question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the
Philippines, and the answer to them was given
in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the
Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the
laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws
are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore,
sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's
parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña
Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter
and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him
strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and
are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit
was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App.,
pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great
unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and
"sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was
admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta,
and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not
have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly
asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding
demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected
event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged
that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with
the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous
one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the
marriage ceremony was had it was not due to
defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the
refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses
Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter
to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision,
or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in
law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that
Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the
United States; for it was natural that they should not wish
their daughter to live in penury even if they did not
concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur.
130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of
improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to
have acted independently, and being of age, she was
entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her
decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections
in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which
have not been shown, good faith being always presumed
until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The
law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest
himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence
of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs.
However, such distinction between the liability of parents
and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify
interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her
spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously,
without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not
liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith
with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest
of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and
be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and
happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest
or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining
of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under
mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or
interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has
been held that the parent is liable for consequences
resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take
his child into his home and afford him or her protection
and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed
his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause
him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule
has more frequently been applied in the case of advice
given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in
the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged
parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek
annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
While this suit may not have been impelled by actual
malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of
the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are
not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices
or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by
appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente
Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his
patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in
damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret,
and its failure was not characterized by publicity or
undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties
never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that
appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid,
being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While
appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a
consequence of the indissoluble character of the union
that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes
rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All
told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover
P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's
fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the
defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by
the court below, we opine that the same are excessive.
While the filing of this unfounded suit must have
wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them
anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured
their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits
having become a common occurrence in present society.
What is important, and has been correctly established in
the decision of the court below, is that said defendants
were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole
deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the
damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition
as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced consort,
subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her
co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby
modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez
entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant
Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to
pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000
for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the
appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages
and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge
of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner
Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders,
dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil
Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which
denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion
for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen
of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in
1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children
born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon
Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and
asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting
of that business, and that private respondent be declared
with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had
"no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court
below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned
case on the ground that the property involved is located
in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil
case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to
question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial
Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was
patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously
and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a
certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority
and to correct the error committed which, in such a case,
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would
then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to
go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the
petition filed in this case within the exception, and we
have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from
laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of
the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
before the American Court that they had no community
of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree
issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to
determine whether the property relations between
petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage,
were upon absolute or relative community property, upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce,
had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It
also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who,
giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San
Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the
divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce
on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that
there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of
Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP &
GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent
him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and
do an things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be
adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the
same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent
Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice.
BLANDINA DANDAN,* Respondents. On the same day, the trial court required the submission
of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten
DECISION (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or
without the documents, the issue on the declaration of
heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The
BELLOSILLO, J.:
prescribed period lapsed without the required documents
being submitted.
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao1 which held
not however blessed with children. Somewhere along
that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought
the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
(Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in
She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private
this jurisdiction,"2 disregarded the divorce between
writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to
petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the
live separately from each other and a settlement of their
view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she
extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack
married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
of judicial approval.3 On the other hand, it opined that
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
there was no showing that marriage existed between
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown
Wernimont.
that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged
by the deceased as his children with her. As regards
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27
August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the November 19874 only petitioner and Ruperto were
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent favor of the two intestate heirs.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan
Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
children were allowed to present proofs that the
all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving
recognition of the children by the deceased as his
children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and
legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as
prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo
his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective
Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon
records of birth. Thus on 15 February 19886 partial
motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan
later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half
oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted
of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing
petitioner to the other half.7 Private respondent was not
and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and
declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were
surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate previous marriage to petitioner.
declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution
of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan
children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the
case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec.
1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone
sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September
1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987
decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court,
and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.8 On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no
need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for
resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children
or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of
the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between
petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the
present petition based on established facts and
admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon
by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as
to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from
the decedent because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself
even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;10 nor as
to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy
remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of
Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than
petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing
on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate
declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply
issued an order requiring the submission of the records
of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be
deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion
private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to
whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the
decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in
the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also
invoked the above quoted procedural rule.11 To this,
petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce
they obtained.12 Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should
have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to
establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of
documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the
arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing
the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily
settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the
ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or
reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that
the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of
the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.13 that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set
for hearing.14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to
squarely address the issue on her citizenship.15 The trial
court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a
hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the
finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino
citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage
as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to
determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still
a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The
trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on
petitioner's citizenship;17 it did not merit enlightenment
however from petitioner.18 In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by
private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with
the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of
a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance
of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another
trial court. When asked whether she was an American
citizen petitioner answered that she was since
1954.19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner
and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner
however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to
erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of
their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be
conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent
appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned
to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited only to the
right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving
spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was
already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in
a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently,
she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as
this status presupposes a legitimate
relationship.20cräläwvirtualibräry
As regards the motion of private respondent for
petitioner and her counsel to be declared in contempt of
court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping,21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to
exist the actions must involve the same transactions and
same essential facts and circumstances. There must
also be identical causes of action, subject matter and
issue.22 The present petition deals with declaration of
heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the
three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new
owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties
belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no
reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe
D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying
its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net
hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the
exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of
Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.
The Court however emphasizes that the reception of
evidence by the trial court should be limited to the
hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in
contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for
forum shopping is DENIED.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity
as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which
ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed
by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former,
provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule
on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay
Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married
before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where
their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April
20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,
1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage
and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on
January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil
Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg
Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said
court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the
issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal
Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However,
upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of
two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually
raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI
presided by the respondent judge; while the other
case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434
went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV,
of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the
Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution
of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against
her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James
Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434.
The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State
Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases
to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge
Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge
merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of
the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings
in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
resolution of the petition for review then pending before
the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also
filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987.
The same order also directed the arraignment of both
accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The
latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner
refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner
being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the
former was ordered detained until she submitted herself
for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a
plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of
the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the
court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge
of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987
and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.
87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary
of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's
ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for
shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the
crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction
of the court over the offense is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is
that complaint which starts the prosecutory
proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions
for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and
nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for
the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of
the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State,
as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the
criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity
or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of
the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in
civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the
prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply.
Understandably, it may not have been found necessary
since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally
commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such
genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action,
or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his
power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public
trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a
logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the
status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably
exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be
absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status
existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the
institution of the case. We would thereby have the
anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very
time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local
precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to
when precisely the status of a complainant as an
offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution
can be commenced only by one who in law can be
categorized as possessed of such status. Stated
differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the
commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused
be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of
the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in
that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields
the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute
provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery.
Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have
no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held
that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except
on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932,
Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when
the offense is said to have been committed, he had
ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and
appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle
him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that
the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as
the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the
statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending
spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should
not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering
our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are
convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined
as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status
of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et
al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States
court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her
American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial
court here alleging that her business concern was
conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to
render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the
right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions,
this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not
have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance
or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that
there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious
heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the
reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses
from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be
successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially
the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be
afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that
"the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the
infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even
though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to
have her marriage contract declared null and void, until
and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically
inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed
after the declaration of nullity because such declaration
that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating
that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said
declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand
on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and
within the purview of the decision in said case is the
situation where the criminal action for adultery was
filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial
declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and
requisite would necessarily apply where the termination
of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid
foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs.
Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same
fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case
reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and
seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an
issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's
motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No.
87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987
is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the
Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring
respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as
"Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
"Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five (25)
years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted
serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10,
1927 to September 30, 1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula
Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo
departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the
conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines
Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United
States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American
Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave
by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was
pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
"Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the
child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name
was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact,
on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances
allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s
salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily
maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they
would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate
agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired
during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not
prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she
voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate
from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by
both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s
father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by
Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November
16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San Diego.
Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and
actively participated in the proceedings. On November
27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California,
for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations
to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became
final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente
in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the
first marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as
husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and
Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public
Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with
attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres
and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R.
FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot,
located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and
other movables or belongings that may be found or
existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R.
Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my
real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay
Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio
Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my
wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City
Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and
165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of
Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned
properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not
be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and
disposed of by and among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the
sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in
her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my
children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her
lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils,
or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed,
or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives
of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever
bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife
Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any
real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed
respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last
Will and Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and testament
wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion
for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly
executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be
terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a
petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property
were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s
will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in
the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate
proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate
proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s
petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was
published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint
decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that
the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente
is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January
16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the
petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to
receive any share from the estate even if the will
especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having
gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739
(1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula
Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13,
1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal
properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T.
Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and
then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul,
Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to
partition in equal shares and also entitled to the
remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal
administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo
Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in
the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to
make a return to the court within three (3) months a true
and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her
possession or to the possession of any other person for
her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all
debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such
dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this
court; to render a true and just account of her
administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court and to perform all
orders of this court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions
for want of evidence could not be granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s
motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier
decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not
children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they
were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its
decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly
Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling
her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of
the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the
Court of Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision, affirming with modification the decision of the
trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is
declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the
deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25)
years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the
motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through
the various arguments raised,36 the issue is simple.
Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of
Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling
on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an
American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution
of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted
and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are
necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the
Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court
of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back"
to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case,
Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of
New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath
it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven
statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary
theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining
the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American
law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of
the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United States.
Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its
citizens and in force only within the State. It can
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of
which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is
no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is
called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid
since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in
the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial
court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It
declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever
property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete
disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed
in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In
the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v.
Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent
was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the
divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose
her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce
obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the
Court of Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction
as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as
to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are
matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to
his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in
the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his
wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our
laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and
legal capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit
from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law
which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will
was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that
whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
Congress specifically left the amount of successional
rights to the decedent's national law.45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon
the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final
on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of IT IS SO ORDERED.3
origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court,
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with are as follows.
instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
within the framework of the Rules of Court.
Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
No costs. blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz
V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
SO ORDERED.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by
DECISION
him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens,
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
under Philippine law?
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the
Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
question, presented as a pure question of law.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is,
herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file
a petition for annulment or for legal
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of
law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits
the divorce decree obtained against him by his American
that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under
determination.6
the Philippine Law.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not
directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to
remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is
ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen,
insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his
second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what
was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article
26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to
govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at
the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing
in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the
Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able
to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly
divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity
of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose
foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry.
We propose that this be deleted and made into law only
after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to
the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were,
as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married.
The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954
and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court
therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results
or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then
the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the
proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in
this particular case, not even feasible, considering that
the marriage of the parties appears to have all the
badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever
the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino
spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of
competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein
must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as
an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that
the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would
be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be
made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays
for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming
the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30
October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null
and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the
filing of a Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of marriage
by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to
the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on
16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had
five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and
Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five
children, the youngest then being only six years old, to
the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely
left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter
from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce
papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in
1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987,
Fely came back to the Philippines with her American
family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely
because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned
to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the
wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the
brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995,
for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been
openly using the surname of her American husband in
the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which
she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time
the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely
left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was
no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that
Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family,
and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on
05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already
an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to
Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously
married to respondent Crasus and having five children
with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by
respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that
she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person,
and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus
on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to
find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of
their household. She could not have been extravagant
since the family hardly had enough money for basic
needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons
as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then
earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was
insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of
her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to
provide financial support to them, as well as, to
respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to
bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert,
who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she
did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied
having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married
her American husband and acquired American
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an
American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law
of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that
respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of
₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the
brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the
foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that
respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the
₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their
respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both
parties the opportunity to present their evidence.
Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of
evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; 7 (2) the
Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the
Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely
in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration
taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son,
wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s
surname, Micklus.9
Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a
Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,
Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon
written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the
Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the
said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12 and
Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine
Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the
depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories,
not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.
Taking into account that it had been over a year since
respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that
Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October
1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right to
present her evidence. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC
promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on
the basis of the following findings –
The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity
deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed,
plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds
that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs
of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity,
mutual love, respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that
the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained
a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another
family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,
wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to
another man in another country.
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been
apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY
CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage
provided that these were eventually manifested after the
wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife
erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and
inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation
of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite
evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and
heart to comply with her marital obligations, such
incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage
in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards
her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is
defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations which already existed at the
time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily
proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly
credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These
are her excessive disposition to material things over and
above the marital stability. That such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage
to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground
to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted
Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence,
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001,
affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no
reversible error therein. It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee
abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing
in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically
stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the
declaration of nullity of their marriage…
…
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY,
THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the
above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust
situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a
divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has
undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This
Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted
can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse
eventually embraces another citizenship and thus
becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these
circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as
married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor
her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff
to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact
does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is
incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants,
is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage
which this Court finds abhorrent and will not
countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief
by affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of
the marriage of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08
March 2002,17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this
Court, based on the following arguments/grounds –
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s
wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of
substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence
considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious
errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus
maintained that Fely’s psychological incapacity was
clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
already become an American citizen. He further
questioned the personality of petitioner Republic,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court,
not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the
State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the
instant Petition to be meritorious.
I (b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the
The totality of evidence presented during trial is
insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial
provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads –
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes
psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court
laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological
incapacity was defined, thus –
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated…21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite
lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced
below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that
there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however,
must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of
evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed
miserably to establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for
declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent
Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be
easily put into question for being self-serving, in the
absence of any other corroborating evidence. He
submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds
of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16
December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her
American husband’s surname. Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the
evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely
had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from
assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do
not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous
cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts
that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the
rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus;
her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of
her American family and her American surname, may
indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root
cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the
incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven
to be in existence at the time of celebration of the
marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is
no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v.
Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied
with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and
that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of
1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
of the Philippines –
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a
special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at
the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and
literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his
wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the
exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in
her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left
for the United States in 1984, after which she married
her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow
and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus,
Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on
behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on
behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of
the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides –
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor
General does not bar him or his Office from intervening
in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the
Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked to
represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of
the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the
Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such
proceedings could only serve and contribute to the
realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor
General is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General takes over when the case is elevated to the
Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is
only reasonable and practical that even while the
proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office
of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision
and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the
interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed
the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that
were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the
case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA
198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family
Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355
SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State…37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became
effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other
doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the
Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of
the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the
Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher
courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below –
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
…
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve
a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within the same
period.
…
Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the
parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the
Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective
memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the
Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the
State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted
for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. –
… No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the
public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the
decision personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in
the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of
fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment
shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new
trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
… marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Sec. 20. Appeal. –
… Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the
Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a
Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial
of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on
the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion
contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates
with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
one of those situations where neither law nor society can governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
provide the specific answer to every individual Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
problem.39 was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV predeceased Felicisimo.
of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married
CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
SET ASIDE. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States
Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting. of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6
SO ORDERED.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
vs. California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional
vs. Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
LUIS, Respondent.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
DECISION that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing
at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by
his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that
in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets
3
1996 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued
City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May to her.
15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of
the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds
and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the
trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to
dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,
respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry
Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar
San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration
from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo
because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo
from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the
case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled
that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed
the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was
properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification
was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge
Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge
Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar
also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order
denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it
does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an
Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was
re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to
submit their respective position papers on the twin
issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file
the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that
he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in
his previous motion for reconsideration as his position
paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position
papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995,
respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the
petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found
that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a
Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s
legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions
were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995
and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24,
1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73
of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode
of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in
Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article
26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of
paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the
reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No.
227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the
individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce
in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny
what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to
give force and effect to the express mandate of the law.
The foreign divorce having been obtained by the
Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between
the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated
as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the
instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later
filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo
insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.
Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage
to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As
such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving
wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to
file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for
properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The
administration. rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
instant case because they involve election cases.
The petition lacks merit. Needless to say, there is a distinction between
"residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
petition for letters of administration of the estate of
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
the province "in which he resides at the time of his
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under
death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
determining the residence – as contradistinguished from
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
venue of the settlement of his estate:
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual place and domicile in another.
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his
and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the
is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
August to December 1992 indicating the address of
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club,
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing
length of time of residence is required though; however,
the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently,
the residence must be more than
the subject petition for letters of administration was
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The
subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that
time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction
over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal
personality to file the petition for letters of administration,
we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who
is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on
June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is
sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which
marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce
obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce
was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their
conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held
that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the
Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a
wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity
of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was
held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing
the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court
stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court
stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954
when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the
development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been
interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a
mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse.
In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned
case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the
historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article
26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the
alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in
resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage,
being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is
the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid
divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this
case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code
in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law
insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of
this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court
stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably,
the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative
intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently
of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation,
we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find
a balance between the word and the will, that justice may
be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must
not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by
Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice
"as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one
his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court
when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California
which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial
court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that
were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that
letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part:
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of
both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which
has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by
expressly regulating the property relations of couples
living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated
to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs. 80 The Court described the property regime
under this provision as follows:
administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the
February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’
motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case
be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.
– A petition for letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence
of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of
the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a
co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
The regime of limited co-ownership of property
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
governing the union of parties who are not legally
vs.
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to
x-------------------------------------------x
the extent of the proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
presumed to be equal.
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
xxxx vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of DECISION
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, VELASCO, JR., J.:
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
The Case
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain
of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance
CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x
x x 81 In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and
docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and
seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution 2 of the CA,
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal
as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2,
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of
private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off
the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to
Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule
45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25,
2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No.
01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage with application for support commenced by
Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain
orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said
case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered
the consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in
Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.
On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca,
then 26 years old, to be an American citizen 7 born in
Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California,
Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix.
From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the latter,
sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the
Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First
Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly
represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the
Dominican court issued Civil Decree No.
362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's
marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing
the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody
and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same
court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the
couple's property relations pursuant to an
Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said
agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only
of the real property and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia
Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month
from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca
filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January
26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the
motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have
been living separately; and that she is carrying a child
not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this
time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's
alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay
Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was
eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it,
Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also
prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent
monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of
PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to
Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of
action and that the petition is barred by the prior
judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca
filed and moved for the allowance of her application for
support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an
opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that,
therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted
another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several
criminal complaints against each other. Specifically,
Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against
Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente
with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying
Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and
granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite,
disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss
filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's
Application in Support of the Motion for Support
Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is
hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED
AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a
month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the
proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce
judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of
defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant
of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate
to preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of
the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to
the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired
TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted,
via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final
resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the
respondent court from implementing the assailed
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order
dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further
proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting
of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the
aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the
meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive
writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for
reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by
Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and
September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in
Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No.
155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a
Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed
Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders
the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the
presently assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001
and the Order dated November 20, 2001
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure
to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's
motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule
applies in determining whether a complaint or petition
states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the light
of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca
had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction
to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the
union having previously been dissolved on February 22,
1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally
secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce
restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce,
she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce
decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to
her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it
was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth,
was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of
Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did
not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American
citizenship, having professed to have that nationality
status and having made representations to that effect
during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during
her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c)
when she applied for and eventually secured an
American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a
year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn
petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378)
on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of
a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows
the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and
assertion about being an American citizen when she
secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying
her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of
the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the
equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence,
Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4)
assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of
her petition, all of which converged on the proposition
that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the
RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support
pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the
assailed CA decision submitting as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE
FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A
QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN
RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS
ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE
TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED
BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND
CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION
ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A
GRAVE ABUSE.30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its
outcome being determinative of the success or failure of
the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the
outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. 31 Second,
the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing
parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.
And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino
married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in
this jurisdiction.32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue
tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the
granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court,
resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether
petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the
divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the
judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its
consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This
Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the
time she applied for and obtained her divorce from
Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one,
absent proof of an effective repudiation of such
citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances
indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born
in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is
followed in this American territory granting American
citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently
professed, asserted, and represented herself as an
American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as
shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth
certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce
from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of
the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated
being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of
Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No.
RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has
indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be
over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was
given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the
Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant
to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate
Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID
Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed
hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office,
and whose other particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of
Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil
Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing
marks on face: none
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as
per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the
1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213
signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated
October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated
June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for
travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October,
1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following
material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the
Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the
1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G.
Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino
citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years
from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued
on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000
fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above
certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on
October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued
the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No
explanation was given for this patent aberration. There
seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the
1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this
Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of
Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001.
There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the
certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for
recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation
by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the
Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as
the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III,
Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to
"provide immigration and naturalization regulatory
services and implement the laws governing
citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus,
the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition
for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No.
RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen
clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section
shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an
official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days
from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any
Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant
to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate
thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her
Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days
after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the
1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It
may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual
sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests
that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca
was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same
sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC
9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau
Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no
identification certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically,
therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's
recognition as a Filipino citizen through the
1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the
eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days
later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is
now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition,
it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of,
or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen
when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out
that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati
City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof
of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal
of that petition shows that, while bearing the date
January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on
March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca
secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce
decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention
about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only
documents appended as annexes to said original petition
were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex
"A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly
issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect
that this piece of document be appended to form part of
the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial
to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID
Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were
attached consisted of the following material documents:
Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It
was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca
attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC
had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken
together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's
opposition to motion, with their respective attachments,
clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which
we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos.
362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated,
Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for
argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a
Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public
documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she
chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her
American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said
divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text
of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties
expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by
reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x
x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of
United States nationality, 42 years of age, married,
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x,
who personally appeared before this court,
accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO,
attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of
Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this
court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS,
attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney
given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the
Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila,
duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the
acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by
the national laws of the United States of America, a
country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly
adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on
December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was
rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by
Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997.
Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding
in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven
as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien
spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was
clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a
copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree
has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties.
And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the
divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings
on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact
or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do
so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of
partition of their conjugal property. As this Court
explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under
Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but
the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in
this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the
claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel,
personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was
duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro
Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the
foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the
Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly
recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8,
2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the
October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not,
standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad
would come within the pale of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by
Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in
this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce
decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca
and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed
from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente
and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each
other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat
the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x
x leaving them free to remarry after completing the
legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente
could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation
under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged
to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code,
providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin
elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of
Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not
belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and
Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their
professed citizenship during the valid divorce
proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil
Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on
December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as
regards their property relations. The Agreement provided
that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only
their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage
consists only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained
at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued
by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila
registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to
Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement
was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second
divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4,
1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered
into between the parties dated 14th day of December
1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this
Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and
that the parties are hereby ordered and directed
to comply with each and every provision of said
agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement
contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting
that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited
to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of
Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to
the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause
of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v.
Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of
action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to
dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically
admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The
allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on
the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's
underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to
dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the
documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner
lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a
marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action,
the movant must show that the claim for relief does not
exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated
or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more
marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal
obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs
of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show
how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged
that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate,
we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27,
1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000,
or four months before her mother initiated her petition for
declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old.
Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had
been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a
separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the
actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well
as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca.
The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if
any, considering that support includes provisions until
the child concerned shall have finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer
need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635,
that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it
were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on
the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of
Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any
legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for
support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No.
163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004
Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino
citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18,
2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon
after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and
has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying
his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went
to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree,
an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading
but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to
the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied
Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was
not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in
order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the
provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present
petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is
essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of
his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling
unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the
standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse –
an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two
marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with
the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of
the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital
rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the
alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that
the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included
in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a
mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated
in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse
is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition
for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific
thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person,
the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of
the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
the requisite interest to institute an action before our
courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according
to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.
Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The
recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of
his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of
a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof,
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by
the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include
a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition
for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem
it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served
and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity
with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment
and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a
right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall
have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by
the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the
foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis
for extending judicial recognition and for considering the
alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as
discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events
and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees
that produce legal consequences touching upon a
person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting
"all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own
will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his
being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a
foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and
status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the
Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall
keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in
which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only
the marriages solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of
name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree
in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the
foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata
effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted
totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of
the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware
of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which
required a final order from a competent Philippine court
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary
to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void
and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for
the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article
412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional
and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the
time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should
not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings
for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by
which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on
certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as
well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a
copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside
the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal
is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15
October 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial
Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC.
NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served
on the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo
Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry
of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a
Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in
substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April
25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing
were published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During the
initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
documentary evidence (consisting of the trial court's
Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication,
and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27,
2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines
authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan
to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and
Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of
the petition considering that, based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition,
which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which
captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married
in the Philippines to a Japanese
national named YOSHINO MINORO
as shown by their Marriage Contract x
x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce
was filed by herein [petitioner] in
Japan and after due proceedings, a
divorce decree dated December 6,
2011 was rendered by the Japanese
Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said
divorce decree, petitioner and her
divorced Japanese husband are no
longer living together and in fact,
petitioner and her daughter are living
 separately from said Japanese former
husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to
have the entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the
former Japanese husband's marriage
was previously registered, in order that
it would not appear anymore that
petitioner is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer
her husband or is no longer married to
her; furthermore, in the event that
petitioner decides to be remarried, she
shall not be bothered and disturbed by
said entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally
for the purpose of causing the
cancellation of entry of the marriage
between the petitioner and the said
Japanese national, pursuant to Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which marriage was already dissolved
by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others,
that together with the cancellation of
the said entry of her marriage, that she
be allowed to return and use. her
maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was
scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment.
Among the documents that were offered and admitted
were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012,
finding the petition and its attachments
to be sufficient in form and in
substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal
dated February 21-27, 2012, February
28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between
Manalo and her former Japanese
husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese
court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by
the Philippine Consulate General in
Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of
Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to
rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition
for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that,
based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine
law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they
are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as
citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have
control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and
duties, together with the determination of their condition
and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil
relations, including marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held
that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who
filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because
the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer
married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary
Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should
be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of
the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to
the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married
to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo
who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as
similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo,
Jr.8 where the marriage between a foreigner and a
Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by
the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage, are of two types: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and
1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital
bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, the former is
allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce
is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino
signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines,
which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter,
E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from
amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a
second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This
provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code
Revision Committee (Committee), but it was presented
and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino
signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now
states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects
of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but
the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and
support of the children or property relations of the
spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid
the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to
his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the former because he or she had obtained a
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.24 The aim was that it would solve the problem of
many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code,
are still considered married to their alien husbands even
after the latter have already validly divorced them under
their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have
already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by
naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and
obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the
Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent
in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as
in this case, Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954
and obtained a divorce in the same
year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the
legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the
legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed
as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the
twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the
same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition
and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the
Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of
marriage in the local civil registry "in order that it would
not appear anymore that [she] is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she]
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to return and to
use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its
legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed
an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor
daughter. Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen,
sued his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement, alleging
that it was only, the latter who exercised sole custody of
their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the
divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule"
prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to
reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by
his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that
the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not
to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce
decree's alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorce decree
violated Illinois law, but because the
divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse - to support the Agreement's
enforceability. The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dorn v.
Romillo settled the matter by holding
that an alien spouse of a Filipino is
bound by a divorce decree obtained
abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not according to their national law. In this
valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30 case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into from the standards of American law,
effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband, under which divorce dissolves the
who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an marriage. As stated by the Federal
accounting of a business that was alleged to be a Supreme Court of the United States
conjugal property and to be declared with right to in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case 799:
on the ground that the cause of action was barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she "The purpose and
initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, effect of a decree of
her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued divorce from the
by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive bond of matrimony
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; by a court of
that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, competent
especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest jurisdiction are to
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within change the existing
its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case filed by the alien status or domestic
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign relation of husband
divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the and wife, and to free
Philippines. Thus: them both from the
bond. The marriage
There can be no question as to the tie, when thus
validity of that Nevada divorce in any severed as to one
of the States of the United States. The party, ceases to
decree is binding on private bind either. A
respondent as an American citizen. husband without a
For instance, private respondent wife, or a wife
without a husband,
cannot sue petitioner, as her
is unknown to the
husband, in any State of the Union.
law. When the law
What he is contending in this case is
provides, in the
that the divorce is not valid and
nature of a penalty,
binding in this jurisdiction, the same
that the guilty party
being contrary to local law and public
shall not marry
policy.
again, that party, as
well as the other, is
It is true that owing to the nationality
still absolutely freed
principle embodied in Article 15 of the
from the bond of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
former marriage."
are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of Thus, pursuant to his national law,
public policy and morality. However, private respondent is no longer the
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, husband of petitioner. He would have
which may be recognized in the no standing to sue in the case below
Philippines, provided they are valid as petitioner's husband entitled to
 exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent
does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to
a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be
served.31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce
initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and
given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our
rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v.
Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first
husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain
a judgment from Japan's family court, which declared the
marriage between her and her second husband, who is a
Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In
resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a
prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a
petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule
108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the
civil registry on the basis of the decree
of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse
has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There
is also no doubt that he is interested in
the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives
from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or
dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise
by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. These property
interests in marriage include the right
to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family" and
preserving the property regime of the
marriage.
Property rights are already substantive
rights protected by the Constitution,
but a spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights
recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and
Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her
Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the
RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph
2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the
ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain
a divorce decree must be proven in accordance with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent
with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v.
Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the
case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action
including the reception of evidence to determine and
resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the
above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the
issues of child custody and property relation, it should
not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the
usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce
is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a
mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity.
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality
principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to
Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence,
the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese
law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a
national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that
a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the
framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino people, as
expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore,
bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature
deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
does not demand that the alien spouse should be the
one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the
words of the statute; neither can We put words in the
mouths of the lawmakers.37 "The legislature is presumed
to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word
"obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when
to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Laws
have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al.
v. COMELEC, et al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times
accurately reflected in the manner in
which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly
literal interpretation of a statute may
render it meaningless and lead to
inconvenience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration,
and bearing in mind the principle that
the intent or the spirit of the law is the
law itself, resort should be to the rule
that the spirit of the law controls its
letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The provision is a corrective measure to address an
anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws
of his or her country.42 Whether the Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have
the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in
"like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving
end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is
erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the
Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact,
the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a
testament that the State may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law.
The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce
as written by the Legislature only if they are
constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification and that its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice,
such classification may be subjected to judicial
review.44 The deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When
these violations arise, this Court must discharge its
primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties,
and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is
required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the
burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those
basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right of procreation,
the right to marry, the right to exercise free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the
right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand,
what constitutes compelling state interest is measured
by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It
essentially involves a public right or interest that,
because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and
allows the former to take precedence over the latter. 52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the
Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the
acts of the President, which have the force and effect of
law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case,
We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection
54
clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only
to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse
is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not
similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a
foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial
differences between them. Ergo, they should not be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic,
cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying
legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a
Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to
contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is
null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made
in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a
divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws,
both are considered as Filipinos who have the same
rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2
of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence,
to make a distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate
against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is
arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would
not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to
Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing
for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim,
tantamount to insisting that he or she should be
governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The
dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that
all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of
her marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the
mechanisms now existing under the Family Code" is
anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench
and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanisms" are and
how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as
those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage,
the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts
will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to
the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 encourages Filipinos to marry
foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate
practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or
initiating divorce proceedings against their alien
spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no
data whatsoever was shown to support what he intends
to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good
faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is
disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted
and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, 58 that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law and
fact,60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is
whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or
immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he
or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow
Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered
into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial
notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more
forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are
more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed
marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the
motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien
national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage
are varied and complex. The State
does not and cannot dictate on the
kind of life that a couple chooses to
lead. Any attempt to regulate their
lifestyle would go into the realm of
their right to privacy and would raise
serious constitutional questions. The
right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children
or no children, to love one another or
not, and so on. Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited
or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and
title, provided that they comply with all
the legal requisites, are equally valid.
Love, though the ideal consideration in
a marriage contract, is not the only
valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law,
may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it
was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce
because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in
response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas
during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was categorical about this point. 65 Their
exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may
I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is
recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I
am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the
proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is
this to be understood as a prohibition
of a general law on divorce? His
intention is to make this a prohibition
so that the legislature cannot pass a
divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer,
that was not primarily my intention. My
intention was primarily to encourage
the social institution of marriage, but
not necessarily discourage divorce.
But now that he mentioned the issue
of divorce, my personal opinion is to
discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No. my question is
more categorical. Does this carry the
meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
 MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding 1. The grounds for legal separation under Article for an absolute divorce based on said
Officer. 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, judicial decree of legal separation.
as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66 1. Grounds for annulment of marriage
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive under Article 45 of the Family Code,
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our conduct directed against the petitioner, restated as follows:
country. Effective March 11, 1917, Philippine courts a common child, or a child of the
could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of petitioner; 1. The party in whose behalf it
adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the b. Physical violence or moral pressure is sought to have the
part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the to compel the petitioner to change marriage annulled was
Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to religious or political affiliation; eighteen (18) years of age or
the authority conferred upon him by the c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or over but below twenty-one
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in induce the petitioner, a common child, (21), and the marriage was
the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the or a child of the petitioner, to engage solemnized without the
Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission in prostitution, or connivance in such consent of the parents,
promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), corruption or inducement; guardian or person having
which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven d. Final judgment sentencing the substitute parental authority
grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or respondent to imprisonment of more over the party, in that order,
unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year than six (6) years, even if pardoned; unless after attaining the age
prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross e. Drug addiction or habitual of twenty-one (21), such
insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent alcoholism or chronic gambling of the party freely cohabited with
as to make further living together impracticable, and a respondent; the other and both lived
spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was f. Homosexuality of the respondent; together as husband or wife;
liberated and the Commonwealth Government was g. Contracting by the respondent of a
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. subsequent bigamous marriage,
2. either party was of unsound
mind, unless such party after
2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the whether in the Philippines or abroad;
coming to reason, freely
effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, h. Marital infidelity or perversion or
cohabited with the other as
an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, having a child with another person
husband and wife;
whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70 other than one's spouse during the
marriage, except when upon the 3. The consent of either party
mutual agreement of the spouses, a was obtained by fraud,
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from
child is born to them by in vitro or a unless such party afterwards
various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute
similar procedure or when the wife with full knowledge of the
absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current 17th
bears a child after being a victim of facts constituting the fraud,
Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
rape; freely cohabited with the
116,71 1062,72 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House
i. Attempt by the respondent against other as husband and wife;
of Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No.
7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and the life of the petitioner, a common 4. The consent of either party
Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or child or a child of the petitioner; and was obtained by force,
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the j. Abandonment of petitioner by intimidation or undue
House Committee on Population and Family Relations respondent without justifiable cause influence, unless the same
on February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, for more than one (1) year. having disappeared or
2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, ceased, such party thereafter
and 2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for a When the spouses are legally freely cohabited with the
judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows: separated by judicial decree for more other as husband and wife;
than two (2) years, either or both 5. Either party was physically
spouses can petition the proper court incapable of consummating
the marriage with the other
 and such incapacity
continues or appears to be
incurable; and
6. Either party was afflicted with
a sexually transmissible
infection found to be serious
or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned
in b, e and f existed either at the time
of the marriage or supervening after
the marriage.
1. When the spouses have
been separated in fact for at
least five (5) years at the time
the petition for absolute
divorce is filed, and
reconciliation is highly
improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of
either spouse as provided for
in Article 36 of the Family
Code, whether or not the
incapacity was present at the
time of the celebration of the
marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses
undergoes a gender
reassignment surgery or
transitions from one sex to
another, the other spouse is
entitled to petition for
absolute divorce with the
transgender or transsexual
as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital
differences and conflicts
which have resulted in the
total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair,
despite earnest and repeated
efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the
Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt
to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary
to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked
upon marriage and family as an institution and their
nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity.
However, none of our laws should be based on any
religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the
separation of Church and State will be violated.75
In the same breath that the
establishment clause restricts what
the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor
can they cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and,
thus, establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its
beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the
citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for
the country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament,
it has civil and legal consequences which are governed
by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any
ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate
right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State, should not be read in total
isolation but must be harmonized with other
constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development. 79 It
is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the
State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We
limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to
those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is
not amiss to point that the women and children are
almost always the helpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable
legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate,
the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order
bride and similar practices), R.A. No. 9262
("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004"), R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"),
R.A. No. 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and R.A. No. 9208
("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"), as amended
by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and
strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous
social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the
constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every
human person, guarantee full respect for human rights,
and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do
more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen
who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require
him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms"
under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that
he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.
Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair
has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate.
Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child,
if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution
is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against
unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying
State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements
or to families formed according to indigenous customs. 82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of
the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as
the improvement of the transportation system that almost
instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it
is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the
unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not
found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it
is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing
marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth
that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and
shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where
one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his
or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served,
San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed,
we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes.
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the
meaning of the law, the first concern of
the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within
the legislative intent. An indispensable
part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law
not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are
some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them
just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is
find a balance between the word and
the will, that justice may be done even
as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We
do not and must not unfeelingly apply
the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we
are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago,
Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when
it assesses the facts and the law in
every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when
the facts warrant, we interpret the law
in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of
the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to
its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature,
it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A
statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet
write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree
rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry
of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine
courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree
will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be
proven.90 Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to
be a written act or record of an act of
an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132,
on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his
office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to
submit before the court a quo the
 1) Decision of the Japanese Court
allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued
by the Philippine Consulate General in
Osaka, Japan of the Decree of
Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of
Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and
the Japanese national. Under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of
Court, these documents sufficiently
prove the subject Divorce Decree as a
fact. Thus, We are constrained to
recognize the Japanese Court's
judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this
case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible as a
written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the
OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged
on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact
or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be
proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the
"party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action."
In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters. x x
x articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that
our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. x x x
The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of
proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well
as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED
IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin
for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to
the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
Chapter 2. Marriages Exempted from License
Requirement
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties
are at the point of death, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and
shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently
survives. (72a)
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that
there is no means of transportation to enable such party
to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the
marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a
marriage license. (72a)
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding
executed before the local civil registrar or any other
person legally authorized to administer oaths that the
marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the
residence of either party, specifying the barrio or
barangay, is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally
before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the
necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of
the contracting parties and the absence of legal
impediment to the marriage. (72a)
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last
preceding article, together with the legible copy of the
marriage contract, shall be sent by the person
solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the
municipality where it was performed within the period of
thirty days after the performance of the marriage. (75a)
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between
passengers or crew members may also be solemnized
by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the
ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during
stopovers at ports of call. (74a)
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a
commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons
within the zone of military operation, whether members
of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members
of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed
validly without the necessity of marriage license,
provided they are solemnized in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices. (78a)
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of
a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any
legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties are found no legal impediment to the
marriage. (76a)
G.R. No. L-9005 June 20, 1958
ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE
LORIA, petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.
Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving
the central issue of the validity of the marriage in articulo
mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan
Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the War of the
Pacific, these two persons lived together as wife and
husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired
properties but had no children. In the early part of the
liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be
came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two
young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God,
named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra1 visited and
persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father
Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The
latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living
with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage,
asked both parties to ratify their union according to the
rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest
heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave
her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of
Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with
Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales
and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It
was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness;
but death was not to be denied, and in January 1946,
she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista
performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria
filed this complaint to compel defendant to an accounting
and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They
are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea,
and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the
latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up
his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment
in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of
Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course
principally to consider the legal question-which they
amply discussed in their petition and printed brief —
whether the events which took place in January 1945
constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding
marriage.
According to the Court of Appeals:
There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr.
Gerardo Bautista, solemnized the marriage in articulo
mortis of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz,
on January 29 and 30, 1945, under the circumstances
set forth in the reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista,
a respectable old priest of Pasay City then, had no
reason to side one or the other. . . . Notwithstanding this
positive evidence on the celebration or performance of
the marriage in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend
that the same was not in articulo mortis, because Matea
de la Cruz was not then on the point of death. Fr.
Bautista clearly testified, however, that her condition at
the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and according to
his observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1),
so apprehensive was he about her condition that he
decided in administering to her the sacrament of extreme
unction, after hearing her confession. . . . .The greatest
objection of the Appellees and the trial court against the
validity of the marriage under consideration, is the
admitted fact that it was not registered.
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the
Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially
sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's
authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no
question that the parties had legal capacity to contract
marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and
Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took
each other as husband and wife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these
propositions:
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the
wedded couple the witnesses and the priest, as required
by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage
with the local civil registry.
The factual basis of the first proposition — no signing —
may seriously be doubted. The Court of Appeals made
no finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision
impliedly held such marriage contract to have been
executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis
was a fact", and the only question at issue was whether
"the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of the
certificate of marriage in question to the Local Civil
Registrar and to register the said marriage in the Record
of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders
the said marriage invalid." And such was the only issue
tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34,
Record on Appeal.)
However, we may as well face this second issue: Does
the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract"
constitute a cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate"
mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law which provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the
ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with
legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of
two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as
husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in
an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark
by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and
attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. . . .
(Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28,
29 and 30 enumerates the causes for annulment of
marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one
of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential
requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the
latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties"
"in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage
and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife" — which in this case actually
occurred.3 We think the signing of the marriage contract
or certificate was required by the statute simply for the
purpose of evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or
court ruling has been cited making it
an essential requisite — not the formal requirement of
evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The fact of
marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be
established is quite another.
Certificate and Record. — Statutes relating to the
solemnization of marriage usually provide for the
issuance of a certificate of marriage and for the
registration or recording of marriage . . . Generally
speaking, the registration or recording of a marriage is
not essential to its validity, the statute being addressed
to the officials issuing the license, certifying the marriage,
and making the proper return and registration or
recording. (Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage"
p. 197-198.)
Formal Requisites. — . . . The general rule, however, is
that statutes which direct that a license must be issued
and procured, that only certain persons shall perform the
ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses shall be
present, that a certificate of the marriage shall be signed,
returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the
conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are
addressed to persons in authority to secure publicity and
to require a record to be made of the marriage
contract. Such statutes do not void common-law
marriages unless they do so expressly, even where such
marriage are entered into without obtaining a license and
are not recorded. It is the purpose of these statutes to
discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit
intercourse under the guise of matrimony, and relieve
from doubt the status of parties who live together as man
and wife, by providing competent evidence of the
marriage. . . . (Section 15 American Jurisprudence
"Marriage" pp. 188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See also
Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several formal
requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty
to furnish to the parties copies of such marriage
certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission
(section 41) implies his obligation to see that such
"certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not
be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of
annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which
apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder
during the liberation of Manila and its environs.
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and
file the affidavit required by sections 20 and 21. It was
the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should
bring no serious consequences to the married pair,
specially where as in this case, it was caused by the
emergency.
