Marine Outfall Construction 1

Marine Outfall
Construction
Other Titles of Interest
Advances in Water and Wastewater Treatment, edited by Rao K. Surampalli and

K. D. Tyagi (ASCE Committee Report, 2004). Presents state-of-the-art informa-
tion on the application of innovative technologies for water and wastewater
treatment with an emphasis on the scientific principles for pollutant or pathogen
removal. (ISBN 978-0-7844-0741-7)
Design of Marine Facilities for the Berthing, Mooring, and Repair of Vessels, 2nd edi-
tion, by John W. Gaythwaite. (ASCE Press, 2004). Covers the design of marine
structures, including piers, wharves, bulkheads, quaywalls, dolphins, dry docks,
and floating docks. (ISBN 978-0-7844-0726-4).
Sedimentation Engineering, edited by Vito A. Vanoni (ASCE Manuals and Reports on

Engineering Practice No. 54, 2006). Constitutes the classic reference for under-
standing the nature and scope of sedimentation problems, methods for their
investigation, and practical solutions. (ISBN 0-7844-0823-8).
Sedimentation Engineering: Processes, Measurements, Modeling, and Practice, edited

by Marcelo García (ASCE Manuals and Reports on Engineering Practice No. 110,
2008). Supplements Manual 54 with updates of selected topics and treatment of
entirely new topics. (ISBN 978-0-7844-0814-8).
Treatment System Hydraulics, by John Bergendahl (ASCE Press, 2008). Addresses

the nuts-and-bolts of typical treatment systems, examines typical variables, and
describes methods for solving problems encountered in the field. (ISBN 978-0-
7844-0919-0)
Water Resources Engineering: Handbook of Essential Methods and Design, by Anand

Prakash (ASCE Press, 2004). Proposes practical methods to solve problems
commonly encountered by practicing water resources engineers in day-to-day
work. (ISBN 978-0-7844-0674-8)
Marine
Outfall
Construction
Background, Techniques,
and Case Studies
Robert A. Grace
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Grace, Robert A., 1938–

Marine outfall construction : background, techniques, and case studies / Robert A.
Grace.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7844-0984-8
1. Sewage disposal in the ocean. 2. Ocean outfalls—Design and construction—
Case studies. 3. Saline waters. I. Title.
TD763.G639 2009
628’.2—dc22
2009002098
Published by American Society of Civil Engineers

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www.pubs.asce.org
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Copyright © 2009 by the American Society of Civil Engineers.

All Rights Reserved.
ISBN 978-0-7844-0984-8
Manufactured in the United States of America.
17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 1 2 3 4 5
To the memory of my mother
Mary Kathleen (Disney) Grace,
and my godmother
Sheila May (Sargent) Fairbairn,
who first met as British school girls
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi
1 The Marine Outfall in Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

1.1 Precious Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Marine Disposal of Wastewater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Wastewater Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Releasing Wastewater to the Marine Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5 Multiple Uses of the Marine Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.6 Taking Individual Outfalls Out of Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.7 The Marine Outfall as the Disposal Method of Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2 Moving toward Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

2.1 Working in the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 The Bracketing of Marine Outfall Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 The Most Crucial Marine Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Development of the Design of the Southwest Ocean Outfall . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5 Additional Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6 Design–Build. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.7 Offshore and Underwater Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.8 Book Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
vii
viii Marine Outfall Construction
3. Providing a Stable Work Base within the Surf Zone . . . . . . . . . .59

3.1 The Trestle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 A Full-Length Outfall Trestle at New Plymouth, New Zealand . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Another Full-Length Outfall Trestle at McGaurans Beach, Australia . . . . 65
3.4 A Large Power Plant Outfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5 Big Pipe with Strict Environmental Stipulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.6 The Jackup Barge or Platform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.7 An Outfall Extension at Fort Bragg, California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.8 More Walking Platforms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4 Pulling an Outfall Seaward along the Ocean Floor . . . . . . . . . . .91

4.1 The Bottom-Pull Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 The Cape Peron Outfall, Western Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3 Two Other Notable Bottom-Pulled Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 A Pair of Modern Bottom-Pulled Conduits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5 Further Cases: 1978–1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.6 Further Cases: 1987–2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.7 Additional Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.8 Crucial Numbers for the Bottom-Pull Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5 Placing Outfalls under Protected Sites or Obstructions . . . . . .115

5.1 Horizontal Directional Drilling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2 Gas and Oil Industry Shore Crossing, Example No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.3 Two More Gas and Oil Shore Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.4 Unfulfilled Horizontal Directional Drilling Attempts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.5 HDD Outfall Case Studies in the United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.6 Other HDD Case Studies in Developed Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.7 Central Pacific Ocean HDD Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6 Crane Barge Offshore, Trestle Inshore, Trouble Ahead. . . . . . .135

6.1 Section-by-Section Installation of Reinforced Concrete Pipe Outfalls . 135
6.2 Southwest Ocean Outfall, San Francisco, California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.3 Monterey Bay Outfall, California. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.4 Santa Cruz No. 3 Outfall, California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.5 Stormwater Outfalls on the Lower U.S. East Coast. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.6 The Crane Barge Working Alone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Contents ix
7 High-Tech Outfall Installation in Deep Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165

7.1 Saturation Diving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.2 Working Underwater with No Divers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.3 Renton, Seattle, Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.4 Iona, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7.5 Point Loma Extension, San Diego, California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8 Creating Tunnel Outfalls and Their Risers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185

8.1 Tunnel Boring Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.2 Three Full-Tunnel Outfalls at Sydney, Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.3 Other Tunnel Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.4 Sacrificial Tunnels for Outfalls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.5 Use of Microtunneling and Pipe-Jacking to Create Outfalls . . . . . . . . . 194
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
9 Hybrid-Design Outfalls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .201

9.1 Two Distinct Parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
9.2 South Bay Ocean Outfall, San Diego, California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
9.3 Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme, Stage I Outfall, Hong Kong . . . . . . 211
9.4 The Fort Kamehameha No. 2 Outfall, Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
9.5 Post Script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
10 Selected Polyethylene Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221

10.1 Lightness and Heaviness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
10.2 High-Density Polyethylene Pipes in South Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
10.3 Selected Polyethylene Outfalls: First Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
10.4 Selected Polyethylene Outfalls: Second Set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
10.5 The Latest Polyethylene Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
10.6 Installation Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
11 Unusual Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .237

11.1 Techniques from the Gas and Oil Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
11.2 Small-Diameter Flexible Pipe from a Reel Barge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
11.3 Outfalls in Remote Locations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
11.4 Novel Designs: The Americas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
11.5 Novel Designs: Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
11.6 Novel Designs: Other Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
x Marine Outfall Construction
12 Difficult or Impossible Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261

12.1 The Cruel Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
12.2 Lobsters versus Crane Barges and Human Lives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
12.3 A Troubled U.S. West Coast Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
12.4 Problems at Pulp and Paper Mills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
12.5 More Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
12.6 Anything That Can Happen Will Happen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
12.7 Outfalls That Couldn’t Be Built . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
13 Giant Tunnel Outfall as Part of the Boston

Harbor Cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .281
13.1 Boston’s Water and Wastewater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
13.2 Early Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
13.3 Installation of Risers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
13.4 A Personal Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
13.5 The Driving of the Tunnel Outfall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
13.6 Diffuser Completion and Outfall Startup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
13.7 The Cross-Harbor Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
13.8 Accomplishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Appendix A: Selected World Outfalls, Continuing after Table 1-1 . . .299
Appendix B: Wave-Related Concepts and Calculations

for Outfall Design-Build . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .357
B.1 Ocean Waves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
B.2 Wave-Related Computations for Trestles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
B.3 The Old Pipe and the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
B.4 Wave Force Considerations for Exposed Submarine Pipelines . . . . . . . 367
B.5 Research Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
B.6 Pipe Protection by Quarry Rock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
Appendix C: Immersed Tubes as Big Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .385

C.1 The Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
C.2 Use of Immersed Tubes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .393
About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .403
Preface
On the third day of July, in the year 1908, a 37-year-old man died of typhoid fever
after weeks of suffering. A missionary, he had contracted the disease during his fam-
ily’s India-to-England ship passage by way of the Suez Canal, because he consumed
raw and tainted oysters at Port Said. The man left behind a bereft widow and three
young boys, aged one, three, and five. The middle child was my father. I will not
elaborate on the hardships subsequently endured by this depleted group. Suffice it
to say that I am not oblivious to the potential perils of releasing sewage to a marine
environment that is used for recreation or as a source of foodstuffs.
I have another (more direct) connection to raw sewage. Between 1967 and 1976,
I was “up close and personal,” on numerous occasions, with the totally untreated
effluent of the Sand Island No. 1 outfall off Honolulu. I did not do this by design;
rather, the “soup” migrated down to where I was conducting underwater engineer-
ing experiments, and I was forced to transit through it, going up or down. Raw
sewage doesn’t taste very good, and from a public health perspective it isn’t wise to
bathe in such a broth.
Although reasonably aware of the potential environmental effects of wastewater,
I am a civil engineer and write from that perspective, dealing with matters related to
the design, construction, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the structural
system that transports and then releases that effluent into the marine ecosystem,
namely the outfall.
Such a conduit can be a pipe or tunnel, and it carries the sewage or industrial
wastewater away from the land, for release from a submerged diffuser and subsequent
dilution in the receiving water. This fluid mechanics topic has so far dominated the
literature on outfalls, and this volume is designed to “tell the other side of the story.”
Sewage is hardly a topic that pops up in polite conversation. An outfall is not
exactly something that its owner brags about, even if the structure is an incredible
xi
xii Marine Outfall Construction
engineering triumph. Although the outfall is an important part of coastal urban and
industrial infrastructure, its existence is largely ignored until the fateful day when
it breaks, causing the closing of all local beaches. The event is reviled by the news
media, with hints at the utter incompetence of engineers.
It must be stressed that the marine outfall is a difficult system for which to plan
because of the negative public perceptions associated with wasted water resources
and discharges to the precious ocean. The design of an outfall must consider myriad
factors. The construction is a minefield of potential disasters and must be carried
out by an experienced and adaptable contractor. After commissioning, the outfall
needs to be regularly inspected and maintained to ensure continuing satisfactory
performance and readiness for some extraordinary natural or human-caused calam-
ity somewhere in the future.
In the early 1970s, I perceived (although I am an academic) a need for a practi-
cal book on outfalls, and I set about creating such a document. After the collec-
tion of exhaustive information on planning, design, construction, operation, and
maintenance, plus months of writing, Marine Outfall Systems: Planning, Design, and
Construction appeared in 1978.
Since the summer of 1977, when the last changes were made to that book, I
have collected whatever additional information I could find on marine outfalls. This
collection has involved a variety of sources, such as papers in professional journals,
brochures from manufacturers and marine contractors, individual contacts, and
Internet searches. In 2002, I was the recipient of a seasoned professional engineer’s
extensive personal collection of articles, reports, and drawings concerned with gas
and oil submarine pipelines, as well as outfalls. To say that my office of 35 years is
crammed is putting it mildly.
Faced with a literal mass of information, I chose to set aside outfall construction
as a suitable topic for a book, this volume of reportage, with all other matters orga-
nized into professional journal contributions incorporating lessons to be learned.
After all, an outfall has to be buildable. Because outfall design must also take into
account the considerations and features that ensure operational success, it is not
unusual to blend the two efforts that bracket the construction endeavor.
I visualize this one-of-a-kind volume as being a boost to anyone involved in
one way or another with a marine outfall. Although this book primarily addresses
the construction of the conduit, there is adequate supporting information on the
planning and design that precede the installation and then on the inspection, main-
tenance, and operation of the facility that follow it. Please note that the engineer
should not skim or skip over the strictly construction details, and should in fact focus
on them. Too many completely inappropriate, unworkable designs for the marine
environment have been created by land-bound engineers in the past.
There are also some 700 references that cover everything from the idea of an
outfall, through its commissioning, to its continuing operation with periodic inspec-
tions. Most of the sources are short articles or papers, but there are also some extraor-
dinary volumes that should be on the active bookshelves of all engineers involved
with marine matters. Please do not write to me for copies of obscure references.
Preface xiii
It is not sensible, in this volume, to wade directly into construction operations

without providing suitable background. I have sought to provide the lead-in with the
first two chapters, and we should first answer the question: Is the outfall an outdated
concept? With all the talk of sustainability and the clear realization of the scarcity of
water, shouldn’t every drop of wastewater be somehow recycled? The ideal answer
is “yes”; the realistic response is “no.” Certain elements in the debate on wastewater
treatment and reuse, including outfalls, appear in Chapter 1. No other contentious
issues appear in the 12 chapters following.
There is much to do between the decision to use an outfall and the start of its
installation. Chapter 2 provides coverage of that period, which starts with the think-
ing about needed data, the preparation of environmental documents, and initial
efforts at securing permits. The actual design of the outfall proceeds through various
levels and culminates in the preparation of plans, specifications, and bid documents.
All of the steps are keyed herein to developments with San Francisco’s colossal
Southwest Ocean Outfall, in California, during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The next 11 chapters set out different methods of constructing an outfall and
provide actual examples of the use of the particular technique. This is not all “dry
stuff”; some sagas approach the suspense of a Harry Potter adventure.
Chapter 3 covers approaches wherein the base of construction is essentially an
extension of the land involving platforms or trestles. There is no floating plant to
speak of, and the outfalls so involved are usually of limited length.
The methodology in Chapter 4 has existed for decades and involves the pipe
being pulled out to sea while sliding along the seabed. The standard material for
such pipes is steel, and the chapter contains 15 world examples with short summa-
ries and 5 cases (one each in Morocco, Scotland, and Spain, plus two in Australia)
with lengthy, detailed accounts.
The technique of directional drilling places a pipeline under whatever obstruc-
tions and protected areas lie between the wastewater treatment plant inland and
the designated offshore location of the outfall diffuser. This approach is covered
in Chapter 5, with descriptions of how it was applied in 18 cases across the world
oceans, 3 of which involved gas and oil lines and the rest outfalls.
Chapter 6 covers outfalls, usually those made of reinforced concrete, that
extend out from shore through the surf zone and then typically well beyond that
turbulent region into water depths exceeding 20 m. The inshore portion is built
using a trestle, whereas the offshore part is created through use of a special barge
whose crane lowers the pipe to the seafloor. The new pipe section is held within a
special laying structure, called a horse, that sits on the seabed. The several examples
of this technique lay out the various problems that can happen during episodes of
heavy weather.
Regulatory authorities prefer to have wastewater discharges highly diluted in
substantial depths of water, but the use of divers during installation would be dan-
gerous and expensive. Chapter 7 details the installation of three outfalls on the west
coast of North America, where high-tech approaches were used to minimize the
need to have humans at significant ambient pressure.
xiv Marine Outfall Construction
To this point, only pipes have been covered, but Chapter 8 presents an approach
of considerable merit in some cases, the mined tunnel. The technology is described,
and 10 examples are provided of the use of this approach for the actual conduit. An
additional idea is presented, that concerning the use (in two cases) of pipes placed
in driven tunnels to carry the flow themselves, rather than containing pipes to carry
the outfall contents.
There is no reason why an outfall has to be of the same design from its origin to
its terminus, and Chapter 9 covers at length three completed outfalls that have two
distinct portions and two other outfalls nearing completion. Typically, the inshore
part is a tunnel, whereas the offshore part involves a pipe set in a seabed trench.
Thus, this chapter essentially marries and extends the contents of Chapters 6 and 8.
The previous seven chapters don’t explicitly deal with the pipe material, and
Chapter 10 departs from this approach to focus exclusively on one type of pipe, poly-
ethylene. Polyethylene is the “modern” outfall pipe material, and fully 60% of the
world’s major outfalls now installed are made of this plastic. The many advantages
and potential problems inherent in the use of polyethylene are explored.
There are numerous outfalls that, for one reason or another, are far from tradi-
tional in design. I have collected 25 of these in Chapter 11. This chapter is basically
a world tour, extending to wild outposts of civilization, where outfall installation is
the toughest of all. There is much food for thought in these unique examples.
From time to time in the preceding chapters, attention has been drawn to the
difficulties of installing an outfall on a dynamic seabed in the sometimes savage sea.
Chapter 12 collects together and closely documents eight outfalls where the con-
tractors went through “hell and high water” to get the job done. The chapter ends
with the stories of four outfalls that because of a variety of factors simply couldn’t
be built.
Chapter 13 attempts to tell the full story behind the world’s mightiest outfall,
that created off Boston, Massachusetts, between 1988 and 1996. This is a tunnel
approximately 15.3 km long with a finished diameter of 7.4 m. Although most of
the text deals with the construction aspects and an underground site visit I made,
there is ample coverage of background information to place the tunnel in proper
context. A central message is that the tunnel not only cost a lot of money to construct
but also the lives of five workers. Environmental improvement has its down side,
both tangible and intangible.
Appendix A is referred to throughout the book. I discuss it here after Appendix C.
All chapters are completely descriptive, with tables and figures, but they contain
no mathematics whatsoever. The stress is on the concepts and realities. We must
never hide a lack of physical understanding behind a barrage of heavy mathematics.
However, a handful of truly important mathematical approaches and equations is
collected and briefly presented in Appendix B. These are all related to ocean waves,
the overall primary design consideration for outfalls. Some of the formulations
result from the many years of underwater wave–structure interaction experiments
that coworkers and I carried out in the sea off Honolulu, starting in 1967 and ending
in 1992, when the big seas of Hurricane Iniki and advancing age wrote an end to
such endeavors. Some of the matters in Appendix B could be controversial.
Preface xv
Appendix C provides coverage of a type of underwater structure that could lend

itself to application for large wastewater flows. This is the immersed tube that has seen
use in dozens of roadway, rail, and rapid transit waterway crossings over the years.
Arguably the outstanding feature of the whole book is the 3,200-cell table in
Appendix A that presents, dates, and numbers 400 significant world outfalls con-
structed from 1978 through 2007. Keep an atlas handy! I urge the reader to make the
link between the text description for an outfall and that conduit’s basic specifications
listed in Table A-1, as neither source, within itself, contains the complete story. Note
that some outfalls, referred to in the text, are not included in the “round number”
within Table A-1.
Roughly two-thirds of the outfalls listed in the array are not otherwise men-
tioned in the text and have no known formal references. In these cases, I provide
virtually every detail I could assemble. For the pipe trunk, there are pipe material,
outside and inside diameters, length, and burial details. For the diffuser itself, there
are the length, the water depth involved, and details on the outlets. Where it was
possible, I have described construction operations, and in some cases I have added
operational details.
Among the one-third of the listed outfalls with write-ups within the text, per-
haps half have formal references. I have been involved, in one way or another, with
various of the outfalls in this category and thus can bring firsthand information to
the reader. The details listed in Appendix A are reduced, to avoid overlap with items
included within the essays. Most of these histories cover relevant matters from plan-
ning, design, and operation, as well as the construction features.
Often there is an incomplete set of numbers for a particular outfall. This defi-
ciency is maddening; however, the reader must understand that I made every effort
to secure a full set but was somehow thwarted. Again, some people don’t like to
discuss their outfalls. It is no use contacting me for more values, as I have given all
that I have.
Sometimes I have seen, in my collected materials, two or even three separate
numbers given for a particular feature of a given conduit. The length of an outfall
is a typical case because this feature can involve the entire pipeline, or the part
involved in the marine construction contract, or that part seaward of the high tide
line. Also, lengths and pipe diameters may change as an outfall passes through
the various stages of development within planning and design. Faced with an
occasional array of numbers, I have had to make a selection of what is the right
figure. For example, three apparently equally valid sources of information gave
the weight of the microtunneling machine for the Tahuna outfall (in Dunedin,
New Zealand) as 42, 42, and 48 metric tons. Which number should be chosen?
I do not think that a number should be omitted simply because of the (close)
ambiguity, and I chose 42.
The weight figure, given in the previous paragraph, is clearly in the metric (Sys-
tème Internationale, or SI) rather than the United States Customary System (USCS)
of units, which has been ignored in this volume, probably much to the disappoint-
ment of U.S. engineers. The metric ton (tonne) is 2204.5 lb and 1 lb is equivalent to
4.448 Newtons (N). The kilogram-force (kgf) is not a basic SI unit. When it comes
xvi Marine Outfall Construction
to length, the two best equivalencies are the following: 1 inch ⬅ 25.4 mm; and 1 m ⬅
3.281 ft. When USCS-to-SI conversions have been made, for this book, roundoff has
been largely used to avoid fractions of mm. As an example, a 0.5-inch pipe wall is
taken as 13 mm; a 48-inch-diameter pipe is called 1,219 mm.
In the multiyear collection of material for this volume, I have been helped by a
number of individuals and companies, and I am deeply grateful for the assistance.
Whatever its shortcomings, it is my hope that you will enjoy your reading experi-
ence with this volume and find in its pages many interesting and useful items. I can
assure you that you will learn a number of things that you never knew before.
Robert A. Grace
University of Hawaii at Manoa
Honolulu, Hawaii
List of Acronyms
ACBM Articulated concrete block mattress

ADS Atmospheric diving system
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
AWT Advanced wastewater treatment
BBT Big bolting tool; see Section 7.4.3
BHC Boston Harbor Cleanup (Massachusetts)
BoD Biochemical oxygen demand
CCC California Coastal Commission
CCSF City and County of San Francisco (California)
CEPT Chemically-enhanced primary treatment (of sewage)
CMP Corrugated metal pipe
CoE (U.S. Army) Corps of Engineers
CSO Combined sewer overflow
CWC Concrete weight coat (on outside of steel pipe)
DDC Deck decompression chamber
DEIS Draft environmental impact statement
DI Ductile iron
DL Diffuser length
DNV Det Norske Veritas
DSV Diver support vessel
DWSD Detroit Water and Sewerage District (Michigan)
EIR Environmental impact report
EIS Environmental impact statement
ENR Engineering News-Record (professional magazine)
EPA (U.S.) Environmental Protection Agency
FBE Fusion-bonded epoxy (coating on steel pipe)
xvii
xviii Marine Outfall Construction
FEMA (U.S.) Federal Emergency Management Agency

FRP Fiberglass reinforced plastic (pipe) (USA)
GPS Global positioning system
GRP Glass fiber-reinforced (plastic) pipe (Europe)
HDD Horizontal directional drilling
HDPE High-density polyethylene
HPPE High-performance polyethylene
i.d. Inside diameter (of pipe)
IWWS Illawarra Wastewater Strategy (Australia)
LNG Liquid natural gas
LP Louisiana Pacific (Corporation)
MBE Minority business enterprise
MDC Metropolitan District Commission (Boston)
MDPE Medium-density polyethylene (pipe)
MHHW Mean higher high water
MHW Mean high water
MLLW Mean lower low water
MLW Mean low water
MRWPCA Monterey Regional Water Pollution Control Agency (California)
MSL Mean sea level
MT Microtunneling
MTBM Microtunnel boring machine
MW Megawatt
MWRA Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
NDBC (U.S.) National Data Buoy Center
NDT Non-destructive testing
NGVD National Geodetic Vertical Datum
NOAA (U.S.) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NSW New South Wales (Australia)
o.d. Outside diameter (of pipe)
OSHA (U.S.) Office of Safety and Health Administration
PCCP Prestressed concrete cylinder pipe; see Section 3.6.3
PE Polyethylene
PVC Polyvinyl chloride
RCP Reinforced concrete pipe
ROV Remotely-operated vehicle
SAF San Andreas fault (California)
SAM Sewer Authority Mid-Coastside (California)
SBOO South Bay ocean outfall (California)
Scuba Self-contained underwater breathing apparatus
SDC Submersible decompression chamber
SDR Standard diameter ratio (⫽ o.d./wall thickness of pipe)
SERRA Southeast Regional Reclamation Authority (California)
SONGS San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (California)
List of Acronyms xix
SSDS Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme (Hong Kong)

SSSI Site of Special Scientific Interest (United Kingdom)
STP Sewage treatment plant
SWC Sydney Water Corporation (Australia)
SWL Still water level
SWRCB (California) State Water Resources Control Board
SWOO Southwest ocean outfall (San Francisco)
TBM Tunnel boring machine
UXO Unexploded ordnance
WBE Women’s business enterprise
WPCP Water pollution control plant
WWTF Wastewater treatment facility
WWTP Wastewater treatment plant
Glossary
Advanced primary treatment—An alternative to secondary (biological) treatment that utilizes

a chemical coagulant/flocculant to alter the physical state of dissolved and suspended
solids and facilitate their removal by sedimentation.
Advanced wastewater treatment—Methods and processes that remove more contaminants
from wastewater than are taken out by conventional physical followed by biological
treatment.
Airlift—Vertical pipe, with air released at its base; when pipe is submerged and placed near
seabed, rising air draws in water and granular material.
Airy theory—Same as linear theory for waves.
Allthread—A rod that is threaded from end to end.
Annulus—Circumferential gap between two concentric pipes.
Anode—A block of metal that will itself corrode before the pipe to which it is joined (accord-
ing to the galvanic series).
Aquaculture—Farming of freshwater and salt water organisms under controlled conditions.
Aqueduct—Channel carrying water to a desired location from a remote source.
Armor rock—The top layer of big rock over a trenched pipe.
As builts—Revised set of plans submitted by a contractor upon completion of a project, show-
ing how the system was actually constructed.
Astronomical tide—Sea level changes due to (regular) gravitational forces of sun and moon.
Auger—This involves a slender shaft with a raised progressive helical blade surrounding it,
used either as a boring tool or (in this book) to convey material along its length.
Backfill—Granular material placed in seabed trench after laying of pipe.
Backhoe—Piece of excavating equipment consisting of a digging bucket on the end of a rear-
mounted (tractor) articulated arm.
Ballast—Something to add weight under water.
Ballast rock—Stabilizing rock placed along the sides of a laid pipe.
Batter pile—Pile driven at an inclination to the vertical to provide lateral restraint.
Beam, on the—Refers to approach onto the side of a ship or pipeline.
xxi
xxii Marine Outfall Construction
Bearing—A direction according to true (abbreviated T) or magnetic compass angles, north

being either 0° or 360°, west being 270°.
Bedding—Trench-bottom granular material on which a pipe is set.
Bell—Two meanings: chamber used for diving, or the receiving end of a pipe section.
Bends—Somewhat slang expression for “decompression sickness.”
Bent—Two meanings: somewhat slang expression for having decompression sickness in some
part of the body; or a pair of linked piles with transverse orientation.
Biological sewage treatment—This is the same as secondary sewage treatment.
Blind flange—A pipe flange that has no opening.
Blind hole—Drilled hole that has no outlet.
Blockout—Item placed before a concrete pour, to create an open space.
Blowout—High-volume ground heave due to artesian water pressure underneath.
Bogie—A wheeled wagon or trolley.
Braided river—Network of small channels at regular flow, separated by small, non-perma-
nent islands.
Brine—Salt water that is much more saline than sea water.
Bulkhead—The cover over the end of a pipe.
Bund—Man-made raised-earth embankment that runs alongside or through shallow water.
Bunkering line—Pipeline that carries a ship’s own fuel from facilities on shore out to the vessel.
Buoy—A device that floats on the sea surface, or is held a short distance under the sea surface,
as a marker.
Buoyancy—The tendency for a submerged object to rise in a liquid.
Buoyant—An object with a bulk specific gravity less than that of the liquid within which it is
immersed.
Buoyant weight—Vertical pipe force down on the seabed under quiescent conditions.
Butt-fuse—Joining method for PE pipe involving the pushing together of two soft (heated)
ends within a special rack.
Cathodic protection—Methods taken to minimize corrosion of a metal immersed in sea
water; see section 4.3.2.
Chainage—Measured distance along a pipeline.
Clamshell—Hydraulic-actuated digging device consisting of two powerful jaws with possibly
serrated margins.
Clearance—Gap between the underside of a pipe and the seabed.
Cofferdam—Temporary enclosed structure to permit work in the dry.
Concrete collar—Discrete ballast unit to vertically stabilize buoyant pipe such as polyethyl-
ene.
Crest—Elevated portion of a wave.
Crossflow—Situation in which only the component of a flow vector perpendicular to a line is
important in determining the flow-induced force.
Crown—The outside-top of a (horizontal) pipe.
Decompression—The process of bringing the human body back to atmospheric conditions
after an interval of exposure to higher pressure.
Decompression sickness—Illness occurring after a reduction in ambient pressure.
Deep water wave—Ocean wave in a situation where its wave length is less than twice the water
depth.
Depth-limited—See Section 4.3.2.
Derrick barge—Flat ocean-going barge fitted with crane and suitable for heavy lifting and
excavating (loosely, the same as a crane barge).
Glossary xxiii
Desalination—Process of removing salt from brackish water or sea water to produce fresh water.
Design-build—The same group (of perhaps different companies), for a given fee, acts as a
team to both design and construct a facility.
Diffuser—A structure with spaced outlets for the wastewater effluent.
Disturbed water motion—Eddying flow that has previously been in the wake of an immersed
object.
Down line—A rope that connects a boat and a seabed work site, useful as a guide and stable
reference for divers.
Dragline—Cable to pull an open bucket along the seabed to collect material.
Drought—Extended period with insufficient water supply, often because of inadequate pre-
cipitation.
Duckbill valve—Check valve with lips that press together to seal when there is no outflow.
Dune—Nature’s way of keeping a raised reserve of sand (behind the beach) against the day of
attack by savage storm waves.
Echo sounder—Instrument for measuring water depth using acoustic energy reflected back to
the boat from the seabed.
Eductor—Local remover of sand due to low pressure in internal reduced-area jet pump when
water flow is supplied by a second remote pump.
Endangered species—One in danger of extinction through most or all of its range.
Engineer’s estimate—A consultant’s best estimate of the cost of constructing the designed
structure.
Estuary—The extended tidal mouth of a river.
Extended-bell—Concrete pipe with socket extending beyond pipe’s outside diameter.
Eyewall—Region immediately surrounding the eye of a hurricane where the most damaging
winds and intense rainfall are found.
Face—The temporary non-excavated vertical boundary in a tunnel.
Faired in—A discontinuity is filled in so as to provide a smooth transition.
Fathom—A traditional mariner’s measure for water depth, equal to 1.829 meters.
Fathometer—Usually a sonar instrument used to determine the local water depth from a
boat’s position on the sea surface.
Flange—Perpendicular end plate on a pipe that permits bolting to a similarly fitted pipe
length.
Flap valve—Check valve with circular top-hinged disc that swings shut when flow ceases and
open as flow is initiated.
Float(out) and sink—Buoyant (empty) pipe towed into position over site, then filled with sea
water and gradually lowered into position on the seabed.
Flush-joint—Bell of concrete pipe maintained at the pipe’s outside diameter.
Four-Point Moor—The restraint system for a floating vessel consists of perpendicular lines to
four anchors.
Freak wave—A real ocean wave that far surpasses the height of those preceding and following.
Freeboard—The distance above the water surface of a ship’s rail or the deck of a trestle or
platform.
Froude number—Dimensionless fluid mechanics parameter involving the ratio of inertia
force and gravity force.
Galled—Threads seize or form a burr due to misalignment, overtightening, fatigue, or failure;
separate parts do not fit properly or are very hard or impossible to loosen.
Gantry—A special type of movable vehicle that straddles the pipe it is carrying and will lower;
see Fig. 3-3.
xxiv Marine Outfall Construction
Gap—Two meanings: vertical distance from seabed to underside of pipe; distance that pipe is
short of being fully seated within a joint.
Gasket—Hard rubber band, extending along a circumferential groove and used to seal pipe
joints.
Geotextile fabric—Tight-mesh permeable rolled sheeting that can be placed over small-size
granular material to keep it from eroding.
Gimble—A component that pivots on two axes at one time.
Gray water—Used domestic water from showers and sinks (but not toilets).
Grit—Hard granular heavy material in sewage that is removed in preliminary treatment to
avoid damaging pumps and causing other problems.
Groin—A shore protection structure, usually perpendicular to the shoreline, to trap littoral
drift of sand or provide base for work.
Hatchbox—Insert in piping system with removable lid, used for trapping flow debris.
Headland—Natural rocky projection into the sea, usually flanked by beaches.
Headworks—An above-ground structure that marks the point of sewage input to a wastewater
treatment plant.
Heliox—A synthetic breathing gas with helium replacing the nitrogen in a normal air envi-
ronment.
Hindcast—An attempt to determine conditions that gave rise to past events.
Hopper—An open-top container for stones or rock.
Horse—A special framed, hydraulically-controlled steel structure, set on the seabed to lay
pipe.
Hybrid—A linking of two systems not normally found together.
Hydraulics—A mechanical system in which the working fluid is oil.
Hydro-Pull—Commercial technique for jointing RCP pipe sections.
Injection well—Drilled hole in the ground into which wastewater is directed for disposal.
Invert—Inside bottom of (horizontal) pipe, used as reference.
Jackhammering—Breaking up pavements or rock using a pneumatically-operated hand-held
percussion tool.
Jackup—See Section 3.3.
Jet pump—Combination of a remote regular pump and a reduced-diameter pipe section. The
low pressure draws in water and sediment through a side port.
Jetty—Man-made, narrow offshore extension of land made of rock.
Kamaaina—Descendent of the original settlers of the Hawaiian Islands.
Kinematics—The variation with time of the displacement, velocity, and acceleration of a
water particle.
Knot—A mariner’s standard measure of speed, meaning 1 nautical mile per hour.
Lift bag—A pear-shaped underwater “balloon” filled by a diver with enough air to handle
specific loads.
Linear wave theory—Basic, simplified representation of ocean wave mechanics; also called
Airy theory.
Liner—Used in two senses, either as an interior pipe coating to inhibit corrosion or as a plas-
tic pipe inserted in a damaged pipe to provide a new, smooth, uninterrupted flow path.
Load capacity test—Bearing capacity of a pile determined from its resistance to being driven.
Lull—Interval with no appreciable wave action.
Malihini—Visitor or recent resident of the Hawaiian Islands.
Manhole—Top-covered hole, for gaining entry to inside of pipe if needed.
Mat—Heavy flexible covering placed over laid pipe.
Glossary xxv
Mattress—Multiple-cell flexible blanket placed over laid pipe for stability.

Microtunneling—Excavation of largely horizontal hole through the ground without human
entry.
Mixed gas—Synthetic diver breathing medium that reduces chance of problems due to nitro-
gen narcosis or decompression sickness.
Model—Replica of a true object that it tested in the laboratory.
Morison equation—Engineering formula that sets the total wave-induced force equal to the
sum of a drag force and an inertia force.
Muck—Residual from a mining operation.
Mud—The “goopy” material used in directional drilling for lubrication and to carry away
cuttings.
Murphy’s Laws—Set of grim statements on construction difficulties.
Natural frequency—The resultant frequency of oscillation of a mechanical system when dis-
placed and then allowed to move freely.
Nautical mile—Distance of exactly 1,852 m, and for mariners appreciated as the equivalent
of a 1-minute change in longitude, along the equator.
Nitrox—Diver breathing gas with less N2 and more O2 than air.
Offshore mooring—Location well off the coast for tankers to offload; marked with a single
large buoy or several smaller buoys.
Orthogonal—An imaginary line, seen from above, always perpendicular to a given wave crest,
showing the variation in direction of that front’s movement.
Outfall—Conduit for transporting wastewater out to sea for disposal.
Oxidation pond—Large shallow pond designed to treat wastewater through interaction of
sunlight, bacteria, and algae.
Padeye—Stout bracket with hole for connecting of a wire rope.
Pathogen—Agent of disease; infectious organism.
Period—Elapsed time between the arrival of two consecutive wave crests at a fixed point.
Phytoplankton—Free-floating, microscopic plants that live in the upper reaches of the ocean
where sunlight can penetrate.
Pig—Device sent through a pipe to push out internal deposits and/or scrape off and remove
wall accumulations; a recent idea has such units made of blocks of ice so that they cannot
become permanently stuck.
Pipe yard—Land area where pipe lengths are stored and worked on.
Plans—The set of drawings that depicts an engineering project.
Plume—The continually mixing efflux from an outfall diffuser, dominated by vertical motion.
Pneumatics—A mechanical system in which the working fluid is air.
Port—The hole in a diffuser through which wastewater passes to enter the marine environment.
Primary treatment—Sewage processing that involves flow detention so that suspended solids
settle out; also called physical treatment.
Prototype—A real ship or actual submarine pipeline.
Pullhead—See Section 4.2.4.
Pulp—Chemically processed wood chips to be made into paper.
Reamer—Device in HDD that is directed to pass through the already-drilled hole to increase
its diameter.
Record drawings—Revised set of plans submitted by a contractor upon completion of a project,
showing how the system was actually constructed.
Reuse—The recovering of wastewater, through treatment, to permit more than one-time-only
use of the liquid.
xxvi Marine Outfall Construction
Reynolds number—Dimensionless fluid mechanics parameter involving the ratio of inertia

force to viscous shear force.
Riprap—A layer or protective mound of randomly-placed stones to prevent erosion or scour.
Riser—Two meanings, both referring to pipe stubs, one for diver or ROV entry into a pipe, the
other for the passage of effluent outflow.
Saddle—A structural component that is used to provide support on the underside of an
underwater pipe.
Sag bend—A vertical bend in a drilled path that progresses upward.
Saline intrusion—The forced entrance of (higher-density) sea water into the interior of an
outfall diffuser through weakly-flowing ports.
Screed—See Section 7.5.4.
Sea—Another name for a wave under the direct action of a strong wind.
Seawater intrusion—Same as saline intrusion.
Secondary treatment—A possible sewage processing step beyond primary treatment, lead-
ing to greater removal of suspended solids and biological oxygen demand; also called
biological treatment.
Semigun—Somewhat narrowed surfboard shape, optimum for riding big waves.
Set—A group of unusually large waves.
Sewage—The two-phase outflow that results from domestic water use.
Sheet piling—Wall made up of individual sheet piles which are long flat or angular steel
plates with tongue and groove edges for jointing.
Shoaling—Changes to a wave’s height and wave length strictly due to its movement into shal-
low water.
Shotcrete—Concrete projected or “shot” under air pressure from a hose (or “gun”) onto a
surface to form a particular structural shape; this method achieves concrete placement
and compaction at the same time.
Significant wave height—Average of highest one-third of a measured wave sequence.
Skeg—Single rear fin on a surfboard.
Snatch block—A pulley or sheave whose side plate can be opened or swung away to allow
entry of a cable (without having to thread its end through the device).
Socket—The part of a pipe joint into which another pipe is inserted.
Soffit—Inside top of (horizontal) pipe.
Source control—The strict regulation of levels of potentially deleterious components in
industrial inputs to a municipal sewer system.
Spanning—A pipe without continuous bottom support.
Specifications—Strict formal rules on construction methods and materials.
Spectra—Plural of spectrum, which involves the distribution of energy in a wave train as a
function of frequency or period.
Spigot—The end of a piece of pipe that is inserted into the bell of another pipe section.
Spoil—Material removed from the seabed during dredging.
Spool piece—A short length of pipe, fabricated according to underwater measurements, to
provide a link between two in-place lengths of submarine pipe.
Spread—Array of boats and barges on a marine job.
Springline—Imaginary line marking mid-height on a (horizontal) pipe.
Spud—Pile on certain barges, driven to ensure temporary stability or turning point.
Station—A number that represents the along-pipe distance of a particular location from a
base position.
Glossary xxvii
Stinger—A structure on the back of a pipe lay barge that curves down into the water and con-
trols the bend radius of the pipe as it transitions to a vertical orientation.
Storm surge—Superelevation of water surface due to wind and low pressure.
Storm tide—Same as storm surge.
Strain gage—Special pad of back-and-forth wire affixed to a specimen, whose linear strain
under load can be translated into electrical potential differences.
Strap—See Section 3.1.
Stream function theory—Special nonlinear wave theory whose predictions closely represent
real phenomena.
String—A substantial length of pipe considered as a unit.
Stringer—Spinal strength member in older surfboards.
Stub—A short length of pipe.
Stubout—A short length of exposed pipe intended for future connection.
Suction hopper dredge—This seabed excavation system trails a suction pipe when working,
and the dredge spoil enters one or two hoppers, within the vessel, that are later emptied
over an approved dump area.
Swell—(Smooth) lake or ocean waves from a distant storm.
Tender—The diver’s essential servant, helping in dressing and undressing above water, com-
municating, monitoring, and tending hose when diver is underwater.
Tertiary treatment—Treatment beyond secondary to remove further solids, nutrients, and
perhaps provide disinfection; also called advanced wastewater treatment.
Threatened species—A plant or animal species that is likely to become endangered in the
near future.
301(h) waiver—Permission of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to discharge waste-
water treated to less than secondary level.
Tide—The periodic rise and fall of the sea’s surface.
Tie rod—See Section 3.1.
Tonne—Metric ton.
Towhead—Leading part of pipe attached to a cable.
Towing tank—Long water basin where ship models are pulled behind a spanning carriage in
order to appraise their resistance to motion.
Trade winds—The prevailing winds in the tropics, from the NE in the northern Hemisphere,
and from the SE in the Southern Hemisphere.
Trawl—Coarse fishing net dragged on two cables (“warps”) behind a boat called a trawler.
Tremie concrete—Concrete that travels down inside a pipe and then is placed underwater.
Trestle—Temporary construction pier through the surf zone.
Trough—Depressed part of a wave.
Trunk—Non-diffuser part of outfall.
Tsunami—Trans-ocean wave generated by massive seabed displacements.
Undisturbed water motion—Wave-induced flow that encounters no foreign object.
Value engineering proposal—Contractor idea to save money on project while not impairing
function; owner and company split the savings; see Section 9.4.7.
Venturi—Insert in pipe that reduces diameter and lowers pressure.
Vibrocoring—The taking of a seabed core through use of a seabed sampler that advances
while being externally vibrated; also spelled vibracoring.
Wastewater—Water adversely affected by use on farms or in homes, commercial entities, and
industrial facilities.
xxviii Marine Outfall Construction
Wave flume—Long water basin with a device at one end that generates wave of adjustable
height and period.
Wave front—The line followed by a wave crest, as seen from above.
Wave length—The horizontal distance between two successive wave crests at a given
moment.
Wave surge—Back and forth near-seabed water motion under waves.
Weather buoy—A large buoy, usually anchored in the deep sea, with sensors that allow mea-
surement of atmospheric and oceanographic variables.
Wetland—An environment at the interface between truly terrestrial ecosystems and strictly
aquatic ones.
Winch—Device to pull in cable under load; the drum winch winds up the cable on a rotating
cylindrical reel whereas the linear winch uses a rack that travels along the barge deck to
provide incremental pull-in.
Zooplankton—Microscopic animal members of the tiny organisms passively drifting in the
upper water column of oceans and seas.
Zooxanthellae—Minute colored plants embedded in the tissues of corals.
1
The Marine Outfall
in Context
1.1 Precious Water

1.1.1 Water Use
A stable and adequate water supply of good quality is crucial to the well-being of rural
and urban people worldwide. Many of us have grown up in lands, like southwestern
Ontario in Canada, where water scarcity is basically a non-issue. Surface water is nor-
mally available from running rivers or impoundments; there is generally adequate
ground water accessible by wells. The vast resources of Lakes Huron and Erie can be
tapped on a regular basis or as backups during intervals of little precipitation.
In 1972, when I first visited Australian relatives in Coffs Harbour, New South
Wales, I was amazed to discover that house water came from under-the-roof cisterns
supplied by channeled roof runoff during rare rainfall events (e.g., Ashworth 2005).
Water is not wasted in a dwelling like that, and “gray water” is directed to the veg-
etable and flower gardens.
In a water-deficient land, such as Australia, such a practice is by no means “a
nice touch”; it is a sensible and necessary one. In mid-August, 2007, after a decade
of punishing drought, the annual report of the Water Services Association of Aus-
tralia stated that almost every city in the country would promptly need to find new
sources of fresh water such as recycling and desalination. Remedial measures in the
driest inhabited continent on earth have already started (Cameron 2007; Crisp 2007;
“Desal” 2008; Landers 2008a), but the idea of recycling has generated some heavy
negative reactions because of the “bugs” still in the water.
Insights into the world water crisis in general, and related U.S. problems in particu-
lar, are provided by Fortner (1995b), Lavelle and Kurlantzick (2002), Montaigne (2002),
Sieger et al. (2002), Banyard (2006), King and Webber (2008), and Kunzig (2008). The
sustainable development book by Brown (2008) contains many environmental points,
1
2 Marine Outfall Construction
some related to water resources. Water tables are dropping, as drafts exceed natural
replenishment. More and more desertification is developing concurrently. Parts of many
of the countries of the world are involved in the latter process, an example being the
Murcia region in the south of Spain (Rosenthal 2008a). An important concept is “virtual
water”: how this liquid is embedded in the production and trade of food and consumer
products. The narrow-vision rush to replace fossil fuels with biofuels has various nega-
tive features such as accelerating the draw on existing water supplies, causing some ana-
lysts to suggest that the world’s water could largely disappear before oil runs out.
1.1.2 Drought Times

The only way that certain giant metropolitan coastal areas have been able to survive
is artificially, by importing the bulk of their massive fresh water needs from else-
where (e.g., “China’s” 2008). The southern California cities of San Diego and Los
Angeles have for years been largely sustained by aqueduct water all the way from the
Colorado River. Recent official predictions indicate a marked decrease in the amount
of water available from the Colorado, and southern California will have to solve its
water problem in the near future, “once and for all.”
In early June, 2008, the governor of California proclaimed a statewide drought.
Snow measurements in May (2008) had shown that the Sierra Nevada mountains
held just 69% of the level at that time in an average year and that runoff into Califor-
nia rivers was at just 55% of a normal year. Later, it was announced that the coastal
town of Bolinas would be completely out of water by the end of April, 2009. Many
California Central Valley farmers are planning to let vast tracts of arable land lie fal-
low in the 2009 growing season through lack of water. Think of the consequences in
terms of the availability of truck crops for the dinner table and, more importantly,
farm worker livelihood.
As a stop-gap measure, Spain’s drought-stricken metropolis of Barcelona, dur-
ing the summer of 2008, was steadily importing water by ship. The usual consump-
tion of water by Barcelona is some 650,000 m3/day. The first tanker docked in the
city on May 13, 2008. The vessel carried 23,000 m3 of drinking water, said to be
from new wells near Tarragona, not from the Ebro River whose mouth is 70 km to
its southwest. Other ships were to follow, initially from Marseilles (with water from
the Rhône River) and later from a desalination plant in Almería (e.g., Downward and
Taylor 2007). It is said that Marseilles had provided this function many times before
to drought-stricken Mediterranean Sea metropolitan centers. Back in 1999, there was
even the US$1 billion idea floated of a 300-km-long pipeline to Barcelona from the
“under-utilized” Rhône.
1.1.3 Desalination
With limited surface water resources and the past need to import water from Malay-
sia, Singapore commissioned its mighty new desalination facility in September,
2005. This US$130 million plant is located on the beachfront at Tuas, at the western
end of the metropolitan area. The freshwater design output of the facility, approxi-
The Marine Outfall in Context 3
mately 136,000 m3/day, requires an input of some 355,000 m3/day of seawater. The
guaranteed maximum energy consumption is 4.346 kWh/m3 (Kiang et al. 2007).
With the abundant sea offlying our coastal habitations, it seems natural to tap this
great resource to augment an inadequate municipal water supply and various world
communities have done so (e.g., Wade and Callister 1997; Alapach and Watson 2004).
But this step is a mixed blessing, because every single thing that one does to create extra
water has its own set of negative effects on the total environment. A costly desalination
plant is no different; it is a choice of last resort. The intake can draw in and shock vast
numbers of fish eggs and larvae plus phytoplankton, and these are then lost to the gen-
eral coastal circulation of living things. Larger creatures (e.g., crustaceans, adult fish, rays,
and sea lions) may end up plastered against the mesh intake screens in some systems.
The desalination process itself is highly energy-intensive and releases large volumes of
greenhouse gases. The (hot, heavy) reject brine is a nightmare to dispose of in terms of
impacts on the marine ecosystem and on human beneficial uses of that domain. Usually,
the brine is released to the marine environment through a conduit called the outfall.
1.2 Marine Disposal of Wastewater

1.2.1 The Idea of the Outfall
Since shortly before the start of the twentieth century, certain of the world’s coastal cities
and towns have installed pipes to carry their sewage out to sea. Honolulu’s first major
outfall was built in 1927, as detailed in Parker (1997). This 1,219-mm-diam. cast iron
pipeline terminates in an upright open 45° elbow in 18 m of water, and I have dived on
this facility many times as it forms a border on my offshore research area. Although not
used on a regular basis since 1949, this pipe still passes flow and has acted through the
years as a successful occasional release for runoff from very large rainfall amounts.
In general terms, a marine outfall is a conduit for transporting storm runoff,
sewage, or industrial wastewater from its source on land out to an undersea disposal
point off exposed coasts or in protected bays and oceanic straits. We shall extend the
word “marine” to include large lakes and big rivers. Although some outfalls are tun-
nels, most involve pipelines laid in, on, or well beneath the seabed.
A storm outfall usually delivers flow out its end, whereas any modern non-storm
outfall consists of an inshore trunk followed by an extended diffuser that releases
the flow into the receiving water at discrete points along its length. Unburied outfall
diffusers generally have wall ports while buried diffusers are fitted with risers that
permit effluent outflow above the level of possible obstructions. The stipulations of
regulatory authorities drive the lengths as well as the number and size of openings in
diffusers plus the water depth in which they are placed. Although the diffuser itself
is at the end of the outfall, its general specification usually begins the outfall design
process profiled in Chapter 2.
My first book on outfalls (Grace 1978) discussed somewhat over 100 such con-
duits installed into 1977. The main characteristics of 50 of these worldwide systems
were presented in a major table, and the names and nominal construction dates
(only) from that complete array are given herein in Table 1-1.
Table 1-1. Outfall Identification in Grace (1978)

No. Date Name/Location
1 1939 Mornington, Victoria, Australia
2 1942 Deal, New Jersey, U.S.
3 1942 Glenelg, South Australia, Australia
4 1946 Ashbridge’s Bay, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
5 1947 Whites Point No. 2, southern California, U.S.
6 1948 Hyperion No. 6, southern California, U.S.
7 1949 Sand Island No. 1, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.
8 1949 Watsonville No. 1, California, U.S.
9 1953 Orange County No. 1, California, U.S.
10 1955 Palm Beach, Florida, U.S.
11 1957 Hyperion Sludge, California, U.S.
12 1959 Hyperion No. 7, southern California, U.S.
13 1959 Pittsburg, Suisun Bay, California, U.S.
14 1959 Port Lincoln, South Australia, Australia
15 1960 Swanbourne, Western Australia, Australia
16 1960 Watsonville No. 2, California, U.S.
17 1961 Sandy Bay, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia
18 1962 Point Loma, San Diego, California, U.S.
19 1963 International Paper, Gardiner, Oregon, U.S.
20 1963 North Miami Beach, Florida, U.S.
21 1964 Whites Point No. 4, southern California, U.S.
22 1964 Woodman Point, Fremantle, Western Australia, Australia
23 1964 Portsmouth, New Hampshire, U.S.
24 1965 West Point, Seattle, Washington, U.S.
25 1965 Gisborne, New Zealand
26 1968 Hollywood, Florida, U.S.
27 1968 Hastings, English Channel, U.K.
28 1969 San Mateo Bridge, San Francisco Bay, California, U.S.
29 1969 Ingoldmells, Lincolnshire, U.K.
30 1969 Nelson, New Zealand
31 1969 Straight Point, South Devon, U.K.
32 1970 Macauley Point, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada
33 1970 Rochester, New York, U.S.
34 1970 Prince Rupert, British Columbia, Canada
(continued)
Table 1-1. Outfall Identification in Grace (1978) (Continued)

No. Date Name/Location
35 1970 Orange County No. 2, California, U.S.
36 1970 Lions Gate STP, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
37 1970 Baglan Bay, South Wales, U.K.
38 1971 Port Fairy, Victoria, Australia
39 1972 Monmouth County, New Jersey, U.S.
40 1973 Five Finger Island, British Columbia, Canada
41 1973 Nassau County, Long Island, New York, U.S.
42 1973 Cannes, France
43 1974 Powell River, British Columbia, Canada
44 1974 Sand Island No. 2, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.
45 1975 Harmac, Nanaimo, British Columbia, Canada
46 1975 Ipanema Beach, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
47 1976 Mokapu, Kailua, Hawaii, U.S.
48 1976 Santa Barbara, California, U.S.
49 1976 Honouliuli, Oahu, Hawaii, U.S.
50 1977 Waitara, New Zealand
Source: Grace 1978.
Since 1977, at least 500 additional major wastewater outfalls have been extended
into marine waters. These have been built from Nome, Alaska, in the United States,
south to Burnie, Tasmania, Australia, from Spaniard’s Bay in Newfoundland, Canada,
down to Tomé, Chile, and from Reykjavik, Iceland, to Cape Town, South Africa.
Every continent has been involved, even Antarctica. Four hundred of these more
recent installations are detailed in Appendix A of this volume, specifically Table A-1,
with numbering carrying on from the 1978 scheme of Table 1-1. The geographical
breakdown of the 400 conduits is presented in Table 1-2. Roughly ten percent of
the Table A-1 outfalls are strictly industrial. Hopefully, the industrial contributions
to the other municipal effluents have been subjected to stringent source control, i.e.,
thorough pretreatment, before entry into the town, city, or district system. Through-
out this book we will assume that this is so.
1.2.2 The Role of the Outfall

The steady history of new outfall construction, depicted in Table A-1, would have
one thinking that by no means is the marine wastewater outfall going the way of
the giant auk. However, sincere stewards of this earth have two strong objections
to such a conduit (e.g., Koop and Hutchings 1996; Champion 2002). In formal
terms, an outfall: (1) wastes a resource that could and should be recycled; (2) has
Table 1-2. Overall Locations of the 400 Table A-1 World Outfalls
Region Percent of Total
United Kingdom 33.0
Continental Europe 11.5
Asia (including Turkey) 9.0
Australasia 7.0
South Africa 2.3
Caribbean and Mexico 3.2
South America 3.5
U.S. East Coast 4.2
U.S. West Coast 9.3
Alaska 5.8
Canada 5.2
Pacific Islands 2.2
Other 3.8
Total 100.0
an outflow that adversely affects the marine ecosystem and impacts human uses
of that environment. Put succinctly in an early 2008 letter from an environmental
organization to a state government official: “This antiquated idea of ‘ocean outfall’
is a remnant of a time long ago, when water was cheap and plentiful and the oceans
were viewed as an inexhaustible dumping ground for pollutants.” There are abso-
lutely elements of truth in these concerns, and before we commit to an outfall, we
must address these matters.
We start by noting that a plan for a long sea outfall was taking shape at Herne
Bay, North Kent, in the United Kingdom. The idea was dropped, however, after a
serious shortage of drinking water in 1989 and 1990 (Peacock and Setterfield 1999).
As a result, secondary wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) effluent was pumped
5 km inland by pipeline to the River Upper Stour, with further processing then done
naturally as the picturesque waterway and its derivatives flowed gently toward the
coast. The possibility of reusing ones own treated sewage, after passage down a river,
is unusual. Normally, the withdrawals of downstream communities contain the out-
put from other upstream places, somewhat purified by time and space.
1.3 Wastewater Reuse

1.3.1 Direct Use of Wastewater
River withdrawals may involve indirect reuse of wastewater carefully done (e.g., Jame-
son et al. 2008). There is also direct reuse of wastewater (e.g., Murrer and Macbeth
2005; “Green” 2006; Kosowatz 2006; Turney 2008). This practice, subject to strict reg-
ulations, can be separated into:
1. urban reuse (e.g., the irrigation of public parks, school grounds, highway medi-
ans, and golf courses);
2. agricultural reuse (usually irrigation for non-food crops, but in the limit for food
crops if high equality);
3. recreational impoundments (e.g., ponds or lakes);
4. environmental (habitat) reuse (e.g., the creation of artificial wetlands or enhance-
ment of natural ones); and
5. industrial reuse (e.g., process or makeup water).
The Hawaiian island of Oahu has its Honouliuli WWTP that on average receives
1.2 m3/sec of raw sewage, with one-third of this flow then treated and reclaimed.
There are two specifications of high-quality recycled water, the basic R-1 grade being
used for landscape, agriculture, and the bulk for watering five area golf courses. As
a matter of interest, the nominal flow to an 18-hole Hawaii golf course is about
4000 m3/day. Because of the nitrogen and phosphorus compounds in the R-1
water, there has been a reduction in the purchase of commercial fertilizers for the
links. The higher grade of recycled wastewater is reverse osmosis (RO) water. In its
demineralized state, it is used for boiler feed water and ultra-pure process water. The
industrial facilities concerned include two power plants and a pair of oil refineries.
It is pertinent to note that Oahu as a whole is not an arid location.
1.3.2 Conserving Water

Israel is 60% desert, in the south, and the Israelis are perhaps the world champions
of wastewater reclamation. One distinct 220 km2 area, the Dan Region, includes Tel
Aviv-Jaffa and seven other municipalities, with a population of 2.1 million people.
Ninety percent of the wastewater processed is of domestic origin, with the remain-
der from industry. In the year 2000, 120 million m3 of wastewater were treated at
the centralized WWTP, of which the major part was recharged into the groundwater
aquifer. There are two benefits here: first, the water receives additional purification as
its percolates down through the soil; second, the aquifer serves as an underground
reservoir, preventing loss by evaporation.
Also in 2000, about 115 million m3 of combined effluent and groundwater were
piped for agricultural irrigation to the Southern Desert and the western part of the
Negev Desert. One would think that with this system of reuse, the Dan Region would
have no need for a municipal outfall into the Mediterranean. But oddly there is one,
but not for wastewater. The pipe, No. 97 in Table A-1, carries sludge beyond what
can be applied to marginal land as a soil conditioner. Despite the success that the
Israelis have had with wastewater recycling, the need for sea water desalination there
is surfacing (“Parched” 2002; Sandler 2002, 2008).
The Orange County Sanitation District, in California, spent virtually half a
billion US dollars but avoided the construction of a third area outfall by: building an
advanced wastewater treatment facility; installing a major transfer pipeline to existing
groundwater recharge basins; and installing pipelines and expanding an existing set
of injection wells used to prevent seawater intrusion (Chalmers and Everest 2002).
The amount of wastewater involved is enormous, up to 265,000 m3/day. On the hori-
zon is drinking water derived from the Orange County aquifers replenished by highly
treated wastewater effluent (Archibold 2007; Weikel 2008). But public resistance and
political negativity remain as stumbling blocks to the idea. Unfortunately, it doesn’t
do much good to reclaim a lot of wastewater for ultimate drinking when no one’s
going to put a glass of it to his or her lips.
1.3.3 Two Ends of the California Spectrum

The city of Arcata, only a few km northeast of the pair of pulp mills discussed
later in section 1.4.3, is located at the north end of Humboldt Bay in coastal
northern California, usually a place of abundant water. In 1983, Arcata (popu-
lation 16,500) received authority to use its wastewater in the Arcata Marsh and
Wildlife Refuge (later Sanctuary) that it had created in mid-1981. The integrated
system was completed in 1986, the same year that the size of the sanctuary was
expanded from 30 to 62 ha. Nominal primary-treated inflow to it is roughly 9,000
m3/day, small but certainly not negligible. Note should be made of the fact that an
area of considerable extent is required for even a small sewage flow. The wetland
has proved to be highly effective from a wastewater treatment point of view. In
addition, it is an attractive setting, and citizens flock to its walkways. The marsh
also seasonally attracts thousands of migrating waterfowl. There are few things
in nature as compelling as a sky full of thousands of trumpeting Canada geese in
their distinctive traveling “vees.”
Whereas the Arcata sewage flow could be accommodated by its wetland, it was
another story at San Jose. In the 1980s officials began to realize that the magnitude
of that city’s wastewater outflow, directly into south San Francisco Bay, was over-
whelming the local salt marsh. The water was becoming brackish; the plant species
were changing; the habitat for two endangered animal species was being altered. A
1989 order by the California State Water Resources Control Board proposed limiting
the summer amount of treated wastewater released to the bay to 450,000 m3/day,
well below the design capacity of the WWTP (630,000 m3/day). Officials had to find
a place for the residual.
And they did so, with much effort and some enticements. The first phase was
completed in 1998 at a cost of US$140 million. This effort involved: 170 km of
pipeline; three reservoirs with a combined capacity of 36,000 m3, and four pump
stations with a total capacity of approximately 200,000 m3/day. Roughly two-thirds
of the recycled water is used for irrigation by over 550 landscape customers—dozens
of parks and schools, a stadium, and a golf course. The remaining third is used for
manufacturing by industrial customers, in cooling towers, and in power plants. Dur-
ing the summer, approximately one-sixth of all incoming sewage flow to the plant is
used again. It must be clearly understood that it is unlikely that a municipality could
ever, within its own boundaries, identify enough users and sufficient volume to fully
account for even a quarter of the water produced in all seasons.
1.3.4 Problems with Wastewater Reuse: Actual and Perceived

I have covered elsewhere (Grace 2001d) the history of the Monterey Bay outfall oper-
ated by the Monterey Regional Water Pollution Control Agency (MRWPCA). In the
early 1990s, agency officials resolved to seasonally reclaim the discharge to the out-
fall and direct the resulting tertiary-treated flow for two purposes in the vicinity of
the community of Salinas. The US$75 million project was called the Salinas Valley
Reclamation Project. One use for the processed wastewater would be for injection
into the ground, to prevent salt water intrusion. The other application would be for
direct reuse for (uncooked) food crops such as lettuce plus potentially cooked crops
such as spinach, cauliflower, and broccoli. Since the growing season does not last
the whole year, there would be unused water that would still have to be disposed of
through the ocean pipeline during the “off season.”
The tertiary treatment facility has been in operation since 1998, and through
April 2008 had produced 136 million m3 of recycled water. The yearly dates of plant
startup and shutdown vary somewhat, depending upon the timing and strength of
local rainfall and on the demands of the farmers. Here are the beginning and ending
dates for three recent years: 2005 (April 19, early November); 2006 (mid-April, mid-
November); 2007 (January, end of October). During peak irrigation months (May
through August), virtually all of the WWTP secondary effluent is converted to tertiary
water—for purely agricultural application. It should be made clear that more and
more irrigation water does not necessarily mean higher and higher crop yield. While
this is true to a point, after reaching a maximum production the yield “crashes.” For
example, wheat will not grow in a marsh. Perhaps more to the point, in this day of
global warming, is the fact that wheat won’t grow in a desert.
The MRWPCA frequently subjects its tertiary effluent to a battery of tests, and
always judges its reclaimed water satisfactory for its expressed use. This conclusion is
probably entirely valid, but what about the September 2006 case of E. coli O157:H7
food contamination, traced to the Salinas Valley, that made hundreds of people ill
and resulted in deaths?
E. coli O157:H7 is one of hundreds of strains of the bacterium Escherichia coli.
Although most strains are harmless and live in the intestines of healthy humans and
animals, this strain produces a powerful toxin and can cause severe illness if ingested
by humans via various pathways. Symptoms include severe bloody diarrhea and
abdominal cramps. In some cases, particularly for surviving small children and the
elderly, an E. coli O157:H7 infection can also cause a complication called hemolytic
uremic syndrome (HUS) that attacks the kidneys.
At any rate, the unfortunate E. coli O157:H7 incident cast a pall over the agency’s
activities and doubts in the minds of the public concerning Valley irrigation prac-
tices. There will certainly not be public acceptance of the direct wastewater applica-
tion idea if people are afflicted with a sickness that can be even remotely tied back
to the reclaimed irrigation water. Furthermore, let us say that an outbreak of sewage-
related illness leads to the suspension of use of reclaimed water for crop irrigation.
Where is that wastewater going to be directed? There had better be a standby outfall
ready to go, that is not collapsed or filled up with sediment and hence unusable.
1.4 Releasing Wastewater to the Marine Environment

1.4.1 Relevant Personal Experiences
Some people suffer an involuntary shudder when they hear the word “outfall”
because their experience with such outlets in the past has been decidedly nega-
tive. It is no secret that many such pipes have gushed raw sewage into intertidal or
nearshore waters, giving the whole idea of marine wastewater disposal a bad name
and making the outfall a much maligned structure (Pearce 1981). Even as I write,
absolutely unacceptable outfall disposal practices continue. The effluents of certain
Alaska seafood processors are in this category.
Until the end of 1976, raw sewage from Honolulu poured into the ocean just
6.4 km west of Waikiki, Hawaii’s tourist mecca. This disgusting flow into 12 m of water
was usually of no consequence for the thousands of tourists and local people using the
beaches because the trade winds, which historically blow 73% of the time, moved the
effluent to the southwest, away from the land. But this was not always the case.
On August 16, 1976, three of us working on a wave-related undersea research
project took our boat out to almost exactly the same depth as the outflow mentioned
above, entering the environment 2.3 km to our west. When we arrived at the site, the
water was as clear and blue as I had ever seen it. Life was good. When we resurfaced
after setting up our experiment we found that a south breeze had come up, and over
the next hour this freshened and veered to the west. It wasn’t long before the smell
of sewage-laden seawater came to us on that breeze, and within a couple of hours
the effluent was upon us. The smell was now very strong on the boat, and when I
dived down through the bits of fecal matter, shreds of toilet paper and, as I imag-
ined, hosts of pathogenic microorganisms, I could still strongly smell (or perhaps
taste) the sewage.
We couldn’t just raise anchor and go home when the effluent arrived. We had set
up an experiment we wanted to run (one has to take advantage of field data when
available) and at the least we were essentially forced to go down to collect the vari-
ous bits of gear and the cables. I said some rather unkind things that day, both in
and out of the water, about the lunacy of sending raw sewage effluents out into shal-
low nearshore waters. I meant those strongly worded statements then, and repeated
them, although softened because of the company, when in early 1989 my family and
I visited New Zealand’s Cook Strait shoreline at the site of Wellington’s absolutely
disgusting old Moa Point discharge.
It was awful: pipe terminating at the shoreline; large volumes of bubbling raw
sewage; immediate Cook Strait seawater stained dark brown; a loud flock of wheel-
ing seagulls; an absolutely penetrating smell. The fundamental, obvious lessons
from such a revolting spectacle are these: (1) provide treatment for the effluent; and
(2) have the discharge conduit extend well offshore. Wellington went ahead with
these two steps (Harding 1991; Karolski 1999). The two papers of Landers (2002a, b)
talk of similar situations.
By late 1989, after a professional visit to Bombay, I had amended my position
that raw effluents should never be allowed to pass, unadulterated, into the marine
environment. In Mumbai I witnessed the disgusting situation of countless bobbing

unmentionables in the foul nearshore waters off Worli and Bandra as well as the
absolutely overpowering stench. Getting the filth a kilometer or two “out of town”
by outfall would have benefited the shoreline and hundreds of local squatters a great
deal. At that time, the World Bank could not see it that way, insisting on treatment
for the effluent as a first step.
1.4.2 The Official Position

Developed nations, or groups of such countries, have regulations related to the
marine disposal of wastewaters. In U.S. waters, sewage must be treated to at least a
secondary (i.e., biological) level before release. Blanket requirements like this do not
take account of the nature of the local waters (e.g., semi-enclosed, sensitive, highly
dispersive) and do not consider the release point (e.g., distance offshore, water
depth, water column stratification). There are indeed legitimate tradeoffs among
treatment levels, diffuser positions, and biota/uses/energy of the local waters (Smith
1992; Price et al. 1993; Frith and Staples 1995). In the United States, a so-called
301(h) waiver allows some out-of-the-ordinary and perhaps remote releases to fall
short of this requirement (e.g., in Alaska and Maine), but environmentalists and the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are making every effort to eliminate
these, especially in California and Hawaii (Arora et al. 1991; Loehr and Brooks 1995;
Fortner 1995a; Brennan 2001; Brannon 2007; Landers 2008b). A particularly sensi-
tive look at the Hawaii situation is rendered by Abe (2007).
Many individuals and organizations have doggedly lobbied for secondary treat-
ment or more, seemingly without fully considering the enormous capital and recur-
ring costs, or the mechanical complexity (“Alaska” 1984), heavy energy consumption,
substantial greenhouse gas emission, or sludge disposal problems. In fact, some envi-
ronmental groups on occassion seem to have lost sight of the fact that there are air
and land environments in this world, not just water. The interested reader should
consult (and linger over): Ling (1972); Garber (1977, 1998); Clough (1983); Steiger
et al. (1984); Miele (1985); “L.A.” (1986, 1988); Nichols (1987); Sun (1989); Wah-
beh et al. (1993); Stiefel (1994); Garber and Gunnerson (1995). The largely forgot-
ten concept of the “Schaumburg curve” in Alexander (1976) is particularly worthy of
study. This idea demonstrates the fallacy in believing that further increasing the level
of conventional sewage treatment at one location is automatically better for the total
world environment of air, land, and water.
Some highly regarded professionals in the wastewater treatment and disposal
field have for years argued vigorously that an outfall discharge properly sited on
an open coast does not need to have secondary treatment. The thinking is that
much cheaper advanced primary treatment, such as chemically-enhanced primary
treatment (CEPT), with its removal efficiencies rivaling those of secondary, would
be sufficient to prevent adverse impacts on marine ecosystems and public health
(Harleman 1990; Odegaard 1992; Chack et al. 1994; Karlsson and Morrissey 1994;
Shao et al. 1996; Harleman et al. 1997; Harleman and Murcott 1999). The immense
smoggy urban area of Hong Kong, at one time on another track, has since bought
into the CEPT idea. The extensive pro/con discussion in Water21 of the International
Water Association, June 2001, pp. 45–59, is particularly relevant.
In Honolulu, from roughly 1990 to 1995, we had a very controversial US$9
million field and desk study carried out to assess the need for secondary treatment
at the city’s two WWTPs. The physical ocean work and data analysis were done by
teams with no prior local experience, who made no effort to ferret out relevant exist-
ing knowledge. Only sets of Eulerian (fixed-site) current stations were used, and few
of them, widely spaced. The conclusions on negative effluent effects drawn by the
researchers have no basis in fact as I have tried to express in exasperated print (Grace
2000, 2001a, 2001b). But the EPA has the “last laugh.”
As this book was approaching the page proof stage, on January 6, 2009, the EPA
turned down Honolulu’s request for an extension of its 301(h) waiver. Estimated
project capital costs for the upgraded Sand Island No. 2 and Honouliuli facilities total
US$1.2 billion, at a time of national economic “crunch.” It is curious that the non-pro-
cessed portion of the extra sludge may ultimately head across the sea to Washington
State with the rest of Honolulu’s solid waste. Oahu’s only landfill is almost full.
There are some gross inconsistencies in the treatment given to effluents in the
same part of the world. The turbulent waterway and salmon highway known as the
Strait of Juan de Fuca, between the south end of Vancouver Island (British Colum-
bia, Canada) and the Olympic Peninsula (Washington state, United States), is one
such location. Flow to Victoria’s two major outfalls is merely milliscreened (“Victo-
ria” 1992; Chapman 2006), a process described by Laughlin and Roming (1993),
whereas to the south such is emphatically not the case (King 1991; Farnsworth 1993).
The city of Port Angeles was required to spend US$31 million on a secondary treat-
ment plant. The city of Sequim not only had to institute advanced wastewater treat-
ment but also was forced to extend its outfall in late 1997. Port Townsend shelled
out US$10 million. Although the sea waters directly off the Olympic Peninsula are
probably close to natural, there has not been any great indication of a pollution
disaster 30 km to the north off Victoria—where a strict source control program is in
place and where comprehensive water surface and seafloor monitoring continue.
1.4.3 Wastewater Effluents and the Ocean

In coastal northern California, two pulp mills operated for many years on what is
known as the North Spit bounding Humboldt Bay on the west. Each enterprise dis-
posed of its heated and discolored wastewater through its own ocean outfall. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Justice com-
bined with the Surfrider Foundation to file suit against both mills (“Surfers...” 1991,
1992; Livermore 1993). This legal action was eventually settled by means of a consent
decree (originally in July 1991, modified in July 1992) that levied US$2.9 million
fines and stipulated that the mills should upgrade their treatment practices as well
as improve and lengthen their outfalls, both multi-million-dollar propositions. The
new, milder outflows would be well outside the pair of surf breaks. One of the two
mills immediately closed its doors permanently, ending the livelihood of many local
people but at least freeing up local Mad River water for other uses—one extraordinary
proposal being export by towed bladder (1,000 km) to extreme southern California.
The other mill, employing 170 citizens, carried out significant in-plant changes (Young
1993) plus extended and upgraded its discharge pipe in an expensive operation racked
with problems (Grace 2005). The genesis for many outfalls or outfall extensions has
authorities compelling a municipal wastewater department or an industrial concern
to install such a conduit.
Those who frequently use the water, such as surfers (Fig. 1-1), are totally opposed
to the notion of releasing sewage or an industrial effluent into the marine envi-
ronment. They will fight hard to maintain a “clean ocean,” and have acquired the
“clout” to get their way. The sea is an extraordinary resource in so many ways, with
so-called “beneficial uses” that include: shellfishing, commercial, recreational, and
subsistence fishing; harvesting of plants; collecting marine organisms; water-contact
and immersion recreational activities; marine research and education; aesthetics;
protected areas; shipping; boating; military activities; and industrial uses. Ideally,
wastewater disposal in the marine environment should infringe as little as possible
on these activities, and cause minimal disruption to natural marine ecosystems
In terms of beneficial uses, two considerations predominate: the possible wide-
spread effects of the actual effluent, which is stressed by regulatory authorities in, say,
the selection of outstanding (“Blue Flag”) beaches; and the direct physical presence
locally of the pipe and its appurtenances. In the second regard, winter storm wave
Figure 1-1. Surfer “dropping in” on Hawaii swell.

removal of beach sand at San Francisco, California, has bared rock, concrete, and
jagged sheet piling associated with the Southwest Ocean Outfall (No. 163 in Table
A-1). Real concern has been expressed over the danger this poses to those using the
local beach, whether items are exposed beneath the water surface beyond the beach,
and if sand transport in the area is being affected.
It needs to be stated, however, that many of the present world outfalls are prop-
erly engineered, ably constructed, and carefully operated facilities. They work in
conjunction with a WWTP whose outflow is of a quality deemed by most to be suit-
able for disposal. Except possibly for the immediate outflow area, human uses of
the overall receiving water are not adversely compromised by pathogens in the dis-
charge, and native marine creatures can flourish (e.g., Echavarri-Erasun et al. 2007).
1.5 Multiple Uses of the Marine Environment

1.5.1 Surfers and Effluents
It was a glorious early weekday morning during the winter of 1966–67, and I was in
the middle of the north Pacific Ocean at Makaha, Oahu, Hawaii, to participate in the
“sport of kings.” I paddled out into a perfect medium swell, and when I reached the
surf break there was only one other person out there. It didn’t take me long to realize
that this was the “king” of Makaha, surfing champion and waterman legend Buffalo
Keaulana. As each set moved through, I waited for Buffalo to pick his wave, and then
I “dropped in” on whatever was left. After perhaps an hour of this stimulating and
orderly activity, a “long wall” approached, and Buffalo looked over at me and gave a
little nod. We dropped in together on that wave, the kamaaina and the malihini. It
was the supreme surfing experience of my life; I’d proved myself as a wave rider and
a gentleman. The “human respect” element is so often absent from surfing lineups,
especially when one is “scratching for waves” or if the break is “kindly” reserved for
“locals,” with enforcement.
Any board rider wants the water to be as clean and transparent as it was when
the Hawaiians first landed in these islands circa 500 A.D. (Nordyke 1989). But we
are living roughly 1,500 years later. My surfboard wasn’t fashioned from a local log,
and only the “stringer” in my “semi-gun” was made of wood. It had in it products
of the advanced industrial age, resin, fiberglass, foam. The skeg was made of plastic.
The manufacture of those materials exacts its toll on the world’s basic resources and
on the cleanliness of the water, air, and land environments that receive the waste
products of that processing. If we are going to have modern surfboards, we can’t
expect the whole of this earth, land and water, to be in as fine a state as it was when
Buffalo’s forebears reached these shores.
My surfing experience would have been far less enjoyable if sewage and/or
industrial wastewater was bubbling to the sea surface in our area. On that occasion
at Makaha, the nearest (treated) sewage release was 3.4 km away to the southeast, in
4 fathoms (7.3 m) of water. Although this small outflow of the original Waianae out-
fall may have disturbed the water and seabed in the immediate vicinity, it is doubtful
that its effects were widespread.
It is possible for wastewater assimilation to co-exist with other beneficial uses

of the marine environment. The 1985 extension of the Waianae outfall (No. 153 in
Table A-1) brought the upstream end of the diffuser to the northwest corner of an
approved “Fish Haven” off Maili, Oahu. This is a rectangular region, trending north-
south, that is clearly shown on NOAA Chart No. 19361. The width is roughly 380 m,
and the (north-south) length is approximately 1450 m. The 10-fathom (18.3 m)
contour hugs the eastern edge of the zone, and the 20-fathom (36.6 m) contour
intrudes briefly into the zone along the western edge. Directly on the western bound-
ary, in the southern part of the area, is the scuttled ship Mahi—located 1.2 km south
of the (new) Waianae outfall diffuser. I have dived on this “wreck” and am not aware
of any great complaints from local people or visitors regarding impairment of the
diving experience by the effluent.
The nautical chart displays a depth of 17 fathoms (31.1 m) towards the center
of the new diffuser. Directly west of this location is a large designated rectangular
area of unexploded military ordnance. This zone covers water depths of from 25 to
80 fathoms (45.7 to 146.3 m).
1.5.2 The Idea of “Corners”

Throughout history, we humans have disturbed the natural landscape with our
walls, fortifications, dwellings, places of worship, roads, and ports. In this modern
world the alteration to the natural terrain is enormous. Great highways crisscross
to and fro, substantial tracts of land have been paved over for shopping malls, high
buildings cluster in city centers, and thousands of dwellings dot the landscape. A
web of pipes and cables lurks under its surface. We perhaps grudgingly accept these
man-made changes to earth’s solid surface as “part of life.” After all, we have to live
somewhere, and we may on occasion need to travel, at the least to the grocery store.
We require water for the dishwasher.
I love the water as much as anyone, but regretfully, in this modern world, I
believe that we must adjust to setting aside certain “corners” of the shallow ocean for
wastewater assimilation. We cannot have all the “perks” of this modern age and not
pay some modest environmental price. Why would we assume that the natural sea
can completely escape the types of changes that have taken place on land?
In such “mixing zones” the water quality will be somewhat degraded chemi-
cally, the mix of phytoplankton and zooplankton may be altered, the immediate
seabed itself may lack certain species (e.g., eelgrass or kelp) and/or display changes
in diversity. This may well be due to the fact that sewage is essentially fresh water, not
necessarily because of the accompanying nutrients or “bugs.” After all, corals don’t
thrive near natural fresh water “seeps” (e.g., Hodgson 1999).
Honolulu’s two current outfalls (Nos. 44 and 49 in Table 1-1) are cases in point,
whatever the expressed views of the EPA. Both carry primary-plus effluent; both
have long diffusers; both discharge into 60-m-plus water depths. Good enough!
The Sand Island No. 2 and the Honouliuli diffusers are hardly located so that their
well-mixed outflow, on the occasion when it rises to the sea surface, would affect
anyone’s enjoyment on a surfboard. Even the hardy souls who surf Cortez Bank,
170 km west of San Diego, do not have 60 m of water directly under them (Casey
2008). The rock-covered portions of the outfall trunks, loaded with reef fish and fur-
ther inshore, are certainly eminently divable. Even adjacent to wastewater releases
there are beautiful places.
1.6 Taking Individual Outfalls Out of Service

1.6.1 The Idea of Injection Wells
The isolated city of Key West is separated from the Florida (U.S.) mainland by
roughly 200 km of parallel highway and freshwater pipeline. The city’s outfall was
built in 1954, and it ended in a water depth of 10 m. A secondary treatment facility
was installed in 1989. In time, the pipe developed a break in about 6 m of water,
some 1,000 m from the shoreline. There was the strong belief that nutrients in the
outflow were adversely affecting the local coral resources, notably leading to their
smothering by macroalgae. One might argue that had Key West striven to maintain
its outfall in good working order, the perceived environmental blight might have
been much less.
At any rate, the decision was reached that the effluent, upgraded to tertiary at
considerable expense, would instead be directed to two deep (900-m) injection wells
each with a capacity of 0.7 m3/sec and costing roughly US$5 million. The outfall
would be retained only as an emergency backup conduit, and then only for a limited
number of years. Funding was a combination of a local sewer rate increase, bond
debt, and special hurricane damage monies from the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA). After the first Key West injection well was built, the second
one was added in August, 2006.
The Key West facility is not alone. On the south Florida mainland, the Miami-
Dade South WWTP makes use of eight wells, 950 m deep, collectively receiving
2.2 m3/sec of treated wastewater (Jones 1991).
1.6.2 Orientation
North of the Miami–Dade South WWTP referred to above, there is a set of six major
outfalls, each of which extends east out into the Atlantic Ocean to essentially the
shelf break, searching for filaments of the Gulf Stream to carry the effluent to the
north. Basic information on the pipes is contained in Table 1-3. Over the years,
extensive studies have been made of the pollutants in and migration of wastewater
“plumes” emanating from the six outflows. See Stewart et al. (1971), Stewart (1973),
Edmond et al. (1978), and Huang et al. (1996). Lapointe et al. (2005) have dealt
with effects of the effluents on benthic biota in the area, focusing on the macronu-
trient nitrogen. It must be noted that the biochemistry of Florida waters is far from
simple (e.g., Lenes et al. 2008).
What baffles me about the top four of these outfalls in Table 1-3 is that their
operators were never apparently compelled by the U.S. EPA to add multi-port diffus-
ers in order to distribute the outflow and hasten dilution. South Florida waters are
Table 1-3. South Florida Ocean Outfalls

Approx. Approx. Nominal Pipe Distance
North Flow Discharge Diam. Offshore
Name Latitude (m3/day) Flow Release Depth (m) (mm) (m)
Boynton– 26°28⬘ 47,000 Open end 29.0 762 1,580
Delray Beach
(City of West
Palm Beach)
Boca Raton 26°21⬘ 40,000 Open end 27.3 914 1,575
Pompano Beach 26°14⬘ 138,000 Open end 32.5 1,372 2,225
(Broward
County North
District)
City of 26°1⬘ 149,000 Open end 28.5 1,524 3,050
Hollywood
Miami–Dade 25°55⬘ 305,000 Diffuser with 29.0 2,286 3,565
North 12 ports of
District 610-mm
Miami–Dade 25°44⬘ 396,000 Diffuser with 28.2 2,286 5,730
Central 5 ports of and
District 1,219-mm 3,048
(Virginia Key)
Note: The level of treatment for all of these outfalls is secondary.
recreationally divable, with one of the “dive experiences” being the turtle-frequented
“Boca Trench” along the alignment of the second outfall in Table 1-3. I can vouch
that the waters in upper Cook Inlet, Alaska, are not divable by mere mortals, since
they are cold, loaded with glacial silt, and flowing “like the wind”. Yet, in the summer
of 1986, for US$2.5 million, a bulbous diffuser was grafted with great difficulty onto
the end of Anchorage’s Point Woronzof outfall. Had the four Florida pipes featured
distributed outflows, the story that follows might have had a different ending.
The Boynton–Delray outfall is made of 762-mm ductile iron pipe. Its marine
extent consists of a buried surfzone portion 266 m long, a buried ocean section of
length 1,318 m, and a terminal section 26 m long. The last 6.5 m of the line extends
upwards from the ocean floor at an angle of 22.5°. The outfall has had engineer
diver inspections from time to time. In my files, I have a short report on such a survey
in May 1985 where the inspectors indicated no deficiencies or problems.
Starting in about the year 2002, recreational divers with an environmental focus
surveyed the discharge site and judged that the inclined outflow from this pipe was
damaging the reef, specifically corals, and promoting growth of smothering algae.
There was strong talk about “polluters,” “partial treatment,” and “Florida’s dirty
little secret.” The truth would appear to be that dedicated public employees have
done their best to remove sewage from Floridians’ front yards, treat it even too
much relative to CEPT, and then have it pass subtly into the ocean at a location that
minimally disrupts the marine ecosystem or human beneficial uses of that environ-
ment. And this is done without running up absolutely prohibitive costs. Rather
than being crucified as “polluters,” these public servants should be applauded for
doing the best they can, at “bargain prices,” to rid overindulgent U.S. society of its
byproducts. By using the toilet, every single citizen is a polluter, and that includes
recreational divers and surfers. We are all responsible for whatever “mess” we are in,
and rather than “pointing the finger” we should get involved in putting things right
while keeping the three “receiving” media very much in mind: water, soil, and air.
The powerful 15,000-member Surfrider Foundation got involved in the Boynton–
Delray matter, and the upshot was that an official decision was reached to phase out
the ocean discharge, turn to expensive tertiary treatment, and resort to deep injection
wells for disposal. On its Web site, the Surfrider Foundation trumpeted this change
in position “Stopped Sewage Outfall at Delray Beach” as one of its “36 Coastal Vic-
tories in 2006.” The Foundation congratulated itself for the December 2006 “first
outfall ever closed in Florida.” This “triumph” brought to an end “dumping from
sewage outfall in order to protect endangered corals and reef ecosystem.” The post-
ing goes on to say “While the proposed alternative for the plant to use a deep well
injection to dispose of more highly treated waste is not ideal, it is the lesser of two
evils at this juncture.”
Surely the outfall is not being closed; the secondary effluent is to be terminated.
Will storm runoff, with its own “baggage” of roofing debris, animal droppings, oil,
twigs, dirt, and litter, still use the pipe? It would be unusual to build new stormwater
outfalls 300 to 600 m long as some U.S. East Coast communities have recently done.
Water quality organizations are keeping track and basically orchestrating which
beaches are desirable from a public health point of view and which are not (e.g.,
Dorfman and Rosselot 2008).
1.6.3 The Big Picture