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the
plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter was
in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate
said marriage, since it does not appear that in the
celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not
present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate not being one of the requisites. (Jones vs.
Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De
Leon, 55 Phil. 1.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without
marriage license; but it requires the priest to make the
affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data
usually required for the issuance of a marriage license.
The first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a
marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable
(under Act 3613),5 this marriage should not also be
voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the
union of men and women who have lived publicly in a
state of concubinage6, (section 22), we must hold this
marriage to be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the
estate of the deceased than the plaintiffs who are the
grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of
brothers or sisters and of nephews, children of the
former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed,
with costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad
Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition
after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent,
obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing
of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already
dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs'
deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing
the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have
filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review
with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance
with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state
the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in
the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as
an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect
under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However,
upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8
The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. 9 This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the
State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the
Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,
one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no license
is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties
to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's
name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners'
father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of
majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs
to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there
is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or
intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband
and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized
by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two
shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil
Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment
to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under
oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment
known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and
his findings thereon in the application for a marriage
license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or
present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same
period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence
or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in
that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law
sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in
this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their father's
marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the
Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by
the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an
annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either
party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not
a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is
silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that
is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The
first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children
born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and
54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before
its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of
petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond
between him and respondent. The conclusion is
erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that
there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between
the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of
all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so
far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place.
And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both
the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded
or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime
of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can
be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For
the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but
not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE
ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two
contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant
complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act,
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a
sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the
late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21
May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta
Avenue, Caloocan City. 1 Four children were born out of
that marriage. 2 On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. 3 When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or
ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his
Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was
legally married. What he knew was that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in
their joint affidavit. 4 According to him, had he known that
the late Manzano was married, he would have advised
the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano)
could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment,
the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.
Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation
reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and
setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the
attention of the Court to two separate affidavits 5 of the
late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly
unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction.
In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and
that since their respective marriages had been marked
by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and
had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on
the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital
cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they
have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to
their marriage.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at
bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior
existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a
subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and
void. 7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he
known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And
respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos
and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same
was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart
from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows
spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation
to live separately from each other, but in such a case the
marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated,legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the
more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the
case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint
Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and
wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least
five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period
of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a
prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law
excuses no one has special application to judges, 8 who,
under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should
be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. 9 And
when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the
failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. 10cräläwvirtualibräry
ACCORDINGLY , the recommendation of the Court
Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with
theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed
upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Chapter 3. Void and Voidable Marriages
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years
of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages
were contracted with either or both parties believing in
good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those
covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing
under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting
party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under
Article 53.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad
Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition
after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent,
obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing
of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already
dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs'
deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing
the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have
filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review
with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance
with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state
the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in
the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as
an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect
under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However,
upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8
The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. 9 This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the
State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the
Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,
one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no license
is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties
to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's
name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners'
father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of
majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs
to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there
is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or
intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband
and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized
by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two
shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil
Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment
to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under
oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment
known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and
his findings thereon in the application for a marriage
license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or
present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same
period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence
or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in
that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law
sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in
this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their father's
marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the
Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by
the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an
annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either
party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not
a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is
silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that
is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The
first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children
born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and
54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before
its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of
petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond
between him and respondent. The conclusion is
erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that
there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between
the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of
all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so
far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place.
And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both
the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded
or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime
of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can
be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For
the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but
not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private
respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent
court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A.
Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No.
4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he
had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on
April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;
she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been
working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month
annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer
since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed
and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under
the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime
in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman;
she further discovered that he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent;
she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed
her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to
take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn
over the possession and administration of said
properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not
authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition
prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over
said properties; their marriage be declared null and void
and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties
acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and
administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its
nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is
in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria
issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a
first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and
void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the
cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case
there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted
by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage
with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to
whether or not the second marriage should first be
judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In
the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme
Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316,
326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from
the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that
petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue
that may be determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the
erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to
the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991,
Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and
gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which
to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a
special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the
ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed
the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited
by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon
by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at
bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases
dealt with the successional rights of the second wife
while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It
observed that the separation and subsequent distribution
of the properties acquired during the union can be had
only upon proper determination of the status of the
marital relationship between said parties, whether or not
the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner.
Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity
of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48,
50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private
respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage may be raised together with other
incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has
jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the
motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the
remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer,
proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision,
reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of
merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant
case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a
void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether
the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper
remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
personal properties allegedly belonging to her
exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People
v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP.
No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property filed by private respondent must
be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous.
Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of
the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required
only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP
No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's
intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the
necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to
provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent celebrated while the former's
previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still
subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People
v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where
the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous
marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating
that:
Though the logician may say that where the former
marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve,
still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that
marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to
the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority
position in subsequent cases involving the same issue.
Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its
earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In
reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's
share of the disputed property acquired during the
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application
of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration
thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that
purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held
in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, that "although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need
for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned
around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling
once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking
for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased
husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of
his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of
no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel
v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for
then such a marriage though void still needs according to
this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as
a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code
Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd
Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39,
was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision
should include not only void but also voidable marriages.
He then suggested that the above provision be modified
as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that
they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they
say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one
cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage
is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno
accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to
read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no
question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even
if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce
the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is
declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is
annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that
this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the
provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct
action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then
the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to
"invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is
the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away
with collateral defense as well as collateral attack.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision
is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself
whether or not the marriage is void, while the other
members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are,
therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point.
Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are
brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He
then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise
the defense that he has no liability because the basis of
the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot
say that there will be no judgment on the validity or
invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in
the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral
declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa
saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they
limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that
Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of
remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except
as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is
too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof.
Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above
provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of
a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that
they go back to the original wording of the provision as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the
pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration
of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before
contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral
conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and
living with another woman other than complainant while
his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting,
said that "for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the
same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of
remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the
position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is
placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members,
the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not
state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which
case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been
such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly,
one can conceive of other instances where a party might
well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses,
as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage
which remains subsisting desires to enter into another
marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by
law to prove that the previous one was an absolute
nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In
other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected
by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal,
and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family
to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose
of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely
on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is so defective with respect to the
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render
it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing
more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social
significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open
and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm
the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to
everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no
impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one
of the parties may be gleaned from new information
required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously
married, how, when and where the previous marriage
was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's
interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that
private respondent's failure to state in the petition that
the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by
the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be
misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage."
Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the
basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only,"
which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for
absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner
suggests that private respondent should have filed an
ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such
an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a
mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction
to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In
addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the
properties were acquired with private respondent's
money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and
concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other
incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states
that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage
in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid,
except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad
faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary
in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage
in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage
acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's
ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be
one of the necessary consequences of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to
be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted
for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations governing
them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly,
the respondent court committed no reversible error in
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP
No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
The decision of respondent Court dated February 7,
1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the
validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now
the subject of the controversy between the two Susans
whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in
toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño,
he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20,
1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter
referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the
second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent
Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee),
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and
bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992,
under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical
and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able
to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00
from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the
instant case for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she
(petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of
summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting
the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to
the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of,
the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only
at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner
who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To
bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which
bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage
license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and
SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on
June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a
true copy or transcription of Marriage License number
from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs.
Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may
serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount
which was paid to her in the form of death benefits
arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of
suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS.
GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE
INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED,
AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after
the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two
marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject
“death benefits” of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when
the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the
marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the
validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held
that such a certification is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of
a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that
they secured the required marriage license. Although
she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court.
But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose
to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition,
however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits”
under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent
Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would
also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity
of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of
the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence,
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage
is the separation of the property of the spouses
according to the applicable property
regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void
ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property,
but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147
and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall
belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned
by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too,
contributions in the form of care of the home, children
and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee
and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner
and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual
Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it
could not be said that she contributed money, property or
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.
Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same.
By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent,
not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of
them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs.
This article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry,
and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article,
wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal
shares and will be divided equally between them, even if
only one party earned the wages and the other did not
contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed
“death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a
co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to
share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad
faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage
are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the
subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the
petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the
other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the
Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the
deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the
second wife, holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has
the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative
heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive
him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an
interest in the husband’s share in the property here in
dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second
wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of
the second wife to her share of one-half in the property
acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other
half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited
decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior
and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage.
This is the reason why in the said case, the Court
determined the rights of the parties in accordance with
their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court,
construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a
prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is
an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage
void, before he or she could contract said second
marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void.
The same rule applies even if the first marriage is
patently void because the parties are not free to
determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry,
like for filing a case for collection of sum of money
anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All
that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial
or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon,
the court, if material to the determination of the issues
before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved
and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in
accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in
Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay
respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees
in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No.
175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic
of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose
and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The
marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In
lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a
sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting
that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25.
He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham,
as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating
that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events
which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he
was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter,
he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter
being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by
her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing
three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused
to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that
his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother
who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man
who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa.
He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of
the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused
the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his
marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted
Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s
allegations and defended the validity of their marriage.
She declared that they had maintained their relationship
as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the
early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting
marriage with him on account of their age difference.5 In
her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31
August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for
bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of
the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively
liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted
out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one
year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a
Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of
the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds
and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a
favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against
[Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence
presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and
Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed
Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and
rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily
suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank
sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that
something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay
City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who
was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of
the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could
have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill
them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him,
more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces
of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that
ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a
ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage
was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa
Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the
duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled
up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and
false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name
of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of
emergency. This Court does not believe that the only
reason why her name was written in his company I.D.
was because he was residing there then. This is just but
a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the
name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand,
under oath, she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage
certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and
she further testified that the signature appearing over the
name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother
that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page
26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when
she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she
believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her
brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all
the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that
Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the
New Civil Code which requires that the action for
annulment of marriage must be commenced by the
injured party within four years after the discovery of the
fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his
consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery
and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged
sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take
any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x
x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11
August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to
be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate
court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the
marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate
court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud
as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article
8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage
between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed
beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The
Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the
following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or
intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent
to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had
already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil
Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage
on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained
by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by
said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was
allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he
had only until February, 1991 within which to file an
action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only
on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for
annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s
assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of
exceptional character, with the parties executing an
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the
affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife for the period required by
Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage,
seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court
of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of
the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit.
The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side
of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument
that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the
Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not
require that either one of the contracting parties to the
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church
or religious sect. The prescription was established only
in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern
the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose
filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His
central opposition was that the requisites for the proper
application of the exemption from a marriage license
under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant
in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and
Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November
2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is
RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and
Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on
the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and
reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the
basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of
majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together
for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry
each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date
of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years
and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of the
law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to
not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two
shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and
Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio
because of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision,
but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s
motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for
Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying
that the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of
merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be
declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474,
similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to
consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity
of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE
PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH
CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF
MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of
Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case
at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties
therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance
which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the
annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for
bigamy and an administrative case had been filed
against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that
the declaration of nullity of their marriage would
exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between
Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the
issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments
vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part,
Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing
this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To
buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that they have lived together as husband and
marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the
falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect
the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal
requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the
said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by
the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must
a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that
they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’
marriage contract states that their marriage was
solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses,
and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage.
To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he
wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated
25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192,
Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose
and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in
said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2
May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule
on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article
76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in
order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa
was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil
Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code
spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a
contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of
an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code,
but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the
Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the
old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage
license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for
the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character
are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72
to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in
articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or
war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan
or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a
man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code
Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage
license may discourage such persons who have lived in
a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and
Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu
thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they
have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried,
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years; and that because of this union, they desire to
marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the
Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of
marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement,
effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general
rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court
will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is
a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves
us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is
plainly written. The exception of a marriage license
under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and
desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement
of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law
can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.
The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in
the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that
partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to
mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts 42 in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister
who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not
lived together for five years at the time they executed
their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The
Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before
the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals
also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced
to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in
February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own
testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to
whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is
factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is
a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not
subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled
that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court
of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized
exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and
the trial court, or in this case the administrative body,
make contradictory findings. However, the exception
does not apply in every instance that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals
remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial
evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November
1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from
the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond
question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the
falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not
affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and
formal requisites were complied with. The argument
deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that
the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so
as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of
marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we
speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference
to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more
explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve
an apparent marriage to which the presumption still
needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and
Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24
November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that
every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity
of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and
extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law.
The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with
the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a
marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a
valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of
the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of
the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a
fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for
at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of
the marriage license, and not to the absence of one.
Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore,
the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the
law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by
the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there
was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth
the argument that based on equity, Jose should be
denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and
cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds
no room for application where there is a law.54 There is a
law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set
in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without
prejudice to their criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error
that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality
of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is
claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent
marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that
it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion
can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case,
the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe,
and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down
the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation
period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage,
and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage
of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if
any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
TITLE III
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. (109a)
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the
other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is
not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the
support of the family. The expenses for such support and
other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the
community property and, in the absence thereof, from
the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case
of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such
obligations shall be satisfied from the separate
properties. (111a)
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the
right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for
such management shall be paid in accordance with the
provisions of Article 70. (115a)
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her
duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend
to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the
family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for
relief. (116a)
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity without the
consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid,
serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether
or not:
(1) The objection is proper; and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the
objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced
against the separate property of the spouse who has not
obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of
creditors who acted in good faith.
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority
Upon the Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental
authority shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children on wards the following rights
and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate
and instruct them by right precept and good example,
and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their
means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance,
inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline,
self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the
duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from
bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits
detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their
interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required
under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law
upon parents and guardians. (316a)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's
property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of
the child so requires. (317)
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity,
the individual, entity or institution exercising parental
authority, may petition the proper court of the place
where the child resides, for an order providing for
disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be
entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice
or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall
be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall
be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the
petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition,
or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may
also order the deprivation or suspension of parental
authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem
just and proper. (318a)
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding
article may include the commitment of the child for not
more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in
child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the
proper government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not
interfere with the care of the child whenever committed
but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or
at its own instance, the court may terminate the
commitment of the child whenever just and proper. (391a)
Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon
the Property of the Children
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
legal guardianship over the property of the
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a
court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to
the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual
income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such
amount as the court may determine, but not less than
ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or
annual income, to guarantee the performance of the
obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed
in the proper court of the place where the child resides,
or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper
court of the place where the property or any part thereof
is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special
proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding
the performance of the obligations referred to in the
second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and
resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely
suppletory except when the child is under substitute
parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a
parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on
guardianship shall apply.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC March 4, 2003
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
RESOLUTION
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting
for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the Court
Resolved to APPROVE the same.
The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003
following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than March 7, 2003
March 4, 2003
Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and
Azcuna
Ynares-Santiago, on leave
Corona, on official leave
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY
OF VOID MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code
of te Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. (n)
(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family
Court.
(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage shall not prescribe.
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family
Code shall specially allege te complete facts showing the
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable
marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriage based on any
of the grounds under article 45 of the Family Code and
within the period herein indicated:
(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or
person exercising substitute parental authority did not
give his or her consent, within five years after attaining
the age of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age of
twenty-one, such party freely cohabitated with the other
as husband or wife; or the parent, guardian or person
having legal charge of the contracting party , at any time
before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the
other's insanity; or by any relative, guardian, or person
having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the
death of either party; or by the insane spouse during the
a lucid interval or after regaining sanity, provided that the
petitioner , after coming to reason, has not freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by
fraud, within five years after the discovery of the fraud,
provided that said party, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with the
other as husband or wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by
force, intimidation, or undue influence, within five years
from the time the force intimidation, or undue influence
disappeared or ceased, provided that the force,
intimidation, or undue influence having disappeared or
ceased, said party has not thereafter freely cohabited
with the other as husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is
physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other and such incapability continues and appears to
be incurable, within five years after the celebration of
marriage; and
(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted
with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious
and appears to be incurable, within five years after the
celebration of marriage.
(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family
Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the
Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner
or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing. Or in the case of
non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The
petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the
cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common
children of the parties and specify the regime governing
their property relations, as well as the properties
involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written
agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply
for a provisional order for spousal support, the custody
and support of common children, visitation rights,
administration of community or conjugal property, and
other matters similarly requiringurgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of
marriage. (b) Where to file.-The petition shall be filed in
the Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner
or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a
non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines at the election of the petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The
petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the
cause of action.
(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common
children of the parties and specify the regime governing
their property relations, as well as the properties
involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written
agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply
for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and
support of common children, visitation rights,
administration of community or conjugal property, and
other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification
against forum shopping. The verification and certification
must be signed personally by me petitioner. No petition
may be filed solely by counsel or through an
attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the
verification and certification against forum shopping shall
be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the
Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or
vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve
a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within the same
period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal
of the petition.
Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall
be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and by the
following rules:
(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given
address or his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may,
by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication
once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines and in such
places as the court may order In addition, a copy of the
summons shall be served on the respondent at his last
known address by registered mail or any other means
the court may deem sufficient.
(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in
an order of the court with the following data: (a) title of
the case; (b) docket number; (c) nature of the petition; (d)
principal grounds of the petition and the reliefs prayed for;
and (e) a directive for the respondent to answer within
thirty days from the last issue of publication.
Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the
petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties;
provided, however, that any other ground that might
warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an
affirmative defense in an answer.
Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his
answer within fifteen days from service of summons, or
within thirty days from the last issue of publication in
case of service of summons by publication. The answer
must be verified by the respondent himself and not by
counsel or attorney-in-fact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court
shall not declare him or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not
tender an issue, the court shall order the public
prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists
between the parties.
Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1)
Within one month after receipt of the court order
mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the
public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he
shall state the on the finding of collusion within ten days
from receipt of a copy of a report The court shall set the
report for hearing and If convinced that the parties are in
collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion
exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be
the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State
at the pre-trial.
Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a
social worker to conduct a case study and submit the
corresponding report at least three days before the
pre-trial. The court may also require a case study at any
stage of the case whenever necessary.
Section 11. Pre-trial. -
(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On
motion or motu proprio, the court shall set the pre-trial
after the last pleading has been served and filed, or upon
receipt of the report of the public prosecutor that no
collusion exists between the parties.
(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall
contain:
(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and
(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their
respective pre-trial briefs in such manner as shall ensure
the receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three
days before the date of pre-trial.
(b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties
and their respective counsels as well as on the public
prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear personally at
the pre-trial.
(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent
even if he fails to file an answer. In case of summons by
publication and the respondent failed to file his answer,
notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at his last
known address.
Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial
brief shall contain the following:
(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter
into agreements as may be allowed by law, indicating the
desired terms thereof;
(b) A concise statement of their respective claims
together with the applicable laws and authorities;
(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as
well as the disputed factual and legal issues;
(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert
opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature
and purpose thereof;
(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their
respective affidavits; and
(f) Such other matters as the court may require.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with
its required contents shall have the same effect as failure
to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding
paragraphs.
Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a)
If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the case shall
be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized
representative appears in court and proves a valid
excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to
appear, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial and
require the public prosecutor to investigate the
non-appearance of the respondent and submit within
fifteen days thereafter a report to the court stating
whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion
between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court
shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the
State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence.
Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial
conference, the court:
(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist
the parties in reaching an agreement on matters not
prohibited by law.
The mediator shall render a report within one
month from referral which, for good reasons, the court
may extend for a period not exceeding one month.
(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails,
the court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference, on
which occasion it shall consider the advisability of
receiving expert testimony and such other makers as
may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the
pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination of the
pre-trial, the court shall Issue a pre-trial order which shall
recite in detail the matters taken up In the conference,
the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed on
the pleadings, and except as to the ground of declaration
of nullity or annulment, the agreements or admissions
made by the parties on any of the matters considered,
including any provisional order that may be necessary or
agreed upon by the parties.
(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall
contain a recital of the following;
(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need
not be proved subject to Section 16 of this Rule;
(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;
(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that
have been marked and will be presented;
(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their
testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.
(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the
public prosecutor to appear for the State and take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties at any stage of
the proceedings and fabrication or suppression of
evidence during the trial on the merits.
(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or
present witnesses and evidence other than those stated
in the pre-trial order.
The order shall control the trial of the case, unless
modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the
pre-trial order to propose corrections or modifications.
Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall
not allow compromise on prohibited matters, such as the
following:
(a) The civil status of persons;
(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(c) Any ground for legal separation;
(d) Future support;
(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(f) Future legitime.
Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall
personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of
the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be
allowed except as to matters involving property relations
of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on
the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed.
(3) The court may order the exclusion from the
courtroom of all persons, including members of the press,
who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an
order may be made if the court determines on the record
that requiring a party to testify in open court would not
enhance the ascertainment of truth; would cause to the
party psychological harm or inability to effectively
communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity;
would violate the right of a party to privacy; or would be
offensive to decency or public morals.
(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or
perusal of the records of the case or parts thereof be
made by any person other than a party or counsel of a
party, except by order of the court.
Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the
parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the
Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective
memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the
Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the
State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted
for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance with Article
50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the
public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the
decision personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in
the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of
fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment
shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new
trial, or appeal Is filed by any of the parties the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall
forthwith issue the corresponding decree if the parties
have no properties.
If the parties have properties, the court shall
observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of this
Rule.
The entry of judgment shall be registered in the
Civil Registry where the marriage was recorded and In
the Civil Registry where the Family Court'granting the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage is located.
Section 20. Appeal. -
(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be
allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from
notice of judgment.
(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor
General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice
of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant
shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse
parties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt
of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting
the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party,
shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including
custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of
Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage." (a) The court
shall issue the Decree after;
(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated
and in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family
Court is located;
(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of
Deeds where the real properties are located; and
(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in
cash, property, or sound securities.
(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive
portion of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree
the approved deed of partition.
 Except in the case of children under Articles 36
and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the
Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate
indicating the new civil status of the children affected.
Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree;
decree as best evidence. - (a) The prevailing party shall
cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry
where the marriage was registered, the Civil Registry of
the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the
National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report td
the court compliance with this requirement within thirty
days from receipt of the copy of the Decree.
(b) In case service of summons was made by publication,
the parties shall cause the publication of the Decree
once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to
prove the declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons
concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent
as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes
delivered to their common children.
Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family
Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a party dies at any
stage of the proceedings before the entry of judgment,
the court shall order the case closed and terminated,
without prejudice to the settlement of the estate in proper
proceedings in the regular courts.
(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity
or annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon the
parties and their successors in interest in the settlement
of the estate in the regular courts.
Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on
March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper
of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
(INSERT OCA CIRCULAR NO. 63-2019)
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
vs. resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA own parents.
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of
America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on
VITUG, J.: 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time
by long distance telephone. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989.
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely,
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
United States, where he underwent a training program
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
1987), which declares:
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home,
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage
solemnization.
Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil
Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by him.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer
Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the
(through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner
application in his attempt to have his marriage with
who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a
decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the
of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
court).
The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for
Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court,
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she
with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La would neither appear nor submit evidence.
Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a
baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to the complaint for lack of merit.3
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a affirmed the decision of the trial court.4
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the couple should start living independently from
The petition should be denied not only because of its
non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or
at the very least to communicate with him, for more than
five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In
his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him)
because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed
all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife
who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the
Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of
the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make
the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy
remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would
make the marriage null and void and the former only
voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph
(7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting
in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's
marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only
a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity?
In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there
is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it
is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph
(7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of
marital obligations.
there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that
this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in
marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is
"insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and
there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is
not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the
phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest"
be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of
the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations
of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated"
— in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because
one does not know all the consequences of the
marriages, and if he had known these completely, he
might not have consented to the marriage.

Art. 36. . . . xxx xxx xxx

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon
Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say
"wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use."
On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say
"wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in
judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph
(7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice
Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
retain the word "mentally." psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages
since otherwise it will encourage one who really
understood the consequences of marriage to claim that
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers
he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the
to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno
marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a
impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor
loose way of providing for divorce.
Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
xxx xxx xxx
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in
the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the
Family Code, the Committee used a language which
case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental
describes a ground for voidable marriages under the
faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in
Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law,
consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a
there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law,
ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation
for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are cases when the insanity is curable. He
emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer
to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.)
Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the
very essence of consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected
but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a
vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the
marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to
marriage, which are completely different from each other,
because they require a different capacity, which is
eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it
should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but
there should be no prescription. In other words, as long
as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right
to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment
so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might
have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no
concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno
stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation
should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has
been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still
insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested
that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this
matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in
the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there
is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary
periods when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean
Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at
the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity
to copulate among the grounds for void marriages.
Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the
impotence that in some instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a particular person.
Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has
a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy
stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured.
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that
"psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft
provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply
with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still
void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in
divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the
idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it
is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological
incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the
remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even
if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted
with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista
proposed that the clause "although such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted
since it may encourage one to create the manifestation
of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out
that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the
basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and
physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that
mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent
while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in
the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the
phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it
as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word
"mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent.
He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to
lack of understanding of the essential obligations of
marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last
meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there
was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the
reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there
having been annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile
with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under
Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common
provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going
to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that
marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically
annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37
should be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity
because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the
Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice
Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote,
which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were
for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof.
Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the
prescriptive period of ten years within which the action
for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in
court. The Committee approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision
Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision
with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so
designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr.
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994);
thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of
judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps
all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect,
the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the
time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least,
to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving
an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095
has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave
any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to
broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed
first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of
marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to
contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new
canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted
to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas
naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to
draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity
need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all,
normal and healthy person should be able to assume the
ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on
Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada
and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this
defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to
render what is due by the contract. This could be
compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to
the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act,
the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John
Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if
the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is
afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did
in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the possibility of being
bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception
of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of
that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists,
and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment.
We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now
still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly
the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family,
and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure
at all, can come close to the standards required to
decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA
LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to
steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters.
Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much
reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen
hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife
against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the
annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's
decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly
denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the
trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its
decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were
preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the
defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila,
as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding
reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same
room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with
each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep .
There was no sexual intercourse between them during
the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place
where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did
so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his
nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But,
during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping
on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since
May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see
her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she
is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this
time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which
was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her.
For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return
but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a
closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if
their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his
wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves
her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and
he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is
any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is
any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May
22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for
this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she
always avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was
shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant ,
why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are:
(1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband,
the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain
valid because they are still very young and there is still a
chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical
examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his
Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that
there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to
masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection
and he found out that from the original size of two (2)
inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection
which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse
with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there
is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence
is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with
the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral,
Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another
copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred:
I court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there
was no sexual intercourse between the parties without
making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have
sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner
and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the
parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying
itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of
proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there
was no independent evidence to prove the alleged
non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other
basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to
validate marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in
their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced
since it could have been a product of collusion; and that
in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the
pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form
of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be
came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He
admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason
why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides
that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of
Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule
19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner
does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only
shows that there is no collusion between the parties.
When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each
other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged
resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by
Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this
Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of
whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that
he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost
ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage
is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an
'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in
holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points
out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a
categorical finding about the alleged psychological
incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have
been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as
aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse
from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of
10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual
contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate,
since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed
by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence
on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he
wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the
reason for private respondent's refusal may not be
psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could
have discussed with private respondent or asked her
what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him
everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her.
He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to
show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is
not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the
part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon
him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of
a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under
the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the
husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he
was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to
March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his
wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves
to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599,
cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were
true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the
fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her
marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it
is hard to believe that she would expose her private life
to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order
and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the
evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention
to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the
admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes
to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor
is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is
useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man
is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to
say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing
but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between
petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared
feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by
the other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for
two consenting adults who view the relationship with
love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its
value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations,
can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects
and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an
entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of
a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity."
Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity
in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In
the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration —
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving
the present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet,
which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the
filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O.
Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more
time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered
his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard
to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between
them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had
been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October
1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of
which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went
to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since
then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the
couple's best interest to have their marriage declared
null and void in order to free them from what appeared to
be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo
admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's
refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following
were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April
14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than
three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her
child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody
of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her
own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G.
Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison,
a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked
as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court
of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as
provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case,"
adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in
effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent
Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it
sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to
liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and
family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his
or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as
well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the
very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason
to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed
no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case,
as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these
discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing
and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is
not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote
that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is
an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty,"
if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed
that she and her husband could nor get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the
problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist
based on your findings that it is better for the Court to
annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another
woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties
are psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their
professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
of
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his
alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration. While some effort was made to prove that
there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of
being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part
of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of
antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely
shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and
blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond
merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing
law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of
the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many
trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided
to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend
Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C.
Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these
friends of the Court for their informative and interesting
discussions during the oral argument on December 3,
1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
— not physical. although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source
and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church —
while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have
already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes
even more cogent with the use of the foregoing
guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C.
HERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30,
1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which
dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private
respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the
Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on
January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).2 Three children were born to
them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh.
B),3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C),4 and Marian,
born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).5
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking
the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on
the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She
alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time
of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to
perform his obligation to support the family and
contribute to the management of the household,
devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees
with his friends. She further claimed that private
respondent, after they were married, cohabited with
another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child,
while having affairs with different women, and that,
because of his promiscuity, private respondent
endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually
transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private
respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared
for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for
having abandoned the family, private respondent be
ordered to give support to their three children in the total
amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded
the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged
as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don
Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite,
purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which
private respondent took with him when he left the
conjugal home on June 12, 1992.6
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents
failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order
directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct
an investigation to determine if there was collusion
between the parties.7 Only petitioner appeared at the
investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the
prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and
recommended that the case be set for trial.8
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the
facts are as follows:9
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the
Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite.
Petitioner, who is five years older than private
respondent, was then in her first year of teaching
zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college
freshman, was her student for two consecutive
semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979
when she was no longer private respondents teacher.
On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more
years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while
petitioner provided his allowances and other financial
needs. The family income came from petitioners salary
as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian
University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling
Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the
buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not
find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help
petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to
customers. However, because her husband was a
spendthrift and had other women, petitioners business
suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and
drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting
cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner
discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita
Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a
married student whose husband was working in Saudi
Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent,
he admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena.
Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her
relationship with private respondent. For his part, private
respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not
keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and
abandoned petitioner and their child. When private
respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted
him, despite private respondents infidelity in the hope of
saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private
respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines,
Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However,
private respondent was employed only until March 31,
1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement
plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in
retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for
the needs of the family, private respondent spent the
money on himself and consumed the entire amount
within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds
Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and
womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that
private respondent carried on relationships with different
women. He had relations with a certain Edna who
worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a
billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay, a
secretary at the Road Master Drivers School in Bayan,
Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a
while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter
named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989
(Exh. E).10 When petitioner confronted private
respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her
up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la
Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on
July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh.
F).11
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in
extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of
1986. As a result, private respondent contracted
gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received
treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in
Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until
March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).12
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated
argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who
was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not
close to any of their children as he was never
affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to
sell (Exh. J)13 with F & C Realty Corporation whereby
she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the
Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal,
Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment
of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of
the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from
monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh.
K)14 was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529
(Exh. M)15 was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a
handwritten letter16 to private respondent expressing her
frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their
marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated
that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type
jeepney17 and to divide the proceeds of the sale between
the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of
her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their
marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to
petitioners letter. By this time, he had already
abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992,
petitioner learned that private respondent left for the
Middle East. Since then, private respondents
whereabouts had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher
at the Philippine Christian University, testified during the
hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that
sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private
respondent to her (Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart.
Alfaro said she was not impressed with private
respondent who was her student in accounting. She
observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending
most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980,
when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary
sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to
dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding
because she thought private respondent was not ready
for married life as he was then unemployed. True
enough, although the couple appeared happy during the
early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that
private respondent started drinking with his friends and
going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners
claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard
who carried on relationships with different women and
continued hanging out with his friends. She also
confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because
she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first
year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private
respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with
their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was
not close to his children and that he had abandoned
petitioner.18
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a
decision19 dismissing the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the
decision reads:20
The Court can underscore the fact that the
circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of
her claim that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited
by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal
separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) - not as
grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or
annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code
reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on
any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the
respondent;
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
which mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for
the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended
to include the above-stated circumstances as
constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not
have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant
relief in favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph
(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no
dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted to the petitioner
by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5)
years after petitioners marriage with respondent was
celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46,
paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in
conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same
code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of
the law would require the existence of this ground (fraud)
at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
annulment of petitioners marriage with the respondent
on this ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case,
cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on
January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the
decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v.
Court of Appeals,21 the Court of Appeals held:22
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of
the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual
infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited
drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity
of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that
petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her
respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated
at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly,
petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their
marriage her respondent-husbands character was on the
borderline between a responsible person and the
happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the psychological
incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family
Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said
attitude to her respondent-husbands youth and very
good looks, who was admittedly several years younger
than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be
the college professor of her respondent-husband.
Petitioner-appellant even described her
respondent-husband not as a problem student but a
normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by
petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and
there is no proof that the same have already existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute
the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the
respondent Court of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF
THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS
NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT
CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF
AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE
AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY
ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of
petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on
the ground of private respondents psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that petitioner failed to show that private
respondents psychological incapacity existed at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the
fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent
became manifest only after the celebration of their
marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their
marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.23
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,24 we held:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception
of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of
that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists,
and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving
declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at
the time they were married, private respondent was
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the
Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was
presented to show that private respondent was not
cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of
a psychological nature, and not merely physical.
Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage,
private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his
family. Private respondents parents and petitioner
supported him through college. After his schooling,
although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of
the early retirement plan offered by his employer and
spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a
greater part of their marital life, private respondent was
out of job and did not have the initiative to look for
another. He indulged in vices and engaged in
philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner
concludes that private respondents condition is incurable,
causing the disintegration of their union and defeating
the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondents alleged habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds
for finding that he is suffering from a psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It
must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being
handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:25
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented
to establish the precise cause of private respondents
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.26 Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.27
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of
respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions,
affirming the trial courts finding with regard to the
non-existence of private respondents psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to
great weight and even finality.28 Only where it is shown
that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and
arbitrary can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary
for us to pass upon petitioners contentions on the issue
of permanent custody of children, the amount for their
respective support, and the declaration of exclusive
ownership of petitioner over the real property. These
matters may more appropriately be litigated in a
separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of
property regime, and/or custody of children which
petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000.]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, Petitioner, v. WILSON G.
MARCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the
nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however,
that the respondent should be examined by a physician
or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such
declaration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV
No. 55588, which disposed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and
the marriage between the parties is hereby declared
valid." 2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998
CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda
B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos,
solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is
declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the
Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is
dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of
the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties’
children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor
children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to
the visitation rights of respondent" .chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the
marriage was solemnized, the National Census and
Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent
with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It was established during the trial that the parties were
married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was
solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8,
1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar,
Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh.
A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born
(Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to
the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang
during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos,
on the other hand, joined the Women’s Auxiliary Corps
under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa
Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the
military service.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them
were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an
escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of
President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually
became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided
at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a
housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss
Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the
military service in 1987 and then engaged in different
business ventures that did not however prosper. As a
wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their
children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the
family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage
in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and
as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would
even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their
children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the
way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during
their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992,
they were already living separately.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of
selling "magic uling" and chicken. While she was still in
the military, she would first make deliveries early in the
morning before going to Malacañang. When she was
discharged from the military service, she concentrated
on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put
up a trading and construction company, NS Ness
Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ took place on
October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As
they were already living separately, she did not want him
to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she
saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical
harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in her sister’s
house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where
her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G,
Records, 153).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two
sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon
seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for
their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their
children were renting a house in Camella, Parañaque,
while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C.
Millan, the children described their father as cruel and
physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp.
85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist
Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., for psychological evaluation
(Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on
the other hand did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towards
appellee and their children, . . . 3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological
incapacity had not been established by the totality of the
evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of
the root cause of the spouse’s psychological incapacity
which should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the parties to assume the essential
obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71
and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non-complied marital obligations must similarly be
alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
explained in the decision.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected
to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The
psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews
conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one
of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly
incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was
assuming, or as would make him or her . . . unable to
assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to
show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated.
The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not
alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically
identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven
by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that
would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental — not
physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was]
grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."
4 need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
In her Memorandum, 6 petitioner presents for this
Court’s consideration the following issues:chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could
set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation .
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and
the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of
the determination of the merits of the Petition." 7
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented
does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results
of various tests that were submitted to determine
respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the
obligations of marriage should not have been brushed
aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner
adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other
sources of information in order to determine the
psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused
to submit himself to such tests.cralaw : red
In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines governing
the application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code 9
were laid down by this Court as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it ‘as the foundation of the nation.’ It
decrees marriage as legally ‘inviolable,’ thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be ‘protected’ by the
state.
x x x disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
— not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the
time of the celebration’ of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their ‘I do’s.’ The manifestation of the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
of marriage. Thus, ‘mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
x x x lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
10chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements
earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: 11 "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the
evidence presented in the present case — including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children,
petitioner’s sister and the social worker — was enough to
sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not
part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to
the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than six years. It was
during this period that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral support, and even left
the family home.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to
said period and not to the inception of the marriage.
Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71,
220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation,
in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and
the like. 12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient
divorce law this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner,
however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure
to observe the guidelines in outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring
personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non
to a finding of psychological incapacity. No
costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON
and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant
to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily
assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by
the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11,
2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are
AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo),
filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon
(Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined
by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
(Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas
City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957,
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having
been conceived and born at the time when her parents
were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on
the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition
for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live
Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition,
it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo
and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought
her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s
estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly
laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and
Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas,
Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue,
the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s
estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed
the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon
posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that
the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas
City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the
petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas,
Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision
reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no
showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve
as administrator, let letters of administration over the
estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be
issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the
approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of
₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals
held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes
lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5,
Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of
Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals
upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August
2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed
Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the
following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS
PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS
NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE
TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE
FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY
INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of a
decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides
at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional
Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile
is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and
that for special proceedings have one and the same
meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of
venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the
RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of
Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident
from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at
No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement
of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the
petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate
that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist
his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof,
however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living
with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This
finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed
an action for judicial partition of properties against
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on
the ground that their marriage is void for being
bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his
marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final
days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It
disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission
that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous
appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings
of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court,
must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the
Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to
Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though
no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law
in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code,
making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable
four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no
marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of
rights, such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription,
which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise,
whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of
such marriage even after the death of her father. The
said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by
raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case
at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a
cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death
of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish
such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine
whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void
for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and
Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac
and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San
Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage
certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the
probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated
more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a
record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not
completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the
time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the
petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays
down the preferred persons who are entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next
of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that
a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.
— A petition for letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show, so far as known to
the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and
the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of
the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of
administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the
issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who
would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin"
refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who
stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to
prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on
her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly,
the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the
estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her
right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled
to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the
purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7
August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]
DIANA M. BARCELONA,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May
1997 Decision1 as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Order2 dated 21 January
1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial
Court refused to dismiss private respondents Petition for
Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of
action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R.
Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M.
Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first petition) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.3 On 9
May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw
Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7
June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition
for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. This
time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-95-24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second
petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to
state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No.
04-94) on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed
the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional
Arguments in Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued
on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order) deferring
resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their
arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion
for reconsideration. However, the trial court, through
Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21
January 1997 an Order (second order) denying the
motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge
Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the
complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial
court determines such fact solely from the petition itself.
Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim,
a perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that
petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right,
thus giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also
rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo
is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition.
Judge Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo filed
the second petition, the first petition (Civil Case No.
Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been
earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing
the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion
and the second order denying the motion for
reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that
the trial court in its first order erred in deferring action on
the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint
states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals pointed out that the trial courts second order
corrected the situation since in denying the motion for
reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the Motion.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the
allegations in the second petition state a cause of action
sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no
violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the
existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis
pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case
must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case,
there is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo
had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first
petition before filing the second petition. Neither is
there res judicata because there is no final decision on
the merits.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the
following issues:
I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED
SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.
04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A
PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE, ITS TERMINATION AND STATUS.4
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails
to state a cause of action is untenable. A cause of action
is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
legal right of the plaintiff.5 A complaint states a cause of
action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the
defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant violates the right of the
plaintiff.6cräläwvirtualibräry
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause
of action. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of
the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code.7 The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and
petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross
Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the
marriage contract attached to the petition. The couple
established their residence in Quezon City. The union
begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November
1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo,
born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7
March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978.
The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up
to the present time. The petition alleged the
non-complied marital obligations in this manner:
xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due
to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a
rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was
frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters
house or would play tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages
suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child,
respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to
speak to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five
months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext
of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested
the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling.
She further insisted that she wanted to feel a little
freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences.
The petitioner argued that he could occupy another room
in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents
desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could
dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave
their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to
safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner
was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and
reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement
between the petitioner and the respondent. The
petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in
respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of
their conjugal partnership of gains. The separation in fact
between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists
to the present time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and
support of the children. The extrajudicial dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as
Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their
marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligation of marriage and such
incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time.
Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the relationship
between the petitioner and the respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent is void ab
initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in
accordance with Article 39 thereof.
xxx.8cräläwvirtualibräry
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which
respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.9 Ultimate facts refer to
the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the
existence of which the cause of action rests. The term
does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars
of evidence which establish the material
elements.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner Diana relies mainly11 on the rulings in Santos v.
Court of Appeals12 as well as in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina.13 Santos gave life to the phrase
psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family
Code, by defining the term in this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than (d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
that either or both parties were psychologically
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to
assist the courts and the parties in cases for annulment
of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity.14cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls
short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and Molina.
Specifically, she contends that the second petition is
defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition
also fails to state that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage
and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second
petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of
the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the
second petition did not even state the marital obligations
which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to
psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted
the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new
Rules).15 Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the
new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages
x x x.
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage.16 The obvious
effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion
need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no
need to allege the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and
behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root
cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules
do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no
need to allege in the petition the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how
our brains work, respond to and control the human body.
Scientists still do not understand everything there is to
know about the root causes of psychological disorders.
The root causes of many psychological disorders are still
unknown to science even as their outward, physical
manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules
require the petition to allege are the physical
manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity.
Respondent Tadeos second petition complies with this
requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it
states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the
correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or
omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right.
In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are
sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in
mind that the complaint does not have to establish or
allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of
action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial
on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v.
CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the
defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152
[1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does
not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50
[1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the
ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all
the factual averments in the complaint.18 Given the
hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the
trial court could render judgment over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that
the second petitions certificate of non-forum shopping
which does not mention the filing of the first petition and
its dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No.
04-94.19 Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of Circular
No. 04-94-
1. The plaintiff, Petitioner, applicant or principal party
seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or
other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such
original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of
the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not
theretofore commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no
action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency;
(c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is
either pending or may have been terminated, he
must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original
pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein
have been filed.20cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did
not disclose in his certificate of non-forum shopping that
he had previously commenced a similar action based on
the same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The
certificate of non-forum shopping should have stated the
fact of termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of
non-forum shopping not attached to the petition or one
belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party
himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such
violation can result in the dismissal of the complaint or
petition. However, the Court has also previously held
that the rule of substantial compliance applies to the
contents of the certification.21cräläwvirtualibräry
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court squarely
addressed the issue of whether the omission of a
statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case
involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of
the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping
about any event that would not constitute res
judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not
fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the
entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to
be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is
in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal
interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on
non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with the
objectives of procedural rules which is to secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
The dismissal of the first petition precluded the
eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions dismissal
did not also amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no
need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in
the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471) about
the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil
Case No. Q-95-23445).
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the
instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the peace
between him and his grown up children. The dismissal
happened before service of answer or any responsive
pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since
respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused
the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently
filed the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision
on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,23 now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, must be interpreted and
applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court
promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice. The Circular should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the
goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.24cräläwvirtualibräry
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that
marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the state cherishes and
protects.25 In rendering this Decision, this Court is not
prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage is
void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial
court must resolve this issue after trial on the merits
where each party can present evidence to prove their
respective allegations and defenses. We are merely
holding that, based on the allegations in the second
petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action
and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus,
the second petition is not subject to attack by a motion to
dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed
Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution
dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays
for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming
the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30
October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null
and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the
filing of a Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of marriage
by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to
the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on
16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had
five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and
Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five
children, the youngest then being only six years old, to
the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely
left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter
from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce
papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in
1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987,
Fely came back to the Philippines with her American
family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely
because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned
to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the
wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the
brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995,
for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been
openly using the surname of her American husband in
the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which
she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time
the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely
left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was
no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that
Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family,
and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on
05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already
an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to
Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously
married to respondent Crasus and having five children
with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by
respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that
she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person,
and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus
on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to
find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of
their household. She could not have been extravagant
since the family hardly had enough money for basic
needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons
as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then
earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was
insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of
her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to
provide financial support to them, as well as, to
respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to
bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert,
who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she
did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied
having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married
her American husband and acquired American
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an
American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law
of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that
respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of
₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the
brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the
foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that
respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the
₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their
respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both
parties the opportunity to present their evidence.
Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of
evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; 7 (2) the
Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the
Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely
in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration
taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son,
wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s
surname, Micklus.9
Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a
Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,
Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon
written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the
Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the
said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12 and
Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine
Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the
depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories,
not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.
Taking into account that it had been over a year since
respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that
Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October
1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right to
present her evidence. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC
promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on
the basis of the following findings –
The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity
deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed,
plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds
that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs
of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity,
mutual love, respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that
the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained
a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another
family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,
wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to
another man in another country.
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been
apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY
CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage
provided that these were eventually manifested after the
wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife
erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and
inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation
of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite
evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and
heart to comply with her marital obligations, such
incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage
in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards
her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is
defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations which already existed at the
time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily
proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly
credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These
are her excessive disposition to material things over and
above the marital stability. That such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage
to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground
to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted
Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence,
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001,
affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no
reversible error therein. It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee
abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing
in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically
stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the
declaration of nullity of their marriage…
… After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY,
THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the
above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust
situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a
divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has
undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This
Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted
can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse
eventually embraces another citizenship and thus
becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these
circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as
married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor
her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff
to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact
does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is
incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants,
is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage
which this Court finds abhorrent and will not
countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief
by affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of
the marriage of the parties.16
March 2002,17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this
Court, based on the following arguments/grounds –
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s
wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of
substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence
considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious
errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus
maintained that Fely’s psychological incapacity was
clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
already become an American citizen. He further
questioned the personality of petitioner Republic,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court,
not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the
State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the
instant Petition to be meritorious.
I history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
The totality of evidence presented during trial is
insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial
provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads –
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes
psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court
laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological
incapacity was defined, thus –
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated…21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite
lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced
below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that
there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however,
must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of
evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed
miserably to establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for
declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent
Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be
easily put into question for being self-serving, in the
absence of any other corroborating evidence. He
submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds
of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16
December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her
American husband’s surname. Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the
evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely
had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from
assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do
not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous
cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts
that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the
rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus;
her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of
her American family and her American surname, may
indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root
cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the
incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven
to be in existence at the time of celebration of the
marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is
no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v.
Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied
with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and
that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of
1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
of the Philippines –
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a
special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at
the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and
literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his
wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the
exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in
her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left
for the United States in 1984, after which she married
her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow
and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus,
Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on
behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on
behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of
the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides –
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor
General does not bar him or his Office from intervening
in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the
Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked to
represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of
the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the
Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such
proceedings could only serve and contribute to the
realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor
General is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General takes over when the case is elevated to the
Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is
only reasonable and practical that even while the
proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office
of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision
and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the
interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed
the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that
were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the
case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA
198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family
Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355
SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State…37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became
effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other
doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the
Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of
the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the
Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher
courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below –
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
… (2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve
a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within the same
period.
… and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage
Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the
parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the
Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective
memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the
Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the
State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted
for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. –
… CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the
public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the
decision personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in
the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of
fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment
shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new
trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
… partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiff’s
Sec. 20. Appeal. –
… of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12%
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a vs.
Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on
the adverse parties. DECISION
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion AZCUNA, J.:
contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of
between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s
nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh
under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his
36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates
petition by stating that both he and his wife were
with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is
essential obligations of marriage. In response,
one of those situations where neither law nor society can
respondent filed an amended answer denying the
provide the specific answer to every individual
allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. 1
problem.39
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the
a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment
of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
SET ASIDE. 1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into
between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null
Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting. and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages
SO ORDERED.
in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary
damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the
G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
date of this decision plus attorney’s fees of P100,000.00;
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of
vs.
litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
x-------------------x
separation/retirement benefits received from the Far
East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005 paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount
interest per annum from the date of this decision and
one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with
Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his
son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount
of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy
Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant;
and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the
use of her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate
civil registry and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of
Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate
court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000
monthly support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh
Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto,
praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for
oral argument.3
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution increasing the support pendente
lite to P20,000.4 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.5
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a
Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit
and affirming in toto the trial court’s decision. 6 Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution,
which increased the monthly support for the
son.7 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question
these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari8 and the Petition for Certiorari9 were
ordered consolidated by this Court.10
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims
that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord
with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5
MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1
MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF
ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL
BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY’S
FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION,
PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,
WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL
TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF
OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT
BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK
AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON
FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT
BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES
OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND
THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES,
ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE
ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE,
AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND
CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES’ MINOR CHILD TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE
CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT
THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN
HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE
CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.11
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the
following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET
RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR INCREASED
SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES’ SON FOR HEARING.12
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVY’S MONTHLY
SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY
PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.13
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR THE
INCREASE OF JAVY’S SUPPORT, THE COURT OF
APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF
EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE
LIGHT OF PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS THERETO,
INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS
ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS
SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."14
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE
GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE
HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT
AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVY’S SUPPORT.15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court
of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of
fact ascertained from the testimonies not only of the
parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise,
those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the
basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant
deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by
professing true love instead of revealing to her that he
was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that
because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he
was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career
was and always would be his first priority; that he was
unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a
husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he
had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in
times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of
leaving defendant–appellee and their son; that he had no
desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as
proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile
after their separation; that the aforementioned caused
defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those
years the parties were together but also after and
throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court’s decision on the
ground that unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary
contracts, damages arising as a consequence of
marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that
there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court
where damages by reason of the performance or
non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it
does not follow that no such award for damages may be
made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically
prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the total
amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the
exercise of its discretion, found full justification of
awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for.
We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. 16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based
on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as
follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article
221917 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which
moral damages may be recovered and it mentions
Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that
Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause
loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is
willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting
moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on
which the moral damages were based were done willfully
and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would
have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage
of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the
petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family
Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. . . .18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the
acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his
psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his
incapacity or inability to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds
for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to
characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring
the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set
of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering
into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was
done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have
been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity
means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that one must assume and discharge as a
consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the
private respondent. If the private respondent was
deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the
petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was
without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it
follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot
stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.19
With respect to the grant of attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorney’s fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code
authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case
the plaintiff’s act or omission has compelled the
defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to
protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems
it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)20
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and
exemplary damages is fully justified, the award of
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is
likewise fully justified.21
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower
court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act
in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage
cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private
respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on
petitioner’s psychological incapacity, which as explained
above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to
comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither
can be a ground for attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and
exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is left without
basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East
Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila
Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies,
the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is
what to do with the assets of the conjugal partnership in
the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage.
The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the
declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993,
226 SCRA, pp. 572 – 573, 586). Thus, speaking through
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states
that the final judgment therein shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in the
previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979,
and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary
is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil
Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are
conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are
the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or
profession of either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received
during the marriage from the common property, as well
as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each
spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without
prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are the
parties’ conjugal properties and what are the exclusive
properties of each spouse, it was disclosed during the
proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first
as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far
East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement
package from the said bank in the amount
of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions
amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount
of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9,
1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts
or obligations other than those deducted from the said
retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family
Code "The net remainder of the conjugal partnership
properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlement or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided
in this Code." In this particular case, however, there had
been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor
had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of
the defendant wife’s share in the conjugal partnership
properties. The previous cession and transfer by the
plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential
house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the
Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila, in favor
of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise
Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the
Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was
actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all
demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife
had allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff
husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the
process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall,
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has
chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done
was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to
defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past
unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to
their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the
defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal
properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be
given one-half (1/2) share of the separation/retirement
benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of
their conjugal partnership properties having been
obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or
profession of said defendant husband in accordance with
Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason,
she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares
of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial
Park and the Provident Group of Companies.22
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as
follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the
order of the trial court for him to give one-half of his
separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank &
Trust Company and half of his outstanding shares in
Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latter’s
share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial
Decision approving the Compromise Agreement entered
into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement,
the parties had agreed that henceforth, their conjugal
partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken
for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half
of the separation/retirement benefits which
plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust
Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said
company for the reason that the benefits accrued from
plaintiff–appellant’s service for the bank for a number of
years, most of which while he was married to
defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same.
The same is true with the outstanding shares of
plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the
plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to
defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half
thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find
no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.23
Since the present case does not involve the annulment
of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in
relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code,
providing for the dissolution of the absolute community
or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do
not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that
in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon
City,24 this Court expounded on the consequences of a
void marriage on the property relations of the spouses
and specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation
is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147
is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted
and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry,
and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man
and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the
first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the
Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the property shall still be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family household."
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
couple's separate property are not included in the
co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the
above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code;
in addition, the law now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter
vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership property,
without the consent of the other, during the period of
cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith
shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor
of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by
any or all of the common children, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or
still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture
shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation
or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
…
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which
had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be
deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in
the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to
Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly
prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for
valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of
the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family
Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43, relates only, by its explicit terms,
to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before
the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special
rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old
doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of
remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of
the previously contracted void marriage, the present law
aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the
status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for
the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and
42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination
of a subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident
property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in
valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on
the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision
of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must
be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state
the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on
the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect
regardless of the property regime of the spouses.25
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the
court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the
union of the parties, the same would be covered by the
co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of
the parties appear to have been included or involved in
said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties owned in common by the parties herein
as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be
sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only Petitioner,
child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he
is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, V.
200526 and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.
MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON,
With regard to the issues on support raised in the
Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot,
Respondent. Promulgated:
owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura,
as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.
November 18, 2005
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
x
dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition
------------- x
for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in
that the award of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and costs are
deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the
retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and
Trust Co. and one-half of petitioner’s shares of stock in
Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of
DECISION
Companies is sustained but on the basis of the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the
co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
contesting the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions of
September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which
increased the support pendente lite in favor of the
parties’ son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT
and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs. On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a
petition [1] for the annulment of his marriage to
respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional
SO ORDERED.
Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC
No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor,
FIRST DIVISION
petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he
claimed existed even prior to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his
JAIME F. VILLALON, G.R. NO. 167206
psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to
maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of
interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity
and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential
obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his
desire for other women and a life unchained from any
spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the
fundamental obligations of companionship and
consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed
that his marriage to respondent be declared null and
void ab initio.
On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer
[2] denying petitioner's allegations. She asserted that her
18-year marriage to petitioner has been 'fruitful and
characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more
growth in their relationship and that their marital
squabbles were normal based on community standards.
Petitioner's success in his professional life aided him in
performing his role as husband, father, and provider.
Respondent claimed that petitioner's commitment to his
paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond
reproach.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the
prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there
was collusion between the parties. [3] The report
submitted to the trial court stated that there was no such
collusion. [4]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently
entered its appearance in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines [5] and submitted an opposition [6] to the
petition on September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in
the early seventies when he applied for a job at
Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a
foreign exchange trader. They began dating in 1975 and
had a romantic relationship soon thereafter. [7] After
going steady for about two years, petitioner and
respondent were married at the San Pancracio Chapel in
Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978. Petitioner claimed that
he married respondent because he believed that it was
the right time to raise a family and that she would be a
good mother to his children. [8]
In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate
from respondent. According to him, their marriage
reached a point where there was no longer any
communication between them and their relationship
became devoid of love, affection, support and respect
due to his constant urge to see other women.
[9] Moreover, their relationship tended to be 'one-sided
since respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever
showed her love, needs, wants and emotions. [10]
Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his
marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He
also saw other women even when he became engaged
to and, later on, married respondent. [11] Respondent
learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued manner.
[12] Petitioner surmised that it was respondent's nature
to be silent and withdrawn. [13]
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and
moved into an apartment located five to ten minutes
away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three
children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old,
respectively. [14] Petitioner consulted a child
psychologist before talking to his children. [15] He
considered himself as a good and loving father and
described his relationship with the children as 'great.
[16]
Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his
children who stayed with him on alternate weekends. He
voluntarily gave monthly support to the children and paid
for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the children's
medical expenses as well as the maintenance and
miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode. [17]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical
psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological
disorder of 'Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder
with 'Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan described the said
disorder as 'a pervasive maladaptation in terms of
interpersonal and occupational functioning with main
symptoms of grand ideation about oneself,
self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to
always be the one followed, the I personality. A person
afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to
gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus
engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with
'Casanova Complex exhibits habitual adulterous
behavior and goes from one relationship to another. [18]
Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both
petitioner and respondent based on clinical interviews
and psychological tests. [19]
Respondent testified that she first learned of her
husband's infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he was
having an affair with one of her friends who worked as a
trader in her husband's company. The affair was cut
short when the woman left for the United States to work.
Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their
relationship and overcome the crisis. [20]
When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband,
respondent averred that she did not know whether her
husband's acts could be deemed 'womanizing since
there were only two instances of infidelity which occurred
13 years apart. [21] She also theorized that petitioner
wanted to have their marriage annulled so he could
marry her old friend. [22] She stated that she has not
closed her doors to petitioner but the latter would have to
give up his extra-marital relationship. [23]
To controvert the findings of petitioner's expert witness,
respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
who testified that Dr. Dayan's findings were incomplete
because a team approach was necessary in evaluating
an individual's personality. An evaluation of one's
psychological capacity requires the expertise of a
psychiatrist and social worker. [24]
Upon order of the trial court, the parties submitted their
respective memoranda. [25] The OSG likewise filed a
certification [26] pursuant to Rep. of the Phils. v. Court
of Appeals. [27] In due course, the trial court rendered
judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent Ma.
Corazon N. Villalon celebrated on April
22, 1978, as null and void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of the petitioner pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal assets and
liabilities are hereby ordered to be
liquidated and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains be
effected in accordance with Article 129
of the Family Code.
As petitioner manifested that he
wishes to maintain the custody
arrangement now existing, the custody
of the three (3) children ' Miguel
Alberto, Fernando Alfonso, and Ma.
Joanna Victoria ' shall remain with the
respondent subject to visitation rights
of petitioner as may be mutually
agreed upon by the parties.
In order to cancel the registration of
the Marriage Contract between herein
parties appearing in the Book of
Marriage of the city of Manila, let
copies of this Decision be furnished to
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as
well as the National Census and
Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal
Department, EDSA, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED. [28]
Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal
from the decision of the trial court, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 74354. On March 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing,
the assailed decision dated November
12, 2001 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new judgment entered
DISMISSING the petitioner's petition
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. [29]
Contrary to the trial court's findings, the appellate court
held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged
psychological incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan testified
that petitioner's psychological incapacity preceded the
marriage, she failed to give sufficient basis for such a
finding. Dr. Dayan also stated that parental marital
instability was the root cause of petitioner's
psychological incapacity but failed to elaborate thereon
or link the two variables. Moreover, petitioner's sexual
infidelity was made to appear as symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder when, in reality, the same merely
resulted from a general dissatisfaction with the marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
appellate court's decision which was denied in an order
dated October 28, 2004. [30] Thus, petitioner took this
recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting
that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to
prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The petition has no merit.
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support
a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is
evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to
respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good
provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital
infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not
appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological
disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his
spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a
general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a
psychological disorder rooted in petitioner's personal
history.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, [31] the court held that
psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability. [32] It should '
... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.... [33]
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that
petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even
before the marriage and thus had the tendency to cheat
on his wife, such conclusion was not sufficiently backed
by concrete evidence showing that petitioner indeed had
several affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful. Except
for petitioner's general claim that on certain occasions he
had two girlfriends at the same time, no details or
explanations were given of such circumstances that
would demonstrate petitioner's inability to be faithful to
respondent either before or at the time of the celebration
of their marriage.
Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of
his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan
described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder as 'self-centered', refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
'characterized by grandiose ideation and 'lack of ill will. In other words, there is a natal
empathy in relating to others' , and one with Casanova or supervening disabling factor in the
Complex as a 'serial adulterer', the evidence on record person, an adverse integral element in
betrays the presence of any of these symptoms. the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations
essential to marriage. [36]
Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a 'serial
or habitual adulterer', as he wants the court to believe.
As stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said that
two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart
In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply
could be deemed 'womanizing', especially considering
lost his love for respondent and has consequently
that these instances involved the same woman. In fact,
refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his own
at the time of respondent's testimony, petitioner's illicit
testimony, petitioner felt that he was no longer part of
relationship has been going on for six years. This is not
respondent's life and that the latter did not need or want
consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from
him. [37] Respondent's uncommunicative and
'Casanova Complex who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one
withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioner's
who jumps from one relationship to another.
discontentment with the marital relationship.
However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals, [38] refusal to comply with the essential
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity
petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It within the meaning of the law. The policy of the State is
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
manifestations of a disordered personality which make institution and marriage is the foundation of the family.
petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of
obligations of marriage. [34] The evidence on record the marriage. [39]
fails to convince us that petitioner's marital indiscretions
are symptomatic of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
evidence reveals that petitioner was a good husband
most of the time when he was living with respondent, a WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED. The March 23,
loving father to his children as well as a good provider. 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution,
are AFFIRMED.
In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, [35] we held
that the cause of the alleged psychological incapacity
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Further '
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution
dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004,
respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the
petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage
with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from
epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on
record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied in an
Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court
reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held
that the evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were
incurable and already present at the inception of the
marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr.
Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of
respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the
respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she
failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or
supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral
element in respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied 6 for
lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition
for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that
the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for
reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix
Ferraris to file comment8 but failed to comply; thus, he is
deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment.
Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner
and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on
the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is
beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the
function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again
the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.10 It is a well-established principle that
factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for
the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the
findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of
the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to
the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or
when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are
unavailing in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all
people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies
heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of
the human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature must be fully explained,15 which petitioner failed
to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the
resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish respondent's
psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that
there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the
evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity.
There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage, or that
those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's
evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure to
perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a
manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent
and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the
couple's relationship before the marriage and even
during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was
not all bad. During that relatively short period of time,
petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the
company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own
reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving
husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner
started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when
they started fighting about the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner,
and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations.
Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of
trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her
suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her
anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at
her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality
disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent
and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that
one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is
dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it
seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation.
Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had
extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself.
Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr.
Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive.
She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family
upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondent's parents having difficulties in their
relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic
history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner.
Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was
really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the
part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him
from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the
essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner
likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed
psychological or mental malady existed even before the
marriage. All these omissions must be held up against
petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the
onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder,
the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled,
the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than
his family, are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17where therein
respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends
than his family on whom he squandered his money,
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was
dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court
held that the psychological defects spoken of were more
of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations and that a mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds
for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed
and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy however is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the
family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from
Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but
for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio,
or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if
the law were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves.27 Neither it is to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004
denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of
the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED
WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 155800 : March 10, 2006]
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, v. MARIE IVONNE F.
REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage.
This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed
into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses,
no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the
depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark
and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace
of certitude on the guilty spouse's capability to fulfill the
marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The
Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After
careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the
trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when
petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years
of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got
married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila
City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at
the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro
Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child
was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5)
months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his
marriage to respondent declared null and void. He
anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent's incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present.8
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth
to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boy's parentage when
petitioner learned about it from other sources after their
marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin
David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no
such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her
obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of
her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice
talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever
witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In
the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was
held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even
presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of
said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via
Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her
as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial
industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the
letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and
Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when
he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater
means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear
that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set
from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired
it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on
unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from
other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to
the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried
to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not
change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante
Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated,
based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative
type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent's persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined
the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent's
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the
point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her
to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with
another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she
performed her marital obligations by attending to all the
needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no
truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies
and invented personalities.24 She presented her version,
thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from
petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and
kill her because she surmised such intent from David's
act of touching her back and ogling her from head to
foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance
graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig
Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas,
an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done
three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and
Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a
Blackgold recording artist although she was not under
contract with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a
luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the
Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not
written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious.
Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a
resident of the United States while Babes Santos was
employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her
husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for
chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her
husband's whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as
she supported almost ten people from her monthly
budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her
non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other
lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay
and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of
psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren
Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes
testified that the series of tests conducted by his
assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and
the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale
(CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated
that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic
tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends,
were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws
in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was
not the one who administered and interpreted
respondent's psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made
use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not
reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such
test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's
evidence and held that respondent's propensity to lying
about almost anything−her occupation, state of health,
singing abilities and her income, among others−had
been duly established. According to the trial court,
respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. 36 The trial
court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the
Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the
ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the
parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the
Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was
affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only
respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the
Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these
rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court
reversed the RTC's judgment. While conceding that
respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that
the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish respondent's psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been
satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends
herein that the evidence conclusively establish
respondent's psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is
heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC
to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled
principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the
trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did
not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that
such evidence was not sufficient to establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version
of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial
question remains as to whether the state of facts as
presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards
set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were
definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling
in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as
the Molina case45 ), and indeed the Court of Appeals
cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the
case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down,
there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that
a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article
36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the
misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of
the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court
is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding
cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while
undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the
declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not
foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36,
even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental
incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from
contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting
marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained
as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage
parties and persons already married, among others. A
party's mental capacity was not a ground for divorce
under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where
"either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its
celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under
the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the
divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound
mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as
a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack
thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the
grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as
voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one
contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized
as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on
consent freely given which is one of the essential
requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus
on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of
vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both
members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological
incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that
the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent
to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling
such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise
stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the
Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations does not
affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding
of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to
comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of
consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage
only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x
[and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of
the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted
"[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity
to understand the essential marital obligations, because
then this would amount to lack of consent to the
marriage."63 These concerns though were answered,
beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the
Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the
inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was
further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court,
through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban
observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that
psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of
psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording
of Article 36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At
the same time, it has been consistently recognized by
this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee
was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given
case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of
the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of
psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision
committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity may be
informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, current trends in psychological
and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under
the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers
that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which
have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has
proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time,
the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of
each situation, and Molina itself arising from this
evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no
cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the
disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that
precedent. There is need though to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court,
first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion
of canon law experts in the interpretation of
psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,
considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly
acknowledged that the concept of psychological
incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one
member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem
of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but
still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to
disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36,
and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the
Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in
the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept
may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation
into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.
Indeed, while Church thought on psychological
incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts,
judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological
incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another
common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too
frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying
petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and
2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state
that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." These provisions highlight
the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the
parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities
to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences
it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself
adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at
present through the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that
affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of
a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action
in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage,
not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage
is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a
petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying
marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated
person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement
of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages
ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family,
as they promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we
decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines
presently recognized in the judicial disposition of
petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in
1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general
rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected"' by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but
not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally'subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that
the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with
following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still,
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the
consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the
petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal's
participation in the hearings before the trial court is
extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now
deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and
the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity
of these facts. As such, it must be considered that
respondent had consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality. The
question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity,
consistent with Article 36 and generally,
the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the
guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in
proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart
from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, and
certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine
Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's
claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also
presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of
psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity.
In any event, both courts below considered petitioner's
evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court
acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest
with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to
establish the cause of action with a preponderance of
evidence. However, since the action cannot be
considered as a non-public matter between private
parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State,
through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor
General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent with
preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among
the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts,
and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. The
initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the
start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters
to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her
actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and
family background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities,
were further linked to medical or clinical causes by
expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner
presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.
Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department
of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit
provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of
things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There
are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated
over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the
persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of
normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of
these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable
of performing the basic obligations of her
marriage?cralawlibrary
A - Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one
owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of
love towards the person, and it is also something that
endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is
based on communication between individuals and what
we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings.
But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings,
[you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you
constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far
as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it
undermines that basic relationship that should be based
on love, trust and respect.
Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the
behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and
fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing
the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q - Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy
Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner,
testified that the respondent has been calling up the
petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities
of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the
petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6)
of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say
about this, Mr. witness?cralawlibrary
A - If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he
is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on
her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with
a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in
the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that
the husband is having an affair with another woman and
if she persistently believes that the husband is having an
affair with different women, then that is pathological and
we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q - Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she
be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform
the basic obligations of the marriage?cralawlibrary
A - Yes, Ma'am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish
not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but
also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He
concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that
[she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about
herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of
psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly
the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as
the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these
witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the
Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that
personal examination of the subject by the physician is
not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as
sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly,
Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common conclusion of
respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on
their own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true
set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted
the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is no
cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert
witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis,
the trial court explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been
shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has
that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it
her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities,
her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent
and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically
lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not
in a position to give meaning and significance to her
marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying
to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust
and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented
by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity. 87
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated
friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept
petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real
parentage as she only confessed when the latter had
found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological
incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately
discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a
year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner
left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the
degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the
belief that respondent's psychological incapacity, as
borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent
were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate
a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth
from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner's
witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to
them, were revelatory of respondent's inability to
understand and perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much
less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.
One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to
adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since
respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to
perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced.
Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes
nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. Respondent's ability to even
comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is
impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to
the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the
marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the
Family Code which states that a marriage may be
annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw
linkages between misrepresentations made by
respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45
(3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the
consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude
to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred
to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the
essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68
to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins
the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to
take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The
appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it
anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner's
efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which
held that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the
marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March
1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of
respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by
both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and
the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent's
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another
marriage without the Tribunal's consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that
matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective
and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a
Part Contractant in possession and employ of a
discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor
markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of
the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the
correct appreciation of the integral significance and
implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the
certitude required by law that based on the depositions
of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies
of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the
Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of
adverse personality constracts that were markedly
antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that
seriously undermined the integrality of her
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative
component. In other words, afflicted with a
discretionary faculty impaired in its
practico-concrete judgment formation on account of
an adverse action and reaction pattern, the
Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially
binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient
evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of
grave lack of due discretion on the part of the
Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was
arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the
Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They
hold sway since they are drawn from a similar
recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court instead
appreciated respondent's version as correct, and the
appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of
the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant
recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement
in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was
on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that
it did not appear certain that respondent's condition was
incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such
effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife
initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make
their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant
behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie,
fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy.
From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's
condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively
concluded that respondent's condition is incurable? It
would seem, at least, that respondent's psychosis is
quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat.
Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's
expert witnesses characterized respondent's condition
as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether
the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for
the experts' taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and
1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10
August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in
Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was
decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first
citing the deliberations of the Family Code
committee,96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the
doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's
opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of
a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological
incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However,
in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological
incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological
incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided
months before the trial court came out with its own ruling
that remained silent on whether respondent's
psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the
incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least,
there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial
of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial
court's decision that required a medical finding of
incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in
1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review,
or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court
countered an argument that Molina and Santos should
not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or
construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a
part of that law as of the date the statute in
enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion.
Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment
from the expert witnesses that respondent's
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply
because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a
declaration and the appropriate question was not
accordingly propounded to him. If we
apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be
undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on
appellate review, where presumably the respective
petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have
seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It
may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable,
even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that
the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a
case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason
to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical
diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have
had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect
at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are
sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's
psychological incapacity has been established by the
petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by
the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which
indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite
of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced
that respondent was so incapacitated to contract
marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his
cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36
of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition,
pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been
inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent,
despite her psychological state, remains in love with
petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the
petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed
undue emphasis on respondent's avowed commitment
to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these
cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live
together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and
VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 173614 : September 28, 2007]
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SPS.
EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD
CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M.
ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the
Order,1 dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No.
II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order,2 dated 11
October 2005, and reinstating respondents' Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses
Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad
Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and
petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint
alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were
married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3 They
begot seven children, herein respondents, namely:
Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and
Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26
August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the
Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or
on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7
In impugning petitioner's marriage to Eulogio,
respondents averred that the same was entered into
without the requisite marriage license. They argued that
Article 348 of the Family Code, which exempts a man
and a woman who have been living together for at least
five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and
Eulogio because they could not have lived together
under the circumstances required by said provision.
Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to
Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter's death, or on
1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the
date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore,
petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. To further their
cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's serious illness
which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and
Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one
roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were
exempted from the requirement of a marriage license.
From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco
Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988
and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in
the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by
the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she
sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is
only the contracting parties while living who can file an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an
Order,9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack
of cause of action. It cited A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the
Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated
on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated
by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15,
2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language
of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a
petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband
or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this
Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive
and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the
heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late
father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null
and void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an
affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is
hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio.13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the
said motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May
2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the
RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that
the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog,15 which was on the authority for holding that
the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to
assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which
provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, applies only where both parties to a void
marriage are still living.16 Where one or both parties are
deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition
to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its
stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal v.
Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the
Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a
deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of
his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this
motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal v.
Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter
referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has
rejected the case of Niñal v. Bayadog by approving the
Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held
that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only
parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity
of their marriage and such right is purely personal and is
not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between
the case of Niñal v. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the
Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the
case of Niñal v. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the
Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the
parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who
entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced
particularly with respect to their successional rights.
During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an
inchoate right over the property of the said parents.
Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be
proper that it should solely be the parent who should be
allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void.
However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have
already a vested right over whatever property left by the
parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any
rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure
cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The
heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void
marriage entered by their parent, especially when the
marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give
premium to such union because the guilty parties will
seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the
marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance
of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition
after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of
the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage
is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void
marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the
guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a
petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the
Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or
the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure
which shall be applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May
2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate
this case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the
RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new
matter was raised therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether
the case law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the
case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated
route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of
courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme
Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their
respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised
against taking a direct recourse to this Court. 20 Instead,
they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower
courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
concurrently within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle
of hierarchy of courts.21 However, it cannot be gainsaid
that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside
procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature
and importance of the issues raised, warrant the
immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.22 Moreover,
notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition
for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case
grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs
the instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is
Niñal which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the
deceased person were granted the right to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents' Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their father's marriage to therein respondent
after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply
its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage
therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the
applicable law to determine the validity of the two
marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.23 What
we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the
marriage sought to be declared void was entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be
gleaned from the facts, petitioner's marriage to Eulogio
was celebrated in 2004.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope,
to wit:
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code
of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15
March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the
RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Niñal, because they
vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its
application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was
celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within
the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages.'
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil
expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is
clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband
or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,
be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the vs.
spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S.
paragraph a] VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL
CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot DECISION
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they
REYES, R.T., J.:
do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory
or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question
bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings,
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
summary judgment, or confession of judgment.
preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
We pronounce these principles as We review
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. which reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child,
recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and
filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean
damages.
that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without
any recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the The Facts
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare
Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or unveiled as follows:
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate.
declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs,
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
lots are particularly described as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No.
Parcel No. 1
II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without
prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE
Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land
for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs. Registration.
SO ORDERED.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil
Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot
159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441)
square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC]
Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a
portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on
the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on
the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to
1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1
(Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more
or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan
Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa
Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on
the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on
the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River;
and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd.
plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND
SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de
la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49;
por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51;
y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds.
01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana,
que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension
superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de
la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50;
por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52;
por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43
gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana,
que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension
superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer
his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order
to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other
legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were
transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These
three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner.
The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was
survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo
Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5
& 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad
and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of
land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878,
respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents
before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties
submitted and caused the approval of a partial
compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the
parties acknowledged their respective shares in the
proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of
land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter
portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the
first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v.
Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of
land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The
remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided
between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental
compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994,
with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties
submitted the supplemental compromise agreement,
which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more
contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the
parties equally divided between them the third and fourth
parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action,
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents
before the court a quo with the following causes of action:
(a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child;
(c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum
of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to
Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage
between his late brother Teofilo and respondent
Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the
required marriage license. He likewise maintained that
his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the
adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts
he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to
the subject real properties. He also prayed for the
cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name
of respondents. He argued that the properties covered
by such certificates of title, including the sums received
by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to
him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way
of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their
answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the
dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license
did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo.
Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate
child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another
woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed
for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They
also asked that their counterclaims for moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be
granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to
the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace
who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also
submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent
Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and
respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for
summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the
contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no
record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for
summary judgment the testimony of respondent
Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in
Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe,
before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony,
respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo
II is her child with Teofilo.5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and
manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion
between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's
(respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as
follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad
Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang,
Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage
Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio
for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II,
is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of
the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to
plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the
interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the
instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of
the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No.
139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and
ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and
to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint,
between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void,
and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to
cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos,
and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff
herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint,
between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the
names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor
Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of
plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the
name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor
Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff
herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of
plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees,
and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in
the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the
appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering
summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr.
and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an
illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary
judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public
policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The
fact that it was appellants who first sought summary
judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant
thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to
recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief,"
the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to
annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue
was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition
of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule.
The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to
the petition for summary judgment practically amount to
these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the
foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to
prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution
of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May
13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein
impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own
brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together
as husband and wife for thirty years and that the
annulment of their marriage is the very means by which
the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in
the estate left by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the
case. Rather that the summary nature by which the
court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to
the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint
for annulment of marriage should always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of
the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench,
Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the
court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted.
While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage
license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of
the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of
the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing
the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of
evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's
affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace
who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage
license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as
basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo
Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said
marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the
marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office
Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract
who in turn, may have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial
court, We are of the considered view that the veracity
and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the
motivations underlying the same should be properly
threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the
primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a
marriage did not take place, neither should appellants'
non-presentation of the subject marriage license be
taken as proof that the same was not procured. The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it
must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the
party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party,
the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the
relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his
putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it
had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II,
the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son
of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether
foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's
illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that
matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the
case, We find appellee's bare allegation that appellant
Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent
couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole,
insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total
forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation.
Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements,
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the
illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible
when considered in the light of the fact that, during the
last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his
household. The least that the trial court could have done
in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in
order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues
pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II. 8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for
reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente,
Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the
twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the
following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary
Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in
denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the
Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of
the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this
case are different from that contemplated and intended
by law, or has otherwise decided a question of
substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court,
or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with
law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary
Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that
the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now
Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for
judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing
Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary
Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that
the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made
findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and
conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of
the laws and misapprehension of the
facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a
marriage may be declared void ab initio through a
judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and
without the benefit of a trial. But there are other
procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is
not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the
pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is
confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule
1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of
the Rules of Court governing summary judgment,
instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding
solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on
the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA
likewise considered the provisions on summary
judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of
the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench,
Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the
court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x
x11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the
rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary
judgments have no place in cases of declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of
marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as
"Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the
question on the application of summary judgments or
even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or
annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity.
The significant principle laid down by the said Rule,
which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section
17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally
conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence
to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on
the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We
excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage
from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for
annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for
legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all
kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has
divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene
in the case. The participation of the State is not
terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor
that no collusion exists between the parties. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered.15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the
court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear
and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the
public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression
of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no
suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to
make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid
down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of
marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public
prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x
xx
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the
public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the
trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of
evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public
prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence. 16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage.
The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by
stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the
husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the
Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they
do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory
or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife
are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful
marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when
and how to build the foundations of marriage. The
spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life.
They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their
matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and
should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance
with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on August 3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the
right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity
of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the
Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or
intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that
the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of
a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. 19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply
to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003
although the marriage involved is within the coverage of
the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which
became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in
its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of
Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and
is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case
against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law
would govern depends upon when the marriage took
place.23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may
bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this
mean that any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision
in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for
any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such
person must appear to be the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated,
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic
in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real
party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of
lack of cause of action.27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of
Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force
at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can
file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action.
Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the
foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to
the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando
was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign
law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab
initio but reduced the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the
contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial
court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas
Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same.29 (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether
or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when
Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son,
Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional
rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law.30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance
are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs
were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the
surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are
compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children
by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of
the Civil Code.31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as
compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such
as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a
compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the
estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code
provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants
or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence
of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of
the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the decedent.33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not
to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of
Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek
the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that
collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire
successional right over the estate if the decedent dies
without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his
parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if
Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner
succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the
first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article
1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a
real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to
be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of
petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is
contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not
a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or
legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no
legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is
based on the ground that he has no successional right to
be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For
although the marriage in controversy may be found to be
void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit.
This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the
collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial
on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the
subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly
instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for
lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that
Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother
of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of
filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in
order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the
trial court as to the other causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue
the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case
concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This
notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging
in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not
specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
resolution of the case.36
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits
having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare
allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an
indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture
of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We
are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the
declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate
filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the
guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of
respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence.
We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article
167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy
of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
(Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the
legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The
language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the
mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect
the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid
marriage.37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of
petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance,
recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated.
This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the
basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was
null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as
follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
in regard to the action on the status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of
marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and
the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo
Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of
marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of
its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial
on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority
in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private
respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent
court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A.
Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No.
4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he
had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on
April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;
she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been
working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month
annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer
since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed
and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under
the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime
in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman;
she further discovered that he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent;
she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed
her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to
take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn
over the possession and administration of said
properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not
authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition
prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over
said properties; their marriage be declared null and void
and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties
acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and
administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its
nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is
in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria
issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a
first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and
void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the
cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case
there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted
by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage
with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to
whether or not the second marriage should first be
judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In
the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme
Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316,
326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from
the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that
petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue
that may be determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the
erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to
the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991,
Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and
gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which
to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a
special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the
ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed
the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited
by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon
by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at
bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases
dealt with the successional rights of the second wife
while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It
observed that the separation and subsequent distribution
of the properties acquired during the union can be had
only upon proper determination of the status of the
marital relationship between said parties, whether or not
the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner.
Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity
of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48,
50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private
respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage may be raised together with other
incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has
jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the
motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the
remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer,
proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision,
reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of
merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant
case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a
void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether
the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper
remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
personal properties allegedly belonging to her
exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People
v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP.
No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property filed by private respondent must
be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous.
Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of
the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required
only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP
No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's
intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the
necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to
provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent celebrated while the former's
previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still
subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People
v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where
the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous
marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating
that:
Though the logician may say that where the former
marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve,
still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that
marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to
the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority
position in subsequent cases involving the same issue.
Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its
earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In
reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's
share of the disputed property acquired during the
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application
of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration
thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that
purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held
in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, that "although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need
for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned
around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling
once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking
for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased
husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of
his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of
no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel
v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for
then such a marriage though void still needs according to
this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as
a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code
Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd
Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39,
was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision
should include not only void but also voidable marriages.
He then suggested that the above provision be modified
as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that
they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they
say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one
cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage
is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno
accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to
read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no
question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even
if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce
the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is
declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is
annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that
this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the
provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct
action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then
the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to
"invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is
the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away
with collateral defense as well as collateral attack.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision
is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself
whether or not the marriage is void, while the other
members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are,
therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point.
Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are
brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He
then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise
the defense that he has no liability because the basis of
the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot
say that there will be no judgment on the validity or
invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in
the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral
declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa
saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they
limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that
Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of
remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except
as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is
too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof.
Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above
provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of
a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that
they go back to the original wording of the provision as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the
pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration
of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before
contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral
conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and
living with another woman other than complainant while
his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting,
said that "for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the
same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of
remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the
position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is
placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members,
the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not
state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which
case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been
such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly,
one can conceive of other instances where a party might
well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses,
as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage
which remains subsisting desires to enter into another
marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by
law to prove that the previous one was an absolute
nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In
other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected
by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal,
and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family
to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose
of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely
on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is so defective with respect to the
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render
it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing
more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying properties were acquired with private respondent's
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human money.