It has already been stated that we certainly need to attend to all three of the air, soil,
and marine environments, and I am compelled to remark that a “coastal victory”
has to concern more than simply the beach and nearshore waters. The “gold medal”
must come without heaping extra stress on the larger land or air environments, or
it isn’t an “environmental victory.” Consider the atmosphere. As the years pass, there
are clear upward trends in annual mean carbon dioxide levels and temperature (e.g.,
Easterling et al. 1997; Kaufmann and Stern 1997). The former increased by one-sixth
from 1960 to the year 2000. Both factors mean enhancement of (essentially irrevers-
ible) global warming that in time will leave vast tracts of coral reef flat bone white
through zooxanthellae expulsion as off Fiji in early 2000. Global warming is already
leading to thinning of sea ice and causing great blocks to separate from massive
historic ice sheets (e.g., Appenzeller 2007). In early August, 2008, the 4,500-year-old
and 50 km2 Markham Ice Shelf broke completely away from Canada’s Ellesmere
Island and drifted out into the Arctic Ocean. Four months earlier, in the Antarctic, a
400 km2 chunk of the centuries-old Wilkins Ice Shelf disintegrated. That is roughly
the size of England’s Isle of Wight. We’re in trouble!
Why have we let the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increase
to a level where more than token global warming results? Consider the process of
treating sewage to a secondary level. In sanitary engineering courses, we have been
told: “Here the effluent is brought into contact with oxygen and aerobic microorgan-
isms. They break down much of the organic matter into harmless substances such
as carbon dioxide.” Harmless! While carbon dioxide is not poisonous, nor explo-
sive, it is certainly not harmless when it accumulates to elevated levels within the
atmosphere. And greenhouse gases pour out of secondary treatment plants, as well
as many other facilities—every second, every day. The idea that carbon dioxide is
“harmless” is at the root of many of our environmental difficulties.
Another problem is that our conventional benefit/cost analyses do not take into
account the intangibles (e.g., Flynn and Pratt 1993; King 1995; Isaac 1998; Farrow
and Toman 1999) such as the release of greenhouse gases from our projects. And
even if we could attach a price tag to a certain volume of carbon dioxide sent sky-
ward, how much of that amount would one attach to the particular project that
released it? Not only the process of sewage treatment creates problems, but prepa-
ration for the construction of a WWTP does likewise. Consider the need for a giant
storage tank or other facility made of reinforced concrete. It must be realized that
concrete’s fundamental constituent is cement, and 5% of global CO2 emissions orig-
inate from cement production. In fact, a “rule of thumb” is that the manufacture of
1 tonne of cement releases approximately 1 tonne of carbon dioxide into the atmo-
sphere. Simply on its own, the United States produced 8 billion tons of greenhouse
gases in 2007.
The prognosis is not good (e.g., Kerr 2007). As far as the oceans are concerned,
sea level is steadily rising (e.g., Smith 1980; Jones 1994), and we have graphic
evidence of this in the waning stages of the tumultuous year 2008. Venice won’t
be the only place where people slosh around in rubber boots and boats won’t fit
under bridges, and the problem will be lasting, not gone when the south sirocco
wind abates.
The inhabitants of Majuro and Ebeye, in the Marshall Islands (8°N 170°E),
draw together on rare bits of elevated ground and watch the risen Pacific Ocean
course through their dwellings. Is it worth “cleaning up” two Oahu sewage efflu-
ents at 21°N 158°W in the Pacific and having same-ocean cousins in the Marshall
Islands evacuated from their homes? Here in Honolulu, we already have many for-
mer inhabitants of those islands in our homeless shelters.
Ocean waters are becoming more acidic (e.g., Veron 2008), there are numerous
oxygen-depleted “dead zones” (e.g., Venkataraman 2008), and now there is another
indication of the precarious state of the world ocean, a widespread and sustained
explosion in jellyfish populations one tiny species of which is regarded by scientists
as being “eternal” (e.g., Rosenthal 2008b). This latest “stinging” development would
first appear to be in part due to overfishing, with less small fish to consume plankton
and fewer large creatures whose diet includes jellyfish. The rise in sea water tem-
perature is also a second factor. Swimming with masses of jellyfish is not fun; using
nets in waters saturated with jellyfish is a nightmare. I have endured both. But these
two observations do not constitute “the point.” The central idea is that the health
of parts of the world ocean is in question. But let’s not forget that the neighboring
atmosphere is mildly ill too, and not getting any better.
As a final matter, coastal changes should also come without imposing undue
extra stress on the already overburdened taxpayer and ratepayer, and it should not
divert funds from needed human services. We have to care for those souls who are
less fortunate than ourselves. There is so much misery in the world that doesn’t need
to be there, and not just in foreign lands with peculiar names. Within 5 km of where
each of us lives there are the homeless, the battered, the abandoned, the hungry, the
diseased. There are orphans and widows; life can be such a burden for the elderly.
Hospital and care expenses are already astronomical, and they may increase substan-
tially more should global warming promote the geographic spread (horizontally as
well as vertically) of heretofore tropical and subtropical diseases like malaria, which
will involve peoples that have not previously been exposed or developed related
immunity. I would give up a surf break or favorite dive site to wastewater assimila-
tion if substantial funds were thus freed up to properly care for the sick and needy
on a continuing basis. Perhaps a “surf shoal” (Weight 2004) or “artificial reef” (Grace
2001c) could be substituted.
1.6.4 Outfall Replacement by Injection Wells

It turns out that officials for the Boynton-Delray pipe have already declared that sew-
age will not be regularly directed to this conduit after 2008. Beyond this date, the
pipe would serve only to carry excess flows during heavy rains—if the pipe will still
physically pass flow. Boynton Beach and Delray Beach will each pay US$9 million in
2008 to build the deep well on the plant site. The extra expense to provide advanced
wastewater treatment (AWT) for the flow is unknown to me. Officials have already
stated that sewer rates will have to be “revisited.”
Experience has shown that the “out of sight, out of mind” deep injection well
is not necessarily a perfect solution. Clogging is a potential problem. Then, injected
sewage can reach underground sources of drinking water by migrating upwards
through cracks in the ground. Similarly, sewage can travel through fissures and ulti-
mately enter the marine environment at a multitude of points (Paul 1997). The
jury is out. The Federal Register (2003) talks at length about the injection of treated
wastewater into deep wells in South Florida. There are many potential problems,
and heavy costs.
At least, with an outfall, one can “see” what is going on. Just as there is discussion
of the role of the outfall today, there will be plentiful discussion by environmental
groups in the future over the unknowns and potential dangers of injection well dis-
posal, perhaps “the lesser of two evils.” The old outfall may look “pretty good!”
1.6.5 Idealistic Total Reuse

The report of Koopman et al. (2006) dealt systematically with the reuse possibilities
of present flows to the six conduits in Table 1-3. The ocean outfall-related alternatives
examined were: (1) continued use at current levels; (2) use for flows not expected
to be handled by reuse or other disposal options; (3) use as (wet weather) backups
for traditional reuse activities; (4) no use at all. In this day of hyper environmental
awareness, I could find no careful discussion of resource commitments, energy use,
or greenhouse gas emissions in the document. Indeed, I did not expect to find any.
In 2006, one U.K. panel put the cost of global warming at US$9 trillion! In our tradi-
tional benefit/cost analyses we have ignored this critical situation for much too long.
It is unfortunate that we cannot see the massive release of greenhouse gases, because
then we might take them into account in our analyses.
There was only tepid support in the Koopman et al. report for perceived marine
environmental impacts near the six pipe outflows. But these researchers strongly
supported the idea of water reuse, and they had this major conclusion: “Consider-
ing impending water shortages in Southeast Florida, continued use of ocean outfalls
and deep injection wells for effluent disposal represents an unsustainable export of
freshwater from the region.”
Hopefully this conclusion will help to steer south Florida away from switch-
ing to the deep injection well. I have seen two ambitious estimates of the amount
of reclaimed water that might be contracted for: 1-million-plus m3/day by 2025,
namely the total flow out of the six outfalls today; 4-million-plus m3/day by the
year 2028. Estimates for the infrastructure, the pumps, and the AWT would run
US$2.7 to 3.0 billion, but some sources feel that these numbers are substantially
on the low side. One source referred to the required outlay of funds as “ruinously
expensive.” Will there really be clients for all that water? Remember San Jose (sec-
tion 1.3.3) and its urban reuse factor of one-sixth! We’d better have disposal facilities
ready for the surplus!
1.7 The Marine Outfall as the Disposal Method of Choice

1.7.1 Dealing with Wastewater
I have put you, the reader, “through the wringer.” There are so many dimensions
to the reuse or disposal of wastewaters, and the decision to build or keep using an
outfall is a difficult one. Careful, non-emotional, respectful, informed deliberation
is required among wastewater agency officials, WWTP operators, concerned citizens,
commercial fishermen, environmental groups, fiscal people, and the like, to reach an
acceptable solution that is financially and environmentally responsible in the total
sense of the word. Quantity and fiscal calculations will be involved. Numbers help to
indicate what is in the realm of the doable.
This chapter concludes with two short case studies and a brief “look” at the nature
of the next chapter. The two following little “stories” present real examples where the
full range of wastewater disposal possibilities was discussed, but the “build an outfall”
decision was finally reached. Such a conduit is a perfectly valid piece of coastal infra-
structure in many cases, and not the “choice of last resort.”
1.7.2 An Example from Australia

I have already mentioned the charming coastal city of Coffs Harbour in eastern Aus-
tralia. The names of two of the local beaches, Emerald and Sapphire, tell of the bril-
liant color of the local sea. I have been in that medium on a number of occasions,
and I have jogged and played crude cricket on the lower saturated part of the wide
beaches. I have climbed the headlands, felt the wind, and admired the vistas. Walk-
ing down from one of the promontories I once saw something that I had never seen
before and have not witnessed since: a porpoise leaping over a breaking wave from
inside to outside. Coffs Harbour is a precious environment, and local residents are
proud of their home.
But disposal of its treated sewage into a local stream had to be regarded as
unacceptable in the long term. A 1982 proposal for an outfall at one headland
(Moonee) was shelved because of public opposition. But sewage will not go away,
and a 1985 proposal had secondary effluent disposed of off another headland (Wool-
goolga). Alternatives to an ocean outfall were prepared by local people. Thousands
marched in protest, and a commission of enquiry was appointed to study the situa-
tion. The commission’s 1987 report said that not all the sewage could be reused and
that an outfall was unavoidable. A new headland (Look-at-Me-Now) was suggested.
Matters were complicated, at the end of 1988, when the New South Wales govern-
ment proposed a marine national park in the area.
In 1989, a reported five thousand people rallied to oppose the outfall. The
authorities stuck to their plan. By October 1991 things had turned ugly. Police with
dogs swept in on a protest at the project site and arrested scores of citizens. Some
were jailed. Children were taken away by welfare officers. In early November the
scene was repeated. Work on the pipe ceased in December 1991 after several court
hearings. In March, 1992, the New South Wales government took action to prevent
work on the outfall. The whole turbulent affair appears to have served as the unusual
basis for a novel for older teenagers (Ridden 2000).
Several years passed and nothing perceptible was done. In March, 1996, a spe-
cial committee was formed to gently discuss the issue, and finally a plan was evolved
that was acceptable to all parties. The city’s sewage would receive tertiary treatment.
Whatever flow remained after reuse would be disposed of through an outfall at a
new location, adjacent to the city’s harbor rather than off one of the scenic head-
lands. The subsequent installation of that outfall is discussed in section 10.6.2.
1.7.3 An Example from New Zealand

Christchurch is a pleasant “English” city of 350,000 people, located on the east coast
of New Zealand’s South Island. I consider myself extremely fortunate to have twice
lived and worked in that gracious urban setting that has approximately 38 km of
open coastline somewhat removed from the city proper. Roughly 53% of the local
coastal margin is beach with dunes up to 8 m high; 38% is a rocky foreshore or cliffs.
The Avon, a small river, gently wends its way through the city from west to south. The
Heathcote River flows east through the southern edge of the metropolitan area.
In 2002, the Christchurch City Council, citing upgrades to its WWTP, applied
for a 15-year extension to continue discharging the city’s treated oxidation pond
sewage into the Avon-Heathcote estuary, in the southern part of the city, on an ebb-
ing tide. The response, that this practice could only continue until the year 2009,
spurred the city council into looking seriously at other methods. They brought in
experts. They provided ample opportunity for well more than token involvement by
the public and special interest groups such as commercial fishermen. Environmen-
tal touches such as improved salt marshes were discussed. They debated alternative
treatment schemes: satellite treatment plants; aquaculture; reclamation for drinking
water; wetlands. They mulled over various disposal scenarios such as discharge to the
braided Waimakariri River to the north, groundwater injection, land-spreading, and
the ocean outfall option.
On July 29, 2004, the Christchurch City Council gave its permission for an
ocean outfall and a non-disinfected effluent. A pipeline would run from the oxida-
tion ponds under the estuary and then extend roughly 3 km out into Pegasus Bay,
buried 3 to 4 meters through the surfzone and a minimum of 1 meter below the
lowest known seabed level.
In early September, 2006, the city council awarded the NZ$87.224 million con-
tract for the conduit and other facilities to an experienced Australasian marine con-
tractor. The ground-breaking ceremony for the tunneling phase took place early in
April, 2007, with the unveiling of the imported tunneling machine near the start
shaft in a park between the estuary and the beach dunes. The 875-m-long first tunnel
would be driven west under the estuary. Two more drives, both to the east, would
complete the 2,310-m-long land portion built of 1,800-mm-i.d. concrete pipe. The
sea portion would be 2,700 m long and made of 1,800-mm-o.d. high-density poly-
ethylene (HDPE) pipe. Floating strings of this conduit, weighted with concrete col-
lars and mostly 360 m long, would be towed to the site from a protected harbor to
the south and then sunk onto the seabed. A special “spool piece” would connect the
separate concrete and HDPE lines.
An update on this developing project is provided in section 9.1.3. When the
Christchurch project is complete, its builder will be 900 km north in Auckland, to
begin that city’s new outfall, another combination of tunnel and seabed pipeline
that was agreed upon after extraordinarily thorough considerations of other options.
“The beat goes on.”
1.7.4 The Next Step

In sections 1.7.2 and 1.7.3 we have studied how two communities resolved to build
a marine outfall, after in-depth study of the various options. I propose that the
reader position himself/herself conceptually at that point in time, with an outfall
to install. The bases for construction of such a conduit, namely the Plans and Speci-
fications, do not just happen. They are the outgrowth of coordinated predesign and
design efforts of perhaps several different oceanographic, environmental/planning,

and engineering consultants over two or more years. Chapter 2 provides this bridge
between concept and the various methods of installation that form the core of this
volume and are detailed in turn in Chapters 3 through 13.
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2
Moving toward Construction
2.1 Working in the Sea

2.1.1 The Ocean and Its Tides
A strictly terrestrial chief engineer once passed judgment on a proposed outfall I
was working on in his consulting company’s office: “It’s just a pipe in an under-
water ditch.” I have since tried, in a series of four technical papers (Grace 2005a, b;
2006; 2007) and without using strong language, to explain why a marine outfall is
a lot more than “a pipe in an underwater ditch.” It is a dreadfully difficult piece of
infrastructure to design, install, and operate. The water doesn’t just sit there. It is on
occasion in furious motion. Furthermore, it is a highly corrosive medium, it negates
stabilizing weight, and it brings over the site all manner of marine vessels dragging
things that can hook the outfall or divers working on it, probably “in the blind”
(Grace 1997, 2001; Parker 1997). These divers run many other risks as well, because
of the water, as I will explain later.
We seek, in this chapter, to set the stage for the “meat” of the book, namely the
construction of a marine outfall, shown conceptually in Fig. 2-1. We start with the
sea itself, whose gradual rise and fall is a familiar process for those who live along
its margins and are not solely polarized by “inland activity” as the filmmaker Bruce
Brown remarked in his classic surfing film The Endless Summer. The tides have a
strong bearing on what is done in nearshore waters and when. Published tide tables
exist for many principal (reference) marine centers and can be derived therefrom
for lesser locations in the vicinity. As a remote example, the Alaskan village of Ouz-
inkie derives its numbers from the busy fish and shellfish port of Kodiak, 25 km
away by water.
If one selects all the high tide levels at a particular location and averages them,
the result is mean high water (MHW). Similarly, if one includes in the data set all
29
Figure 2-1. Schematic of a pipe with descriptive terms.
the low tidal stands, the average is mean low water (MLW). Many coastal locations
see two distinct low and two distinct high tides every 24 h, 52 min. Thus, most days
see two highs and two lows. By averaging the higher high tide each day, one obtains
MHHW; by averaging the lower of the two low tides every day, one derives MLLW.
Spring tides represent the most pronounced tidal excursions in a month, and neap
tides involve the smallest.
Table 2-1 presents some basic water level information for an important U.S.
West Coast metropolitan area that we will deal with shortly, in section 2.4. NGVD
refers to National Geodetic Vertical Datum, sometimes termed “Sea Level Datum
of 1929.” We could loosely regard it as mean sea level (MSL). The Presidio in the
second column is located at the southern extremity of the Golden Gate. As a matter
of interest, the design water level for the Southwest Ocean Outfall at Ocean Beach
(last column) was set at 1.33 m above NGVD.
2.1.2 Nautical Charts and Beyond

Nothing is more significant than an actual visit to a prospective outfall site, mini-
mally above water, advisedly underwater as well. At one’s desk, the starting point is
the careful perusal of the nautical chart that covers the local land and sea areas. The
position of any point can be specified from the latitude-longitude grid. To provide a
measure of safety, the reference level for water depths shown on a chart is keyed to an
average low stand of the common tides rather than NGVD. As an example, all three of
the following (U.S.) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) charts
in my office use MLLW as the reference datum: “Kodiak and St. Paul Harbors,” Alaska
(Chart 16595); “Yaquina Bay and River,” Oregon (Chart 18581); and “Approaches to
Chesapeake Bay,” Virginia (Chart 12208).
Moving toward Construction 31
Table 2-1. Example Ocean Level Ranges at San Francisco, California (1960–1978)
Item Presidio (m) Ocean Beach (m)
Lowest LW to MLLW 0.82 0.76

MLLW to NGVD 0.93 0.90
MLW to NGVD 0.60 0.57
MLLW to MHW 1.55 1.62
MLLW to MHHW 1.74 1.83
MLLW to Highest HW 2.44 2.59
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (n.d.)
Note: NGVD is National Geodetic Vertical Datum, sometimes termed “Sea Level Datum of
1929.”
Such a rendering contains an absolute wealth of useful basic information, nota-

bly the general bathymetry and type of bottom (Wozencraft and Millar 2005), plus
the location and orientation of channels, perhaps marked by navigation aids (Fig.
2-2). But much more information is noted thereon. Of particular concern for the
outfall designer are things like wrecks, obstructions, and (importantly) military ord-
nance (“Drogden” 1996; Williams and Randall 2003).
On Chart 12208 (Virginia, above) are various U.S. Department of Defense areas
both on land and off the shoreline, and one would be immediately alert to unex-
ploded ordnance (UXO). One area of unexploded rockets is shown, along with vari-
ous obstructions and wrecks. The Dam Neck sewage outfall (No. 88 in Table A-1)
is depicted, with the following (U.S. units) notation: “Numerous diffusers, rising
4½ feet above existing bottom, are found along the last 2,400 feet of the sewer.” The
shore end of the Dam Neck pipe, owned by the Hampton Roads Sanitation District
(Kemp et al. 2002), is roughly 11 km south southeast from the 42nd Street storm
water outfall site mentioned in section 6.5.3.
During great storms, the predicted (astronomical, i.e. sun and moon) tidal levels
can be far surpassed. This “storm surge” has to be estimated by the outfall designer,
mathematically or by long-term observation, as it influences the “discharge head”
for pumping calculations, as well as the size of waves that can pass a given outfall
station (e.g., Garcia et al. 1990; Bode and Hardy 1997; Douglass and Browder 2005;
Shen et al. 2006; Fritz et al. 2007, 2008; Luther et al. 2007). Kleinosky et al. (2007)
cover the Virginia Beach area mentioned earlier.
2.2 The Bracketing of Marine Outfall Construction

2.2.1 The Design Part
During the first half of 1962, I spent a number of weekends at the seaside town of
Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, some 230 km up the coast from Virginia Beach. The
devastating extratropical Ash Wednesday Storm (March 6–8) packed up to 62-knot
local winds and lingered offshore for five complete cycles of spring tides. During this
Figure 2-2. Underwater view of channel buoy.
severe nor’easter, untold tons of sand were ripped off the beach and deposited off-
shore, the boardwalk disappeared, the dunes were flattened, beachfront homes were
destroyed, and back beach hotels were heavily damaged. On a discrete-time basis,
I watched the slow rebuilding. Beach repair costs totaled US$20 million. Losses to
public and private property ran US$70 million.
Through the years, town officials have periodically questioned the dumping
of treated wastewater into the Lewes–Rehoboth Canal but have always ended up
embracing the status quo. Now, however, the city is under court order to cease this
practice by December 2014. In 2005, a consultant issued a report that reviewed, in an
orderly way, the alternative means of disposal of that sewage: spray irrigation, rapid
infiltration beds, shallow well injection, deep well injection, and outfalls. Of these
options, city officials conceptually selected spray irrigation and outfall installation
for further study, and in April 2008 they resolved to issue requests for proposals
(RFPs) for both ideas. This action would yield concrete details on the two possibili-
ties, plus produce cost estimates to be used in making a decision.
Consider the outfall. This conduit has to be designed to properly release the
wastewater through the diffuser, plus not fill up with seawater or sediment, but these
matters constitute only a part of overall outfall design. Principally, the outfall must
be designed to do more than simply function on an average day; it has to survive,
not just any day but that one day in 10,000 when nature is attacking the shoreline
with its full, unbelievable fury. It is difficult for a civilized engineer to come to grips
with a most unruly, uncivilized design consideration, but the outfall cannot under
any circumstances end up as a fractured stub, spewing undiluted effluent into the
intertidal zone.
2.2.2 The Sometimes Forgotten Other Part

Assume the most comprehensive design, with the outfall installation a faithful rep-
resentation of sensible plans and specifications as well as a tribute to sound con-
struction practices and careful concurrent inspection. At commissioning, the proud
owner cannot simply walk away with “her head in the clouds” and leave the conduit
entirely to its own devices. She must appreciate that on its day of reckoning, some-
time in the future, the outfall must still be absolutely ready. This realization clearly
calls for technical inspections, as opposed to monitoring surveys done to appraise
the species composition and abundance of fish and shellfish along the corridor.
A program of regular (periodic, using a calm season) and irregular (post-calamity)
inspection has to be instituted, with the prompt putting right of problems large and
small. Although such inspections, using an in-house team of diving engineers or a
knowledgeable outside commercial diving enterprise, must be on the lookout for
flow irregularities (e.g., leaks or blocked ports), they must also be alert to structural
imperfections, such as removal of cover, pipe spanning, missing rock, or failed fas-
teners (Chen and Sheehan 2005). The inspection has to be full-length, and that
includes the surf zone, so often ignored because of the difficult conditions. However,
even the most tempestuous coasts have their benign times, and these intervals must
be watched for and then used immediately.
To convey the idea of being ready for a supreme environmental test, consider
the Ocean County Utilities Authority (OCUA) in New Jersey, another 200 km up
the coast from Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. This agency has three major ocean out-
falls along the “Jersey shore.” All three conduits have a basic steel pipe (diameters
1,219–1,372 mm) and concrete weight coat (CWC). In addition, all were built with
impressed current cathodic protection systems and held in place with special anchor-
age arrangements.
1. The Northern (Brick Town) conduit, completed in 1976, crosses the coast at
roughly north latitude 40°03⬘ and extends offshore to a water depth of roughly
18 m.
2. The Central (Bayville) pipeline also terminates in 18 m of water, and its instal-
lation was finished in 1979. The nominal location is at north latitude 39°54⬘.
3. The end of the Southern (Manahawkin) outfall is located at north latitude
39°38⬘ in 12 m of water. Its construction was completed in 1977.
In April 2007, a commercial diving firm, on a US$139,000 contract with OCUA,

inspected the three pipes. The company’s June 2007 report indicated problems, and
in early 2008 the OCUA released a request for proposal (RFP) seeking an experienced
firm to prepare the bidding documents for the repair of all three of the anchorage
setups, the cathodic protection systems, and the pipe itself. The US$95,000 award
for this follow-up work was made on February 28, 2008. We hope that the improve-
ments will follow in short order, rendering a facility that can withstand whatever
extreme event that nature directs its way.
2.3 The Most Crucial Marine Data

2.3.1 Dealing with the Seabed
The local marine information already available on charts and in accessible reports
will never be enough for the comprehensive design of an outfall for an exposed
coastal location. Regulatory agencies’ focus on outfall diffuser calculations of the
initial dilution and height of rise of a wastewater effluent, as well as what are known
as “mixing zones,” would have one believing that water column data (i.e., tempera-
ture, salinity, density) are the most important (e.g., King et al. 1994; Kim et al. 2001;
Roldão et al. 2001; Economopoulou et al. 2003). The present academic and corpo-
rate stress on numerical models to map effluent advection and dispersion would
indicate that data on the temporal and spatial distribution of currents is of supreme
importance (e.g., Prandle and Eldridge 1987; Elliott et al. 1995; Stacey et al. 1995;
Paduan and Shulman 2004; Kaplan et al. 2005).
It is important to stress that although these concepts and/or data sets have their
place, they are by no means as crucial to outfall success as detailed and accurate data
on the local seabed and immediate subbottom (perhaps up to 3 m below the sea-
bed). Such data should cover the entire alignment, especially the dynamic and hard-
to-survey surf zone, considered by some to nominally extend from the shoreline out
to a water depth of 12 m. This definition, in the case of San Francisco, California,
would extend out 1,200 m from shore.
Unreasonable deadlines, savage surf zone, unavailability, and a lack of prin-
ciples may lead to the issuance of a surf zone reconnaissance report that is insuf-
ficiently detailed or even a work of fiction. I am aware of two cases, both on the U.S.
west coast, where such reports were written by divers who had never even entered
the water. The predesign stage has to be long enough that a period or two of calm
weather is almost guaranteed. The responsible engineer diver(s) must be on call and
ready to enter the water, fully equipped, during such tranquil periods.
Every conceivable “unexpected” situation has confronted contractors working on
outfall alignments of supposedly known seabed and subseabed characteristics. Inad-
equate or unforeseen ground information is the primary reason for disruption, dis-
pute, and change orders in outfall construction. Underground, “unforeseen” can mean
unknown caverns and aquifers that threaten tunneling. On the seabed, “unforeseen”
can involve: undetected pockets of soft mud that must be excavated and replaced with
bedding stone; alternating zones of loose and heavily compacted gravels that can lead
to spanning problems when the softer material is eroded; limited-area outcroppings

of dense rock, necessitating unplanned chiseling and use of explosives; and offshore
reefs that must be blasted, if allowed.
A note must be added that any seabed must be examined for more than its
natural features. Is there any unexploded ordnance (UXO)? Is there an old buried
pier? Is an interred shipwreck sitting on the alignment? Are there any submarine
pipelines in the vicinity? The Fort Kamehameha No. 2 (No. 427 in Table A-1) outfall
had the first problem, and it led to significant delays; the San Antonio Creek storm
water outfall in eastern San Francisco Bay had the second. In the latter case, the situ-
ation was not discovered until construction started in 1995. There were 10 timber
pilings and a timber seawall. An additional difficulty was that a portion of the timber
pilings was concrete-encased. Ultimately, a barge load of big pieces of wood and
other debris was towed away.
The third item was a problem with the Hastings outfall (No. 27 in Table 1-1).
Encountered close inshore was a significant shipwreck. This hulk involved the
Dutch East India Company’s sailing vessel Amsterdam, which had gone aground
during a mighty storm in January of 1749 and been swallowed up by the shift-
ing sands. The fourth problem impeded the placing of the Erie outfall (No. 382
in Table A-1) in Lake Erie, where three unexpected 152-mm submarine pipelines
crossed the chosen alignment. These abandoned gas lines had to be emptied and
removed.
Perhaps the strangest impediment to intake and outflow pipelines was realized
very recently at Powlett River in Victoria, Australia, the site of a planned seawater
desalination plant of colossal size. The problem involved dinosaur bones.
2.3.2 The Open Coast

There is no substitute for long-term records of sea bottom level along the alignment
of a proposed outfall. The longitudinal envelope of all lowest levels can be used as
the imaginary line below which the whole pipe must be laid so that no part “ever”
bares. The upper envelope can be used to create that imaginary level above which
the diffuser risers must extend so that they “never” become buried. Inattention to the
latter detail has diffuser outflow in many cases, such as off the coast of Oregon, bub-
bling up through the sand like a freshwater spring (Grace 2005a). Of course, there
is absolutely no assurance that future events may not surpass those in the histori-
cal past, causing deeper erosion and larger accretion. Note that it is also important
to realize that the “cut” during a storm will always be more severe than afterwards
(when profiles are taken), after all the sand in the water column has settled out.
The beach profile shown on outfall plans may have nothing to do with the pro-
file that exists when the contractor starts work. Generally, beaches tend to build dur-
ing the summer months and recede in the stormy winter season. A big storm may
cause enormous changes, as mentioned earlier for Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. The
actual amount of beach excavation to carry out may differ markedly from that esti-
mated from the plans, with 5.5 m vertically having actually been experienced.
2.3.3 Geophysical and Related Methods

There are many highly experienced marine geophysical/geotechnical companies and
university institutes that can be hired to provide needed information on the seabed
and immediate subbottom using instruments mounted on or towed by a boat or
ship with a Global Positioning System (GPS) aboard.
1. A single or multibeam echo sounder is used to determine accurate bathymetry

to local chart datum, seabed slopes, and general bottom morphology of a pro-
spective area. This survey would be carried out along the preferred and alternate
outfall alignments. The ideal presentation would probably involve a lateral sea-
bed depiction, over the whole of the alignment, overlain transparently on a set
of water depth contours. This result has been termed an “image drape.”
2. A sidescan sonar is used to provide a plan view image of the seafloor geology,
involving locations of bedrock outcrop, boulder beds, obstructions, sinkholes,
and ripples. Such a survey also allows the operator to identify and map the loca-
tions of objects of human origin, such as pipes, wrecks, drums, cables, anchors,
and the like, that extend above the seabed.
3. Various types of subbottom profiling devices are also used to determine the
thickness and lithology (e.g., silt, sand, gravel) of the unconsolidated sediments
that overlie bedrock in the project area. A gridlike survey pattern will yield infor-
mation on the spatial variation of bedrock elevation as referenced to a particular
datum. Nominal minimum seabed penetrations might be 20 m. Geotechnical
studies should be carried out to ensure that sheet and trestle piles can generally
be driven to depth. In some materials, such as boulder clay, a large rock may
impede pile driving locally.
4. Ground truth operations are often undertaken to confirm and enhance the
interpretation of the geophysical data. As examples, there are cores, grab sam-
ples, vibracores, and rotary drilling. There is also bottom video, a field in which
enormous advances have been made to accommodate murky water conditions
and to provide extraordinary resolution. Laser line-scanning technology is inti-
mately involved. See Caimi et al. (1993), as well as Kocak and Caimi (2005).
Beyond the actual seabed, it is necessary to know the nature of the immediate
seabed and of the 10 or so meters of ground under it, using a variety of geophys-
ical and geological methods, the latter of which include sampling, jet probing,
and land-based as well as underwater boring and coring. Samples should be
tested, and desk and computer studies should be made on issues that affect
outfall stability.
5. Magnetometers can either be towed from a boat or carried by a diver. These sys-
tems are extremely sensitive to ferrous (iron and steel) metals, and they work by
sensing changes in the earth’s magnetic field. No outfall should enter the design
phase before magnetometer surveys are run on the intended alignments. Various
ferrous objects can turn up, but once again, a big worry concerns UXO.
Recent papers that bear importantly on different aspects of the above five areas are
Kocak et al. (2008), Potter (2008), and Wilson (2008).
2.3.4 Geotechnical Work

Geophysical ground information must be interpreted by a highly competent geo-
physicist and backed up by a sufficient number of in situ tests and boreholes to prove
the supposed horizons and materials. The marine boring should not be limited to
the more convenient locations, such as the beach. Some unscrupulous or nonmoni-
tored drillers have substituted beach boring data for offshore information. When
obtaining ground truth information for an outfall tunnel, the boreholes should be
drilled to the side of the centerline so that improperly grouted holes will not lead to
tunnel flooding later.
The cone penetration test (CPT) has become a standard method of assessing
seabed strength through in situ measurements. The mechanical version has been
largely replaced by standard electronic cones that have a 60° apex and are pushed
continuously at 20 mm/s. Dual-purpose rigs are available that will sit on the seabed
and carry out both CPT and “vibracore” work. Deployment is often from a jackup
rig, marine equipment detailed in Chapter 3.
2.4 Development of the Design of the Southwest Ocean Outfall

2.4.1 The San Francisco Wastewater Management Plan
Much of what issues from the faucets of the California city of San Francisco is pre-
cious mountain water from the Hetch Hetchy Reservoir, some 240 km to the east
(Landers 2006). Complacent citizens were jolted when the severe drought of early
1977 brought water rationing to their doors. San Francisco has a combined sewer
system that carries both rainfall runoff, when it occurs, as well as wastewater regu-
larly generated by homes, businesses, and industries. In the early 1970s and before,
large storm amounts would overwhelm the system and cause objectionable over-
flows into nearshore waters at 40 points along both the bay and ocean shorelines.
The San Francisco Wastewater Management Plan was developed to deal with the
wet-weather discharge problem.
Environmental reviews for any San Francisco agency, department, or commis-
sion have been conducted by the Office of Environmental Review (OER) within the
city’s Department of City Planning. Adherence is ensured to the California Environ-
mental Quality Act and the federal National Environmental Policy Act. The Water
Quality Control Plan for Ocean Waters of California (“California Ocean Plan”) is
also involved. This plan is administered by the State Water Resources Control Board
of the California Environmental Protection Agency.
The year 1974 saw the issuance of a combined environmental impact review
(EIR), under California law, and an environmental impact statement (EIS), under fed-
eral law. This report would be an umbrella document, with “element EIRs” attached
one by one to discuss each major segment of the system and its relationship to the
whole. Important components in the follow-up document would be design alterna-
tives, construction impacts, and mitigation measures. Bendix and Sahm (1978) pro-
vide details. Both of these authors, one a Ph.D. zoologist and the other an attorney,
were environmental review officers within the OER.
As part of the wastewater management plan, Case No. EE75.179 concerned the
planned Southwest Ocean Outfall (SWOO), a giant conduit that would carry much
of the city’s discharge out into the Pacific Ocean. The final EIR for this project was
certified in mid-December of 1975, and exactly a year later the City and County of
San Francisco got the ball rolling by signing a related design contract with perhaps
the top outfall engineering consultant in the world. This experienced firm would be
supported by two equally seasoned and competent principal subconsultants.
An enormous amount of field, desk, and computer work must be carried out
before an outfall’s construction, as in Fig. 2-3. Scores of meetings are involved. The
elements involved and the timing are illustrated here by considering the SWOO
(No. 163 in Table A-1). In my office, I have a 560-mm-high stack of documents deal-
ing with preconstruction matters for this outfall, and we will work our way through
this material in a sequential manner, to provide the necessary background for the
construction operation.
2.4.2 Early Work

By mid-January 1976, a renowned University of California (Berkeley) coastal engi-
neering professor and coworkers had put together a short desk study on pertinent
waves, currents, tides, tsunamis, erosion, and sedimentation. An important observa-
Figure 2-3. Layout of Seven Mile Beach outfall, with dredge working.
Source: Courtesy of Harold V. Anderson.
tion with regard to erosion and sedimentation was that the seabed would drop an
estimated 1.2–1.8 m over the intended life of the project. This important calculation
was supported by local marine data collected since 1855.
Wave hindcasts yielded a 100-year significant wave height of 13.4 m, with an
astonishing peak of 28.0 m, which would break well outside the environmentally
driven terminus of the outfall in some 24 m of water. But the surf zone on such a
day would extend from the shoreline to a water depth of something like 36 m, thou-
sands of meters of surging water.
In June 1977, the design team issued a two-volume progress report arranged as
shown in Table 2-2. June 1977 also saw the delivery of two other documents: Prelimi-
nary Report Offshore Geological Survey and Basic Data Report Onshore Boring. The latter
concerned a 153-m-deep boring that was drilled and sampled some 30 m east of the
eastern edge of the Great Highway. An outfall tunnel under the customary surf zone
was a possibility. A month later, a report was issued on 11 more onshore borings that
took the total distance drilled to 702 m.
Throughout 1977, a seismic advisory board (SAB) was at work. Dominated by the
group of senior world-renowned earthquake engineering faculty members at the Uni-
versity of California (Berkeley), the board also had representation from the three main
consultants, the City and County of San Francisco (CCSF), as well as another solo
consultant. The major reason for the convening of such a blue ribbon group was that
the outfall would have to cross the San Andreas Fault. No other outfall had ever been
required to traverse such a dynamic 120-m-wide stretch (Murphy and Lask 1983).
The SAB had four meetings, and each resulted in its own report. The issue of
seabed liquefaction during an earthquake was brought clearly into focus, necessitat-
ing substantial pipe burial and minimum burial depths.
October 1977 saw the issuance of three more reports, two of which were Geo-
logical Exploration Studies and Seismic Geologic Evaluation. The latter stressed possible
problems with the San Andreas Fault. The third document was a key one, the Basic
Data Report, with 149 figures. The structure of the document is shown in Table 2-3.
Treadwell et al. (1978) provides some details.
2.4.3 Later Work

Coastal Engineering Evaluation was issued in January 1978 and was supported with an
Addendum five months later “in response to review comments.” The table of contents
in the first document contained the following chapter headings: Significant Find-
ings; Tidal Predictions; Ocean Waves; Tsunamis; Sediments (surf zone and offshore).
There was a section of References, and then four appendices: Tsunami Observations,
Seismic Sea Wave Warning System, Wave Refraction Diagrams, and Pipe Uplift Force–
Pressure Variations (Belvedere et al. 1978; Edmiston 1978; Cross 1980).
The Preliminary Design Report appeared in May 1978. The idea at this point was
three reinforced concrete pipes (RCPs), each with inside diameter (i.d.) of 2,743 mm,
two for intermittent wet weather flows, discharging into 15 m of water, with one for
continuous dry weather flow, ending in a water depth of 24 m. Table 2-4 catches the
essence of this document.
Table 2-2 Early SWOO Design Team Report

Item Title Contents
Section 1 Introduction —
Section 2 Site Description —
Section 3 Design Criteria General (e.g., permits, navigation,
archaeological matters, environ-
mental concerns) and technical
(e.g., wastewater, civil, geotechnical,
oceanographic, structural, design
forces, operation and maintenance,
corrosion control, construction)
Section 4 Design Alternatives Onshore facilities, conduit con-
figuration, outfall placement, San
Andreas Fault zone, diffusers, and
system hydraulics
Section 5 Alternatives Evaluation —
Section 6 Conclusions and Introduction, treatment, hydraulics,
Recommendations geotechnical, conduits, outfall
headworks, surf zone construction,
deep ocean zone construction, dis-
persion and diffuser, construction
scheduling, and summary
Supplement 1 Data Bank Almost 400 documents, many with
prepared abstracts
Supplement 2 Proposed Combined 5.3 m3/s dry weather flow, and
Design Permit 43.8 m3/s (peak) wet
Supplement 3 Wastewater —
Characteristics
Supplement 4 Outfall Hydraulic —
Graphs
Supplement 5 Preliminary —
Oceanography Report
Supplement 6 Preliminary Geological —
Report
Although the ocean discharge idea was the focus, an October 1978 report laid
out and costed seven possible options (at three locations) for effluent release at the
edge of San Francisco Bay. One such “fallback position” was virtually at Fisherman’s
Wharf, the next at the western end of the Bay Bridge, and the last further south.
Final Design Report—Non-Flow Related Elements was issued in November 1978 and
included design drawings and specifications.
Table 2-3 Offshore Borings for the SWOO

Section Title Contents
Chapter A Introduction and —

Organization
Chapter B Surf Zone Geotechnical Three borings in April 1977 using
Exploration Program truck-mounted rotary drill rig set
on walking platform (Spider II);
drilled depths 46–91 m; 17 days
on site; mechanical and weather
problems. The drill string for the
127-mm-diameter boreholes was
protected from wave surge by
305-mm-diameter steel casing.
Chapter C Offshore Geotechnical 21 locations over 16 days in May
Exploration Program 1977 using a 54-m-long drill ship
(Caldrill); 10 sampled borings
(180 m), 16 vibratory corings (56 m),
16 cone penetrometer tests ranging
from roughly 1 to 6 m below the
seabed. The CPT was carried out with
a tethered, bottom-mounted rig.
Chapter D Laboratory Testing —
Program
Appendix I Spider II Operations Log —
Appendix II Caldrill Operations Log —
Appendix III Cone Penetrometer —
Operations Log
Nervousness regarding the seabed led to offshore work from mid-July through
mid-November 1978. Two large test pits were excavated, up to 8 m deep, one in
13 m of water and the other in 16 m. Remote sidescan monitoring charted the infill.
A related report appeared in January 1979, with a final monitoring issue in June
1979. A side issue here was the assurance that a derrick barge could work in project
waters (Murphy et al. 1979). The primary objective of this project involved obtain-
ing information to help the design team and prospective bidders to estimate more
accurately the quantities of required dredged and backfill materials. Additional aims
included an assessment of the capability of equipment to work on site, the examina-
tion of slope stability, and the rate of infill of the pits.
Mid-December 1979 saw the issuance of the contract documents, plans, and
specifications for the three-pipe arrangement. The plans involved 217 separate sheets.
The specifications covered the standard multitude of sections and subsections. In
February 1980, a related Preconstruction Planning Report appeared.
Table 2-4 Contents of Preliminary SWOO Design Report

Chapter Titles Details
1 Summary, Conclusions, and Introduction, onshore zone,
Recommendations offshore zone
2 Preliminary Engineering Introduction, geotechnical and
oceanographic, sanitary and
hydraulic, preparation of con-
struction contract scheduling
3 Preliminary Design Drawings —
4 Preliminary Design Specifications —
5 Preliminary Construction Cost US$188 million for complete cut
Estimates and cover; US$196 million for
tunneled inshore section with cut
and cover otherwise
Table 2-5 Potential Bidders for the SWOO

Group Contractor Prequalified No. of Companies
A Individually or to sponsor joint venture (JV) 13

B To sponsor JV 7
C As supplementary JV member 3
D As subcontractor 3
The documents mentioned above were rendered invalid and were withdrawn
when the decision was reached to divert sewage away from the SWOO location or
to store much of storm flows underground (Carr 1993). Overflow criteria were also
somewhat relaxed. The outfall now would just be a single 3,658-mm-i.d. RCP line.
New contract documents, plans (62 sheets), and specifications, and then an adden-
dum, were issued in January and February 1981. Companies were to bid on two
alternatives: Option 1 (Proposition A) would entail cut and cover work exclusively.
Option 2 (Proposition B) would have the same except for a 1,340-m-long inshore
section that would be tunneled. A special transition structure would raise the con-
duit centerline 4.8 m from tunnel to seabed pipe.
The CCSF had prequalified prospective bidders as shown in Table 2-5. The target
percentage of minority business enterprises on the project was 16.1%.
2.5 Additional Matters

The synopsis of the steps taken for SWOO left out the details of its extensive spec-
ifications. An idea concerning much simpler specifications can be gleaned from
Tables 2-6 and 2-7 that concern the older outfall at Dana Point, California, No. 58
in Table A-1. The issue date was June 1977.
With reference to Item 5 in Table 2-6, a surety bond is a three-party instrument
among a surety (e.g., financial institution), the contractor, and the project owner.
The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the terms and conditions of a
Table 2-6 Contents of Contract Documents and Specifications for Outfall No. 58
Item No. of Pages Title

1 3 Notice Inviting Bids
2 7 Instructions to Bidders
3 19 Bid Proposal
4 3 Contract Agreement
5 4 Performance and Payment Bonds
6 1 Workmen’s Compensation Certificate
7 46 Wage Rates
8 42 General Conditions (details follow)
9 52 Federal Conditions
10 105 Detailed Specifications (details follow)
11 87 Standard Specifications (details follow)
Table 2-7 Details of Three Categories in Table 2-6

Title Section Titles
General Conditions Definitions and Terms; Proposal Requirements and
Conditions; Award and Execution of Contract;
Legal Relations and Responsibilities; Scope of Work;
Prosecution and Progress of the Work; Control
of Materials; Control of Work; Protection and/or
Relocation of Utilities; Method of Payment
Detailed Specifications General Requirements; Construction; Existing Utilities;
Reinforced Concrete Pipe and Appurtenances; Cement
Mortar Lined and Coated Steel Pipe; Miscellaneous
Materials; Gravel Bedding, Quarry Stone, and Backfill;
Sampling and Metering Station; Effluent Pump Station
Modifications; Painting and Protective Coatings;
Measurement and Payment; Permits
Standard Specifications General Information; Earthwork; Paving; Concrete
and Grout; Caulking, Joints, and Sealing; Steel
and Miscellaneous Ferrous Metals; Encasement
Concrete; Tunnel, Steel Casing Pipe, Utility Crossings;
Maintenance of Traffic and Detours; Painting
contract. If the constructor is not able to successfully carry out the project, the surety
assumes the contractor’s responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed.
Marine outfall projects would involve the following three types of such bonds.
1. A bid bond guarantees that the bidder on a contract will enter into the contract
and furnish the required two bonds below.
2. A payment bond ensures payment from the contractor of money to persons or
entities that furnish labor, materials, equipment, and/or supplies for use in the
performance of the contract.
3. A performance bond guarantees that the contractor will perform the contract
totally in accordance with its terms.
Personnel of the prospective marine contractor for an ocean outfall must thor-
oughly review the contract documents. The contractor may well also refer these for
comment to a trusted outside consultant whose experience is pertinent. If the con-
tractor discovers unacceptable procedures, terms, and conditions and cannot have
these altered by the owner, then it may not bid the job.
The preparation of a bid for a heavy construction project, particularly offshore,
is a delicate process and requires past company records and the collaboration of
experienced contractor personnel and selected outside specialty consultants. Quota-
tions are solicited from material suppliers.
Late in the development of the plans and specifications for a job, it is standard
that the consultant update an earlier, approximate estimate of the construction cost
of the project, to prepare so that the owner has some reasonable idea concerning the
level of funding required and can start making appropriate financial arrangements.
The update is called the engineer’s estimate, and it is the standard against which actual
project bids are measured. Table 2-8 contains two sets of outfall bids, as well as the
engineer’s estimate. The former pipeline appeared in Fig. 2–3.
We now return to the SWOO. The winning bid for this mighty pipeline involved
Proposition A (no inshore tunnel) and amounted to US$152 million. This bid was
from an experienced outfall contractor in Group A of Table 2-5. A partial breakdown of
this company’s bid is shown in Table 2-9. It is of note that we are by no means finished
with the Southwest Ocean Outfall, but further detailed coverage is deferred until Chap-
ter 6. All of the marine work and seismic studies outlined earlier cost US$6 million.
Table 2-8 Later Cape May County Outfalls, New Jersey

Seven Mile Beach Wildwood
Item (No. 152 in Table A-1) (US$) (No. 175 in Table A-1) (US$)
Engineer’s estimate 9,632,400 10,820,100

Low bid 5,270,990 8,738,221
Other bid 7,334,055 11,128,805
Other bid 7,658,457 11,780,000
Other bid 8,050,200 —
High bid 8,887,807 12,089,551
Table 2-9 Breakdown for Winning SWOO Bid

Item Percentage of Total Price
Mobilization 9.0
Dredging 20.2
Furnish outfall pipe 14.9
Install outfall pipe 11.8
Backfill 33.0
Furnish and install diffuser 5.3
Other 5.8
Total 100.0
2.6 Design–Build
There is a whole school of thought that would brand as inefficient the sequence of
steps summarized earlier for the SWOO. This opinion can be illustrated by the fact
that the designer’s concept for pipe jointing through the San Andreas Fault segment
was completely redone by the contractor, and the changes were then accepted by the
owner. If a design engineer and marine contractor (design–build team) had worked
together from the beginning (and to the end), the combined input of engineer and
contractor would have solved the San Andreas Fault conundrum once and for all. Some
Table A-1 outfall projects have in fact been carried out in this way: Chevron extension
(No. 285); Emu Bay (No. 311); Wellington (No. 327); and La Trinité (No. 346). The
first two of these were actually handled by the same major U.S. marine company that
has its own engineering, heavy marine construction, and diving departments.
Some would say that a still stronger collaborative approach would be a “part-
nering” idea, in which the consulting engineer and marine contractor are joined, as
an equal member, by the owner. Such an effort, the first for each, linked the Eng-
lish agency Northumbrian Water with an experienced engineering consultant and a
seasoned marine contractor. For £38.5 million, they produced the outfall system at
Horden (No. 337 in Table A-1) during 1996–1997.
This ex-coal-mining community faces onto the North Sea at north latitude
54°46⬘ and has 40-m-high seaside limestone cliffs, which are managed by the
National Trust. The location chosen for the WWTP was on top of these cliffs, some-
what concealed in a dip well back from the brow. A novel idea was developed and
used to drop the effluent to sea level. A specialist subcontractor convinced the tri-
umvirate that it could microtunnel a vertically curved shaft from the WWTP down
to below low water, and this is what was done. The subproject was subsequently
recognized as a top U.K. tunneling contract of 1997.
The clifftop grassland was removed in large pieces of turf for a donor site. A
start pit 4 m deep was excavated at the entry point adjacent to the pipe stringing
area. A thrust wall was constructed to provide a reaction against which to jack the
advancing pipe. There were four 300-tonne cylinders. Properly oriented guide rails
were set in place in the pit to provide the initial downward slope of 1 on 7 for a
distance of 180 m.
A 1,200-m-radius curve was then steered for 90 m, and the remainder of the
530-m-long total drive was on a downward grade of about 3.5% and ended under-
water about 200 m seaward of the beach edge. A tug retrieved the 9.3-m-long tunnel
boring machine (TBM). The hole diameter was 1,800 mm.
The seabed pipe was 711-mm-diam. steel with CWC, 1,325 m long. This pipe
was pulled through the tunnel and out into an excavated trench, where backfilling
was left to nature. The pipe diameter through the tunnel itself was 1,016 mm.
2.7 Offshore and Underwater Operations

2.7.1 Permissions and Notification
The standard marine outfall project starts on the back beach, crosses the beach and
surf zone, and then heads out to deeper water. A whole set of permits is necessary for
all this activity, and the securing of these documents may be a multiyear exercise in
patience. In the United States, the environmental impact statement may play a major
role. This document for outfall No. 427 (Table A-1) in Hawaii was 45 mm thick.
In the United States, an important declaration is issued by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (CoE). On June 9, 1993, the San Francisco District of the CoE issued a four-
page, two-sided public notice for outfall extension No. 288 (Table A-1) in northern
California. In addition to six pertinent diagrams, there was text: a summary of the loca-
tion and planned procedures; and a brief discussion of environmental considerations.
A CoE contact name was given, along with the individual’s telephone number.
The following is the (U.S. Coast Guard District 13) Notice to Mariners (August
28, 2007) text covering one recent marine outfall project (No. 449 in Table A-1):
General Construction Company will be working on a submarine outfall in

the Puget Sound just north of Des Moines marina until 01 Oct 07. Construc-
tion will consist of driving sheet pile, dredging and pipe laying with divers.
It is possible that some sheet pile will be submerged at high tide, if so they
will be marked by buoys. There will be a storm buoy in place with three
barges tied to it. Mariners are requested to maintain a minimum wake in
the vicinity of the moored barges. Marine equipment will monitor VHF-FM
Channels 6, 14, and 16 during working hrs. For additional information,
contact General Construction Company at (206) 730-6232. Chart 18448.
2.7.2 Possible Negative Effects of Submarine Pipeline Construction

Great care must be exercised that the actual installation of the outfall doesn’t cause
direct environmental damage. As a means of illustration, consider the construction
of the 380-m-long Malakal outfall in the Palau Islands (7.5°N, 134.5°E). Over a
water depth range of 2–24 m, roughly 2.5 ha of rich coral reefs and reef flats were
destroyed by dredging for the outfall trench and creating a full-length access and
work causeway.
The blanketing of seabed organisms, such as corals, by construction-caused
sediment in the water column is another negative effect. Blockage of sunlight is
yet another. So-called “silt curtains” are often specified to contain such potentially
harmful constituents.
Extensive coral resources can be crushed when a ship or barge runs aground.
This exact problem happened off Hagatna, Guam, in early December 2007. A barge
involved in an outfall construction project (Table 5-1 in Chapter 5) went up on the
reef after its towrope broke.
Additional insights on the general matter of negative marine construction effects
are provided in the paper by Lewis et al. (2002). This publication concerned Clon-
akilty Bay, West Cork, Ireland.
2.7.3 Precise Ship Positioning

The construction of most outfalls involves a small armada of vessels on the sea sur-
face, including small skiffs, crew boats, anchor scows, tugs, dredgers of various kinds
(Simm and Cruickshank 1998), supply barges, and derrick barges (Fig. 2-4). The dif-
ferent combinations of vessels used in specific projects will be outlined in ensuing
chapters. At this point, we simply wonder how the particular vessel can pinpoint its
location on the surface of the trackless ocean.
The modern method of establishing position on the worldwide ocean surface is
through the use of the Global Positioning System (GPS), which was developed and
funded by the U.S. Department of Defense. This approach makes use of an array of
special satellites orbiting 10,900 nautical miles above the earth’s surface and circling
our planet two times per day. There are two levels of accuracy. The precise posi-
tioning system (PPS) is a highly accurate limited-access military positioning system.
The generally available standard positioning system (SPS) involves the denial of full
accuracy, referred to as selective availability (SA), which was in force for some years
but was turned off at the beginning of May 2000.
The different accuracy of the PPS and SPS systems is illustrated by the following
data set. The position of a specific U.S. location was determined on May 1, 2000, as
well as May 3, 2000. In the first case, 95% of the points fell within a radius of 45.0 m.
In the second case, 95% of the points fell within a radius of 6.3 m. Some U.K. mea-
surements are consistent with the second result. The short article “Andrews Survey”
(2002) reported that a U.K. survey company took 188,000 observations over 23 days
after removal of SA and obtained 99.8% fidelity within ⫾5 m.
When SA was in force, a technique called differential GPS (DGPS) was perfected
and was used to improve positioning accuracy. The success of this approach was
one reason for SA’s elimination. GPS receivers were located at stationary, known
locations (“reference stations”) near places where accurate position determination
was required. These stations broadcast the range errors seen from every GPS satel-
lite within view, and nearby GPS receivers could use these correction messages to
improve the satellite signals they themselves were receiving.
Figure 2-4. Crane barge and tug off outfall construction trestle.
The reader seeking more history or detail on GPS might consult the follow-
ing sources: Cook 1984; Stansell 1986; Wilson 1990; Hogarth 1991; Last 1991;
LaChapelle et al. 1992; and Alsip et al. 1993.
2.7.4 Accurate Subsea Positioning

Locating a ship accurately is one thing; establishing the exact position of a subsea
vehicle, diver, worksite, or borehole is quite another matter. A general view of the
field is available in Milne (1986). The basic idea is the use of pulses of acoustic
energy to measure the distance between the station occupied and a number of bea-
cons arrayed on the seabed at established coordinates. The transponder is mounted
on the object to be positioned, and knowledge of the velocity of sound through local
seawater is necessary. Systems are available from a number of manufacturers, and
these are reportedly accurate to 10 mm or so over ranges of a few hundred meters.
See McIntyre (1991), Kelland (1994), Baker (1997), Skeen (1998), plus Ander-
son and Smalley (2008) for more discussion. Details on the refined underwater posi-
tioning that was done as part of the drilling of diffuser risers for the Sydney (New
South Wales, Australia) trio of outfalls (section 8.2) is contained in Corner (1990).
2.7.5 Divers Underwater at Ambient Pressure

Working in the ocean is not a trivial exercise even when it is “simply” on a research
project (Appendix B), rather than on a commercial diving enterprise. Every outfall
project requires some divers in the water to carry out whatever tasks are required,
with others to inspect the work and approve its execution. The three Maberry papers
(1999, 2000a, b) have an experienced commercial diver explaining to engineers the
background for and nature of his work. These words should be read by those with
little background in undersea operations. For those with no background, the Office
of Underwater Research (1991), booklet might be read first.
There are two basic ways of putting a diver in direct contact with the water. Scuba
features a free-swimming individual carrying a tank of high-pressure air for breath-
ing (Fig. 2-5). Dive time is limited by the volume of air carried. Surface-supplied
Figure 2-5. Commercial diver, using scuba, cutting steel pipe.

diving has air, nitrox, or another breathing gas rich in helium, derived from a com-
pressor or tanks on a boat overhead and transferred to the diver’s helmet via a hose
(Fig. 2-6). The air hose is bundled with a hard-wire communication cable, and this
link is one of the advantages of surface-supplied diving over scuba.
The nitrogen in air leads to two problems, both of which have the potential to
be killers. The first is nitrogen narcosis, or “rapture of the deep.” The single time
that I experienced the developing euphoria of nitrogen narcosis, under 40 m of
water, I instantly realized what was happening and quickly swam upslope. The feel-
ings rapidly dissipated. Wick (2001) tells of two bored diver tenders who climbed
into a decompression chamber and pressurized the structure to the equivalent of
67 m of seawater just to find out firsthand what nitrogen narcosis was like. They
were later found by an astounded operator, laughing uncontrollably, but at least
confined and safe.
The second problem, decompression sickness, also known as the bends, involves
nitrogen leaving body tissues when the diver’s surrounding pressure is reduced.
Figure 2-6. Commercial diver, in swim gear, regaining work barge.

Should the ascent be too rapid, nitrogen bubbles form and lodge in joints and/or
pass to the brain. The agonies suffered by a person with acute decompression sick-
ness can scarcely be believed (Sheats 1998). The two dive tenders mentioned above
suffered mild cases of the bends because they had no idea how long they’d been
locked up, key information for safely bringing them back to atmospheric pressure.
2.7.6 A Personal Diving Experience

On October 1, 1985, two scuba dive teams, one of them my own, were working with
air-filled lift bags in 21 m of water to assemble an artificial fish reef composed of
roughly 40 separate 1.2-m open concrete cubes that we’d dumped on an earlier site
visit. On this day, a heavy surface current had come up, and I was hanging off the
stern of our boat, decompressing. Suddenly, the boat’s two engines were turned on,
and a face appeared by the dive ladder. I was beckoned to quickly come aboard. A
somewhat inexperienced diver on the other team hadn’t come up the “down line”
and had been swept away. His team leader had gone after him.
Because of my shortened decompression, I suffered a bends “hit” in my left shoul-
der, the site of a dislocation when I was a teenager. Initially, the pain was consider-
able, but over the next few hours, it gradually went away. Now, 20 years later, I have
what is known as dysbaric osteonecrosis in that shoulder joint, and the pain is back.
2.7.7 Last Dive of the Week versus Last Dive of a Career

On a Saturday some years ago, a surface-supplied commercial diver that I know was
dead-tired but still working on a personally lucrative outfall project in 30 m of water.
For this last dive of the day, on air, his water stops and surface decompression had
been calculated for 78 minutes of bottom time. While the diver was underwater, the
barge foreman chose to move the vessel to its station for the next week, and the diver
had a long diagonal return to the dive elevator. He took the previously arranged water
stops. While removing his gear, back on deck, he felt a twinge in his lower right back.
He took the long (60-m) walk from the dive station to the decompression chamber,
at the other end of the barge, for his stipulated decompression interval. After that
he jumped into the crew boat with the rest of the workers, intent on “having a few
beers” to celebrate the conclusion of another week of work out on the water.
They hadn’t gone far when one of the diver’s legs went numb, and the other
leg quickly followed. The mood on the boat quickly changed from elation to terror,
and they headed back to the barge at flank speed and took up battle stations. With
care and speed, the diver was carried up on deck and placed in the decompression
chamber. This enclosure was quickly pressurized to an equivalent of 18 m of seawa-
ter, and a decompression course was then run for the next few hours. In time, the
diver walked away. He was fortunate, though, because others who have been treated
in this way never regained the use of their lower bodies. A few years later, using
scuba, I knelt on the seabed in 15 m of water and watched the man lay pipe in a
trench a few meters away, on another outfall job. I am shown in Fig. 2-7 inspecting
yet another outfall.
Figure 2-7. Author inspecting power plant outfall under construction.
Table 2-10 indicates the recent history of commercial diving fatalities within the
United States. OSHA is the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
The reduction in diving deaths in recent years may well have occurred because of the
safe-diving efforts of OSHA, as well as those of the Association of Diving Contractors
International, which has also been lobbying for safer practices by engineer divers
(Chabot 1995; Abbott 2001; Ganas 2003; Elwood et al. 2004). One can only hope
that the numbers of divers maimed by accident or decompression sickness is also
steadily diminishing.
2.8 Book Plan

At this juncture, the reader should have developed a reasonable feel for the array of
topics that relates to outfalls and especially to the matters of concern to the outfall
designer. We are now poised to build the facility that is simply lines on plans and
words in specifications.
We are all used to the solidity of the earth beneath our feet, and most of us are
unnerved when our frame of reference is not fixed. Marine waters are in constant
motion, posing substantial difficulties and possible danger for the contractor that
must work there. It is thus not a surprise that when they can, such companies will
attempt to extend the land seaward to provide a stable basis for construction activi-
ties reasonably close to the shoreline. The major player in this respect is the trestle,
a temporary pier that is examined in Chapter 3. Additional players are the jackup
barge or platform, as well as the rare walking platform.
Table 2-10 Commercial Diving Fatalities Within OSHA’s Jurisdiction

Year Number Year Number
1989 15 1999 2
1990 16 2000 5
1991 11 2001 0
1992 20 2002 4
1993 20 2003 2
1994 7 2004 2
1995 8 2005 3
1996 11 2006 1
1997 14 2007 7
1998 4
Source: Butler (2008).
Many submarine pipelines have been placed by dragging them out from shore
along the seabed. This bottom-pull approach fills Chapter 4. Whereas the route for a
bottom-pull pipe has to negotiate whatever lies within the coastal strip, the horizon-
tal directional drilling approach of Chapter 5 involves the pipe following a vertical
path that takes it under whatever dwellings, parks, nature preserves, walking paths,
roads, and railroads occupy the coastal margin.
We move well offshore in Chapter 6, to consider those outfalls that are placed
section-by-section through lowering via the crane placed on a large, flat barge.
Involved in this activity is a classic structure called a horse, which decouples barge
motion from the pipe jointing activity. In some cases, such a crane barge works
alone, but in many situations there is a division of labor for pipelines of substantial
length. The barge handles the deeper waters, and the trestle (covered earlier) man-
ages water depths up to about 6–9 m. When the water gets too deep, say 60–100 m,
diver operations become difficult and expensive. Chapter 7 details three such cases
when robotics played central roles and divers were supporting players.
An outfall does not have to be a pipe, and we are introduced to tunnels as outfalls
in Chapter 8. Involved are both large passages created by tunnel boring machines
(TBMs) and smaller corridors excavated in microtunneling operations with pipe-
jacking. The world’s mightiest outfall at Boston is a tunneling story within itself, and
the sole topic of Chapter 13. A second option as a big conduit is the immersed tube,
which is summarized in Appendix C.
There is a group of international outfalls where each is composed of two or
more distinct parts. Usually, the upstream portion is a mined tunnel or microtunnel,
whereas the downstream part is a pipe laid in an excavated trench and backfilled.
Chapter 9 discusses three developing projects of this nature and four that have been
commissioned.
Appendix A contains a monumental table that lists the basic characteristics of

400 outfalls installed from 1978 through 2007. This array makes clear the fact that
the percentage of outfalls fashioned of polyethylene has been steadily increasing
over the years. Chapter 10 considers that preferred material in detail, and deals with
the undesirable characteristics, as well as the desirable.
No two outfalls are the same, and some are radically different from anything
installed previously. Chapter 11 is devoted to coverage of such conduits, as well as to
presentation of construction techniques borrowed on occasion from the offshore gas
and oil industry. Whereas previous chapters have occasional mention of construc-
tion difficulties, Chapter 12 focuses on those projects that were difficult or impos-
sible to create. There are many lessons presented.
Not a single equation appears in the chapters and appendices covered to this
point. Appendix B has been included to deal superficially with instances where
ocean wave-related calculations need to be made to support the construction phase.
I have devoted perhaps an undue amount of space to related undersea research work
that I carried out myself with coworkers.
In any event, the construction contract has been signed, and it’s time to get going.
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3
Providing a Stable Work
Base within the Surf Zone
3.1 The Trestle

3.1.1 Difficulties
The standard marine outfall originates at a wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) back
of the coast, crosses that shoreline, and terminates offshore in from 20 to 50 m of
water. Such beginning and ending points mean that the outfall must traverse the surf
zone, that agitated band of shallow water where waves generally break. The contrac-
tor, faced with outfall installation in this turbulent region, customarily endeavors to
effectively extend the land so as to provide a solid base for activities such as trench
excavation and pipe-laying. The overwhelming choice for this stable platform is what
amounts to a temporary land-linked pier, the so-called trestle (Fig. 3-1).
The trestle legs are strong tubular or H piles driven adequately far into the sea-
bed. Piles are “spotted” (located) by using a cantilevered template (as in Fig. 3-2).
Cross members, bolted or welded into place, complete pile bents. Longitudinal
members are added, and possibly railway rails or decking. The underdeck freeboard
is carefully chosen so that even the highest foreseeable wave crests pass underneath.
As soon as a wave makes contact with the deck beams, rather than just the piles, the
force and overturning moment on the structure increase markedly. Even if a trestle
stays standing, it may be unusable. Drivers of ready-mix concrete trucks were reluc-
tant in 1965 to use the swaying trestle for the Georgia–Pacific outfall at Newport,
Oregon.
The consultant aiding a marine contractor or the contractor engineers must real-
ize that trestles have failed for a variety of reasons: structural members that were too
small; a deck freeboard that was inadequate; piles that weren’t driven far enough
into the seabed; or a trestle width that was too narrow, with the piles actually in
the trench. I have devoted part of Appendix B to the types of calculations needed
59
Figure 3-1. An outfall trestle.
to minimize the chances of failure. Any engineer tasked with the design of an open
coast trestle should first read the illuminating paper by Standish-White and Zwam-
born (1978).
3.1.2 Makeup of an Actual Outfall Trestle

We consider here a real case involving the installation of a pair of outfalls where the
coastline involved was exposed and subject to violent episodes of wave action. The
nominal (sandy) beach elevation at Station 5⫹50 (m), the beginning of the trestle,
was approximately ⫹2 m above mean sea level (MSL), and the seabed at Station
9⫹40 (end of trestle) was ⫺9 m. The specified trench depth varied from 8 m to 0 m
over the length of the structure.
After considering possible wave action (maximum depth-limited height 5.3 m,
T ⫽ 10 s, orthogonal at 30° angle to the trestle centerline), the designer established
the vertical extent of the structure. The near-top of the earth ramp into the trestle
(Station 5⫹44) was set at ⫹4.7 m, with a 1% upslope out to Station 6⫹42, giving a
deck height at that point of ⫹5.7 m.
Minimum trench width, for the two planned pipes, was 5 m, and the transverse
tubular pile spacing was specified as 7 m. Longitudinal pile spacing was 6 m. The
design included two rows of Z-profile sheet piles driven along the outsides of the
trestle and connected to that structure by upper-end walers and clamps. The walers
were 305 ⫻ 305 mm wide-flange beams, with weight 1,549 N/m in Section 1 and
1,343 N/m in Section 2 (Table 3-1). The minimum distance between tubular and
sheet piles was 0.5 m.
Providing a Stable Work Base within the Surf Zone 61
Figure 3-2. Extending a trestle by using a template.
The nominal minimum pile embedment, below the trench bottom, was 3 m
(for sheets) and 5 m (for tubular piles). The sheet piles ended at Bent 59.
The trestle designer separated the structure conceptually into four sections, and
the three of these for which we have information are represented in Table 3-1. The
cross bracing in the table is in the plane of the transverse and longitudinal deck
beams. Member sizes were outgrowths of analyses involving sand forces, as well as
wave loads on tubular and sheet piles.
The positioning of the tubular piles, before driving, was aided by a rig extended
from the temporary end of the trestle. Deck sections were fabricated in 6-m units
consisting of two longitudinal members, one cross beam, and the bracing. One
machine was used for the tubular piles and another smaller unit took care of the
sheet piles. Supply carriages also moved along the deck, creating a mild traffic prob-
lem and requiring some leapfrogging.
Table 3-1 Structural Composition of a Particular Trestle

Characteristics Section 1 Section 2 Section 4
Stations (m) 5⫹50 to 6⫹46 6⫹52 to 7⫹72 8⫹20 to 9⫹40
Bent numbers 1–17 18–38 46–66
Tubular pile diameter 610 660 457
(mm)
Wall thickness of tubular 12 14 12
pile (mm)
Tubular pile lengths (m) 13, 14.5, 17 18.5 20
I-beam cross member 457 ⫻ 191 ⫻ 804 686 ⫻ 254 ⫻ 1226 457 ⫻ 191 ⫻ 735
(mm ⫻ mm ⫻ N/m)
I-beam longitudinal 457 ⫻ 191 ⫻ 804 457 ⫻ 191 ⫻ 804 457 ⫻ 191 ⫻ 735
member (mm ⫻
mm ⫻ N/m)
Square-hollow upper cross 100 ⫻ 5 120 ⫻ 5 100 ⫻ 5
bracing (mm ⫻ mm)
Z sheet pile width (mm) 483 483 —
Sheet pile length (m) 11.5 and 13 15 and 16 —
Top of sheet piles (m) ⫹3.5 ⫹4.3 —
3.2 A Full-Length Outfall Trestle at New Plymouth, New Zealand

3.2.1 Decisions and Implications
New Plymouth is a city on the west coast of New Zealand’s North Island, with a
population between 50,000 and 60,000 people. The setting for this urban center is
spectacular, with the storied Tasman Sea to the west and towering Mount Egmont (or
Taranaki) to the immediate east. This is an isolated dormant volcano, in the shape of
a virtually symmetrical cone, some 2,518 m high.
Like many seaside communities, the citizens of New Plymouth wrestled with sew-
age treatment and disposal issues. For some years, the dominant idea had involved
primary effluent and a 1,600-m-long pipe well out into the Tasman Sea. The final
position, in the early 1980s, was an effluent treated to secondary level and a shorter
disposal conduit, 450 m long from mean high water, discharging in 5 m of water.
We pause here to reflect. We have just seen a tradeoff in concept and expense—
higher quality effluent released closer inshore chosen over lower quality effluent
discharged well offshore. This arrangement sounds orderly, but it involves a funda-
mental flaw, as many environmental considerations do. Concealed is the need for
dealing, on a continuous basis, with the increased amount of sludge. In the case of
New Plymouth, this requirement almost brought the city to its knees in terms of
expense and logistics. The decision to use secondary treatment may be applauded
for imposing less of a load on the marine environment, but it may well mean a
deterioration of the land environment (sludge disposal) and of the atmosphere

(greenhouse gas emissions). Here endeth the lesson.
3.2.2 Getting Started

The mean tide range at New Plymouth is approximately 3.2 m (Macdonald and Hen-
derson 1988). The seabed here is boulder-strewn (to 2 m) but underlain with sand
except for localized outcroppings of hard material. Immediately landward of the pro-
posed outfall location (No. 144 in Table A-1) was a hill whose summit is designated
as an official Maori historical site: Te Rewarewa Pa. The last word here refers to a forti-
fied village. Further on was a gravel-filled riverbed, providing an extensive flat expanse
that was in time chosen as the outfall staging area (Henderson and Fullerton 1985).
The basic pipe was 15-mm-thick steel with an inside diameter of 980 mm. A
15-mm spun concrete lining was added internally, and an 82-mm-thick mesh-
reinforced concrete weight coat (CWC) was cast externally over a 5-mm tar enamel
coating. In the 30-m-long diffuser, 200-mm-diam. fiber-reinforced plastic (FRP) ris-
ers, at 1.5-m centers, would be flange-connected to the pipe through cutouts in the
CWC. Elbows would be added, with discharge left and right through 150-mm-diam.
ports, with centers nominally 0.3 m above the reconstituted seabed. The risers were
made of FRP because of its strength and anticorrosion properties but also for the ease
with which a replacement riser could be fabricated and installed in the event of dam-
age. The nose of the outfall had a 600-mm-diam. diver entry opening, as well as a full
bulkhead for pig removal in the event that outfall cleaning had to be carried out.
The bidding process ended in February 1983, a sensible month because the Feb-
ruary to July interval is the calmest season for marine work in the area. The (New
Zealand) contractor chosen (NZ$4.4 million) was not the low bidder, but the New
Plymouth city council preferred its approach over the others. Construction began in
May 1983 and was complete in June 1984. To expedite matters, the outfall pipe itself
had been preordered by the owner from the only supplier of that type of pipe in the
nation. Fifty-eight 10-m-long steel pipes were delivered to the off-site yard, where
the CWC was applied. Ultimately, on site, the contractor had four strings of lengths
(beginning at the sea end and terminating on land) of 150, 170, 115, and 140 m.
Details are in Hutchinson (1985).
3.2.3 The Trestle

The contractor used conventional means to drive a soft-rock tunnel 220 m under
Rewarewa Pa to link the staging area and future pipe location. Muck cars traveled on
the railway that linked the staging area and the pipe installation sites.
The contractor also created a full-length trestle, roughly 500 m long. Great care
had to be exercised in its design not to overstress any part of the pipe as it passed
onto the structure from the seaward tunnel portal, a drop of 4.8 m. The criterion in
this case called for a minimum radius of pipe curvature of 4,000 m. All bents had
to be of different levels out to the 19th one. The heaviest machinery loading on the
trestle was 66 metric tons.
The trestle was unusual in that it was used in two ways. A railway line on top of
the crossbeams permitted travel of bogies involved in trestle extension, trench exca-
vation, and backfilling. A centerline monorail, mounted under the cross members,
was used to transport the pipe well above sea level to a position directly over its
intended location under water.
The trestle had bents every 6 m. Hutchinson (1985) reports only that the piles
were “310UC.” This class of universal column comes in four different cross sec-
tions, as shown in Table 3-2, and we do not know which of these configurations was
selected. These “legs” were raked somewhat toward the end of the trestle. Hutchinson
also relates that the cross members were “530UB.” There are two different universal
beams with this specification (Table 3-2). Finally, Hutchinson states that “610UB”
beams, at 5 m centers, spanned the pile bents and carried the 340 N/m rails for the
bogies. Again, Table 3-2 shows that this is not a unique specification.
The initial part of the trestle was constructed using a land-based crane that fol-
lowed the tide up and down on the beach. This crane was then transferred to the
rail-mounted bogie that traveled on the already completed spur trestle. A cantilever
frame extended in front of the stationary bogie and was supported vertically and sta-
bilized laterally by a pair of tubular spud piles. A pile-driving frame was supported
on the cantilever frame to carry the diesel hammer that drove the trestle support
piles. A crane, also on the bogie, handled the piles, moved the pile-driving frame as
necessary, and swung in the trestle cross members. A steel-framed and timber-decked
walkway was cantilevered off the north side of the trestle at a level below the longitu-
dinal beams to clear the piling frame. When a bay of the trestle had been completed,
the bogie and cantilever frame were moved seaward.
3.2.4 The Work

Sheet piling was used, and the full trench was excavated only in those regions where
any one of the four pipe lengths would be placed. Depending on ground conditions,
Table 3-2 Major Structural Steel Members in New Plymouth Trestle

Steel Depth of Section Flange Width Flange Thickness Web Thickness
Member (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm)
310UC 327 311 25.0 15.7

310UC 321 309 21.7 13.8
310UC 315 307 18.7 11.9
310UC 308 305 15.4 9.9
530UB 533 209 15.6 10.2
530UB 528 209 13.2 9.6
610UB 612 229 19.6 11.9
610UB 607 228 17.3 11.2
610UB 602 228 14.8 10.6
a vibrohammer or diesel hammer was used. Large boulders had to be broken apart by
blasting. Tight accumulations of rocks had to be excavated before placing sheet piles.
The first excavation effort within the cofferdam was done using a dragline. Explo-
sives were employed to break up any large boulders that couldn’t be rolled out of the
enclosure by the drag bucket. Later, a long-reach hydraulic excavator was brought
on site for trench excavation. This machine’s function was aided by an attached
300-mm-diam. airlift pipe to suck out fine material.
“Final touch” excavation was done by dragging a rugged 3-metric-ton reinforc-
ing bar cage along the alignment. The vertical position of the underside of this
essentially cylindrical unit, vis-à-vis the desired pipe invert level at that station, was
monitored from the monorail overhead.
With a favorable weather forecast, the pipe string to be launched was transferred
from the rail bogie arrangement to the monorail system near the seaward portal of
the tunnel. When this string had been winched to its final position above the trench,
there was another change. The five-sheave lowering system was attached, and the
pipe was raised somewhat so that the loop straps to the monorail trolleys could be
unhooked. There were lowering stations with hand winches every 9 m, and a double
sling held the pipe under each of these. The pipe position was carefully monitored
as it descended incrementally to the desired elevation. A 200-mm valve in the end
bulkhead permitted pipe flooding.
The monorail system had seemed like an excellent idea if heavy weather devel-
oped during the tedious lowering process. The pipe could be raised by the hand
winches, rehung on the monorail trolleys, and moved landward off the trestle by a
second winch system that was normally operated in “holdback” mode.
The decision to lay the pipe in four sections meant joints had to be made under-
water. The arrangement for each connection involved two 28-bolt flanges, one
welded securely to the end of one string, and the other rotatable behind a backing
ring welded to the adjacent string. A urethane elastomer gasket was involved, and the
bolts were 27-mm-diam. monel. Cathodic protection measures were taken.
Rail-mounted bottom-dump hoppers were used for basic trench backfilling.
The top of the trench was completed using rocks of nominal diameters between
200 and 800 mm.
The completed pipe was subjected to a rigorous hydrostatic pressure test. Later
run was a diffuser discharge experiment, in which rhodamine dye was added to the
flow. Discrete, nonmerged spots of dye progressively developed above every outlet
(Macdonald and Henderson 1988).
3.3 Another Full-Length Outfall Trestle at

McGaurans Beach, Australia
Bass Strait separates two Australian states, Victoria and Tasmania. This stretch of
water is perhaps best known for its periodic fierce wind and sea conditions, as well as
for the gas and oil industry production facilities that dot its expanse (e.g., Kennedy
1980; Mollison 1987; Cottrill 1990). An outstanding feature of the Victoria coastline
in this area, which I have frequented, is Ninety Mile Beach, which stretches 151 km
from a spit near Port Albert on the west to a man-made channel at Lakes Entrance on
the east. This long strand separates the Gippsland Lakes region from Bass Strait. Sep-
arate sections of Ninety Mile Beach have their own names, like McGaurans Beach,
Flamingo Beach, and Delray Beach.
Further north, near Traralgon in inland Victoria, saline water is generated in
conjunction with electrical power generation. In the mid-1970s, the decision was
reached to pump this wastewater some 52 km south for disposal in Bass Strait
coastal waters (Samson and Howard 1987). Peak flow would be 35 million L per
day. Ryan (1983) reports that an array of studies for the saline discharge lasted from
mid-1977 to mid-1979. The decision was reached to have the disposal point 500 m
offshore from the foredunes behind McGaurans Beach in a water depth of 8 m.
Detailed design was carried out. The buried 54-m-long diffuser would discharge
through 28 (150-mm) ductile iron risers, each with 60-mm ports (and duckbill
valves) in breakaway top elbows located 0.5 m above the seabed in the nominal
8.0 m of water. Design wave conditions had breakers all the way to the end of the
pipe. Peak currents were up to 4.5 m/s.
Eight contractors were prequalified, and bids were received late in 1979 from
four of these companies. A contract was signed in January 1980 with a seasoned
Australasian marine contractor, but this firm departed from the assumed bottom-
pull technique and used the “bit by bit” approach described below. The construction
effort took 18 months and cost A$4.7 million.
The pipe would be steel, with outside diameter (o.d.) set at 610 mm. The wall
thickness would be 10 mm, with a thin epoxy inner coating and an 8-mm exter-
nal anticorrosion wrap that would form the base for a 50-mm-thick (later 75-mm)
CWC. Sacrificial anodes would be placed both internally (with 27-m spacing) and
externally (at 36-m centers). The pipe would lie up to 6 m below the seabed. Enough
pipe embedment was provided to ensure a minimum 2 m of cover should the sea-
bed reach its historically lowest measured position.
The buried diffuser rested on a limestone reef and was encased in poured con-
crete. To take up possible differential settlement between the diffuser block and the
more flexible submarine pipeline, three pipe ball joints, at 20-m centers, lay imme-
diately inshore of the diffuser (Ryan 1985).
A full-length trestle with railway was installed. This structure apparently had
tubular piles, beams supporting full-length crane rails, and a timber roadway. A
major source of project delay was the inability of the two rail-mounted cranes to
operate safely during high wind events. From the trestle, sheet piling was driven
(with up to 8 m of penetration) to form coffer sections 40–60 m long alongside the
trestle. Seabed material within these walls was then removed via an airlift system,
and 50-mm crushed rock bedding was placed. Construction of the trunk involved
the lowering of one 20-m-long doubly flanged pipe section at a time into a tempo-
rary 60-m-long sheet pile cofferdam. Divers bolted the flanges together.
Once a section had been tied in, a temporary end bulkhead was attached, and
the pipeline was pressure tested. The local trench was then backfilled to 1 m above
the crown with 100-mm crushed rock. The sheet piling was then withdrawn and
redriven for the following 60-m portion. Remaining trench backfilling was allowed
to occur naturally. Ryan (1983) provides details on the difficulties experienced with
the flanged joints: gaskets, meeting test pressure, and corrosion protection.
Ryan (1983) also reports that the contractor chose short cofferdams because of
previous Ninety Mile Beach experience of another contractor, in this case for an oil
field pipeline shore crossing. In that case, a long cofferdam came to grief because of
sand buildup due to littoral sediment transport.
The 150-mm-diam. ductile iron diffuser risers had a flange-connected, top-
mounted reducing elbow. The bolts were designed to fail if a stray anchor or trawl
exerted more than 35 kN of load. Also, the actual outlet was fitted with a duckbill
valve. During construction, the material of the reducing elbows was changed from
cast iron to nickel aluminum bronze. I shudder at the array of dissimilar metals and
hope that they were electrically isolated from one another.
A 45° full-diameter stub (up to seabed level) formed the termination of the
pipe. The entire three-part diffuser was assembled on shore and then lowered in
one piece off the trestle. Numbered end caps were on the outlets because there was
to be a delay before commissioning. The end caps would be taken off by divers and
replaced by the end ports. The caps were numbered so that topside personnel would
be certain which ones had been removed. Divers also made connections. In the end,
the diffuser was encased in concrete within cut-off sheet pile walls.
There was a delay before the outfall (No. 111 in Table A-1) was commissioned
in 1983.
3.4 A Large Power Plant Outfall

3.4.1 The Setting and Basic Design
The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) is about 7 km southeast of
San Clemente, California, along the U.S. west coast. The plant’s Unit 1, with a capac-
ity of 440 MW, began operation in 1968. Between mid-1976 and early 1980, a major
marine contractor made site preparations and then installed intake and discharge
lines for Units 2 and 3. The overall cost was US$69 million. Each of these later units
was rated at 1,100 MW and required a once-through cooling water flow of 52 m3/s
(Grove et al. 1993). This prodigious quantity of water passes from the sea into spe-
cial intakes, designed to minimize fish entry, located at a water depth of 9 m. The
volume of coolant that passes through Units 2 and 3 combined in an hour would
occupy a 20-m width along the coast of all the water column extending from the
shore to the end of the longer outfall.
The cooling water arrangement for both units was essentially the same: intake
975 m long and longer outfall, with pipe pair spaced at 12-m centers. For Unit 2, the
outfall length was 2,620 m, and for Unit 3, it was 1,705 m. Both systems were mildly
curved, requiring that the joints in the pipe had to be “pulled” accordingly.
The inflow lines were noncylinder prestressed concrete pipe, with a 5.49-m
inside diameter. They were laid in excavated trenches and then backfilled. Specifica-
tions called for a minimum 1.3-m cover over the top of the pipe. Exactly the same
massive pipe made up most of the outfall for each unit, but there were also portions
of 4.27 and 3.05-m-i.d. pipe within the diffusers. There were, all told, 883 pipe sec-
tions, or roughly 6.25 km, of concrete pipe. The largest pipe sections were 7.315 m
long, had a wall thickness of 381 mm, and a weight of 118 tonnes. Pipe was cast in a
yard 6.5 km from the power plant.
The Unit 3 outfall is the shorter of the two, and its diffuser starts 1,050 m from
shore and ends at a water depth of 11.5 m (mean lower low water, or MLLW). The dis-
tances below the water surface to the centers of the ports range from roughly 9 to 10.5 m
(MLLW). The Unit 2 diffuser starts 1,750 m from shore in a water depth of 12 m. Its end
water depth is 15 m, and the port centers occur from 10.5 to 13.5 m below MLLW.
Each 770-m-long diffuser has 63 port blocks sitting on the top at 12-m intervals
to disperse the heated water effluent. Port diameter is 914 mm, with the flow aimed
up 20 degrees and off the centerline 25 degrees, alternating one side and then the
other. Both diffusers end with concrete bulkheads (Erdman and Emerson 1978).
3.4.2 Trestle Work

It is not surprising that the contractor resolved to use a trestle for the inner portion of
the lines. Enough structural steel was procured to build one two-sided trestle 975 m
long and have a small surplus (Table 3-3). There were 132 spans. After the project
was completed, the contractor succeeded in selling most of the trestle steel to a sec-
ond company that had won the contract for another nuclear power plant outfall, this
one in Florida in the United States.
A pile-driving template 36.6 m long was suspended under and extended out
from the deck of each individual trestle. After each span had been built, the template
was pulled ahead by another 15.2 m. At each step, for the double trestle, four plumb
piles (diameter 610 mm) were driven at spacing of 9.75, 2.44, and 9.75 m. A batter
pile was driven on each side. A powerful water jet was used, before hammering, to
open out an upper path for the driven pile.
Each 14.3-m-wide single deck had a railway line where the rails were spaced
at 9.75-m centers. The double deck included 3-m-wide walkways along each side.
These walkways were made of 150 ⫻ 300-mm timber.
Table 3-3 Contractor’s Major Steel Purchases to Make 2,160 m of Single

SONGS Trestle
Name Description Number Total Length (m)
Pipe for piles 610-mm o.d. with 8-mm wall — 21,300