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social
significant institution, an official state pronouncement The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other
and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same properties."
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to
everyone.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states
that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one the spouses, the custody and support of the common
of the parties may be gleaned from new information children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
required in the Family Code to be included in the unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
married, how, when and where the previous marriage therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
was dissolved and annulled." 23
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's
interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
private respondent's failure to state in the petition that
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage
the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
community property or conjugal partnership property
misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by
there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
the members of the Committee.
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be
misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage."
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid,
Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the
faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
operation of law;
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only,"
which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for
in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner
stipulated as irrevocable; and
suggests that private respondent should have filed an
ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such
in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction
to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In
addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's
ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be
one of the necessary consequences of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to
be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted
for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations governing
them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly,
the respondent court committed no reversible error in
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP
No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
The decision of respondent Court dated February 7,
1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69550 November 24, 1988
MARIA LUISA O. COJUANGCO, and LEO J.
PALMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE
OF RTC BRANCH XXVII, PASAY CITY AND
SPOUSES EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., AND
SOLEDAD O. COJUANGCO, respondents.
Rayala, Estrada & Associates Law Offices for
petitioners.
Angara, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices for
private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking: (1) to annul and set aside:
(a) the Order dated August 17, 1984 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court, Branch
XXVII, Pasay City, which reconsidered and set aside its
Order of July 19, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No.
Pq-0401-P, an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, entitled "Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco et al. v.
Leo J. Palma" and reinstating the same and (b) the
Order dated December 10, 1984 denying the Joint
Motion for Reconsideration of aforesaid resolution; and
(2) to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with
Case No. Pq-041-P.
The decretal portion of the aforementioned order of
August 17, 1984, reads:
The Order of July 19, 1984, is hereby reconsidered and
set aside and the instant case reinstated.
By reason of and pursuant to the order of the Honorable
Court dated December 21, 1983, defendant is hereby
granted a period of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof
within which to file his answer to the complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Annex 1, p. 42, Rollo)
while the dispositive portion of the subsequent order
dated December 10, 1984, reads:
Acting on the joint motion for reconsideration dated
September, 4, 1984, which seeks to set aside the Order
of this Court dated August 17, 1984 reinstating the
instant case, and considering the arguments raised
therein as well as the opposition filed thereto, the court
resolves to deny the aforesaid 'joint Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Annex N, p. 72, Rollo)
This case is related to and is an incident of G.R. No.
64538 entitled "Leo Palma v. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr.
et al." which was resolved by the First Division of this
Court per resolution dated December 21, 1983, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
Upon consideration of the averments and arguments
adduced in the petition, respondent's comment,
petitioners' reply and respondent's rejoinder and the
documents annexed thereto, the Court Resolved to
GRANT the petition and as prayed for, to ORDER
respondent judge to conduct a new trial in the case
below and to allow petitioner to file his answer, which
answer should be filed within ten (10) days from finality
of this Resolution. The records show that respondent
Judge acted with undue haste in declaring petitioner in
default on the complaint filed on August 24, 1982 and in
rendering his ex parte decision of November 2, 1982, as
well as in refusing to give due course to the timely appeal
filed by petitioner and instead ordering the execution of
the judgment.
On the disallowance of the appeal, respondent judge
relied on the inapplicable case of Strachan & Macmurray,
Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals (62 SCRA 109) (re default in
municipal courts under Rule 5, section 13), when under
Rule 41, section 2, which is the rule applicable to default
cases in courts of first instance (now regional trial courts),
"(A)party who has been declared in default may likewise
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition
for relief to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him in accordance with Rule 38." But more
decisively, and even though not raised in the petition but
taken cognizance of by the Court since it involves a
matter of jurisdiction and authority Rule 18, Section 6
expressly mandates that there can be no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage and provides that "(I)f
the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the prosecution, attorney to investigate, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
that the evidence is not fabricated."
Considering further that in petitioner's reply, he states
that in a letter of the principal plaintiff, Maria Luisa O.
Cojuangco, dated September, 1982 addressed to
respondent's counsel (Annex T, petition), she expressed
her desire not to take part in the case, the ends of justice
will be subserved by setting aside the judgment of
November 2, 1982 and the subsequent implementing
orders of January 17, 1983 and June 6, 1983 and
remanding the case to respondent judge's court for
proper proceeding and determination. (Rollo, G.R. No.
64538, pp. 163-164)
and the resolution of May 28, 1984 denying the motion
for reconsideration of aforesaid resolution.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 24, 1982, an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage between Leo J. Palma and Maria Luisa O.
Cojuangco (hereinafter referred to as petitioners) was
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now
Regional Trial Court Branch XXVII, Pasay City, docketed
as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P by Maria Luisa O.
Cojuangco and Spouses Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and
Soledad O. Cojuangco (spouses Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr. and Soledad O. Cojuangco). The complaint alleged
that Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco is 22 years of age, single
and daughter of private respondents, Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. and Soledad O. Cojuangco, while
defendant Leo J. Palma, is a lawyer, 35 years of age and
married to Elizabeth H. Palma with whom he contracted
marriage on December 19, 1971 at Cebu City and with
whom he has been continuously cohabiting, thereby
begetting three (3) children by her, namely: Eugene
Philip, born on March 23, 1973, Elias Anton, born on
February 16, 1975 and Eduardo Lorenzo, born on
September 18, 1976. The complaint further alleged that
Palma, who was for sometime a member of the law firm
of Angara, Concepcion, Regala, and Cruz Law Offices
("ACCRA") was offered by private respondent Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr. to be his own personal and
confidential counsel and that of his family and
companies wholly owned by him, which was promptly
accepted by the petitioner Palma; that he became so
close with the family of the private respondents and was
requested to tutor petitioner Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco,
who was then a student at the Assumption College; that
with grave abuse and betrayal of trust and confidence
reposed in him and with his moral and intellectual
ascendancy over Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco, he
succeeded in courting and contracting a second
marriage with her on June 22, 1982 by falsely
representing to the Hongkong authorities that he is a
"bachelor". Consequently, the marriage between Leo
Palma and Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco, is null and void for
being bigamous and/or contrary to law, morals, good
customs and public policy. Complainants (herein private
respondents) prayed that judgment be rendered
declaring the marriage null and void ab initio and
ordering petitioner Palma to pay private respondents
reasonable amounts as moral, nominal and exemplary
damages, reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation as may be proved in the course of the trial.
On September 27, 1982, apparently because she
wanted to continue her marital union, Maria Luisa O.
Cojuangco sought the immediate dismissal of the
aforecited case and wrote petitioner's counsel, seeking
the dismissal of the said case. On the same date,
respondent Judge issued an order granting Leo J. Palma
three (3) days ending on September 30, 1982 within
which to file his answer to the complaint itself (Rollo, G.R.
No. 64538, p.3).
On October 5, 1982, Palma was declared in default
(Ibid).
On October 13, 1982, Palma prayed for reconsideration
of the order declaring him in default, and a last extension
of fifteen (15) days from October 10, 1982 within which
to file a responsive pleading to the complaint (Ibid., p. 3).
On October 25, 1982, Maria Luisa filed a Motion to
Dismiss which apparently was not acted upon by
respondent Judge. Instead, an Order was issued on the
same date denying Palma's motion for reconsideration
(Ibid).
On November 2, 1982, the lower court issued a decision
declaring the marriage of herein petitioner on June 22,
1982 as null and void ab initio, while on February 18,
1983, Palma's motion for reconsideration (of aforesaid
decision) with motion to lift order of default was denied.
Hence, the petition for Certiorari, mandamus With
Preliminary Injunction, filed in G.R. No. 64538.
On December 21, 1983, the First Division of this Court
issued the aforequoted resolution setting aside the
judgment of November 2, 1982 of the lower court.
In the lower court, a notice of dismissal dated July 13,
1984 was filed by petitioner Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco
affirming her avowal of not being a part of the case and
of her desire for its dismissal with prejudice. Meanwhile,
Palma filed a Motion and Rejoinder to Notice of
Dismissal with Reservation to File Responsive Pleading
after receipt of resolution dated July 18, 1984.
Accordingly, on July 19, 1984, an order was issued by
the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P with
prejudice.
Thereafter, on August 14, 1984, the parents of Maria
Luisa filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal dated July 19, 1984 alleging among others,
that the notice of dismissal of July 13, 1984 is of doubtful
authenticity and/or source and that said parents had not
been given a day in court; that the aforementioned order
runs counter to the resolution of the court directing that a
new trial be conducted.
On August 17, 1984, Palma filed an opposition to the
motion for reconsideration. On the same day, August 17,
1984, an order was issued granting the motion for
reconsideration, setting aside the order of July 19, 1984.
On September 5, 1984, petitioners Maria O. Cojuangco
and Leo Palma, filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration
of the order of August 17, 1984 which was denied for
lack of merit in the order of December 10, 1984.
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of January 21, 1985, this Court required
respondents to file their answer to the petition (Rollo, p.
33), which answer was filed on March 1, 1985 (Rollo, p.
83).
In the resolution of March 18, 1985, this Court required
petitioners to file their reply (Rollo, p. 107), which was
filed on May 13, 1985. In compliance with the resolution
of July 10, 1985 (Rollo, p. 133), petitioners filed their
memorandum on September 5, 1985 (Rollo, p. 134),
while private respondents filed their memorandum on
October 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 148).<äre||anº•1àw>
In their petition, petitioners raised the following grounds
to support the petition:
I
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE CASE AND THE ORDER SETTING
ASIDE THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS CONTRARY TO
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO WANT OF
JURISDICTION. (p. 7, Rollo).
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent
Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to want of jurisdiction, in refusing to dismiss the case in
the lower court.
A careful perusal of the records shows that such refusal
by respondent Judge was in obedience to the resolution
of the First Division of this Court of December 21, 1983
in G.R. No. 64538 entitled "Leo Palma v. Hon. Manuel V.
Romillo, Jr., et al." specifically ordering respondent
Judge to conduct a new trial in the case below and to
allow petitioner to file his answer.
On the other hand, Palma not only failed to file an
answer within ten (10) days as required in aforesaid
resolution, but insisted instead on the dismissal of
subject case, on grounds already considered by this
Court before the issuance of said resolution. Such action
of the petitioner is obviously a disobedience to, if not a
blatant defiance of this Court's Order, or at the very least,
it is a bid to delay the disposition of this case on the
merits. Failing to achieve his objective in the lower court,
Palma now elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on
certiorari and Prohibition without first complying with the
requirements of aforesaid resolution of December 21,
1983.
Moreover, the Court, in general does not entertain a
petition for certiorari questioning the propriety of an
interlocutory order (De Midgely v. Fernando, 64 SCRA
23 [1975]; Malit v. People, 114 SCRA 349 [1982]) unless
grave abuse of discretion was patently committed by the
trial court (Bernabe v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 78 SCRA
341 [1977]; Villalon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144
SCRA 443 [1986]) or where broader interests of justice
require exception. An order denying a motion to dismiss
is interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of a petition
for certiorari (Occena v. Jabson, 73 SCRA 637 [1976];
Gamboa v. Victoriano, 90 SCRA 40 [1979]; Bautista v.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]; Cruz v. People, 144
SCRA 677 [1986]) unless in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash, the court acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in
which case certiorari or prohibition lies (Newsweek, Inc.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 17 [1986]).
Unquestionably, respondent Judge cannot be faulted for
following the resolution of this Court. In the exercise of
his jurisdiction, errors allegedly committed by respondent
Judge may be corrected by a timely appeal and not by a
special civil action of certiorari (Santos v. C.A., 152
SCRA 378 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The case is thus hereby REMANDED to
the respondent trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 159220, September 22, 2008]
MA. DARLENE
DIMAYUGA-LAURENA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS AND JESSE LAURO
LAURENA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 6
June 2003 Decision2 and 1 August 2003 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58458. The
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 25 March
1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 140 (trial court) in Civil Case No. 93-3754.
The Antecedent Facts
Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena (petitioner) and Jesse
Lauro Laurena (respondent) met in January 1983. 4 They
were married on 19 December 1983 at the Church of
Saint Augustine in Intramuros, Manila. They have two
children, Mark Jordan who was born on 2 July 1985 and
Michael Joseph who was born on 11 November 1987.
On 19 October 1993, petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage against respondent.
Petitioner alleged that respondent was psychologically
incapable of assuming the essential obligations of
marriage, and the incapacity existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage although she discovered it
only after the marriage.
Petitioner alleged that after their wedding, she and
respondent went to Baguio City for their honeymoon.
They were accompanied by a 15-year old boy, the son of
one of respondent's house helpers, who respondent
invited to sleep in their hotel suite. After their honeymoon,
they settled in respondent's house in Better Living
Subdivision, Parañaque City. Petitioner became
pregnant in March 1984 but suffered a miscarriage.
According to petitioner, she almost bled to death while
respondent continued watching a television show at the
foot of their matrimonial bed.
Petitioner alleged that respondent gave priority to the
needs of his parents; would come home past midnight;
and even tried to convert her to his religion. In addition,
respondent was a womanizer. Petitioner lived in
Batangas for three years while she tended to their
gasoline station while respondent remained in
Parañaque City. She discovered that respondent had
been living a bachelor's life while she was away.
Petitioner also noticed that respondent had feminine
tendencies. They would frequently quarrel and one time,
respondent hit her face. Petitioner alleged that in
September 1990, respondent abandoned their conjugal
home and stopped supporting their children. Petitioner
alleged that respondent's psychological incapacity was
manifested by his infidelity, utter neglect of his family's
needs, irresponsibility, insensitivity, and tendency to lead
a bachelor's life.
Petitioner further alleged that during their marriage, she
and respondent acquired the following properties which
were all part of their conjugal partnership of gains:
1. duplex house and lot located at 4402 Dayap
Street, Palanan, Makati City;
2. house and lot on Palaspas Street, Tanauan,
Batangas;
3. dealership of Jeddah Caltex Service Station in
Pres. Laurel Highway, Tanauan, Batangas
(Jeddah Caltex Station);
4. Personal vehicles consisting of a Mitsubishi
Lancer, Safari pick-up, L-300 van and L-200
pick-up; and
5. Jeddah Trucking.
Petitioner prayed for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, for custody of their children, and for
monthly support of P25,000.
Respondent denied petitioner's allegations. He asserted
that petitioner was emotionally immature, stubborn,
unstable, unreasonable, and extremely jealous.
Respondent alleged that some of the properties claimed
by petitioner were not part of their conjugal partnership of
gains. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision5 dated 25 March 1997, the trial court
denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The trial court found that the manifestations of
respondent's psychological incapacity alleged by
petitioner were not so serious as to consider respondent
psychologically incapacitated. The trial court ruled that
petitioner's evidence only showed that she could not get
along with respondent.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered:
a) DENYING the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed
by Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena on
the ground of psychological incapacity;
b) DECLARING the conjugal
partnership of gains between
petitioner and respondent Dissolved
with all the effects provided by law;
and further AFFIRMING the
petitioner's claim that all the properties
acquired during the marriage are
conjugal properties;
c) AWARDING the custody of the
children to the parent chosen by the
said minors considering that they are
over seven (7) years of age;
Support of said minors shall be borne
by the parents in proportion to their
respective incomes.
After this decision becomes final, let
copies thereof be furnished the
Register of Deeds of Tanauan,
Batangas and Makati City for their
information.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision insofar
as the trial court denied her petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Respondent appealed from the trial
court's Decision insofar as the trial court declared some
of his parents' properties as part of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 6 June 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the trial court's Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to prove
that the root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity was medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts. The Court of Appeals
noted that Dr. Lourdes Lapuz (Dr. Lapuz), the
psychiatrist presented by petitioner, was not able to talk
to respondent and simply based her conclusions and
impressions of respondent from her two-hour session
with petitioner. The Court of Appeals ruled that Dr.
Lapuz's testimony was vague and ambiguous on the
matter of respondent's personality disorder which would
render him psychologically incapacitated. The Court of
Appeals further ruled that petitioner was not able to
prove that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity
was existing at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. The Court of Appeals further ruled that in her
complaint, petitioner's bases were respondent's
irresponsibility, insensitivity, and infidelity. During the trial,
she claimed that the root of her husband's incapacity
was his homosexuality. The Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner's allegations in her complaint and during the
trial lacked factual and evidentiary bases. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the totality of respondent's acts could
not lead to the conclusion that he was psychologically
incapacitated; that his incapacity was existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage; and that it was
incurable.
The Court of Appeals also sustained the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and
respondent. The Court of Appeals rejected respondent's
argument that the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
of gains should also be denied because of the denial of
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Court of Appeals ruled that respondent's abandonment
of his family and the fact that petitioner and respondent
had been separated for more than a year prior to the
filing of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
were sufficient grounds for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
However, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court
included as part of the conjugal partnership of gains
properties and businesses, particularly the ancestral
house and lot in Tanauan, Batangas; the duplex house 2. Whether the properties excluded by the Court would be beyond the means of the
and lot on Dayap Street, Makati City; the Jeddah Caltex of Appeals form part of the conjugal partnership party involved.13
Station; and Jeddah Trucking, which all belonged to of gains between petitioner and respondent.
respondent's parents. The Court of Appeals found that In Republic v. Court of Appeals14 (Molina case), the
the rentals derived from the properties and the income Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
The Ruling of this Court application of Article 36 of the Family Code as follows:
from the businesses were deposited in the account of
respondent's parents. The Court of Appeals excluded
1) The burden of
the properties and businesses derived from the The petition has no merit. proof to show the
operations of the Jeddah Caltex Station and Jeddah
nullity of the
Trucking from the conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner Failed to Prove Respondent's marriage belongs to
Psychological Incapacity the plaintiff. Any
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision
doubt should be
reads:
resolved in favor of
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
WHEREFORE, the foregoing the existence and
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
considered, the assailed decision is continuation of the
provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who,
AFFIRMED with regard to the denial of marriage and
at the time of celebration, was psychologically
the petition for annulment of marriage against its
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
and the dissolution of the conjugal dissolution and
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
partnership of gains. The adjudication nullity. This is rooted
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
respecting the properties which in the fact that both
solemnization." In Santos v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court
comprise the conjugal partnership is our Constitution and
first declared that psychological incapacity must be
MODIFIED to exclude the properties our laws cherish the
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence;
belonging to the parents of respondent, validity of marriage
and (c) incurability.9 It should refer to "no less than a
i.e., the ancestral house and lot in and unity of the
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
Tanauan, Batangas, the duplex house family. Thus, our
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
and lot at Dayap Street, Makati, as Constitution devotes
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
well as the properties acquired an entire Article on
parties to the marriage"10 It must be confined to "the
through the operation of the Caltex the Family,
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
station and Jeddah Trucking. No costs. recognizing it "as
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
the foundation of the
meaning and significance to the marriage"11 Finally, the
SO ORDERED.7 nation. It decrees
"psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage as legally
marriage is celebrated"12 The Court explained:
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. inviolable," thereby
(a) Gravity - It must be grave and protecting it from
In its 1 August 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals serious such that the party would be dissolution at the
denied the motion. incapable of carrying out the ordinary whim of the parties.
duties required in a marriage; Both the family and
Hence, the petition before this Court. marriage are to be
(b) Judicial Antecedence - It must be "protected" by the
The Issues rooted in the history of the party state.
antedating the marriage, although the
The Family Code
overt manifestations may emerge only
The issues in this case are the following: echoes this
after the marriage; and
constitutional edict
on marriage and the
1. Whether respondent is psychologically (c) Incurability - It must be incurable,
family and
incapacitated to comply with the essential or even if it were otherwise, the cure
emphasizes their
marital obligations; and
permanence,
inviolability and identified as a relevant to the
solidarity. psychological illness assumption of
and its marriage obligations,
2) The root cause of incapacitating not necessarily to
the psychological nature fully those not related to
incapacity must be: explained. Expert marriage, like the
(a) medically or evidence may be exercise of a
clinically identified, given by qualified profession or
(b) alleged in the psychiatrists and employment in a job.
complaint, (c) clinical Hence, a
sufficiently proven psychologists. pediatrician may be
by experts and (d) effective in
clearly explained in 3) The incapacity diagnosing illnesses
the decision. Article must be proven to of children and
36 of the Family be existing at "the prescribing
Code requires that time of the medicine to cure
the incapacity must celebration" of the them but not be
be psychological not marriage. The psychologically
physical, although evidence must show capacitated to
its manifestations that the illness was procreate, bear and
and/or symptoms existing when the raise his/her own
may be physical. parties exchanged children as an
The evidence must their "I do's." The essential obligation
convince the court manifestation of the of marriage.
that the parties, or illness need not be
one of them, was perceivable at such 5) Such illness must
mentally or time, but the illness be grave enough to
psychically ill to itself must have bring about the
such an extent that attached at such disability of the party
the person could not moment, or prior to assume the
have known the thereto. essential obligations
obligations he was of marriage. Thus,
assuming, or 4) Such incapacity "mild
knowing them, must also be shown characteriological
could not have to be medically or peculiarities, mood
given valid clinically permanent changes, occasional
assumption thereof. or incurable. Such emotional
Although no incurability may be outbursts" cannot
example of such absolute or even be accepted as root
incapacity need be relative only in causes. The illness
given here so as not regard to the other must be shown as
to limit the spouse, not downright incapacity
application of the necessarily or inability, not a
provision under the absolutely against refusal, neglect or
principle everyone of the difficulty, much less
of ejusdem generis, same sex. ill will. In other
nevertheless such Furthermore, such words, there is a
root cause must be incapacity must be natal or supervening
disabling factor in Family Code
the person, an Revision Committee In Marcos v. Marcos,17 the Court ruled that if the totalities
adverse integral from Canon 1095 of of the evidence presented are enough to sustain a
element in the the New Code of finding of psychological incapacity, there is no need to
personality structure Canon Law, which resort to the actual medical examination of the person
that effectively became effective in concerned. However, while an actual medical,
incapacitates the 1983 and which psychiatric, or psychological examination is not
person from really provides: a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological
accepting and incapacity, an expert witness would have strengthened
thereby complying "The following are petitioner's claim of respondent's psychological
with the obligations incapable of incapacity.18 While the examination by a physician of a
essential to contracting person to declare him or her psychologically
marriage. marriage: Those incapacitated is not required, the root cause of
who are unable to psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
6) The essential assume the identified.19 In this case, the testimony of Dr. Lapuz on
marital obligations essential obligations respondent's psychological incapacity was based only
must be those of marriage due to on her two-hour session with petitioner. Her testimony
embraced by causes of was characterized by the Court of Appeals as vague and
Articles 68 up to 71 psychological ambiguous. She failed to prove psychological incapacity
of the Family Code nature." or identify its root cause. She failed to establish that
as regards the respondent's psychological incapacity is incurable. Dr.
husband and wife Since the purpose of including such Lapuz testified:
as well as Articles provision in our Family Code is to
220, 221 and 225 of harmonize our civil laws with the What, in your opinion are the causes of this
Q-
the same Code in religious faith of our people, it stands incapacity?
regard to parents to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive I feel, your Honor, that there is some personality
and their children.
weight should be given to decisions of agenda on his part that I do not know because he
Such non-complied
such appellate tribunal. Ideally - A- has not come to see me but there are such men
marital obligation(s)
subject to our law on evidence - what who can be very ardent lovers but suddenly will
must also be stated
is decreed as canonically invalid completely turn over...
in the petition,
proven by evidence should also be decreed civilly void.15
and included in the
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
text of the decision. Q- Is this a sort of personality disorder?
petitioner failed to satisfy the guidelines in the Molina
case. A- Yes, your Honor.
7) Interpretations
given by the
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner anchored
National Appellate
her petition on respondent's irresponsibility, infidelity,
Matrimonial Tribunal Is that inherited or could have been acquired even
and homosexual tendencies. Petitioner likewise alleged Q-
of the Catholic before marriage?
that respondent tried to compel her to change her
Church in the
religious belief, and in one of their arguments, It was there on the time of the inception of his
Philippines, while
respondent also hit her. However, sexual infidelity, personality, it was there. And my feeling is that
not controlling or
repeated physical violence, homosexuality, physical A- these things do not happen overnight, one does not
decisive, should be
violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change spot overnight but that thing, like marriage,
given great respect
change religious affiliation, and abandonment are can completely turn-table his behavior.
by our courts. It is
grounds for legal separation16 but not for declaring a
clear that Article 36
marriage void.
was taken by the

Doctora, do you think this kind of incapacity, this
Q- personality disorder, is there any possibility of
curing it?
Very little at this time and sometimes, when they
become older, like when they reach the age of 50's
A-
or 60's, they may settle down and finally give out
and reveal interest in their families.
In short, there is possibility that this incapacity of
Q-
the respondent could be cured?
Only respondent's physical decline of sexual urge, if
A- the sexual urge would not decline, the incapacity
will continue.
Is there no medicine or is there any kind of
Q-
medicine that can cure this kind of disorder?
None to my knowledge, your Honor. There is no
magic feather in the psychiatric treatment. Perhaps,
A-
if the person would be willing and open enough and
interested enough...20
Even the recommendation in the Social Case Study
Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer Marissa P.
Obrero-Ballon, who was assigned by the trial court to
conduct a social case study on the parties, failed to show
the existence of respondent's psychological incapacity.
The Social Welfare Officer instead found that petitioner
was immature while respondent was responsible. 21 She
also found that the couple separated because of
respondent's infidelity.22
Petitioner also failed to prove that respondent's
psychological incapacity was existing at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. Petitioner only cited that
during their honeymoon, she found it strange that
respondent allowed their 15-year old companion, the son
of one of respondent's house helpers, to sleep in their
room. However, respondent explained that he and
petitioner already stayed in a hotel for one night before
they went to Baguio City and that they had sexual
relations even before their marriage. Respondent
explained that the boy was with them to take pictures
and videos of their stay in Baguio City and had to stay
with them in the room due to monetary constraints.
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by
petitioner failed to show that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity
was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the
solemnization of their marriage.
Properties of Respondent's Parents
Do Not Form Part of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' exclusion of the
properties of respondent's parents from their conjugal
partnership of gains. In particular, the Court of Appeals
excluded the ancestral house and lot in Tanauan,
Batangas; the duplex house and lot on Dayap Street,
Makati City; and the properties acquired through the
operations of the Jeddah Caltex Station and Jeddah
Trucking.
We sustain in part the Court of Appeals' Decision.
As early as 15 July 1978, respondent's parents already
executed a General Power of Attorney23 in favor of
respondent covering all their properties and businesses.
Several Special Powers of Attorney were also executed
by respondent's parents in favor of respondent. On 14
April 1987, respondent's parents executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale24 covering two parcels of land located in
Tanauan, Batangas, with a total area of 966 square
meters, for P40,000. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the transfer was merely an accommodation so that
petitioner, who was then working at the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP), could acquire a loan from BSP at a
lower rate25 using the properties as collateral. The loan
proceeds were used as additional capital for the Jeddah
Caltex Station. As found by the Court of Appeals, the
loan was still being paid from the income from the
Jeddah Caltex Station. The Lease Contract26 on the
Jeddah Caltex Station was signed by respondent as
attorney-in-fact of his mother Juanita Laurena, leaving
no doubt that it was the business of respondent's parents.
Jeddah Trucking was established from the proceeds and
income of the Jeddah Caltex Station.
As regards the duplex house and lot in Makati City, the
Deed of Absolute Sale27 was executed by Manuela C.
Felix in favor of respondent. Respondent claimed that
the duplex house was purchased from the income of the
Jeddah Caltex Station. However, we find no sufficient
proof to sustain this allegation. In fact, respondent
testified that he received a series of promotions during
their marriage "until we can afford to buy that duplex [on]
Dayap"28 Hence, the duplex house on Dayap Street,
Makati City should be included in the conjugal
partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition.
We AFFIRM the 6 June 2003 Decision and 1 August
2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 58458 with MODIFICATION by including the duplex
house and lot on Dayap Street, Makati City in the
conjugal partnership of gains. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010
ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR y ALUNAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (petitioner) challenges
through his petition for review on certiorari 1 the decision
dated May 31, 20052 and the resolution dated December
6, 20053 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
75207.The challenged decision reversed the
resolution4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
276, Muntinlupa City, declaring the marriage of the
petitioner and Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (respondent)
null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand,
denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a
beerhouse where the latter worked. The petitioner, at
that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau
of Customs, while the respondent was a 17-year old
waitress. Their meeting led to a courtship, and they
eventually became sweethearts. They often spent nights
together at the respondent’s rented room, and soon
entered into a common-law relationship.
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent
contracted marriage in a ceremony officiated by
Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila.
The petitioner’s family was apprehensive about this
marriage because of the nature of the respondent’s work
and because she came from a broken family. Out of their
union, the petitioner and the respondent begot four (4)
children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and
Eymarey.
On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
01-081. He alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage as she was carefree and
irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like
cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for
long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not
take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in
order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family
name Agraviador in her activities.
The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent
refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she
became "very close" to a male tenant in their house. In
fact, he discovered their love notes to each other, and
caught them inside his room several times.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the root cause of her psychological
incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the
petition.6 The RTC denied this motion in its order dated
July 2, 2001.7
In her answer,8 the respondent denied that she engaged
in extramarital affairs and maintained that it was the
petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She claimed
that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage
annulled because he wanted to marry their former
household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she
was the one who took care of their son at the hospital
before he died.
The RTC ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor
General to investigate if collusion existed between the
parties.9 The RTC, in its Order of November 20, 2001,
allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex
parte.10 The petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to substantiate his claims.
In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed what he stated
in his petition, i.e., that the respondent was carefree,
irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly did
what she wanted; did not stay long in the conjugal
dwelling; refused to do household chores; refused to
take care of him and their children; and consulted a witch
doctor in order to bring bad luck upon him.
The petitioner further confirmed that the respondent
abandoned their sick child, which led to the latter’s death.
The petitioner further stated that the respondent became
very close to a male border of their house; he discovered
their love notes to each other, and caught them inside
his room several times.
The petitioner declared that he filed the petition for nullity
because the respondent refused to change; he loves his
children and does not want their children to be affected
by their mother’s conduct. He intimated that he might
remarry if it would benefit their children.
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a
certified true copy of their marriage contract (Exh.
"B")11 and the psychiatric evaluation report (Exh.
"A")12 of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.
In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the
following findings:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son
and their helper, the psychological report and the mental
status examination, Enrique is found to be
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations
of marriage. He coped with Erlinda’s selfish and
irresponsible behavior as he dutifully performed what
she failed to do for the family. He patiently tried to
understand her and exerted every effort to make her
realize the harm caused by her neglect to the family.
Throughout their marriage, he provided emotional and
material support for the family. He engaged in other
business endeavors aside from his employment as he
maintained to be financially productive.
The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage. She manifested
inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time before
their marriage. She is known to be stubborn and
uncaring who did things her way without regard to the
feelings of others. She is an irresponsible individual who
selfishly ignored and neglected her role as daughter to
her parents as wife to Enrique and mother to their
children. Before the marriage at a young age of 17,
Erlinda defied her parents as she lived alone, rented a
room for herself and allowed Enrique to sleep with her.
She did not care about the needs of Enrique before and
after marriage and she maintained to be so with her
children. She abandoned and relegated her duty to her
family to their helper. She never stayed long in their
house despite pleadings from her children and Enrique.
Her irresponsible, uncaring behavior even led to the
death of one of their children. Likewise, she does not
show concern and ignores a daughter who is presently
manifesting behavioral problem. She kept secrets as she
never allowed her husband and children know where she
stays when she’s not at work. She falsified documents as
she hid her marital status when she used her maiden
surname in her present employment. She is having illicit
affairs and is reported to be presently having an affair
with a lesbian. Her desire to bring bad fate and death to
Enrique through her consultation with a "mangkukulam"
point out her lack of care, love, and respect to Enrique.
Erlinda’s lack of motivation and insight greatly affected
her capacity to render love, respect and support to her
family.
The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a
Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She
has been having this disorder since her adolescence.
There is no definite treatment for this disorder. She is
deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform the
obligations of marriage.
In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo
the same examination as Enrique underwent.13
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the
respondent in its decision of April 26, 2002. It saw merit
in the petitioner’s testimony and Dr. Patac’s psychiatric
evaluation report, and concluded that:
Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the
findings of the doctor show that Respondent is indeed
suffering from "Mixed Personality Disorder" that render
her incapable of complying with her marital obligations.
Respondent’s refusal to commit herself to the marriage,
her tendencies to avoid a close relationship with
Petitioner, preferring to be with her lover and finally
abandoning their home for a lesbian, a disregard of
social norm, show that she was never prepared for
marital commitment in the first place. This incapacity is
deeply rooted from her family upbringing with no hope for
a cure. Therefore, for the good of society and of the
parties themselves, it is best that this marriage between
ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN and ERLINDA
AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it never took
place at all. The Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and
the General Civil Registrar, National Census and
Statistics Office, East Avenue, Quezon City, are hereby
requested to make the necessary correction of the civil
record of the marriage between the parties and on their
respective civil status.
The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL
AGRAVIADOR, EVELYN AGRAVIADOR and
EYMAREY AGRAVIADOR will however remain as their
legitimate children.
It is SO ORDERED.14
The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
The CA, in its decision15 dated May 31, 2005, reversed
and set aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the
petition.
The CA held that Dr. Patac’s psychiatric evaluation
report failed to establish that the respondent’s
personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent;
it likewise did not mention the root cause of her
incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had no
basis in concluding that the respondent’s disorder had
no definite treatment because he did not subject her to a
mental assessment.
The CA added that the "psychiatric remarks" in the
Report were nothing but a showcase of respondent’s
character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a
natal or supervening factor that effectively incapacitated
the respondent from accepting and complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. If at all, these
character flaws may only give rise to a legal separation
suit.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the
CA denied his motion in its resolution of December 6,
2005.16
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition
to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling,
based on the following arguments:
I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY
[HIM] WAS MORE THAN
SUBSTANTIAL TO ESTABLISH THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
THE RESPONDENT[;]
II. THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN
REPUBLIC V. MOLINA [HAD BEEN]
SATISIFIED[;]
III. THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION
REPORT XXX STILL STANDS FOR
NOT HAVING BEEN CONTESTED
XXX BY THE STATE AND/THE
RESPONDENT[; and]
IV. THE DEGREE OF PROOF
REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES HAD
BEEN SATISIFIED[.]
The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether
there is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and
hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage,
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.
The totality of evidence presented
failed to establish the respondent’s
psychological incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization." It introduced the concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage, although this concept eludes exact definition.
The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it
did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family
Code revision committee that drafted the Code,
conceded that the spouse may have given free and
voluntary consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless,
incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations does not affect the consent to the
marriage."17
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."19 It must be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals20 (the Molina case)
where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we
established in Santos. A later case, Marcos v.
Marcos,21 further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly,
it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality
of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists
and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can
be duly established.
A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,22 declared that it may
have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid
set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. We stated that instead of
serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only
contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well
because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no
case can be considered as on "all fours" with another.
Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of
time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina.
Ting v. Velez-Ting23 and the fairly recent case of Suazo v.
Suazo24 squarely met the issue and laid to rest any
question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these
cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina;
far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the
relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also
explained in Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a more
flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.
Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of
the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to prove the
respondent’s psychological incapacity.
a. Petitioner’s court testimony
For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of the
petitioner’s testimony that essentially confirmed what the
petition alleged:
Q: Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were
you blessed with children, and how many?
A: Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys
and two (2) girls.
Q: Where are they now?
A: All grown up with the exception of one who died of
pneumonia due to the neglect and fault of my said wife
who abandone[d] him at the time of his illness.
Q: Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition,
Mr. Witness?
A: It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.
Q: Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?
A: She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature,
whimsical and used to impose what she wanted to get,
she refused to do household chores, like cooking, caring
for the husband and children, used to stay from the
conjugal dwelling, initially for weeks, then for months and
lately fully abandoned the family house and stay with a
lesbian. [sic]
At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive
and used to be very close to a male renter in the ground
floor of their house and caught them several times alone
in his room, thus explaining the reason why she refused
to have sex since 1993, up to and until the present time.
Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult
"mangkukulam" to bring bad fate against the family and
death for me.
Q: By the way did you give her the chance to change?
A: I gave her but she refused to reform.
xxxx
Q: Can you not give a last chance for you to save your
marriage?
A: I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault
and she does not want to change for the sake of our
family.25
These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the
totality of the petitioner’s testimony on the respondent’s
supposed psychological or mental malady. We glean
from these exchanges the petitioner’s theory that the
respondent’s psychological incapacity is premised on
her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital
obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality
traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and
unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that the law requires, and
should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some
marriages.26 The intent of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders – existing at the
time of the marriage – clearly demonstrating an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.27 The psychological illness that must
have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is
about to assume.28
In the present case, the petitioner’s testimony failed to
establish that the respondent’s condition is a
manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some
incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that
makes her completely unable to discharge the essential
marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed
that the respondent had some personality defects that
showed their manifestation during the marriage; his
testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish
that the respondent’s defects existed at the inception of
the marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss
the gravity of the respondent’s condition; neither did he
mention that the respondent’s malady was incurable, or
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
respondent’s means to undertake. The petitioner’s
declarations that the respondent "does not accept her
fault," "does not want to change," and "refused to reform"
are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental
defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,29 we ruled that it was not
enough that the respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the
respondent's personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations – had to be shown.
b. Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report
The Court finds that Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation
Report fell short in proving that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not
personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in
fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the
respondent to "undergo the same examination [that the
petitioner] underwent."30 Dr. Patac relied only on the
information fed by the petitioner, the parties’ second
child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely,
the doctor relied on the information provided by the
petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair
gauge to assess the petitioner’s own psychological
condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations
of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with
respect to the respondent’s condition. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of the examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder.31
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the
party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that
the person sought to be declared psychologically
incapacitated must be personally examined by a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at
such declaration.32 If a psychological disorder can be
proven by independent means, no reason exists why
such independent proof cannot be admitted and given
credit.33 No such independent evidence appears on
record, however, to have been gathered in this case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the
juridical antecedence of the respondent’s condition by
stating that the respondent manifested "inflexible
maladaptive behavior" before marriage, pointing out how
the respondent behaved before the marriage – the
respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a
room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with
her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are
insufficient to establish that the incapacity was rooted in
the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. Dr.
Patac failed to elucidate on the circumstances that led
the respondent to act the way she did, for example, why
she "defied her parents" and decided to live alone; why
she "neglected her obligations as a daughter;" and why
she often slept with the petitioner. This is an area where
independent evidence, such as information from a
person intimately related to the respondent, could prove
useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence
was gathered in this case. In the absence of such
evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report
Evaluation failed to explain how and why the
respondent’s so-called inflexible maladaptive behavior
was already present at the time of the marriage.
Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed
to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondent’s
condition. He simply made an enumeration of the
respondent’s purported behavioral defects (as related to
him by third persons), and on this basis characterized
the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality
disorder. In the "Background History" portion of his
Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that
the respondent employed one of her siblings to do the
household chores; did not help in augmenting the
family’s earnings; belittled the petitioner’s income;
continued her studies despite the petitioner’s disapproval;
seldom stayed at home; became "close" to a male
border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the
actual date of her departure to Taiwan; threatened to
poison the petitioner and their children; neglected and
ignored their children; used her maiden name at work;
and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad fate to the
petitioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded
statement that "Erlinda’s lack of motivation and insight
greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and
support to the family,"34 there was no other statement
regarding the degree of severity of the respondent’s
condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave,
and how it incapacitated her to comply with the duties
required in marriage. There was likewise no showing of a
supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychological
condition that effectively incapacitated the respondent
from complying with the essential marital obligations. At
any rate, the personality flaws mentioned above, even if
true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not
by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Interestingly, Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report
highlighted only the respondent’s negative behavioral
traits without balancing them with her other qualities. The
allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity,
as well as the claim that the respondent refused to
engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of course,
came from the petitioner, but these claims were not
proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
accusations were true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report
did not indicate that unfaithfulness or promiscuousness
were traits that antedated or existed at the time of
marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the respondent
abandoned her sick child which eventually led to the
latter’s death appears to be an exaggerated claim in the
absence of any specifics and corroboration. On the other
hand, the petitioner’s own questionable traits – his
flirtatious nature before marriage and his admission that
he inflicted physical harm on the respondent every time
he got jealous – were not pursued. From this perspective,
the Psychiatric Evaluation Report appears to be no more
than a one-sided diagnosis against the respondent that
we cannot consider a reliable basis to conclusively
establish the root cause and the degree of seriousness
of her condition.1avvphi1
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to
adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the
conclusion that the respondent’s personality disorder
had "no definite treatment." It did not discuss the concept
of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification,
cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and
to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in
order to create a necessary inference that the
respondent’s condition had no definite treatment or is
incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the
Psychiatric Evaluation Report’s failure to support its
findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply
enumerated the respondent’s perceived behavioral
defects, and then associated these traits with mixed
personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac
himself was not called on the witness stand to expound
on the findings and conclusions he made in his
Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would have aided
petitioner’s cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify.
Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing
the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may
be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of
the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of
the marital vinculum.35 Marriage, an inviolable institution
protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim
of the parties, especially where the prices of evidence
presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of
the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to
assume and perform the essential marital duties.
The petitioner’s marriage to the respondent may have
failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation
The remedy, however, is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
We stress that Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume
and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse. It is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for
divorce manifest themselves. The State, fortunately or
unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that divorce
should be available in this country. Neither should an
Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the
like.36 Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a
grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the
time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to
fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not
then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the
petition and AFFIRM the Decision and the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December
6, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 168796 : April 15, 2010]
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, PETITIONER, VS. MAY
ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG AND THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition seeks to set aside the November 30, 2004
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed
the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner
Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) and private respondent May
Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They
were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed that,
during their marriage, he observed that May had several
manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He
described her as immature, irresponsible and carefree.
Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he
claimed, characterized their marital relations.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00
o'clock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had
watched a video program in a neighboring town, but
admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian
boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be
conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas
were ignored. His persuasions would often lead to
altercations or physical violence.
In the midst of these, Silvino's deep love for her, the
thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their
children, and the commitment of May to reform
dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted
to reconcile with her.
The couple started a new life. A few months after,
however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless.
May was back again to her old ways. This was
demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and
learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched
for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking
beer with a male lover.
Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him.
They then lived separately.
With May's irresponsible, immature and immoral
behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the
matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological
evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she
was still young and became manifest after marriage; and
that the same was serious and incurable.[3]
On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of
Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on
the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina
Nicdao-Basilio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled
that private respondent's alleged sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not
constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code and that the
psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause
thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is
that "the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture
and, therefore, issued without jurisdiction, in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction."[4]
The Court required the private respondent to comment
but she failed to do so. Efforts were exerted to locate her
but to no avail.
Nevertheless, the petition is technically and substantially
flawed. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with
the public respondent that the petitioner should have
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
instead of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For
having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition
deserves outright dismissal.
Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to avail
of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court,[5] the petitioner must clearly
show that the public respondent acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ
of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or
whimsical exercise of power.[6]
In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a
grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed
CA decision dismissing petitioner's complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find
nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its findings.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.[7] The Court likewise laid down the
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
in Republic v. Court of Appeals.[8] Relevant to this
petition are the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of
the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
Guided by these pronouncements, it is the Court's
considered view that petitioner's evidence failed to
establish respondent May's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause,
gravity and incurability of private respondent's condition.
Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of
her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully
explained and established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial.[9]
More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not
even rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity"
that the law requires. Private respondent's act of living
an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be
able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes
her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.[10]
Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a
perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some
character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a
conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the
time of the marriage that rendered her incapable of
fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations.[11]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173138 December 1, 2010
NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assails
the Decision1 dated August 26, 2005 and
Resolution2 dated June 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581. The CA reversed the
February 5, 2002 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which declared the
marriage of petitioner Noel B. Baccay (Noel) and Maribel
Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 364 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as
follows:
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua
Institute of Technology where both took up Electronics
and Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990,
they were introduced by a mutual friend and became
close to one another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was
only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel
accepted Noel’s proposal and the two became
sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish
and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive.5
Noel’s family was aware of their relationship for he used
to bring Maribel to their house. Noel observed that
Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so
to bring her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to
attend family gatherings and other festive occasions like
birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel,
however, would try to avoid Noel’s invitations and
whenever she attended those occasions with Noel’s
family, he observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or
snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to any of his
family members. Noel would talk to Maribel about her
attitude towards his family and she would promise to
change, but she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel
because he was already involved with another woman.
He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused
and offered to accept Noel’s relationship with the other
woman so long as they would not sever their ties. To
give Maribel some time to get over their relationship,
they still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly
basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly
friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic
moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual
contact casually since Maribel never demanded anything
from him except his company. Then, sometime in
November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was
pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel
grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel
were immediately wed on November 23, 1998 before
Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed
to live with Noel’s family in their house at Rosal, Pag-asa,
Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noel’s
family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her
way to endear herself to them. She would just come and
go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never
contributed to the family’s coffer leaving Noel to shoulder
all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have
any sexual contact with Noel.
Surprisingly, despite Maribel’s claim of being pregnant,
Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her.
He asked Maribel’s office mates whether she manifested The absolute community property of the parties is hereby
any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she dissolved and, henceforth, they shall be governed by the
showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, property regime of complete separation of property.
Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came
home she announced to Noel and his family that she had With costs against respondent.
a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General
Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.
SO ORDERED.9
Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage
The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the
sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated
essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure
into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole
was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic
household. Noel’s mother tried to intervene but Maribel
Personality Disorder characterized by juridical
shouted "Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam" at her.
antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a
Because of this, Noel’s mother asked them to leave her
clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy
house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and
L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist presented as witness by
asked them to pick her up. Maribel left Noel’s house and
Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure person. She
did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate
entered into the marriage not because of emotional
with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house
desire for marriage but to prove something, and her
nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone
attitude was exploitative particularly in terms of financial
calls.6
rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed
marriage as a piece of paper and that she can easily get
On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of rid of her husband without any provocation.10
marriage, Noel filed a petition7 for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons,
On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of
Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. The trial
the RTC, thus:
proceeded after the public prosecutor manifested that no
collusion existed between the parties. Despite a directive
from the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of
also did not submit a certification manifesting its the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 38 declaring
agreement or opposition to the case.8 as null and void the marriage between
petitioner-appellee and respondent is hereby
REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant Petition for
On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DENIED.
favor of Noel. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
SO ORDERED.11
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage of the parties hereto celebrated on The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that
November 23, 1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit Maribel’s supposed Narcissistic Personality Disorder
of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law
and VOID. and that it was permanent and incurable. Maribel’s
attitudes were merely mild peculiarities in character or
signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital
The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of
obligations which did not amount to psychological
the National Statistics Office are hereby directed to
incapacity, said the appellate court. The CA noted that
record and enter this decree into the marriage records of
Maribel may have failed or refused to perform her marital
the parties in their respective marriage registers.
obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA
stressed that the law requires nothing short of mental
illness sufficient to render a person incapable of knowing
the essential marital obligations.12
The CA further held that Maribel’s refusal to have sexual
intercourse with Noel did not constitute a ground to find
her psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of
the Family Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous
sexual relations with Maribel before their marriage.
Maribel therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated to
perform this particular obligation and that such incapacity
existed at the time of marriage.13
Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying
that what Noel should have filed was an action to annul
the marriage under Article 45 (3)14 of the Family Code.
According to the CA, Article 45 (3) involving consent to
marriage vitiated by fraud is limited to the instances
enumerated under Article 4615 of the Family Code.
Maribel’s misrepresentation that she was pregnant to
induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud contemplated
under Article 45 (3) as it was not among the instances
enumerated under Article 46.16
On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noel’s motion for
reconsideration. It held that Maribel’s personality
disorder is not the psychological incapacity
contemplated by law. Her refusal to perform the
essential marital obligations may be attributed merely to
her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the manifestations of
the Narcissistic Personality Disorder had no connection
with Maribel’s failure to perform her marital obligations.
Noel having failed to prove Maribel’s alleged
psychological incapacity, any doubts should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.17
Hence, the present petition raising the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs.
COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION
IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT
SUFFERING FROM NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY
DISORDER; AND THAT HER FAILURE TO PERFORM
HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.18
The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage
between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider
Maribel’s refusal to procreate as psychological
incapacity. Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he
had sexual intercourse with Maribel was before the
marriage when she was drunk. They never had any
sexual intimacy during their marriage. Noel claims that if
a spouse senselessly and constantly refuses to perform
his or her marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather
than to stubborn refusal. He insists that the CA should
not have considered the pre-marital sexual encounters
between him and Maribel in finding that the latter was not
psychologically incapacitated to procreate through
marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love
for procreation and consummation of the marriage for
the start of family life is different from "plain, simple and
casual sex." He further stresses that Maribel railroaded
him into marrying her by seducing him and later claiming
that she was pregnant with his child. But after their
marriage, Maribel refused to consummate their marriage
as she would not be sexually intimate with him.19
Noel further claims that there were other indicia of
Maribel’s psychological incapacity and that she
consistently exhibited several traits typical of a person
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder before
and during their marriage. He points out that Maribel
would only mingle with a few individuals and never with
Noel’s family even if they lived under one (1) roof.
Maribel was also arrogant and haughty. She was rude
and disrespectful to his mother and was also
"interpersonally exploitative" as shown by her
misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel to marry
her. After marriage, Maribel never showed respect and
love to Noel and his family. She displayed indifference to
his emotional and sexual needs, but before the marriage
she would display unfounded jealousy when Noel was
visited by his friends. This same jealousy motivated her
to deceive him into marrying her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribel’s psychological
incapacity was proven to be permanent and incurable
with the root cause existing before the marriage. The
psychologist testified that persons suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to
participate in therapy session and would reject any form
of psychological help rendering their condition long
lasting if not incurable. Such persons would not admit
that their behavioral manifestations connote pathology or
abnormality. The psychologist added that Maribel’s
psychological incapacity was deeply rooted within her
adaptive system since early childhood and manifested
during adult life. Maribel was closely attached to her
parents and mingled with only a few close individuals.
Her close attachment to her parents and their
over-protection of her turned her into a self-centered,
self-absorbed individual who was insensitive to the
needs of others. She developed the tendency not to
accept rejection or failure.20
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribel’s
refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not
constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code as her traits were merely mild
peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-will and refusal
or neglect to perform her marital obligations. The
psychologist even admitted that Maribel was capable of
entering into marriage except that it would be difficult for
her to sustain one. Also, it was established that Noel and
Maribel had sexual relations prior to their marriage. The
OSG further pointed out that the psychologist was vague
as to how Maribel’s refusal to have sexual intercourse
with Noel constituted Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
The petition lacks merit.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals21 that the
phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
expressed by Article 6822 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court
laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
– not physical, although its manifestations and/or and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince marriage.
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not (6) The essential marital obligations must be those
have known the obligations he was assuming, or embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
given here so as not to limit the application of the their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a and included in the text of the decision.
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the given great respect by our courts. x x x.
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
xxxx
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
thereto. fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
or clinically permanent or incurable.1avvphi1 Such
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
(Emphasis ours.)
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel
his/her own children as an essential obligation of was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was
marriage.1avvphi1 psychologically incapacitated. Noel’s evidence merely
established that Maribel refused to have sexual
intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
to her experiences during childhood, did not establish
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
validly assuming the essential obligations of the
marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified
that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage
except that it would be difficult for her to sustain
one.24 Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the
incapacity contemplated by law.
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon
petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent
suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders her "truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."25 Psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. An
unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:26
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581 is
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale
of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be
extra careful before making a finding of psychological
incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders
in spouses where there are none. On the other hand,
blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution1 and in our statutes that marriage is an
inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void
despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity,
trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is
doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted
upon its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No.
897612 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No.
Q-01-44854.3
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met
respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both
nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates
then in one university subject when respondent
cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baños campus. The
casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a
boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially
attracted to respondent who she thought was free
spirited and bright, although he did not follow
conventions and traditions.4 Since both resided in
Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and
drove home together from the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style
of courtship which included dining out, unlike other
couples their age who were restricted by a university
student’s budget. At that time, respondent held a job in
the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not
diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not
even by her discovery that respondent was taking
marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university
studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP.
By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his
third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat
Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner’s
graduation and her father’s death, petitioner and
respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was
already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the
Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s
family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were
shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the couple’s
respective salaries were spent solely for their personal
needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly
allowance of ₱1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977,
financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed
expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly
allowance of ₱1,500.00 from respondent stopped.
Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to
petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to
ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he
had resigned due to slow advancement within the family
business. Respondent’s game plan was to venture into
trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and
restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant.
However, this new business took respondent away from
his young family for days on end without any
communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up,
hoping that the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility,
petitioner suggested that they live separately from her
in-laws. However, the new living arrangement
engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner
struggled to make ends meet as the single-income
earner of the household, respondent’s business
floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a
fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful.
Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically.
Compounding the family’s financial woes and further
straining the parties’ relationship was the indifferent
attitude of respondent towards his family. That his
business took him away from his family did not seem to
bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain
in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred
residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s
mother. But the new set up did not end their marital
difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged.
Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a
miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time,
respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire
on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A
week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an
attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond
business stopped operations. Although without any
means to support his family, respondent refused to go
back to work for the family business. Respondent came
up with another business venture, engaging in scrap
paper and carton trading. As with all of respondent’s
business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the
trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but
petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the
parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent
was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard
respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary,
over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondent’s
gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was
not only unable to provide financially for their family, but
he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to
remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the
parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner
for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to
be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played
dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her
as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the
operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of
respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother to
order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to
salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner
approached respondent’s siblings and asked them to
intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her
rope. Yet, even respondent’s siblings waved the white
flag on respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his
spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter
group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group.
The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with
petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the
parties’ relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A.
Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine
benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As
with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted
and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of
respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of
their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to
petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not
improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his
children.
Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s
allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated.
Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in
performing his obligations to his family—both as a
spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical
psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a
psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in
evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the
marriage between the parties null and void on the ground
of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled,
thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of
both parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO
PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON
REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the
Archbishop’s Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong,
Rizal, is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the
Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property
relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES
and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are
already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal
rights to decide for themselves having finished their
studies, are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen
(15) days from notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment
shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New
Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public
Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith
issue the corresponding Decree if the parties have no
properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the
procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of
the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued
by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51
of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property IN NOT RULING THAT IN NOT RULING THAT THE
(Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES
the parties have properties. PSYCHOLOGICALLY OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH WITH THE ESSENTIAL
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong MARRIAGE. WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT
and Quezon City. MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A
II PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties,
their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED VII
Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER
Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, IS LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH IN NOT RULING THAT THE
respective office addresses. THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF PARTIES’ MARRIAGE, WHICH IS
MARRIAGE. UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO
SO ORDERED.6 UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE
III FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT
FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the
STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE
trial court, on motion for reconsideration of the THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE,
respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE
parties’ marriage. TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT
OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE
WITNESSES PRESENTED BY
PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.
Taking exception to the trial court’s rulings, respondent PETITIONER.
appealed to the Court of Appeals, adamant on the
VIII
validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, IV
agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and
declared the parties’ marriage as valid and subsisting. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
Significantly, a special division of five (two members IN NOT RULING THAT THE
IN NOT RULING THAT THE
dissenting from the majority decision and voting to affirm AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus: AMENDED TO CONFORM TO
ARE BINDING ON IT.
EVIDENCE.8
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is V
GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of
dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED on the ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity,
Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854
IN NOT RULING THAT THE as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition
TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby
PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.7 In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
heavily on the oral and documentary evidence obtained
INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO
Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
Court positing the following issues: and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

I After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence

VI
presented, the Court finds merit in the petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual
obligations of a marital partner towards each other and
Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express
the duties of parents toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity
means. It left the determination of the same solely to the
Court on a case to case basis.
xxxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the
determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction
to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis
on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent
and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert
witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on
the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court
finds that the marriage between the parties from its
inception has a congenital infirmity termed
"psychological incapacity" which pertains to the inability
of the parties to effectively function emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each other in relation
to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity
and respect as well as to mutually render help and
support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was
already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of
respondent which created the death of his marriage.
There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the
truthfulness of the personality disorder of the
respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were
unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering
from personality disorder which psychologically
incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.
Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their
profession, the Court considered their
assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an
honest evaluation on the psychological status of the
respondent. This psychological incapacity of the
respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his
marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his
structural constellation. It is beyond the respondent’s
impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless
to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply
because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This
is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was
wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered
their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief,
he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to
them by his original family members to save his marriage.
In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of
his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the
feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been
saturated already that she finally revealed her
misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to
counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard
position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask
respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the
siblings of the respondent were unanimous that
separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage
of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his
siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and
take relationship and not a one sided one. It also
requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential
duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed
by the parties as a consequence of their marriage.
Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage
between the parties did not create a monument of marital
integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the
respondent which renders him psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is
deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not
possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with
them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable
to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra.
Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with
psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be
harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They
are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or
a perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or
carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent
cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both
parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal culprit on
their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with
meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity
that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is
an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity
which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy
event in their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As
human beings, they are entitled to live in a peaceful and
orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact,
Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any
party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the
parties is already a settled matter due to their
psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno,
their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the
funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in
their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds
that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by
continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper
only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties
whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots and
diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional,
intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain.9
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case
through a divided decision, the appellate court diverged
from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina] vis-à-vis the totality of evidence
presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter
failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is
thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show
that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated.
Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as
purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder
(Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality
Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found
[respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial
Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent
features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be
suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially
along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as
conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court
may place whatever weight it chooses upon such
testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they
are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are
otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither
clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas
conducted a psychological examination on the
[respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by
Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They are
"unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal
knowledge of the psychological condition of the
[respondent] as they never personally examined the
[respondent] himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan
that the purported psychological incapacity of
[respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like
this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent]
was referred to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to
determine benchmarks of current psychological
functioning." The undeniable fact is that based on
Dayan’s personal examination of the [respondent], the
assessment procedures used, behavioral observations
made, background information gathered and
interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion
arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent]
through individual therapy and counseling sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the
[petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to give
regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come
and go" attitude are true, the totality of the evidence
presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent]
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations within the contemplation of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings
regarding the [respondent’s] alleged mixed personality
disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business
ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his
family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner’s]
feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on
his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay
debts in connection with his failed business activities,
taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but on serious marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
[Respondent’s] "defects" were not present at the
inception of marriage. They were even able to live in
harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which
bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted
in her Amended Petition that initially they lived
comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in
keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households,
but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned
from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and
thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It
appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully
employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998,
which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of
[petitioner], Dr. Villegas’ Psychiatric Report states that
[petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective
sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional
needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it,
rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that
it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing
that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such
incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx.
In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended
Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent
solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x
x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a
lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it is
jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity
must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations,
it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioner’s] marriage with [respondent] failed and
appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy,
however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio
on the ground of psychological incapacity. An
unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for
different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or
Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable,
or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if
the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should
not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the
preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.10
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we
cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling that the
psychological incapacity of respondent was not
sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision
declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and
subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the jurisprudential
foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and
(3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.12
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in
diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6
siblings of educated parents.
Belonging to an average social status,
intellectual achievement is quite
important to the family values (sic). All
children were equipped with high
intellectual potentials (sic) which made
their parents proud of them. Father
was disabled, but despite his handicap,
he was able to assume his financial
and emotional responsibilities to his
family and to a limited extent, his
social functions (sic). Despite this, he
has been described as the unseen
strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively
involved] in activities outside the home.
Doing volunteer and community
services, she was not the
demonstrative, affectionate and the
emotional mother (sic). Her love and
concern came in the form of positive
attitudes, advices (sic) and
encouragements (sic), but not the
caressing, sensitive and soothing
touches of an emotional reaction (sic).
Psychological home environment did
not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling
or depression, but one has to stand up
and to help himself (sic). This trained
her to subjugate (sic) emotions to
reasons.
Because of her high intellectual
endowment, she has easy facilities for
any undertakings (sic). She is
organized, planned (sic), reliable,
dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal,
competent and has a strong sense of
duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not
as sensitive. Her analytical resources
and strong sense of objectivity
predisposed her to a superficial
adjustments (sic). She acts on the
dictates of her mind and reason, and
less of how she feels (sic). The above
qualities are perfect for a leader, but
less effective in a heterosexual
relationship, especially to her husband,
who has deep seated sense of
inadequacy, insecurity, low self
esteem and self-worth despite his
intellectual assets (sic). Despite this,
[petitioner] remained in her marriage
for more than 20 years, trying to reach
out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship (sic).
She was hoping for the time when
others, like her husband would make
decision for her (sic), instead of being
depended upon. But the more
[petitioner] tried to compensate for
[respondent’s] shortcomings, the
bigger was the discrepancy in their
coping mechanisms (sic). At the end,
[petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated,
uncared for and she characterized
their marriage as very much lacking in
relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the
9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the
second set of brood (sic), where there
were less bounds (sic) and limitations
during his growing up stage.
Additionally, he was acknowledged as
the favorite of his mother, and was
described to have a close relationship
with her. At an early age, he
manifested clinical behavior of
conduct disorder and was on
marijuana regularly. Despite his
apparent high intellectual potentials
(sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to
keep him going. His being a "free
spirit", attracted [petitioner], who
adored him for being able to do what
he wanted, without being bothered by
untraditional, unacceptable norms and
differing ideas from other people. He
presented no guilt feelings, no
remorse, no anxiety for whatever
wrongdoings he has committed. His
studies proved too much of a pressure
for him, and quit at the middle of his
course, despite his apparent high
intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a
bigger pressure. Trying to prove his
worth, he quit work from his family
employment and ventured on his own.
With no much planning and project
study, his businesses failed. This
became the sources (sic) of their
marital conflicts, the lack of
relationships (sic) and consultations
(sic) with each other, his negativistic
attitudes (sic) and sarcasm,
stubbornness and insults, his spitting
at her face which impliedly meant "you
are nothing as compared to me" were
in reality, his defenses for a strong
sense of inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is
intelligent and has bright ides.
However, this seemed not coupled
with emotional attributes such as
perseverance, patience, maturity,
direction, focus, adequacy, stability
and confidence to make it work. He
complained that he did not feel the
support of his wife regarding his
decision to go into his own business.
But when he failed, the more he
became negativistic and closed to
suggestions especially from
[petitioner]. He was too careful not to
let go or make known his strong sense
of inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts,
lack of drive and motivation or even
feelings of inferiority, for fear of
rejection or loss of pride. When things
did not work out according to his plans,
he suppressed his hostilities in
negative ways, such as stubbornness,
sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized
by poor impulse control, lack of insight
and primitive drives. He seemed to
feel more comfortable in being
untraditional and different from others.
Preoccupation is centered on himself,
(sic) an unconscious wish for the
continuance of the gratification of his
dependency needs, (sic) in his
mother-son relationship. From this
stems his difficulties in heterosexual
relationship with his wife, as pressures,
stresses, (sic) demands and
expectations filled up in (sic) up in their
marital relationship. Strong masculine
strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like
[respondent], he may sincerely want to
be able to assume his duties and
responsibilities as a husband and
father, but because of a severe
psychological deficit, he was unable to
do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it
is the opinion of the examiner, that
[petitioner] manifested inadequacies
along her affective sphere, that made
her less responsive to the emotional
needs of her husband, who needed a
great amount of it, rendering her
relatively psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage.
[Respondent], on the other hand, has
manifested strong clinical evidences
(sic), that he is suffering from a
Personality Disorder, of the antisocial
type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings
and narcissistic features that renders
him psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities
of marriage. This is characterized by
his inability to conform to the social
norms that ordinarily govern many
aspects of adolescent and adult
behavior. His being a "free spirit"
associated with no remorse, no guilt
feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive
of this clinical condition. His prolonged
drug intake [marijuana] and maybe
stronger drugs lately, are external
factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical
conditions is due to his underlying
defense mechanisms, or the
unconscious mental processes, that
the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His
prolonged and closed attachments to
his mother encouraged cross
identification and developed a severe
sense of inadequacy specifically along
masculine strivings. He therefore has
to camouflage his weakness, in terms
of authority, assertiveness, unilateral
and forceful decision making,
aloofness and indifference, even if it
resulted to antisocial acts. His
narcissistic supplies rendered by his
mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became
manifest only after the celebration,
due to marital demands and stresses.
It is considered as permanent in
nature because it started early in his
psychological development, and
therefore became so engrained into
his personality structures (sic). It is
considered as severe in degree,
because it hampered, interrupted and
interfered with his normal functioning
related to heterosexual adjustments.
(emphasis supplied)13
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]’s
brothers, referred [respondent] to the
clinic. According to them, respondent
has not really taken care of his wife
and children. He does not seem to
have any direction in life. He seems to
be full of bright ideas and good at
starting things but he never gets to
accomplish anything. His brothers are
suspecting (sic) that until now
[respondent] is still taking drugs. There
are times when they see that
[respondent] is not himself. He likes to
bum around and just spends the day
at home doing nothing. They wish that
he’d be more responsible and try to
give priority to his family. [Petitioner,]
his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the
family because she has a stable job.
[Respondent]’s brothers learned from
friends that [petitioner] is really
disappointed with him. She has
discussed things with him but he
always refused to listen. She does not
know what to do with him anymore.
She has grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about
his drug problem, he mentioned that
he stopped taking it in 1993. His
brothers think that he is not telling the
truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to
stop taking drugs when he had been
hooked to it for the past 22 years.
When [respondent] was also asked
what his problems are at the moment,
he mentioned that he feels lonely and
distressed. He does not have anyone
to talk to. He feels that he and his wife
[have] drifted apart. He wants to be
close to somebody and discuss things
with this person but he is not given the
chance. He also mentioned that one of
his weak points is that he is very
tolerant of people[,] that is why he is
taken advantage of most of the time.
He wants to avoid conflict so he’d
rather be submissive and compliant.
He does not want to hurt anyone [or]
to cause anymore pain. He wants to
make other people happy.
xxxx feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need
for social approval, which could have
Interpretation of Psychological Data stemmed from some deep seated
insecurities makes him submissive
and over [compliant]. He tends to
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
make extra effort to please people.
Although at times[, he] already feels
xxxx victimized and taken advantage of, he
still tolerates abusive behavior for fear
B. Vocational Preference of interpersonal conflicts. Despite
xxxx his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks
to minimize dangers of indifference
and disapproval [of] others.
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
Resentments are suppressed. This is
likely to result in anger and frustrations
xxxx
which is likewise apt to be repressed.
In his relationships with people,
There are indications that [respondent]
[respondent] is apt to project a
is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing
reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
considerable tension and anxiety. He
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal
is prone to fits of apprehension and
patterns. He has deep feelings of
nervousness. Likewise, he is also
inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem,
entertaining feelings of hopelessness
he tends to feel inferior and to exclude
and is preoccupied with negative
himself from association with others.
thought. He feels that he is up in the
He feels that he is "different" and as a
air but with no sound foundation. He is
result is prone to anticipate rejections.
striving [for] goals which he knows he
Because of the discomfort produced
will never be able to attain. Feeling
by these feelings, he is apt to avoid
discouraged and distressed, he has
personal and social involvement,
difficulty concentrating and focusing
which increases his preoccupation
on things which he needs to prioritize.
with himself and accentuates his
He has many plans but he can’t
tendency to withdraw from
accomplish anything because he is
interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is
unable to see which path to take. This
also apt to be the less dominant
feeling of hopelessness is further
partner. He feels better when he has
aggravated by the lack of support from
to follow than when he has to take the
significant others.
lead. A self-contained person[,] he
does not really need to interact with
others in order to enjoy life and to be Diagnostic Impression
able to move on. He has a small need
of companionship and is most Axis I : Drug Dependence
comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels
uncomfortable in expressing his more Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
tender feelings for fear of being hurt.
Likewise, he maybe very angry within
but he may choose to repress this
 [Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and
Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning
and starting things but is unable to
accomplish anything; unable to give
priority to the needs of his family; in
social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of
Functioning – Fair (Emphasis
supplied)14
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from
[petitioner’s] case history and from her
psychological assessment, and
despite the non-cooperation of the
respondent, it is possible to infer with
certainty the nullity of this marriage.
Based on the information available
about the respondent, he suffers from
[an] antisocial personality disorder
with narcissistic and dependent
features that renders him too
immature and irresponsible to assume
the normal obligations of a marriage.
As for the petitioner, she is a good,
sincere, and conscientious person and
she has tried her best to provide for
the needs of her children. Her
achievements in
this regard are praiseworthy. But she
is emotionally immature and her
comprehension of human situations is
very shallow for a woman of her
academic and professional
competence. And this explains why
she married RRR even when she
knew he was a pothead, then despite
the abuse, took so long to do
something about her situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive
Personality Style with Self-Defeating
features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial
Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord
(spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse, and
infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder
with marked narcissistic, aggressive
sadistic and dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial
Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord
(successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
xxxx
One has to go back to [respondent’s] early childhood in
order to understand the root cause of his antisocial
personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth
child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared
of by his grandmother. [Respondent’s] father was kind,
quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his
mother. Unfortunately, [respondent’s] mother grew up
believing that she was not her mother’s favorite child, so
she felt "api, treated like poor relations." [Respondent’s]
mother’s reaction to her perceived rejection was to act
out—with poor impulse control and poor mood regulation
(spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums,
etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondent’s] role
model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the
business of living, he learned to use his good looks and
his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of
others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted
to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration
and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed
money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to
empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot
sustain a relationship with one person for a long time,
which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondent’s] narcissistic personality features were
manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to
Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in
Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he
would just "come and go," without telling his wife his
whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt
entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him
of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g.
let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the
family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to
choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he
would think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic
personality features were manifested whom he has
physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife
when high on drugs; and his dependent personality
features were manifested by his need for others to
assume responsibility for most major areas of his life,
and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality
disorder with marked narcissistic features and
aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render
support for his spouse and children. A personality
disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over
time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is
evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent is] null and void from the very beginning.
(emphasis supplied)15
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA
rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno
and Villegas for being hearsay since they never
personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the
respondent, or any other person diagnosed with
personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the
testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their
exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition,16 necessarily
involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of
one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
In this case, the experts testified on their individual
assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage
from the perception of one of the parties, herein
petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage,
had occasion to interact with, and experience,
respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then
validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the
psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s
assessment were not based solely on the narration or
personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants
such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and
sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own
observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions
with them, spanning the period of time they knew
him.17 These were also used as the basis of the doctors’
assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,18 citing The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (DSM IV),19 instructs us on the general
diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior
that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2)
or more of the following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting
self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and
appropriateness of emotional response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive
across a broad range of personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant
distress or impairment in social, occupational or other
important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its
onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a
manifestation or a consequence of another mental
disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct
physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse,
a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head
trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria
for Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and
violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15
years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to
lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing
acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of
aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by
repeated physical fights or assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated
failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor
financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from
another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset
before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not
exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a
manic episode.20
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can
diagnose the psychological make up of a person based
on a number of factors culled from various sources. A
person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this
case, considering that a personality disorder is
manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the
respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the
doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of
experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan’s findings and
recommendation, the psychological incapacity of
respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically
imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy
are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists,
to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock’s textbook
entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,21 treatment, ranging
from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed
kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short,
Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should
undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding
that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically
declared that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.22 As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her
separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:23
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person’s entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they
were asked to give professional opinions about a party’s
mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
… [Because] of advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in
all three reports and the respective testimonies of
Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent
does have problems; and (2) these problems include
chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work
towards providing the needs of his family; several failed
business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of
unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s
diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not
automatically believed by the courts in cases of
declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical
psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality
disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is
valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’
or both parties’ psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an
expert’s opinion concerning the supposed psychological
incapacity of a party.24 In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we
ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list
found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,26 the
stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of
Appeals27 must be independently met by the party
alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36
of the Family Code. We declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and
conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn
between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the
factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr.
Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr.
Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties'
alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating
effect on their marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties'
personality disorders was not supported by
psychological tests properly administered by clinical
psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and
interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the
parties, considering that such diagnoses were made,
could have been fully established by psychometric and
neurological tests which are designed to measure
specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or
personality.
xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a
maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its
own factual finding on what happened in this case. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie
in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in
the assistance that he can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is
founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’
conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events)
alleged in the petition and established during trial, all
point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with
antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following
clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often
seem to be normal and even charming and ingratiating.
Their histories, however, reveal many areas of
disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away
from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal
activities are typical experiences that patients report as
beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of
their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their
mental content reveals the complete absence of
delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact,
they frequently have a heightened sense of reality
testing and often impress observers as having good
verbal intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and
cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any
conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding
is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear
to lack a conscience.28
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior
manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5)
unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that
is not connected with the family businesses; and (7)
criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioner’s purported psychological
incapacity, we agree with the CA’s ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to
specifically allege the complete facts showing that
petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even
if such incapacity became manifest only after its
celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely prayed for in
the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered
"declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void
ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of
the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner’s]
Amended Petition was indeed amended to conform to
the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas’ finding that [petitioner] is
supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality
[Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a
debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her
from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological
Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno,
[petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was
found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person
and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her
children. Her achievements in this regard are
praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report, it
was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their
marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and
lending a hand for better understanding and
relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no
less than [petitioner’s] own expert witnesses, we find it
hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated
within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family
Code.29
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated
by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:30
x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in
light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to
conclude that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations
at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is
REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854
declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the
Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 165321 : August 03, 2010]
RICARDO P. TORING, PETITIONER, VS. TERESITA M.
TORING AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P.
Toring from the May 31, 2004 decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA
reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-99-36662,[2] nullifying Ricardo's marriage
with respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunt's
house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin's teacher in
Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his
aunt's house. Despite their slight difference in age (of
five years), the younger Ricardo found the dance teacher
attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita
and they became sweethearts after three months of
courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid
of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to
marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4,
1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of
Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson,
Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their
wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before
the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to
declare his marriage to Teresita null and void.
At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage
contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of
his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran,
and his and Dr. Albaran's respective testimonies.
Teresita did not file any answer or opposition to the
petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations
against her.[3]
Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the
trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer.
He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent
money to his wife to cover the family's living expenses
and their children's tuition. Teresita, however, was not
adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances.
Many times, Ricardo would come home and be
welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle
these to avoid embarrassment.
Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from
other people, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts
she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and
cosmetics company. She left the family's utility bills and
their children's tuition fees unpaid. She also missed
paying the rent and the amortization for the house that
Ricardo acquired for the family, so their children had to
live in a small rented room and eventually had to be
taken in by Ricardo's parents. When confronted by
Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she
spent the funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house
and for their children.
Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and
suspected that she was pregnant with another man's
child. During one of his visits to the country, he noticed
that Teresita's stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to
convince her to have a medical examination but she
refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy
confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the
child could not have been his, as his three instances of
sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by
"withdrawals"; other than these, no other sexual contacts
with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with
his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in
Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife
represented herself to others as single, and went out on
dates with other men when he was not around.
Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant,
materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who
mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the
nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a
housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most
unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was
unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their
family; and was most painfully unmindful of him.[4] He
believed that their marriage had broken down beyond
repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust and
love for one another.[5]
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that
contributed to the demise of the marriage was Teresita's
Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential
marital obligations. To quote Dr. Albaran:
Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic]
shown to manifest the following
pervasive pattern of behaviors: a
sense of entitlement as she expected
favorable treatment and automatic
compliance to her wishes, being
interpersonally exploitative as on
several occasions she took advantage
of him to achieve her own ends, lack
of empathy as she was unwilling to
recognize her partners [sic] feelings
and needs[,] taking into consideration
her own feelings and needs only, her
haughty and arrogant behavior and
attitude and her proneness to blame
others for her failures and
shortcomings. These patterns of
behavior speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, which started to
manifest in early adulthood. The
disorder is considered to be grave and
incurable based on the fact that
individuals do not recognize the
symptoms as it is ego syntonic and
they feel there is nothing wrong in
them. Because of that[,] they remain
unmotivated for treatment and
impervious to recovery.[6]
She based her diagnosis on the information she
gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo
and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresita's eldest son). She
admitted, though, that she did not personally observe
and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a
personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a
psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained
unanswered.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was no
basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It
asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on
Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague
and general conclusion on these parties' personality
traits but not on Teresita's psychological makeup. The
OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not
clinically identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause
of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the
evidence indicate that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor
that the incapacity was grave and incurable.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his
marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC believed Dr.
Albaran's psychological evaluation and testimony and,
on the totality of Ricardo's evidence, found Teresita to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision
to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial
court's findings did not satisfy the rules and guidelines
set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina.[7] The RTC failed to specifically point out the root
illness or defect that caused Teresita's psychological
incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity
already existed at the time of celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran's
psychological evaluation do not appear to have been
drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt
mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the
CA found that Ricardo's allegations on Teresita's
overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate
grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if
true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal
separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual
findings of the trial court, particularly the expert
testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court -
in declaring the nullity of the marriage - fully complied
with Molina.
In its Comment,[8] the OSG argued that the CA correctly
reversed the RTC's decision, particularly in its
conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this Court's
guidelines for the proper interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code. Reiterating its earlier
arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence
adduced before the trial court failed to show the gravity,
juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological
incapacity of Teresita, and failed as well to identify and
discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise, failed to
show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge
her marital obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder.
Ricardo's Reply[9] reiterated that the RTC decision
thoroughly discussed the root cause of Teresita's
psychological incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. He claimed that sufficient proof
had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise
on the subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo
further argued that alleging the root cause in a petition
for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no
longer necessary, citing Barcelona v. Court of
Appeals.[10]
These positions were collated and reiterated in the
memoranda the parties filed.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA
committed no reversible error when it set aside the
RTC's decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,[11] we held that psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to
be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The
psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage."[12]
We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code
in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of this article. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability established in
the Santos case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita v.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3)The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and
 raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6)The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.[13]
Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity
applied these basic guidelines to varying factual
situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal
validity of Santos. In so far as the present factual
situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading
and applying our established rulings is the intent of the
law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family
Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders;
these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity
or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she
contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and
its root cause must have been there from the inception of
the marriage. From these requirements arise the
concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not
really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there
never was any marriage in the first place because the
affliction - already then existing - was so grave and
permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she was to assume or had assumed.[14]
In the present case and guided by these standards, we
find the totality of the petitioner's evidence to be
insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As already
mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of the
testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latter's
psychological evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson
from where she derived a psychological evaluation of
Teresita.
a. Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation and
testimony
Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation
that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated
to assume essential marital obligations. To support her
findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements
told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she
narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on the
same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresita's disorder
manifested during her early adulthood and is grave and
incurable.
To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of
testimony and evaluation that, in this case, became the
basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took
place because of the psychological incapacity of one of
the parties at the time of marriage.
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the
statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the
results of the psychological tests administered only on
Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient
basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long
been negatively critical in considering psychological
evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from
one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking
the nullity of the marriage.
In So v. Valera,[15] the Court considered the
psychologist's testimony and conclusions to be
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
finding of respondent's psychological incapacity because
the facts, on which the conclusions were based, were all
derived from the petitioner's statements whose bias in
favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In another
case, Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[16] the Court
declared that while the various tests administered on the
petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to
assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement could not be made with respect to the
respondent-husband's psychological condition. To our
mind, conclusions and generalizations about Teresita's
psychological condition, based solely on information fed
by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.[17]
To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not
require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be
personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[18] This
recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence,
we shall favorably appreciate, should be any less than
the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature,
requires.
Our recognition simply means that the requirements for
nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not
necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated
spouse. In other words, it is still essential - although from
sources other than the respondent spouse - to show his
or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time
of marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate
the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity,
permanence and incurability of the condition.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come
from persons intimately related to them, such as
relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers
who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's
condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the
incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the
spouses who was ever asked to give statements for
purposes of Teresita's psychological evaluation was
Richardson, the spouses' eldest son who would not have
been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case
because he could not have been there when the
spouses were married and could not have been
expected to know what was happening between his
parents until long after his birth.
We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading
of the summary of Richardson's interview with the
pyschologist: Richardson's statement occupied a mere
one paragraph (comprising eleven sentences) in the
psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated
instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of
their house, his father's alleged womanizing, and their
differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while
Teresita is a Mormon).[19]
We find nothing unusual in these recited marital
incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered from some
psychological disorder as far back as the time of her
marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be
indicative of problems traceable to any basic
psychological disorder existing at the time of
marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not
uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the
usual roots of marital problems - finances, fidelity and
religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the
relationship between mother and son except to observe
their estranged relationship due to a previous argument -
a money problem involving Ricardo's financial
remittances to the family. To state the obvious, the
psychologist's evaluation never explained how the
recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at
the time of the spouses' marriage, showed a debilitating
psychological incapacity already existing at that time.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardo's cause,
is the failure of Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation to
fully explain the details - i.e., the what, how, when, where
and since when - of Teresita's alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. It seems to us that, with hardly
any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran
simply stated out of the blue that Teresita's personality
disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming
thereby that the incapacity should have been there when
the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never
explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresita's
alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the
essential marital obligations that she failed to
assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately
explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and
incurable was Teresita's psychological disorder.
Dr. Albaran's testimony at the trial did not improve the
evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it still failed to
provide the required insights that would have remedied
the evidentiary gaps in her written psychological
evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albaran's cross-examination only
made the evidentiary situation worse when she admitted
that she had difficulty pinpointing the root cause of
Teresita's personality disorder, due to the limited
information she gathered from Ricardo and Richardson
regarding Teresita's personal and family history. To
directly quote from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed
this limitation when she said that "[t]he only data that I
have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to have grown
from a tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the
[sic] contributory to the development of the personality
disorder."[20] Dr. Albaran's obvious uncertainty in her
assessment only proves our point that a complete
personality profile of the spouse, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, could not be determined
from meager information coming only from a biased
source.
b. Ricardo's testimony
Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer
and an adulteress. We do not, however, find Ricardo's
characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect"
in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on
the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity"
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness.[21]
Ricardo's testimony merely established that Teresita was
irresponsible in managing the family's finances by not
paying their rent, utility bills and other financial
obligations. Teresita's spendthrift attitude, according to
Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the house and lot
intended to be their family residence. This kind of
irresponsibility, however, does not rise to the level of a
psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the
Family Code. At most, Teresita's mismanagement of
the family's finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal
or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds
intended for the family's financial support.
Teresita's alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does
not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to
constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of
a disordered personality, completely preventing the
respondent from discharging the essential obligations of
the marital state;[22] there must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to
be faithful to her spouse.[23]
In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to
prove that Teresita suffered from a disordered
personality of this kind. Even Ricardo's added
testimony, relating to rumors of Teresita's dates with
other men and her pregnancy by another man, would not
fill in the deficiencies we have observed, given the
absence of an adverse integral element and link to
Teresita's allegedly disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresita's alleged
character traits already existed at the inception of their
marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[24] In the
absence of this element, a marriage cannot be annulled
under Article 36.
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to
be
alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36
of
the Family Code
Citing Barcelona,[25] Ricardo defended the RTC decision,
alleging that the root cause in a petition for annulment
under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer
necessary. We find this argument completely at
variance with Ricardo's main argument against the
assailed CA decision - i.e., that the RTC, in its decision,
discussed thoroughly the root cause of Teresita's
psychological incapacity as Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. These conflicting positions, notwithstanding,
we see the need to address this issue to further clarify
our statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted
and misinterpreted to support his present petition that
"since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege
expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows
that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root
cause of the psychological incapacity."[26]
In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for
annulment for its failure to state the "root cause" of the
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. The
Court resolved this issue, ruling that the petition
sufficiently stated a cause of action because the
petitioner - instead of stating a specific root cause -
clearly described the physical manifestations
indicative of the psychological incapacity. This, the
Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the first
requirement in the Molina case - that the "root cause" of
the psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article 36
petition.
Thus, contrary to Ricardo's position, Barcelona does not
do away with the "root cause" requirement. The ruling
simply means that the statement of the root cause does
not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature,
as the root causes of many psychological disorders are
still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the
physical manifestations constituting the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(Rules)[27] in fact provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
absolute nullity of void marriages. immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity,
x x x x as the same may only be due to a person's difficulty,
refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of
marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness
that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.[28]
(d) What to allege. - A petition
under Article 36 of the Family
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the
Code shall specially allege the
petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of
complete facts showing that
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the
either or both parties were
petitioner.
psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the
SO ORDERED.
essential marital obligations of
marriages at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes
G.R. No. 176464 February 4, 2010
manifest only after its
celebration.
EDWARD N. LIM, Petitioner,
vs.
The complete facts should allege MA. CHERYL STA. CRUZ-LIM, Respondent.
the physical manifestations, if any,
as are indicative of psychological DECISION
incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but
NACHURA, J.:
expert opinion need not be alleged.