(minimum)
Cap beams Double 610 mm deep, 1,110 N/m, 144 —
14.3 m long (with welded plate)
Rail girders 584 mm deep, 559 mm wide, 284 —
15.2 m long (with rail)
Dredge beam 914 mm deep, 3,357 N/m, 29 —
15.2 m long (with hangar)
Three self-propelled, wheel-mounted platforms ran on each track: a 90-tonne

crane to build and dismantle the trestle plus service the pipe-laying crews, a 45-tonne
materials car that also carried personnel as required, and a 135-tonne pipe gantry.
Simply for illustration, the gantry used on another power plant outfall is shown in
Fig. 3-3.
Running under each trestle deck, on its own track, was a 406-mm cutter suction
dredge to excavate the nominally 7.9-m-wide and 7.6-m-deep individual trench.
After the trench was prepared by the dredge, the flush-bell pipe sections (held in
position by cable belly wires) were carried from the beach by the gantry crane and
lowered into position. An outhaul line provided control and prevented impact while
an inhaul line pulled the pipe “home.” A hardhat diver directed final positioning
and makeup of the pipe joints. The pipe joints were not only sealed with an O-ring
but were also wrapped on the outside with 914-mm-wide conveyor belting to ensure
that the joints did not come apart during a seismic disturbance. The local area is
laced with earthquake faults. Trench backfill was rock carried from the beach by a
series of five trip-line conveyors with 610-mm-wide belting.
3.4.3 Work Beyond Intakes

Beyond the mildly curved trestle, the contractor used a custom-built (US$7.5 mil-
lion), 89-m-long, 27.5-m-wide, self-elevating or jackup barge as the construction
platform. The 5.5-m-deep deck carried a 40-tonne truck crane, another pipe-laying
gantry crane, and a 356-mm cutter suction dredge. After the barge was properly
Figure 3-3. Gantry crane on double trestle.

positioned with onboard anchor winches, it was jacked out of the water high
enough to clear the ocean waves. The dredge would then excavate approximately
50 m of pipe trench.
Pipe sections were first transported by a gantry to the end of the trestle, where
they were lowered into a specially designed cargo boat, which then carried them to
the barge, where they were offloaded by the truck crane.
There were open wells in the barge deck so that the gantry could lower a pipe
section into the water. A diver assisted final insertion of the new length into the old
pipe. Five or six sections were placed in this manner before the barge was moved
to its next location. About one-third of the backfilling volume in this area involved
sand discharged from the dredge as it excavated the next section of trench. The rest
of the backfill was rock transported to the site by barge.
The Unit 2 double trestle was built first. After the two pipelines had been laid and
backfilled out to the end, one of the halves of the trestle was gradually dismantled
and used to install a single line for the Unit 3 system. This work went on while the
outer part of the outfall was under construction by the jackup. The other half was kept
intact so that pipe sections could be fed off the end to the transport boat and out to
the jackup as described.
Additional information on this extraordinary project appears in “A-Plant”
(1977), “Cooling” (1977), Byrne (1978), and “Barge” (1979).
3.4.4 Operational Headaches

When construction of Units 2 and 3 was first proposed in 1973, there was con-
siderable environmental resistance. When the California Coastal Commission in
1974 issued a construction permit for these units, it attached stringent conditions. It
directed that an independent marine review committee (MRC) be formed to moni-
tor effects from these units and that mitigation or modifications of the plant itself
might be imposed if there were significant impacts.
The final report of the MRC was submitted in 1989, after many studies car-
ried out over 15 years and costing US$47 million. Ambrose and Hansch (1991),
Ambrose (1994), and Reitzel et al. (1994) reported on some of these. The following
substantial impacts were claimed:
1. death of many local fish that entered the cooling system;
2. reduction in the regional fishery because of entrainment and mortality of fish
eggs, larvae, and juveniles; and
3. cutback of the kelp (Macrocystis pyrifera—large brown alga) bed offshore from
San Onofre due to reduced light and increased sedimentation, caused by the
discharge plume impacting the gametophyte stage (e.g., North 1972).
Needless to say, the permittee did not agree with these findings (Grove et al. 1993),
claiming that some data were ignored whereas others were created to complete time
series that had intervals of no data.
Because of the impacts they perceived, the Coastal Commission in July 1991
stipulated that the permittee should conduct a mitigation program consisting of
restoration of 60 ha of coastal wetland and creation of 120 ha of artificial kelp reef

in nearby coastal waters.
The interested reader should consult the following references to learn about arti-
ficial (kelp) reefs in general and this particular mitigation undertaking in particular
(Carter et al. 1985; Patton et al. 1985, 1994; Seymour et al. 1989; and Zabloudil
et al. 1991). The article of Lau (2006) and the paper by Reed et al. (2006) bring us up
to date. Additional insights concerning the concept of mitigation, but for a different
locale, appear in Goldstein (2006).
3.5 Big Pipe with Strict Environmental Stipulations

3.5.1 Seattle’s West Point Plant
The Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, in Washington state, has a secondary treat-
ment facility at a location called West Point, a feature that juts out into Puget Sound.
In 1993, the agency had an engineering team (lead consultant and 10 other firms)
design an Emergency Marine Outfall for the West Point plant. This reinforced con-
crete pipe (RCP) conduit (No. 295 in Table A-1), 179 m long and with an inside
diameter of 3,658 mm, was aligned to avoid eelgrass beds. The pipe would connect
with an existing stub onshore, using an owner-supplied mitered pipe section, and
would terminate with an end structure in 12 m of water (MLLW). The engineer’s
estimate for the construction was US$5,474,000, a large amount for such a short
pipe in protected waters, and the reason would appear to be the strict environmental
constraints that we will enumerate in the next section.
A prebid conference was called for November 17, 1993, a month before the
December 17, 1993, bid opening. The following matters were discussed: constraints
imposed by permits; equal opportunity requirements; minimum participation (7%)
of combined women’s and minority business enterprises; and bidding forms and
procedures. Two opportunities were provided for prospective bidders to visit the
worksite. Each bidder had to be licensed and registered plus demonstrate its suffi-
cient qualifications and financial capability to undertake the work.
3.5.2 Constraints
It was stipulated that the successful contractor could not have access to the project
site until June 15, 1994, immediately after the annual three-month period set aside
locally for the protection of migrating juvenile salmonids. However, this require-
ment meant an incursion into the treaty fishing season, and so various constraints
were imposed, as will be seen below. The job had to be completed on or before
October 15, 1994, and it ultimately was—two weeks early.
There was a whole host of other environmental constraints, the most important
of which were the following: limited interference with a shoreline walking trail in
the vicinity; work from 7 A.M. to 9 P.M. on nonholiday weekdays only; minimum
two-hour curing time of wet concrete before contact with local waters; limited use
of the intertidal zone when it was submerged; limited use of the beach; no operations
(e.g., propeller wash) in areas of eelgrass; replacement of any lost eelgrass within
one year; no stockpiling of excavation materials on the beach; prevention of fish
from entering excavation trenches; arrangement of trench walls to allow easy exit by
fish on an ebbing tide; minimization of siltation; in cases of fish death or distress,
the cessation of all project activity and notification of the proper fisheries authori-
ties; and, because of the presence in the area of threatened (bald eagle) and endan-
gered (peregrine falcon) raptors, minimization of disturbance by vibratory drivers
for piles, restricting the use of impact hammers to “tapping” only—during three
required load capacity determinations.
3.5.3 Getting Started

Eight bids were received for the project, every one below the engineer’s estimate. Five
of the companies involved had extensive marine outfall construction or reconstruc-
tion experience. The bid amounts appear in Table 3-4.
The municipality awarded the contract to the low bidder, but not until March
15, 1994. This relatively inexperienced company prudently hired a seasoned out-
fall construction engineer to help in its planning for and execution of the con-
tract (Anderson 1995). The originally stipulated arrangement for laying pipe,
from offshore inward, was reversed, and the consultant redesigned the end struc-
ture to be consistent with this change in plan. The 102-metric-ton (63 metric
tons submerged) end structure was ultimately cast on a small barge tied to the
temporary construction dock in the vicinity. Two cranes were required to move
the end piece off the barge, and the structure was set down on a pile-supported
seabed saddle.
The outfall itself was flush-joint, single-gasket pipe with an outside diameter of
4,267 mm. According to the project specifications, the concrete cover over reinforcing
steel had to be 51 mm with a positive tolerance of 6.5 mm and a negative tolerance of
zero. One of the always-sensible requirements of the municipality was that the con-
tractor had to produce record drawings at the end of the project.
Table 3-4 Bids for West Point Emergency Marine Outfall Construction
Rank Amount (US$) Rank Amount (US$)
1 3,229,456 5 3,993,100
2 3,424,675 6 4,076,000
3 3,687,188 7 4,277,943
4 3,914,739 8 4,831,528
3.5.4 The Work

There were three different sets of piles to be driven, two related to the pipe itself and
one concerning the trestle to be used as the work platform (Fig. 3-4). This struc-
ture was designed to support the project crane traveling with a single 36-metric-ton
pipe section. Involved were bents at 5.2-m centers. Each bent consisted of a pair of
610-mm pipe piles, spaced 7.3 m apart, and a pair of steel beams as cross members.
The girders were standard sections, 903 mm deep, with flange width 303 mm, weigh-
ing 1,970 N/m. An occasional batter pile provided lateral stability. The trestle deck
consisted of 250 ⫻ 300-mm Douglas fir timber.
Some 107 m of the pipe (inshore) had to be buried within temporary sheet pile
walls to protect water quality during trench excavation. Sheets were to extend up
to mean sea level, and they were driven to provide 6.1 m of inside clearance. After
use, the sheets were pulled and driven further down the line. A clamshell provided
needed excavation, and spoil was placed on flat-deck barges. The sheet pile walls had
end bulkheads to make a true cofferdam.
Because of soft soils to depths of 4.5–7.5 m, the outer 60 m of the pipe was to
be supported by precast concrete saddles (Fig. 3-5), each topping pairs of concrete-
filled 457-mm-diam. (13-mm-wall) pipe piles from 14 to 18 m long. The tops of the
piles were to fit into sockets whose centers were spaced 3.65 m apart. Each saddle
had 120-deg support for the underside of the outfall.
Figure 3-4. Trestle and cranes for West Point emergency marine outfall.
Figure 3-5. West Point emergency marine outfall precast concrete saddles.
The 18-tonne saddles, 4.9 m wide and 1.4 m thick, were poured upside down
on shore. Cylindrical blockouts in the saddles provided for the sockets, which were
686 mm in diameter and 457 mm deep. Embedded small-diameter polyvinyl chlo-
ride tubes provided for the grouting of the pile caps once they were in place, and the
final step was covering the ensemble with stone.
In actuality, the support piles were not always perfectly spotted, and not infre-
quently the saddles had to be brought back up onto the trestle for dental work with
a jackhammer.
Pipe-laying took place off the side of the trestle. The crawler crane lowered sec-
tions to the seabed in a specially fabricated setting frame with bellybands for support
under the pipe section (Fig. 3-6). Once the joint had been made, divers jetted rock
under the new section before the release of the bellybands. The minimum thickness
of bedding stone was 0.3 m. After mating, each pipe joint was secured with a pair of
metal ties to which mild steel anodes were attached.
3.5.5 Discussion
The undertaking was not without its difficulties; an early issue involved union divers
alleging dangerous practices. Two of these individuals quit the job. The contractor
tried to rent diving equipment from a local commercial diving contractor but in the
end hired this same experienced company to complete the project. There was appar-
ently no inspection diver. Views of the immediate work area were obtained by video
Figure 3-6. Setting frame and pipe section for West Point emergency marine outfall.
camera, but the level of clarity of these views is open to question. It appears that
there may have been some gaps in the pipe joints larger than the allowable upper
limit of 22 mm.
As a means of comparison to the West Point project, we can consider Califor-
nia’s Central Marin outfall (No. 133 in Table A-1) (Figs. 3-7 and 3-8). The saddle in
Fig. 3-7 is roughly 4.1 m wide.
3.6 The Jackup Barge or Platform

3.6.1 The Concept
A wave in nearshore waters is a wonderful thing for a surfer partaking in what Hawai-
ians call “the sport of kings.” But such features are a colossal bother to the contractor
seeking to install a submarine pipeline from the beach and then into or through the
Figure 3-7. Precast concrete saddle for Central Marin outfall.

surf zone. The idea is to install some form of well-founded platform that stands above
the reach of the crests and is the basis for dredging, diving, pipe-laying, and backfill-
ing. Although the working environment can still be a cauldron of turbulent water and
swirling sand, there is at least one item that stands firm and essentially dry.
There are various ways of establishing the firm footing, and we have already
covered the common trestle. Gerwick (1986) provides three pages of coverage on
the jackup barge or platform, which has found use on a number of marine outfall
construction projects. Typically, there is a shallow, boxlike hull and four adjustable-
length legs through its corners. Control over the position of a dredge head or pipe
section under the water can be maintained through the use of pull and restraint lines
to the jackup legs.
The jackup platform does not have propulsive power of its own, and it is towed
from one location to another by tugboats. When underway, the platform is floating
with the legs retracted. Upon reaching its new station, the legs are jacked down until
they make contact with the seabed, and the hull is then raised clear of the water.
The reverse procedure, before towing, depends heavily on the severity of local sea
conditions.
In a situation where an outfall must enter the sea at the base of a substantial
cliff, the jackup is an especially workable system. An example of this was the (not
numbered) Croyde outfall in England in 2002, where the jackup both installed
Figure 3-8. Lowering frame with pipe section at Central Marin outfall.
new pipe and ripped out the old, tight against a North Devon cliff. Perhaps the most
prominent recent use of the jackup platform or barge during outfall construction
has to do with the drilling of the risers for tunneled conduits. This particular use is
documented for a number of sites in Chapters 8 and 13.
3.6.2 Ocean City Outfall, Cape May County, New Jersey

A jackup barge was involved in the 1981 open-coast installation of this outfall
(No. 81 in Table A-1) (Failla et al. 1983; Tuchscher 1984). The trunk of this fully
buried outfall is 914-mm prestressed concrete cylinder pipe. The angled (43°) dif-
fuser, made of 610-mm pipe, is 189 m long and is fitted with 61 risers that have
51-mm outlets. Overall outfall length is 2,024 m, and discharge is into 9 m of water.
The pipe terminus is a full-size elbow.
3.6.3 Dam Neck Outfall, Virginia Beach, Virginia

The owner of this line (No. 88 in Table A-1), also known as the Atlantic Ocean Plant
outfall, is the Hampton Roads Sanitation District, located in Virginia Beach, Vir-
ginia. Design flow was 2.85 m3/s with the trunk orientation N75°E. The experienced
designer called for perhaps the most extensive geological predesign investigation ever
mounted for an outfall, and the pipeline was vertically positioned in a stratum that
had lain undisturbed for decades. When the pipe went out to bid in the autumn of
1980, there were two options: prestressed concrete cylinder pipe (PCCP, which was
selected) or concrete-coated steel pipe. The US$12.2 million contract was awarded to
a seasoned contractor in the winter of 1981.
The total length is 2,960 m, with the terminal 730 m involving the 45-deg off-
angle diffuser that roughly tracks the 9-to-10-m water depth band. The junction is
actually a wye (in the shape of the letter Y), with one port bulkheaded. Pipe sections
are harnessed at the wye, at the two asymmetrical reducers, and near the terminus.
Within the diffuser, there are 334 m of 1,676-mm pipe, 124 m of 1,372-mm pipe,
and 258 m of 1,067-mm pipe. Effluent exits the main pipe through 299 (2-m-high
and 406-mm-diam.) risers. These projections are made in two parts attached to the
main pipes with four breakaway bolts. Topping each riser are single holes with diam-
eters from 67 mm (inshore) to 83 mm (offshore).
The contractor used a trestle for the inshore portion of the line. Sheet pile walls
lined the trench to keep out sediment. Offshore, a jackup barge was used, but this
rig was ultimately badly damaged during Tropical Storm Dennis. With a central pres-
sure of 999 millibars (mb), this disturbance traveled northward along the coast of
South and North Carolina on August 19, 1981. Completion of outfall construction
was delayed until the following spring and summer, and this work was done using
floating equipment (May 1985). The patented Hydro-Pull process was employed
during pipe jointing. Selected papers on this efficient and oft-used system are Hale
(1989), Price (1994), and Harris (2006).
3.6.4 Watchet Outfall, Somerset, England

Watchet is located on the south side of the merging of the Bristol Channel and
Severn River mouth in southwest England. Tides are big, currents are strong, and
there is a lot of rock. This project (No. 352 in Table A-1) began in September 1998,
immediately after the tourist season. The contractor brought in a four-legged steel
jackup rig that had a maximum distance between seabed and platform underside of
27 m. The platform plan area was 288 m2, and the legs were 863 mm in diameter.
The rig had a stinger arrangement for semicontinuous pipe-laying. It also mounted
a long-reach excavator that could carve the trench to 16 m below rig deck. Trench
depths (in mudstone) ranged from 1.2 to 2.0 m.
The design of this outfall featured ductile iron pipe inshore and within the dif-
fuser, with 690 m of concrete-collar-ballasted medium-density polyethylene (MDPE)
in between. The pipe size was 450 mm, with overall length 1,200 m, nominally end-
ing in 15 m of water. There was a concrete surround in the foreshore rock. The dif-
fuser had four pairs of 150-mm duckbill valves at 15-m spacing.
During construction, a bared foreshore during low tidal stands permitted material
deliveries to the standing jackup. High tide allowed the laying of the plastic pipe by
winching the floating platform ahead in 18-m increments as a new section and its con-
crete collars were added. Following the pipe-laying, divers set down 230 (2.75 m ⫻
4.0 m) flexible concrete block mattresses to further stabilize the MDPE pipe. Also, each
tee-shaped diffuser unit was protected with a two-piece precast concrete housing of total
weight 11 metric tons. The (seven days a week) project was completed in March 1999.
3.6.5 Ayr Stormwater Outfall, Southwest Scotland

A three-leg jackup platform was used as both a base for some of the dredging (backhoe)
and as a pipe-laying structure for this major pipe into Scotland’s Firth of Clyde (No. 369
in Table A-1) (Berry 2006). The contract value of the project was £7.8 million, and the
work was carried out in the summer of the year 2000. The 350 (6.1-m-long) sections of
2.4-m-diam. PCCP were supplied by a U.S. manufacturer and sent in three shipments
from Gulfport, Mississippi, directly to the harbor at Ayr. The outfall contractor had to
deepen the port so that the freighter could dock there during high tides.
Over a three-week period, roughly 145,000 m3 of bottom material was removed
by the backhoe excavator and a large cutter suction dredger. Pipe-laying was carried
out with a pipe barge stationed on one side of the trench and the jackup on the
other. The previously mentioned Hydro-Pull technique was used to joint the new
length and the previously laid one.
Each crane-lowered pipe section had a special 3-m-long geotextile bag strapped
to its underside, and a diver relayed instructions to his tender regarding the filling of
this bag with pumped sand slurry to achieve satisfactory pipe support.
3.6.6 Girvan Industrial Outfall, Southwest Scotland

The builder of this outfall (No. 417 in Table A-1) brought in one of its own jackup
platforms as a base of operations. This structure had four 863-mm-diam. tubular
legs and was capable of a maximum distance of 27 m between seabed and the plat-
form underside, or a maximum water depth of 22 m.
The maximum water depth at Girvan, considering the tides, was 14 m, and the
length of the outfall was 1,100 m (Byles 2004). Standard excavation of the 2-m-deep,
1.5-m-wide trench was done using a hydraulically controlled trenching grab oper-
ated from the edge of the deck. The company had to pretreat 290 m of the trench
with drilling and blasting before excavation. All the preexcavation functions were
done from the deck, with no divers: drilling, charging the holes, and blasting. Once a
24-m-long increment of trench had been established, the platform was jacked down,
moved, and repositioned for the next stretch. However, while doing this, another
24-m-length of high-density polyethylene (HDPE) pipe, with concrete ballast collars
attached, was fed off a deck-level stinger. Placing the pipe immediately after trench-
ing prevented the excavation from silting in.
The trench was backfilled by a bottom-dump barge. In the end, the 15-m-long
diffuser and protective works were placed using the jackup’s own pedestal crane,
along with diver assistance. Working around the clock with two 12-hour shifts
allowed the contractor to finish the whole job in 11 weeks, by mid-September 2003.
Commissioning was three weeks ahead of schedule.
3.7 An Outfall Extension at Fort Bragg, California

3.7.1 The Setting and the Design
Fort Bragg is a small U.S. city, with a population of about 7,000 people. It is located
in California’s coastal timber country roughly halfway between San Francisco and the
border with Oregon. The rugged coastline in the vicinity, with low cliffs and rocky
pocket beaches, trends north–south. The local WWTP is situated directly on the coast,
but roughly 12 m above sea level and hemmed in by the extensive property of a lumber
mill, thus limiting access to the site from land. Access by sea is not easy either, with an
absence of adequate port facilities for many kilometers both north and south.
In the mid-1970s, the existing outfall was found to be too short, and in April
1977 an experienced engineering consultant produced the plans and specifications
for a suitable extension. This extra length would extend from Station 0⫹52 (m) to
Station 2⫹41 (m), from a water depth of only 1 m (at MLLW) to one of 8.5 m.
The pipe involved would be 610-mm-i.d. RCP wherein the spigot of a new section
is inserted into the bell of the previously placed pipe section. Each joint would be
sealed with one rubber gasket.
The alignment, within a 15-m-wide easement, had to traverse three separate zones
in a convoluted seabed: unconsolidated cobbles and boulders over bedrock (mostly);
highly consolidated sandstone with shale interbeds; and unconsolidated sand, shells,
and organic debris. The last zone was only in the outer diffuser area. Bearing of the
new line would be N62°26⬘W. Reflecting the massive winter waves in the area plus its
proximity to the San Andreas Fault, the pipe joints would be restrained longitudinally
and the pipe itself would be anchored to the bottom of an excavated trench and then
surrounded with mass poured concrete up to a minimum of 0.3 m above the crown.
The 19-mm-diam. tie rods across the joints would be threaded at both ends
and would fit through holes in brackets set into the pipe. The seabed anchor bolts
would be of size 35 mm and cemented into 44-mm-diam. (minimum) drilled holes
roughly 3 m deep. The pipe would sit on a special concrete saddle, immobilized by
these bolts and held down by a strap. The longitudinal support spacing would be the
same as the pipe section length, 3,658 mm.
At the end of the outfall, there would be a bulkhead. Over a distance of roughly
34 m inshore of this point, there would be 14 outlets for the sewage effluent. These
flow releases would involve vertical risers, 152 mm in diameter, with top-reducing
elbows (to 76 mm) and flap valves. Riser material would be aluminum bronze.
Before we describe the construction operation, it is instructive to review the
nature of the Fort Bragg plans. These drawings consisted of eight sheets, whose titles
and details are presented in Table 3-5. We also sketch the contents of the contract
documents and specifications as a sample representation of the equivalent docu-
ment for any other marine outfall (Tables 3-6 and 3-7).
3.7.2 Building the Extension Using a Walking Platform

An experienced marine contractor won the contract with a (low) bid of US$1,021,000.
This company possessed the perfect solution to the potentially difficult construction
Table 3-5 Information in Fort Bragg Outfall Plans

Sheet Title Details
1 Project Location Map and Index —

to Plans
2 Ocean Outfall Vicinity and Easement Detailed aerial photograph with
Map drawn access road, airstrip,
planned outfall, sewer line,
names of streets
3 Ocean Outfall Plan and Profile Water depths and full outfall
route with stationing
4 Ocean Outfall Bedding and Joint Connection to old pipe,
Details including manhole at onshore
end of new line; joint restraint;
pipe anchoring; concrete
encasement
5 Ocean Outfall Diffuser Details —
6 Access Ladder and Miscellaneous Ladder down seaside cliff and
Details details on joint tie rods and
pipe brackets
7 Ocean Outfall Hydrographic Survey —
8 Reference Drawing Geology Map —
operation, namely a walking platform (Spider II), shown in Fig. 3-9. The rig could
work in up to 12 m of water and could approach the site from offshore. The Spider
II had two nested four-leg platforms. With one of these planted firmly on the seabed,
the other could be moved laterally and set down. The upper (24 ⫻ 24 m) deck had a
crane, quarters for personnel, including divers, and a helicopter landing pad. Person-
nel and some materials would reach the Spider II by this route.
For transit between sites, a suitably narrow submersible barge is drawn under
the structure, then raised against the Spider’s underdeck. On site, the barge is low-
ered and/or the Spider’s legs are extended to make contact with the seabed, and after
the deck has been jacked up suitably, the vessel can move free.
At Fort Bragg, because of the uneven and boulder-strewn seabed, it took a week
for the Spider II to walk inshore to the beginning of the new outfall. A spud had to
be used to move some big rocks out of the way. For the inshore end, jackhammering
was done on an extreme low tide to remove concrete covering from the existing steel
pipe. Roughly 1.2 m of pipe was bared. A special commercial coupling linked the
old pipe and the first new section that involved the manhole. Some 52 pipe sections
were involved. The section length was 3.66 m.
On the Spider II, a pneumatic drill, with a compressor, was used to drill the holes
into the bottom of the excavated trench. The rock bolts had central holes through
which grout passed on its way into the drilled hole. The tops of the rock bolts were
Table 3-6 Contents of Contract Documents and Specifications for

Fort Bragg Outfall
Title or Group Sample Details or Titles
Notice Inviting Sealed Availability of plans and specifications; bid opening

Proposals June 8, 1977
Instructions to Bidders Site visit; labor and material bond; performance bond;
time for completion
Proposal Itemized bid; bid bond; licensing; subcontractors;
official signature
Standard Package of Payment retention clause; bid conditions, affirmative
Government Forms action requirements, equal opportunity
(largely U.S. EPA and employment; labor standards provisions and
Department of Labor) minimum wages for federally assisted construction;
procurement; construction contracts of grantees;
protests; general conditions, including supplemental
General Provisions Definitions and interpretation of plans and
specifications; duties and responsibilities of the
contractor; prosecution of the work
Special Provisions Scope of work; maximum duration (360 days after
contract signing); permits; divers and methods for
underwater operations; protection of waterways;
boat transportation; storage yard; project access;
excavation material
Technical Provisions General requirements (e.g., existing utilities, removal
of obstructions); materials (e.g., RCP, diffuser;
poured concrete); pipeline installation (Table 3–7)
threaded, so that the pipe support (changed to steel from concrete) could be set to
grade. A steel template was used so that sets of six holes could be drilled.
The diving subcontractor was a firm from Hawaii whose divers supplied me with
much firsthand information, some of it not related to the job. There was prolific
marine life in the area, particularly abalone. The helicopter pilot had worked closely
with me, as a technician diver in 1976, on one of my offshore research projects set
out in Appendix B (see Fig. 2-2).
The helicopter was not involved in transporting fluid concrete to the Spider II.
The wire in a high-line arrangement (Fig. 3-10) joined an A frame on the Spider II’s
deck to a platform by a road onshore. Buckets of concrete traveled along the wire
like a clothesline. Roughly 1,000 such trips were involved, meaning some 750 m3 of
concrete. Wire brushing was done as necessary to remove algae from an earlier pour
before new concrete was sent down. Lengths of reinforcing steel were sometimes
inserted into an old pour before a new one arrived. Most of this work took place
during September and October 1978.
Table 3-7 Pipeline Installation Details (Last Line of Table 3-6) for
Fort Bragg Outfall
Section Section Title Subsections
1 General —
2 Pipeline Alignment Introduction; details route survey; offset
and Grade line parallel to alignment
3 Excavation Introduction; use of explosives; overcut;
bracing, sheathing, and shoring; removal
of unsuitable material; disposal of
excavated material
4 Rock Bolt Tiedowns General; anchor tests; boreholes; rock bolt
rods; mechanical anchors; alternate resin
cartridge anchorage system
5 Installation of Pipe —
Support
6 Pipe-Laying Introduction; clearing the trench; handling
pipe and fittings; setting the pipe;
precautions against pipe movement;
deflections
7 Pipe Testing and Introduction; isolation from existing
Photographs system; hydrostatic testing
8 Concrete Encasement Introduction; clearing the trench; concrete
deposited underwater; precaution against
flotation; construction joints; concrete
finishing
9 Payment —
At one stage, one of the work divers was down in the trench in the utter darkness,
cleaning bits of rock out of the bottom and putting them into a steel drum. A rock fell
off the wall and pinned his leg to the side of the trench. The inspector diver went down
and freed him, but when the inspector regained his above-water station, he removed
only his hardhat, nervous about the precarious condition of the trench below.
Suddenly, there was a muffled cry of, “Murph, Murph, I’m trapped” from under-
water, and the inspector diver descended immediately to find a hand protruding
from a pile of rock filling the trench. The inspector diver dug frantically with his own
hands to free the trapped work diver, who could scarcely breathe, then got him up
to the dive station, from which he was lifted onto the platform deck. The helicopter
arrived, and the pilot had to completely remove the passenger-side door to get the
wounded diver inside and off to the hospital.
The shaken work diver suffered broken ribs but was otherwise all right. He was
spared serious head injury because his (dented) hardhat (Fig. 3-11) took the impact
of the rockfall. I myself got him back into the water again—to do some steel cutting
Figure 3-9. Walking platform at Fort Bragg.

underwater for one of my test pipe rigs (Appendix B) in 11 m of clear Hawaii water
(Fig. 2-5). But the cruel sea got him in the end. Sadly, in 1987 he drowned during
the inspection of a beached barge.
3.8 More Walking Platforms

In section 3.7, we studied the use of Spider II in the building of a difficult outfall
along a treacherous section of California coastline. We will study the use of Spider I
below. Sadly, both platforms are now “history,” committed to the scrap yard. In its
Figure 3-10. Onshore end of high line at Fort Bragg.

day, the Spider stood firmly on the seabed for dredging, pile driving, and pipe-lay-
ing. Change of station was accomplished slowly by jacking up one four-leg subplat-
form, moving that structure laterally via hydraulics, setting it down again, and then
repeating the process. Provisioning could be done by walking inshore and using the
Spider’s crane, by sending out a supply boat on calm days, or by using a helicopter.
The co-use of a walking platform (Spider I) and trestle is shown in Fig. 3-12. This
photograph concerns the Honouliuli outfall in Hawaii, No. 49 in Table 1-1.
The responsible agency for the Dana Point Outfall in California (No. 58 in Table
A-1) was the Southeast Regional Reclamation Authority (SERRA), located near San
Figure 3-11. Hardhat being placed on outfall construction diver by tender.
Juan Capistrano, California. This open-coast project involved 1,448-mm RCP with a
152-mm wall. The pipeline was 3,602 m long and extended to a water depth of 33
m. The terminal 454 m was the diffuser, which was parallel to shore.
For 1979 installation, the contractor used a walking platform (Spider I) for the
inshore 600 m, which extended out to a water depth of 12 m (“Mobile” 1979). The
contractor estimated that use of this unique piece of equipment saved two and a
half months of trestle construction. The contract-required driving of a double line of
Figure 3-12. Walking platform working at end of trestle.
sheet piling, as well as clamshell excavation of the trench and inshore pipe-laying,
were done from this facility, which can move up to 4.5 m longitudinally per cycle or
0.9 m sideways.
A crane barge and horse were involved offshore. Two pipe sections were linked
and laid at a time. Rock armor covered the pipe. There were construction problems,
some of which occurred on the barge and required the constant attention of a team
of workers to keep everything operational. But two other significant problems were
also associated with the marine environment. First, in the beginning, the beach built
out some 120 m beyond what had been expected, and some 7,500 m3 of extra sand
had to be excavated. Second, the sudden appearance of large swell later drove one
work barge and two supply barges aground. There were delays while replacement
equipment was located and taken to the site.
Finally, the U.K. subcontractor for the risers for the tunneled outfall at Gwithian
(No. 294 in Table A-1), apparently buoyed by the success of a basic jackup platform,
has since designed and built a walking eight-leg structure (Fortner 2001; “Storm”
2001; “Jack-Up” 2003). The deck measured 12 ⫻ 12 m, and moving speeds of 25 m/h
were possible. More related advancements are contemplated for the future.
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4
Pulling an Outfall Seaward
along the Ocean Floor
4.1 The Bottom-Pull Operation

This launching technique for steel submarine pipelines is common for shore cross-
ings in the gas and oil industry, as well as for outfalls around the United King-
dom, as shown in Table A-1. The pipe is dragged offshore along the seabed (Hale
1985; Wadley and Henry 1987; Little and Duxbury 1989). An intermediate buoyant
weight of the pipe strikes a compromise between ease of pulling longitudinally and
resistance to being displaced laterally by water motion. The pipe must be strong
enough to withstand the pulling force and pliable enough to move from its orien-
tation behind the shoreline to its line within a trench on the seabed, a transition
possible through a chain of suitably placed rollers.
Ideally, there is a substantial area back of the coastline where strings of pipe
can be laid out perpendicular to the shore. Strings are successively attached to the
trailing end of the pulled pipeline. The joint is welded and checked by radiography.
Then internal and external anticorrosion coatings are applied. The slot in the con-
crete weight coat (CWC) is filled in with wire mesh and concrete and allowed to cure
briefly. The now longer length of pipeline is advanced by one more string length,
and the process is repeated.
The pull force is provided by a heavy cable that extends out to drum or linear
winches on a barge securely anchored offshore along the line of the intended pipe.
The pipe route, whether trenched or not, should be marked with buoys and checked
by divers. It is common that the close inshore portion of the trench should be shielded
by a double row of sheet piles. The design of such steel members and details on their
driving are available in Anderson (2001), which also has three photographs that put
the design of a sheet pile cofferdam against waves into perspective.
91
Beyond the cofferdam, material may be moved into the trench by wave and cur-
rent action, and this material should be removed or the pipe will be laid too high.
The offshore end of the pulled pipeline usually has a special towhead designed to
ride over minor obstructions rather than boring into the bottom.
The bottom-pull operation is a time-consuming operation at the best of times.
A forecast of several days of favorable weather is imperative before the pull is initi-
ated. But maritime history is full of cases where truly nasty weather arrived quickly
and virtually without warning. The construction engineer has to have thoroughly
thought out what to do in such a case. Quickly filling the empty pipe with water is
one stabilization measure, but there has to be a (recessed) valve in the pullhead that
can be opened remotely to permit this. How will this water be blown out later so
that the pull can be continued?
Getting a pipe to move again after a cessation in work may require a heavy
month of work to remove the tons of sediment swept into the area and trench by
the storm waves. The dredging work may have to be extremely delicate so as not to
injure the pipe.
The next section deals with a model case of an outfall being bottom-pulled.
However, there have also been some utter disasters, which we will mercifully not
document. Two sources of trouble will close out the text of this chapter.
4.2 The Cape Peron Outfall, Western Australia

4.2.1 A Visit
In December 1983, our family passed a week in and around the city of Perth, West-
ern Australia. I was fortunate to spend one day, both on shore and underwater, at
the construction site for the Cape Peron outfall (No. 130 in Table A-1), some 40 km
south southwest from central Perth. In this section, this project of the Water Author-
ity of Western Australia (Treadgold 1983) will be covered in some detail to lay out
for the reader a highly successful bottom-pull outfall undertaking.
4.2.2 The Setting

In 1980, metropolitan Perth had one minor and three major municipal ocean outfalls.
Within the latter category, Beenyup (22 million L/day) served the northern urban area,
whereas Swanbourne (Subiaco) (45 million L/day) was located due west of the city
center. Both pipes discharged into about 10 m of water, Subiaco some 1,100 m from
the shoreline, Beenyup at two locations, 1,650 and 1,850 m from the water’s edge.
Woodman Point (34 million L/day, No. 22 in Table 1-1) handled the southern
sector, but it discharged into the north end of the protected tidal lake, Cockburn
Sound, as did a number of industry pipes along the sound’s shoreline. There had
been clearly identifiable adverse effects of these collective outlets on the beneficial
uses and marine life in Cockburn Sound. After a number of years of study of various
cleanup options, including reuse, and considering the steady increase in the south-
ern area’s population, it was decided to build a new outfall.
Pulling an Outfall Seaward along the Ocean Floor 93
The new primary WWTP (125 million L/day) and pumping station are located
just inland from the south base of Woodman Point, itself some 24 km south south-
west from downtown Perth, with the connection provided by 23 km of buried 1.4-m-
diam. specially lined pipe installed during the months that the outfall itself was
under construction. A transition tower, on the back beach at Cape Peron, marks the
division between onshore and offshore pipelines (Cox and Kelsall 1986).
The clear ocean waters offlying Cape Peron experience only minor (range less
than 1 m) tides and tide-induced currents. Wind-driven currents dominate, appar-
ently peaking at about 0.4 m/s and effectively limited to only north and south direc-
tions. The 2.5-km-wide limestone Five Fathom Bank, well offshore, largely blocks
big seas that arrive from southern Indian Ocean storms. The outfall’s 100-year design
wave had a period of 11 s and a height of 4.5 m (in a water depth of 15 m).
Along the outfall route, submerged limestone ridges, up to 5 m high, separating
sand-filled gullies, extend to a water depth of 15 m some 2.6 km from shore. Beyond
this rocky outcrop area, there is a sandy seabed (called the Sepia Depression) about
5 m thick sloping down to a 20-m water depth, meeting the eastern edge of the Five
Fathom Bank about 6 km from shore. Some marine scientists have referred to the
Sepia Depression as a biological desert.
Thorough predesign studies were done to establish precise seabed conditions.
First, there was a combined echo sounding, sidescan sonar, and boomer subbottom
survey. Second, an adapted commercially available, track-mounted percussion rock
drill was used to prove bottom conditions. The engine and air compressor for this
rig were mounted on the attending barge overhead, with an umbilical between. A
single diver operated the normal controls to maneuver the vehicle on the seabed and
to set up for drilling.
4.2.3 The Pipe

The basic 1,400-mm-i.d. pipe chosen for the 4.2-km outfall was mild steel. Wall
thickness was either 16 or 18 mm. The pipe had a 25-mm sulfate-resisting cement
mortar lining with an external coal tar enamel coating 6 mm thick. The 113- or 119-mm-
thick CWC was applied (over mesh) on site, to 55-m-long pipe sections within a
horizontal form. The original target submerged weight of the pipeline was 600 N/m,
but this was increased later to 700 N/m for the first 3,000 m and 1,000 N/m for the
remainder. Pipe section weights were actually checked on site using load cells.
Later, four 55-m-long sections were welded together to form a 220-m-long
string. There were 18 of these, and the ends of some among them are shown in
Fig. 4-1. After radiography of a new weld, the gaps were shot-blasted, primed, and
wrapped with a 450-mm-wide bituminous adhesive wrapping. Concrete was then
placed in the gap. On the inside, the joint area was coated with epoxy cement
mortar. The main track rail was long enough that the complete 325-m-long diffuser
could be assembled and tested. This length contained 69 stainless steel ports, each
with internal bell mouth 135 mm in diameter, alternating on either side and ori-
ented 20° upward from the horizontal. There was also a vertical crown port at each
end of the diffuser. The outer 500 m of the outfall, including the diffuser, where
Figure 4-1. Cape Peron pipe strings laid out in yard.
saline intrusion is a possibility, had 50-year-life zinc anodes attached to stainless

steel studs spot-welded to the steel invert.
Of note is the fact that a policy decision had been made that the outfall would have
only two possible entryways, one at the inshore end and the other at the terminus.
4.2.4 Readying the Pull

The prequalification process for the outfall involved 14 Australian and 15 other
marine contractors. Tender documents were offered to 6 of these in August 1982.
The contract was let in December 1982, and on-shore site work began the following
month. The pipe was installed in January 1984, with rock armoring completed by
the commissioning of the line in June 1984.
A temporary limestone groin was built out 500 m alongside and to the south of
the centerline, using trench spoil. End water depth was 3 m. This facility, which was
removed once pipe installation had been completed, provided sheltered mooring
and rock-loading facilities for tugs and barges, as well as protection for the lead end
of the pipe on the eve of its launching.
The intermittent rock outcrops required drilling (by the underwater tracked
rig, over five months) and blasting. Two separate barge-mounted clamshell dredges
removed the 80,000 m3 of required sand and broken limestone fragments into hop-
per barges and formed the required trench from May to November 1983, ending
shortly before blasting would have had to be eliminated for the seven-week end-
of-year migration in the area of young rock lobster, a key part of the local seafood
industry. A commercial bottom-scan profiling echo sounder provided the cross sec-
tions at 5-m spacings. Some reexcavation was necessary on occasion after storms
caused trench infill. Maximum trench depth was 7 m.
The pipe strings were laid out in a yard with transverse rails as well as the main
rail line. Any new pipe section was moved sideways on a line of small rail bogies,
then transferred to the launchway trolleys. Details are in Cox and Kelsall (1986). The
launchway extended under a road and through a cofferdam into the water.
In bottom-tow projects, a special pullhead is secured to the ultimate terminus
of the pipe. The pullhead has a suitable bracket (or brackets) for attaching the tow
cable(s). At Cape Peron, there was a special skid, fastened to the underside of the
pullhead, to decrease the chance of plowing into the seabed even with two 1,400-
mm-diam. buoyancy tanks on the top (Fig. 4-2).
A head start on the bottom-tow process was made by pulling the hydrostati-
cally tested diffuser out into the lee of the jetty using large tractors. Two 220-m-long
regular pipe strings had been attached to permit this initial increment. Divers then
Figure 4-2. Cape Peron pullhead during fabrication.

attached the pair of buoyancy tanks to the pull head about 300 m from shore, later
connecting fill and dump components for air and water.
4.2.5 Moving the Pipe into Position

Two barges were involved in the pipe pull. The larger of the two dredging barges was
outfitted as the pull barge, and the drilling barge became the block barge. Four large
(13.6-tonne) anchors were placed in excavated pits 5.6 km offshore in 20 m of water
to serve the pull barge.
A 63-mm cable extended between the two barges, with the more inshore block
barge directly connected to the pipe’s pullhead. For each tow increment, the pull
barge would move the block barge 220 m further offshore, thereby advancing the pipe
by one string length. While a new string was being moved into position onshore,
then welded, the pull barge would retreat toward its anchors some 220 m and pre-
pare for the next step.
The true pull began at dawn on January 7, 1984, and was completed 2 hours
before dawn on January 14. There were various problems during this time, the worst
of which involved failure, due to overheating, of hydraulic drive motors of the main
winch and the resultant loss of one full day’s towing activity. A diver rode on the
pull head, ready to flood or vent its two buoyancy tanks as conditions warranted.
Monitoring of pull loads with a force gage seemed to indicate a kinetic pipe friction
coefficient of 0.7 and a kinetic rope friction coefficient of 1.0. The actual maximum
pull force was 40% of that predicted for the operation.
The welding tie-in between the temporary end of the pulled pipe and the next
string was achieved by six welders in two crews. The connection took nine hours
initially but was reduced to six hours by the end. Details on the ensuing coating,
wrapping, and concreting of the joint area are available in Cox and Kelsall (1986).
Safe unsupported lengths for the submarine pipe had been calculated before the
pulling operation. Once the outfall had been placed, divers carried out a detailed
inspection of the line and noted spans of consequence. In these areas, the pipe was
supported by sandbagging before trench backfilling was allowed. This material was
natural sand tremied around the pipe. Commercially available woven polypropylene
geotextile fabric was specified to contain backfill and bottom sand (McLearie 1985;
Cox and Kelsall 1986). The fabric came in 12-m widths, and 660 m of it was wound
onto a cable reeler on a towed barge. As the barge moved forward, the edges of the
fabric were wired to two 48-mm steel cables as the ensemble was fed over the stern.
There was then a long catenary of cable and fabric extending down to and astride the
pipe. Once laid, the fabric was covered with a 1-m-thick layer of limestone rock (of
specific gravity 2.0). The minimum specification for this rock (which was in actuality
well exceeded by the contractor) had been maximum 480 mm, median 250 mm, and
D15 of 160 mm. The latter measure defines the stone size for which 15% are smaller.
Harmony was achieved throughout the project among the various human ele-
ments. There was no down time for any form of labor dispute. In fact, there appeared
to be true team spirit, team pride, and team effort involved in the whole of the
undertaking.
At the time of writing, the Perth area is due to have another new major outfall.
This conduit, to be 45 km north of the city center at a currently undeveloped site,
will be called Alkimos, a name derived from a shipwreck in the area. Internal pipe
diameter would be in the range of 700–1,400 mm, with the outfall length somewhere
between 2.0 and 3.5 km. The end water depth for the larger limit would be 20 m.
4.3 Two Other Notable Bottom-Pulled Outfalls

4.3.1 Black Rock, Geelong, Victoria, Australia
Port Phillip Bay, a significant southern feature in the state of Victoria, Australia, has a
narrow southern connection with seasonally stormy Bass Strait. The vast urban area of
greater Melbourne occupies the north and northeast shore of the bay, and the much
smaller city of Geelong (population 130,000–140,000) lies in the western sector. Gee-
long’s sewage is directed roughly 20 km south by force main to the edge of Bass Strait.
Flows from Torquay to the west and Barwon Heads to the east join the Geelong dis-
charge, and disposal of the combined wastewater is achieved in Bass Strait waters.
Studies by two separate consultants in series ended in a January 1985 report to
the Geelong and District Water Board that addressed both improved treatment and a
modern outfall (No. 192 in Table A-1). Detailed design followed. Marine conditions
were assessed in a number of studies, one of which involved a medium-sized three-
legged jackup platform drilling nine holes to depths of 6–10 m below the seabed.
The bearing of the 1,200-m-long and 1,350-mm-i.d. outfall was to be 160° true.
The steel pipe portion had a wall thickness of 16 mm. An internal 25-mm cement
mortar lining was applied; externally, 4 mm of fusion-bonded polyethylene was
overlain by a reinforced CWC 120 mm thick. Located in 15 m of water, the diffuser
was 225 m long and featured 60 evenly spaced outlets. Port diameter was 135 mm.
The flow capacity of the outfall was 3.35 m3/s, the estimated peak wet-weather flow
in the year 2040. The immediate postconstruction plan was to open only 26 ports.
The engineer’s estimate of outfall construction cost was A$14.5 million. Tender-
ing was done over the interval September 1985 to February 1986, with a planned
contract period of 56 weeks. Six marine contractors were prequalified, and five sub-
mitted bids. The contract (A$13.1 million) was awarded in mid-May 1986 to the
same Australian and South African joint venture that had built the Cape Peron out-
fall (McLearie and Barkley 1987).
The contractor built a trestle 265 m long, extending offshore to a water depth
of 7 m. This work was done to aid the trenching and backfilling operations through
the surf zone. The steel frame decking was prefabricated in 8-m-long sections in
Geelong, transported to the site, and welded to driven piles. A movable piling frame
permitted each new bent of piles to be driven from the previously placed frame. The
trestle was completed in eight weeks.
Dredging of the offshore pipe path was carried out using a clamshell excavation
bucket (Fig. 4-3) operated from a crane barge seaward of the trestle and from a crane
on the trestle for the portion of the trench alongside that structure. An outcropping of
basalt, close inshore, involved some blasting. Removal of some densely compacted
Figure 4-3. Clamshell excavation bucket.
sand areas was done by trailer-suction dredge. Jet pumps also found application in
some regions of highly mobile sand. Planned excavation for the project involved
23,000 m3 of sand and 3,000 m3 of rock. When rough weather in October and
November 1986 caused considerable trench infill inshore, the contractor mobilized
another dredge to reexcavate that portion of the trench and to maintain the trench
open, before pulling pipe, while the main barge was being outfitted as a pull barge.
The plan was to install the pipe by the bottom-pull method, and the extensive
and flat local basalt terrain allowed a full-length rail track to be built on land. The
whole length could be assembled and laid out, a remarkable situation nominally
indicating a continuous pulling operation. Each individual 12-m-long pipe section
was weighed before and after weight coating. The short length was lifted onto the
rail track and attached to the previously placed pipe via full-penetration butt welds
that were fully checked radiographically. After this operation, the string was jacked
one pipe length. The pipes were supported on steel cradles fitted with a special plas-
tic sliding surface. The steel beam launchway was capped with the same material.
The addition of lubricant drove the friction coefficients down to low levels (+S ⫽
0.14, +K ⫽ 0.10) and resulted in a peak pipe-pulling force of 300 metric tons.
However, this load was still more than the 180-metric ton capacity of the winch
barge, and the remaining capacity was achieved through the use of an on-shore
winch. Otherwise, the pulling arrangement was the same as at Cape Peron, with a
block barge placed between the pull barge and the nose of the pipe.
Bedding was placed in a completed trench to a nominal depth of 0.5 m. Both
bedding and backfill were placed using a bottom-dump split-hopper barge loaded
using a 70-tonne crane, mounted on the end of the trestle, and then towed into posi-
tion by a tug. A wire rope to a winch located on shore assisted in keeping the barge
on line and then returned the empty vessel to the loading point.
The tow was actually carried out in nine stages because the drum winch could
only hold sufficient cable to advance 150 m at a time. Hydraulic jacks were used,
with the winches, simply to get the pipe started. During the first day of towing in
mid-1987, marginal seas caused undesired movement of the barges. At one point,
the load on the offshore winch dropped to less than 20 tonnes, and that on the on-
shore winch jumped to more than 200 tonnes. A 180-m-long lateral buckle (of up to
350 mm) occurred in the pipe shoreward of the point where the outfall entered the
water. It took the contractor two days to remedy this offset, using grease lubrication
and the hydraulic jacks.
With 300 m to go in the tow, the on-shore winch could no longer be used. The
resulting extra load on the pull barge caused additional mooring cable forces, with
the result that three anchors were pulled out of position and the fourth anchor’s
cable broke. The former were relocated; the latter was repaired; and the tow was
finally completed after five days.
After the pipeline pull had been completed, divers swam the line starting from the
offshore end. In places where spanning of more than 20 m occurred, grout bags were
placed for support. When this operation had been completed, the pipe was filled with
water and then pressure tested. Placing rockfill and armor followed, using a bottom-
dump barge.
External sacrificial anodes were attached to the pipe, and an impressed current pro-
tection system was ultimately installed. Internal zinc anodes had been placed in the off-
shore 360 m of the line, where it was thought that seawater intrusion might take place.
Because of the problems, the contract period was extended to 65 weeks, with the
construction price raised to A$13.8 million. Flow was not diverted to the completed
outfall for more than a year, until the associated new treatment plant had been com-
pleted in December 1988 and commissioned.
4.3.2 Peterhead No. 2 at Sandford Bay, Scotland

The town of Peterhead is located at north latitude 57°30⬘, some 50 km north of the
North Sea oil and gas center at Aberdeen. The sea conditions here on the east coast of
Scotland are seasonally severe, and Peterhead’s first outfall failed in 1979, apparently
because of intense wave action. This pipeline, which was first operational in 1977,
was made of steel with CWC and was situated on the open coast by Sandford Bay,
immediately south of Peterhead’s semienclosed deep-water harbor. Divers used ther-
mal arc cutting equipment to tidy up the mess, and a lengthy, battered section of
pipe was brought to the sea surface, placed on a workboat, and hauled away.
A replacement outfall (No. 200 in Table A-1), designed by an experienced U.K.
consultant, was meant to lie close to the alignment of the earlier pipe. However, the
new 780-mm-i.d. pipe would be completely buried to avoid the fate of its predeces-
sor. The replacement outfall would be 680 m long, out to a water depth of 20 m.
The buried diffuser would be 72 m in length, with 13 risers terminating in 173-mm-
diam. ports. All the outflow structures would be protected by concrete domes, and
eight outlets would be bulkheaded in the beginning to prevent flow. Although it was
envisaged that installation would be by bottom-pull, the final choice would reside
with the chosen contractor. The anticipated technique was in fact selected.
The consultant was careful with its design wave specification. It derived a maxi-
mum deep-water wave height of an astounding 29 m and an associated period of 14 s.
This wave height figure does not seem out of line with severe conditions that have in
fact happened in the North Sea in the past. The famous New Year’s Day (1995) freak
wave at the Draupner oil platform off Norway registered 25.6 m in height. A 29-m-tall
wave would have broken outside the pipe terminus. But its magnitude clearly indicates
“depth-limited” design wave conditions for the whole pipe (see Appendix B). Large
armor rock was sagely specified.
The shoreline conditions at the proposed sea entry point were such that 45-m-long
pipe strings were the limit. The first string was actually 75 m long, but only because
it extended down the launchway. The strings were made up from the 9-m lengths
that were delivered to the site. The steel pipe wall was 16 mm thick and coated inside
and out with coal tar epoxy. There was also a fiberglass wrap externally. Two forms of
cathodic protection would be incorporated: impressed current overall and 48 sacrifi-
cial anodes in the diffuser section.
The seabed was a complex arrangement of weak granite, stiff boulder clay, and highly
mobile sand. In bothersome and delaying sea conditions and periodic fog, the required
trench (with 3-m bottom width) was established in two parts: drilling and blasting of the
rock, and dredging. The latter involved three approaches. From shore to low water mark,
the work was done by a tracked excavator moving back and forth with the tide. Over a
270-m stretch thereafter, the work was done by a 4 m3 spudded backhoe with a reach of
17 m. Offshore, there was a barge-mounted crane with a 1.7 m3 heavy-duty grab.
Details and difficulties concerning the 1988 pipe pulling, the building of the dif-
fuser, and the trench backfilling are in Duncan et al. (1991). The essentially two-year
construction operation cost £2.35 million, and the pipe itself involved an expenditure
of roughly £75,000.
4.4 A Pair of Modern Bottom-Pulled Conduits

4.4.1 The Besós No. 2 Outfall, Barcelona, Spain
Barcelona is Spain’s major city and port on the Mediterranean Sea. It has a popula-
tion of roughly 1.6 million and was the site of the 1992 summer Olympic games,
an event that brought into focus some of the city’s aging infrastructure. Post-Olympics
sewage disposal plans for the northern part of this large metropolitan area involved the
Besós outfall to replace a badly leaking existing pipe (McIntyre 1995). A US$35 mil-
lion design–build contract for this conduit was awarded in January 1994 to a highly
experienced group that included two U.K. consultants and a pair each of Spanish and
Dutch contractors. Extraordinarily, the line had been designed and built by May of a
year later.
In actuality, the outfall project had an extra dimension that involved exten-
sive dredging of soft clay in an area for a future breakwater extending over the
eventual outfall in a water depth of approximately 20 m. The 200,000 m3 of clay
was replaced by sand. A substantial fleet of fully instrumented dredges and barges
was mobilized for this extra job, which could only be carried out in the spring of
1994, before the bathing season (Dijkstra and McIntyre 1995). There could be
no possibility of murky water adversely affecting beach goers. Full-length excava-
tion for the outfall itself had to await the end of the tourist season, and this work
was carried out in the autumn of 1994. There was one hard spot almost 500 m
off the beach. The target pipe location was 3.6 m below the original seabed. The
client checked the success of the dredging before the consortium moved on to
the pipe pull.
The outfall was 2,900 m long and extended offshore to a water depth of 55 m.
The pipe cross section was virtually at the imagined limit of bottom-pull. The bore
of this longitudinally stiff pipe was 2.10 m, and the overall outside diameter (o.d.)
was 2.62 m. This pipe included a cement mortar inner lining, the 19 mm of steel
pipe wall, and 222 mm of reinforced CWC. For quality control, the application of
the CWC was done off site in a specialized factory.
As if all of this was not enough, there was a major at-sea problem, and that was
the crossing of a high-pressure 508-mm-diam. gas pipeline about 1 km offshore and
in 26 m of water. The situation was such that this line could not be shut down. The
eventual solution was for the outfall to burrow under the other pipe, which would
be supported on an essential bridge, a 60-m-long steel lattice structure with 40 m of
central clear span. Some 30,000 m3 of bottom material had to be excavated right in
the zone of the crossing. The state-of-the-art methodology for this ticklish operation
has been explained by Dijkstra and McIntyre (1995).
The steel pipe was supplied in lengths of 9 m, and sets of these were welded into
117-m-long strings. The pull barge had a winch capacity of 600 tonnes and was held
in place by four high-holding-power anchors. Pull wires extended under the gas line,
and the joint venture averaged one pipe string per 24 hours. As it entered the water,
the pipe moved along rails down a seaside launchway and through a cofferdam. The
backfill material was sand.
The diffuser was 840 m long and involved 15 roughly half-diameter projections
from the pipe crown at 50-m centers. Each of these stubs was completed with four
horizontally discharging nozzles. The joint venture managed to install all 15 of the
outflow ensembles within 30 hours. The deck crane lowered the units, and divers
labored at depth, in 1-m visibility, to install them.
Outflow capacity had been set at 12.4 m3/s. The installed pipe was cathodically
protected with an impressed current system.
4.4.2 A Moroccan Outfall

Agadir is an African tourist center fronting onto the Atlantic Ocean in southwest
Morocco, occasionally subjected to mountainous seas. The 50-year significant wave
height is 8.8 m, meaning a maximum height of something like 15 m under regular
(i.e., no freak waves) conditions. Storm seas had heavily damaged earlier outfalls
in the area. The 300° (true) bearing of the outfall (No. 433 in Table A-1) took into
account the approach direction of the most severe storm waves.
During seven months in 2005, a new outfall was constructed from a dune area
2 km south of the town to carry the average sewage flow of 50,000 m3/day. The pipe
was 1,160 m long overall, 713 m of that seaward of the shoreline. Nominal end water
depth was 10 m. There was a full-diameter elbow at the terminal end that turned into
a four-port discharge structure. This feature connected to the pipe trunk whose end
was designed to accept an outfall extension, if this were to be added later.
The basic steel pipe had an outside diameter of 1,016 mm and a wall thick-
ness of 12 mm. Anticorrosion coatings were applied inside and out, and 130 mm
of CWC was added on site after a series of trials and some submerged weight tests.
One hundred and forty sacrificial anodes were installed on the pipe, at 40-m spac-
ing, to theoretically provide the desired 50 years of protection.
The work area was in a national park, with no formal road access, and for
this project, it was surrounded by a 2-m-high fence embedded in the ground. This
barrier was meant to keep out creatures (e.g., boars, ostriches, and gazelles) native
to the park.
The outfall was bottom-pulled into a prepared trench using 48-m-long prefab-
ricated strings (Lhuillier et al. 2006). Nominal burial of the pipe crown in the thick
full-length deposit of coarse sand was 2–3 m.
Using rock up to 5-tonne size, the contractor took a month to build a 268-m-
long dike out from the shore and slightly north of the outfall alignment. The dike
was useful as protection and as the basis for vibrodriving of a double sheet pile wall,
268 m long and 4.5 m apart, to contain the trench close inshore. Some 1,500 tonnes
of sheet piling were driven in a month and a half. Removing material within the cof-
ferdam made use of an excavator and submerged dredge pump. A suction hopper
dredge worked the offshore zone, and a smaller cutter suction dredge managed the
transition sector. Some 60,000 m3 of sand were removed in 25 days.
The outfall’s pullhead involved the full-diameter end elbow. The towing arrange-
ment used a 120-tonne linear winch onshore and an underwater return sheave off-
shore, securely immobilized 60 m beyond the eventual end of the pipe. The point
of fixity here was a large, commercially available “drag embedment” anchor with a
400-tonne capacity. The pull cable was 52 mm in diameter and 1,800 m long.
The air-filled pipe advanced roughly 200 m on land and then passed onto 27 roll-
ers on the launch ramp. Floats had been attached to lighten the load once the pipe
reached the water.
After the four-day pull and subsequent backfilling were completed, the local
terrain was returned to its natural state. The final outfall test took place in mid-
November 2005.
4.5 Further Cases: 1978–1986

4.5.1 Bethany Beach, Delaware
This 1,981-m-long outfall (No. 59 in Table A-1), was installed by a sustained bottom-
pull operation over seven days of kind weather. The details are presented by Donnelly
(1978). The basic pipe was 762-mm-i.d. steel, with a CWC. Nine delivered lengths,
each 12.2 m long, composed each 110-m string (of 14). Steel buoys, 1.5 m in diam-
eter, were strapped to the pipe crown in the yard.
The pipe passed through a 440-m-long sheet pile cofferdam across the shore-
line. A 230-m-long launching ramp eased the pipe down into the 3-m-deep trench.
The pile driver for the 9- to 18-m-long sheets used the earlier created cofferdam as an
essential trestle. The pull winch was mounted on an anchored dredge.
4.5.2 Raccoon Strait, Tiburon, California

Anderson (1983) has described this 914-mm-diam. steel outfall (No. 106 in Table
A-1) with a 10-mm wall and CWC. Length was 270 m, and end depth in vigorous
strait waters was 29 m. For US$675,000, the pipe was bottom-pulled down a steel
shoreline ramp with angled rollers, through a casing under a road, and into a pre-
pared trench (Fig. 4-4). The diffuser was 61 m long and had 15 risers, each with four
ports. An official Notice to Proceed was given January 1, 1982, and the pipe was
pulled into place by June 8 of the same year.
Figure 4-4. New pipe string for Raccoon Strait outfall.

4.5.3 Kawana, Queensland, Australia

This outfall (No. 113 in Table A-1) was installed in 45 weeks starting in March 1983.
The pipe was steel with an inside diameter of 700 mm, CWC 95 mm thick, and
length of 1.2 km. At the site, 12-m sections were welded together into three 350-m
strings that were sequentially bottom-pulled. Diffuser outlets were then added. A
trestle was used inshore for trench excavation. Outside the surf zone, the pipe was
secured to the seabed with pairs of steel piles driven from the pull barge in water
depths of up to 10 m.
4.5.4 Great Grimsby Outfall, England

The owner of this outfall (No. 115 in Table A-1) is Anglian Water, and the consulting
engineer was an experienced U.K. firm. The pipe, extending into the estuary of the
Humber River, off the North Sea, was installed by a U.K. contractor for £7.35 mil-
lion. This work was accomplished during a 15-month period, ending in February
1983. The pipe is 2,909 m long, with 1,670 m below the low tide mark. The end
depth exceeds 7 m at mean low water. The pipe is of composite construction, hav-
ing a steel pipeline (o.d. of 2,240 mm and wall 20 mm thick) with a fiberglass-
reinforced plastic liner (inside diameter of 2.0 m), and a concrete weight coat for
negative buoyancy. The liner was 24 mm thick, whereas the weight coat, cast over
square steel fabric, had a thickness of 185 mm. There were two pipe wraps between
the steel and the concrete. Cement grout occupied the 76-mm annulus between the
inside of the steel pipe and the outside of the liner.
The diffuser is 54 m long and has 10 risers of 500-mm diameter, each with two
300-mm-diam. ports. The pipe size reduces in five stages, eventually to 600 mm.
Lining for the pipe was necessary because of the substantial industrial contribution
to the wastewater.
Of the total pipe length, 170 m was laid on land, 2,500 m was pulled (in 10 strings),
and a 230-m length was towed into position. The mud foreshore was completely
unsuitable as a fabrication area, so substantial initial work was required to alter this
region. The final step, for an area of 250 ⫻ 70 m, was the placing of a timber grillage
to support the pipe strings.
The trenching operation across the extensive mud flats was carried out in two
stages: bulk excavation using a large grabbing pontoon and precise grading by bucket
dredger. This tedious 18-week operation to create a trench 8 m deep involved the
removal of 420,000 m3 of material. Sand bedding, 0.5 m thick, was placed on the
bottom of the completed trench before pulling began.
The pulling operation did not go smoothly at first, and the delays involved
meant that the stipulated 12-month construction period was exceeded. The pipe was
stiffer than expected, meaning that it did not follow the curve of the launch ramp.
The upper end of the ramp was overstressed, damage occurred, and remedial fabrica-
tion had to be carried out.
Once in the water, the pipe was less buoyant than expected, and the pull winch
had to work near its full 200-tonne capacity during the towing of the first several
strings. After extra buoyancy tanks were strapped onto the pipe, the pull load was
substantially reduced. Other delays resulted when three buoyancy tanks burst free
and then when a (pull barge) anchor-lift cable parted. The contractor originally
envisaged a two-week period for the pulling operation, but the actual duration
was 11 weeks.
The attaching of the diffuser risers was difficult. The problem occurred partly because
of the strong flow speeds in the estuary, which can reach 2 m/s. The trench was back-
filled with rock whose size, over the top 300 to 400 mm of the trench, was 100 mm.
The technical literature contains much information on this 17.7 m3/s capacity
outfall (Fullalove 1982; “Grimsby” 1982; Mason et al. 1985; Haywood 1987). Com-
missioning took place in late October 1987.
4.5.5 Tondo, Manila Bay, Philippines

This outfall for the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System of Manila
(No. 127 in Table A-1) was designed and built by U.S. companies. This big steel
line is in largely weather-protected harbor waters. Completion was on May 5, 1983,
after round-the-clock efforts over the previous 14 days. The concrete-coated steel
outfall, 2,540 m long and 1,829 mm in outside diameter, was bottom-pulled by a
barge with a 180-tonne-capacity winch. There were 14 strings. End water depth is
approximately 11 m.
The wall thickness of the pipe is 13 mm, and the heavily reinforced weight coat
is 267 mm thick. The latter was designed to resist ring bending and anchor dam-
age. There was an inside (16-mm) mortar lining. Each 183-m section was placed
on a launchway that used jet tires as bottom rollers. A 150-m-long trestle provided
the transition between the land and sea portions of the project. The land work, in a
flooded trench, experienced some problems because of a heaving bottom (“Long”
1983). The outfall was designed to rest on soft bay mud in an unlined dredged
trench roughly 4–5 m deep. Crushed rock was used for backfill.
The design flow was 3.5 m3/s, with the peak set at 5.5 m3/s. There were 25 risers
bolted by divers to stubs on the pipe crown and 97 ports 150 mm in diameter.
4.5.6 Hythe Foul, South Kent, U.K.

There is written material on this steel outfall (No. 139 in Table A-1) in Brown (1988).
This 610-mm-o.d., 10-mm-wall pipe has a CWC of 80-mm thickness. The outfall dis-
charges through 130-mm ports topping 14 short risers protected by precast concrete
chambers in 25 m of water. The pipe is buried in a dredged trench throughout its
2,714-m length. Installation in the summer of 1984 was by the bottom-pulling of
eight strings. A sheet pile cofferdam crossed the beach.
4.5.7 Kirkcaldy, Firth of Forth, Scotland

This 982-m-long outfall (No. 161 in Table A-1) has been covered in the professional
literature (Moore et al. 1987; Henry and Perfect 1988). A steel line, 864 mm in
outside diameter, with wall 14 mm and 80-mm reinforced CWC, it was installed
in 1986 by the bottom-pull of nine strings into a trench prepared by blasting and
dredging. Flow exits into a large estuary receiving water through five risers and pairs
of 457-mm ports. Various numbers have been given for the end water depth. Some-
thing like 12 m would appear to be appropriate. Cathodic protection is provided by
sacrificial anodes.
4.6 Further Cases: 1987–2002

4.6.1 Broadstairs, Northeast Kent, England
This £2.44 million outfall (No. 176 in Table A-1) was basic 610-mm-diam. steel
with a 6-mm coating of bitumen enamel and an 80-mm CWC. The pipe-string-
ing yard was on a small headland, and sea access was provided by a hand-dug
125-m-long, 1.52-m-diam. tunnel through a chalk cliff that dropped 14 m. The out-
fall trench in the chalk seabed was carved 3–7 m deep by a cutter suction dredge.
The pull barge offshore dealt with strings roughly 300 m long. During the haul,
the diffuser’s complex structure was protected by an outer steel pipe sleeve. Total
length was 3.6 km. Once the pipe was in place, concrete protection units were placed
over inspection hatches spaced every 600 m. The eight high-density polyethylene
(HDPE) diffuser risers were similarly protected by cylindrical concrete chambers.
Details on this outfall are available in Brown (1988), Smy (1988), and particu-
larly Greeman (1987).
4.6.2 Ahirkapi, Istanbul, Turkey

The paper by Dumbleton (1987) covers this twin steel outfall (No. 187 in Table A-1),
where each pipe has a diameter of 1,626 mm, a 25-mm wall, and a CWC. Overall
length is 1,162 m, with an end water depth of 60 m. The pipes were bottom-pulled
onto a gravel bed within a trench that required the excavation of almost 150,000 m3
of Bosporus bottom material. Outflow was through 44 four-m-high risers with top
elbows. This US$13.0 million project started in January 1986 and was completed in
November 1987.
4.6.3 Eastney Beach, Portsmouth, Hampshire, England

This 5,983-m-long outfall (No. 213 in Table A-1), constructed during 1989, is adja-
cent to the main Solent shipping channel. The basic steel pipe was of nominal diam-
eter 1,442 mm and had a 14-mm wall. The CWC was 160 mm thick. There were
18 strings, each approximately 320 m long, plus a diffuser assembly of length 113 m.
The diffuser had nine risers and 10 inspection hatches protected by precast concrete
chambers. Installation by bottom-pull into a trench nominally 4.5 m deep (giving
a minimum 2-m cover), lasted 12 days and passed through a double sheet pile wall
across the shoreline. The design flow was 3.4 m3/s, with end water depth of 20 m (Bul-
len et al. 1993). Kloet and Fairgrieve (1991) discuss the dredging for this project.
4.6.4 Stonecutters Island, Hong Kong

This was a major but temporary outfall (No. 248 in Table A-1), to be ultimately
covered over in Hong Kong’s continuing reclamation efforts within Victoria Har-
bour. The contract was let in October 1990 (Reed and McLearie 1992). Neville-Jones
(1992) has provided thorough coverage of the construction effort of this dual line.
Each pipe was 2,200-mm-o.d. steel with 27-mm wall and 220-mm CWC. One pipe-
line was 573 m long, and the other, 586 m. The pipes were bottom-pulled down
a launchway into a 40-m-wide trench partly created through blasting of rock and
boulder. Some digging in of the pull heads was experienced. The installation was
completed in the early hours of Christmas morning 1991, but some spans had to
be later corrected. There was a single robust 15-m-high riser at the end of each pipe,
topped with a three-port (1,000-mm) head with duckbill valves.
4.6.5 Belmont (Lake Macquarie), New South Wales, Australia

This steel outfall (No. 273 in Table A-1), with an inside diameter of 1.4 m, has a
20-mm wall, linings, and CWC, taking the overall outside diameter to 1,650 mm.
The length is roughly 1.8 km, and the pipe is buried, except for its diffuser section.
During construction, a 500-m-long trestle was installed and used as the base for
the creation of a 3-m-diam. tunnel in the seabed to carry the pipe through the surf
zone, namely to a water depth of 9 m. A special dredge then excavated the pipe
trench out to a water depth of 25 m. Installation was by bottom-pull. The 121-m-
long diffuser had 55 ports of 110 mm fitted with duckbill valves. Commissioning
took place in 1994. In a follow-up operation, roughly nine years later when it was
realized that flows were superior to those proposed, a fabricated steel diffuser exten-
sion assembly was floated out and then sunk near the end of the pipe. Joining was
ultimately realized using a custom 3-m-long spool piece. The 66-m-long diffuser
add-on had 112 ports, and again these were fitted with duckbill valves.
4.6.6 Wellington, North Island, New Zealand

The disgraceful century-old Moa Pt. No. 1 outfall, discharging raw sewage at the
Cook Strait shoreline, was replaced by this 1,850-m-long pipe (No. 327 in Table
A-1) (Harding 1991; Karolski 1999). The old discharge, which I viewed in May 1989,
was closed in June 1998. The new 100-m-long diffuser discharged in a water depth
of 23 m. This was a NZ$22 million design–build project that started in November
1995 and was completed in April 1997.
The basic steel pipe in the outfall had an inside diameter of 1,250 mm. With
internal coating and cement lining, the inside diameter was 1,200 mm. The external
anticorrosion wrap and CWC took the total pipe outside diameter to 1,560 mm.
There was full-length burial. Inshore (less than 12 m of water) excavation of the
trench within sheet piles was from a trestle extending out 208 m from land. Figure
4-5 shows the type of arrangement. The trench was up to 8 m deep across the shore.
Figure 4-5. Sheetpiling being driven by vibratory hammer from trestle.
The trestle was supported by 70 steel piles of 600-mm diameter driven 5 m into the
seabed. Offshore dredging of the 2–3-m-deep trench was from a 50 ⫻ 23-m, 1,000-
tonne crane barge that arrived on site in early June 1996 and started excavation
work toward the end of July. Both a clamshell and suction dredge were used. After
September 1996, the barge was allowed to work its shallower end at night. In-line
air traffic was then on curfew.
Some 80,000 m3 of bottom material was excavated for the trench. For 120 hours
at the end of February and in early March 1997, the pipe was bottom-pulled into
this excavation, in 12 flange-jointed 160-m-long strings. The individual winches
on the barge were rated at 30 tonnes. There was then some 75,000 m3 of “reverse
dredging.”
4.6.7 Baix Llobregat, Barcelona, Spain

This was a substantial CWC-over-steel outfall (No. 387 in Table A-1), 3,745 m long,
overall inside diameter of 2,435 mm and overall outside diameter of 3,070 mm. The
end-of-line Mediterranean Sea water depth was 60 m. Twenty-five strings of 144 m
each were bottom-pulled. The first 500 m of the outfall were on land within a cof-
ferdam; the second 2,600 m were in a trench; and the remainder was on the sea-
bed. The diffuser featured 13 risers, 1.6 m high, each with four openings fitted with
324-mm duckbill valves. Installation took place in May and June 2001.
4.6.8 Bunbury, Western Australia, Australia

This community, 130 km due south of Perth, is one that seeks to maximize the reuse
of its wastewater, sending only the surplus to the outfall (No. 400 in Table A-1). The
design peak discharge, for the year 2040, was 16 million L/day. The 1,700-m-long steel
outfall has an outside diameter of 610 mm and a CWC that takes the overall o.d. to
800 mm. This pipe reaches the shoreline through a natural gap, or “blowout,” in the
coastal dunes where the stringing yard was located. Pipeline bearing is 290°T, mean-
ing 20° north of true west (270°). The outfall was bottom-pulled across the beach and
into its trench over four and a half days. Pipe burial near the shoreline was 2 to 3 m.
The diffuser was positioned to encroach as little as possible on beds of sea grass in the
area. Diffuser length is 120 m, and end depth is 12 m of water. The effluent is released
through 30 crown-mounted elbows at 4-m spacing. Port diameter is 80 mm. Construc-
tion began in November 2001, and commissioning took place in June 2002.
4.7 Additional Matters

4.7.1 Still More Bottom-Pulled Outfalls
There are certainly other major outfalls that have been bottom-pulled, but space
constraints do not allow further project summaries herein except for section 4.7.2.
The reader is referred to the contents of Table 4-1 for additional case histories.
4.7.2 Impediments to Crossing the Coastal Strip

The land, ocean, and seabed situation at Cape Peron (in section 4.2) was virtually
ideal, and the contractor took full advantage of this situation in carrying out the
work. There have been numerous bottom-pull cases where one element or another
has caused a considerable complication, and we will consider four U.K. projects
that were all carried out by the same marine contractor. We seek here (perhaps
Table 4-1. Additional Bottom-Pull Outfalls

Outfall Name No. from Table A-1 References
Hastings 85 Thomson (1981, 1983); Irwin and

Thomson (1984)
Pennington No. 2 86 Smy (1988)
Great Yarmouth 116 Willis (1988)
Clacton Foul No. 2 131 Hayward (1984)
Marske 140 “Dock” (1984); “Longest” (1984a, b)
Greenock 201 Hunter and Scott (1991)
Scalby Mills 207 Henry and Perfect (1988)
Par No. 2 256 Weedon (1994)
Stanley WWTP 261 Oswell (1993)
prematurely) to set the stage for the next chapter, which involves the elimina-
tion of coastal strip problems, whether technical or environmental, by burrowing
underneath.
The Hastings and Bexhill (No. 117 in Table A-1) outfall discharges into 15 m of
English Channel water. The 914-mm steel pipe, with 13-mm wall and 80-mm CWC,
was bottom-pulled in nine increments. Total length was 3,142 m, and the terminal
190 m was the diffuser, with 20 risers and 150-mm-diam. openings. The construc-
tion interval was January 1982 to November 1983. Smy (1988) and Armstrong et al.
(1989) contain details.
There was room behind the coast on an undeveloped flat area for the contrac-
tor to assemble eight trunk strings of 360-m length and the shorter diffuser. But
within the 400-m distance between the stringing yard and the water, a strip of
coastal development had to be negotiated. As the pull head advanced, it passed over
a small stream on heavy rollers, through a backyard, and between two houses. It
then encountered a main road whose traffic was temporarily using two double-ramp
bridges so that the pipe could pass underneath at regular road level. There was then
an 850-m-radius horizontal curve to pass between two more houses, followed by a
2.40-m-diam. culvert crossing under two railway tracks. Finally, there was the beach
crossing within a sheet pile cofferdam into a prepared trench.
The 1,842-m-long open-coast Margate outfall (No. 148 in Table A-1) has received
some coverage in the professional literature (Brown 1988). The pipe material was
steel, outside diameter of 914 mm, with a 13-mm wall and 80-mm CWC. End water
depth was 30 m. The diffuser was 78 m long and featured 13 risers protected by pre-
cast concrete chambers. The openings were 223-mm in diameter. Three hatchboxes
were included (covered openings in the pipe that can be accessed to determine if the
outfall contains settled-out material).
Here, there was an undeveloped coastal margin, but this flat area lay some 20 m
above sea level behind steep chalk cliffs virtually at the sea’s edge. Ten strings, most
roughly 200 m long and aligned offshore–onshore (pointing into the water), could
be fitted into the strip of land. The pipe left the stringing yard and sagged down,
unsupported, into a slit in the cliffs. It then progressively encountered five framed
towers of decreasing height, set in the near shore. Rollers mounted within these
structures both supported the pipe and directed it through a slight change of hori-
zontal alignment.
The Ryde outfall (No. 154 in Table A-1) was another steel outfall, with an inside
diameter of 559 mm, a 13-mm wall, an 80-mm CWC, and a fully buried length of
3,107 m. It was installed in September 1985. Trench excavation through the inshore
sandbank was up to 9 m deep. The stepped diffuser is 90 m long and has six 219-mm
riser outlets protected by domes. The risers are 5.3 m high. There are also five hatch-
boxes. Discharge is to a strait at a depth of 25 m.
Smy (1988) mentions this bottom-pull installation, and detailed material
appears in Gibson and Bone (1987). Here there was a restriction on the felling of
trees in a seaside park. Thus, the stringing yard was located not on land but on a
mildly elevated 250 ⫻ 50 m steel platform created partly over the beach and chiefly
above the extensive tide flat. Thirteen strings of pipe could be placed on the plat-
form. A slot was dredged from outside into the tide flat directly seaward of the plat-
form. Pipe was fed out, ultimately into this opening, over a series of rollers mounted
on temporary frame structures placed on the tide flat.
In the case of the Newhaven Seaford Bay outfall (No. 211 in Table A-1), an on-
land pipe assembly area was available, but it sat back from the shoreline. Nine trunk
strings, each roughly 264 m long, were joined by a diffuser string 296 m in length.
First, the pipe had to pass under a railway line, and then it was routed to avoid sev-
eral ruined buildings of local historical interest. The pipe rose to cross a tidal creek
on rollers mounted on steel frames. (Small bridges had had to be erected to main-
tain footpaths and rights-of-way.) The pipe then dropped down into a sheet pile
cofferdam that crossed the beach.
4.8 Crucial Numbers for the Bottom-Pull Operation

In the hundreds of preceding words, we have only hinted at three potentially seri-
ous problems: the target submerged weight of the pipe, the applicable friction coef-
ficients (static and kinetic) for both tow wire and pipe, and water absorption by the
concrete weight coats.
A CWC has to serve two masters. Once installed, the pipeline has to be stable
in the face of strong wave surge, and it should sit down hard on the seabed. During
installation by pulling, our concern here, the empty pipe has to strike an intermedi-
ate buoyant weight such that it can readily be advanced longitudinally yet not stray
laterally outside its corridor. Target submerged weight data (published and unpub-
lished) from 21 actual bottom-pull projects have been collected, and the (interpo-
lated) statistical distribution is presented in Table 4-2. This summary suggests a
median desired buoyant weight of roughly 900 N/m. Note that iron sand aggregate
or equivalent (as available and cost-effective) can be used to give a base concrete
specific gravity as high as 3.0, if needed.
Two absolutely critical pieces of information involve numbers for cable and pipe
friction coefficients, on the one hand, and the absorption of seawater by the CWC,
expressed as a percentage of the weight of that outer layer, on the other. With sea-
water absorption, the pipe displaces less seawater than expressed by its bulk exterior
volume. The pipe thus sits down heavier on the seabed and is harder to slide. Many
contractors have not taken a chance on the amount of such absorption and have car-
ried out weighing tests with one of their pipe sections hanging off a crane wire and
load cell, immersed in seawater, for example, adjacent to a pier.
Calculating the volume of concrete is not a problem if the weight coat was added
inside forms. However, if the outer layer was applied as shotcrete, that calculation
would be difficult because of the uneven nature of the surface that results. Also, the fin-
ish on the concrete within forms is far smoother than that resulting from shotcrete.
Table 4-2. Distribution of Past Target Submerged Weights for Bottom-Pull Pipelines
Cumulative Percent 20 40 60 80
Weight (N/m) 500 805 1,000 1,335
The amount of water absorption is traditionally given as a percentage of the

weight of the CWC. I have seen a range of design values of from 2% to 8%. Some
designers prefer 3%. I have noted an expressed maximum of 5% in submarine pipe-
line specifications.
Simply for illustration, consider a submarine pipe similar to the Cape Peron one
(section 4.2). If the percent of seawater absorption by the CWC was just 1% higher
than estimated, the submerged weight of the pipe would increase by almost 14%,
from 1,000 to 1,138 N/m.
Long-time U.K. practice calls for a static coefficient of friction of unity for both
cable and pipe. The kinetic coefficient of friction is felt to lie in the range of 0.4 to
0.5. In the planning for the Cape Peron project, a value of +S ⫽ 1.0 was used for the
pipe, but +S ⫽ 1.6 for the cable. Presumably, the latter reflected the possibility of the
cable digging into the trench bottom. Monitoring of the actual friction coefficient
values during the pull indicated 0.7 and 1.0, respectively, for the most part, with
occasional swings to near the design values. Effective friction coefficients are highly
magnified if an attempt is being made to pull a sanded-in pipe.
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5
Placing Outfalls under
Protected Sites or
Obstructions
5.1 Horizontal Directional Drilling

5.1.1 The Technology
The wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) is on land, perhaps some distance back
from the coast. The approved wastewater discharge location is somewhere well off-
shore. In Chapter 4, we dealt with situations wherein the pipe was required to pass
through whatever natural and man-made obstructions lay between the WWTP and
the water’s edge. In this chapter, we deal with a technique, called horizontal direc-
tional drilling (HDD), which takes the pipe under the coastal strip. This technology
has been available since the 1970s, and hundreds of pipeline paths have been estab-
lished in this way.
Although we are interested in what is known as a “shoreline crossing,” from
land to sea, most HDD projects have involved land-to-land links, placing a pipeline
under a waterway and then up the other side. The interested reader might consult the
following sources: Jones (1986), Chan (1990), “Niagara” (1991), “Murphy” (1992),
“Pipeline” (1996), Hairston et al. (1997) , Miller (1999), Nichols et al. (1999), Sker-
pan (1999), Stuby (1999), Angelo (2001), and Smith (2006). See Figs. 5-1 and 5-2.
An example shoreline crossing is described in “Offshore” (2000).
There are dimensional constraints in HDD because of limits on pushing and pull-
ing capabilities of the drill rigs involved. A nominal length constraint would be 1.5 km
(“Directionally” 1991), but 1,831 m has been accomplished (Bueno 1999). A 2,560-m
crossing was done in 2006, but this actually involved two rigs drilling from opposite
sides of Choctawhatchee Bay in Florida and meeting “bang on” in the middle. The
pipe was a 254-mm-diam. steel gas line with wall thickness of approximately 9 mm.
The maximum outside diameter has been slowly creeping up. At one time, it was
1,067 mm (Carr 1989; “Innovative” 1989; Rybel et al. 1991; Cherrington et al. 1993).
115
Figure 5-1. Gas line being pulled into HDD hole for crossing under slough.
Figure 5-2. Configuration of pipe prior to entry into HDD hole for river crossing.
Placing Outfalls under Protected Sites or Obstructions 117
Then it was 1,200 mm (Ensor et al. 1993; Spiekhout et al. 1993; Bueno 1998). At the
time of writing, 1,422 mm has been reached. This distance involved three crossings
of lengths 680 to 767 m (“Southeast” 2005).
5.1.2 The Methodology

The pipe route chosen must clearly connect the predetermined entry and exit (tar-
get) locations and pass an adequate distance (“minimum cover”) beneath gravel
pits, scoured river beds, bridge footings, environmentally sensitive areas, cliff faces,
accumulations of hazardous materials, other pipelines, beaches, and whatever else
lies in between. The path needs to be composed of straight tangents and long-radius
curves, the latter sized to avoid overstressing the planned pipe. The route must also
avoid overly difficult or fissured soil or rock conditions. Knowledge of such subsur-
face ground conditions can only come from a thorough preproject assessment by a
series of (off-centerline) adequately deep boreholes with associated discrete sam-
pling and standard penetration tests.
HDD involves a slant-drilling rig set up on a road-accessible and sufficiently large site
adjacent to the planned land entry point for the pipeline. An initial hole, called a pilot
hole, is drilled along the proposed route of the pipe, from entry to exit. The initial angle
may be something like 8 to 12 degrees, and the exit angle somewhat less (typically 5 to
10 degrees), so that the pipe can be ultimately pulled back into it without a giant bow.
The pilot hole is drilled by a rig that pushes the drill rods into the ground. Benton-
ite drilling fluid (“mud”) is pumped down the center of the non-rotating drill rods and
turns a downhole motor just behind the drill bit. The drill bit advances the string, and
the drilling fluid carries the soil or rock cuttings back along the outside of the rod to an
adequately sized reception pit adjacent to the drill rig. This feature could be a plastic-
lined depression in the ground. Preproject attention must be focused on a source of
water for the slurry and then its disposal. Environmental and regulatory considerations
are an important aspect of most HDD projects, and permits will be involved.
In line with the downhole motor, there is a slightly bent section of drill rod called
a bent housing. The orientation of this feature can be changed by incrementally rotat-
ing the whole drill string. The bend causes the entire assembly to steer mildly to one
side, and periodic adjustments can be made to follow the desired track.
The progress of the pilot hole is monitored by a cable-free steering tool system,
one part of which is a survey package that provides monitoring of the head posi-
tion and orientation. The operator can close any deviation between the actual and
desired positions by repositioning the bent housing.
In certain cases, a washover pipe may be overdrilled along the path being followed
by the drill bit. Whereas the drill string for the pilot hole is not rotated, the whole
washover pipe, with a cutting bit at its downhole end, is rotated into position. The
washover pipe gives rigidity to the pilot string and acts to keep the hole open upon the
cessation of drilling. The drill string and washover pipe can be advanced alternately.
The drilled hole is of a size too small for the ultimate pipe, and the idea is to pull
back to the rig a reamer or series of reamers that will open out the path sufficiently.
The pulling is provided by the drill string unless a washover pipe has been inserted.
In such a case, the drill string is withdrawn back to the drill rig, and the washover
pipe (with cutting bit removed) is used as the pull line. In that case, joints of drill
pipe are added to the drilling string, behind the reamer, as it is pulled back. Large
volumes of drilling fluid are added to flush the cuttings.
When the barrel reamer reaches the drill rig, it is removed. To the far end of the
drill pipe left in the hole, say, is attached a “fly cutter” (an open, soft ground reamer
with “wings”), another reamer, a universal joint, and then a swivel connected to
the pull head on the pipe. The reamer and pull head assembly are rotated from the
drilling rig, using the drill pipe, and the pipe is pulled steadily back to the rig. The
swivel ensures that the rotating action of the cutter and reamer is not transmitted to
the pipeline itself. No work hour restrictions should be imposed on the HDD pro-
cess, either at the preream or pullback stages. A shutdown during these stages could
jeopardize the success of the operation.
Although HDPE is certainly becoming a more popular pipe material for HDD
projects (e.g., Popelar et al. 1997), the usual material is steel. To extend the life of
this material, a long-lasting external coating is applied. The bonding of this material
to the steel is of utmost importance, and fusion-bonded epoxy (FBE) is widely used.
This material is smooth, promoting sliding and reducing pull forces. Various coatings
are in use for the inside of the pipe, notably FBE, coal tar epoxy, or cement mortar.
Steel offers tensile force advantages over HDPE, but the latter has advantages
of cost, corrosion resistance, and ease of fabrication. HDPE also suffers from plastic
deformation and inherent buoyancy, even when full of water.
A wide range of ground materials can be drilled, namely soil, gravel, cobble,
glacial till, as well as soft and hard rock. If the ground is actually soil, a jetting head
may replace the drill bit. High-pressure water is forced out holes in the rotating head,
eroding the formation. Spoil is washed back along the stationary drill string.
5.2 Gas and Oil Industry Shore Crossing, Example No. 1