This petition raises a far-from-novel issue, i.e., the
As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging invalidity of a marriage on the ground of either or both of
the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article the parties’ psychological incapacity. However, similar
36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the petitions continue to hound the lower courts, even with
adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated the stringent requirements for the grant of declaration of
was the need for an expert opinion to prove the root nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further incapacity, given the facility with which married persons
held that the Rules, being procedural in nature, apply are diagnosed with personality disorders.
only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of
their adoption. The instant petition for review on certiorari assails the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of 74822, which reversed the decision2 of the Regional
proof to show that Teresita suffered from psychological Trial Court (RTC), Branch 140, Makati City, in Civil Case
incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage No. 99-1852.
must fail. Ricardo merely established that Teresita had
been remiss in her duties as a wife for being
First, the all too familiar antecedents of
irresponsible in taking care of their family's finances - a
man-meets-woman; they get married after a whirlwind
fault or deficiency that does not amount to the
relationship; and, not surprisingly, the marriage goes
psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family
awry.
Code requires. We reiterate that irreconcilable
Petitioner Edward N. Lim and respondent Maria Cheryl
Sta. Cruz-Lim met in 1978 in Cebu, where petitioner,
who resides in Makati City, spent a semestral break from
college; and respondent, who resides in Gingoog City,
Cagayan de Oro, was a boarder in petitioner’s uncle’s
house. At that time, petitioner was twenty-six (26) years
old, a college student, and working in the family business,
while respondent was a secretarial student.
After less than a year of courtship via long distance
phone calls, petitioner and respondent became
sweethearts in early 1979. Within that year, or on
December 8, 1979, the two were wed at the Don Bosco
Church in Makati City, with a reception at Midtown
Ramada Hotel.
As is customary among those of Chinese descent,
petitioner and respondent took up residence with the
former’s grandparents and parents in Forbes Park,
Makati City. The couple was blessed with three (3)
children: Lester Edward,3 Candice Grace,4 and Mariano
III.5
During their stay in Forbes Park, all living, household and
medical expenses were paid and provided by petitioner’s
grandparents. Petitioner’s salary of ₱6,000.00 for
working in the family distillery went straight to
respondent. Despite all these amenities, the setup and
living arrangement rankled respondent, who continued to
insist that they live separately and independently from
petitioner’s family.
October 14, 1990 proved to be a black-letter day for the
union of petitioner and respondent. That morning,
respondent registered a complaint, which was recorded
in the police blotter of the Makati City police, about a
prior incident where she caught petitioner in their house
in a compromising situation with the stay-in caregiver of
petitioner’s grandmother. This incident landed on the
pages of a tabloid newspaper, Abante, where petitioner,
his grandparents’ house and the family business were all
named and identified. Naturally, this caused
embarrassment and humiliation to petitioner and to the
rest of his family and relatives.
Also, on that same day, respondent finally left petitioner
and brought with her their three (3) children. Respondent
forcibly opened their cabinet and cleaned out the
contents thereof, which included petitioner’s passport,
jewelry, and a land title in petitioner’s name.
Respondent likewise filed a criminal complaint for
Concubinage and Physical Injuries against petitioner
which was eventually dismissed by the investigating
prosecutor for lack of merit.
Subsequently, respondent filed with the RTC of Makati
City an action for support against petitioner and
petitioner’s parents. Thereafter, the trial court directed
petitioner to give a monthly support of ₱6,000.00 and, in
case of his inability to do so, petitioner’s parents were
also decreed to give a monthly support for the three
minor children in the amount of ₱34,000.00.6
On October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a petition and
sought the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Three
years thereafter, on July 22, 2002, petitioner filed an
amended petition including an allegation of his own
psychological incapacity, as both he and respondent
were diagnosed with personality disorders—dependent
personality disorder and histrionic personality disorder,
respectively.
Following the exchange of pleadings between the parties,
petitioner presented evidence, which consisted of the
testimonies of Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas, a psychiatrist; and
Maxima Adato, petitioner’s co-employee in the distillery.
In addition, petitioner offered in evidence Dr. Villegas’
Psychiatric Report, which concluded that the parties
were suffering from personality disorders. Respondent,
despite filing an Answer to the petition denying the
allegations therein, waived her right to present evidence.
Based on the foregoing, primarily on the Psychiatric
Report, the RTC declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void as the two were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The RTC disposed of the
case, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby
DECLARES the marriage of EDWARD N. LIM and MA.
CHERYL STA. CRUZ on December 8, 1979 in Makati
City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological
incapacity of both parties pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code with all the effects and consequences of all
the existing provisions of law.
As regards the custody of the children, considering that
all of them are over seven (7) years of age, the Court
shall take into account the choice of each of the child,
unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
Let copies thereof be sent to the Office of Local Civil
Registrar of Makati City and the National Statistics Office,
Quezon City who are directed to CANCEL from their
respective Civil Registries the marriage of EDWARD N.
LIM and CHERYL STA. CRUZ on December 8, 1979 in
Makati City.
The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses shall be
liquidated, partitioned, and distributed in accordance with
the provisions of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.7
Disagreeing completely with the RTC’s disposition, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed to the CA,
questioning the RTC’s finding that the parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The appellate court granted
the OSG’s appeal and reversed the trial court. It ruled
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated
March 25, 2002 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage between herein parties is hereby declared
subsisting and valid.8
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari positing the
singular issue of whether the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is null and void on the ground
of the parties’ psychological incapacity.
We deny the petition.
The seminal ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals9 cites
three (3) factors characterizing psychological incapacity
to perform the essential marital obligations: (1) gravity, (2)
juridical antecedence, (3) incurability. We expounded on
the foregoing, to wit:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Given the foregoing stringent requisites and without
going into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v.
Court of Appeals,10 petitioner, as the party alleging his
own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, had
the special albatross to prove that he and his wife were
suffering from "the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."11
Instead, petitioner presented the Psychiatric Report of Dr.
Villegas, the conclusions drawn are reprinted in full:
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE:
Edward is of Chinese descent, born and grew up in a
Philippine environment. He was raised and educated in
Philippine school. However, despite his prominent
Filipino exposure, his immediate family still practice a
strong cultural Chinese tradition within his home. Very
clannish, all family members has to stay in one roof, in a
communal style of living, with the elders in this case, the
grandparents are recognized as the authority. Most of
the family members tend to rebel, but at the end,
tendency to be submissive and passive were developed.
But despite physical closeness, Edward did not build
close attachments to his parents. The father was
exceptionally temperamental and moody, while the
mother was extremely asocial, isolated, withdrawn and
seclusive, that repelled him from both of them.
Surrogate parenting from his grandparents satisfied his
dependency needs. He developed into a kind, obedient,
submissive and passive adult, which became the center
of jealousy and rivalry among the siblings. Under
stressful situation, he became depressed and had
suicidal intentions. He felt so secure with his
grandparents, that he subordinated his needs to them.
He allowed them to assume responsibilities for major
areas of his life, as in his family decision and
independence. He has difficulty expressing
disagreements with others, especially with his wife,
because of fear of loss of support or approval. So that
even an abusive spouse may be tolerated for long
periods, in order not to disturb the sense of attachments.
A persevering worker, he had difficulties initiating change
due to lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities,
rather than lack of motivation or energy. Within 10 years
in marriage, he tried hard to grant his wife’s wishes, but
to no avail. His wife left him in October, 1990 together
with their three children, whom he missed very much.
The death of his grandfather in 1994 was a big blow to
him, but he finds solace and security in visiting his grave
every Sunday since then.
On the other hand, Cheryl was initially congenial, which
lasted only for a short period of time. Later, her
immaturity interfered with her behavioral pattern and
adjustment. Apparently, she could not recognize realities
in their family set-up and will insist on her fantasized
wishes. When not granted, she’ll go into tantrums,
moodiness, anger, hostilities, exhibitions and
dramatizations, just to get attention and to emphasize
her wants. Her attention-getting devices will be endless
and her suggestibility to the influence of others is very
fertile.
Based on the family background, pattern of behavior,
and outcome of their marriage, clinical evidence showed
that Mr. Edward Lim is suffering from a Dependent
Personality Disorder, while Cheryl is suffering from
Histrionic Personality Disorder associated with
immaturity, that render both of them psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.1avvphi1
The root cause of the above clinical condition on the part
of Edward was due to overindulgence and overprotection
of his surrogate parents, that left no room for him to
develop his own abilities, encouraging too much
dependence, lack of self-confidence, self-doubt,
passivity, pessimism, and depression. How much of the
Dependent Disorder was due to developmental defect
and how much was due to strong Chinese culture and
traditions, will be difficult to assess.
On the part of Cheryl, the root cause was due to
unsatisfied dependency needs that finds gratification in
adult stage, in the form of attention-seeking devices,
manifested in her clinical symptoms. Both existed prior to
marriage, but became obviously manifested only after
the celebration, due to marital stresses and demands.
Both disorders are considered permanent and incurable,
because they started early in their developmental stage
and therefore became so engrained in their personality
structure. Both are severe and grave in degree, because
they hampered their normal functioning, specifically
related to a difficult heterosexual adjustment. 12
In addition, Dr. Villegas testified in the lower court as to
the findings contained in the Psychiatric Report. Thus,
on direct examination, Dr. Villegas’ testimony consisted
of the following:
Q- Can you tell the Court how you happened to know the
petitioner?
A- He was referred to me by his counsel for
psychological and psychiatric evaluation related to his
application for nullity of marriage in this Honorable Court,
ma’am.
Q- And were you able to actually conduct an examination
for the purposes that you have stated?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- How many times were you able to examine or meet
the petitioner?
A- I met him three (3x) times, ma’am. That was on
January 10, January 14 and January 17, year 2000.
Q- And is there any other witness or person that you
have met for the purpose of evaluating the behavior and
personality of petitioner?
A- Yes, ma’am. I was able to interview a long time
employee that they have in their company in the person
of Mrs. Emmy Adato who herself know the petitioner
since he was eight (8) years old, ma’am.
xxxx
Q- Do you affirm before this Honorable Court the
conclusions that you have arrived at to be correct?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- And what was the conclusion after you conducted the
evaluation of the character of petitioner, as well as that of
the respondent?
A- After my intensive interview about the circumstances
of their marriage, family background of the petitioner and
also the family background of the respondent, it is the
opinion of the examiner that the petitioner Mr. Edward
Lim is suffering from DEPENDENT PERSONALITY
DISORDER that renders him psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage, ma’am. On the other hand, based on the
informations and clinical data gathered from the
petitioner and my other informant, Ms. Emmy Adato, it is
the opinion of the examiner that the respondent is
suffering from HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER
associated with an immaturity that renders her
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
Q- In your capacity as expert, a psychiatrist of forty (40)
years, can you conclude that this deficiencies or defects
that you found are sufficient ground to nullify the
marriage under Article 36?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- Do you conclude also these deficiencies are
continuous and permanent?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- Would you conclude therefore – would you consider it
as valid ground for the annulment of the marriage?
A- Yes, ma’am.13
On cross examination by the prosecutor, Dr. Villegas
testified as follows:
Q- Doctor, you have testified that it was only the
petitioner whom you have examined and evaluated with
(sic)?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- And the other person whom you have interviewed
was the employee of the petitioner?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- No other person whom you have interviewed?
A- None, ma’am.
Q- You did not interview the surrogate parents of
petitioner?
A- No, ma’am.
Q- Did you attempt to communicate with the respondent
of this case for the purpose of interviewing her?
A- Yes, ma’am. [A]nd I have made this through the
petitioner who has contacted his children in Cagayan De
Oro, ma’am.
Q- So you are telling us, Doctor, that the respondent is in
Cagayan De Oro?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- And despite your invitation, she did not appear to
you?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- So based from your Report on the circumstances of
marriage, the information regarding the marriage of
parties in this case came from the petitioner?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- And the family background you have made on Cheryl,
the respondent also came from the petitioner?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- And the interview you have made on Adato, the
employee of petitioner, she gave you some background
of the respondent here?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- But most of the informations you have gathered from
her were pertaining to the petitioner?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- So practically, the evaluation you have made were
based on the interview only on both the employee and
the petitioner himself?
A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- You did not conduct a series of tests to determine or
evaluate further?
A- No, ma’am.
Q- You have not collaborated with any psychologists so
as to get some psychological evaluation on petitioner?
A- No, ma’am. But the clearer picture of the case
presented to me is a very clear picture already of the
psychiatric disorder which did not necessitated (sic) the
assistance of a psychologist because it is obvious, the
signs and symptoms are obviously manifested by the
parties.
Q- How many times did you meet the petitioner?
A- Three (3) times ma’am.
Q- And the duration of interview or examination on
petitioner is how long?
A- It lasted for about one and a half hours to two and a
half hours.
he even, despite the fact that that happened already
about eleven years ago, I could still appreciate how
much he feels, so devastated, so frustrated and
disappointed about family life.
Q- You made a conclusion about the personality of both
the petitioner and the respondent. Would you say that
even if petitioner would marry again, the same
manifestations would exist in the second marriage?
A- The petitioner.
Q- You never discussed the matter with the respondent
or any of her relatives, except the husband?
A- None, ma’am.
Q- Now, you have interviewed Mr. Lim three (3) times.
What tests did you give to him aside from the interview?

A- It would depend again on the personality profile of the

Q- For each session?
A- For each session.
Q- So you were able to examine him for a duration of six
(6) hours, more or less. In the six (6) or seven (7) hours,
you were able to make the conclusions which you have
made in your report?
A- Yes, ma’am. A psychiatric interview is a very
structured interview…
Q- When did you find out that you don’t have to resort to
psychological evaluation?
A- Even on my interview, I already kn[e]w that I will not
be referring this case to a psychological evaluation
because the signs and symptoms are already very clear.
Q- What are these signs and symptoms?
would be partner that he will be having. So it is not really
absolute in his case, in a personality profile, but it would
again depend on the personality profile of the would-be
partner that he will be having, ma’am.14
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and
conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn
between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the
factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr.
Villegas’ sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr.
Villegas’ testimony did not illuminate on the parties’
alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating
effect on their marriage:
Q- Doctora, you gave a conclusion that the respondent is
suffering from Histrionic Personality Disorder associated
with immaturity. Did you discover the antecedents of this
disorder?
A- I did not give him any test because a psychological
examination is given by a psychologist who acts as a
laboratory aide to a psychiatrist and therefore, if there
are some doubts in our clinical interviews, that is the time
we refer the case to a psychologist for a sort of
clarification in our clinical interviews.
Q- As far as the gravity of the disorder of petitioner is
concerned do you have any suggestions as to the cure
of the same?
A- Because the psychological/psychiatric incapacity has
been formed or developed during his early years of
development, I would say that it is ingrained in his
personality and therefore, no amount of psychiatric
assistance or medicines can help him improve his
personality, your honor.15
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),16 provides general
diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:

A- The family background, for example, which gave the
rootcause, of this case are very, very typical ground that
can bring about…
Q- Did you not have any suspicion that the petitioner
might be giving you some informations which would
given (sic) some presumption to nullifying his marriage?
A- I have no basis to doubt that kind of information that
he might be lying. During the one and a half to two hours
of interview based on his reactions, the way he answers
me, the way he grimaces and also, his statements that
he has been giving me are very sincere on his part, that
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior
A- Yes, your honor.
that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual’s culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2)
Q- What did you find out?
or more of the following areas:
A- I found out from her family background that the
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting
parents were separated. She lived with a stepfather and
self, other people, and events)
therefore their family relationship were only preoccupied
by earning a living and no attention were given to the
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, lability, and
children. When the children were growing up, specifically
appropriateness of emotional response)
Cheryl – (interrupted).
Q- By the way, who supplied you this information? (3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive
across a broad range of personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant
distress or impairment in social, occupational or other
important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its
onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a
manifestation or a consequence of another mental
disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct
physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse,
a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head
trauma).
The alleged personality disorders of the parties have the
following specified diagnostic criteria:
301.6 DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER
A pervasive and excessive need to be taken care of that
leads to submissive and clinging behavior and fears of
separation, beginning by early adulthood and present in
a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the
following:
(1) has difficulty making everyday decisions without an
excessive amount of advice and reassurance from
others;
(2) needs others to assume responsibility for most major
areas of his or her life;
(3) has difficulty expressing disagreement with others
because of fear of loss of support or approval. Note: do
not include realistic fears of retribution;
(4) has difficulty intiating projects or doing things on his
or her own (because of a lack of self-confidence in
judgment or abilities rather than a lack of motivation or
energy);
(5) goes to excessive lengths to obtain nurturance and
support from others, to the point of volunteering to do
things that are unpleasant;
(6) feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone because
of exaggerated fears of being unable to care for himself
or herself;
(7) urgently seeks another relationship as a source of
care and support when a close relationship ends;
(8) is unrealistically preoccupied with fears of being left
to take care of himself or herself.
301.5 HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER
A pervasive pattern of excessive emotionality and
attention seeking, beginning by early adulthood and
present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or
more) of the following:
(1) is uncomfortable in situations in which he or she is
not the center of attention;
(2) interaction with others is often characterized by
inappropriate sexually seductive or provocative behavior;
(3) displays rapidly shifting and shallow expressing of
emotions;
(4) consistently uses physical appearance to draw
attention to self;
(5) has a style of speech that is excessively
impressionistic and lacking in detail;
(6) shows self-dramatization, theatricality, and
exaggerated expression of emotion;
(7) is suggestible, i.e., easily influenced by others or
circumstances; and
(8) considers relationships to be more intimate than they
actually are.
Significantly, nowhere in Dr. Villegas’ Psychiatric Report
and in her testimony does she link particular acts of the
parties to the DSM IV’s list of criteria for the specific
personality disorders.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas’ global conclusion of both parties’
personality disorders was not supported by
psychological tests properly administered by clinical
psychologists specifically trained in the tests’ use and
interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the
parties, considering that such diagnoses were made,
could have been fully established by psychometric and
neurological tests which are designed to measure
specific aspects of people’s intelligence, thinking, or
personality.17
Concededly, a copy of DSM IV, or any of the psychology
textbooks, does not transform a lawyer or a judge into a
professional psychologist. A judge should not substitute
his own psychological assessment of the parties for that
of the psychologist or the psychiatrist. However, a judge
has the bounden duty to rule on what the law is, as
applied to a certain set of facts. Certainly, as in all other
litigations involving technical or special knowledge, a
judge must first and foremost resolve the legal question
based on law and jurisprudence.
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a
maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its
own factual finding on what happened in this case. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie
in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in
the assistance that he can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is
founded.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74822 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203993, April 20, 2015
PRISCILO B. PAZ,*Petitioner, v. NEW
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL UNIVERSALITY,
INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated January 31, 2012 and the
Resolution3 dated October 2, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00903-MIN, which
affirmed the Decision4 dated May 19, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33 (RTC) in
Civil Case No. 29,292-2002, declaring petitioner Captain
Priscilo B. Paz (petitioner) liable for breach of contract.
The Facts
On March 1, 2000, petitioner, as the officer-in-charge of
the Aircraft Hangar at the Davao International Airport,
Davao City, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement5 (MOA) with Captain Allan J. Clarke (Capt.
Clarke), President of International Environmental
University, whereby for a period of four (4) years, unless
pre-terminated by both parties with six (6) months
advance notice, the former shall allow the latter to use
the aircraft hangar space at the said Airport "exclusively
for company aircraft/helicopter."6 Said hangar space was
previously leased to Liberty Aviation Corporation, which
assigned the same to petitioner.7
On August 19, 2000, petitioner complained in a
letter8 addressed to "MR. ALLAN J. CLARKE,
International Environmental Universality, Inc. x x x" that
the hangar space was being used "for trucks and
equipment, vehicles maintenance and fabrication,"
instead of for "company helicopter/aircraft" only, and
thereby threatened to cancel the MOA if the "welding,
grinding, and fabrication jobs" were not stopped
immediately.9
On January 16, 2001, petitioner sent another letter10 to
"MR. ALLAN J. CLARKE, International
Environmental Universality, Inc. x x x," reiterating that
the hangar space "must be for aircraft use only," and that
he will terminate the MOA due to the safety of the
aircrafts parked nearby. He further offered a vacant
space along the airport road that was available and
suitable for Capt. Clarke's operations.11
On July 19, 2002, petitioner sent a third letter,12 this time,
addressed to "MR. ALLAN JOSEPH CLARKE, CEO,
New International Environmental University, Inc. x x x,"
demanding that the latter vacate the premises due to the
damage caused by an Isuzu van driven by its employee
to the left wing of an aircraft parked inside the hangar
space, which Capt. Clarke had supposedly promised to
buy, but did not.13
On July 23, 2002, petitioner sent a final
letter14 addressed to "MR. ALLAN J. CLARKE, Chairman,
CEO, New International Environmental University, Inc. x
x x," strongly demanding the latter to immediately
vacate the hangar space. He further informed Capt.
Clarke that the company will "apply for immediate
electrical disconnection with the Davao Light and Power
Company (DLPC)[,] so as to compel [the latter] to desist
from continuing with [the] works" thereon.15
On September 4, 2002, respondent New International
Environmental Universality, Inc.16 (respondent) filed a
complaint17 against petitioner for breach of contract
before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 29,
292-2002,18 claiming that: (a) petitioner had
disconnected its electric and telephone lines; (b) upon
petitioner's instruction, security guards prevented its
employees from entering the leased premises by
blocking the hangar space with barbed wire; and (c)
petitioner violated the terms of the MOA when he took
over the hangar space without giving respondent the
requisite six (6)-month advance notice of termination.19
In his defense, petitioner alleged, among others, that: (a)
respondent had no cause of action against him as the
MOA was executed between him and Capt. Clarke in the
latter's personal capacity; (b) there was no need to wait
for the expiration of the MOA because Capt. Clarke
performed highly risky works in the leased premises that
endangered other aircrafts within the vicinity; and (c) the
six (6)-month advance notice of termination was already
given in the letters he sent to Capt. Clarke.20
On March 25, 2003, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction21 ordering petitioner to: (a) immediately
remove all his aircrafts parked within the leased
premises; (b) allow entry of respondent by removing the
steel gate installed thereat; and (c) desist and refrain
from committing further acts of dispossession and/or
interference in respondent's occupation of the hangar
space.
For failure of petitioner to comply with the foregoing writ,
respondent filed on October 24, 2003 a petition for
indirect contempt22 before the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 30,030-2003, which was tried jointly with Civil
Case No. 29, 292-2002.23
The RTC Ruling
After due trial, the RTC rendered a Decision24 dated May
19, 2006 finding petioner: (a) guilty of indirect
contempt for contumaciously disregarding its
Order25 dated March 6, 2003, by not allowing respondent
to possess occupy the leased premises pending final
decision in the main case; and (b) liable for breach of
contract for illegally terminating the MOA even before
the expiration of the term thereof.26 He was, thus,
ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00, and to
pay respondent nominal damages of P100,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P50,000.00 with legal interest, and
costs of suit.27
On the challenge to respondent's juridical personality,
the RTC quoted the Order28 dated April 11, 2005 of the
SEC explaining that respondent was issued a Certificate
of Incorporation on September 3, 2001 as New
International Environmental Universality, Inc. but that,
subsequently, when it amended its Articles of
Incorporation on November 14, 2001 and July 11, 2002,
the SEC Extension Office in Davao City erroneously
used the name New International Environmental
University, Inc.29 The latter name was used by
respondent when it filed its amended complaint on
September 11, 2002 and the petition for indirect
contempt against petitioner on October 24, 2003
believing that it was allowed to do so, as it was only on
April 11, 2005 when the SEC directed it to revert to its
correct name.30
The RTC further declared that the MOA, which was
"made and executed by and between CAPT. [PRISCILO]
B. PAZ, Officer-In-Charge of Aircraft Hangar at Davao
International Airport, Davao City, Philippines, hereinafter
called as FIRST PARTY [a]nd CAPT. ALLAN J.
CLARKE[,] President of INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL UNIVERSITY with office address at
LIBERTY AVIATION HANGAR, Davao International
Airport, Davao City, Philippines, hereinafter called as
SECOND PARTY,"31 was executed by the parties not
only in their personal capacities but also in
representation of their respective corporations or
entities.32
On the issue of the violation of the terms of the MOA, the
RTC found respondent to have been effectively
evicted from the leased premises between July and
August of 2002, or long before the expiration of the term
thereof in 2004, when petitioner: (a) placed a gate/fence
that prevented ingress to and egress from the leased
premises; (b) parked a plane inside and outside the
leased premises; (c) disconnected the electrical and
telephone connections of respondent; and (d) locked
respondent's employees out.33 Despite the service of the
injunctive writ upon petitioner, respondent was not
allowed to possess and occupy the leased premises, as
in fact, the trial court even had to order on March 8, 2004
the inventory of the items locked inside the bodega of
said premises that was kept off-limits to respondent.
Hence, petitioner was declared guilty of indirect
contempt.34
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal before
the CA, arguing that the trial court should have
dismissed outright the cases against him for failure of
respondent to satisfy the essential requisites of being a
party to an action, i.e., legal personality, legal capacity to
sue or be sued, and real interest in the subject matter of
the action.35
The CA Ruling
Finding that the errors ascribed by petitioner to the trial
court only touched the civil action for breach of contract,
the appellate court resolved the appeal against him in a
Decision36 dated January 31, 2012, and affirmed the
RTC's finding of petitioner's liability for breach of
contract.37
The CA ruled that, while there was no corporate entity at
the time of the execution of the MOA on March 1, 2000
when Capt. Clarke signed as "President of International
Environmental University," petitioner is
nonetheless estopped from denying that he had
contracted with respondent as a corporation, having
recognized the latter as the "Second Party" in the MOA
that "will use the hangar space exclusively
for company aircraft/helicopter."38 Petitioner was
likewise found to have issued checks to respondent from
May 3, 2000 to October 13, 2000, which belied his claim
of contracting with Capt. Clarke in the latter's personal
capacity.39
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration40 of the
foregoing Decision, raising as an additional issue the
death41 of Capt. Clarke which allegedly warranted the
dismissal of the case.42 However, the motion was denied
in a Resolution43 dated October 2, 2012 where the CA
held that Capt. Clarke was merely an agent of
respondent, who is the real party in the case. Thus, Capt.
Clarke's death extinguished only the agency between
him and respondent, not the appeal against petitioner.44
Undaunted, petitioner is now before the Court via the
instant petition,45 claiming that: (a) the CA erred in not
settling his appeal for both the breach of contract and
indirect contempt cases in a single proceeding and,
consequently, the review of said cases before the Court
should be consolidated,46 and (b) the CA should have
dismissed the cases against him for (1) lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court in view of the failure to
implead Capt. Clarke as an indispensable party;47 (2)
lack of legal capacity and personality on the part of
respondent;48 and (3) lack of factual and legal bases for
the assailed RTC Decision.49
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
First, on the matter of the consolidation50 of the instant
case with G.R. No. 202826 entitled "Priscilo B. Paz v.
New International Environmental University,'' the petition
for review of the portion of the RTC Decision finding
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt,51 the Court had
earlier denied said motion in a Resolution52 dated July
24, 2013 on the ground that G.R. No. 202826 had
already been denied53 with finality.54 Thus, any further
elucidation on the issue would be a mere superfluity.
Second, whether or not Capt. Clarke should have been
impleaded as an indispensable party was correctly
resolved by the CA which held that the former was
merely an agent of respondent.55 While Capt. Clarke's
name and signature appeared on the MOA, his
participation was, nonetheless, limited to being a
representative of respondent. As a mere representative,
Capt. Clarke acquired no rights whatsoever, nor did he
incur any liabilities, arising from the contract between
petitioner and respondent. Therefore, he was not an
indispensable party to the case at bar.56
It should be emphasized, as it has been time and again,
that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is thus not
duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence
introduced in and considered by the tribunals. 57 When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact by
the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are
not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under
any of the exceptions,58 none of which was established
herein.
The CA had correctly pointed out that, from the very
language itself of the MOA entered into by petitioner
whereby he obligated himself to allow the use of the
hangar space "for company aircraft/helicopter,"
petitioner cannot deny that he contracted with
respondent.59 Petitioner further acknowledged this fact in
his final letter dated July 23, 2002, where he reiterated
and strongly demanded the former to immediately vacate
the hangar space his "company is occupying/utilizing."60
Section 2161 of the Corporation Code62 explicitly
provides that one who assumes an obligation to an
ostensible corporation, as such, cannot resist
performance thereof on the ground that there was in fact
no corporation. Clearly, petitioner is bound by his
obligation under the MOA not only on estoppel but by
express provision of law. As aptly raised by respondent
in its Comment63 to the instant petition, it is futile to insist
that petitioner issued the receipts for rental payments in
respondent's name and not with Capt. Clarke's, whom
petitioner allegedly contracted in the latter's personal
capacity, only because it was upon the instruction of an
employee.64 Indeed, it is disputably presumed that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns,65 and that all
private transactions have been fair and regular.66 Hence,
it is assumed that petitioner, who is a pilot, knew what he
was doing with respect to his business with respondent.
Petitioner's pleadings, however, abound with clear
indications of a business relationship gone sour. In his
third letter dated July 19, 2002, petitioner lamented the
fact that Capt. Clarke's alleged promise to buy an aircraft
had not materialized.67 He likewise insinuated that Capt.
Clarke's real motive in staying in the leased premises
was the acquisition of petitioner's right to possess and
use the hangar space.68 Be that as it may, it is settled
that courts have no power to relieve parties from
obligations they voluntarily assumed, simply because
their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise
investments.69
The lower courts, therefore, did not err in finding
petitioner liable for breach of contract for effectively
evicting respondent from the leased premises even
before the expiration of the term of the lease. The Court
reiterates with approval the ratiocination of the RTC that,
if it were true that respondent was violating the terms
and conditions of the lease, "[petitioner] should have
gone to court to make the [former] refrain from its 'illegal'
activities or seek rescission of the [MOA], rather than
taking the law into his own hands."70
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 31, 2012 and the Resolution dated
October 2, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00903-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking a review of the December 10,
2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an
original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled
"Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and
Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872,
reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its
decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between
petitioner and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed
a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the
Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for
annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the
following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS
and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on
February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both
petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family
Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as
the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on
August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on
September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied
due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in
violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the
denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order
declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory
and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by
Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders
of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,
to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied
due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the November 23,
2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the
September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007
Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as
final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be
declared psychologically capacitated to render the
essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be
declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and
their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and
reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC.
The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as
the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family
Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the
"coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO
Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File THE WORD "MARRIAGES."
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s Decision C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M.
dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE
February 11, 2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE
extension of time considering that the 15-day NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO
Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED
142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE
was likewise denied. FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL
45 of the Rules of Court raising the following BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
ISSUES D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN
RESPONDENT REFUSED TO
I COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION
FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF
THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT
THE COURT OF APPEALS
PROPER IN HIS CASE.
GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED DECISION DATED
II
DECEMBER 10, 2008
CONSIDERING THAT:
THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V.
DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009
SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
AND THE FACTUAL
CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN
ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE
INSTANT CASE. III
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND
THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND
HONORABLE COURT IS IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND
APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN
CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND
SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE
PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE
CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC INSTANT PETITION IS
PERTAINS TO THE WORD MERITORIOUS AND NOT
INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal
question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also
applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity
of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA
erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in
the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a
marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family
Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the
pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision
on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of
the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico
case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages
sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the
action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the
effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and
decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with
Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years
before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious
nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC
declaring their marriage as null and void due to his
purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere
"failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but
not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as
required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this
case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15,
2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact,
reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The
rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s
interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions"
rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the
law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there
is no room for construction or interpretation. There is
only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or
"speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is
the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the
words of a statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the
tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance
of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case
warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and
again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure
must be faithfully complied with and should not be
discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the
time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to
prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly
discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these
rules are regarded as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration considering that the reglementary period
for filing the said motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court
has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas
Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has
consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the
appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s
earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll
the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a
motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the
CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner
filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the
same decision was already beyond the review
jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting
aside the RTC decision which denied due course to
respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its
purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the
lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to
appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las
Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the right
to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it
is an essential part of our judicial system and courts
should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party
of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every
party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal
considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct
institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage
as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional
policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof
emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not
a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State
is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported
by well-established facts. It is the plaintiff’s burden to
convince the court of the existence of these facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 of the Court of
Appeals’ (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision2 and December 15,
2004 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which
reversed the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the
herein parties’ marriage. The fallo of the assailed
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE¸the appeal is GRANTED, and the
assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma.
Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained
a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on
November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio),
Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and
Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had
an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn),
who gave birth to a son in March 1983.5
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of
her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with
Tyrone.6 Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn,
who bore him three more children.7
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with
Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from
his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde
with only a househelp and a driver.8 The househelp
would just call Malyn to take care of the children
whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with
their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn
on weekends.9
In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for
Malyn’s permission to go to Japan for a one-week
vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone
brought the children to the US.10 After just one year, Ria
returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn’s family returned to the
Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two
younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn,
from that time on, the children refused to go to her house
on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with
their father.11
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation
from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code.12 He alleged that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. He further claimed that her psychological
incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and
irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during
their co-habitation, as shown by Malyn’s following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention
as she played mahjong all day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and
returned in the early hours of the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act
Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.13
During trial,14 Tyrone narrated the circumstances of
Malyn’s alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9,
1985, he and his brother-in-law, Ronald Fernandez
(Malyn’s brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned
that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie
Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room,
he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.15 At rebuttal, Tyrone
elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around
his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear.
After an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge
Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish
all her marital and parental rights.16 They put their
agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr.
Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard
Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s
psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual
allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her sexual
infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent
nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present when a
person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in
utter disregard of her significant others.18 Malyn’s NPD is
manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.19
Dr. Gates reported that Malyn’s personality disorder
"may have been evident even prior to her marriage"
because it is rooted in her family background and
upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be
materially deprived and without a proper maternal role
model.20
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by
her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s
sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also read the
transcript of Tyrone’s court testimony.21
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates’ assessment. He
concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated
to perform her marital duties.22 He explained that her
psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the
breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated
Malyn’s ego to the point that her needs became priority,
while her kids’ and husband’s needs became secondary.
Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of
prioritizing her family’s needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending
time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They
only constitute psychological incapacity whenever
inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities
to the detriment of one’s familial duties.23 Fr. Healy
characterized Malyn’s psychological incapacity as grave
and incurable.24
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the
trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad
Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyn’s expert witness.25 He
clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the
factual allegations regarding Malyn’s "habits" because
he believed it is the court’s duty to do so.26 Instead, he
formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual
allegations are indeed true.
Malyn’s version
Malyn denied being psychologically
incapacitated.27 While she admitted playing mahjong,
she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She
maintained that she did so only two to three times a
week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.28 And in
those instances, she always had Tyrone’s permission
and would often bring the children and their respective
yayas with her.29 She maintained that she did not neglect
her duties as mother and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985.
She, however, explained that she did so only to escape
her physically abusive husband.30 On the day she left,
Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was
upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called
up the security guards and instructed them not to let
Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette
ashes on Malyn’s head and proceeded to lock the
bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed
out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-law’s room.
She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her
mother-in-law gave her ₱300 to leave the house. 31 She
never returned to their conjugal home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against
Tyrone’s wishes, because she wanted to be
self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her discovery that
Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to
the US with Jocelyn.32
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained
that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her
because she was so drunk after partying with friends.
She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at
the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being
fully clothed at that time.33 Malyn insisted that she wrote
the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights
under duress.34
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her
children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She
later obtained partial custody of the children as an
incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone
against her (which action was subsequently dismissed
for lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was
Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity,
as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking,
womanizing, and physical violence.35 Malyn presented
Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay,
and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the spouses.
The factual narrations culled from these interviews
reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a "lousy" mother
because of her mahjong habit,36 while Malyn was fed up
with Tyrone’s sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical
abuse.37 Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and
Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered
problems because of their personality differences, which
ultimately led to the demise of their marriage. Her
diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from
the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for
marriage even after two years of living together and
having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who
showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she
resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could
‘take him or leave him.’ But the minute she started to
care, she became a different person – clingy and
immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding
reassurance that she was the most important person in
his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears
that her style then was when she begins to care for a
man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on
herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling
was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the
thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that
when he was in his younger years, he was often out
seeking other women. His interest in them was not
necessarily for sex, just for fun – dancing, drinking, or
simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some
time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody
man with short temper and unresolved issues with
parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned
more about his work and friends tha[n] he was about
spending time with his family. Because of Malyn’s and
Tyrone’s backgrounds (both came from families with
high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in
their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid
suddenly galloped out of control Their individual
personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of
their marriage.38
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation
report that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe,
dependency, narcissism, and compulsiveness.39
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while
Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she
appeared to have a good relationship with her kids. 40 As
for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent
him from committing himself to his duties as a husband.
He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is
psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.41
Children’s version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of
them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio
testified that they would accompany their mother to
White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her
friends. None of them reported being neglected or
feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their
parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually
witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her mother. 42 The
two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation,
their mother would visit them only in school.43
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the
househelp and driver during the time that their dad was
abroad.44 While they did not live with their mother while
they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in
agreement that their mother took care of them on
weekends and would see to their needs. They had a
common recollection that the househelp would call their
mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde
whenever any of them was sick.45
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrone’s attending psychiatrist at
the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of
Tyrone’s confinement, the couple appeared happy and
the wife was commendable for the support she gave to
her spouse.46 He likewise testified that Tyrone tested
negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.47
Malyn’s brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrone’s
allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt
hotel room. Contrary to Tyrone’s version, he testified that
neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in
the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or
Malyn half-naked.48
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was
allegedly part of Malyn’s group of friends. He stated on
the stand that they would go on nights-out as a group
and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend
afterwards.49
Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V.
Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties
as well as the minor children. Arre interviewed the
parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children
Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrone’s live-in partner,
Jocelyn;50 and Tyrone and Malyn’s only daughter, Ria.
While both parents are financially stable and have
positive relationships with their children, she
recommended that the custody of the minor children be
awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family
members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more
available to the children and to exercise better
supervision and care. The social worker commended the
fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985,
she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in
their respective schools. And while she was only granted
weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she
made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to
devote time with them.51
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children
since the couple’s de facto separation, simply left the
children for several years with only a maid and a driver to
care for them while he lived with his second family
abroad.52 The social worker found that Tyrone tended to
prioritize his second family to the detriment of his
children with Malyn. Given this history during the
formative years of the children, the social worker did not
find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of
adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court53
After summarizing the evidence presented by both
parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code. The court’s
Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both
suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without
as much as understanding what it entails. They failed to
commit themselves to its essential obligations: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education
of their children to become responsible individuals.
Parties’ psychological incapacity is grave, and serious
such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been
clinically established and was found to be pervasive,
grave and incurable.54
The trial court then declared the parties’ marriage void
ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.55
Ruling of the Court of Appeals56
Malyn appealed the trial court’s Decision to the
CA.1âwphi1 The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling
because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both
parties’ allegations and incriminations against each other
do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The
parties’ faults tend only to picture their immaturity and
irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial
obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for
a legal separation.57 Moreover, the psychological report
submitted by petitioner’s expert witness, Dr. Gates, does
not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn
from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and
jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity
of marriage.58
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration 59 but the same
was denied on December 15, 2004.60
Petitioner’s arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in
disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which
is the court that is in the best position to appreciate the
evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant
evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations,
to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved
on the stand that respondent’s egocentric attitude,
immaturity, self-obsession and self-centeredness were
manifestations of respondent’s NPD;61
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondent’s NPD
is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing
her essential martial obligations;62 and
c) that respondent’s NPD existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her
upbringing, family background, and socialite lifestyle
prior to her marriage.63
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that
their marriage is void because of psychological
incapacity, albeit on petitioner’s part.64
Respondent’s arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his
burden of proving her alleged psychological
incapacity.65 She argues that the testimonies of her
children and the findings of the court social worker to the
effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive mother
are sufficient to rebut Tyrone’s allegation that she was
negligent and irresponsible.66
She assails Dr. Gates’s report as one-sided and lacking
in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common
children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to
state that Malyn’s alleged psychological incapacity was
grave and incurable.67 Fr. Healy’s testimony, on the
other hand, was based only on Tyrone’s version of the
facts.68
Malyn reiterates the appellate court’s ruling that the trial
court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to
support its conclusion of psychological incapacity with
factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum,
respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Withdraw
Comment and Memorandum.69 She manifested that she
was no longer disputing the possibility that their marriage
may really be void on the basis of Tyrone’s psychological
incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the
case with justice.70 Her manifestation and motion were
noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution. 71
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that
respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no
reversible error in setting aside the trial court’s Decision
for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations.72 The burden of proving
psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. 73 The plaintiff
must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or
her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological
disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations
of the marital state. The psychological problem must be
grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and
must be incurable.74
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined
that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts,
were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the
petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent
constantly played mahjong and neglected their children
as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but
it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother
and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations
that she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week and
always with the permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother
when she played mahjong in their relative’s home.
Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent
that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated
that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was
not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done
was to prove the frequency of respondent’s
mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus,
while there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse
effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s
alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other
men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her
visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with
friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
companion of respondent during these nights-out) in
order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men,
but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be
dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of
sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it
does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent
actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that
she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed,
the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show
that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental
duties. Not once did the children state that they were
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated
that she took care of them, was around when they were
sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that
respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her
children despite her estrangement from their father.
There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While
petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy,
both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic
shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds
no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the
trial court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity.
The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the
allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective
parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these
allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the
weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make
factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal
conclusion of psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and,
perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and
to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity
that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004
Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the
October 7, 2005 amended decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004
decision3 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In
its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The
Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union
bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his
family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15,
1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi
Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair
with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left
the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin.
Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On
June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition
against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she
contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her
promotions business. She insisted that she is not
psychologically incapacitated and that she left their
home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.9
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s
infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family
home.10 He testified that he continued to provide
financial support for Lolita and their children even after
he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation
report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores
of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores
found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of
major psychiatric illness,"13 but had been "unable to
provide the expectations expected of her for a good and
lasting marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one
job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems
with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband
abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good
marital and family relationship."16
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s
marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare
Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding
that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and
infidelity were not serious cases of personality
disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to
comply with her marital obligations which she was
capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that
infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and,
in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside
its original decision and entered another, which affirmed
the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision, 20 the CA
found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious
psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross
infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her
marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological
evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been
suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish
its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability;
infidelity and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for
legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to
perform her marital obligations established her grave
and incurable psychological incapacity.
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there
exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul
Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological
incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not
merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the
burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant
spouse.23
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s
alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the
dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her
subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as his
continued financial support to her and their children even
after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely mentioned
in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the
erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support
Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and
abandonment were manifestations of any psychological
illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological
evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation,
in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any
major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores’ observation on
Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our
mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the
conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage –
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital
union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved,
a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply
be equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles
apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring
from human relationship, their relatedness and
relevance to one another should be fully established for
them to be compared or to serve as measures of
comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation
report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve
this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal
to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work
out a good marital relationship30 is a mere generalization
unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion
that this Court cannot support.
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence
of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the CA
committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its
original decision.1âwphi1
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable
social institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence
and continuation and against its dissolution and
nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties
nor by transgressions made by one party to the other
during the marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE
the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we
DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita
Castillo-Encelan.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, v. MA. ELENA
FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19,
2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following
ratiocination, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petition has no merit. The CA
committed no reversible error in
setting aside the trial court’s Decision
for lack of legal and factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to
prove that his wife (respondent)
suffers from psychological incapacity.
He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not
been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant
mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children.
Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment
of quality and quantity of time devoted
to her duties as mother and wife,
constitute a psychological incapacity
in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which
served as the bases or underlying
premises of the conclusions of his
experts, were not actually proven. In
fact, respondent presented contrary
evidence refuting these allegations of
the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that
respondent constantly played mahjong
and neglected their children as a result.
Respondent admittedly played
mahjong, but it was not proven that
she engaged in mahjong so frequently
that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent
refuted petitioner’s allegations that she
played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three
times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home. The
children corroborated this, saying that
they were with their mother when she
played mahjong in their relative’s
home. Petitioner did not present any
proof, other than his own testimony,
that the mahjong sessions were so
frequent that respondent neglected
her family. While he intimated that two
of his sons repeated the second grade,
he was not able to link this episode to
respondent’s mahjong-playing. The
least that could have been done was
to prove the frequency of respondent’s
mahjong-playing during the years
when these two children were in
second grade. This was not done.
Thus, while there is no dispute that
respondent played mahjong, its
alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were
not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim
about respondent’s alleged constant
visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, and obsessive need for
attention from other men. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove
her visits to beauty salons or her
frequent partying with friends.
Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
companion of respondent during these
nights-out) in order to prove that
respondent had affairs with other men,
but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating
other men. Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner
was able to prove that respondent had
an extramarital affair with another man,
that one instance of sexual infidelity
cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from
other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does
not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence
that respondent actually engaged in
the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis
for concluding that she was indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed,
the totality of the evidence points to
the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show
that respondent was not totally remiss
and incapable of appreciating and
performing her marital and parental
duties. Not once did the children state
that they were neglected by their
mother. On the contrary, they narrated
that she took care of them, was
around when they were sick, and
cooked the food they like. It appears
that respondent made real efforts to
see and take care of her children
despite her estrangement from their
father. There was no testimony
whatsoever that shows abandonment
and neglect of familial duties. While
petitioner cites the fact that his two
sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the
second elementary level despite
having tutors, there is nothing to link
their academic shortcomings to
Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the
case, the Court finds no factual basis
for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the
CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling
that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial court’s Decision
merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not
actually assess the veracity of these
allegations, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not make
factual findings which can serve as
bases for its legal conclusion of
psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is
acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity,
which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves
 to each other and to their children.
There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not
psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and
its December 15, 2004 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner
implores the Court to take a thorough second look into
what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the
findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies
of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that
the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically
incapacitated to perform their respective essential
marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to
grant the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
I physical) incapacity that causes a
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior
to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to
deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was
about to assume. Although the Family Code has not
defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has
usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in
order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that
the members of the Family Code Revision Committee
were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they
decided to adopt the provision “with less specificity than
expected” in order to have the law “allow some resiliency
in its application.”4 Illustrative of the “less specificity than
expected” has been the omission by the Family Code
Revision Committee to give any examples of
psychological incapacity that would have limited the
applicability of the provision conformably with the
principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee
desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive
effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken
from the Canon Law.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos
v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage have rendered it obvious that the
term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the
Family Code “has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances,” and
could not be taken and construed independently of “but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage.” Thus correlated:-
x x x “psychological incapacity” should
refer to no less than a mental (not
party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity”
to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived
prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be
“legitimate.”7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set
some guidelines for the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it “as the foundation of the
nation.” It decrees marriage as legally
“inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be
“protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes
their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological —
not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties
exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and
which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
“The following are
incapable of
contracting
marriage: Those
who are unable to
assume the
essential obligations
of marriage due to
causes of
psychological
nature.”
Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands
to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally —
subject to our law on evidence — what
is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of
the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church
— while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other —
shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
 General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid,
such that their application to every instance practically
condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the
fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code
must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied
given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its
enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable
“some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court
should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations,
but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity
that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in
the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial
court.”10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with
expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity
rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves
to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed,
the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent
and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the
existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological
incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses
and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and
manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where the
findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the
facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate
court should restrain itself from substituting its own
judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings
and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own
as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution
and the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable
social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of
the constitutional mandate for the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution 14 only relates
to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a
marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a
marriage has no legal
existence.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore,
the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the
sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution.
The foundation of our society is thereby made all the
more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial
court deserved credence because it was in the better
position to view and examine the demeanor of the
witnesses while they were testifying.16 The position and
role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence
showing the psychological incapacity were not to be
downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court
brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina
Gates, a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the
ground that their conclusions were solely based on the
petitioner’s version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it
improper and unwarranted to give to such expert
opinions a merely generalized consideration and
treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently
and competently described the psychological incapacity
of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the
Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the
two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn
from the case records and affidavits, and should not
anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted
the veracity of the petitioner’s factual
premises.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the
transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her
interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his
son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be
unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to
disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her
expert opinion took into consideration other factors
extant in the records, including the own opinions of
another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side
of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled
that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony
on the psychological and mental state of the parties in
cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for
by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the
courts, “despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the
parties.”18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately
necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly
determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the
respondent (if not also of the petitioner). Consequently,
the lack of personal examination and interview of the
person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the
respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the
experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v.
Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to be
declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally
examined by a physician, because what is important is
the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the
party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.”20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition
could possibly result from an assumed state of facts
existed in the record, the expert opinion should be
admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological
incapacity should be considered as conjectural or
speculative and without any probative value only in the
absence of other evidence to establish causation. The
expert’s findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as
evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling that
brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by
Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it
was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based
on the parties’ upbringing and
psychodynamics.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In that context, Dr. Gates’ expert opinion should be
considered not in isolation but along with the other
evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of
psychological incapacity, the trial court was expected to
compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad
Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr.
Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan
impressed that the respondent had “compulsive and
dependent tendencies” to the extent of being
“relationship dependent.” Based from the respondent’s
psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In her relationship with people, Malyne
is likely to be reserved and seemingly
detached in her ways. Although she
likes to be around people, she may
keep her emotional distance. She, too,
values her relationship but she may
not be that demonstrative of her
affections. Intimacy may be quite
difficult for her since she tries to
maintain a certain distance to
minimize opportunities for rejection.
To others, Malyne may appear, critical
and demanding in her ways. She can
be assertive when opinions contrary to
those of her own are expressed. And
yet, she is apt to be a dependent
person. At a less conscious level,
Malyne fears that others will abandon
her. Malyne, who always felt a bit
lonely, placed an enormous value on
having significant others would
depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she
became a different person—clingy and
immature, doubting his love,
constantly demanding reassurance
that she was the most important
person in his life. She became
relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted on
the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained
high scores on dependency, narcissism and
compulsiveness, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Bretania
Q: How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be
normal is 73 percental round and there are several
A: scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high
score and these are on the score of dependency,
narcissism and compulsion.
Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness,
Q:
what is the acceptable score?
When your score is 73 and above, that means that
A: it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be
considered as acceptable.
Q: In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
Under dependency, her score is 78; under
A:
narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict
but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect
that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic
Personality Disorder as well as with Anti-Social Disorder.
Dr. Gates relevantly
testified:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ATTY. GONONG
Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic]
not quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more
Q: or less, could you please tell me in more layman’s
terms how you arrived at your findings that the
respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?
I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if
you ask about her childhood background, her
father died in a vehicular accident when she was in
her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look
for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role in
her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother
partly took care of her and her siblings against the
fact that her own mother was unable to carry out
her respective duties and responsibilities towards
Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that
the husband died prematurely. And there was an
indication that Elena Fernandez on several
occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame
her for being negligent as a mother because she
A: herself never experienced the care and affection of
her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in
her background, in her childhood, and indeed this
seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in
psychology a script, the tendency to repeat some
kind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say
some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to
sustain it even on to your own life when you have
your own family. I did interview the son because I
was not satisfied with what I gathered from both
Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young
son at the age of fourteen already expressed the
he could not see, according to the child, the
sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena and
that he preferred to live with the father actually.
Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion
Q:
that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?
A: Actually respondent has some needs which tempts
[sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still in
 search of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems
that she would jump from one boyfriend to another.
There is this need for attention, this need for love
on other people.
Q: And that led you to conclude?
And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered
A: to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as
a mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does
not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but
rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts
in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion
is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the
probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses
vis-à-vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon
law expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese
and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family
Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s
expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity could be
informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, by current trends in
psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the
concept of psychological incapacity adopted under
Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon
Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion on whether or not the
respondent’s level of immaturity and irresponsibility with
regard to her own children and to her husband
constituted psychological incapacity, testifying
thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ATTY. MADRID
Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that
she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the
Q: facts as you read it based on the records of this
case before this Honorable Court, what can you
say to that claim of respondent?
I would say it is a clear case of psychological
A: incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic
irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
So what you are saying is that, the claim of
Q: respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?
A: Yes. It should be rejected.
Q: Why do you say so?
Because of what she has manifested in her whole
lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested
running through their life made a doubt that this is
immaturity and irresponsibility because her family
was dysfunctional and then her being a model in
her early life and being the breadwinner of the
A:
family put her in an unusual position of prominence
and then begun to inflate her own ego and she
begun to concentrate her own beauty and that
became an obsession and that led to her few
responsibility of subordinating to her children to this
lifestyle that she had embraced.
You only mentioned her relationship with the
Q: children, the impact. How about the impact on the
relationship of the respondent with her husband?
Also the same thing. It just did not fit in to her
lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and
to her children. She had her own priorities, her
A:
beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of
her life.
And what you are saying is that, her family was
Q:
merely secondary?
A: Secondary.
And how does that relate to psychological
Q:
incapacity?
That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the
obligations of marriage which everybody takes for
granted. The concentration on the husband and the
A:
children before everything else would be
subordinated to the marriage with her. It’s the other
way around. Her beauty, her going out, her beauty
parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in
her life.
And in medical or clinical parlance, what
Q:
specifically do you call this?
That is narcissism where the person falls in love
A: with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman
history.
Q: Could you please define to us what narcissism is?
It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make
up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of
Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known
A: in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a
person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and
prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the
top priority in her life.
xxxx
And you stated that circumstances that prove this
Q: narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism
afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?
I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of
neglect of her family and that causes serious
A: obligations which she has ignored and not properly
esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
And do you have an opinion whether or not this
Q: narcissism afflicting respondent was already
existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?
xxxx
When you get married you don’t develop
narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring
with you into the marriage and then it becomes
A: manifested because in marriage you accept these
responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t
accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling
them and you don’t care about them.
Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident
Q:
or congenital or what?
A: No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a
model and still the family was depended [sic] upon
 her and she was a model at Hyatt and then
Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that
this became the top priority in her life. It’s her
lifestyle.
What you are saying is that, the narcissism of
Q:
respondent even expanded after the marriage?
That could have expanded because it became very
A: obvious after the marriage because she was
neglecting such fundamental obligations.
And how about the matter of curability, is this
Q: medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that
you mentioned?
Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in
her life. It was found in her family background
A:
situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable
now.
Q: What specific background are you referring to?
Well, the fact when the father died and she was the
breadwinner and her beauty was so important to
give in her job and money and influence and so on.
But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl
A:
and her position in the family was exalted in a very
very unusual manner and therefore she had that
pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure,
in going along with it and putting it in top priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon
Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings commanded
respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings
could add to the judicial determination of the parties’
psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive.
He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of
the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage,
and he could as well thereby provide to the trial court an
analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts
as psychological incapacity has been. We could not
justly disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating
them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan
would advance more the cause of justice. The Court
observed in Ngo Te v.
Yu-Te:32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
By the very nature of Article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological
and mental temperaments of the
parties.
Justice Romero explained this in
Molina, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Furthermore, and equally
significant, the professional opinion of
a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life,
both before and after the ceremony,
were presented to these experts and
they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental
capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that
its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds
for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the
advances made in psychology during
the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church
broadened its whole idea of marriage
from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it
could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who
could intellectually understand the
concept of marriage could necessarily
give valid consent to marry. The ability
to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the
concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of
personality disorders that incapacitate
a spouse or both spouses from
assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation
or the right of the spouses to each
other's body for heterosexual acts, but
is, in its totality the right to the
community of the whole of life; i.e., the
right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality;
as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a
distinct person; that the spouses must
be `other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses
must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining
of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is
held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference
to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic
Mind, lists six elements necessary to
the mature marital
relationship:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibr
ary
"The courts consider the
following elements crucial to
the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial
responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of
marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about
some of the psychological conditions
that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"At stake is a type of
constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal
communion even with the
best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors
possibly giving rise to his or
her inability to fulfill marital
obligations are the following:
(1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty
to persons or sense of moral
values; (2) hyperesthesia,
where the individual has no
real freedom of sexual choice;
(3) the inadequate
personality where personal
responses consistently fall
short of reasonable
expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds
are the best approach for
anyone who doubts whether
he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does
not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often
fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological
grounds are, experts are
already detecting a shift in
their use. Whereas originally
the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise
proper judgment at the time
of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases
seem to be concentrating on
the parties' incapacity to
assume or carry out their
responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An
advantage to using the
ground of lack of due
competence is that at the
time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost
always is proof of someone's
failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as
promised at the time the
marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court
Appeals emphasizes the importance
of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party's
psychological incapacity, and to show
that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos
Marcos asserts, there is
requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated
be personally examined by a physician,
if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or
the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention
nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.33
Ngo Te also emphasized that in light of the unintended
consequences of strictly applying the standards set
in Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of
evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The resiliency with which the concept
should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so
intended by its framers, had, somehow,
been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawli
brary
xxxx
of
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the
majority of the Court’s membership
concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
v. concurred “in the result” and another
no three--including, as aforesaid, Justice
Romero--took pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that “each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment
of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on ‘all fours’ with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.”
Predictably, however, in resolving
subsequent cases, the Court has
applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the law's
clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently, as “courts should
interpret the provision on a The Court should rather be alarmed by
case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.”
In hindsight, it may have been
inappropriate for the Court to impose a
rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina,
in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court
was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital
bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's
exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most
liberal divorce procedure in the world."
The unintended consequences
of Molina, however, has taken its toll
on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by
little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions.
Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said
individuals.
The Court need not worry about the
possible abuse of the remedy provided
by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency,
among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor,
to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
the rising number of cases involving
marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account
of either party's psychological
incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families,
but it is actually protecting the sanctity
of marriage, because it refuses to
allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot
comply with or assume the essential
marital obligations, from remaining in
that sacred bond. It may be stressed
that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness,
drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. Let it be noted
that in Article 36, there is no marriage
to speak of in the first place, as the
same is void from the very beginning.
To indulge in imagery, the declaration
a of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not
suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,
there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.
At the risk of being redundant, we
reiterate once more the principle that
each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011, the Court
declared as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent admittedly played
mahjong, but it was not proven that
she engaged in mahjong so frequently
that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent
refuted petitioner’s allegations that she
played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three
times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and
 without abandoning her children at
home. The children corroborated
this, saying that they were with
their mother when she played
mahjong in their relatives home.
Petitioner did not present any proof,
other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent
that respondent neglected her family.
While he intimated that two of his sons
repeated the second grade, he was
not able to link this episode to
respondent’s mahjong-playing. The
least that could have been done was
to prove the frequency of respondent’s
mahjong-playing during the years
when these two children were in
second grade. This was not done.
Thus, while there is no dispute that
respondent played mahjong, its
alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were
not proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing
should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity.
Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to
fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had
she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities,
she would have known that bringing along her children of
very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose
them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would
erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s
obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her
family life, particularly on her very young children. We do
find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio
Teodoro Kalaw37 – the parties’ eldest son – in his
deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his
father that his mother had been hooked on playing
mahjong, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
From the time…before your parent’s
ATTY.
separation, do you remember any habit or
PISON: activity or practice which your mother
engaged in, before the separation?
Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and
WITNESS: she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t
remember.
xxxx
ATTY. You said that your mother played mahjong
PISON: frequently. How frequent, do you remember?
Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I
WITNESS :
can’t, I can’t…
ATTY. How long would she stay playing mahjong
PISON: say one session?
Really long cuz’ we would go to my aunt’s
house in White Plains and I think we would
WITNESS :
get there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep.
I think it was like one in the morning.
ATTY.
You, you went there? She brought you?
PISON:
Yeah, to play with my cousins, yeah and my
WITNESS :
brothers & sisters.
ATTY.
Were you brought all the time?
PISON:
Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I
WITNESS:
guess she’d go out by herself.38
The fact that the respondent brought her children with
her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her
neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her
tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her
willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling
on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very
grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and
escapist desires. This was the observation of Father
Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan
both explained that the current psychological state of the
respondent had been rooted on her own childhood
experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her
children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect
her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and
Article 220 of the Family Code, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural
right and duty of parents over the
person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental
authority and responsibility shall
include the caring for and rearing of
such children for civic consciousness
and efficiency and the development
of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those
exercising parental authority shall
have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the
following rights and
duties:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) To keep them in their company,
to support, educate and instruct
them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their
means;chanrobleslaw
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and
spiritual guidance, inculcate in them
honesty, integrity, self-discipline,
self-reliance, industry and thrift,
stimulate their interest in civic affairs,
and inspire in them compliance with
the duties of citizenship;chanrobleslaw
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve
and maintain their physical and
mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and
wholesome educational materials,
supervise their activities, recreation
 and association with others, protect
them from bad company, and
prevent them from acquiring habits
detrimental to their health, studies
and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take
into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect
that both the petitioner and the respondent had been
psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC
would not have found so without the allegation to that
effect by the respondent in her answer,39 whereby she
averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had
suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitioner’s psychological incapacity
was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ATTY. BRETAÑA:
You stated earlier that both parties were
Q:
behaviorally immature?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that the marriage was a mistake?
A: Yes, sir.
What is your basis for your statement that
Q:
respondent was behaviorally immature?
Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage
Malyn had noticed already some of those short
temper of the petitioner but she was very much in
A:
love and so she lived-in with him and even the time
that they were together, that they were living in,
she also had noticed some of his psychological
deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because
she is also dependent and she was one who
determined to make the relationship work, she was
denying even those kinds of problems that she had
seen.
To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here
of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to
Q:
conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally
immature?
I think he also mentioned that his concept of
marriage was not duly stable then. He was not
really thinking of marriage except that his wife got
A:
pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry
her. And even that time he was not also a
monogamous person.
Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the
Q:
decision to marry lied on the petitioner?
A: I think so, Sir.
Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you
mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you
that in his younger years he was often out seeking
other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18.
He also admitted to you that the thought of
commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given
Q:
these admissions by petitioner to you, my
questions is, is it possible for such a person to
enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment
and given his admission that he was a womanizer?
Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing
ways during the marriage?
A: Sir, it’s difficult.
Q: It would be difficult for that person?
A: Yes, Sir.
What is the probability of this person giving up his
Q:
womanizing after marriage?
Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is
A:
almost only 20%.
So, it is entirely possible that the respondent
Q: womanized during his marriage with the
respondent?
A: Yes, Sir.
What is the bearing of this fear of commitment on
the part of the petitioner insofar as his
Q:
psychological capacity to perform his duties as a
husband is concerned?
Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual
A: integrity and also to be fully committed to the role
of husband to Malyn.
Madam Witness, you never directly answered my
question on whether the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty
Q: as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was
behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a
mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question
again and request you to answer that directly?
A: Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the
burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish
the psychological incapacity of her husband because
she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are
justified in declaring a marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is
the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or
in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either
or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed
null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the
parties parted ways. By now, they must have already
accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that
their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law,
was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so
much damage not only to themselves, but also to the
lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a
greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their
void marriage, and then force them and their children to
endure some more damage. This was the very same
injustice that Justice Romero decried in her erudite
dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court
Appeals:41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It would be great injustice, I believe, to
petitioner for this Court to give a much
too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue
to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties
has, for all practical purposes, ceased
to exist.
Besides, there are public policy
considerations involved in the ruling
the Court makes today. It is not, in
effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating
the transformation of petitioner into a
“habitual tryster” or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another
woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children,
simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love
which he has sought from her and to
which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art.
36 of the Family Code is a sanction for
absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to
non-recognition of its evident purpose
and thus deny to one like petitioner, an
opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life
by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wife’s psychological
incapacity to perform an essential
marital obligation.
In this case, the marriage never existed from the
beginning because the respondent was afflicted with
psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the
marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to
declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of
marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not
of preclude striking down a marital union
“ill-equipped to promote family
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Now is also the opportune time to
comment on another common legal
guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. All too
frequently, this Court and lower courts,
in denying petitions of the kind, have
favorably cited Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively state that “[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly,
it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total
development[t],” and that [m]arriage,
as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.” These
provisions highlight the importance of
the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of
marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not
establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it, based
on whatever socio-political influences
it deems proper, and subject of course
to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the
legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has
been accomplished at present through
the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family,
that is spells out the corresponding legal
life,” effects, imposes the limitations that
affect married and family life, as well
as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. While it may appear
that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect
marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of
marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is.
Indeed, if circumstances warrant,
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need
not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into
account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code,
in classifying marriages contracted by
a psychologically incapacitated person
as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the
family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State
to defend against marriages
ill-equipped to promote family life.
Void ab initio marriages under
Article 36 do not further the
initiatives of the State concerning
marriage and family, as they
promote wedlock among persons
who, for reasons independent of
their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the
essential obligations of
marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and
REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner
and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of
the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV
No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and
respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his
answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to
set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The
RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation and determine the existence of
a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear
at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the
pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the
marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios
and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning.
As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement,
petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent
as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid
a misimpression that she remains the wife of
respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each
other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer
to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay
him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a
farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It
explained that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the
CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the
CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA
stated that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married and that their
case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained
that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was
primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain
foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of
$2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE
OF OBTAINING FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST,
HENCE, LACKING IN THE
 ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios
to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be
paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to
the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered
into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the
OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the
latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall
within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the
petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was
similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void
from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating
its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question
of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first
examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant
benefits. This has led to the development of marriage
fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular
benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire
specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited
purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization
of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those
who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if
the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married. "This standard
was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now
requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws of the United States." The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of
evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however,
that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage
declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose
of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The
early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United
States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable
case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein
in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the
parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and
to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through
Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert
temporary into permanent permission to stay in the
country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never
married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the
parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do
not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this
rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is
quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to
the outside world and with the understanding that they
will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose
to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married
at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood
as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of
Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was
intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of
consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic.
The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present,
United States courts have generally denied annulments
involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC
ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying
the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on
to explain that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC,
the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the
Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be
similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties
only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and
never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on
the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of
the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that
the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter
into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that
it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of
an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of
consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended
marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no
real intention of entering into the actual marriage status,
and with a clear understanding that the parties would not
be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a
pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the
absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are
void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is
no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely
no intention of being bound in any way or for any
purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a
marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the
very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus,
an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the
Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides
that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as
the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long
as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and
complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the
kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their
right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children
or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally
valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s
attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It
cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void
ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the
ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code.
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-
disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a
marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration
laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the
ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or
innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured
party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter
into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred
institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize
this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such
a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to
again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as
an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices
of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into
when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case
No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as
presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ
WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for
private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the
erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel
(plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his
marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro
Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for
short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's
previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion,
the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972
at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia,
while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void,
she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having
been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the
pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both
parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the
presence of force exerted against both parties): was said
prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting
the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the
respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised
upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage
in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of
evidence because the existence of force exerted on both
parties of the first marriage had already been agreed
upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing
the following Orders of therespondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties
were compelled to submit the case for resolution based
on "agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's
motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will
not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has
yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is
VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about
the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the
time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for
lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private
respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent
court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A.
Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No.
4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he
had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on
April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;
she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been
working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month
annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer
since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed
and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under
the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime
in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman;
she further discovered that he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent;
she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed
her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to
take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn
over the possession and administration of said
properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not
authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition
prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over
said properties; their marriage be declared null and void
and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties
acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and
administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its
nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is
in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria
issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a
first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and
void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the
cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case
there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted
by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage
with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to
whether or not the second marriage should first be
judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In
the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme
Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316,
326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from
the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that
petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue
that may be determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the
erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to
the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991,
Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and
gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which
to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a
special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the
ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed
the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited
by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon
by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at
bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases
dealt with the successional rights of the second wife
while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It
observed that the separation and subsequent distribution
of the properties acquired during the union can be had
only upon proper determination of the status of the
marital relationship between said parties, whether or not
the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner.
Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity
of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48,
50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private
respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage may be raised together with other
incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has
jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the
motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the
remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer,
proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision,
reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of
merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant
case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a
void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether
the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper
remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
personal properties allegedly belonging to her
exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People
v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP.
No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property filed by private respondent must
be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous.
Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of
the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required
only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP
No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's
intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the
necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to
provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent celebrated while the former's
previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still
subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People
v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where
the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous
marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating
that:
Though the logician may say that where the former
marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve,
still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that
marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to
the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority
position in subsequent cases involving the same issue.
Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its
earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In
reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's
share of the disputed property acquired during the
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application
of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration
thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that
purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held
in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, that "although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need
for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned
around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling
once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking
for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased
husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of
his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of
no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel
v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for
then such a marriage though void still needs according to
this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as
a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code
Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd
Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39,
was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision
should include not only void but also voidable marriages.
He then suggested that the above provision be modified
as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that
they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they
say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one
cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage
is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno
accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to
read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no
question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even
if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce
the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is
declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is
annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that
this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the
provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct
action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then
the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to
"invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is
the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away
with collateral defense as well as collateral attack.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision
is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself
whether or not the marriage is void, while the other
members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are,
therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point.
Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are
brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He
then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise
the defense that he has no liability because the basis of
the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot
say that there will be no judgment on the validity or
invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in
the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral
declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa
saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they
limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that
Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of
remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except
as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is
too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof.
Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above
provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of
a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that
they go back to the original wording of the provision as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the
pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration
of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before
contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral
conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and
living with another woman other than complainant while
his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting,
said that "for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the
same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of
remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the
position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is
placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members,
the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not
state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which
case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been
such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly,
one can conceive of other instances where a party might
well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses,
as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage
which remains subsisting desires to enter into another
marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by
law to prove that the previous one was an absolute
nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In
other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected
by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal,
and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family
to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose
of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely
on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is so defective with respect to the
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render
it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing
more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social
significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open
and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm
the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to
everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no
impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one
of the parties may be gleaned from new information
required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously
married, how, when and where the previous marriage
was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's
interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that
private respondent's failure to state in the petition that
the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by
the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be
misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage."
Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the
basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only,"
which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for
absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner
suggests that private respondent should have filed an
ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such
an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a
mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction
to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In
addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the
properties were acquired with private respondent's
money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and
concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other
incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states
that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage
in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid,
except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad
faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary
in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage
in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage
acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's
ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be
one of the necessary consequences of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to
be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted
for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations governing
them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly,
the respondent court committed no reversible error in
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP
No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
The decision of respondent Court dated February 7,
1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme.
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however,
to put in a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning
and, I believe, no judicial decree is required to establish
their nullity, except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision
of Article 40 of the Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
(n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code in case a party thereto was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where
an action or defense for the declaration of nullity
prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took
effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage
is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially
declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and
justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of,
such a declaration, will not give it the status or the
consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific
instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can
still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these
cases are children of void marriages under Article 36
(due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in
relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof
following the annulment or declaration of nullity a prior
marriage), conceived or born before the judicial
declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law
deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be
considered extant per se. Neither the conjugal,
partnership of gain under the old regime nor the absolute
community of property under the new Code (absent a
marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property
relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules
under either Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
I must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that
the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage
because of the psychological incapacity of a party
thereto should have been extended to cover even the
personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike
the other cases of void marriages where the grounds
therefor may be established by hard facts and with little
uncertainty, the term "psychological incapacity" is so
relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of
nullity is made its interim effects can long and literally
hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses
themselves are concerned but also as regards third
persons with whom the spouses deal.
# Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme.
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however,
to put in a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning
and, I believe, no judicial decree is required to establish
their nullity, except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision
of Article 40 of the Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
(n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code in case a party thereto was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where
an action or defense for the declaration of nullity
prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took
effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage
is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially
declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and
justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of,
such a declaration, will not give it the status or the
consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific
instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can
still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these
cases are children of void marriages under Article 36
(due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in
relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof
following the annulment or declaration of nullity a prior
marriage), conceived or born before the judicial
declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law
deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be
considered extant per se. Neither the conjugal,
partnership of gain under the old regime nor the absolute
community of property under the new Code (absent a
marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property
relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules
under either Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
I must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that
the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage
because of the psychological incapacity of a party
thereto should have been extended to cover even the
personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike
the other cases of void marriages where the grounds
therefor may be established by hard facts and with little
uncertainty, the term "psychological incapacity" is so
relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of
nullity is made its interim effects can long and literally
hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses
themselves are concerned but also as regards third
persons with whom the spouses deal.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with
Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34
Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila.
He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987,
whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his
bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the
houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De
Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up
respondent and instead left the house after giving
instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his
children and even alienated the affection of his children
for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one
Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as
appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of
assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that
respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after
he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the
latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was
not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim
on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De
Castro.
JR.,
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest
28,
and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal
of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro
against complainant. According to him, it was the sister
of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko,
although he admits having five children with her. He
alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a
marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on
April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for
lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the
parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another
marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965.
Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving
their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in
civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4,
1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal
intents and purposes, that he was single because his
first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40
of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the
Family Code does not apply to him considering that his
first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by
the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family
Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides,
under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is
given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has
not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect
the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected
(Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]).
The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good
faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage
and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman,
who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and
was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time
he went through the two marriage ceremonies with
Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured
any marriage license. Any law student would know that a
marriage license is necessary before one can get
married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct
the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were
married for the second time. His failure to secure a
marriage license on these two occasions betrays his
sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard
of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to
his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his
immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro
began and continued when he was already in the
judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of
a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but
also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is
no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his
private life. A judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times, in the
performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.
These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be
overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229
SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits
and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch,
instrumentality, or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070. February 12, 1997]
MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and
GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants, vs. JUDGE
ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more
reverend than plausible, and more advised than
confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and
proper virtue.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing
exhortation some 400 years ago. Today, it is still relevant
and quotable. By the nature of their functions, judges are
revered as models of integrity, wisdom, decorum,
competence and propriety. Human as they are, however,
magistrates do have their own weaknesses, frailties,
mistakes and even indiscretions. In the case before us,
respondent Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero was charged
administratively in the twilight of his government service,
as a result of a failed love affair that happened some 46
years ago. After an otherwise unblemished record, he
would have reached the compulsory retirement age of 70
years on August 8, 1997 had death not intervened a few
months ago on September 26, 1996. Notwithstanding his
death, this Court still resolved to rule on this case, as it
may affect his retirement benefits.
Antecedent Facts
In a letter-complaint2 dated November 10, 1993, Maria
Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A. Cantero
Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the
respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct
for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification
of public documents.
After receipt of the respondent's Comment, the Court on
February 5, 1996, referred this case3 to Executive Judge
Gualberto P. Delgado of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu for investigation, report and
recommendation. The latter submitted his Report and
Recommendation4 dated July 26, 1996. Thereafter, the
Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court
Administrator5 for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
According to the complainants:
"Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be
respondent) and plaintiff (should be complainant) Maria
Apiag, joined together in holy matrimony in marriage
after having lived together as husband and wife wherein
they begot a daughter who was born on June 19, 1947,
whom they named: Teresita A. Cantero; and then on
October 29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was born.
Thereafter, defendant left the conjugal home without any
apparent cause, and leaving the plaintiff Maria Apiag to
raise the two children with her meager income as a
public school teacher at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte.
Plaintiffs suffered a lot after defendant abandoned them
for no reason whatsoever. For several years, defendant
was never heard of and his whereabout unknown.
Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan,
Southern Leyte, whereupon, plaintiffs begged for support,
however, they were ignored by defendant. x x
x"6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty.
Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a letter to respondent as
follows:
"Judge Esmeraldo Cantero
Pinamungajan, Cebu
Dear Judge Cantero:
We are writing in behalf of your legal wife, Maria Apiag,
and your two legitimate children by her, Teresita (Mrs.
Sacurom) and Glicerio.
It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons
known only to you, you left your conjugal home at
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, and abandoned without
any means of support your said wife and children. Since
then and up to now, they have not seen or heard from
you.
They would wish now that you do them right by living up
to your duty as husband and father to them, particularly
that expressly provided under Art. 68 and Art. 195 of the
Family Code (Art. 109 and 195 of the Civil Code) in
relation to Art. 203 of the same Code.
You will please consider this letter as a formal demand
for maintenance and support for three of them, and a
request that they be properly instituted and named as
your compulsory heirs and legal beneficiaries in all legal
documents now on file and to be filed with the Supreme
Court and other agencies or offices as may be required
under applicable laws, such as, the insurance (GSIS)
and retirement laws.
We hope this matter can be amicably settled among you,
your wife and children, without having to resort to judicial
recourse.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) REDENTOR G.
GUYALA"7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The letter elicited no action or response from the
respondent. Subsequently, complainants learned that
respondent Judge had another family. In their own
words,
"x x x The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has
another wife by the name of Nieves C. Ygay, a Public
School teacher from Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu.
According to some documents obtained by plaintiffs, the
herein defendant and Nieves C. Ygay have children of
their own, named as follows with their date of births:
Noralyn Y. Cantero -- May 19, 1968; Ellen Y. Cantero --
February 4, 1970; Erwin Y. Cantero -- April 29, 1979;
Onofre Y. Cantero -- June 10, 1977; and Desirie Vic Y.
Cantero -- December 2, 1981.
It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public
documents required of defendant Judge Cantero to be
filed with the Supreme Court such as his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, his personal data
sheet (SC Form P. 001), income tax returns and his
insurance policy with the Government Service Insurance
System, defendant misrepresented himself as being
married to Nieves C. Ygay, with whom he contracted a
second marriage. The truth of the matter is that
defendant is married to plaintiff Maria Apiag with whom
they have two legitimate children, namely: Teresita A.
Cantero and Glicerio A.
Cantero."8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his
side as follows:
"x x x I admit the existence and form of Annex 'A' of the
said complaint, but vehemently deny the validity of its
due execution, for the truth of the matter is that such
alleged marriage was only dramatized at the instance of
our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes and purposes
on the matter, without my consent freely given. As a
matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go
home to our town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to
attend party celebration of my sister's birthday from
Iligan City, without patently knowing I was made to
appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we were forced
to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly
prepared marriage contract(.) That was 46 years ago
when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second year
high school days."9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Furthermore, Judge Cantero related that:
"x x x sometime in the year 1947, when both respondent
and complainant, Maria Apiag were still in their early age
and in their second year high school days, they were
engaged in a lovely affair which resulted to the
pregnancy of the said complainant, and then and there
gave birth to a child, named Teresita Apiag, having
(been) born out of wedlock on June 19, 1947, now Mrs.
Teresita Sacurom, one of the complainants. That in
order to save name and shame, parents of both the
respondent and the complainant came to an agreement
to allow the respondent, and the complainant (to) get
married in the (sic) name, but not to live together as
husband, wife for being close relatives, thereby forcing
the respondent to appear in a marriage affair where all
the pertinent marriage papers were all ready (sic)
prepared (sic), and duly signed by somebody; that after
the said affair both respondent and the complainant
immediately separated each other (sic) without living
together as husband, and wife even for a day, nor having
established a conjugal home. From that time respondent
and the complainant have never met each other nor
having (sic) communicated (with) each other for the last
40 years; that respondent continued his studies at Cebu
City, and eventually became member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examination in the year 1960,
that is 14 years after the affair of 1947; that in 1964,
respondent was first connected in the government
service as Comelec Registrar of the Commission on
Elections, assigned at Pinamungajan, Cebu(,) that is 16
years after the affair of 1947; that in the year 1982,
respondent was appointed as CLAO lawyer, now PAO,
of the Department of Justice, that is 35 years after the
after the affair of 1947; and finally, on October 3, 1989,
respondent was appointed to the Judiciary as Municipal
Circuit Trial Judge (MCTC) of the Municipalities of
Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan, province of Cebu, that is
42 years from August 11, 1947; that respondent is (sic)
already 32 years in the government service up to the
present time with more than 6 years in the Judiciary; that
respondent is already 69 years old, having been born on
August 8, 1927, and retirable by next year if God willing;
that respondent has served in the government service
for the last 32 years, faithfully, honestly and judiciously
without any complaint whatsoever, except this instant
case; that respondent as member of the Judiciary, has
live-up (sic) to the standard required by the (sic) member
(sic) of the bar and judiciary; that the charges against the
respondent were all based or rooted from the incedent
(sic) that happened on August 11, 1947 and no other;
that the complainants are morally dishonest in filing the
instant (case) just now, an elapsed (sic) of almost 42
years and knowing that respondent (is) retirable by next
year, 1997; that this actuation is very suspicious, and
intriguing;
xxx
That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together
with another man during her public service as public
school teacher and have begotten a child, name (sic)
Manuel Apiag and respondent promised (sic) the
Honorable Court to furnish a complete paper regarding
this case in order to enlighten the Honorable (Court) that,
he who seek (sic) justice must seek justice with cleab
(sic) hand;
That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or
judicial declaration (of nullity) of the alleged marriage
because it is the contention and honest belief, all the way,
that the said marriage was void from the beginning, and
as such nothing is to be voided or nullified, and to do so
will be inconsistent with the stand of the respondent; that
this instant case (was) simply filed for money
consideration as reflected in their letter of demand; (t)hat
as a matter of fact, respondent and the complainant have
already signed a compromised (sic) agreement, copy of
which hereto (sic) attached as Annex '1', stating among
other things that respondent will give a monthly
allowance to Terecita (sic) Sacurom in the (amount)
of P4,000.00 and the complainant will withdraw their
complaint from the Supreme Court., and that respondent
had already given the said allowance for three
consecutive months plus the amount of P25,000.00 for
their Attorney to withdraw the case, and that respondent
stop (sic) the monthly allowance until such time the
complainant will actually withdraw the instant case, and
without knowledge of the respondent, complainant
proceeded (sic) their complaint after the elapsed (sic) of
three (3) years."10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which
was executed sometime in March 1994 by Esmeraldo C.
Cantero and Teresita C. Sacurom and witnessed by
Maria Apiag and Leovegardo Sacurom are reproduced
thus:
"That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed
and entered into by ESMERALDO C. CANTERO, of
legal age, married, Filipino, and with residence and
postal address at Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines,
otherwise called as the FIRST PARTY, and TERESITA
C. SACUROM, also of legal age, married, Filipino,
representing her mother and her brother, and a
residence (sic) of 133-A J. Ramos Street, Caloocan City,
after having duly swirn (sic) to in accordance with law do
hereby depose and say:
1. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit
Trial Judge of Pinamungajan-Aloguinsan, Cebu, is
charged by Second Party for Misconduct before the
Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court
now pending action;
2. That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to have
the said case settled amicably in the interest of family
unity and reconciliation, and arrived at compromise
agreement based on law of equity, as follows:
(a) That both parties have agreed
voluntarily, the Second Party will get
ONE FOURTH (1/4) of the retirement
that the First will receive from the GSIS,
and the rest of it will be for the First
Party;
(b) That the Second Party and his
brother will be included as one of the
beneficiaries of the First Party, in case of
death;
(c) That the Second party and his only
brother will inherit the properties of the
First party inherited from his parents;
(d) That the Second Party, representing
her brother, is authorized to receive and
collect P4,000.00, monthly out of the
second check salary of the First Party
(The second half salary only);
3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the Second
Party will cause the withdrawal and the outright dismissal
of the said pending case filed by her and her mother;
4. That it was also agreed that the above agreement,
shall never be effective and enforceable unless the said
case will be withdrawn and dismiss (sic) from the
Supreme Court, and said dismissal be received by the
First Party, otherwise the above-agreement is void from
the beginning; and the Second Party must desist from
further claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic) criminal
liabilities.
5. That this agreement is executed voluntarily, in good
faith, and in the interest of good will and reconciliation
and both parties is (sic) duty bound to follow faithfully
and religiously."11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In line with the foregoing, the respondent wrote a letter
dated 14 March, 1994 addressed to the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) designating Teresita
Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio Cantero as additional
beneficiaries in his life insurance
policy.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issues
The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues":
"1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria
Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;
2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag
for more than seven (7) years raise the presumption that
she is already dead, that there was no need for any
judicial declaration;
3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to
him because assuming that he committed the offense,
he was not yet a member of the judiciary;
4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already
prescribed;
5. The charges have no basis in fact and in
law."13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Report and Recommendation of Investigating Judge and
Court Administrator
Investigating Judge Gualberto P. Delgado recommended
in his report that:
"After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by the
parties, this Office finds respondent Guilty of the crime of
Grave Misconduct (Bigamy and Falsification of Public
Documents) however, considering his length of service
in the government, it is recommended that he be
suspended for one (1) year without
pay."14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its
report15 recommending respondent Judge's dismissal,
as follows:
"After a careful review of all the documents on file in this
case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of
the investigating judge.
Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by
respondent, he was married to complainant Maria Apiag
on August 11, 1947 and have (sic) two (2) children with
her. Respondent's contention that such marriage was in
jest and assuming that it was valid, it has lost its validity
on the ground that they never met again nor have
communicated with each other for the last 40 years
cannot be given a (sic) scant consideration.
Respondent's argument that he was not yet a lawyer,
much more, a member of the bench when he contracted
his first marriage with the complainant, is unavailing for
having studied law and had become a member of the
Bar in 1960, he knows that the marriage cannot be
dissolved without a judicial declaration of death.
Respondent's second marriage with Nieves Ygay was
therefore bigamous for it was contracted during the
existence of a previous marriage.