I would be remiss if I presented only HDD cases strictly involving outfalls in this
chapter. Three highly pertinent early cases from the gas and oil industry closely mir-
ror the shoreline crossing of a pipeline to carry sewage.
This first project, detailed by Brat (1986), concerns a steel crude oil trunk line
coming ashore just north of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Early on, the author lays
out his views on the negative issues if the 2,300-m-long shore crossing were to be
done using the approach of the previous chapter:
1. a deep excavation and resulting environmental damage to the precious Dutch
dunes that protect this low-lying land from encroachment by the sea;
2. a large cofferdam, across the beach and into the nearshore waters, to contain the
trench and prevent its infill by sand;
3. dredging, by floating plant, right up to the end of the cofferdam;
4. a process that consumes a lot of time;
5. a concept that is expensive; and
6. inability to take advantage of the weather window in the summer because that
interval is the tourist season, with beach work prohibited.
Suffice it to say that this project made use of the HDD approach, but only for an
800-m-long section. A special burial method was chosen for the other 1,500 m, as I
will outline later.
The drill rig was set up behind the first row of dunes, and a 76-mm-diam. pilot
hole was drilled out to the seabed target 800 m away. The entry angle was 12 degrees,
and this tangent was steered to a sagbend that leveled the path out under the beach
12 m below sea level. Later the pipe rose through another sagbend and exited the
seabed at an angle of 3 degrees. In additon, the drill rig also drove a 127-mm-diam.
washover pipe that also exited the seabed at the target location. The complete drill
string was then incrementally returned to the rig, with the washover pipe left in place
as the ultimate pulling medium for pipe placement.
The pipe diameter was 254 mm, and there were two different wall thicknesses, 11
and 14 mm. The pipe string was prepared in sections between the first and second row
of dunes where there was an essentially level area 300 m long and 40 m wide. Here,
one 200-m-long and seven 300-m-long sections were set up on roller beams. The five
300-m sections, which were not to enter the hole, received an asphalt layer plus con-
crete weight coating that varied from 51 mm (inshore) to 63 mm (offshore). The other
three sections received 3 mm of polyethylene only. Discounting the brief time on the
seabed before pullback, weight coating is not necessary for an HDD steel pipe.
A roller track had been built across the dunes and over the beach. A pull barge
was anchored offshore along the pipe centerline, and two of its winch wires were
brought ashore and connected to the pull head of the first 300-m section. When
the tail end of this section reached the appropriate point, the pulling operation was
stopped and the next section then rolled over the beams onto the roller track and
welded to the first section. The discrete pulling and joining steps were repeated until
the full 2,300-m pipeline was assembled. The final pull brought the landward end of
the line somewhat seaward of the HDD exit point in 8 m of water.
The washover pipe had been pushed some distance beyond the exit point so that
its end could be pulled up and onto a work barge. There, the fly cutter, barrel reamer,
and swivel were connected to the washover pipe, with the assembly then lowered to
the seabed. Divers assisted in the joining of the seaward end of the washover pipe
system and the landward end of the 2,300-m-long pipe whose CWC portion had
been fitted with buoyancy tanks to reduce sliding friction. Still, the main rig in the
dunes struggled with the pull load even though it was aided by the efforts of shore-
based winches. In time, the pipeline was pulled into position, and the buoyancy
components were released.
The problem now was the burial of that part of the pipeline that was not inside
the drilled hole. Actually, this step involved only 1,200 m of pipe because the outer
300 m were to stay on the bottom to allow the laybarge to later tie on to it and start
laying the 40-km-long line to the designated North Sea production platform. The
laybarge is detailed at the beginning of Chapter 11, as is the apparatus mentioned in
the next paragraph.
The 1,200 m of line had to be buried from 1.0 to 1.8 m below the seabed of
fine sand, and the contractor chose to do this by using the idea of fluidization of the
bottom material. The plan was to inject water under pressure into an area under the
pipeline and to have that portion of the pipeline sink into the fluidized bed. The pipe
would develop a controlled S-bend between its on-seabed and buried positions. This
arrangement was accomplished by having a special instrumented 40-m-long, 2-m-
high structure resting on and traveling along the pipe, with the pump-equipped pull
barge close overhead connected by hoses.
5.3 Two More Gas and Oil Shore Crossings

5.3.1 Example No. 2
Early in 1984, oil and gas engineers debated how to bring ashore two steel pipelines
from Production Platform Hermosa, installed in 1985 and located some 16 km off
Point Arguello, California. One pipe was a 610-mm crude oil line that would also
carry the production of two other rigs, the other a 508-mm gas line from Hermosa
itself. The projected landing point, roughly 1.5 km north of Point Conception, Cali-
fornia, featured steep cliffs more than 30 m high. In this locale, the design storm
indicated that the pipes should be buried, under up to 3 m of graded backfill, out to
the 18-m water depth contour and then set into a furrow in the claystone seabed out
to depths of 24 m (oil line) and 30 m (gas line).
The initial thinking was to use a traditional seabed trenching approach and then
to bring the pipe up through a natural slit in the cliffs. Use of a trestle, 600–1,200 m
long, was accepted as the way to proceed with the installation. However, bidders on
the job were encouraged to make other proposals, and at least two contractors pro-
posed using HDD, which is how the construction was actually carried out, cheaper
and with less environmental impact. It bears mentioning that preliminary engineer-
ing and permitting for a trestle were actually completed in case of drilling trouble.
The whole operation has been detailed by Black et al. (1988), and the following
paragraphs are merely a summary of that fine paper.
The land entry points of the two pipes, at elevation 36 m, were 9 m apart. Exit
points were separated laterally by roughly 25 m, a distance 1,160 m from the entry
locations and in 18 m of water. This location was approximately 850 m from shore.
The rig was set up on the cliff top, some 300 m shoreward of the high tide line, and
used an entry angle of 12 degrees. The pipe paths were determined to give more than
15 m of cover at the mean high tide line.
The portions of the pipes to be in the drilled holes were externally coated with
FBE. The remainder of the pipes (roughly 300 m) received 4 mm of coal tar enamel
and then a high-density CWC—44 mm for the oil line and 100 mm for the gas pipe.
These extra lengths served as the starting points for pipe laying out to the offshore
platform. Sacrificial anodes were incorporated for corrosion protection.
A 9,000-m3 reservoir was constructed on site, with freshwater supplied by trucks
and seawater coming ashore by pipeline from the support barge. During the permit-
ting process, there was much discussion with regulatory authorities on the use and
fate of the drilling fluid.
The two 250-mm pilot holes were drilled in December 1985 and January 1986.
Tubing size was 73 mm. Drill pipe, 127 mm in diameter, was run into the holes.
While this activity progressed, the two 1,460-m-long pipe strings were made up off-
shore. Weights and buoys were added to the lines to create a small negative buoy-
ancy with the lines evacuated. At one point, some of the weights on the gas line
broke their ties and came loose, and 550 m of the line came up off the bottom, with
60–90 m floating. Flooding of and tension on the line returned it to the seabed.
Weights were once more added, and the pipe was evacuated.
The gas line was pulled back first. Damage to a valve resulted in some flooding
of the line, but the operation was successfully completed over 103 hours, despite
the extra load. Some time into the pullback of the oil line, the drill pipe separated
from the pullhead. The lay barge was immediately sent to the scene and managed to
extract the 790 m of pipe that had been inserted. The drill pipe was retrieved by the
cliff-top rig. A smooth-nosed jetting head was then successfully pushed down the
hole to the exit point, and a second pipe pullback attempt was made. This effort was
successful, although the pull capacity of the rig was closely approached.
Filling of the pipe annuli on the cliff top was completed in July 1987. The next
month saw the completion of the seabed anchoring of the 300-m-long pipe lengths
seaward of the HDD exit points.
5.3.2 Example No. 3

A U.S. company worked between July 11 and August 2, 1995, to directionally drill an
adjoining pair of parallel shore crossings from a barren site at Lantau Island, Hong
Kong. Both 305-mm steel pipes were ultimately to carry natural gas. The idea was
to drill each 394-m-long hole with a 15° entrance angle and horizontal exit into an
excavated trench 17 m below sea level. The Lantau Island entry point was at an eleva-
tion of 5.5 m, and the line had to pass under a seawall.
Ground conditions featured large-diameter rock fill underlain by marine depos-
its of soft, silty clay with sand, angular rocks, and gravels. Casing was set through
the fill. Each pilot hole had a diameter of 229 mm. Forward reaming followed, at a
diameter of 508 mm, with the hole opener tipped with a bull nose and rear-mounted
stabilizer. Drilling mud was bentonite with water from a nearby stream.
The follow-up work involved a team of five divers. The end of the HDD pipe was
marked at the exit point by directing a flow of air through it. Before the HDD pipe could
be welded to the product pipe in the seabed, for ultimate pullback, the divers had to
expose the latter, covered over by sediment. Details are in Callnon and Weeks (1996).
5.4 Unfulfilled Horizontal Directional Drilling Attempts

As fine a technique as it is, HDD cannot always be made to work. Outfall No. 391
in Table A-1 at Fraserburgh, Scotland, was originally to be an HDD undertaking in
hard rock, involving a 450-mm-diam. pipe 700 m long. This attempt failed, but I do
not know the details. Although the paper by Rybel et al. (1991) describes a successful
HDD operation, there was an early interval where even beginning was in question.
Paved-over pilings from an old pier and a buried steel barge turned up along the line
of the planned pilot hole.
The holiday resort community of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, has been
involved with the installation of significant storm water outfalls (see section 6.5.2).
One of these is the 53rd Avenue North (or Deephead Swash) system. In October
2004, the City of Myrtle Beach (CMB) issued, to prequalified marine contractors,
an invitation to bid on this task, using either method of conventional trenched pipe
(two 1,524-mm-diam. concrete pipes) or horizontal directional drilling (HDD)
(three 1,219-mm-diam. HDPE pipes). Bids using both techniques were received,
with the (accepted) low bid, at roughly US$4,148,000, involving the latter. The sec-
ond and third bids, both under US$5 million, involved trenched construction. The
construction contract was signed in November.
The contractor had difficulties (Hoke 2005). Reportedly, he encountered trouble-
some boulders and freshwater seeps, both surprises. Because of the lack of progress,
CMB terminated the contract in late March 2005, with pipe all over the beach (Ritch
2005a, b). The contractor subsequently filed suit against CMB and its design team
members (Ritch 2005c). CMB filed a counterclaim against the contractor and a cross-
claim against the engineers, plus brought in the original second-low (by $339,000)
bidder to complete the project by conventional trenching methods. This same firm
had earlier (2003) successfully installed Myrtle Beach’s 25th Avenue South storm
water outfall using that decades-old technique.
As a final matter, the HDD contractor’s problems might have been suspected
from the beginning. The other two HDD bids originally submitted for the job were
astronomical, roughly US$14 and US$18 million.
5.5 HDD Outfall Case Studies in the United Kingdom

5.5.1 Cowes, Isle of Wight, England
The Cowes outfall (No. 198 in Table A-1) was apparently the first HDD outfall in the
United Kingdom. This approach was chosen to avoid a strip of wooded slope start-
ing a road-width from the upper edge of the local beach. The £1.3 million project
was carried out from April to November of 1988.
The pipe was MDPE (SDR 11) with an inside diameter of 409 mm and an out-
side diameter of 500 mm. Total length was 837 m. The drilling rig was positioned
a short distance back from the brow of the wooded slope. A reception pit was exca-
vated in the seabed at the planned end of the outfall in 20 m of water.
The pipeline was put together on rollers along the esplanade at the foot of the
slope. After the pilot hole had been drilled and then reamed to the proper size, the
outfall was launched and then towed out to a barge anchored seaward of the receiv-
ing pit. This barge was fitted with a stinger that extended down to the seabed to
guide the pipeline. Divers connected the shore end of the outfall to the washover
pipe in the bentonite-filled hole, and pullback then commenced.
Once the outfall trunk had been tested, the crane on the barge lowered the 24-m-
long diffuser assembly into place, and divers made the required connection. There
were three risers, each with a single 250-mm port. The crane also lowered the con-
crete protection chambers, one for each riser. The diffuser area was then backfilled.
5.5.2 Lyme Regis (Gun Cliff), Dorset, England

The presence of an environmentally sensitive marine area, and other constraints,
led to the use of HDD for the Lyme Regis outfall (No. 298 in Table A-1)—through
limestone (Byles 1995; Baty 1999). A beach drilling platform was established on
a gravel pad at the foot of a steep cliff. A 180-mm-diam. pilot bore emerged 600
m from the beach in 8 m of water, the water depth for the end of the pipe. Two
reamer passes then opened out the hole to a 444-mm diameter. A shore-based
hydraulic winch then hauled on the pipe’s pulling head and swivel through a
sheave mounted on an anchored barge offshore. The actual outfall was HDPE, with
315-mm o.d. and 258-mm i.d. Its length was 640 m. This US$1.57 million task took
place in 1995.
5.5.3 Buckhaven (Neptune), Firth of Forth, Scotland

This outfall (No. 351 in Table A-1) carries a distillery effluent. Detailed geotechni-
cal, bathymetric, and seismic surveys were conducted before HDD mobilization.
A 250-mm-diam. pilot hole was drilled through mudstone and under the firth to
“punchout” in 8 m of water. A winch wire was pulled shoreward through the pilot
hole, and then a reamer was hauled out with a winch on an anchored barge. The
400-mm-diam. HDPE pipe was pulled through the resulting 450-mm-diam. hole.
A stainless steel diffuser assembly was added later, featuring three 0.7-m-high risers,
each with four 100-mm-diam. ports. Overall outfall length was 840 m and extended
into 15 m of water. Project cost was US$2.33 million, and construction took place
from May to June 1998.
5.5.4 Two at Fife, Scotland

Fife Ness is the tip of a point of land that extends into the North Sea and marks
the northeast limit of the Firth of Forth in Scotland. Two local communities, Crail
and St. Andrews, were the sites of directionally drilled (HDD) outfalls, starting
with preliminary works in March 1999. The HDD idea minimized environmental
impact on sites of special scientific interest (SSSI), a popular coastal footpath, and
designated shellfish waters. Before the beginning of the projects, geotechnical inves-
tigations identified the strata to be traversed, namely carboniferous sandstones,
limestone, and mudstone.
Both undertakings (Nos. 357 and 359 in Table A-1) were worked on from April
to July 1999. They each involved the use of a 42.6 ⫻ 20.0 m jackup barge posi-
tioned offshore in about 10 m of water. This particular jackup had a useful leg length
under the hull of up to 32 m and a maximum deckload capacity of 600 tonnes. The
required HDD drilling rig (with a push–pull capacity of 130 tonnes) was mounted
on the barge deck, and standard 9.5-m lengths of drill pipe were added to the drill
string as work proceeded.
At St. Andrews, close to its harbor, a pilot bore of 251-mm diameter and 600-m
length was drilled first. Entry angle was 11°, with exit angle 15°. Two back-reaming
operations then opened out the hole to 457 mm, then 610 mm. One short stretch
of very resistant rock was encountered. An HDPE pipe (450-mm o.d., wall thickness
of 30 mm, 614 m long) was then pulled through the hole from the shore to the
platform.
At Crail, the bore was 700 m long and only one back-reaming pass (457 mm)
was needed because the pipe was smaller (315-mm o.d.). The length was 935 m. In
both cases, bentonite mud was used as a combined lubricant and cuttings remover.
5.5.5 Islay (Isle of), Scotland

This system (No. 381 in Table A-1) involved the disposal of wastewater from distill-
eries into a 30-m-deep channel with fast currents. Installation was by HDD through
hard rock, with the entry point within a cramped site some 150 m inland from the
cliff top at an elevation of 30 m and exit point 150 m off the shoreline below. Bore-
hole diameter was 251 mm. The small pipe size, 152-mm HDPE, befits the design
(open-end-of-pipe) discharge of only 23 L/s. Total outfall length was 335 m. The
short 20-min interval of slack water in the waterway meant that the pipe had to be
pushed into the hole. Drilling and completion took five weeks in 2001. The entry
angle was 15°, with a small exit angle of only 2° to 3°.
5.5.6 Cornborough, Devon, England

Planning approvals established the inshore Barnstaple Bay position of this outfall’s
diffuser off an environmentally protected beach. A seabed survey was conducted
some 400 m off the shoreline before the drilling rig and associated equipment
arrived on its cliff top site at the end of May 2002. Meanwhile, the pipe string was
being put together down coast. This line involved a 540-m length of 714-mm SDR
17 HDPE pipe, which would pass up to 24 m underneath the seabed.
Drilling of the 445-mm pilot hole through the local mudstone commenced on
June 8, 2002, and was terminated six days later, 40 m short of the punchout posi-
tion. The drill string was withdrawn, and forward reaming at 711 mm diameter was
done for 500 m. The drill string was again removed from the hole, and a 914-mm
reamer attached. After some difficulties, forward reaming at this size punched out
on July 24.
Meanwhile, a spud barge with a long-reach excavator was anchored over the
exit point. The pipe pullback operation could only commence when there was suit-
able access for the pipe to the hole and the immediate area was free of obstructions
and debris. Difficult weather conditions complicated and lengthened this process
and also delayed the pullback of the pipe. Finally, this procedure was completed on
August 21.
In the 60-m-long diffuser area, 10 individual concrete protective structures (for
the 10 ports) were bedded down onto rock in an excavated trench. Again, wind and
sea conditions rendered this a difficult process. With all marine works completed,
the barge was towed from the site on October 9, 2002.
This outfall is No. 404 in Table A-1.
5.5.7 Meary Veg Rock, Isle of Man

HDD was used for this outfall (No. 416 in Table A-1) so as not to degrade the stun-
ning coastline of the Isle of Man. The rock to be drilled was extremely hard and
abrasive. The pipe itself was 800-mm MDPE (SDR 17.6), 400 m long, meaning a
drilled length of 390 m.
A 100-metric-ton drill rig was involved and a heavyweight drill pipe. The pilot
hole was bored at a diameter of 444 mm, using a 244-mm-diam. mud motor. Typi-
cal advance was 6 m per hour. After the hole reached the seabed, a (drillable) “soft
plug” was installed in order to keep bentonite losses to a minimum.
The first 370 m of the pilot hole was opened out to a diameter of 660 mm in a
forward-reaming operation that advanced at 4.5 m per hour. A followup procedure
enlarged the hole to 864 mm and progressed at 3 m per hour. The final 2 m/hour
forward reaming operation established a hole size of 1,016 mm, sufficient to install
the pipe. Punching out to the seabed involved reuse of the three reamers in series.
After the final breakout, the reamer was left at the end of the boring both to keep
debris from entering and to help the divers locate the hole. An excavator on the barge
over the site dug down until it reached the rock exit.
In the meantime, the pipe had been welded together on land, strung out behind
the drill rig. A steel pull head was attached to the seaward end and a flange to the
other. Bolted to the flange was a blank plate with a pulling eye and a 102-mm valve
to ultimately permit the pipe to be flooded.
On a day of calm sea conditions, the pipe was eased down the slope to the sea. A
tug provided the pull force, and the rear pulling eye was cabled to an on-land winch
for stabilization. Three extra boats helped the tug control the pipe string, which was
in time brought to the barge over the end of the hole where a swivel had been placed
at the end of the drill string.
After the mating of the swivel and the pipe pullhead, the conduit was flooded
and then pulled back to the rig.
At the site, seabed excavation set the stage for the lowering of the two halves of
the weight-collared diffuser, their alignment, and then bolting to the end of the out-
fall pipe. The overall diffuser was 28 m long, with eight short crown-mounted risers.
As a final protective step, concrete mattresses were placed over the backfilled pipe.
5.5.8 Holyhead, Wales

Holyhead is a community on a picturesque island in Anglesey, northwest Wales.
Because of the SSSI classification for the immediate coastline, a proposed sewer out-
fall had to have an HDD component of length 300 m. The overall pipe, in this 2004
design–build case, was 1,100 m long. The pipe material was HDPE with a 560-mm
o.d. and SDR 17.
The three faulted quartzite formations to be drilled were very hard and abra-
sive. The creation of most of the necessary pipe path involved a big rig, heavy-
weight drill pipe, and three hole-diameter stages, all from the same direction: 445,
610, and 762 mm. The hole was stopped 10 m short of punchout in order not to
waste bentonite or let it enter the pristine environment. The average rate of pilot
hole drilling, with a 229-mm mud motor, was 4 m per hour.
The sea end of the HDD hole was bared by the seabed trenching that involved
a large spud-leg backhoe dredger. This excavation work required some drilling and
blasting, especially at the inshore end. The HDD exit was carefully protected with a
concrete plug. Rocks were cleared from near the exit point so that they wouldn’t be
dragged into the hole during pipe pull-in.
The pipe was towed from Norway to Holyhead Harbor as one continuous string.
The 762-mm hole opener, with a padeye arrangement, was pushed out through the
hole, and divers attached a 100-metric-ton swivel. When the weather conditions
were sufficiently calm, the floating pipe string was towed to the site, and the shore-
ward end positioned over the HDD exit point. After flooding, the pipe’s pullhead
was connected by divers to the drill string. The four-hour pull-in operation was also
monitored by divers. Afterward, the whole pipe was progressively flooded, a task
made difficult by strong cross currents.
5.6 Other HDD Case Studies in Developed Countries

5.6.1 EDC Ecuador, Machala, Ecuador
The EDC Ecuador outfall (No. 393 in Table A-1) is a 1,000-m-long industrial pipe-
line about 120 km south of Guayaquil (“Longest” 2002). The late 2001 installation
was by HDD to provide a 15-m cover depth across the shoreline. The 254-mm steel
line had a fusion-bonded epoxy coating. A 127-mm-diam. pilot hole was first drilled
from back of the shoreline out to a 6-m water depth. A barge pulled the outfall off
the beach in 250-m lengths. The tail of the pipe was then hooked to the end of the
drill string, with a reamer and swivel in between, for the 14-hour pullback.
5.6.2 Cliffton, Maryland

The town of Newburg, Maryland, is located close to the Potomac River, roughly 60 km
south of Washington, D.C., and 65 km from the mouth of the river at Chesapeake Bay.
The local Cliffton WWTF discharged 265 m3/day of disinfected secondary effluent at
the shoreline, between two oyster bars and at the base of a 25-m-high cliff. However, the
Maryland Department of the Environment stipulated an improved discharge location
further out into the river in a minimum water depth of 11 m below mean low tide.
For roughly US$900,000 the new line (No. 407 in Table A-1) was established
during three days in spring 2002 by directional drilling methods using a site on the
top of the steep slope. This setup involved pulling back 425 m of (floating) 305-mm
HDPE pipe into the reamed hole. Using an anchored barge as a base of operations,
an additional 30 m of riverbed diffuser was added, held in place by seven 4.5-kN
concrete anchors. Neoprene matting was used between the pipe and concrete to
impede slipping. There were six upward-oriented discharge ports fitted with 102-mm
duckbill valves and a blind-flange terminus for flushing. Once the diffuser was in
place, it was stabilized with dumped No. 57 stone. This is nominal 19-mm aggregate
with 100% of the mix less than a 38-mm size. A local marina served as an assembly
area and launch point for operations out in the river.
5.6.3 Port Orford, Oregon

Port Orford is an attractive coastal town with 1999 population of 1,065. The com-
munity is located halfway between Coos Bay and the California border. In the late
1980s, authorities questioned the use of a back beach lake as a continuing receiving
water for the town’s sewage. An analysis of alternatives, including a marine outfall,
settled on a drain field disposal system with pipe buried in the low foredunes sepa-
rating the lake and the ocean. This 1,900 m3/day concept was permitted, then con-
structed in 1992 for US$260,000.
The El Niño winter storms of 1997–1998 tore away much of the sand spit where
the dune disposal system was installed. The end result was a broken plastic pipe
releasing treated effluent onto the back beach. Thus, the sea outfall idea (No. 413
in Table A-1) was revived. Proposed was a 305-mm-diam. HDPE pipe, with installa-
tion by trenchless methods and ultimate outflow into roughly 13 m of water. Mas-
sive amounts of bathymetric mapping and subbottom profiling were done in the
selected offshore area. Many rock outcrops were detailed. The precise position of
the diffuser was settled on.
The low bid for the project was approximately US$1,194,000, and construction
started in August 2003. The length of the borehole was 686 m, and it was installed
through a 76-m length of 610-mm-diam. steel casing driven at an angle of 15° to bed-
rock refusal under the local beach. Drilling took seven weeks. After that, the entire 701 m
of pipe was eased off the beach by a tugboat, later pulled shoreward through the hole.
The 17-m-long diffuser assembly was added, bedded on the irregular rocky bot-
tom by 1,100 bags of concrete. Holes were drilled into the seabed and studs were
placed. Seven stainless steel straps immobilized the diffuser. Although 25 metric
tons of articulated concrete block mats were supposed to be laid out on top of the
diffusers and also pinned to the substrate, it appears that this step may have been
omitted. Outflow was through six 1.8-m-high risers topped with 102-mm-diam.
duckbill valves. The system was slated to begin operation in 2004.
In 2008, some 350 km north of Port Orford, near Netarts, another Oregon
coastal outfall was established by HDD. The 1,250-m-long HDPE pipe had a speci-
fication of 356-mm-diam. SDR 7.3.
5.6.4 Venus Bay, Victoria, Australia

This Australian outfall (No. 438 in Table A-1), into Bass Strait, was designed to
replace a short pipe exposed on a cross-beach trestle. After the A$21.5 million instal-
lation, the new outfall would pass 5 million L/day of saline wastewater, from inland
milk processing factories, at position 38°45⬘42⬙S, 145°51⬘00⬙E. The Victoria land-
mark, Cape Liptrap, is approximately 20 km to the southeast of the site.
The trunk of this outfall was placed after an HDD operation started in November
2005 behind the coastal dune system. The 750-m-long pilot hole was created in dense
sand with a 310-mm bit and jetting assembly. Back reaming was done in two stages,
445 and 610 mm. The fully assembled 450-mm-diam. HDPE pipe was towed 20 km
to the site, pulled into alignment, flooded, and then inserted by drill string pullback.
Two sections of 450-mm steel diffuser were then bolted together, placed in
10 m of water, and (after measurements and fabrication) connected by divers to the
trunk with a custom-made adapter. Not only did the 108-m-long diffuser have the
necessary (16) ports, but it also had sites for anodes as well as support brackets for
galvanized piles jet-driven into the seabed at 9-m centers.
Finally, the contractor built a deaeration chamber on the back beach and con-
nected up the pipe work. He removed the old outfall and supports.
5.6.5 Warrenton, Oregon

The mighty Columbia River separates the states of Washington and Oregon. The
mouth of this waterway, at the Pacific Ocean, features the Columbia River Bar, noto-
rious among ship captains for its usually difficult and sometimes dangerous sea con-
ditions. The small city of Warrenton, Oregon, is tucked into the “left bank” of the
Columbia, well within sight of the river entrance.
Like many other communities, Warrenton had its troubles with sewage treat-
ment and disposal. The municipal problem was compounded by the existence in
the city of a major seafood processor, the community’s largest employer, that had
wastewater disposal problems of its own. Suffice it to say that the city received the
necessary funds for a new WWTP to serve municipal as well as industrial sources, a
pump station, and an outfall that would discharge out in the busy waterway some
1,340 m from the river bank.
The city’s design engineer for the outfall envisioned an HDD undertaking, with
drilling from the river bank out to the discharge site, and the HDPE pipe being man-
aged in the currents and traffic and being inserted into that hole for pullback to shore.
When the city signed the contract for outfall installation, the contractor proposed a
cheaper installation method that would minimize the chance of trouble with river traf-
fic and fast (tidal) currents. A 457-mm steel pipe would be installed by pushing it into
the hole from shore, maximizing the amount of work done on land, but of course run-
ning the risk of a buckle. The hole would run deeper than had been envisioned earlier.
For environmental noninterference, construction started in bleak November
2005, with the building of an access road and a pad behind the levee for the HDD
rig. Crews drove 40 m of 762-mm casing pipe under the levee before starting the
10-day drilling of the pilot hole. Forward reaming followed at 711 mm.
There were delays with pipe delivery through the Christmas season, but in time
the outfall was pushed in increments through to the exit point over two days. Bueno
(2007) has the details.
A highly experienced diving contractor took care of the installation of the 12-m-
long diffuser. Because of merciless weather conditions, this was a month-long effort.
The diffuser structure was immobilized with helical anchors and concrete weights
and partially covered with crushed rock.
5.7 Central Pacific Ocean HDD Jobs

5.7.1 Tipalao Bay Outfall, Guam
Guam is a possession of the United States located within “Typhoon Alley” of the
western Pacific Ocean at 13°30⬘N, 144°45⬘E. Various sewer outfalls have been
placed around the shoreline of the 544-km² island over the years, and all have suf-
fered damage during storms. As an example, the first extended seabed outfall at
North Tipalao was devastated by Tropical Storm Mary while under construction in
1974 and then virtually totally destroyed by Typhoon Pamela in June 1975. When
a new outfall for the area was being planned, it can be well imagined that a heavily
protected pipe was the number one priority.
The Tipalao Bay outfall (No. 296 in Table A-1) was a joint project between the
U.S. Navy and the Public Utility Agency of Guam. Their engineering consultant pre-
pared plans and specifications for either a deeply trenched pipe or one installed by
directional drilling. Bearings of the two lines were somewhat different. When bids
were submitted, the lowest figure for the trenched option was approximately twice
that for the HDD case, and the latter was thus selected. Project cost was roughly
US$3.6 million. The contractor was an experienced one from the midwestern United
States, and this company used a big rig that they had actually been planning to retire.
The pipe to be used was HDPE, with an inside diameter of 610 mm and an outside
diameter of 711 mm. This outfall was to be inserted into a 914-mm-diam. curved
hole having a drilled length of 536 m and terminating in 39 m of water at the pre-
cipitous reef edge.
The intent had been to initiate construction in January 1995, before the nomi-
nal start of the hurricane season. However, things slipped, and work did not actu-
ally begin until July 10, 1995. The contractor used 9-m lengths of 127-mm drill
pipe, with a drill bit of diameter 251 mm. The ground material was limestone or
cemented coral rubble, and drilling time between additions of drill pipe was usu-
ally about 15 min. The contractor’s initial depression angle was 12°. He had some
difficulty in accurately steering the line through the soft ground material. First, on
the second day of drilling, the hole turned up rather than continuing down, and
the contractor had to withdraw roughly 300 m of drill pipe and start again. On the
next attempt, he had trouble leveling off, and actually cut a path somewhat deeper
than intended.
Bentonite mud was used for lubrication and to remove cuttings, but at the half-
way point in the drilling, circulation was lost, and this problem persisted to the end
of the job. Thorough searches by scuba divers never located the missing mud. The
contractor had originally brought 254 pallets of bentonite, a total of 277 metric tons
of material. After the loss in circulation, the contractor put in a fast order for another
454 metric tons of this material—to Long Beach, California. Fortunately, there was
only a lost half-day of time before the extra material was received. By the end of the
project, there were roughly only 50 metric tons of bentonite remaining.
The pilot hole was punched out on the morning of July 14, the job done in
roughly four days. To prepare for the three reaming passes that were to open out the
pilot hole, divers from a Guam firm had to descend to the breakout point and pre-
pare the drill pipe. The water depth, strong currents, a deposit of bentonite, and zero
visibility because of the mud’s going into suspension made this work very difficult.
It was even troublesome to maintain the boat on station over the site. Unfortunately,
when the first attempt was made to torch-cut the drill pipe for removal of the drilling
tools, the cut was mistakenly made into the casing of the drill motor itself, appar-
ently a US$100,000 mistake. Eventually, the tools were removed and hoisted into
the workboat overhead, and a hole was then burned through the end of the drill
pipe so that a steel cable and swivel could be attached to it. This step would ensure
that something remained in the hole when the drill pipe was withdrawn. In fact, for
the remainder of the project, the drill rig and the workboat were always directly con-
nected via the drill string and cable.
On July 21, the drill string was run out to the end of the hole. The first (432-
mm-diam.) reamer was lowered to the bottom, maneuvered into position, and then
rotated onto the end of the drill string. Two more reaming operations, with sizes of
610 and then 914 mm, were subsequently made. The latter pass involved much hard
cutting and lasted for roughly a week.
Insertion of the actual HDPE pipe began early on August 11 and continued non-
stop until its completion at 2:15 A.M. the next morning. The pipe had been laid out
in eight fused strings 73 m long, so it was necessary to stop seven times to butt-fuse
lengths together. The pipe was on rollers, and it was inserted through a combina-
tion of pushing onshore and pulling offshore, via the cable. The insertion system
onshore involved two big bulldozers tugging on slings around the pipe, two smaller
bulldozers out ahead ensuring that the length did not buckle, and a crane at the rear,
holding the pipe aloft so that it would enter the hole in an optimum manner. This
frontline team was supported by an array of other cranes further to the rear, position-
ing the next length of pipe to be attached.
After the pipe had been placed, the construction manager (who was also the
designer) discovered that the HDD contractor had used the intended line of the
trenched pipe rather than the proper one. The end of the outfall thus ended up some
24 m out of position.
Installing the pipe was by no means the end of the project. To satisfy environ-
mental stipulations, a massive two-port (406-mm) concrete discharge structure had
to be placed and secured. About the time that this installation was getting underway,
it was discovered that the local diving contractor did not have the necessary decom-
pression chamber for work at this depth. The government of Guam would not allow
the project to continue until the subcontractor had such a chamber on board the
workboat. In time, arrangements were made to lease such a piece of equipment from
a diving and marine contractor in Honolulu. Once the chamber was on site, work on
the final part of the project could begin.
At the pipe terminus, divers excavated about 1 m in limestone but then ran into
a thick layer of sand. They had to install steel pipe piles before pouring a concrete
pad for the discharge block. Some jackhammering was required. It is natural to ask
whether, in 39 m of water on the face of an open-water cliff, with a minor sewage
flow, it is necessary to have other than an open-ended pipe.
5.7.2 Recent Projects in the Region

It has already been remarked that this region has a history of conventional outfalls
being destroyed during typhoons. I have, in my professional videotape library, an
inspection diver survey of the utterly smashed original Agaña outfall in Guam. The
devastation can scarcely be believed. Here we explore the beginnings of three sepa-
rate efforts to install HDD outfalls, two on Guam and the other on Saipan, which
is roughly 200 km north of Guam in the Northern Mariana Islands. At the south-
ern end of Saipan is the Agingan Point WWTP that serves a population of between
18,000 and 20,000 people and some small industrial concerns. The treatment level
is nominally secondary, and the plant is designed to treat 0.13 m3/s.
I have, in my files, a faxed note from a consulting engineer saying that his firm’s
work on the Agingan outfall was approaching 60% design. The date was late Decem-
ber 2001. The years dragged by, with adequate funding for the construction one of
the key issues. Finally, a groundbreaking ceremony was held on May 10, 2007, to
start the approximately US$4 million project, largely funded by the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency. This was to be an HDD operation, with an HDPE pipe
686 mm in diameter and 365 m long, discharging in 46 m of water.
The project drill rig was set up on land and began to drill the pilot hole. Unfortu-
nately, a large subsurface void was encountered. Two attempts were made to breach
the cavity, but with no success. A geotechnical expert was brought in and more sub-
surface ground data were obtained. The original alignment was shown to be in a
fault zone, and a new direction was specified.
Details on the two proposed Guam outfalls appear in Table 5-1. The same U.S.
company that installed the Tipalao Bay pipe in 1995 won the US$17.5 million pack-
age contract for these two conduits.
Table 5-1. Features of Two Proposed HDPE HDD Guam Outfalls

Agaña (Hagatna) Tanguisson (Northern
Item Outfall District) Outfall
Size of reamed hole (mm) 1,372 1,067
Pipe size (mm) 1,067 864
Total length (m) 664 594
Bearing S3°22⬘00⬙W N47°23⬘49⬙E
Start At WWTP —
Water depth at terminus (m) 84 43
3
Range of design discharge (m /s) 0.22–1.49 0.22–1.25
Outflow system Open end Diffuser along
(duckbill valve) contour
Length of diffuser (m) — 122 (extra)
Diffuser bearing — N13°07⬘04⬙E
Outlet spacing (m) — 3.05
Diffuser ballasting — Concrete weights (36)
References
Angelo, W. J. (2001). “Directional Drilling Pushes Pipeline to Kentucky.” Engrg. News Rec.,
247(26), 16.
Baty, R. J. (1999). “Clean Sweep at Penzance/St. Ives and Lyme Regis.” Proceedings of the
Institution of Civil Engineers, London, Civil Engineering, 132, 20–27.
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6
Crane Barge Offshore, Trestle
Inshore, Trouble Ahead
6.1 Section-by-Section Installation of Reinforced

Concrete Pipe Outfalls
Reinforced concrete pipe (RCP) is manufactured in relatively short lengths (typically
6.1–7.3 m) and is progressively put together underwater by inserting the spigot of a
new pipe section into the bell of the previously laid section. One or two rubber gas-
kets, set in a groove or grooves on the spigot, provide sealing. The typical RCP used
for marine outfalls in the United States is so-called “extended-bell.” In this case, the
whole bell, or socket, is built radially outward so that the regular outside diameter
of the (next) pipe (spigot) will just fit inside. This arrangement makes for a much
stronger joint than one formed by mating half-thickness pipe ends, an arrangement
that appears in “flush-bell” pipe. Also, more concrete cover is provided over internal
reinforcing steel.
Marine construction of an RCP outfall may require five basic steps:
excavation of a trench;
placement of a “bedding stone” blanket over the trench floor;
inserting the new section into the last-laid pipe section and building up the bed-
ding stone to properly support it;
testing that the joint is “bottle-tight”;
trench “backfilling” with progressively larger rock, ultimately covering pipe and
smaller backfill with a size deemed to be stable under extreme conditions of
water motion at the site.
Various early RCP outfalls in U.S. waters have been built in a hybrid manner
(Grace 1978). From the shoreline to a water depth of from 6 to 12 m, work is done
135
from a temporary steel pier or trestle, which was introduced in Chapter 3. Seaward
of the trestle, a derrick barge is used, basically a crane set on a large flat barge (Ger-
wick 2007) (Fig. 6-1). A special pipe horse, lowered by the crane and set on the
bottom, does the actual pipe-laying. The trestle is used inshore because the derrick
barge would be a most unstable work platform in the amplified, short-wavelength
“bumps” in shallower water. There would also be a real risk of vessel grounding.
Figure 6-1. Crane barge and trestle on outfall project.

Crane Barge Offshore, Trestle Inshore, Trouble Ahead 137
6.2 Southwest Ocean Outfall, San Francisco, California

6.2.1 Configuration and Bidding
An extensive introduction to this mighty conduit (sometimes called SWOO), the
largest nontunnel sewage outfall in the world, was provided in Chapter 2. This rein-
forced concrete pipeline crosses the San Francisco shoreline at Ocean Beach, some
11–12 km south of the Golden Gate Bridge, and extends in a west by southwest
direction some 7,126 m into the Pacific Ocean. The water depth at the terminus is
24 m. The pipe is buried throughout its length, and the flow (19.7 m3/s in design)
passes up and out of the pipe through a series of risers and holes. The operator is the
City and County of San Francisco.
The successful bid for the job, US$152 million, $10 million under the engi-
neer’s estimate, came from a consortium of experienced companies. The contract
was awarded in July 1981, for completion in early 1985. A company other than the
designer served as the construction manager for the owner. The outfall crosses (at a
78° angle) the dreaded San Andreas Fault, which suffered a maximum slip of 6 m
in the historic and devastating San Francisco 1906 earthquake, and extra-thick pipe
sections with special joints were placed in this region over a distance of 365 m. The
contractor submitted a plan to revise the engineer’s design for this crossing, and this
change was ultimately accepted by the owner. These were apparently fussy sections
(Fig. 6-2) for the divers to set.
Figure 6-2. Earthquake-proof pipe section in SWOO horse.

6.2.2 Laying Pipe through the Surf Zone

Inshore work was done from a trestle whose final length was 884 m. This temporary
pier was 9.8 m wide and stood 8.5 m above the water. Both the pair of bearing piles
in any bent and the single batter pile (on the south side) involved 610-mm steel
pipe. The wall thickness of the batter piles was always about 13 mm, and this same
number applied for the bearing piles for the first 31 bents. After that, the dimension
was 16 mm. The longitudinal spacing between bents was roughly 9.1 m.
Pipe-laying through the surf zone began in April 1982 and by mid-May (under
calm conditions) had reached 640 m from the beach edge. The whole operation
was essentially complete by the end of the working season in 1982. Trench excava-
tion was done by clamshell with the spoil side cast, and the first 122 m from shore
was lined with sheet pile walls 7.3 m apart. Special wave barriers were used later for
protection during unruly sea conditions. Anderson (2001) includes two pertinent
photographs, one showing a failed portion of the sheet pile wall, the other depicting
waves breaking on the protective structure.
A gantry (see Fig. 3-3) on the trestle transported a pipe section from shore to
the laying location, then lowered it down through the trestle, supported by slings, to
the joint makeup area. There, hard-hat divers assisted in the process. Backfilling of
smaller materials was accomplished using two converted rail hopper cars mounted
side by side on a trestle carrier. Skips were involved in hauling larger rock, to be
placed by crane. The pipe-casting yard was located at the shore end of the trestle dur-
ing the inshore pipe-laying operation, and ready-mix concrete was used.
6.2.3 A Delay in Starting Work Offshore

While trestle work was going on, a shipyard in Portland, Oregon, was fabricating a
specially designed US$20 million derrick barge for the offshore part of the project.
This 128-m-long vessel was 30 m wide and 7.6 m deep, with an advertised draft
of 3.0–3.6 m. The barge featured a 500-tonne crane and had sufficient room for
20 joints of the big pipe along the two sides of the deck, as well as 4,500 tonnes of
bedding and backfill in hoppers along the inside.
The 1982–1983 winter was a so-called El Niño occurrence. The west to east
tracks of winter storms lay further south than usual and covered a broader part of the
north Pacific Ocean. The result was that the western coast of the United States suf-
fered a semi continuous stretch of severe weather. Central California endured storm
after storm from the end of November 1982 into the first days of March 1983. Not
only the Southwest Ocean outfall was affected, but also the Monterey Bay outfall fur-
ther south, under construction at the same time and covered in the next section. The
highest water level ever measured at the Presidio (Table 2-1) occurred on January 27,
1983, during this stormy interval. This was 2.70 m relative to MLLW.
The brand new barge was brought proudly to the site in late February 1983,
when it was thought that the vicious storms of the 1982–1983 California winter
had ended. Unfortunately, there was one more storm left, featuring not only high
waves but also unusually long periods. One week after arrival, the barge snapped
her 50-mm anchor lines and then was driven ashore and heavily damaged. It took
15 days before she was dislodged.
The particular Portland, Oregon–based twin-screw salvage vessel that towed the
6,100-tonne barge free is famous for such jobs along the U.S. West Coast. Roughly,
the vessel is 62 m long, 10 m in the beam, and has a draft of 3 m. She has six power-
ful winches, three bow ones for anchor lines and three stern ones for tow lines. The
ship has accommodation for 27 of the types of workers that one might need on a
salvage job: welders; riggers; fitters, divers, and seamen. She has three booms, and on
her stern she carries a helicopter pad.
Reportedly, the salvage of the SWOO crane barge was one of the toughest tasks
ever undertaken by the salvage vessel. The barge was previously lightened, and ren-
dered less of a pollution threat, by having the U.S. Coast Guard draw off 450 m3 of
diesel fuel. The crane barge was towed to a local shipyard for repairs, which took
13 months and cost (the contractor’s insurance company) roughly US$15 million.
The owner simply paid the US$10,000 deductible. This mishap set the job back
17 months, but it allowed the contractor to make some desired mild alterations to
the barge in the sense of improved efficiency.
6.2.4 Laying RCP in Exposed Coastal Waters

When the barge returned to the site in April 1984, a length of filled-in trench had to
be reexcavated. As the outfall advanced steadily seaward, two other derrick barges,
outfitted for clamshell dredging, were out ahead, excavating the required trench. A
commercial side scan sonar device on one barge surveyed the seabed and produced
an undistorted trace of the excavation. Any errors were then remedied by clamshell
from the second crane. I have taken one of the (highly symmetrical) traces of a com-
pleted trench, where the (centerline) depth was the target 9.1 m and extracted the
following horizontal and vertical distances (in meters), assuming a coordinate ori-
gin at the center bottom: (7.6, 0.9); (11.3, 4.0); and (12.8, 5.5). Note the effectively
flat trench floor and the 45° angle between the final two sets of coordinates.
The pipe-laying crane barge followed behind the trenching operation, posi-
tioned at the appropriate trench station by winching off her anchor lines. Aboard
the massive barge was a specially designed and fabricated four-legged system called
a horse, which is lifted from the ocean and lowered into it by the big crane. The idea
of such a framed structure, used on various other outfalls as well (e.g., Grace 1978),
is to isolate the touchy pipe insertion operation from whatever unavoidable motion
the barge is experiencing as a result of residual ocean swell. An umbilical of hydrau-
lic lines links an operator at levers on the barge with the horse. (See Fig. 7-2.)
The horse is lowered over the side and is set down on its four feet on the seabed
close to the temporary end of the outfall. The horse has a trolley carriage that permits
two-way travel, within the confines of the framed structure, through use of hydraulic
rams. A pipe section to be laid is held by grippers under the trolley, and two-dimen-
sional trolley motion plus differential adjustments in leg extension move the spigot of
the new section into close proximity to and proper alignment with the last-laid section.
When everything is ready, the new pipe is rammed home. The necessary series of pipe
movements is orchestrated by a hard-hat diver on the bottom, relaying instructions to

the topside hydraulics operator through his or her tender. In cases of deep water, not
the case for SWOO, instructions come from an observer in an atmospheric-pressure
chamber affixed to the horse, looking through a view port. Two rubber gaskets within
circumferential grooves on the pipe spigot (ideally) seal the joint once it is made.
The pipe is not released upon successful insertion because bedding stone has to
be sent down from the barge overhead. This material cascades down through a tremie
pipe (610-mm-diameter for SWOO) and is given direction under the new section by
the diver through use of water jets. In the SWOO case, the Horse was equipped with
a tilt-up frame equipped with multiple jets for this purpose. The size of the bedding
stone for SWOO (called Type I) involved 100% (by weight) less than 76 mm and
35–70% (by weight) less than 38 mm. The target specific gravity was 2.65. Once the
proper pipe support had been built up, the pipe clamps were released and the horse
was lifted back to the deck of the barge for yet another pipe section. All of the fore-
going was made difficult by virtually zero underwater visibility, strong currents, cold
water, and surge from passing swell.
The task of placing other rock on the completed pipe, without undue delay, to
decrease the likelihood of wave-induced erosion of the bedding stone, fell to a fol-
lowing barge. In the SWOO case, there were three more levels after the bedding. Type
II had 80–100% (by weight) less than 76 mm, 60–85% (by weight) less than 38
mm, and 40–55% (by weight) less than 5 mm. The gradations for Types III and IV
(the top armor rock layer) are shown in Table 6-1. On the very top, there was enough
of the previously dredged natural seabed material to return the seabed to its previous
level. The following extract from the job specifications is of interest: “Material for
Type IV backfill shall be a graded mix of quarried rock consisting of pieces of hard,
durable, angular rock, free of cleavages and cracks, containing no earth or vegetable
matter, soft or elongated pieces where thickness does not exceed 1⁄3 times the length,
conforming to the following:”
1. specific gravity of at least 2.65 and
2. gradation as in Table 6-1, where a Type IV equivalent is shown in Fig. 6-3.
Table 6-1. Two Top Levels of Trench Rock Backfill for the Southwest Ocean Outfall
Approximate Stone Percent Passing for Type III Percent Passing for Type IV
Weight (N) (by weight) (by weight)
11,100 — 100
6,700 — 40–60
2,200 — 25–45
900 100 —
735 80–90 —
400 45–70 —
110 — 0–15
45 15–30 —
Figure 6-3. Armor rock 11-kN-minus.
6.2.5 The Outer 1,000 Meters of the Outfall

The Southwest Ocean Outfall was not all one size of RCP, and it was not all straight.
The first 6,361 m lay along bearing S63°29⬘05⬙W, but then there was a gradual 55°
turn toward the north effected by 20 full-diameter but half-length pipe sections,
19 beveled at 3° and the remaining one square. This curve actually separated the first
part of the diffuser from the second.
The diffuser arrangement was standard in that the pipe diameter would be
stepped down with two reducers. Otherwise, the design was revolutionary. There
would be no flow outlets from the pipe itself, only from special precast concrete
blocks with near-invert inlets (to purge accumulated sediment during higher flows)
and stout, tall risers. Basic dimensions and weights appear in Table 6-2. On one side
of each of the eighty-five blocks there was a bell and on the other a short spigot,
since standard pipe sections (Table 6-3) would be placed in between. Riser spacing
was 11.0 m. The first 23 blocks (D1 through D23) came before the curve, with the
Table 6-2. Southwest Ocean Outfall Outflow Units

No. of Block
Blocks Weight Net Block Block Riser Riser
Pipe i.d. and of Block Length Width Height Height Weight
(mm) Risers (tonnes) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (tonnes)
3,658 28 178 3,658 6,274 4,928 5,207 21

3,048 22 138 3,658 5,639 4,115 5,893 22
2,438 35 103 3,658 5,004 3,302 6,579 23.5
Table 6-3. Southwest Ocean Outfall Pipe Details

Pipe i.d. Pipe o.d. Bell o.d. Approximate Section
(mm) (mm) (mm) Weight (tonnes) No. of Pieces
3,658 4,318 4,877 83 808

3,048 3,607 4,064 56 21
2,438 2,898 3,175 38 34
remaining five big blocks set after it. The total arrangement of blocks and risers is
presented in Table 6-2.
Roughly half of each block contained the through pipe, the other half (left
side, going downstream) contained the flow inlet and was topped with the riser.
The risers, connected with special bolts, were designed to be strong enough to resist
a multitonne load imposed by hooked fishing gear or a dragged anchor. The flow
path through all three block–riser combinations had a diameter of 457 mm. Each
riser had a 1,016-mm-high cylindrical portion at the bottom, which rested on top
of the block, then a 1,118-mm-o.d. cylinder, and on top a flared assembly that con-
tained the eight discharge ports and was topped by an inspection cover. The outflow
ports were of four different approximate sizes as follows: 91 mm (D1–D15); 97 mm
(D16–D28); 103 mm (D29–D50); and 109 mm (D51–D85). During construction, a
special steel cap was placed over any riser to protect it from rock impact (Fig. 6-4). A
rubber tire at the bottom acted as a cushion.
During a three-day work and vacation visit to the San Francisco area in mid-
August 1985, I was first able to visit the impressive trestle, by that point unused and
bare (Fig. 6-5). I was then taken aboard the colossal main crane barge, which had
just been towed into port so that alterations could be made so that its horse could
lay the diffuser blocks. On a Sunday morning, with work suspended for the day, I
was able to do a slow tour of the pipe yard in Rio Vista (inland, and halfway to Sac-
ramento), which had been set up for the offshore part of the project. There I viewed
finished pipe sections (Fig. 6-6), diffuser blocks, and risers (Fig. 6-7), and then stud-
ied their steel forms. Pipe, blocks, and risers were barged 113 km seaward from that
protected location through a series of waterways and then out through the Golden
Gate to the job site.
Figure 6-4. Protective cap on SWOO riser as rock shield.

6.2.6 The Project Winds Down

During the pipe-laying, there was occasional trouble with wave action driving sand
well inside the open-ended pipe overnight. A cover solved that problem. By late
October 1984, 2,650 m of pipe had been laid. During good weather spells in 1985,
a maximum of seven pipe sections per day was achieved. In mid-August 1985, when
the barge was brought into port so that the horse could be refitted for laying the
diffuser blocks, 6,285 m of outfall had been laid. The curved 273-tonne end piece
(Fig. 6-8) was lifted on June 9, 1986, and connected on June 15, 1986. In the end
gate structure, four 10° tangents combined to have the terminal portion angled up
by 40° to reach the seabed. The flow passageway through the structure had a diam-
eter of 2,438 mm.
The total excavation volume was 2.1 million m3, and the total rock placed was
approximately 1.1 million tonnes. The project was completed in late summer of 1986.
Figure 6-5. The bare SWOO trestle in mid-August 1985.
Figure 6-6. SWOO pipe sections in casting yard.

Figure 6-7. The smallest SWOO diffuser block with its riser.
Figure 6-8. SWOO terminus.

Written material bearing on different aspects of the SWOO project follows. Predesign
work is covered in Chapter 2. Intermediate endeavors are described by “Outfall Bid”
(1981), Eisenberg and Treadwell (1982), “$152” (1984), plus Murphy and Eisen-
berg (1985). Construction is addressed by “Calif.” (1983), “Outfall Barge” (1983),
Reina (1984), “San Francisco” (1984), and Kosowatz (1986). The final cost, with
change orders, was US$154.13 million.
The possibility of divers or remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) gaining entry to
the pipe interior, in the case of an internal operating problem, was nominally taken
care of by installing 43 manholes shoreward of the diffuser and 7 more within the
diffuser. The truth of the matter, though, was that all of these possible entry points
were buried under tons of sand and rock, and were thus effectively unusable. The
only feasible entry point, at least offshore, was the end gate. It is worth noting, as
a final consideration, that on the occasional outfall a manhole riser has been used
so that the entryway is essentially at the level of the top of the rock armor and thus
accessible. However, such a raised structure would be a nightmare during construc-
tion, requiring the contractor to be delicate with rock placement.
Because wastewater flows peaking at 5.7 m3/s were expected after outfall com-
pletion, not all the risers were to carry flow. Only 21 alternate risers, starting from
the offshore end of the pipe, had their ports open. Even then, most of these risers
only carry flow intermittently. This fact was first made evident through dye studies.
Seawater has intruded into the outfall through the outermost ports, bringing with
it both sand and larval sea creatures. Internal visual and sonar surveys of the line by
ROV have confirmed this, showing piles of sediment (especially opposite nonfunc-
tioning risers) plus market-size live Dungeness crabs. See Grace (1997).
Finally, the designer of the SWOO has reported that the local Loma Prieta earth-
quake of 1989 does not appear to have adversely affected the pipeline.
6.3 Monterey Bay Outfall, California

6.3.1 Given a Tortured Alignment
Grace (2001) has traced the history of this unusual outfall (No. 114 in Table A-1).
Because of environmental deliberations, there was a two-and-a-half-year delay in
soliciting bids. An outgrowth of these talks was a radical change in the outfall’s align-
ment. The location of the outfall’s diffuser had been fixed. The direct route to this
site, from the east, would have had the outfall pass through fine vegetated dunes
backing the shoreline. This route was now forbidden, and another place for making
the land–sea transition would have to be used. Such a site had been found some-
what to the south, where there was already a dunal breach and, as well, a working
sand plant.
We were not present at the meetings where this environmental decision was
reached. But consider the Netherlands. The Dutch are probably those most sensitive
to coastal dune degradation among the inhabitants of developed countries. Their
land is largely below sea level; they cannot tolerate any breach. Yet even they found
a way to cross their precious dunal system with a submarine pipeline (“Callantsoog”
1975, “How” 1975, “Pipeline” 1977). Of course, their concern is one of necessity.
The Monterey Bay one may have been partly aesthetics and partly the protection of
protected species of plants or small animals.
Because of the new environmental stipulations, the Monterey Bay pipe would
have to follow an unusual, Z-shaped alignment. The middle leg would be largely
parallel to the fronts of big winter storm waves, absolutely the worst possible orien-
tation in terms of wave-induced forces, as shown in Appendix B. The new Z configu-
ration clearly also added extra length and additional cost.
Involved in the final design were 3,015 m of 1,524-mm-i.d. (152-mm wall)
pipe, 146 m of diffuser run at this size, a 1,524-mm to 1,219-mm reducer, and
263 m of 1,219-mm diffuser run. The length of the first part of the outfall, directly
out from shore, was 1,038 m. The following middle section was 1,977 m long,
extending from a water depth of roughly 17 m to one of 28 m. The final section,
oriented 15° north of west, had a length of 414 m, including the diffuser. The end
water depth was 33 m.
The spacing of the diffuser ports took into account the length of the separate
pipe sections, namely 7.315 m. There were three holes per section, on alternating
sides. The openings were “bellmouth,” converging through the pipe wall to an exit
diameter of 51 mm located 152 mm above the pipe’s spring line. A single port (in
the whole diffuser) exited vertically. This was an air release opening placed in the
reducer section located 265 m inshore of the end of the line.
6.3.2 Beginning Inshore Construction

In early February 1982, the accepted low bid for the project was US$16.5 million.
Subsequently, several change orders modified aspects of the original design. As
examples, the two transitions between outfall legs would now be curved, rather
than abrupt and requiring reaction blocks. This change would involve repeatedly
“pulling the joint” on one side to slowly effect the change in orientation. The thrust
system at the end of the diffuser was retained, but it was altered in concept and
configuration.
A construction staging area was set up surrounding the back-beach location of
the junction box linking the land and ocean outfalls. A trestle was built. This con-
sisted of 70 bents extending from slightly landward of the junction box to 610 m
offshore in a water depth of 10.5 m. The trestle deck stood 9 m above sea level. Pile
driving for this structure began in late May 1982, and the trestle was completed in
mid-July. Pile driving never reached refusal. Earlier tests had shown that stoppage
would not occur even at seabed penetrations of 18 to 21 m, and geophysical data
actually suggested a sand deposit tens of meters thick. Sheet piling was driven under
the trestle, almost to its end, to contain the outfall through the turbulent nearshore
region. These sheets would ultimately be cut off at seabed level.
After trench excavation, pipe was laid and backfilled under the trestle for five
weeks in October and November. A 0.76-m-thick reinforced concrete cap was the
ultimate protection over the pipe to a water depth of 3 m, 335 m offshore; beyond
that point protection was provided by rock.
6.3.3 Early Offshore Work

The design of the outfall was such that it would be completely buried, in a trench,
out to a water depth of 16 m. It would then gradually emerge, lying directly on the
bottom beyond a water depth of 22 m. There would be rock cover in both cases. The
trench under the trestle was thus extended by the offshore operation as required. A
clam bucket was used for this purpose, and a well-defined trench was carved in the
dense seabed of fine-grained sand overlain by from 0.1 to 0.3 m of looser fine sand.
This derrick barge work extended from May 25 to July 17, 1982.
The work vessel used for the Monterey Bay outfall, Davy Crockett, is not a typi-
cal derrick barge. It is actually a converted 135-m World War II Liberty ship with its
superstructure cut off and its engines removed. This oft-used vessel, involved for
example in the construction of the Sand Island No. 2 outfall (No. 44 in Table 1-1) at
Honolulu, Hawaii, has been detailed elsewhere (Grace 1978).
Pipe-laying began June 23, 1982, at the intermediate end-of-trestle point, with
the simple placement of the first standard extended-bell pipe section, all by itself and
with its socket (bell) offshore, rather than a more typical first-laid special double-
bell section, such as has been used on some other outfalls. Pipe-laying ended October
12, 1982. A laser on shore provided line for the work but was sometimes obscured
by the area’s notorious fog. The nominal thickness of bedding was 0.30 m. After
placement of the pipe and hydrostatic tests on each joint, various passes then had to
be made to place the protective rock layers.
During work stoppages, a bulkhead was placed in the temporary pipe end so that
sand and bedding stone could not be swept inside by wave action. Divers for the con-
struction manager made repeated inspections, and in cases of inadequacies, directed
the contractor to rectify the situation. The rocking of the diffuser was ultimately com-
pleted on November 17, 1982. There was little time for inspection because the Davy
Crockett was towed from the site the next day, not a moment too soon.
6.3.4 The Winter of 1982–1983: Heavy Weather

During the interval November 30–December 1, 1982, storm waves damaged 100 m
of the end of the Monterey Bay trestle. Crests of the bigger waves stood above the
deck of the structure. Still larger and longer-period waves, from December 16 to
18, 1982, overwhelmed and demolished more of the trestle (Lazanoff and Court-
ney 1984). The waves during this second storm were the biggest seen from the
staging area during the whole tempestuous season, and the feeling of observers
was that the largest breaking waves in the trestle vicinity were at least 11 m high.
By the end of the year, an 80-m intermediate part of the trestle was missing and
230 m off the end.
Winter storms are no stranger to the California coastline, but the sheer num-
ber of storms in 1982–1983 was unusual. Also, what is normally a northwest wave
source direction swung to the southwest. Even more unprecedented were the sub-
stantial amounts of spectral energy linked to long wave periods during the height
of these episodes. Often there are forerunners of storms, low waves of long period
that arrive early. But during 1982–1983, the story was different (Earle et al. 1984).
Consider the following amounts of energy associated with periods longer than 16 s:
49% on December 17, 1982; 56% on January 23, 1983; 44% on February 10, 1983;
and 54% on March 1, 1983. The last storm is the one that “got” the massive crane
barge during outfall construction at San Francisco (see section 6.2.3).
6.3.5 Completion of Inshore Work

Once the Monterey Bay trestle had been rebuilt, following the extraordinary 1982–
1983 winter storms, redredging was done and inshore pipe-laying resumed from
July 7 to completion on September 24, 1983, by tying into the spigot of the first pipe
section, laid months earlier by the offshore horse. This unusual makeup joint, using
a short closure piece, was not entirely satisfactory, as it tended to leak. After endur-
ing occasional waves breaking over it on October 21, the trestle was dismantled in
November 1983.
6.3.6 Trouble Offshore

When the tumultuous weather of winter 1982–1983 finally moderated, the non-
diffuser portion of the outfall was thoroughly inspected by the Monterey Regional
Water Pollution Control Agency (MRWPCA) in-house diving engineers. Several
inspection attempts had preceded this late-July 1983 operation, but all had been
aborted because of unworkable sea conditions. Divers found that the long middle
section of the pipe had been largely denuded of its rock cover. The larger nominal
size of the two classes of top rock over this length, Type 1 for the shallower half, was
roughly 0.5 m (Table 6-4). Fortunately, there was no structural damage to the outfall
and no apparent settlement. It is of interest to enquire whether the rock removal
would have been so substantial had the rock matrix been given a chance to settle
Table 6-4. Grading of the Largest Monterey Bay Outfall Armor Rock
Weight of Pieces Rock Diameter If Percent Larger by Percent Larger by
(kN) Spherical (m) Weight (Type 1) Weight (Type X)
13.34 0.993 — 0
11.12 0.935 — 5–20
6.67 0.788 — 40–65
3.34 0.626 0 65–80
2.22 0.547 40–60 —
0.89 0.403 — 75–90
0.56 0.344 70–80 —
0.16 0.225 85–100 —
0.09 0.187 — 90–100
somewhat under constant wave agitation as well as to become somewhat cemented

together by developing marine plant growth.
The MRWPCA had to work fast to again provide rock protection for the pipe
before the next winter’s storms. The target date for ending the work was mid-Novem-
ber. The original designer was put in charge, and three “name” coastal engineering
subconsultants were quickly retained.
It was obvious that the previous Type 1 rock size would have to be surpassed for
the new protection. After a rapid series of tests in a large wave tank facility, impos-
sibly trying to physically model waves of 19-s modal period and 11.5-m significant
wave height, the decision was reached to triple the nominal weight of the outfall’s
top armor rock. This large “Type X” rock, whose specifications appear in Table 6-4,
would be placed immediately in sections where there was still smaller rock to pro-
vide a cushion over the pipe. Otherwise, smaller rock would have to be placed before
the Type X.
6.3.7 Finishing the Outfall

After arrangements with the quarry, the earlier-mobilized contractor began the
US$2.7 million placement of the new rock cover on October 3, 1983, already omi-
nously close to the start of winter weather. The initial water depth was 14 m, along
the straight-offshore portion of the outfall. After a few days on this stretch, the long
middle part was started. The contractor worked 16 hours per day, seven days per
week, placing 2,700 tonnes of rock per day. By October 25, 1983, 1,040 m of the out-
fall had been covered, with 910 m to go (“Crews” 1983). As this rocking operation
proceeded, a team of divers was working inside the diffuser with educators, trying to
remove tons of sand that had been driven inside.
Because of heavy weather, the barge vacated the site on November 12, 1983,
leaving two stretches unfinished, a combined length of 350 m. The barge returned
17 days later, for an apparent good weather window, and completed the shallower
of the two locations the next day. The Davy Crockett was then moved to the longer
and deeper work area for the final effort, but once again nature displayed her occa-
sional fury.
An intense, sudden storm struck the area early on December 3, 1983, and con-
tinued into the following day. The strong winds and waves drove a materials barge
ashore, and it was a total loss. This was the second barge lost by the contractor on
this job. The anchored Davy Crockett work vessel was tossed violently by the big
seas. A U.S. Coast Guard helicopter was called in and in two trips lifted off the nine-
person night crew still left aboard. There was frequently green water sluicing across
the deck of the vessel, and astonishing damage to deck-mounted gear was noted
when she was reboarded after the storm.
There would be no more rock placement until the Davy Crockett was repaired
and until the 1983–1984 winter was well and truly over. In time, spring arrived. The
work vessel was again on site in May and June of 1984 and completed the rerocking
operation, ending construction of the outfall. After all the trouble, its final cost was
close to US$20 million.
6.4 Santa Cruz No. 3 Outfall, California

The designer of this outfall (No. 199 in Table A-1) was an experienced engineering
consultant. The design flow was 4.6 m3/s, and the pipe chosen was a 1,829-mm-
diam. RCP of L configuration and 3,734 m long. The pipe is fully buried out to a
water depth of 26 m, and the end water depth is 34 m. The diffuser occupies the final
640 m of the line, and the port sizes are as follows: 50 of 94-mm diameter; 64 of
64-mm diameter; and 60 of 51-mm diameter.
The contractor for the Southwest Ocean outfall at San Francisco moved directly
100 km south to this job and used the same horse, although in modified form
(Anderson 1987). The accepted low bid of US$18,367,000 was well less than the
engineer’s estimate of US$23.0 million because the mobilization component was
largely absent. Construction was by crane barge and horse offshore, with the trestle
inshore. The trestle work (Fig. 6-9) was done last.
A clamshell dredge was used for excavation of the trench, whose bottom was
4.3 m below the sea floor. The enormous derrick barge, fabricated for the San Fran-
cisco project, provided the same function here. The same 9.75-m square horse was
also used, but in this case it was modified to lay two of this project’s (smaller) pipe
sections (joined) at one time. These elements lay along the outsides of the deck
of the vessel, and lateral tracks were used to bring two sections (on transfer carts)
together under the horse (Fig. 6-10).
Figure 6-9. Pile template at end of Santa Cruz trestle.

Figure 6-10. Two Santa Cruz transfer carts and pipe sections.
The trench sideslopes were sufficiently steep that the horse (Fig. 6-11) could
straddle the trench and reach down inside it to join sections of pipe. More than
3,000 m of line was laid and backfilled during May to August of 1987. This was the
offshore portion. The 290 m of pipe-laying under the trestle was done last and com-
pleted in 1988 after some difficult dredging of inshore mudstone.
The horse modification for this work also involved a strongback (a longitudinal
support beam) suspended from the horse, as well as bins for holding bedding rock.
In the first case, a telescoping vertical setting frame was attached between the strong-
back device and the traveling frame portion of the horse. Remote-controlled hydrau-
lic rams allowed for finely tuned, all-direction movement for jointing, directed by
diver commentary. In the second case, the bins could hold all bedding rock required
for the two linked pipe sections. This material was released using flap gates.
6.5 Stormwater Outfalls on the Lower U.S. East Coast

6.5.1 Dealing with Runoff from Heavy Rains
Historically, the runoff from heavy precipitation events at many U.S. coastal com-
munities has been piped to the local shoreline and released through a whole string
of outlets. These have taken various (gravity) forms, the most basic being an under-
ground pipe terminating at the backbeach and the storm flow carving a course for
Figure 6-11. Santa Cruz horse and pipe being swung over the side of the derrick barge.
itself across the saturated strand to the sea. Such a channel then persists as an unde-
sirable discontinuity along the shoreline for some weeks thereafter. Above-grade
outlets at the rear of the beach tend to attract small children and animals. Grating
over the outlets, to prevent their entry, could materially decrease the effectiveness
of the storm drainage system through rapid clogging by street trash. The openings
also provide a means for storm surge to force water through the drains in the wrong
direction, possibly worsening inland flooding.
In some cases, buried pipes have terminated halfway across a (perhaps widened)
beach, their ends becoming exposed when the pipe is charged during heavy runoff
events. In others, the pipe is buried across the whole beach and emerges onto stilts
near the water’s edge, forming an unsightly image when exposed near low tide and
a potential danger to swimmers and especially to surfers near high tide. A serious
collision of the latter variety has indeed happened, one example involving a double
pipe at Manly Beach in Australia.
In mid-October 2000, a junior world champion triathlete, doing some bodysurf-
ing after a training swim, slammed into the pipe pair at high tide. He broke four neck
vertebrae and ended up a wheelchair-bound quadriplegic. He sued both Manly Coun-
cil and Sydney Water, each of which owned one of the pipes. In May 2006, at the age
of 26, he was awarded A$1.75 million. The award, half of what was sought, was made
despite the fact that he was outside the flagged safe area. The judge halved the award
because he felt that the victim knew very well about the dangers of the location.
The modern trend has been to intercept sets of the various outlets and to route
the combined flows to a single outfall extending somewhat (perhaps 400–600 m)
offshore (Heathcote and Britton 1980). First-flush and continuing contaminants will
then be released well off the beach, rather than onto it or at its edge. Water quality
reports will then tend to be kinder, and the beach involved will be a more desirable
destination for those seeking an experience beside the sea. Whereas such consolida-
tion has been going on for several decades in the United Kingdom, the effort in the
United States has been more recent. Two extended metropolitan areas along the U.S.
East Coast are prime examples of the U.S. effort.
6.5.2 Grand Strand, South Carolina

Sanford and Wooten (2006) provide background for major storm water outfalls
at Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Consider the 25th Avenue South (Yaupon Drain-
age Basin) conduit at this location. Predesign ocean work involved three vibracores
along the planned alignment, and the design storm conditions considered a 50-year
recurrence interval. The outfall itself involved two parallel 1,524-mm-diam. concrete
pipes, each 360 m long, with the invert of the buried pipe terminus at almost 9 m
below sea level. Water depth at the latter point was nearly 6.5 m.
The outfall was installed by an experienced contractor from March to August
2003. Offshore work cost roughly US$4.3 million, with related onshore activity
another US$1.2 million. A trestle and double sheet pile walls were used in the surf
zone, with crane barges outside. A notable feature of this outfall concerns the stone
and rock that was used. Nominal bedding size was 0.2-N stone (range 0.03–0.9 N),
and the nominal filter stone was 150 N (range 20–600 N). The top armor cover had
a nominal size of 9.5 kN, with a range of 1.2–38 kN. Such protection for an exposed-
coast outfall has become the standard.
The 21st Avenue South storm water outfall at North Myrtle Beach consisted
of twin 1,829-mm prestressed concrete cylinder pipe (PCCP), each 460 m long.
The engineer’s estimate for this project was US$5.8 million. The winning (low)
bid was US$5.037 million, and the other bids were US$5.510 and 5.929 million.
The contract award had occurred May 25, 2004, and I visited the construction site
six months later. The beach couldn’t be occupied until the beginning of Septem-
ber, after the bulk of the tourist season. The contractor was delayed by unforeseen
subsurface conditions, notably a stretch of hard limestone, and it appears that he
received several hundred thousand dollars extra for dealing with that situation. A
trestle was involved, and the pipe was trenched. The installation was completed in
April 2006.
Late in 2007, it was announced that the shoreline of both Myrtle Beach and
North Myrtle Beach would be replenished using sand from borrow sites straddling
the state–federal line about 5.5 km offshore. The amounts were 1,100,000 and
540,000 m3, respectively. This kind of operation poses a definite threat to outfalls in
the area, whether from workboat traffic, dredger spuds, the slurry delivery pipeline
system, or from being completely covered up.
6.5.3 Virginia Beach, Virginia

At this location, the decision was reached in the mid-1990s to eliminate some
90 storm drains onto the beach and install two backbeach pump stations connected
to outfalls. This project would be part of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (CoE)
and city of Virginia Beach (35% funding) plan to widen and heighten the beach
with pumped sand, rebuild the 6.5-km-long backbeach seawall, and stabilize a
stretch of low dunes. The plan was called the Beach Erosion Control and Hurricane
Protection Study.
Although 90 bids were solicited for the replenishment of the oceanfront at
Virginia Beach, only two bids were received. The CoE was the contracting agency
for the initial US$14,766,000 fixed-price contract with an experienced East Coast
marine company, involving roughly 1.9 million m3 of fill. In the end, with an
option exercised, plus modifications, the contractor placed approximately 3.1 mil-
lion m3. The work commenced July 6, 2001, and officially ended on February 11,
2002, closely following the interval when the CoE was being heavily criticized for
irregularities associated with expensive plans to upgrade the locks and dams along
the Mississippi River.
There were six separate discharge locations, and the dredge was typically sta-
tioned in some 9 m of water over government-furnished borrow sites. The discharge
pipeline ranged in length from approximately 700 m (with no booster) to 2,100 m
(with an anchored booster barge). The depth of cut was typically 1.5–2.5 m. The
effects of tropical storms and two nor’easters caused delays.
The CoE has been profiled by Pilkey and Dixon (1996). This agency ventured
beyond its normal strictly hydraulic and coastal engineering functions and served as
the final designer for the two outfalls, one at 16th Street (called the S pipe) and the
other at 42nd Street (called the F pipe). Both outfalls involved 1,219-mm RCP that
was 610 m long; the former location had three parallel pipes, and the latter four. This
is a curious and fussy arrangement. In the two cases, a single reinforced concrete pipe
of 1,841 (S) and 2,050 (F) mm would have mathematically rendered the same flow
capacity (not flow area) and required less net seabed excavation. Such pipe sizes are
well less than the maximum RCP size available from manufacturers.
In three notable respects, the F pipe did not conform to the marine industry
norm (not the terrestrial standard) for 1,219-mm-diam. RCP installed for other out-
falls and typified by that used in the Mokapu outfall in Hawaii (No. 47 in Table 1-1).
The wall was too thin (127 versus 171 mm); the outside concrete cover over rein-
forcing steel was too small (25 versus 51 mm); there was no diagonal steel that con-
nected longitudinal reinforcing bars in the barrel with those in the extended bell.
Significantly, neither outfall had specified stone bedding and backfill. Neither
outfall had specified armor rock or articulated concrete block mattress. The intent
was to have the pipe crown under at least 1.2 m of native fine sand, a thickness that
can be removed in mere hours by severe storm waves.
In both the S and F pipe cases, there were unusual boxlike discharge structures
at the terminus (in a water depth of 8 m) that were approximately 5.5 m high, half-
buried, and 7 m deep. The width of each box accepted its set of pipes at centerline
spacing of 2.3 m. Each open-end pipe at the box had a flap valve. Each of the seven
separate pipes had three full-size 1.5-m-high manhole risers at the following approx-
imate distances from the onshore pumping station: 230 m, 335 m, and 455 m. The
thin manhole lids were made of stainless steel.
Two different companies won the contracts. The low bid for the S pumping sta-
tion, shore improvements, and outfall was US$9.196 million. The corresponding
figure (nine bids) for the F system was US$11.826 million, with the award date early
September 1998. Completion was to be in mid-March of 2001. The contractor for
the S project started work offshore, whereas the F company began its work on the
beach. Trestles and crane barges were involved. In truth, the trestles were more like
platforms, usually lacking any link to the shoreline (see section 6.5.4).
Each contractor completed the outfall for which it was responsible. The F pipe
company had experienced a considerable amount of pipe cracking in the nearshore
zone, particularly after two nor’easter storms. The contractor had been ordered to
slipline all four close-inshore branches, each with roughly 150 m of 1,067-mm HDPE
pipe. Glass (2005a) has reported that the contractor subsequently brought suit against
the CoE, and resolution of the case in March 2005 resulted in a US$6.8 million award
to that company. During the trial, the defense attorney sought settlement soon after
the prosecuting attorney had identified document falsification by one of the defense
expert witnesses, actually a CoE employee.
There is a message here. A federal coastal engineering agency is not a suitable
outfall designer and had no business drawing up the plans and specifications at
16th and 42nd Streets without help. The CoE should have sought assistance from
an engineering consultant schooled in the design of close-inshore submarine pipe-
lines. It’s a tough business. The CoE should seek increased understanding of its core
business—breakwaters, levees, and harbors—rather than striking off into completely
unknown territory (“The Corps” 2006; Reid 2006; Schwartz 2006).
The story has not ended. Over several years, the S outfall filled up with sand.
The CoE contracted with yet another company to remove the tons of material and
redo the manholes, apparently using a piled work platform set over each location. A
U.S. Coast Guard Notice to Mariners reported that the work would extend from July
2006 to July 2007. The CoE directed that later work of a similar nature and dura-
tion should also be done for the F system. On October 4, 2007, the CoE awarded a
continuation contract to the same company, for the period November 5, 2007, to
October 1, 2008. The plan was to erect a leapfrog trestle (see section 6.5.4) support-
ing a 180-tonne crawler crane and to gradually advance to the end of the line, 600 m
offshore. The manhole lids would be replaced and sealed, and the accumulated sand
would be removed.
Finally, on October 15, 2007, the CoE awarded a US$9,306,196 contract for
the (proposed one-year) construction of another storm water outfall, this one at
79th Street, to extend 550 m offshore (Glass 2005b). The successful contractor
(of three bids) was the same one that had built the 25th Avenue South outfall
at Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Surprisingly, at 79th Street, the local dune was
graded and covered with stone to provide a staging area for the contractor. A trestle
was planned.
6.5.4 Leapfrog Trestle

On some U.S. East Coast storm water outfall projects, the trestle did not extend from
land all the way out to the pipe terminus. The trestle had a defined length, say 60 m.
After the pipe installation was completed for that length, the trestle would be moved
ahead another 60 m by taking the piles and modular deck sections from the rear and
progressively installing them at the head of the structure. Thus, the trestle essentially
becomes an isolated and elongated platform.
The savings in structural steel costs can be considerable. In situations where
local officials will not tolerate construction equipment contacting the beach during
the busy summer season, this arrangement of detachment has its advantages. The
finale of the leapfrog trestle is the creation of an end ramp that allows the crane to
walk down onto a deck barge (on a flat day). The crane then takes up the remainder
of the trestle from its floating position.
This technique, also referred to as a “creeping trestle,” was considered for the San
Onofre outfalls project reviewed in Chapter 3. However, the idea was dismissed, in part
because it was viewed as too complicated, but also because of the worry that isolated
workers and equipment could not be brought to safety in the event of a bad storm.
6.6 The Crane Barge Working Alone

6.6.1 Courtice Outfall, Ontario, Canada
The small city of Courtice has a population of 22,000 and is located near the northern
shore of Lake Ontario halfway between the metropolitan centers of Hamilton and
Toronto. Situated on the nearby shoreline is the Darlington Nuclear Generating Sta-
tion (DNGS), which produces a large outflow of heated water. The designers of the
Courtice outfall (No. 439 in Table A-1) took advantage of the offshore-directed DNGS
outflow to push the diluted sewage further out into the lake. The 180-m-long diffuser
site was in 9–11 m of water roughly 900 m south of the shoreline. There were 45 out-
lets, and the structure’s diameter was stepped from the size of the trunk (1,650 mm)
down to 750 mm.
The conduit material was concrete pressure pipe. In July 2005, an experienced
Canadian Great Lakes company won the construction contract for C$8,513,000.
There was a drop shaft structure on shore, and then a 40-m-long sheet pile cofferdam
crossed the shoreline. Two spud barges with large cranes were involved offshore. The
trench excavation involved hard till and a heavy-duty clamshell bucket. Some of the
excavated material was retained to be used as backfill, and the rest was loaded onto
dump scows and taken to an approved site more than 5 km offshore with water at
least 40 m deep.
Bedding was 50-mm crushed stone, and this material was extended upward to
the pipe springline. Divers made the connections. Except for the first 400 m of the
line, where armor stone was placed on top, the backfill was native material. The proj-
ect was completed in the spring of 2006, shortly before the span of April through
June, during which offshore work is prohibited in the area because of fish spawning.
Additional details are in Weber (2006).
6.6.2 East Bay Dischargers Authority Outfall,

San Francisco Bay, California
The owner of this L-shaped outfall (No. 79 in Table A-1) is the East Bay Dischargers
Authority (EBDA), located in San Lorenzo, California. The pipe extends roughly east
into San Francisco Bay in the vicinity of Oakland. Engineering was done by a local
consulting company using a design flow of 8.28 m3/s. Double-gasket reinforced con-
crete pipe was used: 2,438-mm inside diameter with a 229-mm wall. The major
distance features of the outfall are total length, 11,618 m and diffuser length, 610 m.
Flow was to pass out of 250 (203-mm) top-mounted tees, reduced to 102 mm. There
were to be two end manholes and one in the middle. The entire length was to be
buried in the soft San Francisco Bay sediments. Fourteen offshore borings had been
done to detail the substrate.
The US$16.0 million contract for this installation in protected waters was
awarded to a joint venture of two experienced outfall contractors. Apparently, the
second-lowest bid was roughly US$7 million higher. One company’s crane barge did
the dredging work and the spoils disposal, using bottom-dump scows, at a bay site
24 km away. The derrick barge of the second contractor carried out the placement of
pipe (Fig. 6-12) and bedding. Work started in the offshore portion in April 1978 and
was completed in 29 months, one month ahead of schedule (Tennant et al. 1983).
Figure 6-12. EBDA diffuser section being lowered into the water.
From afar, I was able to view this two-barge “spread” off Oakland on several occa-
sions during that time.
The first company’s clamshell bucket had a capacity of 3.8 m3, and work pro-
ceeded in two stages: excavation of a 30-m-wide inshore access trench to allow work
to be done in the shallow water and dredging of the pipe trench itself. Nominal
sidewalls on the latter were 1-on-1.
The second company’s big barge mounted two cranes. One, in the bow with a
1.2 m3 bucket, carried out any needed spot trench excavation. The main crane trans-
ferred 7.3-m-long, 35-metric-ton pipe sections (there were 1,569 of these) from the
pipe barge to the trench. Each pipe section was suspended under a strongback by
adjustable slings for depth control. A laser target was mounted on the upper part of
one sling for ensuring the proper line. Temporary steel survey towers were installed
every 600 m for help in positioning. One is shown in the distance in Fig. 6–12.
With the spigot of the new section close to and properly aligned with the bell
of the preceding pipe, the joint was quickly executed through use of the patented
Hydro-Pull process using a bulkhead and a small pump that creates a reduced inter-
nal pipe pressure, drawing the new pipe into position. On a typical day, the con-
struction crew placed four to five lengths of pipe, and on a good day, six sections
were laid.
The contractor experienced some trouble working the first 3,000–3,500 m
inshore at low tide because of the mud flats. Two flat barges conveyed river-run bed-
ding gravel to the site. Overexcavation of the trench was done, and mud was replaced
by bedding. A movable conveyor delivered the bedding material into the trench,
while a diver jetted it around the pipe. Rock cover was then carefully added.
Another problem involved the removal by airlift just before pipe-laying of soft
material that had slopped into the trench. Some soft pockets of bay mud required
extra excavation. High winds and thick fog stopped operations on occasion. Away
from the nearshore area, tidal currents, especially on the flood, were sometimes strong
enough to disrupt construction and prevent safe inspection diving. Nevertheless, the
job was completed approximately six months early. Information at hand suggests
that the actual payout for the project may have been close to US$20 million.
6.6.3 The Waianae Outfall Extension, Hawaii, and Its Problems

Waianae is a town on the west coastline of Oahu, Hawaii. The City and County of
Honolulu is responsible for the community’s sewage collection, treatment, and dis-
posal. There is no harbor of refuge near Waianae for anything larger than a fishing
boat. The nearest military shelter for substantial marine plant is at Pearl Harbor, 35 km
away, while the closest state of Hawaii refuge (Honolulu Harbor) is 45 km distant.
The original 914-mm-diameter RCP outfall, built in 1965, was 955 m long
and terminated as a diffuser in roughly 4 fathoms of water. The designer of the
extension had to cope with areas of unexploded ordnance (UXO), as well as an
official artificial reef (or fish haven) area dominated by a scuttled ship. The final
arrangement was that the 1,067-mm-diam. RCP (127-mm wall) trunk of the exten-
sion would extend offshore 930 m. The perpendicular 162-m-long “broken-back”
diffuser, featuring 42 crown-mounted elbow-shaped risers, would terminate in

32 m of water. Riser height would be 0.3 m, diameter would be 152 mm, and the
orifice diameter, 76 mm.
The low bid for the extension (No. 153 in Table A-1) was approximately
US$2.8 million; the second-lowest bid was roughly US$2.0 million higher. Even the
second bid was several hundred thousand dollars lower than the engineer’s estimate.
The extension work began June 1, 1984, and ended January 26, 1986.
A concrete plug at the end of the existing outfall had to be removed. The exten-
sion pipe was to be laid on gravel bedding in an excavated trench, backfilled with
stone, and overlain by a tremie concrete cover. The estimated amount of excavated
material was 4,500 m3. The contractor built its own horse for laying pipe to decouple
barge motion and pipe placement. Such a structure is introduced in section 6.2.4.
An unusual thing with this particular horse was that, because it had limited lateral
adjustment, the legs were sometimes retracted during descent and the pipe section
itself first contacted the bottom. The horse was then moved over.
The contractor had its problems, one of which was a concrete workers’ strike.
Some spigots were broken when the new section was “stabbed” indelicately into the
old. Some bells were broken when the horse landed. On one occasion, a diver lost
the tips of two fingers—caught under the foot of a landing horse. Bedding stone, on
occasion, was driven well inside the already laid pipes during the sluicing operation.
There were also problems with pipe levels and maintaining centerline.
These problems were as nothing compared to what happened in mid-January
1985. A west wind in Hawaii is rare, but a strong westerly struck the state at this
time. Measurements off Barking Sands, Kauai, 180 km west by northwest of Wai-
anae, peaked with a significant wave height of almost 7 m and 35% of the energy
over periods above 16 seconds. There was insufficient time to even start a tow toward
a distant haven, and the large crane barge, a medium barge with silos of cement
and a store of gravel, plus a tiny anchor scow were all driven ashore east of the site.
These vessels were pounded by the raging surf. All three had been towed free within
72 hours. In time, the smaller pair was repaired and returned to service. Figure 6-13
shows a beached crane barge on another Hawaiian outfall job.
I visited the drydock within which the big barge was placed. Her bottom plating
was peeled back in many places, much of her bottom bracing was buckled, and some
of her bulkheads were missing. Repair cost was estimated at more than US$1 million;
there would have been months of delay. She was stripped, and on March 12 she was
scuttled (with difficulty) in an approved artificial reef haven off Kahala, Oahu. She
settled upright. Some months later, using scuba, I visited the site in 21 m of water and
took a tour, part of the time with a curious green turtle.
A replacement barge was leased from another offshore contractor on the main-
land and then towed to Hawaii. However, the vessel did not have proper Coast Guard
papers, and there was a delay before she could be used.
Meanwhile, it took the contractor a full month of heavy work underwater to
clear away the bulk of materials driven onto the alignment by the storm. Airlifts were
used for the sand and air-filled lift bags for the rocks. The contractor simply couldn’t
get down to pure gravel.
Figure 6-13. Outfall crane barge driven ashore.
In time, the contractor once more had assembled a workable spread and was
moving along the route, excavating, laying pipe, backfilling, and placing a tremie
concrete overlayer. A distinct problem involved the merging of the concrete cap and
the sidewall of the trench to provide protection from wave-induced water motion
that might later erode around the edges and perhaps remove backfill.
A final note is in order. The standard test for RCP joint tightness involves a
monel tube within the pipe spigot that runs from outside the joint to between the
two O-rings (Grace 1978). If the joint is well made, overpressure imposed on the
outside of the joint will be sustained. However, if the tube is either plugged with
foreign material or crimped with vise grips, the tested joint appears to be good. An
entire outfall in Puerto Rico was built with every joint test compromised in this way.
On the Waianae job, as an example, an inspector diver twice, in one day, found that
putty had been forced into the tube. He was not pleased.
As in many endeavors, there are tricks of the trade in the construction of marine
outfalls. It doesn’t do any harm for the owner to hire a construction manager and
inspector company whose divers have served as work divers in the past, and who
know the ropes. Another idea is to use as the construction inspector team the con-
tractor that had the second low bid for the job. Its personnel should already be well
versed in the details of the project.
In one strange outfall undertaking, both the construction and inspector divers
were supplied by the same diving contractor. A young diver was expected to report
on his boss.
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7
High-Tech Outfall
Installation in Deep Water
7.1 Saturation Diving

7.1.1 Background
Wastewater regulatory agencies’ perceived need to have highly-diluted, submerged
effluent clouds above marine diffusers has pushed some outfalls into substantial
depths of water, particularly when the effluent involved has been treated to less than
a secondary level. An extreme example is the (US$28 million design-build) Bright-
water outfall, under construction at the time of writing, that will discharge at a water
depth of roughly 180 m in Puget Sound off Washington state, in the United States.
Such deep water situations are not uncommon for oil and gas pipelines, but they are
very rare for wastewater outflow pipes. Not only would construction and inspection
divers be subjected to difficult and hazardous conditions, but they would also have
to breathe mixed gas at such depths. To permit reasonable work durations by those
involved, a saturation diving setup would be necessary (e.g., Barsky and Christensen
2004; “SAT” 2007).
Saturation diving revolves around the empirically established fact that when a
diver is underwater (real or simulated) for a long interval, the time needed to decom-
press reaches a stable and maximum point. Divers become “gas saturated” and their
body tissue no longer accumulates additional gas such as nitrogen or helium. Satura-
tion diving permits workers to remain at high pressures for weeks or longer without
having to repeatedly decompress. One long (multi-day) final decompression “does
the trick.” Lost in the foregoing, though, are the realities of life as a highly-paid satu-
ration diver: extreme boredom, the press of humanity, skin problems, headaches,
and the fact that one cannot just “up and leave.” Lost also is the danger (e.g., Warren
and Park 1990). See also Lamont and Booth (2006).
165
7.1.2 The Concept of Saturation Diving

A typical saturation system would have two deck decompression chambers (DDC),
a transfer lock (TL), and a submersible decompression chamber (SDC, or “bell”).
Each DDC would weigh roughly 17 tonnes. It would provide a dry environment and
house (with bunks) up to six divers. The DDC would be 2.4 m high, 4.6 m long, and
2,134 mm in diameter. There would be three ports. Each DDC would be equipped
with a built-in breathing system, capable of supplying the required gas at any simu-
lated or actual water depth. Clearly, a full-time support crew would be necessary.
These individuals would use a service lock for the passage of food, medical supplies,
and other articles to and from the workers under pressure.
The TL permits access between the two DDCs or between the DDC and the SDC.
The TL contains a toilet, a shower, and a wash basin. Typically, the TL is a vertical
cylinder 2.2 m high and 2.0 m in diameter, and it weighs 8 tonnes.
The 2.75-m-diameter spherical SDC transports two divers from the DDCs on
deck over the side of the diving support vessel (DSV) and down to the work site
below. After the bell’s bottom hatch is opened, one diver exits to work while the
other remains inside as an observer. The bell weighs 6.3 tonnes, fully outfitted, but
has a buoyant weight of 6.5 kN when submerged. The interior of the bell is heated.
For safety, the SDC has a releasable exterior 1-tonne ballast weight. An umbilical
connects the bell to the DSV. This link carries two breathing gas hoses, one hot
water hose, two electrical cables, communication cables, and other lines. A control
van on the deck of the DSV, staffed 24 hours a day, houses all breathing gas, elec-
trical, and communication control as well as breathing gas instrumentation. The
launch and retrieval of the SDC can present significant hazards to the divers during
heavy weather.
7.1.3 The Use of Saturation Diving

In mid-September, 2001, unacceptable cracks were found in two spool piece flanges,
part of a 508-mm submarine oil pipeline with origin at the oil/gas production Plat-
form Irene off Point Arguello, California. The water depth at the site of the problem
was 52 m. As a result of this finding, the platform was shut down and the particular
pipeline filled with water.
The operator called in the same diving contractor it had used for 1999 work on
the same line, but at the base of the platform in 74 m of water. This had specifically
involved the replacement of a tie-in spool, with the mooring over the site of a 67-m
work boat, the DSV. Saturated divers were aided by surface air divers and remotely-
operated vehicles (ROVs) that are detailed later. Tasks involved underwater burn-
ing, jetting, waterblasting, hydraulic flange-forming, bolt tensioning, and the use of
hydraulic hand tools.
In 2001, not only did the contractor repair the problem in 52 m of water, but
it also worked again at the base of the platform. In all, three 508-mm commercial
flanges and two 508-mm spool pieces were replaced. This required that the divers cut
the lines and prepare the ends to receive the new connectors.
High-Tech Outfall Installation in Deep Water 167
I do not know the costs associated with this particular operation. The purchase
price of a basic 12-man saturation diving system is something like US$8 million.
The “bare bones” rental of such a setup is of the order of US$100,000 per month.
The operational cost of such an arrangement might run US$50,000 per day. This
would include the divers, support crew, DSV rental, and consumables like heliox.
Simply to give an idea of the timing of work and decompression, an actual com-
mercial diving project involved eight days of pipeline work in a prodigious water
depth of 330 m. The six divers involved then decompressed over a period of ten days.
At the other end of the scale, another saturation effort at a depth of 55 m required
66 hours of decompression, while yet another to 520 m necessitated 14 days to
return to atmospheric conditions.
This is a complex and very expensive operation, and clients other than those in
the “oil patch” will usually explicitly or implicitly push for a less costly, less diver-
intensive, and less dangerous approach.
7.2 Working Underwater with No Divers

7.2.1 The Submersible
Every outfall requires some work to be done underwater, perhaps blasting (Cregger
1991). Often, such a function is carried out by a human at the pressure of his/her
surroundings, but also it may involve some form of vehicle that houses its operator
in an atmospheric-pressure capsule (Bjonnes and Mills 1988; Maberry 2003). One
finds the wet diver usually in shallower water, the vehicle in deeper depths where
diver work times would be heavily impacted by worries concerning decompression.
This transition normally occurs at a water depth of roughly 40 to 50 m (Mills 1984).
The submersible (e.g., Koenig 1983; Timmermans 1990; Taylor 2001) is hardly
an “off the shelf” item, and it is not generally available. It houses two or three human
occupants at atmospheric pressure. The submersible has been used, at the outfall
predesign stage and for water depths exceeding 30 m, to make physical, geological,
or biological observations of the sea floor or, with its manipulator(s), to pick up or
extract a bottom sample. These vehicles have seen much more application in bio-
logical monitoring and technical assessments of operating outfalls. My pair of known
uses of a submersible as a work vehicle during (deep-water) outfall construction will
be presented later in sections 7.3.4 and 7.4.3.
7.2.2 Humans at Sea Level Pressure in

an Atmospheric Diving System
The Atmospheric Diving System (ADS) also houses an operator at atmospheric pres-
sure, but in this case the housing looks like a “Michelin Man” or a spaceman (Farnquist
1996; McCabe and Charalambides 2000; Thornton 2001; Bissett and Viau 2003). The
“diver” does not have to decompress upon return to the surface. The ADS achieves
diver-like dexterity of motion through the use of advanced rotary joint technology. We
outline below ADS use on two outfall construction projects.
Gofas et al. (1987) as well as Eisenberg et al. (1988) provide background for
the two-branch Greek outfall at Psyttalia Island (No. 252 in Table A-1) The deep
water installation required some remote control and the use of an ROV and an ADS
during construction. Flow capacity of the combined system is 27 m3/sec. Project
cost was US$42 million, the work took place from 1990 to 1993, and the system
became operational in 1994. The joint venture of U.K. and Greek contractors was
involved in this project. The lead designer was a U.K. consultant, while the owner is
the Greek Ministry of Public Works based in Athens. A pair of well-separated outfalls
was involved, each of L shape terminating at a depth of 63 m.
The outfalls extend south from Psyttalia Island located just west of Piraeus, the
port for Athens. Each conduit is 1,870 m long. They are made of extended-bell rein-
forced concrete pipe, with 2.4 m inside diameter, 3.0 m outside diameter. Smaller
pipe, to 1.3-m inside diameter, is involved in the diffuser having minimal 11-mm-
diam. ports.
Pipe segments were 8 m long, and nine of these were put together on land and
tensioned into 72-m lengths. These were launched down a slipway, transported to the
laying site under a specially adapted transport barge, and then transferred to the main
pipelaying derrick barge. Special handling frames were used to position and joint the
pipe, by remote control, once it reached the seabed. The pipe trench was up to 5 m
deep, and this was created by a grab dredger sidecasting the spoil. After completion
of pipe jointing, stone ballast was tremie placed around the new pipe section before
removal of the frames. Laying rates of almost 300 m per week were achieved.
The contractor for the Ponce No. 2 outfall, No. 325 in Table A-1, encountered excess
hard bottom along the route and refused to continue until US$3.0 million had been
added to the base US$32.0 million low-bid contract award. Roughly half of the pipeline
is buried across a relatively flat seabed out to a water depth of 35 m. Thereafter, the out-
fall runs over an escarpment and down a moderately steep slope (22°) to its termination
in 125 m of water. An ADS was used in the deeper waters (Powers, 1997). Total length
is 5,880 m, and the offshore half of the pipeline is 1,219-mm-diameter steel having a
22-mm wall, with a 178-mm CWC. There are ball joints on the steep slope. Design flow
is 1.9 m3/sec; diffuser risers are involved. The outfall was put into service in October
1999, but later found to have various shallow water and deep water leaks (Grace 2007).
7.2.3 Remotely-Operated Vehicles

The ROV has developed, over the past three decades, into perhaps the most important
means of observing and sampling the marine environment, to say nothing about its
use as a work system (Rosenbalm 1997, Pearl and Winegarder 2000). In its simplest
form, the ROV could be regarded as a virtual toy, with a video camera in a waterproof
housing to which are attached two pairs of ducted propellers. One pair, oriented
horizontally, in-line, causes forward, reverse, or turning motion in a horizontal plane.
The other (diagonally-mounted) “transversal” pair accounts for up, down, and lat-
eral movement. Signals to the propulsion system and output from the video cam-
era travel in a bundle of cables, called the umbilical or tether, extending between
the submerged unit and a shipboard control room overhead that houses the human
operator (or “pilot”), a monitor with videotape recorder, and a control “joystick” or
“hand control unit.” Under absolutely ideal conditions in clear, still water, the ROV
is lowered over the side of the vessel, travels down to the seabed site of interest, as the
tether pays out, cruises around at the will of the operator, taking crystal-clear pictures,
and then returns to the ship with concurrent retrieval of the umbilical.
Enter reality. First, there are waves of consequence on the sea surface, where
the ship is located, making the ROV’s water entry “over the side” an initial night-
mare. After deployment, then the vessel’s movement in the seaway causes its end of
the umbilical to jerk around to such an extent that there is only limited control of
the ROV below. Second, an appreciable current is running, dragging heavily on the
umbilical, also impacting vehicle control. Third, visibility in the water is virtually nil,
especially near the bottom, because of suspended silt. The standard video camera is
useless and one is forced to use a forward-looking sonar for navigation and collision
avoidance. Fourth, the ROV is being called upon to do other than simply look; it is to
recover a specific object of non-negligible weight from a jagged seabed. It must be of
very solid construction, to resist possible impacts, should be fitted underneath with
a “skid” to ease landing, and should also possess “arms.” The ROV for the real ocean
must thus be far more than a simple toy.
There are dozens of ROV manufacturers across the world, and scores of different
sizes and designs for the vehicles. (See any issue of the trade magazine Underwater.)
Air weight of these units may be as small as 36 N, and maximum cross-dimension
less than 220 mm. There may be (low-light) monochrome and color video cam-
eras mounted (on pan and tilt platforms), film and digital still cameras, (tiltable,
variable-intensity) halogen lights, electronic flashes, lasers, sonars of various types, a
veritable trove of other instruments, including NDT (non-destructive testing) devices,
and many forms of tools. Examples of the latter are: small dredges; rotary, guillotine,
and reciprocating saws; water blasters; impact wrenches; and wire-rope cutters.
In the control room, the operator will usually be able to set an autopilot for
compass heading and submergence depth of the ROV. These, and other selected trip
variables, such as vehicle speed, altitude, pitch, and roll, can also be displayed on
the monitor. In some cases, the thrusters may be adjustable in both speed and direc-
tion. The modern thruster propeller does not need a shaft seal because it is coupled
magnetically to its (brushless DC electric) motor.
Subsea work is accomplished via multi-function articulated arms, or “manipu-
lators,” extending from the vehicle. As an example, a single-function manipulator
could simply have a pair of open-and-close jaws that would grab objects such as
cables or perhaps cut soft lines. A two (or dual-) function manipulator could have
the same initial feature as the above but then could possess “wrist rotation,” so that
it could grasp a cable in any orientation with respect to the vehicle. Another function
is added if the arm can swing in/out, yet another if this motion can also be up/down.
There are five- and seven-function manipulators available. One design type of arms
involves a cable-connected “master-controller” and “slave-manipulator” in which
the motions of the former (human) are duplicated by the latter. A “force-feedback”
feature provides the operator with a “feel” for what (resistance) the manipulator is
encountering (Harbur 1998).
The ROV may not be in “free-swimming” mode, directly connected to the bob-
bing ship via the umbilical. Rather, the vehicle is cable-lowered from the ship in
conjunction with a unit that itself houses the ROV umbilical. In one case, the ROV
is contained within a protective frame, and at depth the vehicle can make side-
exit excursions in and out from its own “garage.” Another concept has a “top hat
launcher” with the ROV locked beneath it during lowering and retrieval. In both
cases, the ROV’s tether is connected to its tether management system (TMS) which
serves as an intermediate component in the ultimate ship-to-ROV link. The inte-
grated piece of ship-mounted equipment responsible for handling the TMS, called
the “launch and recovery system” (LARS), will include an articulated crane, hydrau-
lic power unit, and winch. There will be a separate control cabin. Some vessels have
a “moon pool” for easier ROV entry and lowering. A moon pool is a substantial cen-
tral opening through the deck and bottom plating of a ship, for special operations.
Since the ROV’s umbilical is such a hindrance, it was only natural that a tether-
less vehicle would be developed. Various such autonomous underwater vehicles
(AUV) systems have been developed in recent years. See Flanigan (2002).
7.2.4 Chapter Orientation

In this chapter we study what was done to install three separate major “deep-
water” outfalls along the west coast of North America from 1986 to 1993. Average
end water depth was 130 m. Great ingenuity was displayed, in each of the cited
cases, to replace divers at ambient pressure. Submersibles found some applica-
tion, but the main innovation involved robotics overseen by operators on the sea
surface—monitoring progress on a television screen. The advanced techniques will
be described, and some forms of them are certain to be used for deep water outfalls
in the future.
7.3 Renton, Seattle, Washington

7.3.1 Background
An immense urban area surrounds the city of Seattle in the state of Washington. One
of the region’s wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), serving a southern sector land
area of 360 km2, is at Renton. For a number of years, the secondary effluent of this
facility was allowed to pass into the northward-flowing Duwamish River, emptying
into a lobe of Puget Sound called Elliott Bay. In time, however, increased sewage
flows and alleged pollution in the river mouth led to major change. The Renton
WWTP outflow would be pumped 19 km northwest and disposed of in 180-m-deep
Puget Sound waters off Duwamish Head, 4 km directly west of downtown Seattle
(Ralston 1986). This outfall (No. 167 in Table A-1) would not be the first Seattle-
area one into those waters, as several other pipes already served this function, nota-
bly at West Point to the north (Grace 1997).
The Renton-to-Duwamish Head transfer line was made of 2,438-mm-diameter
prestressed concrete cylinder pipe, most installed by cut-and-cover, but 1,500 m tun-
neled. Nine separate construction contracts were involved in an effort to save time,
and the whole difficult job was complete in 16 months. Speed was of the essence
because of a court-ordered deadline (January 1987) and possible $10,000-per-day
penalties for continued discharge to the Duwamish River.
The Seattle authorities, namely the owner/operator Municipality of Metropoli-
tan Seattle (Metro), hired a consultant to conduct preliminary engineering studies. In
time, this firm brought aboard another company with gas/oil submarine pipeline
experience, appropriate because of the substantial water depth involved. A twin-
pipe arrangement was settled upon, with a 3000-m length to each branch. Some
US$2 million was spent on the gathering of related physical oceanographic and
marine geological information.
Metro decided to function, with its consultants, as the construction manager for
the project. The consultants beefed up their staff with recruits from local engineering
firms and contractors caught in the lull of heavy construction projects in the area.
Metro also determined to save time by contracting specifically and early for the sup-
ply of the required 1,626-mm-diameter, 19-mm-wall steel pipe (from Japan), the
pair of 150-m-long diffuser sections, and various other fittings (Stewart and Tatum
1988). The pipe had the capacity to bridge 120-m spans without overstressing, a
notable feature due to the uneven nature of the Puget Sound seabed. Of note is the
fact that the pipe had no concrete weight coat.
After much debate, the design team chose the bottom-tow method of outfall
construction and specified it in the contract documents. The steel outfall line was
designed and bid to be welded together onshore and placed continuously from
launching sleds. However, it was indicated that Metro would consider alternate
installation methods after signing of the contract. The low bid was only US$10.16 mil-
lion, some US$5 million below the engineer’s estimate and testament to the “lean
times” in the local construction sector at that moment. A contract was signed in
December, 1985.
7.3.2 Inshore Work

The nearshore 500 m of each line was placed in an excavated trench and backfilled
as protection from dragged anchors. The related dredging operation apparently
led to a massive slope failure (Sylwester and Holmes 1989). Some 250,000 m3 of
loose recent sediments were involved. The slide scar was a large oval depression,
located in from 15 to 50 m of water, with maximum width and relief of 250 and
15 m respectively. Bottom slope in the vicinity was apparently in the range of 10
to 25%.
7.3.3 Offshore Work

The successful bidder did propose an audacious concept for the outer five-sixths of
the dual pipeline. This (accepted) plan centered on the towout of empty bulkheaded
pipe sections (roughly 40% submerged), the slow and controlled lowering of the
open-ended pipe section to the seabed, and diverless connection of the new section
to the end of the already-laid line. The latter made use of 60-bolt flanges. This was
the first outfall I know of where underwater robotic systems were seriously applied
during construction.
In a local shipyard, the pipe was lightly sandblasted and then coated with a
40-mm layer of polyurethane to protect against abrasion. Nine delivered pipe seg-
ments from the mill were welded into a 162-m-long length having an air weight of
122 metric tons. A fixed flange (for the nuts) was welded to one end of the pipe-
string. At the other end, there was a flange capable of limited rotation and designed
to hold withdrawn bolts.
After launching, the pipestring was moved to the laying site by tug. A second
tug, in the rear, provided holdback and steering. Two booms extended from the side
of the on-site shiplike vessel used in the past for outfalls such as Clover Point No. 2
(No. 75 in Table A-1) and Monterey Bay (No. 114 in Table A-1). After the newly-
arrived pipe section was connected to each boom, a series of steps was undertaken to
prepare for the pipe lowering and connection. Considerable detail on this sequence
is provided by Stewart and Tatum (1988).
The contractor had developed a 7.6-m-long, hydraulically-operated align-
ment frame for the task of holding and connecting pipe lengths. The frame was
equipped with a bolting tool controlled from the deck of the pipe-laying barge.
Side anchors at each end of the pipe worked with fall lines from the barge in align-
ing a segment precisely.
The alignment frame was used in an effort to avoid diver work at the 20-atmo-
sphere-absolute pressure involved. The bolt-up tool aligned the flanges, pushed the
sixty bolts through after one flange was rotated to line up with the other, and then
tightened bolts and nuts, all through surface control. Two rotating impact wrenches
were activated to tighten the sixty bolts to specified torques. The nuts were held in a
hinged retainer ring, behind the (offshore, fixed) flange of the pipe length in place,
secured by rubber “butterflies.”
By the first week of June, 1986, crews were placing five (floated-out) strings
per week. This pace was in stark contrast to the time required for the bolting tool
to make the first joint, namely two weeks. All pipe lengths had been placed by the
end of July, 1986. This effort was followed by the final stringing of cathodic protec-
tion cables.
7.3.4 Underwater Assistance

The flange-jointing operation was monitored and aided at the seabed by a two-
person submersible, 5.2 m long, 2.4 m in the beam, and 2.7 m in height. The sub-
mersible was rated to a water depth of 350 m. Main viewing from the submarine was
through the forward 1,067-mm-diameter dome port. There were also other smaller
windows. Illumination was provided by four 250-watt lights. Communication with
the surface involved wireless systems. Capable of 3 knots, the vehicle had 10 hours
of underwater endurance at low speeds. Maximum total thrust, from four units, was
1.3 kN. It had two hydraulically-controlled mechanical arms, an eight-function unit,
and a three-function one. The former has a reach of 2.1 m and can lift 1.1 kN.
The submarine assisted the bolt-up tool to overcome unexpected problems and
malfunctions when they developed. On a regular basis it attached the crane hook
for recovery of equipment, released straps holding the pipe, operated valves, and
swaged bond wires at each flange to electrically link the different pipe lengths. Air-
filled lift bags in flotation frames, fastened to each end of the pipe, were inflated by
the submarine underwater to hold the pipe off the sea floor for the mating. The end
of the pipe length already in place was similarly supported. The submarine attached
a hydrostatic joint test hose to confirm the seal between two O-rings at the connec-
tion (“Manned” 1986). Only twice did divers have to appear to assist joint linkup.
They traveled down and up in a backup diving bell. After every joint makeup, the
submersible surveyed the contact points between the new (marked every 6 m) pipe
and the bottom, to assure no overstressing.
7.4 Iona, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

7.4.1 Background
This is the second outfall where underwater robotics played a central role (Peer
1987; Bloomberg 1987, 1988; Lively et al. 1990). This undertaking profited from
the developments during the Renton project covered in the previous section. The
owner, the Greater Vancouver Regional District, did the design, plus suggested con-
struction by bottom-pull. However, the contractor made some notable changes,
involving both alignment (now straight rather than curved) and construction
method. Apparently C$3 million was saved. The owner purchased the pipe neces-
sary for the job (for C$7 million) and made it available to the contractor. The out-
fall (No. 185 in Table A-1) started at the end of a long jetty traversing a mud flat.
This pipe was steel, with a 2,290-mm o.d. and a 14-mm wall. There was no
weight coat, and for protection the pipe was clad with fir lumber held against the
pipe by stainless steel banding. The alignment was straight, 3,190 m long, terminat-
ing in a water depth of 107 m. Twin pipes were involved. The outfall was buried out
to a water depth of 24 m, at station 23 ⫹ 80 m. The excavated trench had a nominal
top width of 9 m, and was of sufficient depth to provide a minimum 2 m of cover
over the pipe crown. The offshore unburied part of the pipe, lying on a 13° slope,
was not anchored in any way. The last 500 m of the lines comprised the diffuser
where pipe sizes were 2,083, 1,829, and 1,372 mm.
The outfall was tendered for construction in late 1986. A joint venture bid on
the basis of the pipe’s being sunk in sections and bolted together underwater. Their
work method and (C$8.5 million) bid were accepted by the owner in February 1987.
Of interest are the other 11 bids, which ranged from C$8.7 million to C$17.4 mil-
lion. Six of these involved surface tow and sink, the rest bottom-pull.
7.4.2 The Pipes

Pipes were assembled at a yard where there was a 370-m railway onto a sloping
trestle. Pipe, with coal tar enamel inside and out, was supplied to the yard in 18-m
sections and then welded together into (twenty-two) 305-m strings. Because the
unusual flanges cost US$19,000 each, the string length was made as long as possi-
ble. The limiting condition involved the maximum unsupported pipe span between
catamarans (already available) to avoid overstressing. Four semi-automatic welding
stations were used in string makeup. A custom hydraulic line-up clamp was used to
bring the two pipe section ends properly together, during the first of these opera-
tions, plus maintain the thin-walled pipe circular. (The pipe wall could deflect 35 mm
under its own weight.) The last stage of yard work was to bulkhead (plywood) the
strings at low tide. These were then pulled (on rail cars) down the launchway (at high
tide, by a tug) and stored in a basin by the yard until the towing operation.
The contractor had decided to slowly lower a pipe string by stationing six
pontoon-type winch-equipped catamarans at 54-m spacing along its length. The
winches were of diesel-operated, double-drum design, and the pipe was supported
by nylon slings. One unusual aspect of this arrangement was that these same cata-
marans participated in the 26-km tow from the yard to the outfall site. They were
linked by cables for this trip. The pipe was just awash, and one tug pulled while
another stood by to assist with turns. The 5- to 6-hour trip was timed to minimize
problems of tidal currents.
7.4.3 Pipe Lowering

After the pipe arrived on site, the catamarans moved to their lowering stations.
The two outside catamarans, each 18 m from its respective end of the pipe, were
attached to derrick barges anchored according to a laser alignment system. The
onshore end of the pipe was then raised somewhat by the catamarans, and the so-
called big bolting tool (BBT) was clamped on carefully. Cantilevered out from the
end of the BBT was a horseshoe-shaped guiding yoke which was used to line up
the new pipe with the last in-place one. The original idea for this system had come
from the alignment frame used on the Renton outfall. The BBT was 13 m long and
weighed 20 metric tons.
Each catamaran had a vertical-pipe stilling well, the water level being translat-
able into the load being supported by that particular catamaran. In addition, in each
case there was a depth sounder so that the local water depth was known.
With an operator located on each catamaran, the pipe was lowered by the five-
part rigging in roughly 0.6-m increments. Radio communication was continuously
maintained. In the final stages, after four to six hours, a hard-hat diver (in water
depths less than 60 m) or submarine (in deeper waters) guided the pipe sufficiently
close (typically 0.5 m) to the installed pipe that the BBT operator on the barge over-
head could follow up through images from five video cameras mounted on the BBT.
The diver had descended (if appropriate) when the pipe reached a position about
3 m off bottom. High-intensity lights on the BBT provided illumination.
Throughout the lowering process, the weight of the BBT was held by the onshore
derrick barge. A load cell in the line permitted the monitoring of force. When the
pipe was lowered onto an appreciably sloping reach of the bottom, there had to be
differential catamaran winch payouts. A cable from the onshore derrick barge lifted
the end of the previously-laid string sufficiently to allow off-bottom mating. After
jointing was accomplished, the new string was lowered to the seabed. Then, the diver
or submarine connected the cathodic protection cable across the joint.
7.4.4 Pipe Jointing

The BBT was sufficiently strong to move the new pipe horizontally and vertically
during the mating operations after the yoke had been engaged. A hydraulic clamp
pulled the new flange towards the old. Three of the cameras, spaced around the
periphery, were checked to ensure that the gap was the same at all three of these loca-
tions. Each pipe was made with a Vanstone flange which features a rotating slip ring.
This ring allows the bolt holes to be lined up without rotating the pipe. Bolts were
already in the slip ring as the pipe was going down; the nuts were inside a wooden
retaining ring next to the other flange. When the BBT operator determined that the
holes had been lined up, he rammed the 44 bolts home and then torqued them up
using one of two impact wrenches.
Once the pipe had reached the seabed after joint makeup, the hydraulically-
controlled pin releases in the nylon straps were actuated, and then the lowering lines
reeled back onto the catamarans. These pipe-lowering units were bunched together
and towed back to the pipe yard by a tug.
7.4.5 The Work

The offshore work was done first on this job, and was completed in late September,
1987. During weeks of good weather, the contractor was able to place two pipe
strings. Inshore, the marine equipment could only be used at high tide, but lowering
times were reduced. The project was essentially finished by the end of November,
1987. All 6,400 m of pipe had been installed in slightly over 2 months despite losing
10 days to marginal weather.
Trench excavation was really the only mildly troubled operation during the proj-
ect. Clamshell derricks and hopper-style dump scows were used. By plan, the exca-
vation started at an intermediate station along the trench. One idea had involved
the use of immediately-dredged spoil as pipe backfill at a nearby station. The other
idea was to do the predicted more difficult deep pipe laying in the good-weather
summer months.
The first idea did not work for several reasons. Most importantly, the pipe-
laying operation turned out to be faster than the dredging. Secondly, there was
the problem of interference of anchor lines for the various pieces of floating plant.
Thirdly, offshore work was made difficult by strong currents at certain times in the
tidal cycle.
Because some trench siltation had occurred (requiring trench cleanout), there
was the initial hope that laid pipe would be naturally backfilled. However, this did
not occur to any notable degree. Specifications had the parallel pipes a minimum of
1.2 m apart. The minimum trench depth was about 5 m. The volume of excavated
material amounted to roughly 270,000 m3.
7.5 Point Loma Extension, San Diego, California

7.5.1 The Situation
San Diego, California, is the southernmost city along the U.S. West Coast. The met-
ropolitan area and U.S. Dept. of Defense facilities sprawl along the shore of San
Diego Bay. The north/south-oriented entrance to this extensive and safe harbor is
blocked on the west side by a peninsula called Point Loma. San Diego’s WWTP and
the beginnings of its ocean outfall are located on this promontory, some 1.5 km
north of its tip.
The original Point Loma outfall (No. 18 in Table 1-1) was built with difficulty in
1963. It consisted of a 2,743-mm-diameter RCP trunk 3,449 m long that terminated
in a Y diffuser in roughly 62 m of water. Each of the two diffuser legs was built of
1,981-mm RCP and was 417 m long. The 56-port diffuser was seaward of the area’s
extensive kelp beds in depths of roughly 18 to 21 m. When coastal water quality stan-
dards were amended to include kelp beds as well as beaches, the City of San Diego
had to make a change because the diluted effluent on occasion migrated into the off-
shore edge of the kelp frequented by divers. The necessary step would involve either
effluent disinfection or an outfall extension (Meiorin and Langworthy 1995).
The latter was decided upon (No. 265 in Table A-1). The usual suite of predesign
studies was carried out by the highly experienced consulting engineer charged with
the preparation of Plans and Specifications. It is interesting to note some of the
items found more or less along the proposed path for the outfall—discarded air-
plane wings and engines, a crashed plane, a torpedo, and a small diesel boat.
7.5.2 The Design

The general plan was to extend the old outfall, at its 2,743-mm-i.d. size, from a bell
stubout centered in the terminal Y structure of the existing diffuser. The water depth
here was roughly 62 m. After nine new 6.1-m-long sections of the 2,743-mm pipe,
there would be an expansion into the main pipe size, namely 3,658-mm inside diam-
eter (outside diameter of 4,267 mm), and this pipe would proceed offshore a short
distance before entering a massive (270-metric-ton) steel and concrete “intermedi-
ate” Y structure. The reason for this feature was the precarious nature of the existing
outfall—that only months before had suffered a major dislocation and been repaired
quickly in a heroic operation by the same contractor that won the extension job (Lang
1992a; Prendergast 1992; “Innovations” 1992). Thus the Y had a (bulkheaded) open-
ing for a future 3,658-mm-diameter pipe that would parallel the existing outfall.
The new 270-metric-ton intermediate Y marked the beginning of the 3,800-
m-long and 3,658-mm-diameter outfall trunk, itself terminating in a second new
(270-metric-ton) Y structure, the root of two 760-m-long diffuser legs lying along the
99-m depth contour. Each leg would have a stepped inside diameter, 2,134 to 1,676
to 1,219 mm, and contain 208 evenly-spaced wall ports sized from 95 (upstream) to
121 mm (downstream). The ports started internally 150 mm above the pipe spring-
line and were aimed down at 5° to the horizontal. In the 4,267-mm-o.d. trunk,
90° centered on the soffit of the pipes had an embedded polyvinyl chloride (PVC)
T-Lock liner to prevent long-term deterioration of the pipe in contact with sewage
and possibly sewage gases (e.g., Parande 2006).
Because the very heavy Y structures would be placed by themselves, two pipe
closures would be required, one in 62 m of water, the other in 99 m.
7.5.3 Getting Going

The engineer’s estimate for the job was US$90.0 million. Four bids were received,
all from joint ventures, some with numerous major outfalls under their belts. The
winning bid for the project was US$54,808,801, and the other submitted figures
were US$57,062,775, $69,999,144, and $81,144,400. The Notice of Award was
issued on June 19, 1992, with the Notice to Proceed on July 2, 1992. The contract
completion date was given as August 2, 1994. This was not an arbitrary date, but one
driven by the court order commanding the extension. The source of the money was
city-issued bonds.
Basically, the work included all personnel, skills, tools, and equipment (land-
based, floating, and submersible) necessary to carry out the following types of tasks:
transport the pipe and appurtenances to the barge, prepare the foundations, set Y
structures in place, lay and join pipe with follow-up testing of the joints, furnish and
place ballast rock, construct pipe closures or tie-ins, switch over the flow from the
old to the new diffuser, and secure the former diffuser.
The contractor made a great effort to apply appropriate deepwater technology to
the project and to minimize both surface support crew and the amount of saturation
diving necessary (Lang 1992b; “Innovative” 1993). The joint venture brought in an
instrument-experienced underwater subcontractor for guidance. Items covered were
the multi-conductor umbilicals for the Horse and screed, a subsea control pod, a
waterjet/eductor system, a landing reference system, subsea lights and cameras, and
surface control consoles and van.
The experience and cooperation among the owner, designer, construction man-
ager, contractor, and subcontractors bordered on the remarkable. The project was
heralded as being a true “team effort.” In an extraordinary exhibition of heavy con-
struction efficiency by the contractor, the outfall was actually commissioned on
November 24, 1993. Significantly, there were no diving accidents.
7.5.4 Laying the Foundation for the Pipe

The contractor managed with great difficulty (over six months) to convince the
designer, the construction manager, and the owner to depart from the original plan of
applying bedding and laying pipe virtually in unison. The move to creating the outfall
base all in one continuous operation, using a screed, was a no-cost Change Order.
Because of the poor quality of the native seabed material, which in certain areas was
actually to be removed and replaced, the contractor preferred to effectively prebed/
preload the alignment path. The base course would be filter sand of minimum depth
0.61 m over the highest local seabed protuberence. The top layer, a minimum of
0.38 m thick, would be outfall bedding stone later built up around a placed pipe
with additional material. Because it turned out that the amount of sand consumed
was one of the highest cost elements on the project, absolutely no wastage would
be tolerated. Some 397,000 metric tons of base were placed, 255,000 metric tons
of bedding.
There were several episodes of heavy weather while the contractor was building
the 5,300-m-long “roadway with a fork in it.” An example occurred on December 7,
1992, when a tornado actually touched down in San Diego County. During one of
the first storms, the contractor hung the screed on its two davits about 20 m below its
companion barge. When contractor personnel reboarded the barge after the storm,
both 270-tonne davit wires had parted and the screed had plunged to the seabed.
Fortunately, the umbilical had stayed whole, and the contractor technicians man-
aged to have the screed electronics communicate with them.
An ROV (US$516,594 subcontract) was sent below and located the 1.5-m-
diameter spherical buoy that was used to hold up the shackles and slings above
the screed at all times. A diver then descended to hook up the derrick barge to the
suspended rigging. In time, the screed was eased out of the mud and up to the sur-
face where it was placed on a flat-deck barge and then taken into port for repairs.
However, the screed was soon back to work. After this experience the screed was left
on-bottom during storm events.
7.5.5 Screed Work

The contractor created an extraordinary remote-controlled system for forming the
roadway once there was space seaward of the old Y. This “screed” was basically a
steel-framed structure, measuring 24.4 ⫻ 8.5 m in plan and weighing 118 metric
tons. See Fig. 7-1. The four screed corner legs were hydraulically-adjustable, with posi-
tion measurable to an accuracy of 2.5 mm. On the screed were slope indicators, depth
sensors, and a sonar profiler. The link between the overhead barge and the screed on
the seabed was provided by a 150-m-long umbilical.
Up on the barge, a clamshell was used to move roadway material (filter sand
or bedding stone) from a stone-and-rock barge tied alongside into a fixed hopper.
Material issued from the hopper down onto a conveyor belt that dumped into the
cone top of a telescoping 914-mm-diameter tremie pipe. This was a gimble-mounted
system lashed horizontally alongside the barge when not in use.
Material passed out the bottom of the tremie pipe into a movable screed hopper
while a nearby ROV provided operators topside with the view. Underwater cameras
on the screed, in five stations, enabled its operation to be monitored from the barge
overhead. There had been the distinct worry, at the beginning of the project, that the
transfer of the granular materials would result in impaired visibility, but this was not
an undue problem. Two big light assemblies were in place on the structure. Sensors
mounted on the screed also provided other information: slope indicators; sonar
profiler; precision leg extension.
There were 18 hydraulic functions on the screed controlled remotely by the sur-
face operator. There was also a wide range of subsea electrical power and instrumen-
Figure 7-1. Fabrication of Point Loma extension screed nearing completion.

tation systems that required 32 separate electrical cables. The umbilical for all these
lines, weighing 250 N/m with all hydraulic lines filled, was supported by the derrick
barge’s 450-metric-ton crane.
The funneled hopper for the auger, carrying material from the center to the sides,
was on a “traveler” which could move fore and aft over a 15-m stroke. Another elec-
tromechanical system could provide plus or minus 2.5-mm position measurement to
the surface operator. Material issuing from it was driven transversely across the road-
way by a hydraulic-powered double-flight screw auger. This system extended beyond
the confines of the screed frame to create a roadway 12.8 m wide. The position of the
auger at any time was known. Limit switches indicated the elevation of the roadway.
When a single cross-section was complete, an underwater hydraulic winch advanced
the hopper and auger incrementally along the traveler to the next station.
When 15 m of roadway had been laid, the limit of the traveler, the whole screed
(with legs up) was advanced by the same distance through the use of a pulling wire
bridle acting against a holdback wire system. The screed had two front pontoon
skids and a single rear pontoon skid that acted as a compactor and smoother as the
whole screed was advanced to the next station.
7.5.6 Divers in the Water

The top 1.2 m of existing seabed material had to be removed and replaced at the
locations of the two new Y structures. The minimum diameters of cleared area were
21.3 m for the intermediate Y and 18.3 m for the diffuser Y. The construction of this
outfall extension certainly had its measure of high-tech paraphernalia, but it also
involved some basic laborer work on the seabed by divers.
A particular problem was that the bottom immediately seaward of the original
Y was a “mess,” featuring first a concrete and rock scour apron that extended above
the seabed and second a pile of rock, 15 m in diameter and 3 m high. The clearing of
these obstructions was a hard job for divers, not for some robotic system. It also had
to be done without blasting, because of the fear of damaging the existing pipeline.
Furthermore, the natural seabed soil from the original Y out to and including
the proposed area of the intermediate Y was known to be deficient, and needed
to be replaced to a depth of 1.5 m with the same stone that constituted pipe bed-
ding material.
An amount up to US$4.5 million had been earmarked for diving services pro-
vided by a subcontractor (that reportedly had financial difficulties after the job was
completed). Divers tried a water blaster and a jackhammer on the old apron, but
made no appreciable headway. They then brought in a heavy chisel, and dropped it
repeatedly within a length of pipe that provided guidance. Debris was placed inside
a frame. After three weeks of work, the apron had been eliminated.
One saturation diving operation, in the vicinity of the intermediate Y, involved
six divers working for 13 days and then decompressing for four. Two divers used the
bell, and the lock-to-lock duration was typically 6 to 12 hours. The mixed gas sup-
plied was 98% helium and 2% oxygen.
7.5.7 Pipelaying Horse Systems

The same derrick barge was used here as for the laying of the Southwest ocean out-
fall at San Francisco, California. The crane had a rating of 450 tonnes. Furthermore,
the same Horse was employed, but it was modified and strengthened so that it
could carry two of the Point Loma pipe sections at a time. The Horse also featured
a U-shaped diving bell, with view ports, so that contractor and inspection people
could observe the operations at 1 atmosphere. See Fig. 7-2.
The horse was also fitted with underwater cameras and lights. There were nine
such arrays, positioned as follows: pipe mating interface area (3); pipe section bot-
tom surface (4); pipe section joint top (1); and inhaul winch (1). Control was in a
van on the work barge overhead. Incidentally, this was not the same barge as that
used with the screed.
Two large hydraulic cylinders were mounted in series and housed within each of
the four corner legs. This arrangement permitted each of the legs to extend a maxi-
mum of 4.9 m to facilitate pipe handling and alignment. The pipe support frame
and pipe clamps similarly had their own hydraulic rams.
A large 1-atmosphere subsea control pod was designed and built. Within it,
electrically-operated control valves directed hydraulic fluid to each of the subsea
systems. A total of 52 hydraulic and electrical supply/return penetrations was incor-
porated into the subsea control pod. A 240-m-long umbilical extended up to the
control van on the barge above.
Figure 7-2. Horse on deck of derrick barge at Point Loma.
Three other systems of note were mounted on the horse:

1. an eductor system, to remove stabilizing rock inadvertently introduced into the
bell of the pipe and hampering the makeup of the next joint;
2. a water jet nozzle system to alter the local roadway configuration directly under
both pipe sections before final installation; and
3. a pipe seal test system to ensure the tightness of the double O-ring joint.
7.5.8 The Work Itself

After manufacture, the 73-tonne main pipe sections were trucked (in the early morn-
ing hours so as to avoid traffic) to a dock in the Port of Long Beach. From there they
were barged to the construction site.
The modified horse proved to be an exceptionally efficient system. Pipe was laid
on the screeded roadbed at record-setting rates. On several occasions, with impaired
water visibility, the Horse was landed using sonar data. The pipelaying on the main
line (all pipe plus two Y structures) was completed on September 22, 1993. The aver-
age production rates of 14 per day in July and 13 per day in August surpassed the
target 12 per day rate that had been established beforehand. The maximum produc-
tion in one 12-hour work day was an astounding 22 sections.
An ROV system (Fig. 7-3) was employed to inspect both inside and outside the
pipe. This craft operated from a launch and recovery system with a winch for deploy-
ment and storage of the vehicle’s umbilical. The customary plan was for the ROV to
Figure 7-3. Remotely-operated vehicle on barge at Point Loma.
Table 7-1. Allowable Pipe Joint Gaps at Point Loma

Pipe i.d. (mm) Maximum Gap (mm)
3,658 57
2,743 44.5
2,134 38
1,676 32
1,219 32
internally survey the pipe after every pair of laying operations. A laser was mounted
on the ROV to assist in assessing the amount of pipe joint gap. The summation
of gaps on either side of the pipe had to be equal to or less than 1.8 times the
maximum individual gaps shown in Table 7-1. After a new section was successfully
placed on the seabed, bedding was sent down from the pipelaying barge overhead
and built up, using a system of jet nozzles, to form a support angle of 120°. Later,
ballast rock was delivered to the spot and itself built up to the springline of the pipe.
The distribution of stone sizes in the bedding and ballast is shown in Table 7-2. The
ballasting operation started on August 7, 1993. Monitoring of the buildup of ballast
was provided by a sonar unit mounted on the tremie pipe. ROVs with video cameras
also circulated.
The pipe-laying for this project was completed on October 25, 1993. The finish-
ing up of the project then involved the rocking of the diffuser as well as 600 to 900 m
Table 7-2. Breakdown of Point Loma Extension Stones and Rock

Sieve % Passing for % Passing % Passing for Class 2 % Passing for Class 1
Size Filter Sand (pipe for Bedding Ballast Rock (water Ballast Rock (water
(mm) foundation) Class 3 depth 62–76 m) depth 76–99 m)
159 100
127 35–60
114 100
102 5–20
89 35–75
51 0–15
38 100 0–15
25.5 25–75
13 0–20
9.5 100
of main barrel that the rocking barge couldn’t reach because of anchor lines. Dur-
ing this last operation, some rock encroached on the port areas and thus had to be
cleared (by divers, with a 152-mm suction dredge head) before the overall project
was complete.
Finally, the former Y diffuser had to be secured. All 56 ports needed to be cov-
ered, and the two legs isolated. After the two stop doors were dropped into place to
cut off the side pipes, a third one was removed from the stubout. A commercial diver
I know had his umbilical caught in the sudden outflow, and he himself was then
blasted upwards.
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8
Creating Tunnel Outfalls
and Their Risers
8.1 Tunnel Boring Machines

8.1.1 The Modern Method of Creating a Tunnel
Humankind has created hundreds of underground passages over the years for a wide
variety of purposes. One of the hard ground techniques has been called “drill and
shoot,” or “drill and blast.” Here multiple holes are drilled into the (vertical) face
of the excavation from a rail-mounted platform, or “jumbo,” and sticks of dynamite
are placed in the resulting holes. After detonation, the resulting rock debris, or muck,
is removed, by rail or by conveyor belt (e.g., Megaw and Bartlett 1983). The new
tunnel face is then redrilled, and the process is repeated until breakout or until the
required length has been driven. In 1958, I first visited such a worksite as a surveyor’s
assistant. We traveled in and out of this Canadian Shield excavation in a muck car.
The hard-rock tunnel may be lined or unlined, depending on its use. Many
tunnels have been created in soft ground conditions, including material directly
underlying water bodies. In such cases, the ground surrounding the tunnel must be
supported, by shields during excavation and by steel rings or concrete lining after-
ward (e.g., Prendergast 1993; Finch 1996).
The modern method of creating a tunnel, in either hard or soft media, is through
use of a tunnel boring machine, or TBM, and two views of the same machine are
shown in Figs. 8-1 and 8-2. In the 1980s and 1990s, many tunnels were created
through the work of such systems (e.g., Frerichs and Egger 1991). One of the most
impressive involved the U.K.–French effort to establish a link between their countries
beneath the English Channel. A brief account of the creation of this Chunnel, along
with fine photographs and drawings, appears in Newman (1994). A more technical
description is provided by Heywood et al. (1988). The Institution of Civil Engineers
185
Figure 8-1. Front view of Boston TBM.

Source: Courtesy of The Robbins Company.
(in London, U.K.) produced a significant set of three Special Issues, connected to
their journal Civil Engineering, on this massive project in 1992, 1993, and 1994.
As noted in Table 10-1, a tunnel for wastewater disposal is used on occasion,
and meaningful background material on such installations appears in Moore and
Osorio (1980), MacKenzie (1984), and Henderson (1988). In most cases, the lined
or unlined tunnel has been the sole means of bulk wastewater conveyance, with near-
terminus risers carrying the effluent up to the receiving water. Examples of such out-
falls in Table A-1 are Nos. 63 and 235 (Wallis 1990), the Australian set of outfalls
in Nos. 219, 220, 221 (described in section 8.2), the Indian pair of outfalls in Nos.
356 and 368 (described in section 8.3.2), and the mighty Boston tunnel, No. 355
(described in Chapter 13). Four other notable examples, built in the 1970s and not
included in Table A-1, are the following: Rya Nabbe in Goteborg, Sweden; Viikinmaki
(Helsinki) and Suomenoja (Espoo) in Finland; and Sainte-Foy in Québec, Canada.
Tunnels have played an important part also in certain hybrid cases, where the tun-
nel is simply a part of the overall facility. These cases are described in Chapter 9. Two
additional important references on pure tunnels are Cole (1996) and Hoek (2001).
8.1.2 A Set of Three U.K. Tunnel Outfalls

The 2,800-m-long Scottish tunnel outfall in Edinburgh (No. 53 in Table A-1) passes
through shales, sandstones, and limestones. The tunnel was concrete-lined to
Creating Tunnel Outfalls and Their Risers 187
Figure 8-2. View from rear of Boston TBM.

Source: Courtesy of The Robbins Company.
3.66 m, and has 20 (900-mm) risers. Construction of these risers was from a jackup
barge with 1,200-mm casings driven to refusal on the rock substratum, with the
remaining length drilled. There is ample coverage in the professional literature. See
limited material in Flaxman (1980) and an exhaustive treatment in Richards and
Smith (1982).
Construction of the Aberdeen, Scotland, tunnel outfall (No. 73 in Table A-1)
was plagued by problems. In the end, the December 1985 completion was exactly
three years late, and the cost had increased from £5.0 million to £8.5 million. The
66-m-deep access shaft flooded twice. Ground freezing ultimately solved that prob-
lem. The tunnel drive itself, using drill and blast, suffered from broken rock and high
water inflow. There is a wealth of related information in print (Hayward 1987; Hen-
derson and McNair 1987). Ten riser shafts were drilled from a jackup barge at 30-m
centers. Each riser had a 750-mm diameter and was topped with a concrete cap that
had four 200-mm ports. The tunnel was rated for a peak flow of 6.3 m3/s, and it had
a special Venturi saline intrusion control insert (Charlton 1985).
The professional literature has thoroughly documented the design and troubled
construction of the Weymouth tunnel outfall (No. 122 in Table A-1) in extreme
southern England (“Long” 1980; Flint 1982; Fullalove 1982, 1983; “Costs” 1983; and
Roberts et al. 1984). The south-oriented outfall discharges within West Bay, off Chesil
Beach, near the Dorset community of Weymouth. Bids were solicited from a list of
contractors experienced in tunnels or outfalls. No offer was received for a pulled pipe,
and a 150-week, £4.4 million tunnel contract was signed in early May 1979. The tun-
nel would be hand-driven, and the risers would be thrust up with hydraulic jacks. It
turned out that a TBM was in fact used, and the three risers were drilled (accurately)
down from a 1972-built jackup barge. There were other changes as well, notably the
introduction of compressed air to combat the inrush of water. This change caused a
jump in tunneling costs, greater complexity of operations, and more danger to work-
ers. The narrow-gauge railway in the tunnel had a rail spacing of 610 mm.
8.2 Three Full-Tunnel Outfalls at Sydney, Australia

8.2.1 The Beginnings
Sydney, an immense metropolitan area, is located in Australia’s southeastern state of
New South Wales, sprawling along the shores of the immense harbor known as Port
Jackson. The entrance to this refuge, approximately 1.5 km across, splits an immedi-
ate coastline of steep cliffs trending north and south. North Head bounds the harbor
entrance on the north side, and Manly Beach lies 4 km further in that direction. The
largely steep coast to the south extends roughly 20 km, down to Botany Bay, passing
on the way Bondi, Bondi Beach, and Malabar.
For many years, Sydney disposed of its substantial sewage with outlets at the
base of the cliffs at North Head, Bondi, and Malabar (Beder 1987; Benson 1987).
Local people had complained over and over about the occasional fouling of rec-
reational meccas, such as Manly Beach or Bondi Beach, by diluted effluent (e.g.,
“Sydney” 1981). These protests did not slacken appreciably when primary treatment
plants were built on the clifftops at all three locations.
In mid-1976, a consultant to the Sydney Water Board submitted a report concern-
ing the feasibility and cost of building three outfalls terminating in depths of 45–75 m
out from the cliffs of Sydney. In 1980, the water board formally adopted the concept
of deep-water disposal of its sewage (e.g., “$100m” 1980). A further refinement was
that each of the three conduits would be a hard-rock tunnel, on a 1:200 upslope, with
drilled risers conveying the effluent up to its seabed release point. “Declined shafts”
would drop steeply (e.g., a 25% slope at Malabar) from the WWTPs to the beginnings
of the effluent tunnels. Table 8-1 contains assorted information on all three outfalls
(Nos. 219, 220, and 221 in Table A-1). Pertinent discussion appears in Carroll (1985),
as well as Clancy and Carroll (1986). Also see Henderson (1990).
Plentiful ocean and ground data were obtained for this project (e.g., Ebner and
French 1985). Both traveling drogues and moored systems were used for currents.
The peak speed was about 0.5 m/s. For waves, a buoy off Botany Bay had been taking
such data for many years, with occasional glimpses of the notorious giant waves of
the Tasman Sea.
Density stratification was such that the effluent fields should be submerged
roughly 95% of the time and almost 100% of the time during the summer bathing
Table 8-1. Basic Data on Sydney Sewage and Deep Water Outfalls
Item North Head Bondi Malabar
Dry weather flow in 1991 (m3/s) 4.5 1.9 5.7

3
Wet weather flow in 1991 (m /s) 12.2 8.1 13.9
Outfall flow capacity (m3/s) 27.8 8.1 26.0
Finished outfall i.d. (m) 3.5 2.3 3.5
Length of outfall tunnel (km) 4.1 2.6 4.8
Shoreline to end of diffuser (km) 3.6 2.2 3.6
Diffuser length (m) 762 512 720
Riser i.d. (mm) 450 400 600
No. of risers or diffuser heads 36 26 28
Outlets per diffuser head 6 4 8
Maximum diffuser water depth (m) 65 63 82
Commissioning date December May 1991 September
1990 1990
Commissioning duration (days) 15 15 30
months. Surface dispersion experiments were conducted. The so-called “T90” times
for coliform bacteria dieoff (the time it takes for 90% of the organisms to die) were
measured and varied from 2 h at noon to 12 h in the night.
Geophysical surveys were conducted. Vibracoring was carried out, with cores up
to 6.5 m long. Seabed surveys were run by (unstaffed) ROVs and (human-driven)
submersibles.
Four distinct formations of claystones and sandstones exist in the Sydney region.
A 1,500-tonne drill ship was used to obtain subseabed geotechnical information.
The vessel was in the Sydney area for a lengthy period, from July 26, 1981, off North
Head, to April 2, 1982, off Malabar. The drill ship spent roughly 43% of the time
standing by for improving wind and sea conditions and 14% idle as equipment was
repaired. Apparently, the vessel had substantial response to local seas. Also, there
were anchoring problems, including anchor loss. There was casing breakage, and
loss of drill rods. Details are in Enever et al. (1986), Henderson (1986), and Lean
et al. (1986).
The goal of the drilling program was to create five holes along each tunnel align-
ment. Off Malabar, five holes were drilled, but for North Head and Bondi, only four
and three holes were drilled, respectively. Average hole depth was 90 m. There was
essentially 100% core (85 mm) recovery. Holes were grouted after subsurface explo-
ration. Substantially different profiles were obtained along each alignment.
A preliminary internal report on all three outfalls was prepared in June 1983.
Detailed design followed. An overall requirement was to have 45 m of sound rock
above any tunnel (Pells and Best 1991). All risers except one would exit from the
tunnel invert to carry away grit. The terminal riser for each outfall would be from the
soffit, to eliminate floatables. The riser and diffuser head design was truly state of the
art (Brooks and Perrone 1990).
8.2.2 Construction and Operation

The worksites were established as follows: Malabar in October 1984, North Head
in November 1984, and Bondi in August 1985. Tunneling was initiated according
to these dates: Malabar in July 1985, Bondi in January 1986, and North Head in
March 1986. TBMs were used at North Head and Malabar but not at Bondi. Instal-
lation of riser systems was carried out as follows: Malabar (September 1987–March
1988), Bondi (March 1988–June 1988), and North Head (June 1988–October
1988). The riser work involved a true learning curve. The first site took 341 h to
complete. Ten sites later (still off Malabar), the time was 85 h. Overall, the aver-
age Malabar time was 146 h, with means of 72.5 and 76.5 h for Bondi and North
Head, respectively.
The rig used for the risers was an oil and gas field semisubmersible, 75 m long,
52 m wide, and 27.5 m high from keel to main deck. A sophisticated positioning
system was used, with seabed transponders, for accurately locating hole locations.
The drill bit size for casing holes was 1,448 mm. These holes passed through seabed
sediments and were then drilled 3 m into solid bedrock. Riser hole size for Malabar
was 1,194 mm, and it was 940 mm for the other two locations. A seabed template
was used. Pertinent references are “Racal” (1988), Arnold (1989), Corner (1990),
and Arnold and Tait (1989, 1990).
The eventual link between tunnel and riser, nominally 9 m away, had to be care-
fully carried out. Subtle drill and blast was used to within 4 m of the riser location.
The connection was made of custom-fitted fiberglass pipe, and concrete then filled
the open spaces (Hattersley 1995).
A pair of specially outfitted ROVs was used to attach nozzles and ready the dif-
fuser heads for operation. Tether management systems were used for both ROVs to
minimize direct influence on the unit by the support vessel, which was in constant
movement overhead.
The interested reader should consult Wilkinson and Browne (1988) and Sydney
Water Board (n.d.). The latter is a particularly informative booklet, including ample
description as well as many visual aids in the forms of color photographs, charts,
and drawings.
8.2.3 Postscript
Some people lauded the outfalls when they were completed (e.g., Wallis 1987). But
some people are never satisfied (e.g., Jones 1989). Monitoring was undertaken (e.g.,
McLean et al. 1991; Fagan et al. 1992). Upgrading of the three WWTPs was proposed
(Rosenbaum 1992).
Official summer water quality data off Sydney beaches confirm that the com-
bination of further treatment and deep outfalls has worked wonders. Bondi Beach,
for example, went from a median fecal coliform density of 258 colony forming
units/100 mL in 1989–1990 to only 6 in 1999–2000. Manly’s Shelly Beach saw a

decrease from 585 colony forming units/100 mL to 12.
Three raw cliff-base outflows remain, amounting to 0.3% of Sydney’s sewage.
Discussions in 2001–2002 involved termination of these outlets located at Vaucluse
(1 outlet) and Diamond Bay (2 outlets) between South Head and Bondi.
As a final note in an operational context, plastic debris has at times come
through the system, reached some diffuser heads, and succeeded in blocking cer-
tain nozzles.
8.3 Other Tunnel Outfalls

8.3.1 Burwood Beach, New South Wales, Australia
The driving of the tunnel for this facility (No. 216 in Table A-1), south of Newcastle,
began in 1985, and the system was commissioned in 1989. The tunnel, through
sandstone, was 1.7 km long and 2.7 m in inside diameter. The 1,000-mm holes for
the nine effluent risers were drilled from a jackup platform over a 236-m length in
22 m of water. A 900-mm steel tube was placed and cemented into each hole then
topped with a 55-metric ton precast concrete diffuser head with eight 200-mm ports.
The design flow rate for this open-coast installation was 5.9 m3/s.
8.3.2 Worli and Bandra in Mumbai (Bombay), India

In section 12.7.2, there is extensive discussion on the fruitless attempts to install
reinforced concrete pipe (RCP) outfalls at these two locations. Several years passed
with wrangling between the Mumbai authorities and the French contractor, discus-
sions involving the World Bank, and investigations by a U.K. consulting engineering
firm. In time, designs were prepared for both seabed pipe and tunneled outfalls. The
U.K. consultants felt by including RCP in the mix, the Indian officials were saving
face after the initial fiasco.
For the tunnels, after many hydraulic tests, the design of the flow discharge struc-
tures was finalized. There would be 10 ports per riser. The main diffuser barrel would
taper just upstream of each riser off take, including the first, to ensure that flow speeds,
and thus sediment transport capacity, would always be greater than along the main
length of the outfall. Tests also indicated that flow discharge would be substantially
influenced by ocean waves over the risers, especially for wave lengths twice the riser
spacing. The plan was for there to be a daily purging flow pumped to the outfalls.
The bids for the tunnel option were roughly half of those for the RCP alterna-
tive. An experienced tunneling contractor from Germany won the dual-outfall job
(Page 1997). The Worli tunnel would be 3.4 km long (3.7 km for Bandra), ending
in 240 m-long diffusers with 10 risers 12 m apart. The bore through sandstone and
basalt would be 34 m below the seabed. Precast concrete wall segments would be
bolted and grouted in place to form the wastewater flow boundary. Inside diameter
would be 3.5 m, but reducing gradually in the diffuser. Water depth at the special
discharge structures would be 10 m or less. Capacity would be 24 m3/s.
As of mid-August 1996, Reina (1996) reported that the (open-face gripper type)
TBM was on its way to Mumbai from Germany by ship. Excavation of the drop shaft
at Worli (64 m deep, with an 8-m diameter) was complete, as was the TBM assembly
area below it. Excavation of the Bandra drop shaft had begun. Offshore, one trial
riser had been completed, with review of its success continuing.
The TBM involved in Mumbai was actually carrying out its third project; it was
built in 1986. In this last refurbishment, the TBM cutting diameter had been set to
4.05 m. Complications during the drives involved a number of rock falls and heavy
ingress of water.
The Worli tunnel drive itself was finished in mid-1998, and then the completed
outfall was commissioned in May 1999 and placed in operation the following month.
The mining of the Bandra tunnel was initiated in September 1998 and brought to
its conclusion in April 2000. The peak combined monthly production rate occurred
during the Bandra drive: 555 m.
The risers were set in 1.6-m-diam. holes bored from a jackup rig and were then
grouted in place. The discharge structure was composed of a stack of concrete ring
spacers, each 7 m in outside diameter, 1 m high, and weighing roughly 50 tonnes.
The fiberglass reinforced plastic structure passing the flow resembled a 10-armed
starfish. The hub was of 1.6-m diameter, and the port diameter was 450 mm. Port
inserts were possible, and half of the outlets were sealed when the Worli outfall was
placed in operation.
As of mid-April 2001, the Worli outfall (No. 356 in Table A-1) was functioning
satisfactorily. Seawater conditions off Worli had improved markedly, with fish and
prawn catches on the rise. The later-completed Bandra tunnel (No. 368 in Table A-1)
was not yet operational, awaiting finalization of upstream elements to deliver flow
to it. It was finally commissioned in the year 2003 after divers cleaned the discharge
structures and removed the bolts holding the port covers.
For additional information, see Table 8-2 and the papers by Wallis (1998) and
Rankin (1999).
8.4 Sacrificial Tunnels for Outfalls

8.4.1 A Long Chamber for Pipes
In this case, a tunnel is driven, not as the actual wastewater conduit but as a long
chamber through which pass the actual pipes carrying the wastewater. As an example,
the Lowestoft (Norfolk, U.K.) outfall, built in the early 1970s, involved two 900-mm
pipes within a 2,100-mm-diam. tunnel otherwise filled with concrete.
8.4.2 Irvine Bay Installation, Scotland

A small part of Scotland’s Firth of Clyde is Irvine Bay, situated to the north of the
town of Troon. The concept here was to drive a 1,925-m-long tunnel seaward,
roughly 1,500 m of this under the sea. This passage would not in itself carry flow but
would contain two 1,118-mm-diam. steel pipes that would transport sewage (with
Table 8-2. Selected Details for the Pair of Mumbai Outfall Tunnels
Item Worli Bandra
Peak flow capacity (m3/s at spring MHW) 20.0 21.3

3
Peak flow capacity (m /s at spring MLW) 25.2 26.7
Water depth at diffuser section (m from MSL) 12 9
Drop shaft diameter (m) 8 8
Shaft depth to tunnel invert from MSL (m) 59 59
Shaft depth to tunnel invert from ground (m) 64 —
Internal finished diameter of tunnel (m) 3.5 3.5
Main tunnel length (m from shaft, with diffuser) 3,410 3,748
Subsea length of tunnel (m to end of diffuser) 2,992 2,899
Diffuser length (m) 240 240
No. of horizontal diffuser side adits 10 10
Height of vertical riser sections (m) 35 38
Internal diameter of FRP-lined risers (m) 1.0 1.0
No. of ports per riser 10 10
Nominal port diameter (mm) 450 450
Range of port insert sizes, if not bulkheaded (mm) 220–290 270–350
a design peak flow of 6.28 m3/s) for offshore disposal through risers. The unused
space would be filled with concrete. The idea of a bottom-pull had been dropped
because the stringing yard would have taken over too much of the local seaside golf
links. The Scots do love their golf!
Predesign geological investigations included a drill ship creating boreholes along
the alignment. On several occasions, a heavy swell caused a hole to be abandoned
temporarily. Along the route, sand overlay boulder clay, which itself covered the
sandstone, shale, and mudstone (with coal seams) to be mined. The clay effectively
sealed the tunnel activity from seawater leakage.
The access shaft for this tunnel was on the raised back beach of Irvine Bay, 5 km
north of Troon, some 340 m behind a popular and safe beach. Excavation of the
5.79-m-i.d. drop shaft began in July 1974. The invert of the tunnel was 27.92 m
below ground level at the entrance. Sinking of a caisson began on August 19, and a
blowout on August 27 caused a delay. The caisson lowering came to an end on Octo-
ber 9 (see Henry and McCall 1982 for details). The base was grouted early in January
1975, and leakage was reduced to acceptable levels before the tunnel breakout.
After initial hand excavation and rock shattering with limited explosives, the TBM
was introduced on March 2, 1975. The tunnel was driven to a finished diameter of
3.2 m. When the precast concrete bolted segments were added, the inside diameter
was 2.9 m. After a series of problems and 17 weeks of downtime, the drive was com-
pleted on September 11, 1977. The maximum production over that span was 49 m
per week.
There would be 10 risers, nine for the regular sewage pipe and one for the storm
water pipe. A 60 ⫻ 20-m eight-legged jackup barge was brought on site by a subcon-
tractor, and it started drilling the required holes on September 14, 1975. This work
was done in roughly 13 m of water, 1,500 m from shore. The task was to form the
shafts, each more than 20 m deep, then add the risers and discharge heads. Each of
the latter had four 140-mm ports.
There were wave-related problems with the establishment of the first two casings,
but the whole program was completed in 11 weeks of uncommonly kind weather for
the potentially tempestuous interval of September—December 1975.
Some 3,670 m of pipe, in 9-m lengths, arrived during the autumn of 1975. In
the spring of the next year, these lengths were lined by a specialist with 16 mm of
cement mortar. In time, all this pipe was installed within the completed tunnel.
The tunnel was completed in 1979 at a final cost of £4.25 million. The tender
price had been £2.7 million. The system was not commissioned until June 1984.
8.4.3 Gwithian (Hayle), St. Ives Bay, Cornwall, U.K.

The coast of Cornwall, in southwest England, is one of the most rugged and wave-
beset inhabited areas in the world. The design for an outfall into St. Ives Bay
(No. 294 in Table A-1), on the north coast, involved a trench established largely by
blasting with a pipe pulled into it and backfilled. Fearing the weather window for
the job was too short and too risky, the contractor proposed an unusual but sensible
concept. He would drive a tunnel, not as the direct conduit for the wastewater but as
an indirect one, the wastewater traveling through a 900-mm-diam. pipe laid in the
excavated passage.
The drop shaft was 60 m deep and had a finished diameter of 5.7 m. The roughly
rectangular tunnel, 2.5 m wide and 2.8 m high, was excavated through the siltstone
seabed using drill and shoot methods. Tunnel length was 2,650 m.
A subcontractor was responsible for installing the risers, and he did this, starting
in July 1993, after spending five months converting a conventional barge into a four-
leg jackup rig. Compressed air was used in the legs, and drilling was done through a
cantilevered platform. Four 720-mm holes were drilled, three at 40-m centers offset
2.75 m from the tunnel axis, and the fourth on the tunnel axis at its terminus. The
riser itself was a 560-mm steel tube topped by a 1-m tall hexagonal concrete block
with discharge ports. Grout was used to gravity fill the annulus between the riser and
hole, as well as around a bag set between the diffuser head and the seabed. Details
on this project are in Byles (1993), Darling (1994), and “Penzance” (1994).
8.5 Use of Microtunneling and Pipe-Jacking to Create Outfalls

8.5.1 The Process
The combination of pipe-jacking and microtunneling provides another trench-
less way of creating an underground conduit, perhaps up to 500 m long. The pre-
fix “micro” seems to suggest subterranean passages of small size, but in truth the
method has evolved to handle 3-m diameters and even greater. The difference with
microtunneling is that human entry is not required, certainly a safety measure. The
original use of the term “microtunneling” was for a diameter smaller than could be
safely accessed by a human.
Microtunnel boring machine (MTBM) monitoring and steering are controlled
from the ground surface at an operator’s console housed in a portable shelter. Micro-
tunneling can be used in a variety of single- or mixed-face ground conditions, from
stiff clay to rock, or even a boulder situation. Different cutting heads are used for dif-
ferent types of ground, blades for soft soil, picks for mixed ground, and disc cutters
for hard rock. The route can be above the water table or even up to approximately
30 m below the water table with no dewatering.
The single-step method usually requires two vertical shafts, a compulsory one at
the beginning and a receiving pit at the end. The starting (also called driving, thrust,
launch, access, or jacking) pit has a bulkhead, through which the cutting head is
advanced, and a thrust wall at the rear of the pit to distribute jacking forces. A railing
frame is set into the bottom of the pit. The pipe itself serves as the excavation support
system by being advanced using hydraulic jacks from the access pit. As the excavation
proceeds, additional sections of pipe are lowered and then added at the rear, on the
railing frame. The pipe must be strong to absorb the jacking forces, and it must have
a constant outside diameter.
Advance (typically 10–20 m/day) is possible because of the cutting action at the
face of the remotely controlled and steerable MTBM. The line and grade accuracy of
microtunneling comes from a computer-controlled hydraulic steering system that
uses a laser beam directed down the tunnel (onto a target mounted on the machine)
to guide the cutter head. Align and grade tolerance of ⫾25 mm is standard. Spoil
removal is taken care of automatically either by a series of augers or by a slurry
delivery system. Boreholes can be blind or open-ended. In the former case, the cutter
head assembly can be retracted through the installed pipeline.
Particular care must be taken with microtunneling projects wherein the drive
terminates underwater. There is a distinct possibility of sudden flooding if the tun-
nel is not properly sealed. On exit, water pressure tries to push the machine and
pipeline back toward the launch pit. The critical time is at the end of the jack-
ing stroke, when everything is being retracted for the next pipe section. If the pipe
moves back too far, the rubber gasket can flip back, allowing water (and soil) to
pour into the shaft.
In one case, a microtunneling venture had to end up on a steep lakeshore. A
small crane barge and clamshell were used to cut a bench into the bank. A series of
steel H piles was driven into the bench in a rectangular configuration, and precast
concrete panels were then dropped into the webs of piling pairs to form a box.
Tremie concrete was poured between the box and bank cutout for stability.
A seal was affixed to the inside wall of the reception box. This arrangement was
supplemented with pressurized bentonite injected between two rubber flanges. The
receiving seal permitted the machine to pass through the receiving box bulkhead
with no leakage. The cutting head section entered the box, and divers disconnected
the slurry lines, hydraulic hoses, and electrical and laser lines. The cutting head was
then pushed on into the receiving box and subsequently removed. There was a bulk-
head in the pipe to prevent flowback on the inside.
A selection of pertinent microtunneling and pipe-jacking references follows:
“Pipe” (1992); Shah et al. (1992); Iseley et al. (1993); Pilecki et al. (1994); Fitzell
(1998); Cusack et al. (2003). The paper “Longest” (1997) is instructive in terms of
the “fishing trips” that may have to be made to extract a stalled machine or to recover
the MTBM when jacking forces have risen to the limit.
8.5.2 Marbella Outfall, France

Biarritz is a summer vacation mecca located in extreme southwest France. I have
passed several weeks of my life in that holiday resort, and the first time I surfed on a
“soft board” was at that location in 1981.
Even holiday resorts have sewage, and officials of the region finally decided to
replace a short, poorly located outfall with a longer one discharging well off the fine
beaches and 2 km south of the center of the city. It was specified that no related work
could take place during the summer season.
A 12-m-diam. starting pit, 20 m deep, was excavated on the adjacent shoreline.
The pipe-jacking arrangement was set up on the bottom of the shaft. Details are in
Verbeke and Marlie (2004). The elements were 1.88-m-o.d., 1.60-m-i.d. reinforced
concrete jacking pipe segments 2,545 mm long. The drive, in mixed conditions rang-
ing from running sands to massive rocks, was on a 0.8% downslope to end 780 m
away, 7 m below the seabed in 15 m of water.
The 25-metric ton MTBM cut at a diameter of 1,930 mm. The cutting face had
both teeth (24) and double disks (8), none of which had to be changed during the
drive. The shield had a diameter of 1,880 mm and a length of 3,900 mm.
In May, statistically the best month for weather, a jackup platform was towed
into place over the ultimate diffuser site. A drilling rig was used to weaken the seabed
marl at that location, and a cavity was excavated so that the MTBM could be retrieved.
Divers removed blocking material with airlifts. A stopper, in the tail of the shield,
was removed to allow seawater to fill the tunnel, thereby equalizing pressure.
The prefabricated concrete diffuser was towed to the site and lowered into place.
Connection to the jacked pipe was made via a bolted flange. The outflow arrange-
ment was a pair of 600-mm-diam. ports located 2 m above the seabed.
In the final stages, the contractor worked 24-hour days to finish before the tour-
ist season. Nine months after the start of the project, on June 18, 2003, sewage flows
were directed to the new outfall, No. 420 in Table A-1.
References
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Arnold, M. S., and Tait, S. A. (1989). “The Methods and Equipment Used for the Offshore
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Benson, D. (1987). “Diffusing Sydney’s Wastewater Problems.” Engineers Australia, 59(14),
22–24.
Brooks, R. P., and Perrone, J. V. (1990). “Design and Construction Planning of Deepwater
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“Longest Microtunneling Push in North America Jacks 83 Pipes over 250 Metres.” (1997).
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9
Hybrid-Design Outfalls
9.1 Two Distinct Parts

9.1.1 The Concept
The proposed Samut Prakarn outfall in Thailand, near Bangkok, is the prototype
hybrid outfall idea. There is an onshore drop shaft for a 2,610-m-long concrete-
lined tunnel 20–25 m below ground level in a stiff clay stratum, then a riser shaft,
followed by 608 m of 2.6-m-i.d. steel seabed pipe set on pairs of driven piles and
featuring 100 outflow risers. In the late 1990s, there were rumors that the outfall was
badly sited (because of land subsidence), not needed, and that there had been no
adequate environmental and social assessments. Land speculation and corruption
were said to be playing large roles. Since that time, I have learned only that a major
Japanese contractor, with Asian Development Bank funding, started the tunnel por-
tion in March 2000 and completed the task in August 2001.
The Mompás (Donostia) outfall (No. 385 in Table A-1), into the Bay of Bis-
cay from the Basque part of Spain, is another (but known-to-be-completed) hybrid
installation involving a tunnel, riser, and seabed line. The access shaft to the 440-m-
long tunnel was 60 m deep, and microtunneling was involved to create the 2.4-m-
diam. passage at 7% downslope until underwater breakout at 35-m water depth.
Reinforced concrete pipe of 2,000-mm size was placed in the tunnel. The outer por-
tion of the outfall was made of 2,000-mm-i.d. and 19-mm-wall steel pipe, 900 m
long and buried in an excavated trench. The diffuser was 200 m long and had eight
outlets. There were substantial diver problems on this line, and one worker was
apparently killed. The construction took place during the latter half of 1999 and in
the year 2000.
201
9.1.2 Developing Project No. 1: Difficult Ground

We return to the South Island of New Zealand, which was introduced in section
1.7.3. When it was clearly established microbiologically that the effluent from the
Lawyers Head outfall at Dunedin was affecting recreational activities off Tomahawk
and other local beaches, a move was made to create a new outfall, named Tahuna,
off St. Kilda Beach. The deadline for its completion was April 2008.
An experienced New Zealand consulting engineering firm did the initial work
on outfall concept and performance, and then (in May 2006) a marine contractor
took over the detailed design and build. This latter company had been involved in
many Australasian outfalls and had recently constructed the Waimakariri (No. 436
in Table A-1) and Clandeboye (No. 437 in Table A-1) outfalls up the coast.
The idea was to have two separate parts to the outfall. The landward segment would
involve microtunneling under a coastal road and the substantial back beach dunes to a
point roughly 200 m seaward of the limit of the standard surf zone. This drive would
be 510 m long and would start from a 9-m-deep jacking pit. The 900-m-long seaward
continuation of the outfall would involve plastic pipe set on the seabed.
The land-based pipe-jacking stage involved 3-m-long sections of concrete pipe
with diameter 1.5 m. The offshore conduit was 1,400-mm-o.d. HDPE pipe fitted
with discrete concrete weights. The outfall’s terminus would be 1,100 m from the
mean high spring tide line. It is said that after pressure testing of the completed sys-
tem, divers will drill holes in the outer portion for eventual wastewater outflow.
The local road was blocked so that its surface could be used as a pipe yard. One
by one, four HDPE pipe strings were butt-fused together. Each completed string was
then wrenched around through 90 degrees, using a crane, to pass onto a series of
the concrete underweights stationed along the deck of a 250-m-long trestle. This
structure was actually a double trestle with a crane movable along one half, with the
other side available for the pipe.
The placement method for each weighted HDPE pipe string involved a 36-mm
synthetic rope 3,400 m long, pulling through an offshore pulley secured by sea
anchors. The pipe string traveled out along the trestle then passed down a ramp,
through a cofferdam, and onto the seabed. It was towed empty (on its weights) to
minimize pull forces once it was submerged.
Once in May 2007, a group of weights somehow detached from the pipe. Because
of the sudden loss of ballast, the pipe surfaced rapidly, under a dive support vessel
with eight people on board. The boat was holed in one corner, and it suffered some
other additional minor damage.
Although details are sketchy, it appears that there have been two sets of difficulties
with the pipe-jacking operation, leading to delays. At one time, there was the expressed
need for additional geological data. Then there was talk in late 2007 of hard ground.
After having been reopened, the coastal road was once again closed to traffic.
The 42-metric-ton microtunneling machine was finally retrieved during calm
weather on June 20, 2008, after being underground for more than a year. The retrieval
pit was a sheet pile enclosure, alongside the partly dismantled trestle, 250 m off the
beach and in 5 m of water.
Hybrid-Design Outfalls 203
The outfall was part of the NZ$37 million Stage I that also included a new pump
station as well as chlorination and odor-control facilities at the local WWTP. Stage II,
costing NZ$67 million, would involve installation of a secondary treatment plant.
By the end of June 2008, officials had still not finished debating the fate of the
increased sludge.
9.1.3 Developing Project No. 2: Grim Business

The NZ$61 million outfall at Christchurch, New Zealand, is another hybrid idea
that is nearing completion at the time of writing. It involves the same contractor as
for the Tahuna pipeline sketched earlier. The Christchurch conduit, with inner half
concrete and outer half HDPE, is approximately 4,900 m long. The junction between
the two lengths is roughly 700 m seaward of the shoreline.
The 430 (6-m-long) sections of polyethylene (PE) pipe were manufactured
locally. The size was 1,800-mm-o.d. SDR 26. Seven 360-m-long strings were formed
by butt-fusing the individual sections. Stub flanges (with 36 bolts) were affixed to
the string ends.
The site of this work was in a secure harbor (Lyttelton) 18 km by water south
of the eventual outfall site. After being eased down a special launching ramp, the
strings were flooded and stored on the harbor bottom. Ballast for the PE pipe was
provided by angular bolt-together (vertical seam) concrete members. Unit weight
was 15 metric tons, and longitudinal spacing was 6 m.
The outflow arrangement involved 13 diffuser structures and 104 ports. Design
flow was roughly 2.1 m3/s, with a capacity of 6.0 m3/s.
The PE pipe, despite its armament, was set in a seabed trench carved out by
a 280-metric ton long-reach excavator mounted on a three-spud barge. Spoil was
removed in bottom-dumping hopper barges. Nominal trench bottom width was
8 m, and its depth was 4.5–6 m. The first string to be laid unfortunately “tore” and
had to be recovered.
The inner half of the outfall was created by three drives of microtunneling and
pipe-jacking. The NZ$7 million machine arrived on site in five pieces and was assem-
bled at the bottom of the initial jacking pit, 12 m deep and 14 m in diameter. The
length of the intact microtunnel boring machine was 13.3 m, its weight 55 metric
tons, and it cut at a diameter of 2.190 m. The concrete jacking pipe had a 1.8-m i.d.
and came in 3-m-long lengths.
The initial jacking pit handled two drives, the first one essentially west (871 m)
under an estuary (to reach the treatment plant) and the second one east (595 m)
toward the coast. The second receiving pit then became the jacking pit for the third
(830-m) drive to the east. The first bore took 151 days, including a 3-day delay to
reinforce a seal. The projected total volume of material removed (as bentonite slurry)
was 8,800 m3.
As stated earlier, at this time of writing, the project remains unfinished. There
has emphatically been a human cost associated with the project, apparently starting
with an early incident onshore where a worker suffered a broken leg in a welding
accident.
In early December 2007, a crewman on a dredger-tending tug at the offshore

site, during an anchor-moving operation, had his leg pinned against the bulwarks by
a cable. The limb was completely severed, and heroic efforts were made to stem the
heavy bleeding and save his life. He was taken off by helicopter.
In March 2008, on its return to port on one choppy occasion, a 6-m crewboat
flipped and dumped nine workers into the cold water. Fortunately, the location
and timing of the mishap were such that rescue was swift. There were no inju-
ries, but all nine workers required treatment for hypothermia. Notably, all of the
people were wearing lifevests. It bears mentioning that every person, whatever his
or her prowess in the water, must wear a life jacket when on a trestle or boat.
Two good reasons are a possible blow to the head, leaving the person temporarily
unconscious, or cold water that renders one absolutely incapable of moving at all
after only a few moments.
In late October 2008, during a storm with various mishaps, a 6-m “unsinkable”
boat running for Lyttelton went missing. Both occupants of the vessel died. One
body was spotted that night, some hours later, whereas it was 2 weeks before the
other body was located and recovered. Although some gasoline cans washed up on
the shoreline, it was not clear whether these were from the boat in question. No
other obvious debris from the vessel was found.
The reader must absorb the preceding paragraphs. Every environmental cleanup
project has its down side, at the worst leaving maimed workers plus grieving families
and friends.
9.1.4 Developing Project No. 3: Planned Completion in 2010

Yet another New Zealand hybrid outfall is in the offing, and the same marine con-
tractor for the four South Island outfalls was awarded the approximately NZ$91
million contract, this by the North Shore City Council of Auckland in August 2007.
The council advanced NZ$6 million to the contractor so that it could order the
3.3-m-diam. tunnel boring machine (TBM) in a timely manner.
The inshore portion is a 2,950-m-long segmentally lined tunnel (mixed ground)
with inside diameter of 2.8 m. This passage is at least 25 m underground, well below
the water table. The tunnel terminates 550 m offshore and is said to connect to a
1.6-m-o.d. HDPE pipe that continues 2.0 km further offshore, in a dredged trench,
into the Rangitoto Channel. I have been unable to verify the apparent inconsistency
here between the capacity of the inshore and offshore conduits.
9.2 South Bay Ocean Outfall, San Diego, California

9.2.1 The Setting and the Situation
In section 7.5, we were introduced to the most southwesterly city in the United
States, San Diego, California. The U.S. border with Mexico lies 8 km below the south
limit of San Diego Bay. The rapidly growing Mexican city of Tijuana lies just across
the boundary astride the Tijuana River. This waterway flows west by northwest, cross-
ing the border at a flat angle and entering the Pacific Ocean 12 km south of the tip
of Point Loma and 2 km north of the border. The sewage treatment plant at Tijuana
has for many years not had the capacity to treat all of the incoming sewage, espe-
cially in wet weather, and on many occasions the Tijuana River’s outflow has fouled
California nearshore waters to Point Loma and beyond, leading to beach closures
(“Tijuana” 1994).
The city of San Diego (Metropolitan Wastewater Department) and the Inter-
national Boundary and Water Commission agreed to co-fund (40% and 60%,
respectively, according to proposed use) a new US$239 million primary wastewater
treatment plant, on 30 ha of U.S. soil adjacent to the frontier, and a three-contract
US$140 million conduit to dispose of its effluent well offshore. The outfall con-
cerned would be in U.S. coastal waters, marginally north of the border, where the
water depth is 28 m. Design flows were 7.6 m3/s (average dry weather flow), 11.3 m3/s
(capacity with no pumping), and 14.6 m3/s (pumped capacity) (McBain 1995).
The initial part of the effluent line was the $9.9 million South Bay Land Outfall,
3,750 m of 3.66-m-diam. reinforced concrete cylinder pipe detailed in Garvey and
Ruth (1993), as well as Meiorin and Garvey (1999). This line was completed in
March 1994. The second portion, covered in section 9.2.2, involved a drop shaft, a
tunnel 5,780 m long crossing beneath the coastline, and a riser. The third part (cov-
ered in section 9.2.3) concerned a more or less standard reinforced concrete pipe
outfall, laid in an excavated seabed trench, using a horse (Fig. 9-1), and backfilled.
Figure 9-1. SBOO horse and pipe section going over the side of the barge.
The entire outfall was dedicated in November 1998 and was on line by year’s end.
This outfall is No. 326 in Table A-1.
The following two papers are relevant: McBain et al. (1998) and Kaneshiro et al.
(1999).
9.2.2 Tunnel Overview

The drop shaft, in sandy and unstable soils, was 14 m in diameter and 58 m deep,
extending to 50 m below sea level. Its reinforced concrete boundary wall was 0.6 m
thick. The 1996 construction of the access shaft was plagued by a sinkhole and flow-
ing water. Remedying these related problems by ground freezing delayed the con-
tract’s completion by five months. A frozen earth wall 90 m deep and 4 m thick was
required for both bottom stability and structural integrity to overcome the high earth
and hydrostatic pressures. A standby ground freezing design was in place later for
stabilizing the tunnel face if unstable soil conditions developed during the drive.
The notice to proceed with the South Bay Ocean Outfall (SBOO) underground
system was given in October 1995 (Navin et al. 1996). The TBM was lowered down
the access shaft in sections and reassembled on the bottom. The tunnel was com-
pleted in July 1998, and the SBOO was dedicated at the end of November 1998
(Miller 1998). The average rate of advance of the lined tunnel was 18 m/day, with a
maximum of twice this rate. The idea from the beginning was to recover the hydrau-
lic pieces and abandon the shell at the end of the mining (“Siting” 1995).
This tunnel was not to be driven through rock but through a true (saturated) soil
known as the San Diego Formation, an extraordinary mixture of clays, silts, sands,
gravel, cobbles, and boulders. To complicate matters, the tunnel would be under
some seven bars of water pressure. Characterization of the ground conditions was
possible after extensive early geotechnical investigations, including five onshore and
nine offshore soil borings (Meiorin and Garvey 1999).
The 100-m-long device (including trailing gear and equipment) chosen to drive
the tunnel was a “unique earth pressure balanced tunnel boring machine (EPBM)
that incorporated both a closed-face cutting head and disc cutters to handle boul-
ders” (Miller 1998). The machine diameter was slightly under 4.0 m, and the shield
length was 9.66 m. This “lead” part of the TBM weighed 214 metric tons (Navin
et al. 1997). Two screw conveyors carried excavated material back from the face. The
finished internal diameter of the tunnel was to be 3.35 m. Of the total tunnel length,
roughly 1,510 m would be under land and 4,270 m beneath the sea. The tunnel
would cross 19 faults in its first 900 m offshore.
As the Japan-made machine moved forward, the tunnel was single-pass lined
with segmented gasketed precast concrete segments with continuous hoop steel to
bear the external pressure. Five segments, 1.22 m wide and 229 mm thick, made
up each ring in angular increments of 80, 80, 82.5, 82.5, and 35°, the last being
the “key” (Collins et al. 1996). Segments in any ring were linked with 25-mm
bolts, as were adjoining liner elements. The segment concrete was dense and high-
strength (340 bars). There were 24,000 segments in all. The outside tunnel void
was grouted.
Workers traveled between the bottom of the drop shaft and the EPBM in a spe-
cial rail vehicle termed a mantrip. There were times, during the tunneling, when it
seemed virtually impossible that the drive could continue. Boulders, for example,
were a real problem (Rosta 1999). However, on the one hand, the contractor dis-
played considerable ingenuity in making helpful changes to the machine. On the
other, addition of bentonite and polymer to the foam injection system, used by the
contractor to assist excavation and removal of cuttings, allowed the machine to once
again continue on its way.
In one 600-m-long zone of cobbly sand and gravel, there were several washouts,
or uncontrolled flows. There were, all told, 16 excavation chamber interventions
made during stops in favorable ground. On these occasions, the workers checked for
wear, replaced worn cutters, and removed boulder accumulations at the base of the
screw. Tunneling was completed in July 1998.
9.2.3 The Pipe Portion

The conventional extended-bell reinforced concrete pipe outfall was of a wye con-
figuration in plan view. A 1,433-m length extended directly offshore from the riser
location, along a bearing of roughly S84°W, and then split into a pair of 610-m-
long diffuser branches, the northerly one approximately N18°W, the southerly one
roughly S10°W, the latter almost reaching the international boundary. Water depth
at the diffuser was approximately 29 m, and effluent release was through top exit
risers crowned by four-port heads. Hole sizes were 60–67 mm, and each diffuser leg
had 82 risers, roughly 7.3 m apart.
Three pipe sizes were involved in the diffuser: 2,134-mm i.d. (2,591-mm o.d.);
1,829-mm i.d. (2,235-mm o.d.); and 1,372-mm i.d. (1,778-mm o.d.). The respective
length of each was roughly the same. The outfall trunk’s dimensions were 3,048-mm
i.d. (3,658-mm o.d.). Section lengths varied from 6.10 to 7.31 m. The entire outfall
was laid in a trench and backfilled.
The design included an end flapgate structure for each diffuser leg. A slide gate
at the wye allowed for possible later flushing of only one diffuser at a time. The
wye structure was also configured to allow for an outfall extension, should that be
required later.
The successful bid for the seabed pipe was US$36.4 million. The contractor
started the project in January 1996 and completed the work in January 1998. Trench-
ing required the excavation of 160,000 m3 of bottom material. Thereafter, 320,000
tonnes of rock were placed to bed (38 mm), ballast (152 mm), and armor the pipe
placed by an underwater horse lowered from a derrick barge. Dimensions of the
pipe-laying apparatus were 10.4 ⫻ 12.2 ⫻ 15.2 m. Extensive use was made of divers
and ROVs, for both installation and inspection purposes. A tremie pipe was used for
the bedding and ballast rock. There was a traveling splitter to distribute the stone
and rock to either side of the pipe (Fig. 9-2).
There is always some risk involved when working off the U.S. West Coast in
the autumn. The contractor’s fleet of five barges was subjected to a moderate pre-
winter storm when working in late 1996. Wave conditions intensified during the
Figure 9-2. The traveling rock splitter at SBOO.

early evening hours of Friday, October 25, and peaked somewhere near midnight.
Roughly 40% of the wave energy was in the 8–10 second range, with a maximum
significant wave height of 3.9 m.
Fortunately, the main derrick barge (capacity of 450 metric tons) was safely in
port, reloading. A second derrick barge held secure at its offshore anchorage, but
the third derrick barge broke loose. Luckily, tugs were able to corral it and tow it to
shelter, but not before its electronics area had been hard hit.
Two provisioning barges fetched up on the shoreline, one carrying bedding stone
onto a beach some 100 m south of the international border. This barge was pulled
off on October 26 and then towed into port for repairs. The fifth barge, as long as a
football field and carrying 900 tonnes of rock and a bulldozer, also broke free. She
grounded against a rocky cliff some 5 km south of the border. Partly full of water and
heavily damaged, she was very difficult to pull free (Ballut 1996).
Figures 9-3 and 9-4 show rock barges from other outfall projects. Note the pair
of skips in Fig. 9-3. Figure 9-5 displays a crane barge being used to offload a rock
barge.
Figure 9-3. Rock barge with two skips.
Figure 9-4. Rock barge coming alongside derrick barge.
9.2.4 Riser
The seabed outfall was completed before installation of the riser, so an adjustable
closure section was designed and built to later connect a horizontal outlet in the
riser head to the onshore end of the pipe (Fig. 9-6).
The riser was constructed from a custom four-pile, two-deck platform positioned
over the appropriate location in 22 m of water. Diving apparatus and machinery
Figure 9-5. Crane barge and rock barge.
were on the lower deck, a crane on the upper. After an initial excavation to some
8 m below the ocean floor, an upper steel casing (4,267-mm i.d., 51-mm wall) was
positioned and driven to 24 m below seabed level, 6–12 mm per blow. After the
material within this casing was removed, a second (lower) steel casing (3,962-mm
i.d., 51-mm wall) was placed and driven until it reached 40 m below the seabed,
within 3 m of the planned tunnel crown. Again, contained material was removed,
but this step was made difficult by the presence of many unexpected boulders. The
annulus was grouted.
After drilling and flaring below the base of the lower casing, a special concrete
plug was placed. This plug, measuring 6.1 m in diameter and 8.2 m deep, was unusual
in that its strength was to have both a specified minimum (102 bars in 28 days) and
a specified maximum (136 bars in 90 days) strength, the latter to permit being tra-
versed by the tunneling contractor after 1.5 years. Extensive testing of various mixes
had preceded the actual placement.
The actual 49-m-long, 372-tonne riser structure was lowered (by three cranes)
with difficulty, its lower end fitting into a drilled socket in the plug. Once the riser
was aligned, the second annulus was grouted. Net riser height was 44 m, its diameter
2,743 mm. Full details of this extraordinary undertaking are in Grob (1999). Ger-
wick (2007) has devoted two meaningful paragraphs to the subject.
Figure 9-6. SBOO frame and closure pipe.