We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the
respondent that he cannot be held liable for misconduct
on the ground that he was not yet a lawyer nor a judge
when the act(s) complained of were committed. The
infraction he committed continued from the time he
became a lawyer in 1960 to the time he was appointed
as a judge in October 23, 1989. This is a continuing
offense (an unlawful act performed continuously or over
and over again, Law Dictionary, Robert E. Rothenberg).
He can therefore be held liable for his misdeeds.
On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity in
his Personal Data Sheet for Judges, Sworn Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Networth, Income Tax Return (pp.
99-102, rollo), that he had committed a
misrepresentation by stating therein that his spouse is
Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8) children (with her) which
is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria Apiag with
whom he had two (2) children.
Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense
by the respondent presupposes the imposition of an
administrative sanction for the charges filed against him.
'A judge's actuation of cohabiting with another when his
marriage was still valid and subsisting - his wife having
been allegedly absent for four years only constitutes
gross immoral conduct' (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr., 249
SCRA 447). It is evident that respondent failed to meet
the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. While deceit employed by respondent,
existed prior to his appointment as a x x x Judge, his
immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with x x x began and
continued when he was already in the judiciary. A judge,
in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in
his everyday life. These are judicial guidepost to(sic)
self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness
of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Atienza vs.
Brilliantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32-33).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent judge be DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
prejudice to re-appointment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations."
As earlier indicated, respondent Judge died on
September 27, 1996 while this case was still being
deliberated upon by this Court.
The Court's Ruling
In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this
case on the merits, in view of the foregoing
recommendation of the OCA which, if affirmed by this
Court, would mean forfeiture of the death and retirement
of the respondent.
Gross Misconduct Not Applicable
The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the
judge comprises the following: abandonment of his first
wife and children, failing to give support, marrying for the
second time without having first obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage, and falsification
of public documents. Misconduct, as a ground for
administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.
"'Misconduct in office has definite and well understood
legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a
misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties
as an officer and not such only as affects his character
as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at
all times, it is necessary to separate the character of man
from the character of an officer. x x x It is settled that
misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting
removal from office of an officer, must have direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of
official duties x x x.' More specifically, in Buenaventura
vs. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a
judge of the court of first instance, the present Chief
Justice defines misconduct as referring 'to a
transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer.' That is to abide by the
authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of
In re Horilleno, a decision penned by Justice Malcolm,
which requires that in order for serious misconduct to be
shown, there must be 'reliable evidence showing that the
judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard
of well-known legal rules.'"16
The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero
clearly pertain to his personal life and have no direct
relation to his judicial function. Neither do these
misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official
responsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed
misconduct much less gross misconduct in office. For
any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero" x x x
(t)o warrant disciplinary action, the act of the judge must
have a direct relation to the performance of his official
duties. It is necessary to separate the character of the
man from the character of the
officer."17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Nullity of Prior Marriage
It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Maria Apiag prior
to marrying Nieves C. Ygay. He argued however that the
first marriage was void and that there was no need to
have the same judicially declared void, pursuant to
jurisprudence then prevailing. In the en banc case of
Odayat vs. Amante,18 complainant charged Amante, a
clerk of court, with oppression, immorality and
falsification of public document. The complainant Odayat
alleged among others " x x x that respondent is
cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he
begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena
Abella is still alive x x x." In order to rebut the charge of
immorality, Amante " x x x presented in evidence the
certification (of the) x x x Local Civil Registrar x x x
attesting that x x x Filomena Abella was married to one
Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's
contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was
void ab initio, because of her previous marriage with said
Eliseo Portales." This Court ruled that "Filomena Abella's
marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under
Article 80 [4] of the New Civil Code, and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void
marriages."19
Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void
still needs x x x a judicial declaration of such
fact"20 before any party thereto "can marry again;
otherwise, the second marriage will also be void."21 This
was expressly provided under Article 40 22 of the Family
Code. However, the marriage of Judge Cantero to
Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and
before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the
doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante applies in favor of
respondent.
On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not
prosper either because it is based on a finding of guilt in
the bigamy charge. Since, as shown in the preceding
discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand, so too must
the accusation of falsification fail. Furthermore, the
respondent judge's belief in good faith that his first
marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up
these public documents, a valid defense in a charge of
falsification of public document,23 which must be
appreciated in his favor.
Personal Conduct of a Judge
However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability on
his part does not preclude this Court from finding him
administratively liable for his indiscretion, which would
have merited disciplinary action from this Court had
death not intervened. In deciding this case, the Court
emphasizes that "(t)he personal behavior of a judge, not
only upon the bench but also in his everyday life, should
be above reproach and free from the appearance of
impropriety. He should maintain high ethical principles
and sense of propriety without which he cannot preserve
the faith of the people in the judiciary, so indispensable
in an orderly society. For the judicial office circumscribes
the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number
of restrictions thereon, which he has to observe faithfully
as the price he has to pay for accepting and occupying
an exalted position in the administration of justice."24 It is
against this standard that we must gauge the public and
private life of Judge Cantero.
The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life
falls short of this standard because the record reveals he
had two families. The record also shows that he did not
attend to the needs, support and education of his
children of his first marriage. Such is conduct
unbecoming a trial magistrate. Thus, the late Judge
Cantero "violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which mandates that '[a] judge's official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and
his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach,' and Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that '[a]
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.'"25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted
Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of
respondent's record. Other than this case, we found no
trace of wrongdoing in the discharge of his judicial
functions from the time of his appointment up to the filing
of this administrative case, and has to all appearances
lived up to the stringent standards embodied in the Code
of Judicial Conduct. Considering his otherwise
untarnished 32 years in government service,26 this Court
is inclined to treat him with leniency.
Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may
commit a mistake. But we should not look only at his sin.
We should also consider the man's sincerity in his
repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his
eventual triumph in the reformation of his life.
This respondent should not be judged solely and finally
by what took place some 46 years ago. He may have
committed an indiscretion in the past. But having
repented for it, such youthful mistake should not forever
haunt him and should not totally destroy his career and
render inutile his otherwise unblemished record. Indeed,
it should not demolish completely what he built in his
public life since then. Much less should it absolutely
deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards and fruits of
his long and dedicated service in government. For these
reasons, dismissal from service as recommended by the
Office of the Court Administrator would be too harsh.
However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he
was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his
first marriage -- children whose filiation he did not deny.
He neglected them and refused to support them until
they came up with this administrative charge. For such
conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in
view of his death prior to the promulgation of this
Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 214064
MIRASOL CASTILLO, Petitioner
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE IMPAS,
Respondents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner Mirasol Castillo (Mirasol) challenging the
Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated March 10, 2014 and
August 28, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which ruled against the dissolution and nullity of
her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts of the case follow:
As their parents were good friends and business
partners, Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then,
eventually, became sweethearts. During their courtship,
Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with
his former girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned
tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of
their parents, they reconciled. They got married in Bani,
Pangasinan on April 22, 1984 and were blessed with two
(2) children born in 1992 and in 2001.3
On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint4 for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90.
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was
harmonious prompting her to believe that the same was
made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of
marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Their relatives
and friends saw him with different women. One time, she
has just arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise
her family. But to her consternation, she caught him in a
compromising act with another woman. He did not
bother to explain or apologize. Tired of her husband's
infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any
communication with him.5 Felipe's irresponsible acts like
cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with
her, and not supporting their children for a period of not
less than ten (10) years without any reason, constitute a
severe psychological disorder.6
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical
psychologist Sheila Marie
Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report,7 concluded that Felipe is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. A portion of the report reads:
x x xx
The personality disorder speaks of
antecedence as it has an early onset,
with an enduring pattern and behavior
that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual's
culture. His poor parental and family
molding (particularly lack of parental
parenting) caused him to have a
defective superego and he proved to
be selfish, immature and negligent
person and followed a pattern of gross
irresponsibility and gross disregard of
the feelings of his partner/wife
disregarding the marriage contract
and the commitment he agreed on
during the wedding. In other words,
the root cause of respondent's flawed
personality pattern can be in childhood
milieu. Respondent's familial
constellation, unreliable parenting
style from significant figures around
him, and unfavorable childhood
experiences have greatly affected his
perceptions of himself and his
environment in general. The
respondent did not grow up mature
enough to cope with his obligations
and responsibilities as married man
and father.
It also speaks of gravity as he was not
able to carry out the normative and
ordinary duties of marriage and family,
shouldered by any married man,
existing in ordinary circumstances. He
 just cannot perform his duties and
obligations as a husband, as he
entered into marriage for his own
self-satisfaction and gratification,
manipulate and denigrate the
petitioner for his own pleasures and
satisfaction. In the process,
respondent was unable to assume his
marital duties and responsibilities to
his wife. He failed to render mutual
help and support (Article 68, FC).
Additionally, it also speaks of
incurability, as respondent has no
psychological insight that he has a
character problem. He would not
acknowledge the pain he caused to
people around him. People suffering
from this personality disorder are
unmotivated to treatment and
impervious to recovery. There are no
medications and laboratory
examinations to be taken for
maladaptive behavior such as the
NPD (Narcissistic Personality
Disorder).
Otherwise stated, his personality
disorder is chronic and pervasive
affecting many aspects of his life, such
as social functioning and close
relationships.1âwphi1 Apparently, he
has failed to develop appropriate
adjustment methods. He lacks the
intrapersonal and interpersonal
integration that caused him the failure
to understand the very nature of that
sharing of life that is directed toward
the solidarity and formation of family.
x x x x8
In a Decision9 dated January 20, 2012, the RTC in Civil
Case No. 4853-11 declared the marriage between
Mirasol and Felipe null and void. The dispositive portion
of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
Court hereby declares the marriage
contract by the petitioner MIRASOL
CASTILLO to the respondent FELIPE
IMPAS on April 22, 1984 in Bani,
Pangasinan to be NULL AND VOID
AB INITIO.
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the
provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
the Clerk of Court is directed to enter
this judgment upon its finality in the
Book of Entry of Judgment and to
issue the corresponding Entry of
Judgment. Thereupon, the Office of
the Civil Registrars in Bani,
Pangasinan and Imus, Cavite, are also
mandated to cause the registration of
the said ENTRY OF JUDGMENT in
their respective Book of Marriages.
Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the
counsel of the petitioner, the
respondent, the Solicitor General, 3rd
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar
R. Jarlos and the Civil Registrar
General with copies hereof.
Upon compliance, the Court shall
forthwith issue the DECREE OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
SO ORDERED.10
On February 22, 2012, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an
Order11 dated April 3, 2012.
On appeal, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol
failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe
was suffering from psychological incapacity, thus,
incapable of performing marital obligations due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.12 A pertinent portion of the
decision reads:
x x xx
Based on the records, it appears more
likely that Felipe became unfaithful as
a result of unknown factors that
happened during the marriage and not
because of his family background. His
tendency to womanize was not shown
to be due to causes of a psychological
nature that are grave, permanent and
incurable. In fact, it was only after
thirteen (13) years of marriage that he
started to engage in extra-marital
affairs. In the complaint filed by
Mirasol, she said that after they got
married, their relationship as husband
and wife went smoothly and that she
was of the belief that she had a
marriage made in heaven.
In short, Felipe's marital infidelity does
not appear to be symptomatic of a
grave psychological disorder which
rendered him incapable of performing
his spousal obligations. Sexual
infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient
proof that petitioner is suffering from
psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that the acts of unfaithfulness
are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make him
completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of marriage.
Since that situation does not obtain in
the case, Mirasol's claim of
psychological incapacity must fail.
Psychological incapacity must be
more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Rather, it is
essential that the concerned party was
incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
 In fine, given the insufficiency of the
evidence proving the psychological
incapacity of Felipe, We cannot but
rule in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is
GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 20, 2012 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.13
Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration,
Mirasol elevated the case before this Court raising the
issue, thus:
[Petitioner] was able to establish that
respondent is suffering from grave
psychological condition that rendered
him incognitive of his marital
covenants under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is
whether or not the totality of evidence presented
warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the
ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
This Court rules in the negative.
Mirasol alleges that she has sufficiently established that
Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. The conclusions of the
trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses are
entitled to great respect because of its opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Since the
court a quo accepted the veracity of the petitioner's
premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of
Felipe's psychological incapacity drawn from the expert
witness. She claims that Montefalcon was correct in
interviewing her for it was submitted that it was only her
who knew best whether her husband was complying with
his marital obligations. Moreover, the OSG admits that
personal examination of the respondent by the clinical
psychologist is not an indispensable requisite for a
finding of psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to
establish from the totality of evidence the gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability of Felipe's alleged
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The conclusions of the
clinical psychologist that he was psychologically
incapacitated and that such incapacity was present at
the inception of the marriage were not supported by
evidence. At most, the psychologist merely proved his
refusal to perform his marital obligations.14 Moreover,
she has no personal knowledge of the facts from which
she based her findings and was working on pure
assumptions and secondhand information related to her
by one side.15
Time and again, it was held that "psychological
incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the
marriage.16 Psychological incapacity must
characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage,
(b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage,
and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.17
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,18 this Court laid down the more definitive
guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity
cases, viz.:
x x xx
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. x x
x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough
be
to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. x x x In other words, there is
a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and
their children. x x x
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
 Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. x x x
xxx19
The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity
shall be based strictly on the facts of each case and not
on a priori assumptions, predilections
generalizations.20
As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving
the application of Article 36, it is logical
and understandable to give weight to
the expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of
parties in order to determine the
root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However,
such opinions, while highly advisable,
are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts
must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits
of a given case. In fact, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or
psychological examination of the
person concerned need not be
resorted to. The trial court, as in any
other given case presented before it,
must always base its decision not
solely on the expert opinions
furnished by the parties but also on
the totality of evidence adduced in
the course of the proceedings.22
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological
evidence to show the psychological incapacity, however,
did not mean that the same would have automatically
ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts,
as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented
by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in
the course of their proceedings.23
or Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful
perusal of the records, this Court rules that the totality of
the evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's
psychological incapacity.
Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that
respondent is encumbered with a personality disorder
classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder deeply
ingrained in his personality structure that rendered him
incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
obligations. In her direct testimony, she stated:
ATTY. BAYAUA:
Question: Were you able to interview
and conduct examination on the
respondent?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: [W]here did you base your
conclusion that supported your
findings that the husband of Mirasol is
psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations
of marriage?
Answer: From the interviews I had with
the petitioner and also from my
interview of the couple's common
friend who validated all information
given to me by the petitioner.
Question: You mean to say you were
not able to interview the respondent?
Answer: No sir. But I sent him an
invitation to undergo the same
psychological evaluation I
administered with the petitioner but he
did not respond to my invitation.
Question: [W]hat relevant information
were you able to gather from your
interview of the friend of the couple?
Answer: She validated every piece of
information relayed to me by the
petitioner during the interview.
x x xx
Question: Madam witness, were you
able to determine at what point in time
in the life of the respondent did he
acquire this disorder that you
mentioned?
Answer: The disorder of the
respondent already existed even at
the time of celebration of their
marriage, although the incapacity
became manifest only after their
marriage. His disorder seemed to
have started during the early years
of his life.
Question: In your expert opinion, what
would be the likely source of the
disorder of the respondent?
Answer: The disorder of the
respondent seemed to have
developed during the early years of
his life due to his poor parental and
family [molding] particularly lack of
parental guidance. [His] parents
separated when he was still young
and when [his] mother had another
 affair and lived with her common-law
husband. Respondent's familial
constellation and [unfavorable]
childhood experiences have greatly
affected his perceptions of himself and
his environment. Respondent did not
grow up mature enough to cope with
his obligations and responsibilities as
a married man and father.
x x x24
The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the
psychological evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal of
the RTC's decision would reveal that there was no
assessment of the veracity of such allegations, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the pieces
of evidence presented. Also, there were no factual
findings which can serve as bases for its conclusion of
Felipe's psychological incapacity.
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration
of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.25 The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement
of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance
that she can render to the courts in showing the
facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the
reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.26
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds
on the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however, admitted
that she evaluated respondent's psychological condition
indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and
her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which
brought about his personality disorder as painted in the
evaluation was based solely on the assumed truthful
knowledge of petitioner. There was no independent
witness knowledgeable of respondent's upbringing
interviewed by the psychologist or presented before the
trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's common
friend, agreed with petitioner's claims in the interview
with the psychologist, confirmed the information given by
petitioner, and alleged that she knew Felipe as "chick
boy" or ''playboy."27 She did not testify before the
court a quo.
As such, there are no other convincing evidence
asserted to establish Felipe's psychological condition
and its associations in his early life. Montefalcon's
testimony and psychological evaluation report do not
provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity
of Mirasol's one-sided assertion. The said report falls
short of the required proof for the Court to rely on the
same as basis to declare petitioner's marriage to
respondent as void.
While the examination by a physician of a person in
order to declare him psychologically incapacitated is not
required, the root cause thereof must still be "medically
or clinically identified," and adequately established by
evidence.28 We cannot take the conclusion that Felipe
harbors a personality disorder existing prior to his
marriage which purportedly incapacitated him with the
essential marital obligations as credible proof of juridical
antecedence. The manner by which such conclusion
was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of
meeting the standard of evidence required in
determining psychological incapacity. The lack of
corroborative witness and evidence regarding Felipe's
upbringing and family history renders Montefalcon's
opinion on the root cause of his psychological incapacity
conjectural or speculative.
Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at
issue are considered since the judge had found them to
be credible enough, this Court cannot lower the
evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on
Felipe's pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of
antecedence in this case because we only have
petitioner's words to rely on. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition
based on the information fed by only one side, as in the
case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness
of the content of such evidence.29
Anent Felipe's sexual infidelity, Mirasol alleged in her
judicial affidavit, to wit:
x x xx
Question: You said Madam Witness
that after several months you and
respondent became sweethearts,
what happened next Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, while we were already
sweethearts, I got dismayed when
respondent was also maintaining
another woman who was his former
girlfriend.
Question: What was the reaction of
the respondent when you told him
about his relation with his former
girlfriend?
Answer: Respondent was shocked
and became moody Sir. This turned
our relationship sour and it led to being
stormy.
Question: You said Madam Witness
that you and respondent's relationship
became sour and stormy, what
happened next, if any?
Answer: Sir, my relationship with
respondent should have been ended
had it not been with the timely
intervention of our parents.
Respondent and I reconciled.
x x xx
Question: Madam Witness as you said
you finally got married with the
respondent as evidenced in fact by a
Marriage Certificate. What happened
next after the marriage?
Answer: After our wedding, our
relationship as husband and wife went
on smoothly. I was of the belief that
 my marriage was made in heaven and
that respondent had already reformed
his ways and had completely deviated
from his relationship with his
ex-girlfriend;
x x x30
Question: After giving birth to your first
child did respondent change or
become responsible considering that
he is already a father?
Answer: No, Sir. I thought that having
our first child would already change
the ways of respondent. The birth of
our first child did not actually help
improve respondent's ways because
respondent is really a man who is not
contented with one woman even
before we got married;
xxx31
Question: After you gave birth to you[r]
second child what happened next
Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, after thirteen (13) years of
marriage, respondent is back to his old
habit where he has been seen having
relationship with a different woman.
This was also seen by our relatives
and friends of respondent.
x xx32
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same
may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.33 In order
for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological
incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be
established as a manifestation of a disordered
personality, completely preventing the respondent Accordingly, we AFFIRM the assailed Decision and
from discharging the essential obligations of the Resolution, dated March 10, 2014 and August 28, 2014,
marital state; there must be proof of a natal or respectively, of the Court of Appeals.
supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to SO ORDERED.
be faithful to his spouse.34 It is indispensable that the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
G.R. No. 222541
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.35
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner
vs.
As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS,
did not emanate from a personal interview with the
Respondents
subject himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion
and petitioner's allegations, no other reliable evidence
DECISION
was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a
manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is
grave, deeply rooted, and incurable. We are not PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor
which effectively incapacitated him from complying with Before the Court is this petition for review
his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated May 29,
clinically established. 2015 and the Resolution3 dated December 1, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745,
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated which reversed the Decision4 dated April 23, 2014 of the
by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136 (RTC) in
allegations are not evidence.36 Based on the records, Civil Case No. 11-891 declaring the marriage of Jose O.
this Court finds that there exists insufficient factual or Del Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel)
legal basis to conclude that Felipe's sexual infidelity and void on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant
irresponsibility can be equated with psychological to Article 365 of the Family Code, as amended.6
incapacity as contemplated by law. We reiterate that
there was no other evidence adduced. Aside from the The Facts
psychologist, petitioner did not present other witnesses
to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then
notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their
seventeen (17) years old, sometime in December 1983
relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony,
at a party in Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.7 Very
therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious
soon, they became romantically involved.8
evidentiary value.
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the
a domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly
ruling of the CA against the dissolution and nullity of the
provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college education.
parties' marriage due to insufficiency of the evidence
Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on
presented. The policy of the State is to protect and
December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son,
marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
named Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February 19,
should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.37
1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony
held in the Philippine Independent Church, Bagabag,
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review Nueva Vizcaya.9
on certiorari filed by herein petitioner Mirasol Castillo.
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as
domestic helper/caregiver and has been working there
ever since, only returning to the Philippines every year
for a vacation. Through her efforts, she was able to
acquire a house and lot in Rufino Homes Subdivision,
San Jose, Nueva Ecija.10
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11 for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 11-891, alleging that Jose
was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential
marital obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel
claimed that: during their marriage, Jose conspicuously
tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and
father. According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and
violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few days
before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when
she refused to pay for the transportation expenses of his
parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the
latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to leave
Jose's parents' house where they were then staying; and
he even locked her out of their house in the middle of the
night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her
relatives from the bus terminal, which he refused to
perform. Rachel added that Jose would represent
himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an
extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose
mistakenly sent a text message to her sister, Beverly A.
Juan (Beverly), stating: "love, kung ayaw mo na akong
magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang dito."12 Another
text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo,
ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa 'yo." On one
occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly, caught
Jose and the other woman with their child inside their
conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose would
refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as
they slowly drifted apart.13
Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran
smoothly during its early years, and it was only later in
their marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and
engaging in drinking sessions.14
Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley15 and
her sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora,16 which
corroborated her allegations, as well as the
testimony17 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who
prepared the Psychological Report18 (Report) on Rachel.
The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which was
primarily based on her interview with Rachel and Wesley,
stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality
Disorder (APD) characterized by: (a) his lack of empathy
and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his
pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to his own
fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his
lack of depth when it comes to his marital commitments;
and (d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings.19
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition.
Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully performed all of
his marital and parental duties and obligations to his
family; (b) he had provided for his family's financial and
emotional needs; and (c) he contributed to the building
and maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed
that although they occasionally had misunderstandings,
they nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out
that their first major argument was when Rachel decided
to go to Hongkong to work; that they continued to
communicate through mail during her stay overseas; and
that he remained supportive of Rachel and would advise
her to give her family the financial aid that they need so
long as she would not sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he
denied the alleged extra-marital affair and having laid
hand on Rachel and their son.20 Jose presented as well
the testimony of Faustino Rigos to support his
allegations.21
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared
the marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the
findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that
Jose's APD interferes with his capacity to perform his
marital and paternal duties, as he in fact even refused to
take responsibility for his actions, notwithstanding the
overwhelming evidence against him.23
Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his alleged
refusal to seek employment, squandering of their money
on vices, violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious,
grave, and permanent psychological condition that
incapacitates him to perform his marital obligations
required by Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
At most, they are personality defects, i.e., immaturity,
irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, which may be
considered as grounds for legal separation under Article
5525 of the same code.26
The CA Ruling
In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed
the ruling of the RTC,28 holding that the totality of the
evidence Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a
finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.29 Particularly, the CA declared that Jose's
alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek employment, his act
of squandering their money on his vices, and his temper
and alleged propensity for violence were not so grave
and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
sufficient to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code; at best, they showed that Jose was
irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature which
nonetheless do not amount to the downright incapacity
that the law requires. Additionally, the CA pointed out
that the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity, its incapacitating nature, and the incapacity
itself were not sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's
Report failed to show the relation between Jose's
"deprived childhood" and "poor home condition," on one
hand, and grave and permanent psychological malady,
on the other. Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's
testimony was detailed, it only offered a general
evaluation on the supposed root cause of Jose's
personality disorder.30
Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which was,
however, denied by the CA in a Resolution32 dated
December 1, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether
or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of
psychological incapacity.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic social institution,33 and marriage
as the foundation of the family.34 Because of this, the
Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. In
this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to
nullify the marriage under Article 3635 of the Family
Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.36 It should refer to no less
than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as
provided under Article 6837 of the Family Code, among
others,38 include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and
support.39 In other words, it must be a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.40
In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise
the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.42 The Court laid down more definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 in Republic v. Molina43 (Molina) whose salient points
are footnoted below,44 that incorporated the basic
requirements the Court established in Santos.
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however,
that an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and
may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established.45 The evidence need not necessarily come
from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come
from persons intimately related to the
spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could
clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's
condition at or about the time of the marriage.46 In other
words, the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its
application calls for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity.47 To be
clear, however, the totality of the evidence must still
establish the characteristics that Santos laid down:
gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence.
Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein
respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it
was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make her completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or
sexual promiscuity.49 In Taring v. Taring,50 the Court
emphasized that "irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as [these]
may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or
neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is
not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of
the Family Code addresses."51 The Court equally did
not consider as tantamount to psychological incapacity
the emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual
promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders invoked by
the petitioning spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,52 Republic v.
Encelan,53 Republic v. De Gracia,54 and Republic v.
Romero,55 to name a few, and thus dismissed their
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus,
denies the petition. Based on the totality of the evidence
presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis
to conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or
infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence
merely showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in
drinking sprees; (2) tends to become violent when he
gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties as a father
to Wesley and as a husband to Rachel, which includes
sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself
as single; and (4) engaged in an extra-marital affair with
a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on
several occasions. Significantly, Rachel admitted that
their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr.
Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply summarized
Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose
with APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's
"personality flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and
have become deeply embedded within his adaptive
systems since early childhood years, thereby rendering
such to be a permanent component of his life [and]
[t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair despite any
form of intervention."56
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not
explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized
as grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable
within the jurisprudential parameters for establishing
psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not
discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers
from, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure,
or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited this
disorder or how and to what extent his alleged actions
and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to
conclude that Jose's condition has no definite treatment,
making it incurable within the law's conception. Neither
did the Report specify the reasons why and to what
extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and how it
incapacitated him to understand and comply with his
marital obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly, the Report hastily
concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and
"poor home condition" that automatically resulted in his
APD equivalent to psychological incapacity without,
however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's
condition antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior
or habits during his adolescent years that could explain
his behavior during the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or
interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his
background that could have given her a more accurate
basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in his
childhood or was already existing at the inception of the
marriage. To be sure, established parameters do not
require that the expert witness personally examine the
party alleged to be suffering from psychological
incapacity provided corroborating evidence are
presented sufficiently establishing the required legal
parameters.57 Considering that her Report was based
solely on Rachel's side whose bias cannot be doubted,
the Report and her testimony deserved the application of
a more rigid and stringent standards which the RTC
failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken
together with the various testimonies, failed to show that
Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to
the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the
nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and
emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party
prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and
duty of a married person.58 There must be proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations
of the psychological incapacity.59
A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce
manifest themselves;60 a marriage, no matter how
unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Thus,
absent sufficient evidence establishing psychological
incapacity within the context of Article 36, the Court is
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated December
1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
102745 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36
of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188400
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner
vs
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to
an inability to comply with or comprehend essential
marital obligations.
This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Maria
Teresa B. Tani- De La Fuente (Maria Teresa) assailing
the Court of Appeals Decision2 and Resolution3 dated
August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV. No. 76243, which reversed the
Decision4 dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
99-37829.
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La
Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they were students
at the University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they
became sweethearts.5
After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work
at the University of Sto. Tomas Treasurer's
Office.6 Meanwhile, Rodolfo, who was unable to finish
his college degree, found continued employment at his
family's printing press business.7
While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already
noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to
jealousy.8 She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to
have no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings,
who excelled in their studies and careers.9
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got
married in Mandaluyong City. They had two children:
Maria Katharyn, who was born on May 23, 1985, and
Maria Kimberly, who was born on April 6, 1986.10
Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their
marital life. He was jealous of everyone who talked to
Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's
printing press to stalk her.11 Rodolfo's jealousy was so
severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old
cousin who was staying at their house because he
suspected his cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover.12
In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave.
They would have sex four (4) or five (5) times a
day.13 At times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from
her office during her lunch break, just so they could have
sex.14 During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either
tie her to the bed or poke her with things.15 Rodolfo also
suggested that they invite a third person with them while
having sex, or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another
man in Rodolfo's presence.16 Rodolfo's suggestions
made Maria Teresa feel molested and
maltreated.17 Whenever Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's
advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they
would quarrel.18
Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer,
and a priest, as well as any person she thought could
help her and Rodolfo.19 Maria Teresa also suggested
that she and Rodolfo undergo marriage counselling, but
Rodolfo refused and deemed it as mere "kalokohan".20
Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because
Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an
affair.21 In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun
at Maria Teresa's head. Maria Teresa, with their two (2)
daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home
after the gunpoking incident. Maria Teresa never saw
Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children
by herself.22
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage23 before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was initially
archived because Rodolfo failed to file a responsive
pleading.24 Maria Teresa moved for the revival of the
Petition.25 The trial court granted the motion and
referred the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for
collusion investigation.26 Assistant City Prosecutor
Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and recommended
the trial of the case on the merits.27
Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled
pre-trial conference.28 The pre-trial conference was
declared closed and terminated, and Maria Teresa was
allowed to present her evidence.29
Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr.
Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was presented as an
expert witness.30 Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted
an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather
information on her family background and her marital life
with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of
psychological tests.31 Dr. Lopez also interviewed
Rodolfo's best friend.32
After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr.
Lopez concluded that Maria Teresa was not suffering
from any severe mental disorder and had no indication of
any organic or functional impairment.33 Although Dr.
Lopez found that Maria Teresa had an emotionally
disturbed personality, he opined that this was not severe
enough to constitute psychological incapacity.34
Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of
invitation through registered mail.35 After two (2) months,
Rodolfo contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor, ano ba
ang pakialam niyo sa amin, hindi niyo naman ako
kilala." Dr. Lopez explained that he only wanted to hear
Rodolfo's side of the story, but Rodolfo replied
with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala kayong pakialam sa
akin."36
Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality
disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior
like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being
distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust
of friends and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being
irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to
treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe
immaturity."37
Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the
severe forms of personality disorder, even more severe
than the other personality disorders like borderline and
narcissistic personality disorders.38 Dr. Lopez explained
that Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably
caused by a pathogenic parental model.39 Rodolfo's
family background showed that his father was a
psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed
psychic contamination called double insanity, a symptom
similar to his father's.40 Dr. Lopez further claimed that
Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable because of
his severe paranoia.41
Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and
Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's
incapacity to perform his marital obligations.42
Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file
any responsive leading.43 He likewise did not appear
during the pre-trial conference.44 He was given a
specific date to present evidence but he still failed to
appear.45 he trial court eventually deemed his
non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present
evidence.46
On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of
the Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria
Teresa's formal offer of evidence.47 The Office of the
Solicitor General was also directed to submit its
certification.48 The Office of the Solicitor General,
however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders;
thus, the case was submitted for decision without the
certification and comment from the Office of the Solicitor
General.49
On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its
Decision50 granting the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage.
While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine
Rodolfo, the trial court gave credence to his findings as
they were based on information gathered from credible
informants. The trial court held that the marriage
between Maria Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared
null and void because "[Rodolfo's] psychological
incapacity [was] grave, serious and incurable."51 The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered, to wit:
(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner,
MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE LA
FUENTE to respondent, RODOLFO
DE LA FUENTE, JR. null and void on
the ground of respondent's
psychological incapacity pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code. Their
conjugal partnership (sic) property
relations is hereby dissolved. There
being no mention of properties
acquired by the parties, no
pronouncement as to its liquidation
and partition is hereby made;
(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and
Maria Kimberly, both surnamed De la
Fuente shall remain legitimate. They
shall remain in the custody of the
petitioner.
(3) Both parties must support their
children. There being no evidence
presented as to the capability of the
respondent to give support, no
pronouncement is hereby made in the
meantime;
(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be
known by her maiden name, TANI.
Let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrars of
Quezon City and Mandaluyong City
where the marriage was celebrated
upon the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the
original)
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a motion for reconsideration.53 The Office of the
Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit
the required certification because it had no copies of the
transcripts of stenographic notes.54 It was also unable to
inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the
volume of cases it was handling.55
On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion
for reconsideration, with the dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, considering the
foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General is hereby
deemed moot and academic.
This Court would like to call the
attention of the Office of the Solicitor
General that this case was filed on
June 3, 1999 and there should be no
more delay in the disposition of the
case.56
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before
the Court of Appeals.57 It argued that the trial court
erred a) in deciding the case without the required
certification from the Office of the Solicitor
General,58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's
conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It
held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient
data and did not follow the standards set forth in
the Molina case.59
The Court of Appeals granted60 the Office of the
Solicitor General's appeal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr.
Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay, thus, the trial
court should not have given it weight.61 The Court of
Appeals also disagreed with Dr. Lopez's finding that
Rodolfo's behavior descended from psychological illness
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.62
In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria
Teresa's admission that she married Rodolfo with the
belief that he would change, and that they were in a
relationship for five (5) years before getting married,
showed that they were in good terms during the early
part of their marriage. It also negated her claim that
Rodolfo's psychological defect existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, and that it deprived him of
the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage.63 The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION
DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is
REVERSED and the petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of
the parties is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.64 (Emphasis in the
original)
Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration65 but this was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution66 dated
May 25, 2009.
On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari.67
Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence,
trial courts had a wider discretion on whether expert
opinion was needed to prove psychological
incapacity.68 Petitioner further argued that for as long as
the trial court had basis in concluding that psychological
incapacity existed, such conclusion should be upheld.69
Rodolfo filed a Comment70 stating that he was not
opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly
believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging
him and petitioner as married."71
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its
Comment,72 agreed that a physician was not required to
declare a person psychologically incapacitated but
emphasized that the evidence presented must be able to
adequately prove the presence of a psychological
condition. The Office of the Solicitor General maintained
that Maria Teresa was unable to sufficiently prove
Rodolfo's alleged psychological incapacity.73
The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr.
Lopez's psychological report stated that his assessment
was based on interviews he made with petitioner and two
(2) of the parties' common friends. However, Dr. Lopez
did not name the two (2) common friends in the
report.74 Furthermore, during trial Dr. Lopez testified
that he only interviewed petitioner and Rodolfo's best
friend, not two (2) friends as indicated in his
report.75 The Office of the Solicitor General insisted that
the finding of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity should
be dismissed as hearsay as it was based solely on
information given by petitioner to Dr. Lopez.76
The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is
whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because
petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove that
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
marital obligations.
The Petition is granted.
The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals77 was the
first case that attempted to lay down the standards for
determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Santos declared that "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."78 Furthermore, the incapacity "should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage[.]"79
Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,80 provided the guidelines to be followed when
interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild
characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
"The following are
incapable of
contracting
marriage: Those
who are unable to
assume the
essential obligations
of marriage due to
causes of
psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands
to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally -
subject to our law on evidence - what
is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of
the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision,
 contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church
- while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other -
shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.81 (Emphasis in the original)
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find
that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to
warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with
respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden
of proof that respondent suffered from psychological
incapacity.
The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving
undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had
no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and
analysis of respondent's mental and psychological
condition. The Court of Appeals cited Republic v.
Dagdag,82 where this Court held that "the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by experts."83 The
Court of Appeals then ruled that "[o]bviously, this
requirement is not deemed complied with where no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testifies on the alleged
psychological incapacity of one party."84
The Court of Appeals is mistaken.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes85 states that
non-examination of one of the parties will not
automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings
of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since
"marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only
two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse
during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."86
Marcos v. Marcos87 emphasizes that Molina does not
require a physician to examine a person and declare
him/her to be psychologically incapacitated. What
matters is that the totality of evidence presented
establishes the party's psychological condition.88
Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner,
sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from
psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid
personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to
extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating
him to fully comprehend and assume the essential
obligations of marriage. As the trial court found:
Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at
his conclusion of respondent' [s]
personality by taking into
consideration the psychological
impression and conclusion he
gathered from the analysis of the
different behaviors he manifested
during the time that he and petitioner
were living together. According to him,
under the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual, he found the respondent to be
suffering from a paranoid personality
disorder manifested by the
respondent's damaging behavior like
reckless driving and extreme jealousy;
his being distrustful and suspicious;
his severe doubts and distrust of
friends and relatives of the petitioner;
his being irresponsible and lack of
remorse; his resistance to treatment;
and his emotional coldness and
severe immaturity. He also testified
that this kind of disorder is actually one
of the severe forms of personality
the
disorder even more severe than the
other personality disorders like the
borderline and narcissistic personality
disorders.
As to the root cause, [h]e explained
that this must have been caused by a
pathogenic parental model. As he
investigated the family background of
the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered
that his father was a psychiatric
patient such that the respondent
developed a similar symptom or
psychic contamination which is called
double insanity. This, according to Dr.
Lopez is usually developed among
close family members, bestfriends
(sic), sweethearts and even couples
who are close to one another; that
people close to one another get
psychically contaminated; that
surprisingly, the symptom that the
father manifested is the same as those
of the respondent. The said disorder
started during respondent's late
childhood years and developed in his
early adolescent years.
He further testified that this disorder is
very severe, serious and incurable
because of the severe paranoia of the
patient; that patients with this kind of
personality disorder could never
accept that there is something wrong
with them and if ever forced to seek
treatment, they would rather engage in
an intellectual battle with the therapist
rather than cooperate with them.
 Dr. Lopez concluded that because of
respondent's personality disorder, he
is incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations of giving love, respect, and
support to the petitioner.1âwphi1 He
recommends that the marriage be
annulled.89 (Emphasis supplied)
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having
the ultimate task of decision-making, must give due
regard to expert opinion on the psychological and mental
disposition of the parties.90
The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality
disorder was hereditary in nature as his own father
suffered from a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that
respondent's own psychological disorder probably
started during his late childhood years and developed in
his early adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that
respondent's psychological incapacity to perform his
marital obligations was likely caused by growing up with
a pathogenic parental model.
The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological
incapacity was also sufficiently proven during trial.
Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent's
jealousy even before their marriage, and that he would
often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to
anyone or cheat on him.91 She believed that he would
change after they got married;92 however, this did not
happen. Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so
extreme and severe that these caused him to poke a gun
at petitioner's head.93
The incurability and severity of respondent's
psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr.
Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid
personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was
something wrong and that there was a need for
treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she
stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment.
Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and
suggested couples counselling to respondent; however,
respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking
professional help. Respondent also refused to be
examined by Dr. Lopez.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and
wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case,
petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but
the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent
failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations
expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic
that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
their marriage.
This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of
harassment towards petitioner, which show his need to
intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive
control. At first, respondent only inflicted nonphysical
forms of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her
from her family and friends due to his jealousy, and
stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his jealousy
soon escalated into physical violence when, on separate
instances, he poked a gun at his teenage cousin, and at
petitioner.
Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which
refers to a pattern of behavior meant to dominate a
partner through different tactics such as physical and
sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and
economic deprivation.94 Although not specifically
named, coercive control as a form of psychological
abuse or harm has been recognized in Republic Act No.
9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children
Act of 2004:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As
used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series
of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he
has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It
includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to
acts or omissions causing or likely to
cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse
and mental infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or
psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs,
or to witness pornography in any form
or to witness abusive injury to pets or
to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of
the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse
by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her
family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of
physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter
lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership
entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to
decree that petitioner should remain married to
respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their
marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to
believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage.
This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend
and perform his marital obligations. This fact is
persuasive enough for this Court to believe that
respondent's mental illness is incurable.
In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of
Maria Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court reiterates the
pronouncement we made in an opinion in Mallilin v.
Jamesolamin:95
Our choices of intimate partners define
us - inherent ironically in our
individuality. Consequently, when the
 law speaks of the nature,
consequences, and incidents of
marriage governed by law, this refers
to responsibility to children, property
relations, disqualifications, privileges,
and other matters limited to ensuring
the stability of society.1âwphi1 The
state's interest should not amount to
unwarranted intrusions into individual
liberties.
Since the State's interest must be
toward the stability of society, the
notion of psychological incapacity
should not only be based on a medical
or psychological disorder, but should
consist of the inability to comply with
essential marital obligations such that
public interest is imperiled.96
Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu
Te's observation that a straitjacket application of
the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families,
our basic social institutions."97 Ironically, the ultimate
effect of such stringent application of
the Molina guidelines is the perversion of the family unit,
the very institution that our laws are meant to protect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is GRANTED. The marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-De La
Fuente and Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared NULL and
VOID. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 76243
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
August 14, 2002 of Branch 107, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
MARRIAGE IN JEST
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV
No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and
respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his
answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to
set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The
RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation and determine the existence of
a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear
at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the
pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the
marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios
and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning.
As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement,
petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent
as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid
a misimpression that she remains the wife of
respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each
other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer
to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay
him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a
farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It
explained that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the
CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the
CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA
stated that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married and that their
case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained
that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was
primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain
foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of
$2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE
OF OBTAINING FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST,
HENCE, LACKING IN THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios
to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be
paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to
the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered
into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the
OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the
latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall
within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the
petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was
similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void
from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating
its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question
of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first
examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant
benefits. This has led to the development of marriage
fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular
benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire
specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited
purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization
of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those
who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if
the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married. "This standard
was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now
requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws of the United States." The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of
evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however,
that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage
declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose
of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The
early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United
States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable
case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein
in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the
parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and
to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through
Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert
temporary into permanent permission to stay in the
country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never
married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the
parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do
not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this
rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is
quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to
the outside world and with the understanding that they
will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose
to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married
at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood
as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of
Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was
intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of
consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic.
The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present,
United States courts have generally denied annulments
involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC
ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying
the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on
to explain that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC,
the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the
Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be
similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties
only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and
never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on
the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of
the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that
the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter
into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that
it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of
an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of
consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended
marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no
real intention of entering into the actual marriage status,
and with a clear understanding that the parties would not
be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a
pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the
absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are
void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is
no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely
no intention of being bound in any way or for any
purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a
marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the
very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus,
an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the
Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides
that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as
the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long
as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and
complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the
kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their
right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children
or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally
valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s
attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It
cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void
ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to
again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as
an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices
of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into
when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case
No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the SO ORDERED.

ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code.
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-
disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a
marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration
laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the
ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or
innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured
party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter
into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred

institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize
this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such
a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a