9.3 Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme,

Stage I Outfall, Hong Kong
Hong Kong, located at 22.3°N 114.1°E, is a densely populated coastal city with
2004 population of 6.9 million and rising steadily. The Stonecutters Island outfall
(No. 248 in Table A-1) was a major but temporary structure there, to be covered over
by substantial reclamation works taking place after 1994. Under Stage I of the Har-
bour Area Treatment Scheme, formerly called the Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme
(SSDS), sewage from 3.5 million people was transferred to a centralized chemically
enhanced primary treatment (CEPT) plant by a deep, multitunnel collector system.
The system’s delayed construction itself was a major world tunneling project with
difficult ground conditions and a major contractor that walked off the job. The
WWTP (the largest CEPT installation in the world) was set on 10.6 ha of reclaimed
Stonecutters Island terrain and commissioned in May 1997, before the collector sys-
tem was complete. The plant had a design flow of 1.7 million m3/day, and since its
commissioning has seen a relatively steady 1.3 million m3/day.
The SSDS Stage I outfall was to carry the treated wastewater away from Stone-
cutters Island and well out into Victoria Harbour for disposal. The design flow
capacity of the outfall was to be 37.5 m3/s at highest astronomical tide. This sys-
tem was originally intended as an interim facility, but rethinking of Hong Kong’s
master plan for sewage disposal turned this into a permanent installation (“Hong
Kong” 1997).
In totality, this is another hybrid outfall, starting with a 1,730-m-long tunnel,

followed by twin risers and then immediately by a pair of diffuser legs trenched into
the seabed of Victoria Harbour. The early part of the tunnel passes almost directly
under the outer parts of the covered Stonecutters Island outfall and then under what
is known as the Northern Fairway. The diffuser centerpoint, between the twin risers,
ended up 1,200 m from the south Stonecutters Island seawall.
The drop shaft at Stonecutters Island extended down to the tunnel roughly
100 m underground and 90 m below sea level. The finished diameter of the drop
shaft was 7.3 m. The drive to the southwest, with adverse gradient of 0.2%, was by
TBM through difficult ground conditions. The rock tunnel was lined with precast
concrete segments to give a finished diameter of 5 m.
The subcontractor for the risers was an experienced U.K. firm that worked from
a jackup barge. Its subcontract was worth US$3.7 million. After setting up in the
area, the company started with an initial trial hole in March 1995 and had finished
the first shaft and riser by the end of May, with the second system by the end of
June. The tool involved a hub and interchangeable cutter wings, with maximum size
5.0 m. The 4.1-m-diam. blind and partially cased holes were created in single passes
through granite. The 70-m casing was grouted into the underlying granite. Then the
boring of the blind hole went another 50 m, to full depth. Each of the long risers
weighed 400 tonnes; each was 3.25-m-diam. steel, 75 m high, and was placed in the
4.1-m-diam. shafts using a jackup barge.
Each stepped diffuser arm was 587 m long. The diffuser was protected by rock
in its open, deep trench. Flow exited through 24 (0.85-m-diam.) risers, 6–8 m long,
surrounded by rock, topped with eight-port discharge heads having hole sizes shown
in Table 9-1, plus duckbill valves. The discharge heads were made of polyethylene, to
absorb the possible impact from a dredge head or ship anchor. Victoria Harbour is,
at all times, an absolute beehive of boat and ship traffic.
The outflow risers were spaced at intervals of 52 m. Each of the first 11 of these,
on each leg, was connected to the diffuser invert so that solids settled during low
nighttime flows might be washed out and up upon the resumption of more elevated
discharges the next day. There was an arrangement to bulkhead any port and special
sealing plugs to place at the top of either one of the major pair of risers in the event
that the tunnel needed to be dewatered for maintenance purposes. The tops of the
tunnel risers were interconnected by means of a 12-m length of 1.5-m-diam. pipe.
Because of the near certainty of future dredging in the diffuser area, a limit was
imposed on the height of the diffuser discharge heads. It was stipulated that these
Table 9-1. Details for One Arm of the SSDS I Diffuser

Diffuser Diameter (m) Length of Pipe at This Size (m) Port Size (mm)
3.25 239 225
2.50 156 250
2.00 156 275
1.50 36 275
outflow components had to be a minimum of 4 m below the anticipated future har-

bor seabed level. To ensure this, a gigantic trench was excavated in the seabed over
the length of the diffuser. This excavation was trapezoidal in cross section, nominally
20 m deep (actually 13–24) and 150 m across the top. Small trenches were dredged
along the two sides of the main trench, their purpose being the collection of sea-
bed material that would otherwise wash down into the diffuser trench and perhaps
impair outlet function.
As a matter of interest, the 45 Hong Kong area outfalls are in fact inspected by
divers on a regular basis, often in conjunction with a dye release and helicopter over-
flights. I have in my files several notices from the (Hong Kong) Marine Department
telling of two-week periods of work at the Stage I outfall and of the presence of a
derrick barge, a tug, and a small workboat, plus the establishment of marker buoys.
Both ends of the double Stage I diffuser feature angled risers that extend up to the
local seabed and serve as possible entry points for divers or ROVs charged with the
internal inspection of the diffuser. The openings could also serve for outfall purging
of air, grease balls, mud, and floatables. Hong Kong outfalls are regularly flushed.
9.4 The Fort Kamehameha No. 2 Outfall, Hawaii

9.4.1 The Setting and the Plan
The third biggest of the Hawaiian Islands is Oahu, the “gathering place,” positioned
at 21.5°N 158°W in the Pacific Ocean. The extreme southern portion of the island
contains the city of Honolulu, as well as the bulk of the island’s 1 million popula-
tion. Honolulu Harbor, a long-time civilian port, receives container ships, freighters,
passenger liners, and tug and barge traffic. Some 11 km to the west lies the multi-
lobed expanse of Pearl Harbor, a U.S. Navy base and National Wildlife Refuge. From
a military perspective, Pearl Harbor’s fatal flaw is its single narrow entrance to the
south. This access is oriented roughly N30°W.
The considerable activities around the harbor, the adjoining Hickam Air Force
Base, and the extensive military housing in the area serve to generate a moderate
flow of sewage that is treated to secondary level at the Fort Kamehameha WWTP.
This facility is located on the east side of the entrance channel, roughly 3 km inshore
from the point where the 20-fathom (36.6-m) coastal water depth contour crosses
the extended channel centerline. This passageway is cut through coral reef and has
a depth of from approximately 12 to 15 m. U.S. Navy submarines and ships of all
sizes, including the occasional aircraft carrier, use this waterway. In addition, there
is a certain circulation of local tour boats. There is also air traffic close overhead as
two parallel dual-use (military and commercial) aircraft runways lie not far to the
east. The flight line for the more southerly of these, which starts 1,200 m away, is a
mere 30 m above the entrance channel. A final complication involves the possible
presence or passage of protected marine mammals. Monk seals and green turtles are
distinct possibilities. Over the weekend of March 21–22, 1998, there was an unprec-
edented event, when a mother humpback whale and calf cruised into Pearl Harbor
and then out again.
A shallow reef flat extends out about 350 m from the shoreline at the WWTP
before terminating at the abrupt dropoff into the channel. This same reef flat runs
seaward along the channel from this point for about 2 km. The original reinforced
concrete pipe outfall crossed this reef flat and then passed down into the eastern
edge of the channel. The pipe was installed between 1968 and 1970; it had a
diameter of 762 mm and a total length of 550 m. The design flow was 0.33 m3/s.
Somewhat saline secondary, disinfected effluent was discharged through eight
203-mm riser ports over the final 49 m of the pipe. The “boil” of this outflow was
quite apparent to observant passengers on passing vessels. Diver inspections of
the pipe itself revealed severe undermining over a length of 18 m, missing con-
crete at one location, some broken outlets, and the loss of the terminus in 14 m
of water. Turtles had apparently taken up residence in the open end, as well as in
the eroded holes.
The deteriorated state of the existing outfall, the fact that effluent was passing
into inland estuarine waters (for which discharge requirements were to be tight-
ened), and the increase of flow to the WWTP were all factors pointing toward a new
outfall. The U.S. Navy published an insert in the Commerce Business Daily on May 28,
1993, to this effect. Two years later, in April 1995, an engineering consultant to the
U.S. Navy issued a Concept Report for the project.
On September 11, 1996, in the Federal Register, the U.S. Navy published a notice
of intent to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for the undertaking.
After two public scoping meetings and considerable other effort such as marine data
collection, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), published a notice of
availability of the draft EIS (DEIS) on November 21, 1997. The DEIS preferred pipe
route passed virtually south from the WWTP, (buried) across the reef flat to the
east side of the entrance channel. The HDPE outfall then occupied the edge of the
channel to and then along the 46-m water depth contour, this final portion being
the exposed 200-m-long diffuser. Total pipe length was roughly 3.8 km, with inside
diameter of 1,067 mm and outside diameter of 1,169 mm.
On December 17, 1997, the U.S. Navy held a hearing to collect public com-
ments on the DEIS. In addition, the document was sent to more than 100 govern-
ment agencies, groups, and concerned individuals for their review and comments.
All of the oral and written input was addressed in the final EIS (FEIS), for which the
notice of availability was published in the Federal Register on May 4, 2001. The three
and a half years between the DEIS and FEIS requires some explanation.
9.4.2 Nearshore Developments

Detailed post-DEIS route reconnaissance revealed that the eastern edge of the entrance
channel was not continuous. It appeared that a meander in the natural Pearl Harbor
drainage channel was cut off by the dredging for the straight ship entrance chan-
nel, and this “oxbow” was then apparently filled with dredge spoil. The result was a
very soft stretch along an intermediate part of the channel-edge route. This material
was unsuitable to support the weighted pipe and too extensive to be removed and
replaced by appropriate material. This revelation forced the path to fall more on the
reef flat, joining the entrance channel edge at a point seaward of the point indicated
in the DEIS. A great concern was then that part of the pipe alignment would lie out-
side the corridor shown in the DEIS.
A second problem then loomed larger than it had beforehand. The new align-
ment would be along a gradient from the rather barren limestone reef flat to a reef
proper, with some notable massive coral heads and a number of reef fish species.
It was of paramount importance that the coral reef ecosystem suffer no harm dur-
ing the installation and then operation of the planned outfall, legally protected
under President Clinton’s Executive Order 13089 of June 11, 1998. The conclu-
sion was reached that trenchless pipe installation methods would have to be used
to preserve this area. The choice was microtunneling (MT), a developing type of
construction introduced in Chapter 8. The outfall would pass underneath the rich
coral area, and the excavation “mole” would be recovered in open water. To my
knowledge, this is one of the two first uses of MT for an outfall; the other case is
in Portugal.
9.4.3 Danger to Humans and Marine Mammals

A belated magnetometer survey in March–April 1999 turned up a host of “targets”
along the chosen route. Most of the objects recovered were “dumped ordnance,” of
no danger, but other targets still in place could certainly be unexploded ordnance
(UXO). Months of debate followed about potential dangers to divers involved in the
ultimate installation and to protected creatures, such as marine turtles.
In the FEIS, the contractor was instructed to have a diving UXO expert thoroughly
inspect the corridor. Should suspicious objects be found, the U.S. Navy should be
notified immediately to identify the object and carry out necessary steps concerning
its removal or detonation.
9.4.4 Diffuser Site

The idea at the concept report stage in 1995 was that the cross-slope diffuser would
be in a water depth of 36 m. However, it turned out that such a specification would
locate the diffuser halfway down a deep deposit of 1-on-6-slope loose sand. By the
time of the DEIS, the diffuser was to be placed in a 46-m water depth seaward of the
loose slope. This new position, on a more level (1-on-14) finer grain sand deposit,
would theoretically provide enhanced effluent dilution and a higher frequency of
discharge plume submergence than the 36-m site. This situation is consistent with
the intent of regulatory agencies.
A fellow diver-engineer and I surveyed the area on November 11, 1997. It was
clear that, from a pipe stability standpoint, the diffuser should be set in a concrete-
backfilled trench across a calcium carbonate ledge in 21 m of water. Such an instal-
lation would be figuratively “bomb-proof.”
A pipe across the base of the slope would be in great danger of being swept
downhill if a slide was triggered during a high-wave event. It is conjectured, based
on happenings during Hurricane Iwa (Dengler et al. 1984), that a portion of this
accumulation would travel downslope during a heavy wave event (or earthquake),
and thus the diffuser would need to be restrained, either through “stapling” to the
substrate or via support on piles. Is it possible that lower dilution and greater safety
is preferable in a marine diffuser to precarious position and high dilution at times
when “all’s well”?
9.4.5 Construction Starts

The outfall consisted of five distinct sections, as shown in Table 9-2. The US$22.7
million construction contract was signed with an experienced marine company with
an ongoing Hawaii presence. On February 7, 2002, the president of this firm broke
ground with other project officials on the property of the WWTP.
The construction corridor for section 2 was 30 m wide. The pipe extended
essentially south for roughly 500 m from the shoreline near the WWTP, then passed
through a 28° bend into its final alignment, which ended in a manhole.
The main HDPE pipe had an outside diameter of 1,200 mm and a wall thick-
ness of 76 mm. Manufacturer lengths of pipe were butt-fused to create the whole
string in section 2. The bund, or embankment, was progressively extended with
material from the excavated trench. The pipe was flooded, and crushed rock was
used as backfill. Articulated concrete block mats were placed over the pipe, as well
as top native material from the removal of the bund. Silt curtains were used in the
shallow reef areas.
In section 4, involving water depths of 8–20 m, a trench excavation was carried
out from a crane barge, but the pipe arrangement within the trench was the same as
for section 2, except for some additional use of tremie concrete in the heavy wave
surge area. The link was made to the sea end of the microtunneled section 3.
Table 9-2. Separate Parts of Fort Kamehameha No. 2 Outfall

Approximate Stations
Section (m) Description Pipe Material
1 0 ⫹ 00 to 0 ⫹ 60 Onshore; tie-in to WWTP with Ductile iron

shored trench
2 0 ⫹ 60 to 15 ⫹ 50 Reef flat; land-based equipment HDPE
on bund; open-cut trench;
angled
3 15 ⫹ 50 to 23 ⫹ 50 Microtunneled length; straight Concrete
4 23 ⫹ 50 to 33 ⫹ 10 Open trench within narrow HDPE
strip along edge of ship
entrance channel
5 33 ⫹ 10 to 39 ⫹ 01 Pile-supported length; angled; HDPE
ending in 200-m-long
diffuser
9.4.6 Microtunneling Under the Protected Region of Live Coral

The main contractor turned over section 3 to an experienced subcontractor. A 1,524-
mm-diam. MT machine was used, and the concrete pipe had an inside diameter of
1,219 mm. This US$6.0 million subtask involved two 400-m drives, one central jack-
ing shaft, and two underwater retrieval pits. The floor of the jacking shaft was 12 m
below sea level. Specifications dictated that there should be at least 5 m of cover
above the crown of the pipe.
Six overwater borings had explored the substrate before construction began.
These holes had reached distances of 10–27 m below sea level. A small rig, set on
a pontoon, was used in shallow water, but it was bothered by wave action. A truck-
mounted rig, based on a barge, was used for the other holes. Laboratory tests were
done on samples obtained during the program. An assortment of subsurface materi-
als was involved, ranging from loose silty sand to hard limestone reef. Mixed-face
conditions would often be encountered during the drives.
The jacking shaft was watertight for four months. Its walls were made using
interlocking steel sheet piles. To avoid blowing out the bottom of the shaft, a bot-
tom plug was created by jet grouting, a technique detailed by Anderson (2001). To
prevent inflow of subsurface material and water, special entrance–exit seal and thrust
blocks were required outside the shaft. Required was a work platform that extended
beyond the shaft boundary. The legs for this structure were pipe piles, and the top
floor was big enough for a small crane. Access to the jacking pit, in 2 m of water, was
provided by a 20-m-wide slot dredged in the nearby reef.
9.4.7 The Outer Section

Before working on section 5, the contractor had a subcontractor reevaluate the
design wave loads on that part of the outfall. The deep-water design wave was felt
to be appropriate to the waters overlaying the outer part of the outfall approaches
from direction 195° true, and it has a height of 19.8 m and a period of 13.7 s. Over
the diffuser location, the refracted/shoaled wave is 21.3 m high, easily big enough to
cause major problems of both slope and pipe stability.
The result of the reassessment, using equations in Grace (1992), was a Value
Engineering proposal that substantially reduced the size and weight of the pile
caps. This step actually made things much easier for the contractor because the
new pile caps could be placed on the air-filled pipe when deployed. The former
ones would have sunk the pipe. The boltable top of the pile cap was not unlike
the standard upper half of a concrete weight collar. But the bottom was broader,
incorporating two vertical collars through which a steel pipe pile pair would later
pass. Saddles were placed every 9.14 m. Before the stabilization of section 5 began,
some test piles were driven and then subjected to a tensile load test to evaluate the
pile friction force.
There were 126 of these piles of lengths 21.3–27.4 m, outside diameter of
508 mm, and wall thickness of 13 mm. Each such pile had transverse lines painted
on it so that ground penetration could be monitored via underwater videocamera. A
separate ROV moved around the operation, providing other points of view. Because
of the vague threat of UXO, the contractor sought to keep divers out of the water
during the pile-driving exercise.
To keep the pile driver itself out of the water, a temporary pile extension (or
follower) was used during driving and then removed. The line of any pile was aided
by an edge-of-barge guide and a funnel set over the receiving hole on the bot-
tom. A four-legged structure was lowered to the bottom before pile driving com-
menced. Within this structure, two frames extended down onto the pipe and held
it in position while the pile driving was going on. Video cameras were mounted on
the structure, with monitors topside. Blow counts were evaluated. Piles were driven
precisely to grade, and tremie concrete was placed to secure the support arrange-
ment in place.
Sealed flexible air-filled lift bags were tied to the diffuser during its descent. Dur-
ing installation, the 127-mm-diam. ports in the 200-m-long diffuser were plugged.
The holes were oriented in the underside of the diffuser, aiming 45° down alter-
nately to either side. A manhole was placed roughly 5 m upstream of the beginning
of the diffuser.
The Global Positioning System–directed and laser-guided offshore operation
was never bothered by strong currents or large waves, two distinct worries. However,
the contractor did have to survive a broken barge anchor cable at one point.
9.5 Post Script

One of the great worries for harbormouth outfalls is that a stray ship might ground
on the pipe or a vessel in distress would hook it with a dragged anchor. An event in
early February, 2009, very near the outer part of the Fort Kamehameha outfall, illus-
trates the potential problem.
The US$1 billion USS Port Royal is a guided missile cruiser displacing 8,700
tonnes. She is 173 m long, with a beam of 17 m, and carries 24 officers and 340
enlisted men and women. Late in 2008 she was drydocked for US$18 million worth
of routine maintenance at the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. Over a period of four
months, her hull was repainted, her propellers and hubs replaced, rudders repaired,
shafts refurbished, sonar dome repaired, and topside structures worked on.
After her first day of trials following the above work, she hove to in the dark-
ness, outside Pearl Harbor, in order to transfer personnel to small boats and move
them ashore. The individuals involved were sailors, civilian contractors, and ship-
yard workers. During this exercise, the ship went hard aground in from 5 to 7 m of
water about 0.8 km off the Honolulu International Airport Reef Runway and 2.5 km
from the Pearl Harbor Entrance Channel. An unsuccessful attempt was made that
first evening to tow her off.
At high tide on the next two evenings, further unsuccessful attempts were made
to remove her. Finally, on the fourth evening she was pulled free. This took four U.S.
Navy and three commercial tugboats. Also in attendance were a U.S. Navy salvage
ship, another U.S. Navy vessel, and a commercial oil recovery boat for a possible
spill. Earlier, a fuel barge had been towed into place, to offload some of Port Royal’s
fuel to further lighten her, but the relative motion of the vessels in the existing seas
made this impossible. The Port Royal was lightened for the last pull by dropping
her anchors and chain, pumping off 500 tonnes of seawater ballast, plus sending
135 sailors ashore.
The ship suffered serious damage to her sonar dome forward and to struts, shafts,
and the pair of five-bladed propellers aft. Some propeller tips were sheared off. Repair
costs will be tens of millions of dollars. The cruiser left a great scar of heavily-damaged
reef, with many completely-detached blocks.
One can imagine the comings and goings of the small armada of vessels involved,
the anchors that were dropped and pulled back aboard, the tow cables along the sea-
bed, the heavy “prop-wash” from the tugs under full power.
At the time of writing I do not know if the outfall was affected by all the traffic and
the gear, but the risk was definitely there for a major dislocation in its outer portion.
State of Hawaii officials were miffed that the Navy did not report, in a timely fashion,
the release of an appreciable amount of raw sewage from the cruiser one night when
she was aground. It is indeed a peculiar development when Honolulu is being directed
by another U.S. federal agency to bring its two neighboring outfall effluents to a sec-
ondary treatment level.
References
Anderson, H. V. (2001). Underwater Construction Using Cofferdams, Best, Flagstaff, Arizona.
Ballut, K. (1996). “Tugboats to Try Again Today to Free Huge Barge.” The San Diego Union-
Tribune, October 29.
Collins, F. X., et al. (1996). “The South Bay Ocean Outfall.” Conference Proceedings Paper, North
American Water and Environment Congress & Destructive Water, C. Bathala, ed., ASCE, New York.
Dengler, A. T., et al. (1984). “Slumping and Related Turbidity Currents Along Proposed OTEC
Cold-Water-Pipe Route Resulting from Hurricane Iwa.” Proceedings of the 16th Annual
Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas, May, Offshore Technology Conference,
Richardson, Tex., Paper No. OTC 4702.
Garvey, J., and Ruth, C. W. (1993). “The Big Pipe: Design and Construction of the South Bay
Land Outfall in San Diego, California.” Conference Proceedings Paper, Pipeline Infrastruc-
ture II, M. B. Pickell, ed., ASCE, New York, 439–447.
Gerwick, B. C., Jr. (2007). Construction of Marine and Offshore Structures, 3rd ed., CRC Press,
Boca Raton, Florida.
Grace, R. A. (1992). “Reliable Design-Wave Force Predictions for Seabed Pipelines.” Confer-
ence Proceedings Paper, Civil Engineering in the Oceans V, R. T. Hudspeth, ed., ASCE, New
York, 481–495.
Grob, H. (1999). “Outfall Installation Requires Varied Underwater Operations.” Underwater,
11(3), 90–93.
“Hong Kong Survey.” (1997). The Dock and Harbour Authority, 78(877), 84.
Kaneshiro, J. Y., et al. (1999). “Geotechnical Lessons Learned in San Diego’s South Bay Ocean
Outfall.” Conference Proceedings Paper, Geo-Engineering for Underground Facilities, G. Fer-
nandez and R. A. Bauer, eds., ASCE, Reston, Va., 1130–1142.
McBain, G. (1995). “South Bay Outfall to Carry Border Wastewater.” Water Environment and
Technology, 7(4), 27–28.
McBain, G. W., et al. (1998). “Construction Challenges for Soft Ground Tunneling.” Confer-
ence Proceedings Paper, Pipelines in the Constructed Environment, J. P. Castronovo and J. A.
Clark, eds., ASCE, Reston, Va., 681–691.
Meiorin, L., and Garvey, J. (1999). “South Bay Ocean Outfall: A 21st Century Solution to a
Historic Problem.” Water and Wastewater International, 14(2), 14–16.
Miller, P. (1998). “Dramatic Ocean Outfall Project Cleans South Bay Beaches.” TBM: Tunnel
Business Magazine, November–December, 25.
Navin, S. J., et al. (1996). “Tunneling Under Pressure.” Civ. Engrg., 66(2), 64–67.
Navin, S. J., et al. (1997). “Construction Challenges for the South Bay Ocean Outfall, San
Diego, California—An Update.” Conference Proceedings Paper, Construction Congress V.
Managing Engineered Construction in Expanding Global Markets, S. D. Anderson, ed., ASCE,
Reston, Va., 290–300.
Rosta, P. H. (1999). “Outfall Goes Deep in San Diego.” Engrg. News Rec., 242(4), 22.
“Siting for Seismic Safety.” (1995). Engrg. News Rec., 235(17), 20.
“Tijuana Slimes San Diego.” (1994). Engrg. News Rec., 232(20), 15.
10
Selected Polyethylene
Outfalls
10.1 Lightness and Heaviness

To this point, the chapters in this volume have been organized according to the
method of outfall construction rather than the pipe material involved. And yet, a
particular method and a specific material often go together. Most bottom-pulled
outfalls (Chapter 4) are steel, and most pipes lowered from crane barges (Chapter 6)
are concrete.
Here we change our system to focus on a single material, polyethylene (PE). The
proportion of such pipes in the overall mix of outfall materials has been steadily
increasing, as shown in Table 10-1. Some of this success is due to increased product
availability, some to the strong marketing effort displayed by the industry. Much has
occurred because of the desirable properties of PE, such as its flexibility, corrosion
resistance, and integral waterproof joints. Another advertised advantage is lightness;
high-density polyethylene (HDPE) has a specific gravity of 0.955, as compared to
2.2–3.0 for concrete or 7.85 for steel.
There are unquestionable shipping and handling advantages to a light pipe, but
in its final position on the bottom of the sea, a submarine pipe has to be pressed
heavily into the seabed to survive. The standard means of immobilizing such pipe
is to either thread it through short sections of concrete pipe or to clamp onto it two
halves that form a concrete “donut.” The latter technique has been used in many,
many successful marine applications of HDPE pipe. It has also been used in some
unsuccessful ventures, such as at Tatitlek in Alaska (No. 240 in Table A-1), where the
halves came apart and the outfall ended up floating on the water surface. An opera-
tion had to be mounted to incrementally pull the bared pipe across the stern of a
small boat and have workers reattach the ballast elements. Another Alaskan Native
community at Ouzinkie had the same problem.
221
Table 10-1. Materials Choice, Through the Years, for Outfalls in Appendix A
% Poly- % % % % % %
Group Years N ethylene Conc. Steel Tunn. DI Other Total
1 1978–1982 57 19.3 22.8 33.3 5.3 5.3 14.0 100.0

2 1983–1987 86 13.9 12.8 41.9 1.2 16.3 13.9 100.0
3 1988–1992 67 29.9 6.0 40.3 7.4 4.5 11.9 100.0
4 1993–1997 78 33.3 9.0 39.8 0.0 0.0 17.9 100.0
5 1998–2002 70 58.5 8.6 15.7 4.3 0.0 12.9 100.0
6 2003–2007 42 61.9 7.1 16.7 0.0 0.0 14.3 100.0
Total — 400 — — — — — — —
Note: N, number of outfalls. The fifth through eighth columns relate to the proportion of
concrete pipe, steel pipe, tunnel, and ductile iron pipe, respectively.
If an HDPE pipe is to be used unburied in the sea, the installation must be able
to survive the unrelenting and furious wave surge that exists at the seabed under
storm waves. I have spent many hours under only moderate seas, while measuring
wave forces, and I have been beaten black and blue. The engineer must make an
accurate assessment of the forces exerted on the to-be-installed HDPE pipe and col-
lars by extraordinary water motion. Figure 10-1 shows a nearshore HDPE pipe stabi-
lized by frames bolted into the substrate. An earlier installation, not so constrained,
failed and led to one of my ocean research projects, which is mentioned in the first
paragraph of section B.4.5 of Appendix B.
10.2 High-Density Polyethylene Pipes in South Africa

10.2.1 Pipe Ballasting Versus Waves
I spent the second half of 1983 in South Africa, principally in the greater Cape
Town area. That was a politically dynamic time to be in that extraordinary country,
with apartheid on its last legs. That was a dynamic time to be in that land for quite
another, and much less important, reason. The construction of three major HDPE
outfalls was just beginning. One of these was the Green Point No. 3 municipal pipe
at Cape Town (No. 155 in Table A-1), and the other two were close-together indus-
trial lines off a port called Richards Bay (Nos. 146 and 147 in Table A-1), situated on
the Indian Ocean some 150 km northeast of Durban. The same design procedure for
pipe ballasting versus waves was used for all three pipes.
I visited Richards Bay on August 22, 1983. On that day, at the sea edge of the
beach, a start was being made on the work trestle. On a waterway a short distance
behind the coast, the early extruded pipe was issuing from the machine that pro-
cessed the container loads of HDPE pellets shipped in from Europe. After the site
visit, I was asked to officially review the planned weighting of the two local out-
falls. After several days of thought and calculations, I reported that the total concrete
Selected Polyethylene Outfalls 223
Figure 10-1. 305-mm-diameter HDPE pipe used in ocean thermal energy conversion
experiment.
weight on each outfall should be doubled, and that step was actually taken. The
pipes have survived, even with instances of foam being pumped through one line.
The weighting of the Green Point No. 3 outfall was not revised, and history has
clearly demonstrated that it was too light. I have detailed elsewhere the back-to-back
demolishing of the pipe during terrible storms and thunderous seas in 1984 and
1989 (Grace 2005).
10.2.2 Green Point Outfall No. 4

After much discussion by the public and authorities, the go-ahead for another but
this time buried attempt was given in August 1990. The contract for this work was
awarded to an experienced South African marine contractor in May 1991, and seri-
ous marine work began in September, with the ending of the Southern Hemisphere
winter season.
The 1,676-m-long pipe (No. 274 in Table A-1) would again be 800-mm-o.d. and
700-mm-i.d. HDPE. The pipe was in 60-m lengths, with upset ends and steel bolting
rings, laid out behind the Cape Town Harbour breakwater. Much of this pipe had
been recovered from the ocean and reconditioned after the 1989 storm.
The work can be conceptually subdivided into inshore and offshore sections
linked by a 50-m-long transition section (Brodrick 1993). Inshore, the remaining
276-m-long section of outfall and adjoining seabed had to be cleaned of marine
growth, and debris had to be removed to permit encasement by mass concrete poured
into a big, boxlike form (or “shutter”) that was incrementally moved along the pipe.
Offshore, a 1,400-m-long pipe trench had to be created. This activity involved vari-
ous steps: clearing of the seabed; drilling and sleeving of holes along the alignment;
placing of explosives in the holes; detonation; removal of blasting debris from the
rough trench; and shaping of the trench into a final form.
The contractor had a South African specialist company develop the three pieces
of subsea equipment that it would need for the project. First, there was a twin-tower
drilling framework that traveled over the seabed on four independent tracked legs. A
500-mm-diam. articulated airlift was mounted on the frame, and an umbilical was
extended up to a support barge overhead. Second was an excavator with a pair of
tracks like a bulldozer, which removed blast debris from the trench. A filled bucket,
on the end of a long arm, could tilt and then be emptied by a powerful airlift. Again,
a support barge operated above. Problems with this system appeared to be major
contributors to an eventual four-month project delay. The third piece of equipment
was a diver-operated machine, also on a pair of tracks, that used a rotating toothed
head (on a horizontal axis) for final cutting and trimming of the trench. Material
was removed by an airlift and an extended discharge pipe.
The concrete weights used on the pipe were not of the star weight type shown
in Fig. B-2. They were actually rounded underneath and square across the top. The
separate air-filled pipe lengths, with weights attached, were moved down a slipway,
towed to the proper outfall position, then flooded and finally bolted up to the last-
laid length of pipe. Many divers were involved in the underwater work. Tragically,
one of the contractor’s divers was killed in 1992.
The encasing of each 60-m length of installed pipe required roughly 220 m3 of
concrete. A batch plant was housed on a 32 ⫻ 15 m barge, and a concrete pump was
used for delivery. The pipe’s concrete collars served two additional functions besides
stabilization, first as a partial end stop to the pour and second as a measure of its
depth. Concreting was done in two layers to prevent undue uplift. Up to 115 m3 of
concrete was placed in a single day.
Construction operations ceased for the (Southern Hemisphere) winter in early
April 1993, then resumed in October. During that nonwork interval, effluent was
released from the new pipe through a temporary outlet at station 1,030 m, the
beginning of the pipe being station 0. During the actual construction, the release
point was roughly 500 m from the shoreline. The final diffuser, like the rest of the
outfall, was buried and concreted over. The outlets were 150-mm-diam. 90° elbows,
each protected by a precast concrete cupola. The outfall construction project was
completed in December 1993.
10.2.3 Two Industrial Lines at Richards Bay, Natal

The two side-by-side industrial outfalls are known as Mondi and Triomf (Nos. 146
and 147, respectively), and both were made of HDPE after inshore rubber-lined steel
pipe (“Diversity” 1983). The Mondi conduit (“A-line”) was the bigger and longer
line. Its length was 5,450 m with an outside diameter of 1,000 mm, and its wall
thickness was 50 mm inshore and 40 mm offshore. End water depth was 27 m. The
Triomf outfall (“B-line”) was 4,290 m long and ended in 23 m of water. Pipe outside
diameter was 900 mm, with a 40-mm wall throughout.
Both pipes were stabilized by discrete concrete fixtures. These elements were circu-
lar inshore, where the pipes were buried, and of a “star” configuration offshore, where
the pipes were exposed. An interesting feature of these lines is that markers were
driven into the seabed offshore so that any net movement of the pipes could be noted
during diver inspections. Note that displacements were subsequently detected.
The effluents from the two lines are completely different. The one from Mondi
is a hot (50°C), buoyant, fibrous pulp mill outflow, and that from Triomf is a heavy
gypsum slurry from a fertilizer plant. The length of the diffuser in the Mondi case
was 630 m, and the flow exited through 106 conventional ports whose average diam-
eter was 75 mm. The Triomf diffuser was only 280 m long.
The designer of the Triomf diffuser (Roberts and Toms 1988) sought to provide
the dense effluent with sufficient dilution to cause the gypsum to go into solution.
The effluent was directed up 60° into the water column, in an essentially offshore
direction, through 16 pipe-crown openings averaging 75 mm in size.
The disposal of the gypsum slurry at that site was difficult. There were blockages
in the outfall, ultimately reducing the carrying capacity by one-third. Huge piles of
gypsum accumulated on the seabed near the diffuser. Finally, there was a break in
the outfall, and more gypsum accumulated at that point. Installation of a 900-mm-
diam., 3.2-km-long weighted HDPE replacement pipe was initiated in late 2006 and
was expected to take one year for construction. The cost of this “C-line,” connected
to a 700-m-long stub installed during original installation, is 150 million Rand.
Once it is completed, the B-line will be repaired. The C-line will have a 450-m-long
diffuser ending in 25 m of water.
Gypsum slurry is not the only heavy effluent to pass through outfalls. The brine
left over from desalination of seawater is another such negatively buoyant example,
and such cases will be increasing in number in the future as natural freshwater sup-
plies are depleted and we turn to the abundant sea for our supply (e.g., Randall 1981;
Rote 1991; Prendergast 1992; Armstrong et al. 1993).
10.2.4 Hout Bay, Cape Province

This outfall (No. 234 in Table A-1), which curves out into the mouth of a marine
bay, has no written account known to me. The wastewater has both domestic and
fishing industry sources, and outfall capacity is 250 L/s. The pipe is made of HDPE
and features a 364-mm inside diameter and a 43-mm wall. The end 144 m of the
1,905-m-long line is the diffuser, where the risers at 10-m spacing have flexible cou-
plings so that they can be pulled right over if they are snagged by a line or anchor.
There are ten 110-mm-diam. ports and five of size 140 mm. Five of the former were
blanked initially. End water depth is 38 m. Construction lasted from November
1989 to April 1991, and commissioning took place in early 1993. There was a sleeve
pipe inshore, and offshore there was installation by float and sink into a trench with
cover up to 3.0 m. The procedures involved in the latter operation are spelled out in
the literature of the PE pipeline manufacturers, at least for calm water.
10.3 Selected Polyethylene Outfalls: First Set

10.3.1 Peekskill, New York
This outfall (No. 68 in Table A-1) extends 1,768 m into the Hudson River in New
York state. Construction planning involved assembly of flanged strings of lengths
213–305 m, with bolt-together concrete collars already in place. The onshore end of
any new string and the offshore end of the previously laid string were to be bolted
together on the deck of the crane barge. Failure of two of the multibolt flange connec-
tions caused the contractor to eliminate that form of jointing. Remaining flanges were
sawed off and the butt ends were dressed for fuse-welding. Sixty-five on-barge butt
welds were necessary for the last 1,097 m of pipe. Details are in “Techniques” (1979).
10.3.2 Southport Broadwater, Queensland, Australia

This outfall (No. 98 in Table A-1) is 1,450 m long and crossed a tidal estuary and an
important navigation channel, then required trenching of up to 8 m into sand and
sandstone (Jackson 1983, 1984). Discharge was at a point in the stabilized mouth
of the Nerang River at the south end of South Stradbroke Island in Queensland. The
pipe outside diameter was 1,000 mm, at the time an unusually big plastic pipe in
Australia. The wall thickness varied between 43 and 51 mm. Concrete collars weigh-
ing 1.8 tonnes were fitted to the pipe at 4.7-m intervals.
10.3.3 Chevron Extension, El Segundo, California

Protests and legal action by the powerful Surfrider Foundation focused on the close
inshore discharge of a warm, brownish effluent in roughly 5 m of water and led
to the lengthening of this outfall (No. 285 in Table A-1) by 914 m. The original
short pipe was made of RCP, and the extension was HDPE with outside diameter of
1,600 mm and a wall 51 mm thick. This was a design–build project where a thor-
ough cost analysis found that the plastic option was 60% cheaper than the better
of either weight-coated steel or RCP, saving some US$2 million.
The whole pipe length was put together at Long Beach, California, by butt-fusing
20-m lengths together. A special nose cone was flange bolted onto one end of the
string as a pull point, and the 55-km tow to the installation site was done in good
weather and without any problems from ship traffic. A heavy chain had been run
through the pipe to make it sink on site, and can buoys were attached for the tow.
When this chain was withdrawn later, before permanent stabilization, there was a
temporary problem of off-bottom pipe.
The project was to include two manhole structures with 914-mm openings. One,
made of steel (and protected by sacrificial anodes), was to be at the inshore end of
the new line and another, fashioned of HDPE, was to be at the terminus, imme-
diately inshore of an end cap. The linkup of the sea end of the old pipe and the
inshore face of the manhole block was not easy. The former was heavily sanded in,
and a hole had to be excavated to bare the existing terminus. The link between the
old and new system began with four bolts on the last concrete block of the old line.
An adapter backing ring was connected to this. Divers fitted a two-flange jig into the
space and a spool piece was later fabricated to make the link.
The large, buoyant pipe was to sit on the sandy bottom. Massive weight would
be needed to keep the outfall down at the best of times, with the real worry com-
ing during events of large waves. The major stabilization unit was a prefabricated
30-tonne inverted U made of concrete that was set down over the pipe, separated
from it by a protective rubber sheet. Fifty of these units were poured. To avoid having
differential seabed sediment topple these units over, two helical-strake anchor rods
were drilled hydraulically (from a lowered frame) 2–3 m into the seabed, at each
stabilization site, and the U units themselves were connected. If adequate turning
pressure was not achieved, an extra 2.5 m of rod was added and drilled into place.
Apparently, it was not always possible to tighten up on the connection because there
was no turnbuckle. One of the construction divers on the job informed me that he
had little confidence in the ability of the chosen stabilization system to keep the pipe
in place during a big storm.
The outlet holes for effluent were drilled in the top of the pipe. Over these were
glued little flanged stubs that would later accept the specified nonreturn duckbill
valves. There was considerable problem with the stubs, and many broke off during
underwater activity. The contractor experienced other problems, such as a broken
HDPE backup ring and galled stainless steel allthreads.
10.3.4 Fleetwood (Fylde) Foul Lancashire, U.K.

Oliver (1995), Atkinson (1997), and Rasaratnam (1999) have discussed this 5,250-m-
long sewage pipe (No. 305 in Table A-1), which is in the same trench as a shorter
(1,100-m storm water) pipe. Material is medium-density polyethylene (MDPE), with
outside diameter of 1,400 mm and inside diameter of 1,293 mm. Sets of four 500-m-
long strings were towed to the site from the manufacturing facilities in Norway.
After joining of pairs of strings on a barge, the pipe was laid over a stinger into a
trench nominally 3.5 m deep. Weighting was provided by 4.5-metric ton concrete
collars at 4.0-m spacing. There were three 15-m-high risers within the short (10-m-
long) diffuser, and these risers were protected with domes. End water depth was
30 m, and the design flow was 2.15 m3/s. The project execution period was May to
December 1995.
10.3.5 Emu Bay, Tasmania, Australia

The installation of this pipe (No. 311 in Table A-1) resulted from a failed attempt to
reline a 270-m-long, 1.2-m-o.d. patchwork concrete outfall for a paper mill at Burnie
on the north coast of the Australian state of Tasmania. The lining pipe was MDPE
with outside diameter of 956 mm and inside diameter of 890 mm. Butt fusion had
been used, with 12-m-long lengths, to create a line 492 m long, and this pipe was
floated out into the adjacent bay.
When the liner was inserted, it stalled against a vertical discontinuity in the con-
crete pipe that had not been identified during an earlier internal video survey. The
liner was then removed and once more tethered in the local embayment. The bulk of
the pipe floated, but towheads caused the two ends to sink. There were three central
anchors, another anchor at the offshore end, and the inshore end was stabilized by
a short length of railway track.
During a Bass Strait storm, the inshore towhead sheared off the pipe about 1.5 m
from its end. The pipe thrashed around in the 3- to 4-m waves, and despite valiant
rescue attempts by mill workers, it ended up in two lengths on the local beach. Ini-
tially, mill personnel still planned to reline the concrete outfall, but then the step
was taken to hire an experienced international marine and diving contractor to both
design and install a more workable concept. The project began early in March 1996
and was successfully completed in August 1996. Roughly 40% of that interval was
down time because of poor weather.
This company determined to remove the heavily damaged end of the concrete
pipe, and after a survey the cut was made and dressed about 200 m offshore, where
the water depth was 3.0 m. A 50-tonne winch and sheave assembly was used to
pull into the concrete pipe some 100 m of HDPE pipe with outside diameter of
1,000 mm and a 25-mm wall thickness. The rest of the new outfall consisted of
720 m of trunk and 240 m of diffuser, and it ended in 11 m of water.
The local seabed was a nightmare of basalt outcrops, large cobbles, and sand,
which precluded drilled or piled anchors. The owner rejected the expensive idea of
trenching. The contractor thus determined that the pipe would be set directly on
the uneven seabed, held down by a series of abutting concrete saddle weights. These
blocks were each 6 m long and weighed 12 tonnes. In the diffuser, holes were incor-
porated into the saddle weights for the effluent discharge points.
A special 400-m-long curved assembly and launch ramp was constructed from
on land to a distance off the shore where the water depth was roughly 2 m. Five
separate tows made use of the ramp; one was the 100-m-long pull-in section already
described, and a second was the diffuser. In each case, a special pull head had
been flange-bolted onto the pipe end. The others were the two 350-m-long halves
of the trunk plus a 36-m-long closing spool. In each case, the pipe was doubly
bulkheaded and full of air. Internal temporary ballast was added to provide nega-
tive buoyancy to sink the pipe when on location and flooded. The saddle weights
were then lowered off a work barge by a 40-tonne crane and put into position.
With the individual pipe lengths in place and securely weighted down, measure-
ments were taken in the gaps and suitable transition sections were fabricated and
then installed.
10.3.6 Peñarrubia, Gijon East, Spain

I visited the open-coast cliff-base site on the Bay of Biscay in October 1996, when a
sizable swell was running in from the north. Site work had been suspended. I also
viewed four 250-m-long strings of floating and weighted HDPE pipe anchored out
in the Gijon harbor. The boltable halves of surplus weights were stored on a pier.
The arrangement was semicircular on top and rectangular below, and each weighed
5.0 metric tons. They were spaced at 5.0-m intervals. Pipe diameter was 1,400 mm,
with a wall thickness of 34 mm. The pipe trench was established by a combination
of blasting (1,126 m) and dredging, and pipe installation was by floatout and sink.
Total pipe length was 2,590 m, bearing north, with the terminus in 24 m of water.
The 126-m-long diffuser was stabilized on top with 1-metric ton rocks. The outflow
risers were protected with domes.
10.4 Selected Polyethylene Outfalls: Second Set

10.4.1 Seabrook, New Hampshire
This outfall, virtually on the state line between New Hampshire and Massachusetts,
required a whole set of permits (Elliott 1997). The total pipe has a 1,890-m land
portion (of PVC) that crosses a salt marsh, and then a 790-m length (of HDPE) that
traverses stable sand dunes, the beach, and the surf zone before terminating in a
water depth of 9 m. The local seabed is sand, with occasional outcroppings of rock
that the chosen pipe route studiously avoided. Engineering analysis derived a suit-
able storm tide and determined a design wave height of 9.5 m.
The ocean pipe had outside diameter of 610 mm and a (heavy) wall thickness of
54 mm. Manufactured lengths were butt-fused into strings, with lengths from 60 to
150 m, and pressure tested. This task was done on a pier in a harbor adjacent to the
worksite. An HDPE flange was fused onto each end of any string, and a ductile iron
backing ring was added in each case. Concrete collars were placed on each string. The
weight added still permitted the pipe to float when empty, and capped strings were
towed into place by a tug.
The total construction took six months, weathered several gales when the float-
ing plant was removed to shelter, and cost US$2.78 million. Work in the sand dunes
and beach area was done before the tourist season started, and it extended as far off-
shore as land-based equipment could reach during extreme low tide cycles. Offshore
work, using a crane barge, took place in July and August. The trench was excavated
by a clamshell bucket suspended from the crane wire.
Stabilization of the outfall in the surf zone had the pipe crown 2.1 m below the
seabed, with 0.3 m of 50-mm-maximum well-graded bedding and 0.8 m of armor
stone on top. Outside the surf zone, the cover over the pipe crown was dropped to
1.5 m. The armor stone had a maximum rock size of 1,800 N and a minimum of
100 N. A special tug-towed materials barge brought the stone and rock to the site
from Portsmouth Harbor, roughly 24 km away.
Contractor divers monitored and controlled the condition of the trench, bed-
ding placement, and rock installation after they had made flange connections for
the pipe itself. There was a separate inspection diver, and underwater video was
recorded. The completed outfall (No. 314 in Table A-1) began discharging effluent
in March 1996.
10.4.2 Antalya, Turkey

The capacity of this 1,600-mm-diam. SDR 26 HDPE line is 4.0 m3/s. Length is
2,440 m into 45 m of water. The pipe was towed from its source in Norway. The
outfall (No. 339 in Table A-1) was placed in a trench to 15 m of water and thereafter
allowed to rest on the seabed. The year was 1997. Within the 300-m-long diffuser are
120 (160-mm-diam.) openings with duckbill valves. Pertinent written materials are
“Turkey” (1997) and “Antalya” (1998). See also Blomster and Stanimirov (2004).
10.4.3 São Jacinto, Aveiro, Portugal

Ramos et al. (2001) refer to this 1998 open-coast installation (No. 354 in Table
A-1). The source of the wastewater is mostly industrial. The 3,378-m-long HDPE line
was installed by float and sink. Cross-sectional dimensions were outside diameter of
1,600 mm and inside diameter of 1,478 mm. The end of the outfall lies in 15 m of water.
The landfall is buried, but the rest of the pipe is exposed and stabilized with concrete
weights. The diffuser is 332 m long, and the terminal 243 m has an outside diameter
of 1,200 mm. The design discharge was 3.4 m3/s, and flow exits through 72 (175-mm-
diam.) wall ports angled up at 30°. Fifty-two of these were capped initially.
10.4.4 Sainte Luce, Martinique

The overall length of this 250-mm-diam. HDPE outfall was 1,600 m, with 400 m on
shore. A 30-m-long diffuser ended the pipe in 46 m of water.
A French marine contractor built this line from April to June 2002. Care had to be
taken, with the beach-edge launching ramp, not to disturb the activities of beach-goers.
The pipe was buried on shore, and out 500 m into the sea. The trench was nomi-
nally 2 m deep. The dredging operation was carried out from small barges using two
commercially available submersible agitator dredge pump systems.
Behind the beach, 48-m-long strings were laid out in a parallel arrangement. The
lengths pulled to sea were from 350 to 550 m long, and these strings were negatively
ballasted by a continuous length of 38-mm chain. Divers were involved in joining
strings on the seabed.
Unburied pipe was loaded on top with 3.3-kN concrete “horseback” units. The
diffuser was set on and strapped to 1.1-kN concrete saddles that maintained the pipe
off bottom. Discharge was through flanged vertical outlets.
10.4.5 Montpellier, France

Montpellier is a fast-growing city in the far south of France. Population is approach-
ing half a million. The city’s sewage (4 m3/s maximum) is directed 9 km to Palavas-les-
Flots on the Mediterranean coast. In the year 2000, bidding was opened on a marine
outfall line, 1,600 mm in diameter and 11 km long, the latter a European record.
Twenty resulting proposals covered four materials: steel, concrete, FRP, and PE. The
(33,541,905 Euro) award of the contract (in September 2002) to a consortium using
PE was delayed by a claim from another bidder. The HDPE pipe used would be SDR
26 (with a wall thickness of 61 mm) and supplied in continuously extruded lengths
of either 515-m (5) or 550-m (15) from a plant in southern Norway. Total supplied
length, over eight months, was 10,825 m.
The pipes were bulk headed and were fitted with towing clamps. Five pipes
made up each 5,000-km tow, which took from 17 to 19 days. The March 2003 first
trip was particularly difficult because of arduous sea conditions encountered in the
Bay of Biscay. The pipes were stored in the port of Sète where 5,450 special concrete
ballast pipe collars were run onto the pipe. These collars were unique, essential pipes
with no longitudinal bolting (of halves) and with pairs of embedded rubber stop-
pers between sections. Outside diameter was 2.0 m, length was 1.9 m, and thickness
was 110–130 mm.
HDPE stub ends were butt-welded on the pipe ends. Seventy-eight outlets were
also welded into place along the 460 m of diffuser. These locations were fitted with
200-mm nonreturn valves. End water depth was 30 m.
The two inshore pipe lengths were partly installed within a 325-m-long cofferdam
in early June 2003, just before the start of the (June 15–September 15) tourist season,
when the beach and up to 300 m offshore from it are closed to construction activity.
Meanwhile, a nominal 2-m-deep trench (1-on-4 side slopes) was excavated
along a somewhat serpentine alignment that avoided rocky areas, zones with too
little sediment, and sets of artificial reefs. The idea was to have the pipe crown vir-
tually at the level of the natural seabed. The remaining 18 sections, including the
diffuser, were in place in November 2003, despite an October storm. The pipes were
installed by float and sink, with pumps at the shore end of the pipe.
Flexible concrete mattresses were placed over the laid pipe to protect from trawler
nets and boards, and this operation was complete by the end of January 2004. These
mats, measuring 7 ⫻ 3 m in plan, and laid seven at a time, were of two designs; 186
of them were 0.30 m thick and weighed 10.7 metric tons each, while 3,240 were
0.15 m thick and weighed 6.1 metric tons.
However, there is a connected story. Immediately after the diffuser was installed,
and before it could be mat-protected, one or more boats dragged their trawls over the
outfall. Web remnants were found hooked onto the pipe, and three outlets needed
repairs. Diver inspection of the diffuser, after mat placement, showed other nets
entangled in the mattresses but no outfall damage. As a result, to strongly dissuade
trawlers from working the area, 30 (20-metric ton) concrete blocks, each crossed by
three protruding steel H beams, were placed at random around the diffuser (Beken-
dam and Ottenheim 2005).
10.5 The Latest Polyethylene Outfalls

10.5.1 Some New Zealand Outfalls
A 400-km-long central stretch of the east coast of the South Island of New Zealand
has recently become a beehive of activity for marine outfalls. Four pipelines are
involved, and each involves the same Australasian marine contractor. At the time of
writing, two hybrid ones are under construction, the Tahuna outfall near Dunedin
and the Christchurch municipal outfall. Progress on these two projects appears in
sections 9.1.2 and 9.1.3. We sketch below the other two (completed) outfalls, made
entirely of HDPE.
10.5.2 Waimakariri, New Zealand

The Waimakariri River flows southeast for 151 km from the Southern Alps to its
mouth 13 km north of Christchurch. Four towns immediately north of the river
mouth, each with sewage disposal problems, decided to combine their efforts and
pipe their sewage to a single disposal point 2 km north of the Waimakariri River
outflow. The outfall at that location (No. 436 in Table A-1) would be 1,500 m long,
buried, and ending in 14 m of water. Pipe material would be HDPE, with a diam-
eter of 900 mm. The diffuser would have four 500-mm risers at 30-m spacing, each
topped with an eight-port head. Hole size would be 150 mm.
The trestle at Waimakariri was 280 m long. Two cranes traveled back and forth as
required. There was a walkway on the north side. The trench along the south side of
the trestle was up to 9 m deep. There was a 400-m-long sheet piled cofferdam across
the beach. The axis of this installation was south of the trestle centerline, and this
was the path of the surf zone and beach portions of the outfall. The pipe was fitted
with precast concrete weights at 7.2-m centers.
The outside part of the outfall was pulled into the water on the north side of
the trestle, and it was floated offshore for ultimate sinking into the 3-m-deep trench
and then backfilled. Articulated concrete scour mats were placed on top. The 1,376
deadweight tonne trailing suction split hopper dredger, used offshore, is owned by a
European company but has worked for many years off Australia and New Zealand.
The self-propelled vessel is roughly 63 m long, has a beam of approximately 11 m,
and has a hopper capacity of 965 m. Both her suction and discharge pipes have
diameters of 450 mm, and she can work in up to 20 m of water.
The outfall was commissioned in early June 2006.
10.5.3 Clandeboye, New Zealand

One of the world’s largest milk processing plants exists at Clandeboye, situated 25 km
northeast of Timaru and 4 km from the coast. Roughly 650 dairy farms, averaging
approximately 550 cows apiece, supply the facility with raw milk. When the com-
pany added a massive new milk powder drier, it had to dispose of the 18,000 m3/
day of residual liquid, using something beyond the irrigation of pastureland that it
had tried before. After much debate, the company received the go-ahead for the out-
fall from the permitting authorities. An experienced New Zealand consulting engi-
neering firm was the designer. The outfall (No. 437 in Table A-1) effectively began
at a surge chamber 150 m inland and then ran out 810 m, terminating in a diffuser
160 m long.
The contractor used a custom-built piling frame in building the trestle. Pipe
piles supported this structure. Double cross beams were used to link transverse pairs
of piles, and each bay also had a single intermediate cross beam. There was some
timber decking and a walkway on the north side. Pipe was placed within a double
sheet-pile wall along the south edge of the trestle.
The pipe was 900-mm-o.d. HDPE (SDR 26). Plant-supplied 12-m lengths were
butt-fused into varying lengths of 80–140 m. The singular feature of this outfall was
that it was not placed in a trench but was maintained roughly 1 m above the seabed.
Sixty-two permanent piles were driven at 10-m centers. These piles were topped by
concrete saddles. Immediately inshore of this stretch, the outfall passed through a
40-m-long protective sleeve, actually a bigger (1,000-mm-o.d.) HDPE buried pipe.
Although the contractor managed to complete the job over an interval of
12 months, it had to cope with the vagaries of nature: an unstable beach, storms,
huge swells, bitingly cold winds, and even snowfalls. The outfall was commissioned
in January 2007.
10.6 Installation Problems

10.6.1 Port Gardner Outfall, Washington
Everett is a city of 100,000 people located roughly 50 km north of Seattle, Washing-
ton, on Puget Sound. For $50 million, the city of Everett combined with a nearby
city (Marysville, population 30,000) and a major local producer of pulp and paper
in an effort to improve the marine environment in the area, save freshwater, extend
wastewater treatment, and install a better wastewater disposal system into adjacent
Port Gardner Bay. The mill started using the disposal system’s US$17 million outfall
(No. 426 in Table A-1) in April 2004. The two cities made relevant connections and
followed roughly six months later.
The joint outfall had a design capacity of 4.6 m3/s. Concrete pipe was used
onshore and (1,600-mm-o.d.) HDPE for the 1,432-m marine section, which had a
Z shape when seen in plan view. The furthest offshore leg was the 472-m-long dif-
fuser, which terminated in 107 m of water and had 80 (203-mm) diffuser outlets
with 127-mm orifices.
A 579-m length of the pipe was placed parallel to the shoreline through use of a
trestle originating on a mild coastal projection. The trestle was 411 m long and 7.3 m
wide, took six weeks to build, and was in place for six months. The structure was
topped with wide flange beams and timber mats. The sheet-pile cofferdam alongside
the shore side of the trestle was roughly 3.5 m wide. Clamshell excavation was made
difficult and was delayed when large concrete structures were encountered. The pipe
was heavily weighted with concrete collars.
A four-part 853-m length of pipe was flange-bolted together at a riverside site
adjacent to the mill. The waterway concerned was the Snohomish River, which borders
Everett on the north. The river is listed in the federal Clean Water Act as an impaired
water. It is also the focus of a multimillion-dollar effort to save chinook salmon and
bull trout, two fish species listed as threatened in the Puget Sound region under the
federal Endangered Species Act. Offshore construction projects must adhere to strict
rules concerning operations and must restrict such activity to certain seasonal win-
dows. Not only are animals protected, but also rooted plants such as eelgrass. Grinde
(2004) has listed the array of federal, state, city, and industrial signed documents
needed for this project: various permits; approvals, easements, and certificates; plus
an environmental impact review.
Early on September 12, 2003, the long pipe string was towed out of the Sno-
homish River mouth and into Port Gardner Bay. Large concrete anchors had
already been attached, one set at the inshore end off the trestle and the other at the
location of the intermediate bend location into the diffuser. The inshore end was
set in 24 m of water, and connections were made to a pump barge. The offshore
end was taken by a well-known U.S. West Coast 62-m salvage vessel (see section
6.2.3), and the pipe was configured on the water surface along the alignment. The
ship maintained 60–70 metric tons of tension on the line during the progressive
sinking from the inshore end. Flow was 0.13 m3/s, and the internal pipe air pres-
sure was monitored.
With three-quarters of the work done and five hours elapsed, the pipe broke
adjacent to a flange, apparently in the stub end fabrication rather than a fusion joint.
Some 640 m of pipe then lay on the seabed. A subsequent ROV inspection indicated
that this length appeared to be in place, right side up, and undamaged. The 48 dif-
fuser ports over this stretch were opened using the vehicle.
When the break occurred, the free end of the 213-m-long residual section sank.
However, the length was refloated and towed inshore, first to the vicinity of the
inshore trestle, and later to the riverside site used earlier. After inspection, planning
and design began on remedial measures, and in particular an appropriate mechani-
cal coupling. Some months later, in February 2004, the length was lowered from
barges, and later a diverless (ROV) connection was made using a steel repair sleeve
and grout bags to seal the joint. Again, the ROV opened the ports.
10.6.2 Coffs Harbour Outfall, New South Wales, Australia

Coffs Harbour is a delightful city some 400 km north of Sydney, New South Wales
(NSW). In March 1996, a committee was formed of NSW state and local repre-
sentatives to rethink sewage disposal for the area. The ultimate decision was that
tertiary-treated wastewater, in excess of the reuse demand (for sports fields and crop
irrigation), would be discharged 1.5 km offshore from (east of) Boambee Beach
in 20 m of water. The environmental impact statement also laid out several other
features: a pipe inside diameter of 900 mm; diffuser length of 180 m; and 36 elbow
risers, 5 m apart, with 100-mm-diam. openings. Pipe material was not identified, but
it became HDPE. The outfall (No. 421 in Table A-1) was subsequently built, despite
setbacks, and commissioned on March 11, 2005.
Construction work began in July 2003. Four months later, the first 150 m of
pipe was pulled through a culvert under the local coastal railway line. Pipe-jacking
was used through the dune. Installation of the 400-m-long construction trestle was
initiated, with completion on October 24, 2003, at a water depth of 6 m. Half of the
structure came from the Bunbury outfall site (No. 400 in Table A-1), and half was
made up locally. There were 50 pile bents, each pile embedded 8 m or more into the
sandy bottom. Two different vibrohammers were used. Pipe was ultimately laid off
the south side of the trestle. The north side featured a plank walkway.
The inshore outfall was laid in a limited-length sheet-pile cofferdam alongside
the trestle. Pipe-laying began in January 2004 at the offshore end, and the enclosure
was gradually moved shoreward. A crane on the trestle supported a strongback that
itself held up each doubly flanged laying length of pipe (apparently 18 m) fitted
with five concrete collars. Divers made the flange connections. The last pipe section
went into place on the beach in November 2004. A 20-m-long deaeration (pipe)
chamber later connected the land and inshore marine sections.
While the trestle-related work was progressing, other members of the contractor
team were dealing with the length of pipe to carry the effluent from a water depth
of 6 m to the diffuser, terminating in 20 m of water. At one time, the 84-m basic
lengths of pipe were stored at Corrambirra Point. Three 360-m-long pipe strings,
with weight collars attached, were made up, towed out, and then moored in the
harbor. This was the situation in early February 2004.
Large swells on the nights of February 25 and 26, possibly from developing
Tropical Cyclone Grace, caused two of the three pipe lengths to break free, and these
were driven onto the nearby beach. Fortunately, the pipes sustained no discernible
damage. The third pipe length was later intentionally sunk onto the harbor seabed
for protection. A suitable marine warning was posted.
A strong low-pressure system pushed south in early March and crossed the western
Coral Sea boundary at Hervey Bay, Queensland, late on March 5. Big swell ran out ahead
of the advancing storm, and a buoy off Stradbroke Island, approximately 300 km north
of Coffs Harbour, had a maximum wave height of 14.3 m the same day. That night,
swells to an estimated 6-m height entered the port at Coffs Harbour and went to work
on the crane barge that was to be used to pick up the pipes and join them together.
Three of the barge’s five anchor lines failed, and the craft was driven ashore and
the crane overturned on the harbor’s south breakwater. Heavy wave action on March
22 completed the destruction, and the contractor and its insurers decided that the
damage was sufficiently severe that the unit would be dismantled. This effort began
on August 9, 2004, with a predicted time to completion of four months. It should be
noted that the local council had itself insured the contractor’s risk.
On April 4, four heavy-lifting excavators were brought into the area for the pur-
pose of removing the two stranded pipes (with weight collars) from the beach, one
at a time. Four slings were placed under each pipe for the journey to the water. Both
of the salvaged pipe lengths were floated into position and then were scuttled to join
their third member on the bottom of the harbor. The date was April 21.
When favorable wind and sea conditions were forecast for June 26, the first har-
bor pipe length was raised and towed by three tugs to the end of the trestle and prop-
erly oriented. There it was again submerged, in this case along the chosen alignment
and 150 m within an excavated trench. The sinking operation took eight hours.
On August 27, the remaining pair of pipe lengths in the harbor was joined
underwater preparatory to towout and sinking. The operation for the outer 720 m
took place afterward. When this operation was completed, divers made careful mea-
surements on the gap. A makeup piece was fabricated in Melbourne and was then
installed on September 11, 2004.
References
“Antalya Outfall Sited by Satellite.” (1998). Tunnels and Tunnelling International, 30(7), 13.
Armstrong, L. J., et al. (1993). “Two Options for Disposal of Desalination Reject Water.” Con-
ference Proceedings Paper, Hydraulic Engineering (1993), H. W. Shen, et al., eds., ASCE,
New York, 2026–2031.
Atkinson, R. (1997). “The Fylde Coastal Waters Improvement Scheme.” Proceedings of the
Institution of Civil Engineers, Municipal Engineer, 121, 1–6.
Bekendam, H., and Ottenheim, E. (2005). “Montpellier Sea Outfall: Europe’s Longest Marine
PE Pipe Project.” Terra et Aqua, 101, 13–20.
Blomster, T. J., and Stanimirov, M. (2004). “Continuously Extruded Long Length Polyethylene
Pipes for Seawater Intakes and Marine Outfalls.” Desalination, 166, 275–286.
Brodrick, G. (1993). “Innovation at Green Point.” S.A. Construction World, December (1992)/
January, 22–27.
“Diversity of Disciplines on Pacesetting Pipeline Project.” (1983). S.A. Construction World,
December, 38–40.
Elliott, R. W. (1997). “Town Builds Wastewater System from Scratch.” Public Works, 128(3),
34–36.
Grace, R. A. (2005). “Marine Outfall Performance. II: Stability and Case Studies.” J. Perf. of
Constr. Fac., 19(4), 359–369.
Grinde, E. (2004). “K-C Completes Unique Deep Water Outfall Project with Local Cities.” Pulp
and Paper, 78(9), 45–50.
Jackson, L. A. (1983). “Design and Construction of 1,000 mm Dia. Polyethylene Effluent
Outfall 1,400 m Across the Southport Broadwater.” Preprints of the Sixth Australian Confer-
ence on Coastal and Ocean Engineering, Brisbane, July, Institution of Engineers Australia,
Canberra, Australia, 117–121.
Jackson, L. A. (1984). “Large Diameter Polyethylene Submarine Outfalls.” Conference Pro-
ceedings Paper, Coastal Engineering (1984), B. L. Edge, ed., ASCE, New York, 3148–3156.
Oliver, A. (1995). “Silent Treatment.” New Civil Engineer, 1125, 32–33.
Prendergast, J. (1992). “The Desalination Situation.” Civ. Engrg., 62(8), 42–44.
Ramos, P., et al. (2001). “Monitoring an Ocean Outfall Using an AUV.” Oceans 2001, Confer-
ence Proceedings, Honolulu, Hawaii, Nov., Marine Technology Society, Columbia, Md.,
2009–2014.
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Freeport, Texas.” Oc. Engrg., 8, 407–419.
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Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Civil Engineering, 132, 36–44.
Roberts, P. J. W., and Toms, G. (1988). “Ocean Outfall System for Dense and Buoyant Efflu-
ents.” J. Envir. Engrg., 114(5), 1175–1191.
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California.” Coastal Ocean Space Utilization II, Long Beach, Calif., April, University of
Southern California, Sea Grant Program, Los Angeles, 431–440.
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11
Unusual Outfalls
11.1 Techniques from the Gas and Oil Industry

11.1.1 An Array of Approaches
Countless kilometers of submarine pipeline have been placed by the gas and oil
industry on the seabed of the world oceans (Palmer and King 2004). A common
technique for installing such pipes has been the bottom-pull method, which we
have already detailed for outfalls in Chapter 4. Further sources of reference on this
technique are Anderson (1972), Mousselli and Pospishil (1984), and Hughes and
Gibbons (2005). The last is a particularly informative paper.
In this chapter, we first consider two other approaches drawn from the offshore
gas and oil industry, namely lay barge and reel barge (Smith 1981; “Long” 1988).
These two techniques are not common for outfalls, but they have in fact been used
on occasion. Included with the discussion of reel barges (Lumpkin 1985) is yet
another approach borrowed from the offshore gas and oil industry, namely the plac-
ing of the pipe in a trench after laying.
An excellent short report on post-trenching of submarine pipelines, with pho-
tographs, is an early paper by Schwartz (1971). Other pertinent material appears
in the following: Brown 1980; “Plough” 1985; Reece and Reece 1985; Brown and
Luynenburg 1987; “HAM” 1994.
11.1.2 The Lay Barge

The lay barge is a floating platform that is large enough both for storage of separate
pipe sections and for the joining of a new pipe length to the back end of the pipeline
being fed into the water over a “stinger.” The lay barge’s winches slowly advance the
vessel against its anchors. The pipe being laid adopts an essential S curve as it extends
237
down through the water column to the seabed. The method is detailed in the mile-
stone book of Gerwick (1986).
The same contractor installed the (Scottish) Aberdour Silversands (No. 250 in
Table A-1) and the (English) Upper Pyewipe (No. 251 in Table A-1) HDPE outfalls
off the same small stinger mounted on the same spud barge. The stinger had neo-
prene rollers throughout its length. There was a butt-fusion station on board and
a holdback winch. The Scottish project took from October 1991 to February 1992,
while the English task lasted from June to November 1992. The latter was delayed,
first, because the initial 600-m length was in the intertidal zone, and second, because
the bottom of the trench was filled each tidal cycle with a layer of soft mud, jeopar-
dizing the stability of the installed but not backfilled line.
11.1.3 La Trinité, Galion Bay, Martinique

Martinique is an island on the eastern edge of the Caribbean Sea. Location is
14°40⬘N, 61°00⬘W. The land area is 1,100 square km, the length of coastline is
369 km, and the population is between 400,000 and 450,000 people. The town
of La Trinité is on the northeast-facing coast, and in 1998 a French contractor won
the design–build contract for the community’s outfall (No. 346 in Table A-1). An
onshore pipe length of 1,700 m was involved, connected to a 2,000-m-long offshore
portion. Pipe material was HDPE, and its size was 315 mm. Pipe arrived in Marti-
nique in shipping containers. Boltable-half concrete rings each provided 800 N of
discrete stability.
A trench through the beach was dug by a land-based long-reach excavator. A
clamshell bucket was used offshore for the same purpose. The crane occupied space
on the forward part of a 50 ⫻ 14 m barge with a stinger over its stern. The first part
of the outfall, pulled ashore, had no weights. Thereafter, as 24-m lengths of new pipe
were added by butt-fusion onto the end of the line being launched, weights were in
place. On the barge, these weights rested on little wheeled dollies that moved along
a primitive railway track toward the stinger.
After 406-mm tubular piles were vibro-driven into the seabed, the diffuser was
set in place and secured to them by divers. Diffuser length was 36 m, and flow exited
through wall ports.
11.2 Small-Diameter Flexible Pipe from a Reel Barge

11.2.1 Aldeburgh Outfall, Suffolk, England
Small-diameter flexible piping for offshore use has periodic application in the gas
and oil industry but is rare for outfalls. Such pipe, apparently made by only three
manufacturers worldwide, is expensive. Outfall use would seem to be restricted
to short lengths, and of course, small flows. Such piping is placed on a giant reel
mounted either vertically or horizontally on a special offshore vessel.
The outfall at Aldeburgh (No. 77 in Table A-1) was a multilayer flexible conduit
with steel armoring within the wall and HDPE on the inside (Davis 1980). The
Unusual Outfalls 239
inside diameter was 202 mm and the outside diameter, 259 mm. The sewage-filled
line was negatively buoyant at 353 N/m. A flexible conduit at this location had merit
because of the historically variable seabed profile in the area and because of the exis-
tence of a web of submarine communication cables.
Before pipe unspooling began, a “dead man” was set on the seabed. A 2-m-high
precast concrete cone was lowered and jetted into place. The vessel moved a plotted
course toward the shore, paying out pipe, until a water depth of about 4 m, when
the ship turned parallel to the coastline. Enough pipe was laid out in that direction
to ultimately reach the shore, and the pipe was cut on board. Air bags were added.
A flotilla of small boats moved the pipe end close enough to the shoreline that a
land-based crane and bulldozer could take over. In time, the end of the pipe was fed
through a hole in the seawall, and its beach portion was permanently sheltered in a
small cofferdam driven across the strand.
This was an unusual case (for outfalls) of the trench being prepared after the
pipe had been laid on the seabed. A sledge traversed the bottom using the pipe
as a guide. High-pressure water guns and air jets on the sledge carved out a suit-
able trench, into which the pipe sagged. The sledge was served by a pontoon barge
on the water surface. This operation took five weeks, rather than the planned five
days, because of sustained intervals of strong easterly winds. To add to the problems,
roughly a meter of seabed sand was removed during a gale that occurred just as the
trenching was getting underway. The trencher had to be adapted to the relatively
solid new (clay) bottom conditions.
11.2.2 Dunbar Outfall, Scotland

Dunbar is on the North Sea coast of Scotland, at 56°00⬘ north latitude. This outfall
installation (No. 215 in Table A-1) also involved flexible pipe that was laid from a
reel barge. The cross-sectional dimensions of the multilayer pipe were outside diam-
eter of 260 mm and inside diameter of 206 mm. The pipe had an inner HDPE
liner 9 mm thick, then various layers, including a pair with steel wire armoring, and
finally a 6-mm-thick external HDPE sheath. The outfall trunk was 1,980 m long,
with the diffuser adding on a further 22 m. The approximate water depths at the dif-
fuser could range from roughly 9 m at low tide to 14 m at high tide.
The main contractor was the (Danish) pipe manufacturer that brought the pipe
to the site and laid it. A subcontractor (English) did the trench excavation, pipe
burial, diffuser assembly, and placement. The lay barge was towed to the site (from a
job in Iceland) by a powerful tug, arriving on July 27, 1989. Extraordinarily, this ves-
sel has the capability of carrying 9.5 km of the size of flexible pipe used at Dunbar.
There had been much concern and detailed hydraulic studies related to the
design of the Dunbar diffuser. I am always struck by the level of concern over what
really is a secondary matter, namely the theoretical dilution of the effluent. It is so
much more difficult to build an outfall than to analyze the flow out of it.
The outfall’s zero chainage started on land and continued seaward 40 m to a
stone seawall. Then there were 260 m of protected salt marsh, including a river cross-
ing 12 m wide, followed by 420 m of beach to the low-water mark. Some 1,260 m
of true submarine pipe followed; the last 960 m of this was on a nominal 1-on-200
downslope. Seabed sampling and inspection showed a mainly sandy gravelly bot-
tom, with a few areas of cobbles.
After a day of preparations, including setting up anchor points, placing buoys,
and checking the positioning system, laying commenced on August 2. The pipe was
unwound from the turntable drum, passed through a system of rollers, then round
the laying wheel and off the stern of the barge through the “trumpet” (or funnel)
and down to the seabed. The initial 800 m took roughly three hours to lay out, with
continual adjustment of the laying position to allow for wind and tide. In some
cases, pipe was wound back onto the reel. In time, the end of the pipe was moved
ashore by a small workboat.
In the interim, a steel cable had been run across the beach, and in time divers con-
nected this line to the end of the (empty) pipe in shallow water. Air bags were attached
to the pipe, and the nonsubmarine portion of the line was towed up the shore using a
system of more than 100 rollers. We will not detail the considerable effort involved in
placing and protecting the part of the pipe shoreward of the low-tide line.
The last of the pipe was set out when the laying vessel pulled itself seaward on its
anchor lines. After slow overnight filling, the pipe was cut on the laying vessel and a
flange was attached to ultimately mate with the diffuser assembly. The series of layers
in the pipe rendered this operation far from trivial. Water was added to that already
in the pipe, and a 25-bar pressure test was conducted and held for four hours. After
the successful completion of this test, the end of the pipe was lowered to the seabed
and fixed to a temporary two-metric ton concrete anchor block. The laying vessel
then departed for its home port.
An airlift was used at the diffuser site to excavate an 18-m-diam. depression
about 1 m deep, the elevation of a layer of stiff clay. A bottom-dump hopper barge
was used to deposit rock in this depression, and a crane barge then arrived on site
and tailored the rock surface (or “scour mat”) using its rock grab.
Meanwhile, the diffuser pipe work was being prepared. The basic pipe was
100-mm-diam. steel with an 11-mm wall and a fusion-bonded epoxy (FBE) coating.
To protect the FBE from rough handling and seafloor abrasion, there were two over-
wraps—first PVC tape, then plastic mesh. Aluminum alloy sacrificial anodes were
affixed to the pipe work in certain locations, as well as to the domes that protected
each of the three outlets. After the diffuser system was lowered and settled on the
scour mat, 20-mm gravel was spread around the site and then followed by 300-mm
armor rock. A marker buoy was eventually planted.
The subcontractor had fabricated its own pipe burial machine based on the
design of other such systems built in the past. As with many prototypes, the system
did not work perfectly. Problems occurred with the hydraulic cutter head, hoses, and
the on-board hydraulic power pack. An electric pump replacement still did not work
well. Occasional appearances of hard sandstone did not help matters.
It was fortunate that the nature of the seabed was such that simple airlifts could
be used. This mode of sediment removal was used along the sides of the pipe, and in
the end the airlifts lowered and covered the pipe according to specifications. In some
cases where rock cropped out, sandbags were placed under the pipe.
It was decided during the installation to provide still more negative buoyancy
for the pipe. Precast concrete saddles, each weighing two-thirds of a tonne, were
added by divers every 10 m through the use of air-filled lift bags.
11.2.3 North Berwick and South Queensferry Outfalls, Scotland

These installations are located in eastern Scotland’s Firth of Forth, the former at
the mouth and the latter well inside. Each of these outfalls was a two-pipe arrange-
ment, and both were laid from the same manufacturer-supplied reel barge in a joint
operation that took place between March and November of 1990. In both locations,
the steel-armored HDPE lines had an inside diameter of 200 mm and an outside
diameter of 270 mm. Each of the pair of lines at North Berwick (No. 228 in Table
A-1) was 1,600 m long; at South Queensferry (No. 229 in Table A-1), the distance
was 750 m.
Trench excavation was done by a backhoe dredger and a 600 m3 split hopper
barge. Another vessel dumped the 50–100-mm gravel used as backfill filter material
and the 150–500-mm top rock used as armor. Nominal pipe cover was 1 m.
Each of the four pipes was laid in its trench in one continuous string. The reel
was mounted vertically. Buoyancy units were added before a part of the pipe left
the stern.
The pipe cross section is divided into nine zones, some of which are further
subdivided. The 9-mm-thick inner lining is HDPE, whereas the external sheath is
MDPE, taking the outside diameter to 274 mm. The inside diameter is 202 mm. Two
of the (6-mm-thick) zones between have galvanized steel wires wound in opposite
directions.
The empty pipe has a total weight of 716 N/m. It is negatively buoyant in seawater
because the displaced weight of liquid for a fully immersed condition is 596 N/m.
11.3 Outfalls in Remote Locations

11.3.1 Introduction
There are small outfalls installed in little backwaters with challenging conditions,
strange developments, and limited access to modern methods and big plant. The
Yap Lagoon outfall extension (No. 110 in Table A-1), on a steep slope in the middle
of the North Pacific Ocean, was of that type, with much of the job done on the fly
and with a convicted murderer out of jail to work his shifts. But we will focus here
on several pipes installed in the frontier state of the United States, starting with one
in southeast Alaska.
The city of Angoon is situated on a narrow spit on the southwest side of Admi-
ralty Island at north latitude 57°30⬘. The community was occupied by native Tlingits
before the arrival of the Russian fur traders, and 95 percent of the modern popula-
tion of about 700 people is of that extraction.
A broken outfall and treatment works in disrepair demanded changes. A 301(h)
waiver was granted in June 1996. A new outfall was designed of ductile iron on shore
(80 m) and HDPE in the water. The size of the HDPE part was 200 mm (SDR 11)
roughly 300 m long.
There was no suitable shoreline assembly area close to the site, so the pipe was
fully put together some 5 km away and towed to Angoon. This trip was rendered
slow because of abundant kelp. Inner-tube floats supported the pipe, which had its
concrete collars in place. These “doughnuts” each weighed 1.75 kN, and they were
placed at 3-m centers.
Kelp also had to be cut away along the alignment. Also, a tidal window was
required. The shore end of the pipe was chained to the boom of an excavator. Three
boats in radio contact were involved in the laying operation, one large one doing the
towing and the other two controlling alignment laterally. At slack tide, the excavator
pulled the slack from the outfall and a flange connection was made to the sea end of
the ductile iron shore pipe.
Final positioning of the pipe was made, and the inner tubes were quickly dis-
carded in sequence, either by puncturing them or by cutting the tie ropes. A diver
confirmed that the pipe was set within 2 m of the centerline of a 6-m-wide right of
way. Construction cost was US$87,000.
11.3.2 The St. Paul Outfall, Pribilof Islands, Alaska

The five volcanic Pribilof Islands are centered at roughly 57°N, 170°W in the Ber-
ing Sea, “in the middle of nowhere,” the place of ultimate storms. These isolated
pieces of land were discovered by the Russians in 1786. The two main islands are
St. Paul (114 km2) and St. George (92 km2), and they are separated by some 64 km
of open sea. Apart from extreme isolation, the Pribilofs are best known for abomi-
nable weather and numbers of fur seals. In the latter regard, some 1.3–1.4 million
northern fur seals migrate to the islands each year for breeding and pupping.
Shorefast ice forms in late December or January and persists, usually until April.
There is also plentiful moving ice during these times. The weather window for the
islands is usually three to four weeks long, starting in early May. For many years,
there were no port facilities for ships and barges bringing in supplies, and offloading
had to be done by lighter.
St. Paul is a small native village on a narrow peninsula on the southern tip of the
island of the same name. The local seabed is sand and gravel near shore. At roughly
the mean lower low water (MLLW) level, a field of interlocked 0.3 to 0.9-m boulders
appears and increases in size in a seaward direction. Also, kelp starts growing at
roughly the MLLW mark and becomes more prolific with distance offshore.
This outfall (No. 186 in Table A-1) is 270 m long. The pipe is ductile iron with
possible off-angle joints so as to zigzag through the boulder field. The maximum
misalignment at any joint is 15°. The outside diameter is 230 mm, and the wall
thickness 14 mm. The pipe is stabilized with 457-mm ductile iron pipe halves bolted
together longitudinally. Near shore these pipe halves were placed every 6 m; at the
end of the pipe, there were six per 6 m.
Installation required extreme tides and calm weather. In July 1986, an attempt
was made to place the weighted outfall using a raft system of timber and large inner
tubes. A bulldozer pushed from shore while a barge pulled from the sea. After two
days and 165 m of pipe laid, a storm destroyed the raft system and ended installa-
tion attempts for that year (Hopson and Lahr 1987).
A new method, using divers in close proximity to frolicking sea lions, was put
into practice in June 1987. This operation involved sequentially floating 17 (6.1-m)
sections offshore under air-filled lift bags, then pulling each section “home” using
a shore-based bulldozer pulling on a cable threaded through the already laid pipe.
Using this method, the outfall was completed in five days. Zinc anodes were added.
Unfortunately, by mid-September 1989, the outfall was broken at two joints, appar-
ently the victim of a dragged ship anchor. The St. Paul pipe was still out of service
in 2008. In the interim, the sewer line had been connected to the outlet from a
seafood processor.
11.3.3 The St. George Town No. 1 Outfall, Pribilof Islands, Alaska
St. George Island had a 1990 population of 138. The town of St. George is located on
the northeast shore of the island of the same name. The seabed in this area is swept-
clean bedrock, and a completely different form of stabilization was done for this
town’s outfall than that practiced at St. Paul. The 100-m-long pipe (No. 170 in Table
A-1) was in service in the spring of 1986. Material was ductile iron, with an outside
diameter of 175 mm and a wall thickness of 13 mm. From MLLW to mean higher
high water (MHHW), this pipe was placed in a trench and concreted over.
A cable-block system was set up to handle the offshore pipe. This arrangement
was attached to rock bolts set in the bottom seaward of the ultimate end of the pipe.
Pulling onshore was done by a tractor. Pipe floatout made use of truck inner tubes,
and the pipe was then dropped to the seabed. Pipe stabilization was accomplished
(by commercial divers) by using stud pairs roughly at 1.8-m stations. The holes
drilled in the seabed were approximately 660 mm deep and 44 mm in diameter.
Commercial spin-lock rock bolts (25 mm) were inserted, expanded, and grouted in
place. A stud roughly 250 mm high (above the bottom) allowed for attachment of
nuts and the chain (within a length of hose) that passed over the top of the pipe.
11.3.4 The St. George Industrial Outfall, Pribilof Islands, Alaska

A heavily protected St. George Island harbor was gradually created on the south
coast and completed in 1993. Supply boats would no longer be forced to use
lighters. Also, the harbor would provide haven, in part, for commercial crab boats
plying the perilous Bering Sea, as well as offloading facilities for a local crab pro-
cessing plant.
An outfall (No. 206 in Table A-1) for the crab processing facility had to be put
in place, and partial federal funding depended on completion of the task by the
end of 1989. Preparations had been going on during the summers of 1986 through
1988, and although the 120-m-long pipe had been put together and laid out along
the single road, it had not been put into the water, partly because of the death of the
main diver involved. The outfall was to be 270-mm steel drill casing with screwed
connections.
After the tanker Exxon Valdez went aground in March 1989 and dumped most
of its crude oil, most Alaska-based mariners were busy with cleanup operations in
Prince William Sound. For that reason, two Hawaii-based commercial diving broth-
ers whom I know were asked to install this crab-waste industrial outfall in mid-July
1989. Because of time constraints, they would have to do this planning and work
sight unseen and would have the assistance of only one other individual, a sometime
calm-water scuba diver still left on the island. The brothers would have to display
multiple talents to serve as negotiators, divers, dive tenders, laborers, mechanics,
equipment operators, “powder men,” and welders.
There were no proper plans. Based on what he learned from the consulting engi-
neering firm concerned, as well as from the city manager, both based in Anchorage,
the older brother shopped in Alaska’s largest city for what he imagined they would
need: an air-diving compressor; dry suits; drills; allthread; nuts; grout; and warm work
clothes. They rented a pneumatic rock drill and bits.
Foggy weather is the Pribilofs’ norm during the summer months, and regu-
lar twice-a-week visual-flight-rules passenger flights from Dutch Harbor were cur-
tailed. The brothers had to charter (for $2,300) their own plane, and a hole in the
fog allowed them to land on St. George, the first passenger flight in 21 days. They
brought much of their equipment with them, including dive gear and the air com-
pressor, and other needed items reached the island separately in a DC-3 freight plane
that also managed to land. The runway was a widened part of the road. A truck with
flashing lights blocked off each end of the strip so that there would be no interfering
local traffic.
What the brothers didn’t have they had to scrounge on the island: a pickup
truck, a backhoe, a dump truck, welding equipment, and a work (fishing) boat. In
city warehouses, they found buoys, rope, chain, cable, and a snatch block. The broth-
ers tack-welded the pipe joints and welded padeyes onto the offshore end (for tow-
ing) and to each coupling (for buoys). With dynamite borrowed from the nearby
harbor project, they flattened an unexpected back-of-the-beach 2-m drop off to cre-
ate a ramp for pipe installation in line with the road. Also, with explosives they took
the high points off the nearshore underwater route for the pipe. Before blasting,
they endeavored to scare off the many seals by shooting over their heads with a rifle.
No Alaska Department of Fish and Game representatives were there. There were no
inspectors and no one representing the consultants. Using scuba and knives, they cut
back the extensive kelp growing along the route.
They borrowed a crane and drove it 8 km from the yard to the pipe site. With a
borrowed front-end loader and dump truck, they moved rock from a quarry to the
beach and built a crane pad. The crane was required to swing into the water a large,
heavy discarded sprocket that would be placed off the end of the line to serve as a
deadman during the pullout of the pipe. The sprocket was placed in enough water
that air-filled lift bags could be attached and then inflated.
Using a 5.8-m-long skiff belonging to the local helper, they towed out and then
dropped the big sprocket, which had been fitted with the snatch block. They couldn’t
use the city launch because it was out of service for an oil change. The brothers ran a
wire through the block and brought both ends up onto the beach.
One end of the tow cable was shackled to the terminal eye in the pipe. The other
end was attached to the pull arrangement, namely the loader towing the dump truck.
The brothers drove these two vehicles while the local man remained on the beach to
flag the end of the pull. Once the pipe was in position, the buoys were removed. End
water depth was about 3 m.
The local air compressor had flat tires and a dead battery when they arrived. The
brothers got the system working and moved it to the beach to provide air for the drill.
With their own dive compressor also sitting on the shore, and carrying much lead for
stability, they drilled the uneven rock seabed alongside the pipe and later placed the
threaded rods. The brothers had welded together a steel box template to set over the
pipe and hold the drill. Holes were 51 mm in diameter and roughly 0.6 m deep.
Wave surge frequently buffeted the divers, and the local man was amazed that
the Hawaii men (both experienced body surfers) could work in such conditions. It
was a great help that the onshore tender was able to warn the diver to hold onto
something whenever a wave set was looming outside.
Because of the coldness of the water, they couldn’t use epoxy for these 32-mm-
diam. studs but used nonshrink grout in the 51-mm holes. Sand for the mix they
obtained from a thin shallow-water deposit in the vicinity. Once the grout had cured,
a doubly burned straight steel plate, 25 mm thick and about 150 mm wide, extended
horizontally between the studs (over the pipe) and held the pipe down when the
nuts were placed and tightened.
The job was complete in mid-September 1989; it had taken overall a month and
a half but with many days off because of heavy weather. The brothers revisited the
site a year later and found that the winter ice had pushed the pipe somewhat side-
ways and laid over some of the studs. Thus the brothers drilled some more holes,
placed some more studs, and further secured the outfall.
11.4 Novel Designs: The Americas

11.4.1 Suffolk County Outfall, Long Island, New York
For this outfall (No. 71 in Table A-1), notice regarding the availability of prelimi-
nary drawings for purchase by interested marine contractors was first published in
late 1975. The August 11, 1977, issue of Engineering News-Record contained an offi-
cial bid proposal that had three pipe options: build the entirety of the line; install
the 4.3-km-long back bay and beach crossing portion; or construct the 5.6-km-long
marine segment. The possible pipes were single 1,829-mm prestressed concrete cyl-
inder pipe or 1,829-mm steel, or else twin 1,372-mm steel. The final arrangement
was separate back bay and marine contracts, using the single 1,829-mm-diam. steel
pipe for the US$28.4 million ocean part (“Steel” 1978). We will not deal with the
back bay portion.
Fourteen delivered 12.2-m-long pipe sections were welded together to make
strings roughly 171 m long. Each pipe was spray-coated with 152 mm of concrete
weight coat (CWC) over a layer of coal tar epoxy with a wrap of fiberglass-reinforced
roofing paper. Spherical steel buoys were strapped onto the crown of the pipe at
approximately 3-m spacing.
Each doubly capped string was launched down a special 252-m-long ramp at
high tide. As a tugboat advanced the line, a diver cut away the attached rollers, which
were ultimately returned to the yard. The length of surface tow from the launching
location to the worksite was roughly 80 km. At the worksite, roughly half of the
buoys were cut free to allow the string to sink slowly into the trench, which was
approximately 4.6 m deep and 4.3 m wide. Sandbags were placed every 23 m, and
a cable was attached to hold the string in place before proper backfilling. However,
in late 1978, one of these lengths actually escaped and, barely awash, drifted 32 km
over five days before recovery by the contractor (“FBI” 1978).
The usual procedure for a new string was to use hydraulic jacks to move its shore
end to within 0.3 m of the sea end of the already laid line. Divers assisted makeup
of the bell and spigot joint.
The outfall ended in a 1,060-m-long stepped diffuser whose end pipe size was
914 mm. The bearing of the diffuser was roughly 219.5°, compared to 184.5° for the
pipe trunk. End water depth was approximately 18 m.
11.4.2 Clover Point Extension No. 2 Outfall,

British Columbia, Canada
The ill-fated attempt to install the plastic Clover Point No. 1 outfall extension is
described in section 12.7.1. The redesign by a new consultant resulted in a 1,067-
mm-diam. steel outfall, with 76–102 mm of gunite CWC, for Clover Point No. 2
(No. 75 in Table A-1). This pipe extension would be 878 m long, extending from a
water depth of 14 m to termination in 67 m of turbulent water. Because of the nature
of the bottom (chiefly dense shell hash), the decision was reached not to trench the
pipe. Stability in the face of strong currents and protection from ship-dragged gear
would be achieved through the placing of 150-mm-median (300-mm maximum)
ballast stone topped with armor rock. Both sizes were obtained locally.
The winning contractor (not the low bidder) brought to the site the oft-used
Davy Crockett as its work barge. Work planning involved spurts of activity during
slack tide, but the timing didn’t always work out. The installation interval lasted from
August through November 1980, and the weather was good. Welded pipe strings of
49 m were brought in by barge from Vancouver, 135 km away by water. The basic
steel pipe came cheap, rejected from use in the Alberta oil fields by factors such as
nonsquare ends. Corrosion protection involved coal tar enamel inside and out, with
the later placement of sacrificial anodes and a future plan for possible impressed
current protection.
Four slings supported the pipe lengths lowered from the ship, and control for
the descent came from a complex system of cables and tugger winches on board the
vessel. A heavy pipe on the seabed acted as a deadman. A hydraulic unit undid the
shackles. There was considerable bridging of the 49-m sections along the uneven
bottom and two bad cantilever ends.
Once a pipe string was on the bottom, construction divers were lowered in a
one-atmosphere two-person horseshoe-shaped diving bell to direct final pipe adjust-
ments so that hard-hat divers could descend and (stainless steel) bolt the lengths
together. The bell divers also gave instructions in placement of the end of the tremie
pipe that brought down the ballast rock. Pipe placement and deposition of ballast
stone proceeded hand in hand. On occasion, a representative of the designer used
the bell for inspection purposes. The regular inspectors were loath to use the cham-
ber. There were also diver-held cameras and one mounted on the bell.
Placement of armor rock came late, during a two- to three-week period. The
armor rock ranged generally from 0.3 to 1.2 m in size, with the maximum 1.5 m.
This rock was not applied along the roughly 210 m of diffuser whose inner end was
in a water depth of 60 m. The diffuser had crown-mounted elbows for wastewater
discharge and terminated in a flap gate. The outlets proved to be a nightmare during
the late stages of construction because of the snagging of cables.
The construction contract was worth C$4.0 million. There were some claims for
more money. The main ship derrick failed after the last pipe was laid.
11.4.3 Kenai Outfall, Alaska

The small city of Kenai is on the eastern shore of Cook Inlet, beside the Kenai River.
This waterway is one of central Alaska’s major sockeye salmon producers, and the
summer traffic of fishing boats and tenders is very heavy. As a matter of interest, I
was involved in that industry at Kenai during the record run in 1978. In the spring,
the Kenai River carries seaward great chunks of ice from the interior. The wastewater
treatment plant (WWTP) at Kenai sits on the north bank at the river mouth. The
previous outfall, extending south into the mouth of the river, had been damaged by
ice and heavy boat traffic, and the idea in this case was to extend the pipe directly
westward onto the tidal flat.
Regulatory authorities wanted the pipe (No. 82 in Table A-1) to extend to the
very edge of the tidal flat, but they relaxed that stipulation when such a plan was
shown to be extraordinarily expensive. The agreed-upon location on the tidal flat
typifies the problem of not enough sustained water depth for heavy floating plant
and not enough long-time bared ground for ponderous land-based equipment. The
best approach is lightning-fast forays by the contractor.
The summer 1981 construction of the outfall is briefly described by Leman and
Rybel (1983). To give a rough idea of the rush of water in and out with the tides at
that time, I have consulted tide tables for the month of July 1981 (Table 11-1). There
is a nominal 6-h, 13-min interval between successive highs and lows.
11.4.4 Chevron Refinery Outfall Extension,

Carquinez Strait, California
California state regulatory authorities required this San Francisco area refinery to
install a new outfall by July 1, 1987. On January 28, 1987, the following abridged
paragraph led off Public Notice No. 16277E52 of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Table 11.1. Kenai River Entrance Tides, July 1981

Day Low (m) High (m) Low (m) High (m) Low (m)
1 7.19 ⫺1.37 6.61 0.52

2 7.31 ⫺1.49 6.74 0.43
3 7.25 ⫺1.40 6.74 0.49
4 7.04 ⫺1.13 6.61 0.64
5 6.67 ⫺0.70 6.40 0.85
6 6.19 ⫺0.18 6.13
7 1.13 5.67 0.37 5.85
8 1.34 5.18 0.91 5.61
9 1.49 4.82 1.40 5.46
10 1.49 4.60 1.77 5.39
11 1.31 4.63 1.95 5.46
12 1.04 4.85 1.95 5.64
13 0.70 5.15 1.83 5.85
14 0.37 5.46 1.65
15 6.13 0.03 5.76 1.46
16 6.37 ⫺0.24 6.00 1.25
17 6.58 ⫺0.46 6.19 1.10
18 6.70 ⫺0.58 6.31 0.97
19 6.71 ⫺0.58 6.37 0.91
20 6.58 ⫺0.49 6.34 0.88
21 6.37 ⫺0.24 6.28 0.88
22 6.03 0.12 6.22
23 0.91 5.67 0.55 6.13
24 0.91 5.30 1.01 6.03
25 0.82 5.12 1.34 6.07
26 0.55 5.15 1.49 6.19
27 0.12 5.46 1.40 6.43
28 ⫺0.34 5.85 1.16
29 6.74 ⫺0.73 6.28 0.88
30 7.01 ⫺1.01 6.58 0.61
31 7.16 ⫺1.13 6.80 0.43
Source: Derived from Seldovia predictions by accepted correction factors for size and timing
(NOAA).
San Francisco District, California. “Chevron U.S.A. . . . has applied to the Dept. of
the Army for authorization to construct a deepwater outfall for the treated refinery
process water, at their Richmond Refinery, San Pablo Bay. . . . This application is
being processed pursuant to the provisions of Sect. 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403) and Sect. 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344).”
There followed paragraphs on the purpose and design of the pipeline, as well as
planned construction activities, including dredging. Nine drawings and a table were
included. Other permit requirements were outlined. Impacts of the project were
assessed briefly, and the public was asked to submit comments in writing before
February 28, 1987. This input could include a request for a public hearing and could
lead to the preparation of a formal environmental impact statement.
The completely buried line would extend a distance of 2,213 m into San Pablo
Bay, traversing a levee, a small boat harbor, shallow-water mud flats, and finally
reaching water deeper than 3 m over the last 300 m of the line. The diffuser was to
terminate in 17 m of water adjacent to a ship channel. The diffuser featured 23 ver-
tical 203-mm-diam. PVC risers extending up through the backfill and topped with
tees having 76-mm-diam. nozzles.
The 12-m-long lengths of welded steel pipe came from a Canadian mill and
were furnished by the owner. The outside diameter was 914 mm, and the wall
thickness was 9.5 mm. The interior mortar lining and coal tar coating were both
applied by a local company, and another area firm used a portable plant for the
application of the concrete weight coat. The completed pipe weighed an average
of 9.6 kN/m in air.
The contractor had to dredge a 30-m-wide access channel through the mud flats
simply to excavate the pipe trench. Over a one-month period, some 150,000 m3 of
material was removed and then dumped at a designated disposal site near Alcatraz
Island.
Because of restrictions on available land, the contractor was forced to build a
curved launch way that followed a 610-m radius before reaching the desired align-
ment. The platform allowed assembly of pipe strings up to 165 m long, requiring
13 tie-in welds.
Measurements on the pipe revealed that there was abnormally high water
absorption by the CWC, almost 10% of the concrete weight. The contractor rea-
soned that because of the heavy pipe, the mud flats, and the long curves, a traditional
bottom-pull would not be practical. Investigations indicated that the pipe could be
forced into the required curves if it was buoyed (by oil drums strapped in place),
thus floating, and if pairs of guide piles could be driven into the bottom at appropri-
ate stations to maintain pipe alignment.
The outfall was pushed out through use of a large backhoe walking alongside
with a wire rope choker around the pipe. The diffuser was troublesome, trying to roll
because of the in-place riser stubs. Guide pile pair No. 3 was reached on May 28,
1987, and guide pile pair No. 13, on June 1, 1987. Once deeper water was encoun-
tered, the leading end was submerged. This step was done mainly to avoid the heavy
currents in the vicinity of the ship channel. Bottom-pulling was then instituted in
concert with the pushing from shore.
During the final stages of installation, and 55 m short of the target, the front
end of the outfall dug into the bottom. The owner directed the contractor to remove
all auxiliary buoyancy and let the line sink. This would be the final position. Dredg-
ing was done by clamshell and 406-mm airlift. The diffuser was raised and set back
down on bedding stone, and the riser and outflow devices were installed by divers.
The installation was complete on June 26, 1987, beating the deadline by less than
a week.
Photographic coverage of this project is provided by Figs. 11-1 through 11-3.
11.5 Novel Designs: Europe

11.5.1 Arbroath Outfall, Scotland
Arbroath is a city of population 21,000 lying on the east coast of Scotland, facing the
North Sea at latitude 56°34⬘N. Cockburn (1982) has provided information on this
community’s outfall (No. 107 in Table A-1), where the £1.6 million construction
contract was let in late 1979. The 945-m-long steel conduit, including the diffuser,
extends out to a water depth of 14 m. Pipe inside diameter is 889 mm, and wall
thickness is 13 mm. Protective coatings were coal tar epoxy on the inside and bitu-
men enamel wrap, incorporating fiberglass, on the outside. The latter was overlain
Figure 11-1. Threading Chevron Refinery outfall manhole and buoys through “gate.”
Figure 11-2. Derrick barge used for pulling Chevron Refinery outfall.
Figure 11-3. Trailing end of Chevron Refinery outfall.

by a 102-mm reinforced CWC. Additional anticorrosion protection for the outfall,

after placement, was provided by zinc anode bracelets.
The diffuser was 200 m long and included two steps to inside diameters of 660
and 406 mm. Each of the 33 discharge ports had a diameter of 76 mm. An unusual
feature of this diffuser involved its being mounted some 0.5 m above the seabed.
The system was designed by the main contractor, and the 18 supports were incorpo-
rated into a steel sled, some 180 m long, that was towed from shore to a prepared
seabed depression. After the sled was leveled, concrete was poured around it, leaving
the steel supports protruding. Once the outfall had been bottom-pulled into posi-
tion and connected, concrete was poured within forms around each support.
The trunk of the outfall was set on 19-mm gravel in a 2-m-deep trench carved
into the sandstone seabed by a spud pontoon dredger. The top backfill layer was rock
up to 2 kN size.
11.5.2 Guia Outfall, Costa do Estoril, Portugal

This is an open-coast outflow, with design discharge of 5.0 m3/s (Costa et al. 1992).
The 800-m-long trunk is made of 1,800-mm ductile iron, and it resides in a rock
trench backfilled with concrete. A three-way concrete junction chamber, located in
20 m of water, gives rise to the two exposed diffuser legs, each of weighted HDPE,
1,800 m long, and ending in 45 m of water. The pipe (No. 244 in Table A-1) has an
outside diameter of 1,200 mm and an inside diameter of 1,108 mm. The end 400 m of
each leg involves diffuser sections, yielding a total of 160 (100-mm-diam.) wall ports.
Tip diffuser diameter is 800 mm. The diffuser legs were placed by the float and sink
method in 1990, and the system started operation in May 1994 (Matos et al. 1998).
11.5.3 Lavernock Point Outfall, Wales

Cardiff, the capital of Wales, is situated on the mouth of the Severn River in the
United Kingdom. The tides in this area, at the east end of the Bristol Channel, are
some of the highest in the world. The associated currents are very strong.
The coastal community of Lavernock lies 8 km south of Cardiff, and plans by
the Welsh water authority stipulated that a new sewage outfall would be installed
at Lavernock Point (“Innovative” 1994). The design featured a south-oriented con-
duit with trunk 1,000 m long followed by a 252-m-long, 15-riser diffuser. The basic
element in the outfall would be a steel pipe of o.d. 1,892 mm. This pipe would be
coated inside and out, with a CWC added. Sacrificial anodes would be clamped into
place. The pipeline would be installed in a 6-m-deep trench to extend the full length
of the trunk.
The tender documents encouraged bidders to propose approaches other than
traditional bottom-pull, and the chosen contractor had put forward the money-sav-
ing idea of pushing out the pipe. This land-based operation would largely avoid the
difficult marine conditions out in the waterway, but of course that would be impos-
sible for the earlier excavation work. The £4.8 million contract was for 37 weeks. The
outfall is No. 286 in Table A-1.
An onshore complication to the whole project was the local cliff, a Site of Spe-
cial Scientific Interest (SSSI) and thus protected. Irish miners were brought in, and
they hand-excavated a 5-m-high, 40-m-long tunnel to pass under the cliff to the
water’s edge.
The contractor butt-welded together mill sections of pipe into 12 (100-m-long)
strings, and these were laid out in a yard behind the cliff top. Each of the strings
weighed 427 tonnes. Buoyancy was added during the installation.
A 300-m-long launch way was built from the pipe yard, through the tunnel, and
into the water. Low-friction track was used, set into concrete beds. The pushing jacks
were rated at 360 tonnes.
Trench excavation was carried out by a long-reach excavator set on a three-spud
barge. The bucket on the dredge had a 16-m3 capacity. The nominal trench width
was 4.5 m, established in up to 25 m of water. After the pipe was pushed into final
position, the trench was backfilled.
11.5.4 Sandown Bay Foul Outfall, Isle of Wight, U.K.

This outfall (No. 373 in Table A-1) was a design–build project where environmental
considerations led to review and change in outfall position. Delays ensued, and the
actual construction took place from January to October of 2000. The launching of
this 3,200-m-long steel line required that a 435-m-long and 1.8-m-diam. tunnel be
driven under a zoo, a roadway, and a seawall. A bottom pull then took place into an
excavated trench. The outfall has an outside diameter of 914 mm, an inside diameter
of 887 mm, plus a CWC. Within the 140-m-long diffuser, there are nine outlets,
averaging 320 mm in diameter. End water depth is 17 m.
11.5.5 Thessaloniki City Outfall, Northern Greece

This is an open-coast installation with a design flow of 4.5 m3/s. The trunk of this
line (No. 394 in Table A-1) is made of 1,600-mm-i.d. and 2,000-mm-o.d. bell and
spigot reinforced concrete pipe (RCP). The stepped diffuser involves the same mate-
rial and size, but the remainder is 1,300-mm and then 900-mm cast iron. Each of the
50 right-angle risers has a single 164-mm opening. Section-by-section placement of
10-m-long pipe lengths was involved during construction. There was full-length pipe
burial, with the top protection either quarry rock or concrete block mattresses. Total
pipe length is 2.6 km but is unusual in that there are twin parallel lines for 970 m,
then they separate at a 30° angle. End water depth is 23 m.
11.5.6 Pardigon No. 2 Outfall, La Croix-Valmer,

Cavalaire-sur-Mer, France
Extreme southern France is a region with a stunning Mediterranean Sea coastline
and gorgeous beaches that receive environmental protection. South of St. Tropez,
several communities, such as La Croix-Valmer, use the same WWTP at Pardigon.
With increasing population in the region came the need for further sewer capacity.
The existing 1974-built PVC outfall was not only too small (400-mm-diam.)
and too short (length 1,260 m), but it was also in a severe state of disrepair. The
new line (No. 396 in Table A-1), 600 mm in inside diameter, 1,500 m long, would
dispose of a maximum 1,700 m3/h of wastewater in 39 m of water. The pipe would
be steel cylinder reinforced concrete pipe made by a French manufacturer.
Construction cost was apparently 9,223,868 francs, and the work occupied the
interval October 2000 to June 2001. There were major environmental consider-
ations, such as avoiding certain benthic species and positioning the new pipe close
alongside the old. This pipe was in a dredged trench.
The pipe was divided into four parts for the laying operation. Each portion had
buoyancy cylinders strapped onto the pipe crown every 17–20 m. Once the pipe was
in position on the water surface, divers progressively cut away the buoyancy units,
starting at the inshore end, to drop the pipe gradually onto the seabed. Part 1 had a
length of 118 m. After laying and measuring, a makeup piece was fabricated to link its
upstream end to shore facilities. Parts 2 (300 m), 3 (474 m), and 4 (488 m) were laid
in order and connected at their inshore ends with special pieces in the same way.
The diffuser length was 80 m. The pipe was buried out to a water depth approach-
ing 8 m. From that point to a water depth of 20 m, the exposed pipe was immobi-
lized with straps to helical-strake drill-in anchor piles, and thereafter lay on top of
the seabed with no restraint.
11.5.7 Gullane Sewage Outfall, Firth of Forth, Scotland

This location is on the south shore of the Firth of Forth, roughly 25 km east of Edin-
burgh, Scotland. Actually, two steel outfalls were installed here at the same time, but
we will focus on the 1,200-m-long sewage pipe (No. 415 in Table A-1) rather than
the 650-m-long storm water conduit.
There is little question that the outfall designers were concerned with the pos-
sibility of soil liquefaction putting the pipe in jeopardy (Thibault and Forbes 1996;
De Groot et al. 2006; Teh et al. 2006). Thus, they rejected the idea of polyethylene
and went with steel for its greater weight, strength, and stability. The bulk specific
gravity of the pipe, air-filled, was an astounding value of 2.
A band of loose, mobile sand, across the route caused the engineers to worry
about pipe bending. This zone was found during the site surveys of 2001, 2002,
and early 2003. In the first year, the logical and necessary series of surveys was run:
bathymetry; side scan sonar; subbottom profiling; magnetometer. Follow-up work
involved beach profiles and two boreholes. Also, using a jackup platform, 11 cone
penetrometer tests were carried out at 100-m intervals along the intended alignment
and up to 23 m deep.
Another problem was that the site itself did not lend itself to an extensive pipe
stringing operation. Furthermore, there was a nearby wetland (nature reserve) and an
array of dunes, both protected. The result was that major access could only be by water.
For this reason, the pipe stringing facility was established 25 km across the estuary at a
property where North Sea oil and gas platforms had been fabricated in the past.
Details on the pipe preparation and coatings are in Little (2005). The outside
diameter was 273 mm, and the pipe wall thickness was 10 mm, with a 50-mm-thick
outer sheath of high-density (3,050 kg/m3) concrete.
Two pipe bundles were made up for towing across the firth in the summer of
2003. The first bundle, 650 m long, contained the storm water outfall, the inshore
portion of the sewage outfall, and two continuous lengths of polyethylene (PE) pipe
for buoyancy. The second bundle, 550 m long, had the offshore portion of the sewer
line and one PE pipe length for support. The towing operation had one tug pulling
ahead and one providing stability from the rear.
At the south shore site, a trapezoidal trench was prepared. The nominal bot-
tom width was 4 m, and the sideslopes were 1-on-4. Once the towing tug ran out of
water, a rope was extended from shore and attached to the inshore end of the pipe.
A tracked excavator on land then pulled the pipe into position. Linking of the two
parts of the sewage outfall was carried out above water, with the completed pipe
then lowered into the trench. Backfilling was carried out with excavated material to
achieve a minimum cover of 1.5 m. Lack of marine traffic in the area meant that no
special pipe protection was required.
The outfall terminus featured two risers, 15 m apart, each with four 125-mm
ports and duckbill valves. Effluent discharge was horizontal, 0.8–1.0 m above the
seabed. Each riser was protected with a precast concrete dome.
11.6 Novel Designs: Other Countries

11.6.1 Timaru Outfall, South Island, New Zealand
From the back beach, this outfall (No. 172 in Table A-1) is 730 m long (Macdonald
and Weaver 1985). Roughly 450 m of the line is seaward of the shoreline. This out-
fall, because of high overburden loads through the beach, included sections that had
a 10.0-m length of steel pipe being threaded inside a 9.5-m-long section of spun RCP,
and the 15-mm annulus grouted. The steel pipe had an inside diameter of 1,067 mm
and a 15-mm wall. The concrete wall was 140 mm thick. Twelve composite lengths
were combined on site to create 120-m pipe strings, each weighing 230 metric tons
and terminating in flanges.
During construction, a 400-m-long steel trestle was built, and excavation of the
trench was done from this structure. Through the beach, a sheet-piled 10-m-deep
excavation was required. Two monorails on the trestle helped to position the pipe
before it was lowered into place. The 104-m diffuser was set at a 22.5° angle to the
pipe trunk and was supported by 8-m-long concrete piles a nominal 0.6 m off the
seabed. This arrangement was in 6 m of water. There were 120 bell-mouthed, 75-mm-
diam. ports, 100 of these discharging horizontally and 20 aiming 45° down.
11.6.2 Pardoe Beach Outfall, Devonport, Tasmania, Australia

Wallis and Holmes (1987) have reported on Stage I of the installation of this munic-
ipal outfall off a beach backed by sand dunes up to 8 m high. The inshore seabed
at this location has an ephemeral veneer of sand immediately underlain by shingle,

to a thickness of 2 m or more, which rests on weathered basalt. However, complica-
tions arise because of occasional outcroppings of basalt and cross-alignment chan-
nels in the rock.
Permission was obtained to excavate a dune crossing and trench for the outfall
as long as the removed sand was stockpiled, then later replaced and replanted. A
length of 120 m of the outfall extended through the dunes and across the beach. A
further length of 140 m passed through the intertidal zone, where a 2-m-high tem-
porary groin was built, alongside the pipe alignment, to permit access by land-based
equipment. Some blasting was necessary before trench excavation could proceed.
The final 120 m of Stage I lay in the surf zone and extended offshore to a water
depth of 4 m. A manned underwater excavator was used to create the trench in this
region after the inshore half had been blasted. The pipe was immobilized in the
trench by a combination of 11 regular concrete boxes recessed slightly into the rock
and 5 concrete anchor blocks set more deeply into the substrate. The final feature of
Stage I involved a 6-m-long multiport tee diffuser attached to the sea end of the FRP
pipe by a flexible coupling.
Stage II involved an extension, and the year 1990 request for this work was
unusual in that each contractor was asked how much 900-mm HDPE pipe he could
install for A$1 million. The contract award did not go to the highest length estimate,
but to an experienced Australian outfall contractor because of its proposed construc-
tion method. The owner wanted the extension to be 1,000 m long, and it appears
that this is the length that was actually added.
The project involved the digging of an offshore trench in the rocky seabed using
a 25-tonne diver-operated underwater excavator. The power pack for this machine
was on a barge overhead. When a reach of excavation was complete, small-size aggre-
gate was spread along the bottom of the trench.
Concrete U-shaped sections, each weighing 3 tonnes, were set into the trench
and bolted together. The pipe was then floated out and dropped into the U-shaped
channel. Concrete was then pumped down and around the pipe.
11.6.3 Baltalimani Outfall, Istanbul, Turkey

Sayinli and Yigit (1995) have covered this 300-m-long outfall (No. 263 in Table
A-1). It is a fully buried twin steel line (each pipe with an outside diameter of 1,727
mm and a 32-mm wall) with a 150-mm CWC. The lines are laid on a steep (40%)
slope and have an end water depth of 75 m. There are two flexible joints in each
pipe and full rock cover. The total design flow was 9.9 m3/s, and each pipe has
six 508-mm-o.d. risers with domes. The lengthy US$9.5 million construction effort
started in late 1990.
11.6.4 El Hank Outfall, Casablanca, Morocco

There is little that is conventional about this 3,700-m-long outfall (No. 300 in Table
A-1), extending out onto an exceptionally uneven rock seabed. The inside quarter
of the line is buried 2,080-mm RCP. Thereafter, the pipe is exposed and made of
2,038-mm steel with CWC, of overall outside diameter 2.46 m. It is stabilized off-
bottom with special supports and paired 27-metric ton weights detailed by Ludwig
(1998), and it is cathodically protected by sacrificial anodes. The 550-m-long dif-
fuser has 110 (160-mm) wall ports and one 300-mm end opening, the latter in 27 m
of water. The system was completed in 1995, but it suffered damage because of heavy
wave action in the ensuing winter. Twenty-one of the supports were found to have
cracks and/or foundation problems. Repairs were made.
11.6.5 South Coast (Needhams Point) Outfall, Barbados

Published information exists for this outfall (No. 323 in Table A-1), which extends
1,150 m offshore into 35 m of water (Herbert et al. 1992). The basic pipe is steel,
with an inside diameter of 584 mm and an outside diameter of 608 mm, and there
is a CWC. Flow capacity is 0.35 m3/s. A heavy clamshell bucket was used for trench
excavation, and pipe installation involved 50-m-long sections with rotatable flanges
at each end. The pipe was encased in concrete. The diffuser had 20 risers and
100-mm-diam. ports fitted with duckbill valves. The outfall had a nominal construc-
tion year of 1997, but it was not put into operation until 2002.
11.6.6 Baie du Tombeau Outfall, Port Louis, Mauritius

Mauritius (Ile de Maurice) is an isolated island located in the southwest Indian Ocean
at 20°17⬘S, 57°33⬘E. Land area is 2,040 km2, the length of coastline is 177 km, and
the population is 1.2–1.3 million.
The Baie du Tombeau outfall (No. 371 in Table A-1) was designed to have a
capacity of 2,000 L/s. In 1999, the Waste Water Authority of Mauritius solicited ten-
ders. The low (accepted) bid was from a European contractor, for 355 million Mau-
ritian rupees (roughly 8.5 million euros). This price was 25% under the second-low
bid. The contract time period was 18 months. There was an initial five-month delay
in startup because of factors beyond the contractor’s control. The whole project was
completed from December 1999 to November 2000. Offshore work took place from
March to June of 2000.
The project involved an onshore pipe and the outfall. The former entailed
1,927 m of 1,200-mm-diam. pipe. The latter involved 1,294 m of 1,200-mm-diam.
pipe trunk and then a 132-m-long stepped (1,200 down to 300 mm) diffuser end-
ing in 33 m of water. Twenty-two risers averaged 2.5 m high and had diameters of
150–300 mm. The outfall was to be buried across the lagoon and through the fring-
ing coral reef.
The contractor proposed the use of thin-wall FRP pipe installed by float and
sink, rather than the bottom-pull of a steel line. This light pipe idea, involving no
pipe-stringing yard and no corrosion worries, was accepted, and it lowered the proj-
ect price to 280 million Mauritian rupees.
Because of the hard coral bottom offshore, the contractor brought in a self-pro-
pelled rock cutter vessel. Over seven days, this craft successfully excavated the 3%
grade trench—which had to be at least 8 m wide at the offshore end—to accommo-

date the 15-tonne pyramidlike concrete chambers to be placed over the riser stubs
and the risers added later by divers inside the protective structures. Dredge spoil was
placed in a self-propelled split barge for dumping at approved sites. Trench depth
was 4.5–6 m.
Trench excavation in the shallow lagoon was done by using excavated material
to progressively build an above-water bund that could be used by land-based equip-
ment. The minimum trench width here was 2.2 m.
Offshore, the contractor made use of a backup barge for multiple purposes,
namely to carry the diffuser protective units, pipes, backfill, and the diver complex,
which supported 22 individuals. Diver bottom time was limited to one hour.
An accurately positioned, four-point-moored crane barge installed pipe off-
shore. Sections 6 m long, supported by air-filled lift bags, were lowered and then
placed by scuba and surface-supplied swim-gear divers on special woven nylon bags
filled with gravel. The new pipe was coupled to the old using sealant and long tight-
ening bolts set across the joints through steel collars and then temporarily stabilized
with backfill material before the barge was moved to it new position. A steel clamp
was fitted around the outside of any new joint, and an inspector diver filmed the link
from inside the pipe. Gap measurements were sometimes taken.
In the diffuser, each protective unit had an FRP grid on top, with another set into
the side of the chamber directly opposite the riser outlet. Top armor in this region
was 420-mm nominal stone, with 220-mm material placed between it and the near-
base 14–20-mm gravel.
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12
Difficult or Impossible
Outfalls
12.1 The Cruel Sea

We have already dealt with a number of outfalls where the construction sequence
was dogged by problems. As prime examples, construction efforts for both the
Southwest Ocean and Monterey Bay outfalls (in Chapter 6) had to contend with the
merciless California wave conditions of the El Niño winter of 1982–1983, and suf-
fered accordingly. In this chapter, we focus on the building of other troubled outfalls
(Fig. 12-1).
Lavagna is a northern Italian town some 35 km east of Genoa along the coast. Its
710-mm-diam. plastic outfall had three sections: the first 350 m through a marina,
the next 60 m through an existing dike, and the final 890 m in a trench until a
water depth of 10 m in the exposed sea. Pipe strings of 120-m length were used for
the outside portion, constructed first. After two of these, heavily ballasted with cast
iron collars, had been put together on the seabed, a storm of unprecedented feroc-
ity struck the area. The pipe was reoriented and driven in against the dike, and the
resulting pounding dislodged all the ballast on a 50-m-long end section. This bare
pipe broke off and surfaced, then was driven 15 km along the coast, where waves
crashing against the rocky shoreline broke it into three pieces.
Mundesley is situated on the North Sea coast of England, at 52°53′ north latitude.
The community’s high-density polyethylene (HDPE) outfall (No. 78 in Table A-1),
with concrete weighting rings, was to replace an earlier short cast iron line that broke
up in 1974–1975 and then was sliplined in 1977 (Daynes 1980). This was a (£1.1 mil-
lion) project beset with problems (“Dock” 1984). Storms delayed matters. The excava-
tion for the 1.6-m-deep trench took three times as long as projected and damaged a
local storm water outfall. One pipe string slipped from its laying cable and dropped to
261
Figure 12-1. Crane barge hard aground next to outfall construction trestle.
the seabed, sustaining enough damage that there were further delays. Finally, a dock
strike threatened to close down the port used for tugs and supply boats.
12.2 Lobsters versus Crane Barges and Human Lives

12.2.1 The Setting and Outfall Design
Scarborough is a seaside town adjacent to the city of Portland, Maine. Extending
south from the small community is a land feature known as Prout’s Neck, the loca-
tion of the Scarborough (Sanitary District’s) outfall (No. 125 in Table A-1). There
was much public resistance to the idea. Installation of this pipe off the rocky and
exposed shore was severely hampered by environmental regulations that required
that the outfall be installed in the generally stormy months of November through
May. Specifically, the mild weather months were not allowed because of the danger
of interfering with the migration of lobsters, a locally important marine creature for
livelihoods and finances.
The data gathering and planning for the outfall extended over a number of
years, as detailed by Jubinville and Arsenault (1983). The pipe trunk was sized
to have a 508-mm diameter to pass the nominal 0.08 m3/s flow of the associated
wastewater treatment plant (WWTP). The specified overall length was 453 m, with
roughly 90 m (of ductile iron) onshore and the rest (of HDPE) underwater, termi-
nating in a water depth of 12 m at the shoreward edge of a rock ridge, 5–7 m high.
The final off-angle 110 m of the outfall, made of 406-mm pipe, was the diffuser, and
it had 36 (76-mm) ports.
Difficult or Impossible Outfalls 263
Except for pockets of gravel and cobbles, the seabed was solid rock. The idea
was to bury the pipe over its whole length, partly to protect it from wave forces but
also to leave little above the seabed that could be snagged by lobster pots and gear.
Nominal trench depth was 2.1 m, with a desired width of 1.8–2.4 m. That would
leave the seabed some 1.2 m above the pipe crown. Except in the intertidal zone
where there was to be a concrete cap 0.9 m thick, trench backfill was to be crushed
stone, with armor rock on top, of minimum half-tonne size. The pipe itself was to
be weighted with 7.5-kN square two-piece concrete collars, united by stainless steel
bolts and placed at 3-m intervals.
12.2.2 First Session of Construction

The US$881,878 contract for outfall installation was awarded in February 1982, with
a subcontract issued for the marine portion. Because of the June 1 deadline for the
first increment of work, efforts started right away. Using triangulation from shore,
important points along the outfall centerline were established, and hard-hat divers
drilled the immediate seabed and placed rock anchors. Marked nylon cord was then
extended between pairs of anchors. Use of a pneumofathometer along the route
established the precise bottom profile.
The trench in the intertidal zone was created by land-based equipment. For the
submerged portions, an underwater tracked drill rig, operated by a hard-hat diver,
drilled the holes into which charges were later stuffed for the blasting operation. The
inshore trench excavation was carried out in April and May of 1982, its depth again
checked with a pressure gauge. Offshore, a 40-m-long crane barge was involved.
Excavated material was placed to the side of the trench.
The HDPE pipe was delivered to the site in sections 18.3 m long. Butt-fusing of
these pieces resulted in five separate lengths terminating in flanges. The piece to pass
through the intertidal zone had a length of 125 m, and this portion was pulled into
place by the crane barge offshore. Restraint was provided by a crane onshore. During
the latter stages of the placement of the concrete cap, a sudden storm struck, and at
one point waves were breaking over the cab of the concrete pump truck parked high
on the shore. However, the end result, before the cessation of work for the season,
was that the inshore pipe section was in place and concreted over.
12.2.3 Second Session of Construction

The first thing to do in November 1982 was to place the second section, 95 m long.
First, the trench had to be cleaned out. Blind flanges were placed on the ends of the
pipe. These flanges had valves so that the empty pipe could ultimately be flooded
and the trapped air vented. Complete with concrete weights, the pipe was floated
offshore, and from a position alongside the barge, it was lowered to the seabed.
However, before the pipe could be backfilled, a storm in mid-December 1982 drove
the crane barge ashore. There, the barge was totally destroyed and the crane itself
dumped into the water.
The subcontractor took until mid-March 1983 to move a second barge on site,
and the backfilling and rocking of the second pipe length was then completed before
the beginning of April. Despite considerable wave action over the intervening three
months, the unprotected but sheltered and weighted pipe apparently survived on the
bottom without damage. Wave forces for a pipe exposed in a nonbackfilled trench
have been addressed by Grace (1993), who reports on a related research effort done
offshore. An outfall set in an open, steep-walled excavation is not out of danger, in
terms of wave forces, because of the strong in-trough eddy driven by the main flow.
During follow-up dredging operations for the next pipe length in early April
1983, severe wave action broke the anchor lines on the second construction barge,
and she too was driven onto the adjacent shoreline. Jubinville and Arsenault’s (1983)
paper ends with salvage operations underway in May 1983, the installation of the
last 141 m of pipe at a standstill.
Through personal contact with the senior author, I have learned that a third barge
arrived at the site in early June 1983 and completed the outfall installation by mid-
July after a stretch of excellent weather. Obviously, the authorities sensibly relaxed
their stipulation on the allowed months during which work could take place.
I have also learned that the WWTP and outfall went online in 1984. Annual
diver surveys are carried out. There have been some problems with the diffuser risers,
with one broken off at one point and some sand inside. I do not know whether the
outfall was flushed or the riser(s) repaired.
12.2.4 Postscript
Should there ever be severe environmental constraints that cause greatly inflated
contract capital prices for marine work; lead to hazardous work conditions and risk
lives unnecessarily; and perhaps cause an inferior work product that will mean later
headaches in terms of inspection, maintenance, and repair, to say nothing of opera-
tional costs?
12.3 A Troubled U.S. West Coast Project

12.3.1 Background
In February 1976, three municipal entities in San Mateo County, California, formed
a joint powers authority, called the Sewer Authority Mid-Coastside (SAM), for the
purpose of providing collection, treatment, and disposal of wastewater. The three
members of the team were the Montara Sanitary District (MSD), the city of Half
Moon Bay (HMB), and the Granada Sanitary District (GSD). Half Moon Bay is
located on a crescent-shaped bight with the same name, approximately 30 km south
of San Francisco, which sees extensive recreational usage. The waters off Pillar Point,
bounding Half Moon Bay on the north, seasonally become one of North America’s
fabled big-wave surfing locations called Mavericks. Breaking waves to 20 m have
been ridden there by tow-in surfers.
Each of the three municipal districts had its own outfall. Those of the MSD and
GSD discharged treated effluent into shallow water of the order of 2 m in depth.
After a number of repairs and an extension, the 305-mm-diam. HMB outfall ter-
minated in some 9 m of water. The ductile iron diffuser was 58 m long, with 35
(38-mm-diam.) ports (Maggi 1983).
After discussions with representatives from the California State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB), the design of the regional outfall was completed in 1976.
This pipe was to have a diameter of 457 mm and extend offshore 445 m from the
lowest stand of tidal water near the center of the bay. Discharge depth was to be in
9 m of water with a 49-m-long diffuser that had 24 ports, each of 51-mm diameter.
Because of a dispute between the SAM and the SWRCB over the regional outfall’s
flow capacity, the plan stalled. However, it was revived in 1978 when HMB’s outfall
suffered a failure in the surf zone that would have required extensive and costly
repairs. Redesign of the planned pipe took place, with its diameter taken to 508 mm
to deal with an increased flow specification. The outfall would now extend roughly
600 m offshore, with 72 m of diffuser. The pipe would be buried and protected with
armor rock. The pipe is No. 112 in Table A-1.
12.3.2 Initial Effort

The SWRCB wanted the new outfall completed without delay, and the SAM elected
to bid the construction contract, specifying a six-month completion. A public open-
ing of the bids took place in May 1979, but one of the nonlow bidders filed a formal
protest, delaying award to the low bidder until July 1979. This date was already a
“red flag” because six months of continuous work would take the project into the
stormy and normally unworkable months of December and January.
According to Maggi (1983), the low bidder, although not an established marine
contractor, had had previous outfall construction experience. He built a 20-m-high
welded-pipe tower mounted on twin pontoons, each 33.5 m long with a cross sec-
tion of roughly 6.7 m2. These pontoons could be filled with air from a compressor
located on the top deck to provide (adjustable) buoyancy, once the structure had
reached the sea. Also at this level was a 90-tonne crane. The tower was designed to
be pulled directly onshore or offshore using wire rope and sea anchors beyond the
planned diffuser position plus an anchorage on the beach. The structure was to be
used as the base for installation of sheet piling, excavation of the pipe trench, placing
of the pipe, and backfilling operations.
The contractor sought to assemble the work platform on the back beach, avoid-
ing the protected San Francisco Garter Snake Habitat, but was unable to complete
this work before the 1979 marine construction season ended. He attributed the
delays to natural effects of rainfall, fog, and wind. After the fabrication was com-
pleted in late spring 1980, the contractor attempted to advance the structure across
the seasonally “building” beach. As he went, he drove the specified double line of
sheet piles and laid the pipe. In late September 1980, the tower reached the water,
finally enabling use of the buoyancy of the pontoons. However, storm waves the
next month buried the pontoons and immobilized the platform in the surf zone,
requiring the construction of a trestle so that crews could gain access to the structure
to effect needed repairs and make certain modifications. When these changes were
completed in December 1980, the driving of sheet piling resumed. A switch had
been made, because of driving difficulties, from an impact to a vibratory hammer.

But another storm in January 1981 immobilized the platform once again. The nar-
row access trestle was extended to a length of roughly 210 m, but repairs could not be
completed until June 1981. The sheet pile-protected sand access ramp to the trestle
had a habit of washing away.
During the spring and summer of 1981, the contractor began laying restrained-
joint ductile iron pipe from the trestle. On June 26, 1981, he moved the platform
out to station 4⫹33 (meters). The contractor’s shoring approach in the surf zone
area did not leave the top of the sheet piles above the water line. As a result, wave
action transported sand over the top, inside the row. It was difficult for the company
to maintain the trench open long enough to lay pipe. Finally, the contractor (in
September 1981) informed SAM that he could not continue, and his contract was
terminated. At that point, he had largely completed the onshore pumping station
and surge chamber, along with pipe extending 53 m beyond the shoreline.
12.3.3 Transition
The contractor had completed the two sheet-piling rows out to station 3⫹88, but
some of this sheet piling failed. He succeeded in laying pipe to station 3⫹12, where
he apparently installed an end cap, with rocking completed to station 3⫹09. For
the last-laid pair of pipe sections, as it turned out, the contractor had installed 76 m
of 356-mm-diam. pipeline to provide seawater flushing flow through the develop-
ing outfall.
The first contractor left 93 trunk sections of the ductile iron pipe in the yard.
These were approximately 5.5 m long, with cement mortar lining and thin concrete
coating. The ends were consistent with standard restrained mechanical joints. There
were also 14 of the same length but for the diffuser. These sections had 35 tapping
saddles. Stored in the yard were also 35 sets of the cast iron diffuser risers: 152-mm
nipples 457 mm long; reducing elbows (152 to 102 mm); reducers (102 to 51 mm);
and 51-mm blind flanges.
The new contractor, when selected, was directed to clean, recoat, and repair the
pipe and diffuser items left in the yard, as needed, before installing. The staging area
itself had to be tidied up. There was a lot of debris. Both the pump station and surge
chamber had to be completed.
The second contractor had to ensure an open pipe from the surge chamber at
station 1⫹44 to station 3⫹12. This was to be done by 24 hours of flushing with
water (at 25 L/s) and then pigging the line three times to drive out accumulated
sand. The installed pipeline also had to be hydrostatically tested.
Finally, the new contractor had to disassemble, remove, and dispose offsite of
previously installed sheet piling, some of it still in place and some fallen over; the
tower and accessories (e.g., winch and wire rope); and the flushing pipe. The trestle
was to be carefully salvaged and stockpiled, with no breaking off or burning of piles
at the seabed.
In the interim, a hydrographic survey was done along the alignment seaward of
station 4⫹57. The water depth at that station, on the day of the survey in November
1981, was 6.4 m. This is 1.5 m lower than the depth at that same location in July
1977. Also, six borings were done in August 1981 by the same company that had
done others in the immediate area in January 1979.
12.3.4 A Second Contractor

A second outfall construction contract (of one year) was awarded in June 1982 to
the previous second-low bidder. Simply as an indication, one of the bidders on this
occasion had a final number of US$3.4 million. Of this amount, 44.1% was for
mobilization and demobilization, while 23.5% was for taking care of the leftovers
from the previous contractor, mainly the platform and trestle.
The new contractor had to install 588 m of submerged pipe and diffuser. He
elected to use cranes, working from the trestle, to install sheet piling and nearshore
pipeline. He also brought to the site a walking eight-legged platform to work inter-
mediate water depths, and (in mid-July) a derrick barge and horse to deal with the
offshore portion. Pipe was laid in two directions from the end of the trestle.
I do not know the size of the armor rock over the pipe. However, the minimum
thickness of this material over the crown of the pipe was 0.76 m.
Risers were flange-connected to the diffuser sections after they had been placed
by the horse. A “breakaway” design, featuring PVC bolts, was used for the risers in
case they were hooked by fishing gear or a stray ship anchor. The risers from the pre-
vious contractor were replaced by longer (roughly 2.7-m) ones, and the older items
were stored at the WWTP. I do not know whether these risers were cast or ductile
iron; the second contractor had a choice. A 150-N zinc anode was specified for burial
at the upstream end of the diffuser. The pipe invert in the diffuser zone was 12 m
below sea level.
Work was slowed by the heavy weather during the 1982–1983 winter and by the
finding of an unexpected outcropping of mudstone, extending into the last 200 m of
trench, which had to be chiseled before removal by clamshell. The outfall was appar-
ently completed by the end of the 1983 work season.
I have also learned that, tragically, three people lost their lives on this job. Another
negative report concerns the contractor’s walking platform, which collapsed. Unfor-
tunately, it also appears that as-built drawings were not prepared.
12.3.5 Operational Trouble with the Diffuser

The contractor can essentially walk away from the outfall it has just built. The owner
has to operate the facility for many subsequent years. More than a decade after out-
fall completion, SAM had an experienced commercial diving company inspect the
line with video, and the October 1994 report was not good. Because of the impend-
ing winter season and its periodic storms, a US$80,000 contract was immediately
signed, and the diving contractor set to work, with the flow unabated.
The main task was to excavate down to the pipe crown and recover a number
of broken riser sections. These lengths then would be replaced with PVC piping and
terminal check valves. After replacement, a flexible suction hose would be inserted
and lowered down into the diffuser so that local sand deposits could be removed.
At least four outlets were blocked by inside accumulations. Once the divers set to
work, they realized that the scope of work was somewhat greater than what they had
anticipated. First, it was difficult and time-consuming to roll the rocks up and out of
the trench. Second, fully 19 of the 35 risers had been damaged or separated below
the sand seabed.
A second contract was signed in July 1995, with the face amount increased to
US$123,000. At that time, the 20 upstream risers had been redone, whether or not
they had failed, and an exposed flange had been left 0.3–0.6 m above seabed level.
Sand would be removed from within the pipe once all the risers had been replaced.
The top outlet check valves would then be added.
12.4 Problems at Pulp and Paper Mills

12.4.1 Louisiana Pacific Pulp Mill, Northern California
An environmental suit led to two major changes for the Louisiana–Pacific (LP) pulp
mill outfall at Samoa in northern California, immediately west of Eureka. A new
914-mm-diam. HDPE liner had to be inserted, and at its offshore end would flange-
connect to a 1,588-m-long steel pipe extension and diffuser of the same diameter.
Herein we consider only the extension because the details of the lining operation
have been provided by Grace (2005). The wall thickness of the basic steel pipe in the
extension would be 9.5 mm. There was to be a PVC liner, cement mortar, and a CWC
some 152 mm thick. The lengthened outfall would now terminate in 25 m of water,
rather than the 13 m of the former one.
Two of the contractors’ own vessels would be involved, the first a large four-
point-moored one to pull completed pipe segments offshore. A 20-m workboat
would handle the anchors’ crown lines, endeavoring to avoid their dragging across
the seabed, a key (but misguided) worry in the final environmental impact report
for the project.
By mid-July 1993, the extension was being laid out in the LP yard. In addition,
the contractor was setting out the rollers that would be necessary for moving pipe
toward the water. The overall construction time, for both liner and extension, had
been estimated at four months. By the beginning of December, however, the con-
tractor had a disaster on its hands, and early in 1994, the owner brought in a fresh
team to complete both the liner and the extension. The remedial work took the rest
of 1994 and required more than 500 dives.
At this point, the extension was in four pieces, lying on the seabed fronting the
mill. One piece overlapped the end of the old diffuser by 6 m. Apparently, there had
been a problem with pipe rollers breaking. Also, it appears that two separate pipe
lengths had buckled during placement in the ocean, then had been cut and flanges
added. The idea was to use spools as connectors.
When the new contractor removed the blind flanges from the ends of the pipe
lengths on the seabed, there was a lot of sand inside. There had clearly been a delay
in mounting the flanges. The new contractor took 10 days to clear out the accu-
mulation. The most inshore length (designated No. 4) also contained 20 sandbags
toward the middle of the pipe. These were also removed.
Close examination of the two most inshore lengths (Nos. 3 and 4) also revealed
that the internal liners had collapsed. The remnants were cut away by divers, and
LP requested that these two lengths be sliplined before installation. The work barge
was demobilized for 20 days while roughly 600 m of 800-mm-o.d. SDR 32 HDPE
pipe was manufactured and delivered. This length was cut in half. The new contrac-
tor then took 30 days, including weather delays, to do the relining, which left short
stubs protruding from the ends of the two steel pipes.
The original plan had been to directly connect the offshore end of the 914-mm
HDPE liner (in the old pipe) to the inshore end of length No. 4. But now, the latter
had its own liner. There was also the matter of the overlap between the end of the old
pipe and length No. 4. To deal with the latter and improve alignment, the two outer
sections of the old outfall were removed. Two stabilizer clamps, a commercial pipe
connector, and a 0.9-m-long stainless steel spool piece made the link, carried out
“live,” while the mill was operating. At least the water would have been warmer for
the divers. Because the mill was in operation, a final “hydro test” of the new facility
could not be made.
In all four cases, divers took templates between pairs of pipe ends destined for
jointing before the individual spools could be designed and fabricated. Each of the
remaining three spools contained a straight piece of 1,067-mm HDPE flanged to
the off-angle stainless steel piece that made up the remaining distance between end
flanges and dealt with the misalignment (Table 12-1). All four stainless steel spool
sections had the same anticorrosion touches, namely four 130-N sacrificial anodes.
One of the charges to the new contractor was the sealing of the old diffuser. This
fussy task took 13 days. Most of the outlets were in a bad state of disrepair, and oth-
ers had actually fallen off. A local sheet metal shop prepared rolled steel plate for the
holes, and this plate was put in place and held with either wire come-along or band
clamps. Some outlets were blanked.
Apparently, an effort was made to immobilize certain parts of the new extension
and the area in the region of the end of the old outfall. Heavy chain and anchors
were involved; details are unknown. Although the new contractor had been charged
with the jetting down of the new part into the sandy bottom, this step was not
Table 12-1. Louisiana–Pacific Outfall Separation Distances

Approximate Approximate Length of Stainless
Joint Between New Distance Out of Separation Steel Spool
Pipes Numbers Alignment (m) Distance (m) Piece (m)
1 (new diffuser) 0.9 7.6 3.0

and 2
2 and 3 1.2 7.6 3.0
3 and 4 0.6 5.2 2.4
carried out. For one thing, it was late in the season and time to vacate the site for
safety. For another, the pipe had worked its way down to the spring line in the sedi-
ments anyway. Finally, the second contractor was to be responsible for the mainte-
nance of the outfall in the future and would check the situation at its next visit in the
spring. One diver involved in the work has told me that he fears for the life of the
patched-together outfall under massive seas from a local storm or giant swell from
a distant disturbance.
As the project wound down, big swells on November 9, 1994, caused the leased
derrick barge Martinez to break free of her moorings and run aground. Thirty days
were lost because of the mishap, salvage, barge demobilization, and arranging for
another workboat. The replacement vessel, the Jolly Roger, completed the project in
two days.
I have been informed that the lining and extending of the old LP outfall cost
close to US$10 million. At least there were no injuries of consequence, other than
apparently nonserious cases of the bends.
12.4.2 SAICCOR Mill, Natal, South Africa

In the 1990s, environmentalists cited the thick froth on beaches and associated algal
blooms, stretching 20 km either side of the Umkomaas River mouth, as a result of
the stabilization of natural foam by the SAICCOR Mill’s effluent. The adjacent sea
was also discolored by the “purple death.” With certain tidal and wind conditions,
this murky cloud was swept over an outstanding and popular nearby tourist and
local dive site named the Aliwal Shoal (e.g., Koornhof 1991; Warne 2002). On the
best of these occasions, there was a substantial impairment of water clarity; on the
worst of these, visibility was reduced to zero.
The cleanup steps stipulated by the South African authorities were to eliminate
the foaming and color problems by building an in-house lignosulfonate plant (com-
pleted in March 1999) and to effectively double the length of the existing outfall, so
that the Aliwal Shoal would be spared impact.
The initial outfall and its extension are Nos. 190 and 363, respectively, in Table
A-1. Stainless steel was chosen because of the hot, corrosive wastewater. The weight
of the material involved in the extension was 810 tonnes. The alloy chosen as most
resistant to the corrosive liquid (because of its high molybdenum content) was
316LXK. To prevent scaling on the inner wall, an extraordinary polishing operation
was required. A durable PVC film was then applied to ensure that the polished sur-
face sustained no damage during fabrication and the installation process.
Three hundred lengths of 12 m were sent to a company in Durban, which
encased them in a 145-mm-thick reinforced concrete jacket. The sections were then
transported 50 km to an inland assembly area near the mill. One by one, the sections
were lifted onto the contractor’s launch way for welding and finishing. The plan was
to pull the pipe in 24 increments. The pull barge was equipped with a linear winch
arrangement.
The contractor had selected to launch the pipe across the beach without the use
of a sheet pile cofferdam. Piles (mounted with rollers) were driven across the beach
surface. Unfortunately, pronounced wave action eroded enough sand that the piles
toppled over, dropping the pipe onto the strand.
In early September 1998, an attempt was made to exert a mighty pull on the
beached pipe, to get it moving. The result was a violent failure of the pull barge’s
anchoring system, and a mangled stern (which I managed to see).
I do not know subsequent installation details, but in time the extension was
pulled into position and connected to the 3.0-km-long preexisting pipe. Commis-
sioning took place in April 1999.
That is not the end of the story, however. In late July 2001, a work stoppage at
the mill caused the usual 55°C effluent to be largely replaced by 20°C seawater.
Resulting pipe contraction snapped the connecting bolts and led to an effluent leak.
Until this gap could be repaired by divers, the mill had to cut back production by
40 percent.
The coefficient of thermal expansion for stainless steel is 17(10⫺6) m/m °C. For
a temperature decrease of 35°C, this means a thermal strain of roughly 600(10⫺6)
m/m. For a pipe length of 3,500 m, the (unrestrained) pipe contraction would theo-
retically be 2.1 m. One can sense the mighty force on the flange connection.
12.5 More Problems

12.5.1 Camps Bay Outfall, South Africa
The bight where this pipe (No. 52 in Table A-1) is located is in southwest Cape
Town, South Africa. This unusual three-material outfall had a length of 1,350 m and
extended along a bearing of 300° true out to a water depth of approximately 25 m.
The inner pipe was HDPE (with an inside diameter of 354 mm and an outside diam-
eter of 400 mm), and the outer pipe was steel (with an inside diameter of 540 mm
and an outside diameter of 552 mm). The 70-mm annulus was filled with concrete.
There were three stepped reductions in double-pipe diameters over the 87-m-long
diffuser. The terminal sizes were HDPE (with an inside diameter of 142 mm and an
outside diameter of 160 mm) and steel (with an inside diameter of 300 mm and an
outside diameter of 312 mm). Flow exited the diffuser through eight risers topped
with 90° elbows and involving port sizes of 92 to 115 mm.
The pipe was designed to be buried 3 m, from the shoreline out 840 m. Rock
rubble (of 550-mm size) was to be placed (by tremie pipe) over the pipe from then
on. The intermediate zone, from chainage 840 m to the beginning of the diffuser,
had 21 concrete markers at 20-m centers. Bedding was 100-mm crushed rock, and it
often washed away, even in 18 m of water.
For construction, the sea end of the diffuser had a special pull head, which was
later replaced with a proper cap. During the installation process, caps replaced the
risers. The diffuser was pulled out by itself, with a spool piece later fitted between its
inshore end and the offshore end of the trunk.
A number of rock pinnacles along the route had to be blasted, and some local
residents claimed damage to their houses. Boulders along the alignment were
removed. The pipe was organized into 36-m-long strings, and a slipway was con-
structed on the beach. String jointing was a complicated process. The mating HDPE
parts were butt-welded. Welded steel sleeves connected the steel pipe ends. The space
was filled with grout.
The pipe was air-filled and mounted with buoyancy tanks. With some 300 m
pulled, a storm stopped the operation. After this event, the contractor had to use
buoyancy tanks to ease the pipe out of its partial burial before continuing. The whole
trunk was in place on the seabed by mid-1976, but it still had to be buried.
A trench-cutting vehicle was put into operation to carve a suitable trench in the
sand, clay, and fused shell layers and to drop the pipe into it. The machine straddled
the pipe and was pulled shoreward by a winch on the beach. The barge followed
along. There were continual problems with the breaking of hoses (for air and water),
and by the end of the 1977 three-month weather window, the pipe was only partially
(0.3–2.0 m) buried.
By the next season, a prototype fluidization sled had been fabricated. This sled
was taken to chainage 850 m and set in place on the pipe. However, a storm tore the
device apart.
The year was now 1978, and a second fluidization sled, 49 m long, was built
and placed into operation. Details are in “Fluidization” (1979). Work progressed
night and day to finish by the end of the weather window. There were many initial
problems, such as wear and jamming caused by the sand, but the problems were in
time solved and the task was completed with a rush.
After commissioning, this outfall continued to give problems. First, the pipe
would bare at various times at locations within the surf zone. Second, much of the
offshore rock was removed. Finally, the steel pipe corroded through in various places,
causing officials to worry about the concrete layer and the HDPE pipe, should the
corrosion areas become more substantial.
12.5.2 Lulu Island Replacement Outfall, British Columbia, Canada

We will illustrate a truly difficult wastewater discharge location through reference
to Vancouver’s Lulu Island outfall (No. 262 in Table A-1) in British Columbia, Can-
ada. This pipe discharges into the lower Fraser River, famous for its multiwatershed
annual run of sockeye (red) salmon. This waterway also sees a heavy volume of boat,
ship, tug, barge, and log boom traffic. Annual dredging work is necessary to main-
tain a navigation channel.
For low river flows, a saline wedge can penetrate 20 km upstream. During high
river discharges, the saline wedge disappears. At the Lulu Island site, the river is
roughly 600 m wide, and there is typically a 5-m tidal range. There is complete rever-
sal of flow at the location as the adjacent ocean level rises and falls.
The original 240-m-long outfall, installed in 1969, was a 1,070-mm-diam. fiber-
glass pipe extending 180 m into the river, with an end depth of roughly 10 m. This
outfall suffered a series of problems requiring repairs: exposure caused by dredg-
ing; loss of the end, presumably by a ship’s anchor; and damage from scour and
undermining.
Design of the new outfall had to consider the environmentally sensitive aspect
of the waterway, the degree of mixing of the effluent in the potentially two-level
back-and-forth regime, future lowering (3–5 m) of the riverbed by dredging, and the
marine traffic (not necessarily within the defined 250-m-wide navigation channel).
The result after numerous iterations was a trenched (deeply toward the termi-
nus) 2,134-mm-diam. steel pipe extending 180 m into the river (to just short of the
navigation channel) and covered with a 1-m-thick riprap blanket having a median
size of 200 mm. Effluent was to leave the (stepped, 50-m-long) diffuser through
23 (6-m-long), vertically discharging neoprene risers, reinforced with stainless steel,
with 250-mm openings. The steel pipe walls themselves were coated internally and
externally with coal tar enamel, with an exterior sheath of fir strapping added to
protect the wall from rock impact. Sacrificial anodes were used inside the pipe; an
impressed current cathodic protection system was also included.
The outfall trench was excavated by a clamshell dredge. Guide piles were driven
12 m into the riverbed. Three sections were floated into place, lowered with barge-
mounted cranes, then joined by special flanges that use a rotatable ring to eliminate
bolt misalignment problems. River flow speeds of 1–2 m/s made the work difficult.
During one night, the guide piles disappeared, possibly stripped off by an off-course
log boom. The diffuser ports ended up roughly 0.6–1.0 m above the reconstituted
river bottom. PVC plugs were placed in 11 risers.
12.5.3 West Runton Outfall, U.K.

This was a troubled project alongside the North Sea. The construction period was
March 1993 to April 1995. The original design was for a bottom-pull onto the sea-
bed and protection by concrete blocks and quarry rock. The concept then became
a 710-mm medium-density polyethylene pipe, 2,500 m long, placed in a 2.24-m
finished-diameter sacrificial tunnel having 5–10 m of rock cover. There would be
five risers (each with four duckbill valve openings) extending up to the seabed in
12 m of water and protected by a concrete shroud/fender. The outfall is No. 287 in
Table A-1.
The full-face cutting diameter was 2,642 mm. The ground was primarily com-
pletely weathered chalk without bedding or jointing. But this material contained
flints up to 700 mm in diameter, and there was heavy tool wear and damage to the
tunnel boring machine (TBM). To reduce water flow, compressed air had to be used
for the last three-quarters of the 2.1-km-long drive. The tunnel was actually driven
downhill, at a maximum slope of 1 on 90. The more common uphill drive was
dispensed with in an effort to minimize the depth of the entry shaft (32 m). In the
beginning, the 45-tonne TBM was lowered in one piece, nose down. In the end, the
skin of the machine was left in place at the end of the tunnel.
In November 1993, a strong (force 12) northwesterly gale in the North Sea
caused the shearing of the extended legs of an 80-tonne jack up platform working
on the outfall’s discharge risers. The rig drifted in to the beach, then was driven
alongshore, ultimately slicing the historic Cromer Pier in two. Preliminary damage
estimates were near £1 million. Fortunately, workers had been taken off the rig after
gale warnings were received.
12.6 Anything That Can Happen Will Happen

12.6.1 Murphy’s Laws
The name of an apparently fictitious gentleman named Murphy frequently surfaces
during discussions of difficulties encountered when trying to get something done,
for example, in the marine environment (e.g., Brown 1989). Here is one interpre-
tation of the first ten of Murphy’s Laws. Although the appearance of this list is by
no means professional and borders on facetious, any engineer involved in marine
structures is encouraged to spend a thoughtful minute or two on each item. There is
much food for thought.
1. Nothing is as easy as it looks.
2. Everything takes longer than you think.
3. In any field of endeavor, anything that can go wrong will go wrong.
4. If there is a possibility of several things going wrong, the one that will cause the
most damage will be the one that occurs.
5. If anything just cannot go wrong, it will anyway.
6. If you perceive that there are four possible ways in which a procedure can go
wrong and circumvent these, then a fifth way, unprepared for, will promptly
develop.
7. Left to themselves, things tend to go from bad to worse.
8. If everything seems to be going well, you have obviously overlooked some-
thing.
9. Nature always sides with the hidden flaw.
10. Mother Nature is a bitch.
The extraordinary book by Parker (1997) puts some of the above laws into context,
often using an outfall construction job as reference. Building such a conduit can be
a grim business.
12.6.2 Wollongong No. 2 Outfall, New South Wales, Australia

The Illawarra is a district on the east coast of the Australian state of New South
Wales. The area’s main city is the port and industrial center of Wollongong, lying
70 km SSW of Sydney. The originally estimated A$200 million Illawarra Wastewater
Strategy (IWWS) project dealt chiefly with upgrades of the district’s three treatment
plants. The collection, treatment, and disposal of wastewater in the region are the
responsibility of the Sydney Water Corporation (SWC). A key element in the pro-
gram was the reuse of much of the wastewater, treated to tertiary level, by the local
steelworks. Another key element was a new outfall at Wollongong (No. 409 in Table
A-1) to replace another pipe only 220 m long (Prothero et al. 2004).
In November 2001, SWC awarded the contract to design, construct, and operate
the outfall to a joint venture of two massive Europe-based companies that we will
here represent by A and B. B was responsible for process mechanical and electri-
cal design, as well as installation. A would deal with project management, creation
of infrastructure (such as the outfall), and civil engineering work at the treatment
plants. A and B had worked together previously on water and wastewater projects. In
January 2002, company A turned over the outfall to a very experienced Australasian
marine contractor (C). The subcontract amount was A$13.0 million, with initial
scheduled completion in June 2003, later changed to September 2003. Company C
subcontracted with Australian company D for the diving work.
In early September 2002, C had started building the 350-m-long trestle, using
tubular piles driven into the sandy bottom. This temporary structure would support
a traveling crane to drive sheet piles to create a cofferdam, to excavate a trench up to
7 m deep, and to place therein a 4 ⫻ 2 m jointed box culvert tunnel to ultimately
contain the surf zone portion of the outfall. This protected segment was 360 m long;
there were 126 separate sections.
The overall outfall was to be 1,080 m long, out to a water depth of roughly 20 m.
Two parallel 1,067-mm-o.d. and 985-mm-i.d. HDPE pipes would be involved, with
a major concern the provision of an open flow path should one pipe suffer damage
or blockage. The inshore portion would be sunk and then pulled into the culvert by
means of a wire rope. The offshore portion would later be towed to the site, joined
to the already laid length, and then fully sunk to the seabed.
Because rock and clay are only about 0.5 m below the sandy seabed surface out-
side the surf zone, the offshore portion was not buried. It was stabilized by precast
bolt-together 5-metric ton concrete units that contained both pipes and had 3-m
longitudinal spacing. The weights also provided an approximate quarter-diameter
gap underneath the pipes, which some people regard as that magic number that
means no upward wave-induced force on the pipe (see Appendix B). The total off-
shore length was 750 m, composed by flange-bolting 150-m-long strings.
The 300-m-long diffuser featured 100 crown-mounted blocks with 150-mm out-
lets fitted with duckbill check valves. The bottom of each end bulkhead was fitted with
a 300-mm duckbill valve, presumably to flush out settled materials along the inverts.
The Tasman Sea is notorious for large seas. As an example, in May 1997 a weather
buoy between Sydney and Wollongong measured an individual wave 16.7 m high,
when wind speeds were gusting to 100 km/h. Heavy weather dogged this particu-
lar project. The diving subcontractor’s fully outfitted container was swept away. The
cofferdam tunnel sanded in. The year 2003 had particularly savage conditions on
June 5, August 24, and September 5. In 2004, the dates were June 19 and July 17. The
wind gusted to 109 km/h in the Wollongong area on July 10, 2005.
On February 10, 2004, one of contractor A’s concrete workers fell 9 m onto a
concrete floor through a nonsecured opening at a related sewage treatment plant
worksite. There was a long delay in getting medical help to the badly wounded man,
and he died, perhaps unnecessarily. This event cast a pall over all the IWWS work,
both onshore and offshore, and workers stayed off the job sites until assurances were
given of immediate medical assistance in case of accident.
However, the biggest blow to the project happened in the first few days of Febru-
ary 2005. Contractor A was bankrupt. This problem left more than 1,000 Australian
workers and subcontractors adrift on an array of projects and owing A$40 million.
IWWS work was suspended for a period.
Toward the end of 2005, with a run of favorable weather, subcontractor D used
a team of 30 divers to clear out the accumulated sand within the tunnel. The inshore
portion of the outfall was then dragged into place. The offshore length was fed into
harbor waters from a pile-supported shoreline ramp and then towed to the site. This
length was subsequently sunk and then connected. The installation of the duckbill
valves followed. The month was December 2005.
12.7 Outfalls That Couldn’t Be Built

12.7.1 Clover Point No. 1, British Columbia, Canada
The construction plan in 1977 was for this Canadian west coast outfall to be extended
by 1,800 m to a total length of 2,100 m. The pipe involved was 1,200-mm HDPE
with a 40-mm wall, and floating 360-m-long fused strings were to be bolted together
at sea (Ellis 1980). Strong currents swept away portions of the pipe as it was being
moved into position, and one 200-m-long length ended up on the seabed. Construc-
tion was stopped, and the contractor brought suit against the owner, who enjoined
its consultant. Two key questions involved the strength of the local currents vis-à-vis
those envisioned beforehand and the level of weighting of the pipe with concrete
collars. I do not know the results of the litigation, but nonplastic outfall No. 75 in
Table A-1 in time replaced the 1977 plastic concept. The strong currents that plagued
this undertaking provide the basis for “natural sewage treatment” of the two pres-
ent outflows of milliscreened (6 mm) effluent off Victoria, mentioned at the end of
section 1.4.2.
12.7.2 Two at Mumbai, India

Bombay (or, more properly, Mumbai) is one of the fastest growing and most densely
populated urban areas in the world. Almost half of the official (beginning of 1999)
13.5 million inhabitants are either slum dwellers or homeless. This immense, low-
lying city rests on a peninsula on the west coast of India at north latitude 19°.
The peninsula, extending south to Colaba, has Bombay Harbor on its eastern side.
Some 13 km north of the tip of the peninsula is an area known as Worli, and 5 km
further north, across Mahim Bay, is a catchment named Bandra. Both front onto
the Arabian Sea.
Supplying water to the burgeoning population of Mumbai has been a difficult
proposition (“Bombay’s Race” 1993). Properly getting rid of the city’s voluminous
sewage outflow, roughly 23 m3/s, is a great concern. For many years, sewage had
simply been released on land or into the nearest watercourse, with appalling conse-
quences in terms of odor and appearance.
The Mumbai area has seen submarine pipelines since the 1950s, when links
were provided between the oil terminal at Butcher Island in Bombay Harbor and
onshore refineries (Anand 1989). However, it was not until 1985 that the first major
outfall was constructed, this being the Colaba pipe (No. 150 in Table A-1), which
extends roughly east into the entrance to Bombay Harbor.
The experienced U.K. marine contractor for this pipe had the following notable
experiences:
1. Internal Indian financial restrictions delayed project startup by approximately
two years.
2. A completely different seabed profile was found than what had been advertised
at the prebid stage, as well as a differing seabed material.
3. Actual use of the completed outfall was delayed many months, and then it was
intermittent because of problems with its pump station, built by an Indian
contractor.
The first attempt at outfalls into the Arabian Sea took place at Worli and Ban-
dra, with World Bank funding. The rated discharges were substantial, 24.0 m3/s at
Worli and 20.4 m3/s at Bandra. In both cases, the diffuser length was approximately
1.3 km, with the pipe inside diameter ultimately reducing to approximately 1.8 m.
The end water depth at Worli was 11.7 m; at Bandra this was 8.5 m.
The project involved a French contractor trying to build a U.S. design. This com-
bination, plus the three problems at Colaba (red tape and delays, incorrect seabed
and subseabed information, and less-than-perfect local workmanship) spelled even-
tual disaster.
The contractor started work in February 1984, with a planned November 1986
completion date. By December 1986, it has been reported that the contractor had
become clearly agitated, and he defaulted in June 1987, claiming that the outfalls
were not buildable as designed (“Bombay” 1988). In time, the contractor brought a
large, unsuccessful lawsuit against the designer, claiming delays and disruption.
The contractor had made 538 of the required 914 extended-bell reinforced con-
crete pipe (RCP) sections. The inside diameter of pipe in the trunk was 3,505 mm,
and the wall thickness was 292 mm. Grooves for two O-rings were part of the spig-
ots, but often these grooves were incomplete, running out onto the truncated end of
the spigot.
Officially, 66 sections were laid offshore at Worli, producing a short outfall
498 m long, one-sixth of the desired length. Officially, 141 sections had been put
together at Bandra, mostly onshore, but leaving a 195-m stub extending into the
Arabian Sea. These stubs would be regarded later as emergency (overflow) outlets.
After inspection, a powerful pump was used in September 1999 to blast through
blockage inside the Bandra stub, and the line was later resurveyed in early 2003.
The vessel used by the contractor was a semisubmersible catamaran barge with
its main deck up off the water. Gerwick (2000) attributes the contractor’s problems
to movement of that platform, in whatever residual swell was present, and resultant
lack of control over the position of the new section being inserted. Joints (which
already displayed less than ideal workmanship) were damaged by impact.
At some point the contractor fabricated a bull-nosed steel grillwork arrangement
that fitted into and extended out from the spigot of a pipe section to be inserted into
place. This “thin edge of the wedge” idea was clearly meant to assist in successful
pipe mating. But one can well imagine that, once inserted with the joint not seated,
this frame would rattle around inside the last laid pipe section as the laying vessel
heaved and surged, causing it to be moved out of position.
There was a mystery about the nature of the specified seabed material and a
suspicion that the local drilling contractor had set up its rig on the beach. There was
a mystery about dredged trenches. The contractor claimed that these trenches had
been excavated from end to end, but it was not clear in later inspections that it had
been done. Perhaps the soft seabed material had run back into the excavations.
The contractor proposed the approach used for the outfall at Ipanema Beach,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, with pipe supported by piles (“Outfall” 1975). But the Indian
officials, with advice from their British consultants, turned this idea down in the
spring of 1988.
I visited the onshore staging area for this aborted undertaking in November 1989.
At that time, Indian workers were using torches to cut up certain elements of the
previous contractor’s impounded equipment. Several hundred sections of imperfect
locally made RCP were stacked in the area. Looking ahead, two platforms could be
seen offshore, gathering true marine geotechnical information for the next attempts.
The sequel to the Mumbai story is in Chapter 8.
12.7.3 Detroit River Outfall Tunnel No. 2, Michigan

The outfalls in this book are almost entirely derived from the world’s ocean and
seacoasts. Here we consider a tunnel outfall remote from such margins, at Detroit,
Michigan. This US$93.5 million facility of the Detroit Water and Sewerage District
(DWSD) was to be built out under the Detroit River, the final flow link between Lake
Huron (in the Great Lakes) and Lake Erie. This short river is hardly an inconsequen-
tial waterway, transporting an average discharge of roughly 5,000 m3/s, and its two
dredged shipping channels carry many large ships in nonwinter months.
Detroit’s water and sewage service area covers about 2,300 km2, involving a pop-
ulation of roughly 3 million people. The new outfall would allow the DWSD to meet
the flow capacity of its WWTP, namely 80 m3/s, plus phase out flow to the Rouge
River, which cannot be chlorinated. Plentiful technical details on the concept are
available in Burke (2001). The Detroit River Outfall Tunnel No. 1 was built in 1936.
This tunnel involved soft clay, an open-shield machine, and the use of compressed
air at a depth of 20 m. The excavated cross dimension was at 7.8 m, with the finished
inside diameter at 5.5 m.
The project startup date in the more recent case was November 1, 1999. Although
this date precluded work out on the river, the 9.14-m-i.d. main access shaft was exca-
vated on land and concreted, using the top-down method, to its final 92-m depth.
The starter tunnel for the TBM was also created.
Out on the river, as soon as the climate allowed, a work platform, supported by
driven piling and surrounded by barges, was set in 14 m of water. Work involved
the blind drilling, in pairs, of six 3.81-m-diam. riser shafts. These borings passed
through 15–30 m of overburden soils and then through limestone bedrock a maxi-
mum of 56 m. The nominal depth of each hole in the riverbed was 67 m. Upon
completion of drilling, the whole 3.05-m-diam. epoxy-coated steel pipe for any riser
was lifted in one piece and inserted into the hole. This pipe had been assembled
from sections that were flange-bolted together, with gaskets. Afterward, the annulus
was filled with cement grout. Upon completion of the tunnel, connection would be
established with the six risers. One of the final project activities would be the placing
of the diffuser heads by divers.
The length of the tunnel was 1,873 m (“Detroit” 2001). The rebuilt, single-
shield, 22-year-old TBM, with a host of the “latest” features, was delivered to the site
in May 2001. The cutting diameter of the TBM was 7.22 m, its length was roughly
120 m, and its weight was 365 tonnes. The planned final lined tunnel diameter was
6.40 m. The 7,410 boltable, gasketed segmental concrete liner elements were already
completed and on site.
The drive began in mid-November 2001, with target completion at the end of
April 2003. The mining took place roughly 88 m underground, at a nominal rate of
70–90 tonnes per hour, or 6–9 m/day. Advance in August 2002 was roughly 350 m.
Material was limestone, and because this formation contained plentiful water as well
as hydrogen sulfide, probing was done 20–25 m ahead of the cutting face. Grouting
ahead of the face was also done. Conveyors transported the muck away from the
face. Liner elements were placed in the rear of the TBM as it advanced.
On April 24, 2003, the drive had advanced 806 m into a highly fractured, blocky
ground. On that night, groundwater flows into the tunnel, under a high hydrostatic
pressure, intensified. Elevated levels of hydrogen sulfide filled the tunnel as the
groundwater was depressurized, requiring an evacuation.
The contractor tried to match the water inflow by drilling a number of strategi-
cally placed production water wells, but the inflow was simply too great, and there
was the additional problem of more liberated hydrogen sulfide. Water ultimately
filled the tunnel all the way up to the collar of the access shaft, leaving the TBM some
90 m under water.
The construction contract was terminated on January 31, 2005, and the contrac-
tor demobilized. The DWSD attempted to recover some of its expenditures with
insurance claims (Strong and Armistead 2005). The plan of the agency was to try
again, but in this case with a shallower (56 m) tunnel and a different type of TBM,
namely a slurry-faced machine that maintains pressure out ahead of the mining face
to keep water back.
References
Anand, S. (1989). “Pipeline Construction in India—Prospects.” Proceedings of the Eighth In-
ternational Conference on Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering, ASME, The Hague,
Netherlands, March, 5, 83–94.
“Bombay Outfalls on Hold.” (1988). Engrg. News Rec., 221(1), 17–18.
“Bombay’s Race Against Rising Water Demands.” (1993). Water and Wastewater International,
October, 13–15.
Brown, R. J. (1989). “Murphy’s Laws and Subsea Pipeline Installation and Connection by the
Towing Technique.” Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Offshore Mechanics
and Arctic Engineering, ASME, The Hague, Netherlands, March, 5, 1–7.
Burke, J. (2001). “Safe Environment a Key Requirement for DRO No. 2.” World Tunnelling,
14(10), 469–473.
Daynes, R. J. (1980). “Mundesley Sea Outfalls and Associated Works.” The Public Health Engi-
neer, 8(3), 121.
“Detroit Outfall Making Headway.” (2001). Tunnels and Tunnelling North America, 5, 23–25.
“Dock Strike Adds to Outfall Headaches.” (1984). New Civil Engineer, 605, 8–9.
Ellis, D. V. (1980). “Environmental Consequences of Breaks and Interrupted Construction at
Marine Outfalls in British Columbia.” Coastal Discharges, Institution of Civil Engineers,
London, Chapter 20.
“Fluidization Sled Buries Pipe Line to 10-Foot Depth.” (1979). Pipe Line Industry, 51(1),
49–50.
Gerwick, B. C., Jr. (2000). Construction of Marine and Offshore Structures, 2nd ed., Wiley-Inter-
science, New York.
Grace, R. A. (1993). “Wave Forces on a Test Pipe Exposed in an Ocean Trench,” International J.
of Offshore and Polar Engineering, 3, 35–42.
Grace, R. A. (2005). “Marine Outfall Performance. I: Introduction and Flow Restoration.”
Jubinville, R. A., and Arsenault, R. D. (1983). “Design Features and Construction Techniques
for Ocean Outfall, Scarborough, Maine.” Conference Proceedings Paper, Pipelines in
Adverse Environments II, M. B. Pickell, ed., ASCE, New York, 552–562.
Koornhof, A. (1991). The Dive Sites of South Africa, Struik Timmins, Cape Town, South Africa.
Maggi, M. A. (1983). “The San Mateo Coastside Regional Outfall.” Conference Proceedings
Paper, Pipelines in Adverse Environments II, M. B. Pickell, ed., ASCE, New York, 541–551.
“Outfall, Plagued by Endless Surf, Finally Makes It to the Sea.” (1975). Engrg. News Rec.,
194(5), 20–21.
Parker, T. R. (1997). 20,000 Jobs Under the Sea: A History of Diving and Underwater Engineering,
Prothero, J., et al. (2004). “A Cleaner Coast Down Under.” Civ. Engrg., 74(8), 44–51.
Strong, M., and Armistead, T. (2005). “Detroit Files Insurance Claim and Will Try Again on
Outfall.” Engrg. News Rec., 254(15), 31.
Warne, K. (2002). “Oceans of Plenty: South Africa’s Teeming Seas.” National Geographic,
202(2), 2–25.
13
Giant Tunnel Outfall as
Part of the Boston Harbor
Cleanup
13.1 Boston’s Water and Wastewater

13.1.1 Background
Boston is located on the northeastern seaboard of the United States at 42°20′N,
71°10′W (Fig. 13-1). The area was settled by Europeans in 1630 on the Shawmut
Peninsula. By 1652, a local spring had become insufficient, and from then on Bos-
ton had to reach beyond its confines to locate and develop water sources. Boston’s
population in 1795 was 19,000, and by 1850 it had reached 180,000. When the Met-
ropolitan District Commission (MDC) was formed in 1895, its 13 cities and towns
had a population of 750,000 and a water demand of 3.1 m3/s. When Quabbin Res-
ervoir was completed in 1940, the MDC’s service area included 20 cities and towns,
with a population of 1.5 million and a water requirement of 6.3 m3/s. By 1970, the
MDC was responsible for 42 municipalities, a service population of 2.4 million, and
a water demand of 13.4 m3/s (Brutsch 1986). Greater Boston is shown in Fig. 13-2.
In 1970, sewage discharge facilities for Quincy and other parts of the southern
Boston metropolitan area included two 1,524-mm-diam. and 38-mm-wall cast iron
buried outfalls (locally numbered 101 and 102) built off Nut Island from 1902 to
1903. The former was 1,780 m in length, the latter 1,690 m, and both had end
elbows directing outflow upward. In 1914, a 430-m-long pipe (No. 103) was added
to provide relief during concurrencies of high flows and high tides. When a primary
treatment plant was established at Nut Island in 1952, a 200-m-long emergency
overflow (No. 104) was built and some dome deflectors were placed over the outlets
Nos. 101 and 102 to mask the “boil” on the water surface (French et al. 1986).
Northern parts of greater Boston, not served by Nut Island, directed their sew-
age to Deer Island, an essential peninsula adjoining the northside city of Winthrop.
Here also, four outfalls had been installed over the years, the first in 1896 and the
281
Figure 13-1. Boston, Massachusetts, and environs.
last in 1959. Nos. 001 and 002 were the long normal-flow pipes with multiport dif-
fusers and a combined capacity of 17.5 m3/s. The former outfall was 782 m long,
3,048 mm in diameter, with 51 (515-mm-diam.) side ports and a single 762-mm
end port. No. 002 had a length of 689 m, a diameter of 1,917 mm, and 14 (509-
mm-diam.) openings. Both outfalls discharged in roughly 17 m of water. There was
no lasting No. 003, but Nos. 004 and 005 were both 2,743-mm-diam., open-end
pipes, of lengths 152 and 41 m, respectively. A primary wastewater treatment plant
(WWTP) was constructed in 1968.
The disposal of liquid sludge, 1,100–1,500 m3/day, had been primitive. The Deer
Island WWTP piped its product to the north side of a natural channel called Presi-
dent Roads across from Long Island. The Nut Island facility piped its sludge across
the harbor to the south side of President Roads. The twin releases to this waterway,
in 9 m of water, took place on outgoing tides, but there was a local eddy off the tip
of Long Island that often trapped this outflow, making it available for return to the
harbor on the next flooding tide. Average tidal fall at Boston Harbor is about 2.9 m,
with a standard deviation of 0.6 m.
Giant Tunnel Outfall as Part of the Boston Harbor Cleanup 283
Figure 13-2. Metropolitan Boston and offlying islands in Massachusetts Bay.
By 1988, the year that the polluted state of Boston Harbor was brought to the
attention of the whole United States during the presidential campaign, the south sys-
tem (Nut Island) had 17 exclusive communities and the north system (Deer Island),
22. The four cities of Boston, Brookline, Milton, and Newton contributed to both
systems. Total flow in 1988 was about 17.1 m3/s, 28% from the south system, 72%
from the north system.
13.1.2 Boston Harbor Cleanup

The genesis of the whole Boston Harbor Cleanup (BHC) project would appear to
be an instance when an official of the city of Quincy encountered fecal matter while
jogging on the local beach. Suits were filed by the city of Quincy (in December 1982)
and by the Conservation Law Foundation (in June 1983) demanding action. Several
months after the official beginnings of the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
(MWRA) on July 1, 1985, U.S. federal judge David Mazzone set up the decade-plus
“road map” that would produce a harbor that greater Bostonians could be proud
of and would flock to. There was a great deal of civic pride as the BHC began, with
perhaps inadequate anticipation of the taxpayer cost of actually achieving this end. It
was too late to secure substantial assistance from the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), available in the 1970s and early 1980s, but in the end, about one-
quarter of the US$3.8 million total cost was federal money. The proposed massive
project, of course, had its dissenters (e.g., Peterson 1993).
The basic idea of the BHC was that the existing wastewater treatment facilities on
both Nut and Deer Islands would cease operation. The former plant would be con-
verted into a “headworks,” providing screening and grit removal for the south system
inflows (Pisano et al. 1999). All treatment would be done within a new WWTP on
Deer Island (Lass 1988a, b), with pumped south system flows traveling there via a
tunnel under the harbor. Up to 55.6 m3/s would then be disposed of well out in
Massachusetts Bay after travel through a massive concrete-lined tunnel outfall many
kilometers long, which was to be operational in July 1995.
The interested reader will find additional background material in Weston and
Edwards (1939), Ducsik and Najarian (1971), Doneski (1985), Flynn (1985), “Site”
(1985), “Boston” (1987), “Slow” (1987), Krizan (1991), “Landfill” (1991), Dolin
(1992), “Case” (1993), Levy (1993), Shelley (1993), and Breen et al. (1994).
13.2 Early Stages

13.2.1 Getting Down to Work
The MWRA assembled a world-class engineering team (“Boston” 1986; “Second”
1986; “Boston” 1988; “Metcalf” 1988; “ICF” 1990; “State” 1990). A 27-member
facilities planning and advisory committee started predesign outfall siting discus-
sions in 1986. This group included members from environmental organizations and
regulatory agencies, as well as community officials. Data on currents and water col-
umn characteristics were taken. Alternate diffuser sites were investigated. Many care-
ful computer-aided studies were done to analyze the initial mixing of the massive
wastewater outflow with adjacent seawater plus the following migration and poten-
tial effects (nutrients and pollutants) of the effluent. The following papers represent
these efforts: French (1989,1990); Walton et al. (1989, 1990); Adams et al. (1992);
and Brocard et al. (1994). (Additional related later work appears in Signell et al.
2000). A final diffuser site was selected. This location was in 33 to 34 m of water,
with the upstream limit at position 42°23′04″N, 70°48′14″W and the terminus at
42°23′19″N, 70°46′48″W.
A two-phase geophysical program had the following objectives: develop a
detailed bathymetric map of the seabed along the proposed corridor, determine the
thickness of unconsolidated marine sediments overlying bedrock, identify and map
major bedrock fault zones and intrusive bodies, and identify bedrock conditions
that might have an adverse effect on tunneling. The objectives were achieved, using a
combination of precision digital bathymetry, subbottom profiling, single- and mul-
tichannel reflection, and seismic refraction.
In 1988, 25 borings were executed over an extensive marine area (Sylwester and
Bohlke 1989). In the summer of 1989, with the diffuser position and thus outfall
alignment settled, 36 boreholes were drilled along this path, at an average spacing of
roughly 400 m. Two separate jackup rigs were used in this work (Palmer 1991).
The basement material was sedimentary argillite, overlain by Boston blue clay
and bands of sediment. The path of the tunnel would be through relatively strong
argillite (56%), sandy argillite (23%), somewhat weak tuffaceous argillite (8%),
with diabase, felsite, and andesite composing the remainder (13%).
With ground conditions largely established, the designs for both the tunnel out-
fall and the riser system could be finalized. This was realized in February 1990.
The effluent tunnel was to have a concrete wall and finished diameter of 7.39 m,
with at least four times that dimension of sound rock overhead. The tunnel would
slope upward, at 0.05%, so that seepage water could not pond up in the mining area
but would flow away.
The truly sophisticated (100-year) design of the risers, as well as the seabed
nozzle assembly and protective domes, is described by Palmer (1991) as well as
Eisenberg and Brooks (1992). The diameter of the high-density fiberglass riser pipe
was 762 mm, and there was a fiber-reinforced plastic lining. The average riser height
from tunnel to seabed was 73 m. The 3.05-m-diam., 54-tonne diffuser head on top
had eight branches, each with a tapered nozzle made of cast nylon. Sizes varied from
150 to 196 mm. The nominal nozzle height above the seabed was 1.2 m. A pro-
tective high-density polyethylene (HDPE) dome over the head, as well as a quarry
rock surround, would protect the effluent release structure from damage by dragging
ship anchors. The number of risers, 55, was determined after appropriate laboratory
experiments (Roberts and Snyder 1993).
Outfall construction bids were opened in July 1990. As the different components
in the BHC were designed, bid, and then settled into the construction phase (Koso-
watz 1991), greater Boston’s water and sewage rates rose dramatically, as shown in
Table 13-1. In some cases, the increase was fourfold from 1985 to 1996.
Table 13-1. Annual Cost of Water and Sewer Services for a 340 m3/year
Household in the MWRA Service Area
Year Rate ($) Relative Increase (%)
1986 161 —
1987 196 21.7
1988 211 7.7
1989 292 38.4
1990 351 20.2
1991 409 16.5
1992 472 15.4
1993 545 15.5
Source: Adapted from a bar chart in Allen (1993).
After a few years, the bloom was off the rose. The taxpayers now faced the
cold reality of actually paying for the BHC. There were heated meetings in 1992,
there were turbulent demonstrations in mid-1993 that even included the burning
of water/sewer bills. Taxpayer revolt—shades of the Boston Tea Party! There were
objections that some communities were paying too much, some too little. All of
this was documented in frequent pieces in the Boston Globe. In 1994, the Massa-
chusetts legislature first came to the partial rescue of Boston’s citizenry by setting
aside additional funds for the MWRA. In fiscal years 1993 and 1994, after intense
efforts (“Harbor” 1992; Ichniowski and Bradford 1993), the EPA also provided
some monies.
13.2.2 Work Continuation

A high-priority consideration in the BHC was the elimination of sludge discharges
to the harbor. Thus, an early completed part (in December 1991) was a US$70
million sludge pelletizing plant built on the old Fore River Shipyard facility in
Quincy. (This was expanded later.) Sludge discharges to Boston Harbor ceased
forever on December 24, 1991 (“MWRA” 1992). Sludge was then barged to the
Fore River facility from the still-functioning primary WWTP facilities at Deer and
Nut Islands, with their continuing effluents (Ryther et al. 1991, 1996). The pellets
were sold nationwide to fertilizer blenders and other agricultural consumers. As an
example, 12,400 dry tonnes of product were produced in 1996, the ultimate goal
being 54,400 dry tonnes annually.
Extraordinary as it seems, the whole idea of releasing treated wastewater in
Massachusetts Bay, well beyond Boston Harbor and 9.0 km from the nearest land
(Nahant), met with strong resistance, especially in late 1992 and much of 1993
(“Ecological” 1992). There was worry that the waters off Cape Cod would be fouled,
even though Provincetown was 56.8 km from the diffuser. It was said that com-
mercial fishing would be harmed. Nutrients in the effluent would perhaps cause an
explosion of unwanted algal growth, leading to toxic red tides as well as dislocation
of the food supply of the endangered northern right whale. The brand new (June 26,
1993) Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary, generally 50 km east of Boston,
at its closest fully 24.5 km from the diffuser, would be adversely affected (Aubrey
and Connor 1993). At this time, there was considerable worry among engineers and
contractors that the whole BHC would grind to a halt.
Thus, there was considerable relief on Deer Island when the U.S. National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) issued its investigative report on September 15,
1993. It said that the tunnel effluent “may affect” endangered species such as right
whales but would be “unlikely to jeopardize” their existence. NMFS was actually rul-
ing on an EPA “all’s well” report of April 27, 1993, and Judge Mazzone’s follow-up
and supportive report three months later.
Technical, labor, and fiscal background on much of the foregoing is contained
in the following: Brocard and Brooks (1989); Wallis (1989); Brocard et al. (1990);
“Hard-Rock” (1990); Palmer (1990); Klemens (1991); Moss (1992); Tarricone
(1992); and Garrett (1993).
13.3 Installation of Risers

The installation of the diffuser risers, over the 2,000-m length of the diffuser, was a
job separate from the driving of the tunnel. Two separate companies combined to
form the successful contractor (Z) for this enterprise in 35 m of water. The (low) bid
was US$77 million, an astonishing US$70 million under the engineer’s estimate.
At least one reason for this disparity is that Z intended to place two risers per rig
position rather than the anticipated single one. Other bid amounts extended from
US$95 million up to a maximum of US$173 million.
The contractor barged in a four-leg, 2,800-tonne jackup rig from Singapore and
had it reoutfitted in its own local dockyard. Work on and from this structure, pic-
tured near “Boston” (1993), was supported by up to seven barges. As stated earlier,
two 762-mm-diam. and 76-m-deep holes were drilled per station, and two riser and
head assemblies were placed. Precise positioning of the risers was critical. During
the summer and early fall of 1991, 36 riser systems were completed. The operation
was shut down from November 1991 to April 1992. The remaining holes were then
drilled with riser and head assemblies then installed, the task complete in Septem-
ber 1992, almost a year ahead of schedule. It must be noted that the riser-drilling
operation involved the death of a rock-drilling shift foreman because of massive
injuries he suffered on July 20, 1992, when he fell after a sudden shift in the posi-
tion of a casing.
Before drilling any riser hole, a dredge would skim off 2 m of sediment within a
9-m-radius circle centered on the planned borehole, with each riser hole extending
down approximately 76 m, well into bedrock. Longitudinal riser spacing was 37 m.
There was a plug at the base of each riser, which was itself filled with 30 m3 of water
dyed fluorescent green. At the seabed, a watertight cap sealed each of the eight noz-
zles in any 54-tonne riser cap. Several years after this project had been completed,
in December 1995, a remotely operated vehicle was used to inspect all 55 seabed
assemblies. It found no problems.
13.4 A Personal Experience

Early on the morning of September 3, 1993, I climbed into a private car in the Bos-
ton suburb of Watertown. The driver was Jonathan French, an engineer who has
made many valuable contributions to marine outfall literature (e.g., French 1988).
For the next three-quarters of an hour, in heavy traffic, we made our way toward the
northern city of Revere, specifically the Suffolk Downs race track. There, we would
leave the car in the extensive parking area and catch a painted-over school bus for the
10–15-min. run through the narrow streets of the city of Winthrop that would take
us to Deer Island (see Fig. 13-2).
A minor proportion of the construction workers for the BHC would use the
same park and bus system we were employing, arriving from the north. But the
bulk of the personnel and virtually all of the equipment and supplies would reach
Deer Island from the south, by water (Armstrong 1992). This approach would mini-
mize traffic stress on surrounding municipalities, but it could of course be rendered
difficult during winter months and virtually impossible at times during severe win-
ters such as 1993–1994 (Rubin 1994a).
I had made arrangements for Jonathan and me to be taken down into the large
tunnel being drilled to create the immense outfall for the BHC. This passage, to be
ultimately 15,125 m long, the world’s longest single-entry tunnel, was being mined
by a tunnel boring machine (TBM) of colossal size (Fig. 8-1). The entity responsible
for creating the unprecedented outfall was actually a consortium of three experi-
enced U.S. contractors that we will identify as Q. They won the outfall contract with
a low bid of US$202 million. The engineer’s estimate for the job was US$216 mil-
lion, and the high bid was US$246 million.
We were given a briefing in Q’s site office, then we were issued rubber boots,
pants, slickers, and hard hats. Shortly, we and our guide entered the elevator for
cargo and personnel, and after the gates clanged shut, we eased slowly down the
128-m drop shaft, water dripping everywhere. On the bottom, we walked out into
the area where the TBM had been assembled many months before. The noise was
absolutely deafening: grinding, clanging, roaring, welding, splashing sounds, even
though this was a maintenance day in the tunnel. There were workers and equip-
ment items here and there in the dim light.
We were directed to a little railway train, and we wedged ourselves into the tiny
open locomotive. As we rattled along the track laid on the bottom of the tunnel (at
6 o’clock) in the direction of the TBM, we began to make out the layout. A sizable
conveyor belt assembly occupied the space from 2 o’clock to 4 o’clock. This conveyor
belt was to transport excavated rock, or “muck,” away from the area being mined
and ultimately up and out of the tunnel. A large air ventilation duct extended along
the roof of the tunnel, at 12 o’clock, with a high-voltage electrical cable at 10 o’clock.
Between 8 o’clock and 9 o’clock, there were three pipes: water going out of the tun-
nel; water being pumped back; and compressed air.
The track was in time blocked by another train and a group of “sandhogs,” the
term for tunnel workers. We left our train and continued on our way on foot, slosh-
ing along the railroad ties. Every now and then there would be a loud toot, and we
would climb partway up the left tunnel wall and hold onto a pipe until the work
train passed.
Ultimately, we entered the rear of the idle TBM (Fig. 8-2). We were staggered by
the size and complexity of this massive machine. Many of the special precast con-
crete tunnel-lining elements were lying on railcars tucked into the trailing section of
the TBM, where the liner placement system was located. The liner segments had a
3,861-mm arc length, a width of 1,524 mm, and a thickness of 229 mm. They had
been supplied by an MBE/WBE company.
In time, we spent a half hour in the bewildering control room of the TBM and
were given a thorough rundown by the operator on duty. Part of his wonderful
Boston accent oration dealt with the necessity of using a laser to keep the TBM on
line toward its ultimate destination, a lane between the row of seabed holes drilled
months earlier and described in the previous section.
When our tour of the TBM was complete, we set off once again on foot, sloshing
through the shallow water and over the ties. This time we walked the entire distance
to the drop shaft, a trudge of 5 wet kilometers. For several hours after we emerged
from the hoist into the light of day, I endured the worst headache of my life. There
was something not altogether good about the air in that tunnel, and this problem
was officially recognized later.
13.5 The Driving of the Tunnel Outfall

The powerful 680-tonne double-shield TBM had a diameter of 8.08 m. Mounted
on the rotating head of the machine were 50 (432-mm) disk cutters. These could
be changed from the rear, within the TBM. The maximum thrust of the machine,
obtained by first hydraulically wedging out against the cut sides of the tunnel for
anchorage, was 1,130 tonnes.
The TBM arrived at Deer Island in pieces and was later lowered as such down the
9-m-diam. drop shaft, to be there assembled at tunnel invert level. The shaft hoist,
used for both materials and personnel, proved troublesome. Control was imperfect,
and there were brake problems. Most workers, hired locally from the union hall,
had had no tunneling experience and needed considerable training. A worker for a
subcontractor was crushed to death in July 1992.
In addition to the delays caused by these problems, it took some months to get
the TBM to operate as intended. Excavation started in June 1991. Before the end of
May 1992, there were two instances of its high-voltage panel box exploding.
On March 8, 1993, during advancement of the TBM, water inflow to the tun-
nel was much greater than expected. Water entered the panel box and a smoky fire
resulted, causing all the workers to exit the tunnel in great haste. Firefighters had to
slog 1.5 km to the TBM through appreciable water. A one-month shutdown followed
the incident.
Underway once again, probing and grouting ahead to arrest the water inflow, a
10-m-high cavern was encountered in November 1993. Slabs of rock tumbled down
on the TBM. Tunneling was stopped for four weeks as the space was filled with
450 m3 of concrete. Ground harder than expected was encountered at times, causing
rapid wear of the disk cutters.
The unexpected conditions caused Q to negotiate various change orders with
MWRA and its project management team. The evolution of the price for the effluent
outfall is charted in Table 13-2. Tunneling-made-good approximations appear in
Table 13-3. The outfall tunnel drive started in August 1990, that for the inter-island
tunnel (covered later) in April 1991.
As a result of a June 15, 1994, fire in the so-called “inter-island” or “cross-
tunnel” tunnel being driven concurrently, work in the outfall tunnel stopped for
three months’ review of overall operating procedures. Underway once more, on June
23, 1995, an engineer was crushed to death between the little train and the trailing
section of the TBM. More delay resulted, as well as fines imposed by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In July 1995, there was yet another
calamity, with resulting delays, as 200 tunnel workers were felled by respiratory ill-
nesses. OSHA employees flocked into the tunnel in an effort to identify the cause of
the ailment. Numerous fines were once again meted out for irregularities.
Table 13-2. Effects of Boston Harbor Cleanup Change Orders

MWRA Outfall Outfall Cross-Harbor Cross-Harbor
“Through” Tunnel Tunnel Cost Tunnel Tunnel Cost
Date Supposed Finish (US$ million)* Supposed Finish (US$ million)
November 92 10/95 202.4 2/95 75.0

5/93 7/95 202.8 5/95 73.9
12/93 7/95 202.8 5/95 73.9
5/94 11/96 207.5 12/95 78.2
12/94 Autumn/97 207.5 Autumn/96 78.2
8/95 4/98 211.7 4/97 122.1
3/96 4/98 274.2 4/97 142.2
10/96 4/98 253.0 11/97 147.3
5/97 4/98 247.5 11/97 152.3
6/99 9/99 257.2 Completed 158.1
10/00 Completed 257.7 Completed 158.8
*These amounts do not include separate contracts as follows: riser installation (US$76.8 mil-
lion); mucking and disposal (US$32.7 million); system startup and testing (US$9.5 million);
emergency system completion (estimated US$15.0 million).
Table 13-3. Progress with Outfall Tunnel

Date Approx. Dist. (m)
October 22, 1992 370

March 8, 1993 1,430
June 16, 1993 2,250
April 20, 1994 6,130
November 14, 1994 7,740
April 7, 1995 9,840
May 23, 1995 10,510
June 23, 1995 11,100
February 9, 1996 13,500
May 31, 1996 13,990
September 19, 1996 15,120
There were many interruptions, of course, but the tunnel kept being advanced
toward its ultimate destination (e.g., Kratch 1996). Between April 7 and May 23,
1995, as an example, the advance was 665 m, a mean of roughly 15 m/day. Over the
entire project, the average rate of progress was approximately 10 m/day, the maxi-
mum daily increment was 44 m, and the peak weekly advance was 195 m.
The original idea was that the TBM would not mine the final 550 m of the tun-
nel, which was to have a greatly reduced size, down to roughly 1.2 m across at the
end. The region was to be “drilled and shot.” However, a change was made and the
TBM worked the entire alignment, completing the drive on September 19, 1996.
The concrete lining had been completed earlier, the last of 218,000 tonnes of these
segments. Some 2,200,000 tonnes of rock had been excavated. The machine was
stripped of useful parts and then buried. The railway track and electrical cables were
subsequently removed.
An enormous amount of material would have to be placed on the tunnel invert
to produce the size reduction required. The actual figure was 34,500 m3, this being
largely foamed (20–22% increase in volume) cement grout. Some precast fairings
were placed.
The final riser exits from the top of the diffuser to purge trapped air. All other
riser exits are near the tunnel floor to expel intruded seawater. A further feature
of the diffuser is a restriction, or “venturi,” at its upstream end. This narrowing
serves to increase mixing so as to provide an extra mechanism that discourages
seawater intrusion.
13.6 Diffuser Completion and Outfall Startup

Three independent tunnel surveys were carried out to pinpoint the locations along
the tunnel where lateral excavation toward individual risers should begin. Green
water first flowed into the tunnel in very early January 1996 (Angelo 1996). By
the end of October 1996, 26 tunnel-to-riser connections had been completed. In
March 1997, connections were still being made. These involved 6- to 9-m lengths
of 762-mm-diam., custom-fitted fiberglass pipe, later encased in concrete. Although
the tops of the risers were covered, as a safety measure special plugs were installed
at their tunnel entrance points to prevent seawater from entering the tunnel in the
event of a seabed accident. These full-diameter bulkheads were made of fiberglass,
and each weighed some 310 N.
July 1999 marked the time for the 55 plugs to be finally pried loose and removed
in an operation predicted to take two weeks. Because Q had with MWRA approval
dismantled the tunnel’s ventilation system, the workers clearly had to have a por-
table air supply. They also had to provide their own electrical power and light.
One working and one backup system were set up. Each arrangement involved
two civilian versions of special all-terrain military vehicles plus a custom-built trailer
that could be towed from either end. One vehicle, oriented seaward, was lowered
down the drop shaft. The trailer, carrying the other vehicle oriented landward, was
also lowered into the tunnel. The idea was that, after a day’s shift, the vehicle on the
trailer would drive off, to be replaced by the other vehicle. The second vehicle would
then provide the towing back to the drop shaft 15 km away. It bears mentioning that
the diesel engines of the two vehicles had had to be modified to operate in the uncer-
tain tunnel atmosphere. Also, there were stretches of standing water to negotiate.
The plan was to first drive (for 2 hours) as far down the tunnel as possible until
passage was prevented by the reducing diameter within the diffuser. This was near
the 12th riser, counting from the terminus. The vehicle would then be parked. Each
team involved five “divers.” While two men stayed with the vehicle, the three oth-
ers would don breathing apparatus and let out their umbilical as they walked the
roughly 450-m distance to the furthest plug, the one pulled first. Large tanks of nitro-
gen and oxygen were set on the trailer to supply a breathing mixture. Safety bottles
were carried. Each member of the threesome also wore a remote camera, allowing
the pair in the vehicle to view video monitors of their activity.
After the third plug had been removed, the three-person crew at the risers lost
contact with their companions back at the vehicles, as did topside personnel. The
trio raced 350 long m back to the vehicles, to find both men unconscious and in
cardiac arrest. In their haste to return to the drop shaft with the victims, all the while
attempting resuscitation, the trio abandoned the lead vehicle, along with various
items of equipment. Emergency personnel met the essential ambulance at the foot
of the drop shaft, but it was too late. Each man, once on the surface, was taken to
a separate hospital by helicopter, there officially pronounced dead (Angelo 1999).
I know that a successful legal suit was in time filed in behalf of one of the pair, but
have no related knowledge of the other individual.
These deaths stopped the activities that were to have led to an outfall operation in
September 1999. OSHA stepped in, levied fines of $411,000, and demanded that the
tunnel be fully ventilated before workers could resume pulling plugs. The brilliant,
award-winning idea that evolved to deal with this dictate was to use one of the three
unplugged risers as the exit for air pulled 15.1 km through the tunnel from the drop
shaft. Removal of the second vehicle and equipment would have to wait until then.
For roughly US$15 million, the MWRA rehired Z, the joint venture that had
originally drilled the holes and then placed the risers. Z found the same jack up rig
in Venezuela and had it towed back to Boston for the final work. The jackup arrived
at Boston on June 6, 2000, and after being reoutfitted was on station July 7, 2000.
The company also rehired some of the former rig personnel, including the resident
engineer. A deck barge was also taken to the site.
Riser number 3 (from the terminus) was selected, its protective dome was
removed, and bolts on the diffuser head manhole were loosened. A specially fabri-
cated 52.5-m-long, 55-tonne, 2,134-mm-diam. casing with a flared base was lowered
over the head and set in place. The manhole was removed, and a 1,219-mm-diam.
pipe was run down into the riser itself. A 16.5 m3/s fan, mounted at the top of
the casing, provided air circulation, starting July 14, 2000 (Wallace and Duckworth
2002). After the casing system was in place, it took six weeks to complete remaining
tunnel activities. The last riser safety plugs were pulled on July 24, 2000.
On July 28, 2000, dewatering pumps were removed from the outfall, and
groundwater inflow began to fill the tunnel. When the water level reached a depth
of roughly 3.5 m beneath the drop shaft to cushion the impact, effluent was released
into the tunnel. While this was going on, Z pulled up its ventilation casing and div-
ers returned the diffuser head and dome to the proper condition.
When the water depth under the drop shaft eventually attained 11.5 m, the tun-
nel was full as far as diffuser riser number 3. Divers removed pressure relief caps
from every dome and drilled holes in most nozzle caps for the release of air. The
view from the jack up rig was that of boiling water as air was continuously expelled.
More divers ultimately dropped to the seabed and removed five (of eight) nozzle
caps at each diffuser head. The last uncapping occurred August 22, 2000, well before
the dreaded onset of winter weather.
13.7 The Cross-Harbor Tunnel

As remarked earlier, the outfall was not the only tunnel involved in the BHC (Green
1990). Two short (roughly 800-m) tunnels, intended to supply sewage to Deer
Island from the north, had been completed in 1993. The “inter-island,” or “cross-
harbor,” tunnel was designed to convey wastewater from the new headworks at Nut
Island north to the new WWTP on Deer Island (see Fig. 13-2). The projected average
flow was 6.3 m3/s. This tunnel was also to contain, behind its concrete lining, two
356-mm pipes that would transport liquid sludge in the other direction, the ulti-
mate destination being the sludge processing and fertilizer plant at Fore River.
The 89-m-deep drop shaft for this 7,668-m-long tunnel was on Deer Island, as
it was for the outfall tunnel (McMonagle and Otoski 1997). The TBM was 4.27 m
in diameter, with a finished tunnel diameter of 3.51 m. There was a Thanksgiving
Day flood in the tunnel on November 25, 1993. Electricity went out and dewatering
pumps ceased operating. During several months in the spring of 1994, tunneling
crews were slowed by high levels of water seepage. As of April 20, 1994, the tunnel
had been driven 5,356 m.
On June 15, 1994, a serious fire took place in the drop shaft area (Rubin 1994b;
“Tunnel” 1994). Fortunately, the 43 workers in the tunnel at the time were able to
escape via “man cage” through a 1.2-m-diam. ventilation and evacuation shaft on
Long Island about 2.4 km from the fire. Power was knocked out, shutting down the
dewatering system. The combination of fire and water caused considerable damage.
Repairs, alterations, and enhancements were made, and on September 9, 1994, the
TBM continued on its way. On October 6, 1994, less than a month later, the machine
became trapped in soft and loose rock (Angelo 1995a). Excavation continued, largely
by hand, for the next nine months—until the tunnel had been advanced roughly
27 m into solid rock.
On November 4, 1995, after more last-minute problems, the TBM reached the
79-m-deep drop shaft at Nut Island (Angelo 1995b; “Under-Harbor” 1996). Dur-
ing the month that followed, the TBM was disassembled and removed. Thereafter,
another month was needed to mobilize for tunnel lining installation, which started
in January 1996 (“Grout” 1997). Lining thickness was nominally 254 mm.
The steady climb in the cost of the multi-calamity cross-harbor tunnel is shown
in Table 13-2.
13.8 Accomplishments
13.8.1 Commissioning
In January 1995, the new primary WWTP on Deer Island was first operated on a
trial basis, solely with north system wastewater. The ribbon was cut in July of that
year, and south system flows were added in July 1998. There had been arguments
(e.g., Bicknell 1989; Harleman 1989, 1990, 1991) that advanced primary treatment
would be sufficient for the effluent, but the end result was in fact an adjacent second-
ary plant. The first battery was operational in August 1997, and the second in Janu-
ary 1998. At a total of three batteries, there was one less than anticipated because of
25% lower actual flows than forecast, with a capital cost savings of US$165 million.
Boston taxpayers got still more relief in April 1996, when plans for an immense com-
bined sewer overflow storage tunnel (Suhr 1992) were shelved, a saving of roughly
US$1 billion.
The final Deer Island WWTP, intended to serve roughly 2.5 million people and
5,500 businesses, is the second largest WWTP in the United States. The US$3.8 bil-
lion BHC was a shot in the arm for the sagging economy of the Boston area. Over the
length of the project, there were 16,000 construction jobs, 3,600 engineering and
professional services positions, plus 4,600 supplier jobs. In May 1992, there were
360 firms on Deer Island. The peak work force there was some 3,000 people.
The management of all the different data gathering, permitting, design, construc-
tion, supply, operation, maintenance, disposal, etc., tasks was an immense under-
taking, requiring a highly efficient, computerized project management system and
related training for all teams. Details are in Lager and Locke (1990) and Button et al.
(1994). There were, nevertheless, contract infractions, and when found, these trans-
gressions were heavily penalized (hundreds of thousands of dollars) by OSHA.
The BHC was notable in the relative absence of labor problems and related work
stoppages. For background, see Bradford (1993). Of considerable interest in this
regard is the fact that Judge Mazzone had been a high school classmate of a ranking
officer with the Metropolitan District Trade Council, overseeing 31 local unions and
more than 35,000 journeymen and apprentices.
After several weeks of trial for the whole new Deer Island system, wastewater
flows to Boston Harbor were triumphantly terminated (“MWRA” 2000; Brown
2002). The date was September 6, 2000, slightly more than 15 years after Judge
Mazzone’s initial directive. Fortunately, the jurist lived to witness the success of the
project. He passed away in October 2004.
13.8.2 Continuing Monitoring

Although it would appear that the BHC was complete, except possibly for combined
sewer overflow problems, the July 12, 2000, permit for the Deer Island WWTP did
not make this assumption. Extensive monitoring of the receiving waters would be
required; plant performance data would have to be collected to ensure that the
WWTP was being well run. A contingency plan was set up to deal with problems
made evident by the testing program. The official group concerned with monitor-
ing was initially the Outfall Monitoring Task Force and later the Outfall Monitoring
Scientific Advisory Panel.
The ocean water monitoring would be extensive, reaching from off Cape Ann to
the north all the way south into Cape Cod Bay, and east well out into Massachusetts
Bay. The estimated cost is roughly US$3 million per year, and the researchers would
obtain the following types of data: water conditions (e.g., temperature, clarity, total
suspended solids, and nutrients); sewage-related bacteria; floatables; phytoplankton;

toxic chemicals; red tides; fish; and marine mammals. Basic plant performance data
would include flow rate, pH, total suspended solids, biochemical oxygen demand,
fecal coliforms, and total chlorine residual. The latter was important because of the
terminal chlorination and dechlorination of the plant’s secondary effluent.
During the interval January to mid-April 2001, the water column over the diffuser
was cold and vertically well mixed. As would be expected, the effluent surfaced.
13.8.3 Fate of the Former Outfalls

Outfall Nos. 101 and 102 at Nut Island were cleaned internally in 1985–1986. This
pair plus No. 103 are now standby effluent pipes and were secured by adding a
1,524-mm-diam. spool piece and duckbill valve to each terminus to prevent growth
of marine life and accumulation of debris. The contractor, in each case, had to pour
a special reinforced concrete base to support the new end structure.
The Deer Island harbor outfalls would also be kept for emergency use. However,
year 2000 inspections showed that No. 002 was cracked and leaking. Outfalls 001,
004, and 005 were sound, except that five of the No. 001 openings were buried. One
idea was to fit all of the No. 001 45-degree outlets with duckbill valves, and to leave
Nos. 004 and 005 unaltered. The duckbills could be clamped to 230-mm-long lips
on the No. 001 outlets.
13.8.4 A Final Touch

As a final note, the U.S. Congress, in November 1996, created the 650-ha Boston
Harbor Islands National Park, extending 18 km from downtown Boston. Thirty-four
islands were included, significantly both Nut and Deer Islands, essential peninsulas.
Each of these areas had its exposed wastewater-related features, of course, but on Nut
Island, 6 of 7 ha were park. Deer Island had 24 (of 85) ha for public recreation, with
an extensive network of walkways and trails, 10 landscaped overlooks, and a small
mooring basin for boats plying the attractive waters.
Boston Harbor has become what it should be, but we mourn the loss of five of
our brothers who worked to make it happen.
References
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Appendix A
299
300
Table A-1. Selected World Outfalls, Continuing after Table 1-1
Max.
Nominal Water
Marine Outfall Construction

Const. Depth
No. Year Name/Location Pipe Size & Material Length, (m) (m) Details More Info.
51 1978 Santos/Sao Vicente, Brazil 1,750-mm i.d. steel, 19-mm 4,000 12 Design flow 7.0 m3/s; 3-year construction time; —
wall, with 215-mm CWC staging area reclaimed from the sea; bottom-
pull; pipe string length 400 m; DL ⫽ 200 m;
diffuser has 40 vertical 300-mm pipes, 5 m
apart, with ports of the same size, but only
20 were used at the outset; milliscreened
effluent
52 1978 Camps Bay, Cape Province, 374-mm i.d. HDPE within 1,365 24 Semiopen coast (ocean); long construction 12.5.1,
South Africa 552-mm steel, annulus time B.6.2
concrete
53 1978 Edinburgh, Scotland Concrete-lined tunnel 2,800 10 Discharge to large estuary; all but one riser with 8.1.2
(3.66 m i.d.) four ports; DL ⫽ 760 m; stepped diffuser
54 1978 Wied Ghammieq, Valletta, HDPE, 900-mm, 35-mm 716 36 Float out and sink; DL ⫽ 144 m; 25 stub —
Malta wall 200-mm ports (horizontally discharging),
saline effluent; flow 58,000 m3/day
55 1978 Calback, Sullom Voe, 876-mm i.d. steel, 19-mm 480 24 Ballast water discharge; bottom-pull; steel —
Shetland Islands, wall, with 68-mm CWC sleeve through surf zone; DL ⫽ 135 m;
England, U.K. T-diffuser; top ports
56 1978 Petersburg City, Alaska, U.S. 406-mm ductile iron 500 18 Four 102-mm ports (two plugged in 1989); —
flow into coastal strait
57 1978 Blaine, Washington, U.S. 762-mm ductile iron 730 — Discharge to oceanic sound; approximately —
19-mm pipe wall
58 1978 Dana Point (SERRA), Cali- 1,448-mm RCP, 152-mm 3,602 33 491 pipe pieces; construction cost US$11.3 2.5, 3.8
fornia, U.S. wall million
59 1978 Bethany Beach, Delaware, 762-mm i.d. steel 1,980 — CWC 4.5.1
U.S.
60 1978 French Creek, Regional 500-mm i.d., 550-mm o.d. 2,440 61 Capacity 16,000 m3/day; straight alignment; —
District of Nanaimo, HDPE DL ⫽ 78 m (steel); 25 ports of 63-mm-
Vancouver Island, British diameter and hinged end assembly; first
Columbia, Canada 950 m buried (to 15-m water depth)
61 1978 Aracruz Celulose No. 1, 1,000-mm o.d., 923-mm i.d. 1,000 17 Open coast pulp mill discharge; installation by —
Aracruz, Brazil polypropylene (twin) float and sink; design flow 2.0 m3/s; unbur-
ied; DL ⫽ 200 m; 50 wall ports of 100 mm
62 1978 Fort Bragg extension, 610-mm RCP 190 9 Highly irregular seabed 3.7
California, U.S.
63 1978 Québec East, Québec, 2,134-mm tunnel 950 56 Two 1,219-mm-diam. risers, roughly 82 m 8.1.1
Canada long, into large river; design flow 0.20 m3/s
64 1979 Lynetten, Copenhagen, Twin 1.80-m spun concrete 1,500 20 Ice problems during construction; trenching, —
Denmark pipe floated out; 22 vertical outflow pipes
on top, discharging at 8-m water depth
65 1979 Terminal Island, Los Angeles, 1,524-mm i.d. RCP 300 9 0.97 m3/s nominal discharge to harbor; single —
California, U.S. full-size terminal elbow discharging upward
66 1979 Richmond, San Francisco 1,829-mm RCP 2,810 9 Pipe buried, crosses shipping channel, diffuser —
Bay, California, U.S. length 340 m, 140 top-exit single risers
0.58 m high, port diameter 63–102 mm;
two extended-bell pipe sections crane-low-
ered as one unit (strongback and bedding
stone hoppers)
67 1979 Irvine Valley, Troon, Twin 1,168-mm o.d. steel 1,925 13 Industrial wastewater; tunnel excavation took 8.4.2
Scotland in 2.90-m concrete-lined 2.5 years; 10 risers each with four 140-mm
tunnel ports; riser holes drilled by jackup; commis-
Appendix A
sioned June 1984
68 1979 Peekskill, New York, U.S. 1,219-mm HDPE 1,750 — Discharge to tidal part of Hudson River 10.3.1
69 1979 Norton reconstruction, 610-mm o.d., 595-mm i.d. 311 16 Trenching; float and sink two equal lengths; —
Yarmouth, Isle of Wight, steel backfill; open end; construction cost
England, U.K. £400,000
DL ⫽ 120 m; tapered diffuser; 10 risers; floated
301
70 1979 Oban Bay, Strathclyde, 610-mm i.d. steel, 13-mm 500 43 —
Scotland wall, with 75-mm CWC out; two ball joints
(contintued)
302
Table A-1. Selected World Outfalls, Continuing after Table 1-1 (Continued )
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
71 1979 Suffolk County, Long 1,829-mm steel with 5,350 18 Pipe lengths floated out, then sunk into trench; 11.4.1
Island, New York, U.S. 152-mm CWC construction problems
72 1979 Highland Creek Sewage 2,740-mm RCP 1,320 15 Design flow ⫽ 11.3 m3/s; DL ⫽ 460 m; adjust- —
Treatment Plant, Toronto, able multiport outlets
Ontario, Canada
73 1980 Aberdeen, Scotland 2.50-m concrete-lined 2,500 — Discharge to North Sea 8.1.2
tunnel
74 1980 Bo’ness (Grangemouth), 500-mm o.d., 469-mm i.d. 1,850 4 400-mm CWC and cement lining; industrial —
Firth of Forth, Scotland steel discharge into estuary; 21-port diffuser in
frame; 500-mm nozzles; bottom-pull
(31 strings)
75 1980 Clover Point Extension 1,067-mm steel with CWC 850 67 Sewage discharge to marine strait; overall out- 7.3.3,
No. 2, Victoria, British (76–102 mm) fall 1,200 m long; additional ports opened 11.4.2
Columbia, Canada in 1992
76 1980 Monaco No. 1, Mediterra- 1,000 mm 200 50 65-m-long sections during construction —
nean Sea, Monaco
77 1980 Aldeburgh, Suffolk, 202-mm i.d., 259-mm o.d. 1,300 — Reel barge; two 125-mm outlets 11.2.1
England, U.K. steel-armored HDPE
78 1980 Mundesley (Knapton 600-mm HDPE 1,500 — Protective concrete domes for diffuser 12.1
Road), Norfolk,
England, U.K.
79 1980 East Bay Dischargers 2,438-mm RCP with 11,600 7 Full-length burial 6.6.2
Authority, Oakland, 229-mm wall
California, U.S.
80 1981 Akhiok, Kodiak Island, 152-mm PE 1,070 3 Open-end discharge; construction cost —
Alaska, U.S. US$30,000; pipe repaired in 1990
81 1981 Ocean City, Cape May 914-mm prestressed 2,024 11 Jackup barge; full-length burial; average flow 3.6.2
County, New Jersey, U.S. concrete cylinder pipe approximately 0.3 m3/s
(trunk)
82 1981 Kenai, Alaska, U.S. 457-mm ductile iron — 2 Full-length burial with 1.5 m of pipe cover; one 11.4.3
simple open-end 305-mm riser encased in
concrete; design flow 15,000 m3/day; large
tidal range
83 1981 Ganges, Salt Spring Island, 200-mm HDPE 4,800 16 Mean flow 446 m3/day; discharge to harbor; —
British Columbia, public outcry over whole idea; pipe partly
Canada jetted in at shore end; rest of pipe used
continuous tunnel weights
84 1981 Afan, Wales 1,050-mm steel with CWC 3,000 — 26 PVC risers; some broke, and modifications —
made; diffuser full of silt
85 1981 Hastings, Hawkes Bay, New 1,150-mm prestressed con- 2,800 13 Bottom-pull; tapered DL ⫽ 300 m; 50 each 4.7.1
Zealand crete with flexible joints 125- and 155-mm ports
86 1981 Pennington No. 2, 1,422-mm o.d., 1,390-mm 820 6 One riser with two ports; sewage discharge into 4.7.1
Hampshire, U.K. i.d. steel estuary; pipe bottom-pulled in four lengths;
CWC and PE coating; construction cost £1.4
million
87 1981 Stevenston (Ardeer 500-mm i.d. HDPE, cement 2,361 24 Industrial effluent; DL ⫽ 135 m; 20 ports; —
No. 2, Irvine), grout, 660 mm o.d. steel seven strings bottom-pulled; construction
Strathclyde, Scotland (sleeve) cost £2.6 million
88 1981 Dam Neck (Atlantic Plant), 1,676-mm prestressed con- 2,950 9 Outfall located off military property 3.6.3
Virginia Beach, Virginia, crete cylinder
U.S.
Appendix A
89 1981 Discovery Bay, Hong Kong 400-mm HDPE 630 12 — —
90 1981 Ta-Lin-Pu, Kaohsiung City, 1.50-m steel with CWC 3,350 20 Diffuser length 347 m with 140 T-shaped out- —
Taiwan flow devices, step-down diffuser
91 1981 Tso-Ying, Kaohsiung City, 1.50-m steel with CWC 5,080 20 Diffuser length 347 m, step-down diffuser; —
Taiwan design–build; mainly industrial effluent 303
(contintued)
304
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
92 1982 Camuy-Hatillo, Puerto 610-mm RCP 600 15 Open coast (ocean), diffuser 70 m long —
Rico, U.S.
93 1982 Bayamon, Puerto Rico, U.S. 3,048-mm RCP 2,865 41 Open coast (ocean), Y diffuser (each leg —
316 m long); 102 ports of 152-mm diameter;
trench excavation started in 1979 (numer-
ous rock outcroppings); pipe section length
6.10 m; construction cost US$15.8 million
94 1982 Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, U.S. 1,524 mm 1,915 15 Open coast (ocean), Y diffuser (each leg 97 m —
long); pipe on pile caps topping pairs of
steel pipe piles every 7.6 m
95 1982 Pondicherry Paper Mills, 315-mm HDPE 500 — Concrete ballast blocks, discharge to Bay of —
Pondicherry, India Bengal
96 1982 Morro Bay-Cayucos, Cali- 686-mm welded steel pipe 1,340 16 Top exit molded fiberglass risers with monel —
fornia, U.S. fasteners; 34 ports of 51 mm
97 1982 Dan Region (Soreq, Shaf- 400-mm HDPE 5,200 37 19-mm pipe wall; Y diffuser, each leg 100 m 1.3.2
dan) Excess Sludge, long; first 500 m of pipe snaked through
Tel Aviv, Israel obstructions and then covered by tremie
concrete; outside portion stabilized by con-
crete half rings and saddles; air release valve
far upstream; design flow 700 m3/h
98 1982 Southport Broadwater, 1,000-mm o.d. HDPE, wall 1,400 — Concrete weight blocks; discharge point trans- 10.3.2
Nerang River Estuary, 43–51 mm ferred to north side of trained entrance in
Queensland, Australia 1985; outflow only on ebb tide
99 1982 Wanganui City, North 1,300-mm post-tensioned 1,800 — Open coast marine discharge; operational —
Island, New Zealand concrete problems; repairs made to detached termi-
nus in late 2007
100 1982 Sitka City, southeast Alaska, 610-mm concrete (trunk) 1,676 23 Tapered ductile iron diffuser (to 254 mm); —
U.S. DL ⫽ 61 m; zigzag path; discharge to coastal
strait; 16 wall ports of 102 mm
101 1982 Anchorsholme No. 2, 2,460-mm, 28-mm-wall 930 13 Sewage discharge to Irish Sea; floating pipe —
Blackpool, U.K. steel towed to site and lowered into predredged
trench; full-size terminal elbow; eight
1,016-mm ports; construction cost £5.75
million
102 1982 Tanajib, Saudi Arabia 1,035-mm i.d. steel 1,800 — Industrial brine outflow; nine strings bottom- —
pulled into predug trench; one riser, one
1,066-mm opening; CWC
103 1982 Bridlington, Yorkshire, U.K. 1,016-mm steel 1,500 — Sewage discharge to North Sea; pipe bottom- —
pulled into trench; 19 diffuser ports; con-
struction cost £2.5 million; fabrication area
over beach on steel piles
104 1982 Cork, Ireland 1,420-mm steel with CWC 2,500 — Industrial effluent —
105 1982 Waimea, New Zealand 630-mm HDPE 300 — — —
106 1982 Raccoon Strait, Tiburon, 914-mm steel, 10-mm wall, 270 29 Upper San Francisco Bay, California 4.5.2
California, U.S. with CWC
107 1982 Arbroath, Scotland 889-mm i.d. steel, 13-mm 945 14 102-mm CWC 11.5.1
wall
108 1983 Kiel extension, Baltic Sea, 1,500 mm — 6 Two 76-m Y diffuser legs at end of 750-m —
Germany extension; 42 risers; floated out and joined
109 1983 Atka, Aleutian Islands, 152-mm PE 300 9 Open-end discharge —
Alaska, U.S.
Appendix A
110 1983 Yap Lagoon extension, Yap, 406-mm ductile iron 170 40 End T; steep slope; concrete cover 11.3.1
Western Caroline Islands
111 1983 Loy Yang saline water 610-mm steel, 10-mm wall 550 8 CWC; full-length trestle and burial, each pipe 3.3
(McGaurans Beach), lowered into trench; three flexible joints
Ninety Mile Beach,
Victoria, Australia
305
(contintued)
306
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
112 1983 Sewer Authority Mid-Coast- 508-mm ductile iron 600 12 Construction involved two different contrac- 12.3
side Regional No. 2, Half (restrained) tors; surge chamber; full-length burial; DL ⫽
Moon Bay, California, 72 m; 35 risers of 86 mm with top elbows
U.S. (51-mm openings); diffuser pipe diameter
of 457 mm
113 1983 Kawana, Bokarina, 700-mm i.d. steel with 1,200 10 Construction cost A$5.2 million 4.5.3
Sunshine Coast, 95-mm CWC
Queensland, Australia
114 1983 Monterey Bay, Marina, 1,524-mm RCP 3,400 33 Unusual pipe route because of permit prob- 6.3, 7.3.3
California, U.S. lems; DL ⫽ 415 m; 172 ports (51-mm);
open coast; series of operational problems
115 1983 Great Grimsby (Pyewipe 2,000-mm i.d., 2,600-mm 2,910 8 Sewage discharge to estuary; pipe bottom- 4.5.4
No. 2), South Humber- o.d., composite steel, pulled; construction cost £7.5 million
side, England, U.K. reinforced plastic, con-
crete
116 1983 Great Yarmouth (Caister), 914-mm o.d., 20-mm wall 1,400 24 100-mm CWC; sewage discharge to estuary; 4.7.1
Norfolk, England, U.K. steel six lengths bottom-pulled into 5-m-deep
trench; ductile iron under sand dunes;
operation in 1986; 300-mm openings;
DL ⫽ 51 m; construction cost £3.5 million
117 1983 Hastings and Bexhill 914-mm, 13-mm wall steel 3,142 15 Cement mortar lining; complicated bottom- 4.7.2
(Bulverhythe), southeast pull into predredged trench; commissioned
England, U.K. 1988; construction cost £2.0 million
118 1983 Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, U.S. 1,219-mm ductile iron 860 15 Open coast (ocean) —
119 1983 Arecibo, Puerto Rico, U.S. 914-mm RCP 1,150 23 Open coast (ocean), diffuser 250 m long, —
56 ports
120 1983 Santa Isabel, Puerto Rico, 508-mm ductile iron 2,000 9 Open coast (ocean), three ports —
U.S.
121 1983 Toulon, France 450-mm PVC 1,850 42 No diffuser, double pipe —
122 1983 Weymouth (and Portland) Tunnel lined to 1.68 m 2,500 30 Many geological problems during prolonged 8.1.2
(West Bay), Dorset, construction; risers at 50-m centers (each
England, U.K. with six 250-mm ports)
123 1983 Port Alice Pulpmill, Port 1,219-mm HDPE 300 49 — —
Alice, Vancouver Island,
British Columbia,
Canada
124 1983 Beirut South No. 1 1.2-m steel with CWC 2,600 60 Average year 2000 flow about 35,000 m3/day —
(Ghadir), Lebanon
125 1983 Scarborough, Maine, U.S. 508-mm HDPE 450 13 Blasting inshore; pipe lengths floated then 12.2
sunk; complete burial; many construction
problems; DL ⫽ 110 m; 36 risers (76-mm)
126 1983 Sanary, Mediterranean Sea, 700-mm concrete cylinder 1,500 50 Flow 6,800 m3/day —
southern France pipe
127 1983 Tondo, Manila Bay, 1,800-mm steel, 13-mm 3,600 10 Bottom-pull; DL ⫽ 320 m; US$23.0 million for 4.5.5
Philippines wall, with CWC installation by U.S. marine contractor
128 1983 Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, Concrete 1,340 — Flow into major channel; flow capacity —
Canada 2.7 m3/s; 50 (150-mm) diffuser ports
129 1984 Unalaska, Aleutian Islands, 406-mm ductile iron 137 30 Design flow 60 L/s; open end; ball joint; large —
Alaska, U.S. armor rock; pipe eased down shoreline
wood skidway by loader pulling through
sheave anchored offshore in 50 m of water;
stainless steel bolts; zinc anodes
130 1984 Cape Peron, south of 1,400-mm i.d. steel with 4,200 20 Bottom-pulled into prepared trench 4.2
Appendix A
Perth, Western Australia, 120-mm CWC
Australia
131 1984 Clacton foul No. 2, Hum- 1,067-mm o.d. steel, 14-mm 800 10 Design flow 1.5 m3/s; ductile iron risers; 4.7.1
berside, England, U.K. wall, with 130-mm CWC 16 (200-mm) ports; protective domes; pipe
bottom-pulled into excavated trench; step-
down diffuser encased in concrete
307
(contintued)
308
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
132 1984 Narragansett No. 2 (Scar- 559-mm HDPE (trunk) 670 6 Full-length burial; tapering diffuser system in —
borough WWTF), Rhode ductile iron; three horizontal flow, 305-mm
Island, U.S. ports
133 1984 Central Marin, San Rafael, 2,134-mm-i.d. RCP, 2,546 9 Design flow 4.0 m3/s; DL ⫽ 325 m.; 176 risers, 3.5.5
San Francisco Bay, Cali- 203-mm wall 1.5 m high, each with two arms and 76-mm
fornia, U.S. ports; full-length trench; support from
precast concrete saddles supported by pairs
of 356-mm square concrete piles 14–18 m
long; installation took slightly more than one
year; trench left to fill naturally; construction
cost US$6.4 million; new saddle lowered
with struts attached to connect to previously
set cap; pipe lowered in frame with operator-
controlled hydraulic rams for releasing pins
for belly bands; checkered operational history
of diffuser involving placement of internal
band seals, repair and replacement of risers,
plus removal of internal deposits, costing
hundreds of thousands of dollars
134 1984 Chung-Chou, Kaohsiung 1.8 m 3,000 24 Design flow 6.5 m3/s; step-down diffuser —
City, Taiwan 600 m long; heavy ship traffic (pipe located
off busy harbor)
135 1984 Gloucester No. 2 original, 914-mm HDPE 1,590 9 Sewage discharge into harbor; zigzag line; —
Gloucester, Massachu- 10 (152-mm) ports; DL ⫽ 30 m; complete
setts, U.S. burial
136 1984 James River Marathon 1,000-mm PE 800 12 Blasted rock trench; rock backfill; 10 diffuser —
paper mill, Lake Supe- risers and nozzles
rior, Ontario, Canada
137 1984 Peter Pan reconstruction, 457-mm CMP 400 15 — —
Valdez, Alaska, U.S.
138 1984 Shanganagh (Killiney 1,170-mm steel 1,700 8 Bottom-pull of 11 strings into predug trench; —
Beach), Dublin, Ireland o.d. with CWC ⫽ 2,232 mm; one 1.6-m riser
and one 457-mm port
139 1984 Hythe foul, South Kent, 610-mm o.d. steel, 10-mm wall 2,714 25 Sewage discharge to English Channel 4.5.6
England, U.K.
140 1984 Marske (Langbaurgh), 1,200-mm steel, with 1,500 — Bottom-pull into prepared trench; DL ⫽ 4.7.1
Cleveland, England, U.K. 150-mm CWC 250 m; 15 risers with domes; design–build
project at £2.0 million
141 1984 Garnock Valley, Stevenston, Twin 1,170-mm steel with 1,200 18 Each pipe has eight risers, each with two ports; —
Strathclyde, Scotland CWC industrial wastewater; construction cost £3.9 mil-
lion; not commissioned until September 1987
142 1984 Antibes, Côte d’Azur, south- 1,100 mm 1,000 100 Steel cylinder with welded-on end rings and —
ern France internal and external reinforced concrete; tie
rods on section joints
143 1984 Tenby, South Wales 400-mm steel, with CWC 2,370 9 Nine risers; pipe bottom-pulled, jetted into —
seabed; commissioned in July 1985
144 1984 New Plymouth City, North 950-mm i.d. steel with 575 5 DL ⫽ 30 m (elevated); whole trunk lowered 3.2
Island, New Zealand 85-mm CWC into trench from trestle; shore approach
through 220-m-long soft rock tunnel
145 1984 Old Harbor, Kodiak Island, 152-mm ductile iron 335 5 Concrete weights; truck inner tubes to support —
Alaska, U.S. pipe, later pierced to sink line; end plug
loosened, shot up line; diver’s arm followed;
he managed to work way free before run-
Appendix A
ning out of air
146 1984 Mondi, Richards Bay, Natal, 1,000-mm o.d., 40-mm 5,450 27 Buoyant, fibrous pulp mill effluent; open coast 10.2.3
South Africa wall offshore (50-mm (ocean)
inshore) HDPE
147 1984 Triomf, Richards Bay, Natal, 900-mm o.d., 40-mm wall, 4,290 23 Heavy fertilizer plant effluent (gypsum slurry); 10.2.3
South Africa HDPE open coast (ocean)
309
(contintued)
310
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
148 1985 Margate, North Kent, 914-mm o.d., 13-mm wall 1,842 30 Construction cost £1.5 million 4.7.2
England, U.K. steel
149 1985 Carolina (Loiza), Puerto 1,829-mm RCP 1,994 27 12,600 tonnes of bedding stone and 58,700 —
Rico, U.S. tonnes of armor rock; DL ⫽ 203 m; 34 ports
varying in diameter from 191 to 381 mm;
open-coast discharge; construction cost
US$10.8 million
150 1985 Colaba, Mumbai 1,200-mm steel with CWC 1,200 — Bottom-pulled into prepared full-length trench; 12.7.2
(Bombay), India 20 risers; outflow into harbor; diffuser
surveyed in 2002, with duckbill valves fitted
in early 2005
151 1985 Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Mexico 914-mm coated steel 715 22 Open coast (ocean), diffuser 180 m long —
152 1985 Seven Mile Beach, Cape 610-mm o.d. steel with CWC 1,807 12 Full-length burial; 508-mm DL ⫽ 120 m; —
May County, New Jersey, (trunk) 39 risers; full-size 90° terminal elbow;
U.S. 57-mm ports; average flow approximately
0.3 m3/s; roller launchway; pull barge; com-
bined sheet pipe and trestle through the surf
zone; spud-mounted dragline for excavation
of sand from in front of sheet pipe enclosure
153 1985 Waianae extension, Hawaii, 1,067-mm RCP 1,100 32 Construction problems 1.5.1,
U.S. 6.6.3
154 1985 Ryde, Isle of Wight, 559-mm i.d. steel, 13-mm 3,107 25 Sewage discharge to strait; burial whole length; 4.7.2
England, U.K. wall, with 80-mm CWC construction cost £2.85 million
155 1985 Green Point No. 3, Cape 700-mm i.d., 50-mm wall, 1,700 27 Semiopen coast (ocean); destroyed in 1989 10.2.1
Town, South Africa HDPE storm
156 1985 Morfa Bychan, Porthma- 200-mm steel with concrete 2,410 23 Sewage into marine bay; pipe laid on soft sand —
dog, North Wales weights then sucked up to bury pipe
157 1985 Varo Pulp and Paper Mill 1,000-mm MDPE 4,100 — Design flow 2 m3/s; concrete collars; pipes —
extension, 80 km south towed to site
of Gothenburg, Sweden
158 1985 Beirut East No. 1, Lebanon 2,000-mm steel, 16-mm 900 — Bottom-pulled; underwater winch; elbows from —
wall, with 270-mm CWC crown
159 1985 Beirut East No. 2, Lebanon 1,700-mm steel with 2,000 60 Bottom-pulled; underwater winch; elbows from —
200-mm CWC crown
160 1986 Sausalito-Marin City, San 762-mm HDPE 90 12 Design flow 75 L/s; DL ⫽ 30 m; 102-mm —
Francisco Bay, Califor- ports with flapper valves; trenched; pairs of
nia, U.S. railroad rail anchor piles (approximate 3-m
spacing) and chain; crane barge during con-
struction; two flanged lengths with concrete
ballast collars
161 1986 Kirkcaldy, Firth of Forth, 864-mm o.d. steel, 14-mm 982 13 DL ⫽ 60 m; construction cost £2.6 million 4.5.7
Scotland wall
162 1986 Wollongong No. 1, New 868-mm i.d., 900-mm o.d. 264 10 Cement lining and CWC; support by piles —
South Wales, Australia steel into rock, pipe saddle, and straps; 166 L/s
average dry weather flow to Tasman Sea; one
seven-port riser; port size 200 mm
163 1986 Southwest Ocean, San Fran- 3,658-mm i.d., 330-mm 7,309 24 Construction problems; stepped DL ⫽ 1,006 m; 1.4.3,
cisco, California, U.S. wall RCP, thicker across full-length burial 2.4,
fault 6.2
164 1986 Stonehaven, northeast 457-mm steel with CWC 750 — Curved sea entry; bottom tow; construction —
Scotland cost £1.4 million
165 1986 Modare, Colombo, Sri 1,500-mm o.d. RCP 2,000 — — —
Appendix A
Lanka
166 1986 Wellawatte, Colombo, Sri 1,500-mm o.d. RCP 1,500 — — —
Lanka
167 1986 Renton, Seattle, Washing- 1,626-mm with 19-mm 3,050 190 Twin lines; design flow 3.2 m3/s; outflow to 7.3
ton, U.S. wall, steel oceanic sound; two discharge areas roughly
300 m apart and 3,000 m off breakwater
311
(contintued)
312
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
168 1986 Carry-le-Rouet, Golfe du 400 mm 530 30 Steel cylinder with welded-on end rings and —
Lion, Mediterranean Sea, internal and external reinforced concrete; tie
France rods on section joints
169 1986 King Cove Downtown, 152-mm ductile iron 210 11 Concrete collars —
Aleutian Islands, Alaska,
U.S.
170 1986 St. George Town No. 1, 175-mm-o.d. ductile iron 100 5 Rock anchors 11.3.4
Pribilof Islands, Alaska,
U.S.
171 1986 Alki STP extension, Seattle, 1,067-mm steel, 13-mm 210 44 Connects to open-end 1,219-mm-diam. pipe —
Washington, U.S. wall with 76-mm CWC at water depth of 26 m; eight 305-mm
ports, five ball joints, steep slope; center of
diffuser at 47°34⬘12.90⬙N 122°25⬘21.00⬙W;
discharge 350 m from street
172 1986 Timaru, South Island, New 1,000-mm i.d., 1,067-mm 730 6 Design flow 1.4 m3/s; barrel in trench with 11.6.1
Zealand o.d. steel 2.0-m nominal cover
173 1986 Arica, northern Chile 900-mm HDPE 1,400 18 Open coast (ocean); Y diffuser; design flow —
950 L/s; 48 (75-mm) outlets
174 1987 Cape Lazo, Comox, east 900-mm concrete-encased 3,000 75 — —
side of central Vancouver steel pipe
Island, British Colum-
bia, Canada
175 1987 Wildwood, Cape May 1,067-mm steel (trunk) 1,682 11 Average flow approximately 0.9 m3/s; full- —
County, New Jersey, U.S. (trunk) length burial; U-shaped diffuser, each
leg 238 m long, and half 762-mm, half
508-mm; 52 risers each leg; bearing of trunk
approximately S43°E; full-size 90° elbow at
end of each diffuser leg; end of pipe coordi-
nates 38°56⬘45⬙N 74°50⬘00⬙W
176 1987 Broadstairs, Northeast Kent, 610-mm o.d. steel, 10-mm 3,597 15 Outflow to sea; pipe buried whole length; 4.6.1
England, U.K. wall, with CWC complicated bottom-pull (eleven strings);
DL ⫽ 47 m; 273-mm ports
177 1987 Morrum Pulp Mill exten- MDPE, 1200 mm — — Mill 150 km north of Malmo —
sion, southern Sweden
178 1987 Burcom (Tioxide), Humber 500-mm i.d., 715-mm o.d., 2,450 — Industrial effluent to estuary; sheet pile coffer- —
Estuary, England, U.K. composite steel and dam across beach; construction cost
MDPE £4.4 million
179 1987 Minehead No. 2, Somerset, 712-mm steel, with CWC 675 — One other pipe; three different materials —
England, U.K.
180 1987 Kasaan, Southeast Alaska, 152-mm ductile iron 200 24 No anchoring; open end —
U.S.
181 1987 English Bay, Kenai Penin- 152-mm ductile iron 76 4 — —
sula, Alaska, U.S.
182 1987 Conwy No. 2, North Wales 400-mm ductile iron 450 — Estuary discharge; last 105 m on timber-piled —
supports
183 1987 Barmouth, Western Wales 325-mm steel with CWC 1,750 — DL ⫽ 45 m; bottom-pull; trenching machine —
for burial
184 1987 Chevron Refinery exten- 914-mm o.d., 10-mm wall 2,200 17 Curved alignment 11.4.4
sion, Carquinez Strait, steel
California, U.S.
185 1987 Iona, Vancouver, British 2,290-mm o.d. steel, 14-mm 3,200 110 Twin lines; burial to 21-m water depth; capacity 7.4
Columbia, Canada wall; no CWC 17.7 m3/s
186 1987 St. Paul, Pribilof Islands, 203-mm ductile iron 280 — Ductile iron weights; rocky seabed; work took 11.3.3
Alaska, U.S. two consecutive summers; pipe broken by
Appendix A
ship anchor soon thereafter
187 1987 Ahirkapi, Istanbul, Turkey Twin steel 1,626-mm diam- 1,162 60 CWC; discharge to strait; bottom-pulled into 4.6.2
eter, with 25-mm wall trench; construction cost US$13,043,000
(contintued)
313
314
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
188 1987 Spaniard’s Bay, Newfound- 200-mm ductile iron 100 7 Cement lining; pipe burial full length in 1-m- —
land, Canada deep trench created by blasting; two risers,
each with one 100-mm opening; concrete
over and around the pipe at sea end; after
the pipe was completed, the community
did not have sufficient funds to operate the
associated new WWTP
189 1987 West Road (Clacton) storm, 1,400-mm ductile iron 300 — Laid on greenheart piles above seabed —
Essex, England, U.K.
190 1987 SAICCOR No. 2, Umko- 900-mm i.d. stainless steel, 3,000 24 95-mm CWC, bottom-pulled into trench, 12.4.2
maas, Natal, South 10-mm wall DL ⫽ 989 m with 74 top T’s
Africa
191 1987 Southend extension, 1,800-mm FRP 1,350 18 Design flow 2.5 m3/s; concrete collars across —
Thames River Estuary, each joint; DL ⫽ 35 m with three risers and
England, U.K. six 500-mm ports; floated out and sunk in
sections
192 1987 Black Rock, Geelong, Victo- 1,350-mm i.d. steel, 16-mm 1,200 15 CWC; full-length bottom-pulled; approximate 4.3.1
ria, Australia wall construction cost A$13 million
193 1987 Watsonville No. 2 exten- 1,219-mm RCP 1,070 20 DL ⫽ 137 m; 102-mm ports; design flow 1,665 —
sion, California, U.S. L/s; total outfall length 2,240 m
194 1988 Mount Pleasant, Charles- 762-mm steel with CWC 1,400 11 Full-length burial; 10 risers, each with two —
ton, South Carolina, U.S. ports; DL ⫽ 82 m; full-size 90° end elbow
for flushing
195 1988 Serena (La), Chile 900-mm HDPE 1,200 20 Design flow 713 L/s; open coast (ocean); —
concrete weights; Y diffuser; 40 (140-mm)
outlets
196 1988 Zarauz (Zarautz), northern 0.45-m steel with CWC 1,035 33 Risers in diffuser; design flow 75 L/s B.6.2
Spain
197 1988 Waldronville Beach original Twin 800-mm HDPE 500 9 Pipes mounted on articulated concrete base —
(Green Island), Dune- slab; the seaward end of the outfall settled
din, South Island, New about 2 m, resulting in ports covered with
Zealand sand, which led to later extension
198 1988 Cowes (Old Castle Point), 500-mm o.d., 409-mm i.d. 837 20 Directionally drilled hole; pipe floated out, 5.5.1
Isle of Wight, England, MDPE then pulled shoreward; design and construc-
U.K. tion cost £1.3 million
199 1988 Santa Cruz No. 3, Califor- 1,829-mm RCP 3,734 34 Fully buried until roughly 26-m water depth 6.4
nia, U.S.
200 1988 Peterhead No. 2 (Sandford 780-mm i.d. steel, 16-mm 680 20 Pipe bottom-pulled; full-length burial 4.3.2
Bay), Scotland wall
201 1988 Greenock (Battery Park), 965-mm steel, wall 18-mm, 1,250 26 Bottom-pull of nine regular 126-m strings and 4.7.1
Firth of Clyde, Scotland with 100-mm CWC one 120-m end string; pull, using 76-mm-
diam. steel cable, from other side of Firth,
2,800 m away; tapered DL ⫽ 94 m; five
400-mm risers, each with two ports; full-
length burial; some blasting for trench;
80,000 m3 excavated; top backfill stone
maximum 200-mm; six bidders; construction
cost £3,455,550
202 1988 Saxman, Southeast Alaska, 152-mm ductile iron 230 26 Construction cost US$70,000 —
U.S.
203 1988 Humacao, Puerto Rico, U.S. 1,219-mm reinforced 1,920 — Diffuser Y with 24-m-long legs of 762-mm- —
concrete cylinder pipe diam. pipe; sheet pile cofferdam through
beach; construction cost US$7.6 million
Appendix A
204 1988 Pedder Bay, Metchosin, 254-mm HDPE 365 — Pipe completely jetted into seabed by hand —
south Vancouver Island,
British Columbia,
Canada
205 1988 Dumbarton (Castlegreen), 1,400-mm steel 423 3 Industrial wastewater —
Firth of Clyde, Scotland 315
(contintued)
316
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
206 1989 St. George Industrial, 270-mm steel drill casing 120 — Pipe pulled, then anchored to hard bottom 11.3.5
Pribilof Islands, Alaska, using drilled holes and allthread
U.S.
207 1989 Scalby Mills, Scarborough, 864-mm o.d., 14-mm wall, 1,454 17 Bottom-pulled alongside trench, then lowered; 4.7.1
North Yorkshire, steel with 100-mm CWC buried; tapered (to 457 mm); DL ⫽ 60 m;
England, U.K. five risers
208 1989 Gordano Valley, Bristol 864-mm o.d., then 762-mm 874 8 Bottom-pull; tapered (to 274-mm o.d.); DL ⫽ —
Channel, U.K. o.d. steel, 13-mm wall, 52 m; eight risers, each with one 200-mm
mostly with 80-mm CWC port; burial
209 1989 Wicklow Town foul, Wick- 508-mm o.d., 13-mm wall, 1,250 10 Bottom-pull; tapered (to 219-mm); DL ⫽ 62 m; —
low, Irish Sea, Ireland steel, with 65-mm CWC five risers, each with one port, dome-covered
210 1989 Tyonek, Cook Inlet, Alaska, 152-mm ductile iron and PE 90 2 Large tidal range; much installation work done —
U.S. using land-based equipment on extremely
low spring tide; clamp-on weights; construc-
tion cost US$25,000
211 1989 Newhaven Seaford Bay, 660-mm o.d., 641-mm i.d. 2,672 14 Cement mortar lining; wrapping and 80-mm- 4.7.2
English Channel, East steel thick CWC; DL ⫽ 64 m; 15 precast diffuser
Sussex, England, U.K. and inspection chambers; 245-mm ports;
design flow 590 L/s; construction cost
£2.7 million
212 1989 Charmouth (Lyme Bay), 457-mm o.d. steel, 13-mm 1,300 15 Open bay facing strait; sewage; domes; bottom- —
Dorset, England, U.K. wall, with 90-mm CWC pull with 50-m pipe strings; DL ⫽ 30 m;
four 175-mm ports; trench overdug laterally,
resulting in augmented wave forces and
leading to disagreements; top protection
from armor stone as well as articulated
concrete block mattresses
213 1989 Eastney Beach, Portsmouth, 1,442-mm steel with 14-mm 5,983 20 Internal sand cement mortar lining; construc- 4.6.3
Hampshire, England, U.K. wall tion cost £6.5 million
214 1989 Trieste, Gulf of Trieste, Twin steel — — One line 1,500-mm in diameter and 7.5 km —
extreme northeast Italy long; other line of diameter 1,200 mm and
6.5 km long; diffusers; pipes launched down
ramp, then first 3.5 km of each pipe lifted
and moved laterally 400 m into excavated
trench
215 1989 Dunbar (Belhaven Bay), 260 mm o.d., 206 mm i.d. 2,002 20 Open North Sea coastal receiving water; flexible 11.2.2
Lothian, Scotland line to diffuser, duckbill valves, domes
216 1989 Burwood Beach, New- Tunnel, 2.7-m i.d. 1,500 22 72 (200-mm) ports; nine riser shafts and one 8.3.1
castle, New South Wales, sludge riser drilled 50 m below the seabed;
Australia annuli grouted; construction cost approxi-
mately A$23 million
217 1989 Chemainus, southeastern 610-mm HDPE 460 64 — —
Vancouver Island, British
Columbia, Canada
218 1989 Central Treatment Plant, 1,384-mm i.d., 1,422-mm 378 45 DL ⫽ 90 m; 30 (305-mm) risers, each with —
Tacoma, Washington, o.d., steel with 76-mm one 152-mm-diam. orifice plate; impressed
U.S. CWC current cathodic protection system; some
ball joints
219 1989 Bondi, Sydney, New South 2.3-m concrete-lined tunnel 2,600 63 Outflow to Tasman Sea 8.1.1, 8.2
Wales, Australia
220 1989 Malabar, Sydney, New 3.5-m concrete-lined tunnel 4,800 82 Outflow to Tasman Sea 8.1.1, 8.2
South Wales, Australia
Appendix A
221 1989 North Head, Sydney, New 3.5-m concrete-lined tunnel 4,100 65 Outflow to Tasman Sea 8.1.1, 8.2
South Wales, Australia
222 1990 Newport City extension, 610-mm steel 229 5 Full-length burial; three 229-mm ports; (exist- —
Oregon, U.S. ing outfall inversion-lined at same time);
trestle used during construction
317
(contintued)
318
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
223 1990 Pontevedra, northwest 1,200-mm HDPE 2,535 18 Concrete weight bracelets; floated out and —
Spain sunk; discharge to estuary
224 1990 Coronel, Chile 517-mm HDPE 600 12 Open coast (ocean); Y diffuser, the end of each leg —
with a single 250-mm port; design flow 296 L/s
225 1990 Mobil North Sea, St. Fergus, 323 mm 800 — Industrial effluent; pull ashore, then burial by —
Scotland trenching machine
226 1990 Ironmill Bay, Fife, Scotland 800 mm 1,400 — Pipe in backfilled trench —
227 1990 Newbiggin-by-the-Sea foul, 610-mm o.d., 13-mm wall, 1,490 — Bottom-pull; buried; five single-port 200-mm —
Northumberland, North steel with 150-mm CWC i.d. risers
Sea, England, U.K.
228 1990 North Berwick, Firth of Spun-wire armored HDPE, 1,600 30 Twin lines terminating in same precast concrete 11.2.3
Forth, Scotland 270-mm o.d., 200-mm diffuser unit; reel barge; full-length burial;
i.d. mouth of large estuary
229 1990 South Queensferry, Firth of Spun-wire armored HDPE, 750 16 Large estuary; full-length burial; twin lines, 11.2.3
Forth, Scotland 270-mm o.d., 200-mm 750 mm apart, then terminating in same
i.d. precast concrete diffuser unit; reel barge
230 1990 North End extension, 914-mm i.d., 1,016-mm 55 43 Flanged pipe lengths; concrete collars; steep —
Tacoma, Washington, o.d., HDPE (19°) slope; six 406-mm risers, each with
U.S. single port (279–356-mm diameter)
231 1990 Gloucester No. 2 extension, 914-mm ductile iron 2,650 27 Zigzag line through harbor; tapered DL ⫽ 90 m; —
Gloucester, Massachu- 10 (152-mm) risers; complete burial
setts, U.S.
232 1990 Seaton Carew foul, Hartle- 1,016-mm o.d. steel, 18-mm 3,734 — Dredge, bottom-pull, backfill; DL ⫽ 190 m; five —
pool, Durham, England, wall, with 100-mm CWC single-port 200-mm i.d. risers
U.K.
233 1990 Owl’s Head, New York, 3,048-mm prestressed 163 18 64 risers —
New York, U.S. concrete
234 1991 Hout Bay, Cape Province, 364-mm i.d., 43-mm wall, 1,905 38 Mouth of marine bay 10.2.4
South Africa HDPE
235 1991 Stavanger, Norway 4 m ⫻ 5 m tunnel 4,200 80 Discharge 1500 m offshore; drill and blast; 8.1.1
downhill drive
236 1991 Samoa Packing/Starkist, Pago 406-mm HDPE 2,600 54 Edge of deep harbor; concrete cover weights; —
Pago, American Samoa installed in 305-m flanged segments
237 1991 Withernsea No. 2, Humber- 450-mm steel, 10-mm wall 1,120 — Open coast; 60-mm CWC —
side, England, U.K.
238 1991 Hydaburg No. 2, Southeast 203-mm ductile iron 176 12 Concrete crib anchoring; discharge through —
Alaska, U.S. 152-mm T
239 1991 Bude, North Cornwall, 700-mm i.d. steel, with 1,200 20 Pipe assembly area and temporary works on fore- —
England, U.K. 75-mm CWC shore; eight strings, and bottom-pull over five
days; stepped diffuser with DL ⫽ 30 m; three
risers and six 220-mm ports fitted with duckbill
valves; 70,000 m3 of dredging; unexpected rock
at diffuser; construction cost £5.5 million; alu-
minum anode bracelets; 0.5-tonne armor rock
240 1991 Tatitlek, Prince William 152-mm PE 490 12 Concrete weights fell off in short order and had 10.1
Sound, Alaska, U.S. to be replaced
241 1991 Tryon Creek STP extension, 914-mm HDPE 90 17 Discharge to large river; four risers with four —
Portland, Oregon, U.S. 127-mm ports each
242 1991 Bayona, northwest Spain 355-mm HDPE 1,785 32 — —
243 1991 Villagarcia, northwest Spain 500-mm HDPE 4,560 21 Discharge into estuary —
244 1991 Guia, Costa do Estoril, 1,800-mm ductile iron 800 45 HDPE diffuser legs 11.5.2
Portugal (trunk) (trunk)
Appendix A
245 1992 Pinedo, Valencia, Spain 3,200-mm steel-lined rein- 5,100 23 Outfall bottom pulled into prepared trench; on —
forced concrete Mediterranean Sea
246 1992 Uskudar, Istanbul, Turkey 1,219-mm steel, 24-mm 270 45 1.33 m3/s capacity; three flexible joints; stepped —
wall, with 120-mm CWC diffuser; 10 diffuser risers and domes; full-
length rock cover; steep slopes 319
(contintued)
320
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
247 1992 Seabright extension, 489-mm i.d. PE (SDR 17) 170 17 Replacement of open-ended pipe by multiport —
Hamilton, Bermuda diffuser; capacity 100 L/s; outflow 700 m
from shore; nearshore effects on marine
biota lessened, but outflow closer to deep
offshore reefs; vertical risers topped with
90° elbows and duckbill valves (found to
lose their elasticity after five years); concrete
saddle weights; float and sink
248 1992 Stonecutters Island, Twin 2,200-mm o.d. steel, 573 and 27 Overall o.d. ⫽ 2,652 mm; 6-mm fiberglass- 4.6.4
Hong Kong 27-mm wall 586 reinforced bitumen epoxy on outside of steel,
15-mm cement mortar lining on inside; bed-
ding stone; rock around base of riser and pre-
cast concrete dome over it; extra pipe strength
for future burial under land reclamation
249 1992 Longview Fibre, Longview, 1,219-mm steel — 12 13-mm wall; pile supported; 3.5 m3/s design —
Washington, U.S. flow into Columbia River; replacement for
old wood stave line (silted over after Mt. St.
Helens eruption)
250 1992 Aberdour Silversands, Firth 400-mm o.d., 23-mm wall, 1,100 11 Lay barge; tapered diffuser (to 219-mm o.d.); 11.1.2
of Forth, Scotland HDPE six risers each with four-port head; end
flushing port; diffuser outlets protected by
steel structure
251 1992 Upper Pyewipe, Grimsby HDPE, 500-mm o.d., 1,395 8 Industrial; lay barge; problems of very shallow 11.1.2
Humber Estuary, 45-mm wall water and soft (flowing) mud
England, U.K.
252 1992 Psyttalia Island effluent, 2.4-m i.d., 3.0-m o.d., RCP Twin 63 Remote control 7.2.2
Athens, Greece 1,870
253 1992 Delray Beach (Latrobe 800-mm o.d., 727-mm i.d. 1,267 18 Open coast; float and sink installation (three —
Valley), Ninety Mile HDPE strings); pipe exposed, except for landfall,
Beach, Victoria, Australia with concrete blocks; DL ⫽ 170 m; 51
(140-mm) openings with duckbill valves;
design flow 0.7 m3/s; 350-m-long trestle
during construction; wastewater from a
dozen each of towns and Latrobe Valley
industries, the latter from treatment lagoons
254 1992 Teignmouth, Devon, 965-mm-o.d. steel with 2,350 16 Estuary; design flow rate 1400 L/s; sewage; —
England, U.K. 14-mm wall 100-mm-CWC; trenching (3 m deep), with
70 m by drill and blast, then bottom pulling
of 200-m strings; diffuser domes; DL ⫽ 90
m; 10 outlets; 20 ports; open steelwork plat-
form served as base of operations; construc-
tion cost £5.8 million
255 1992 Flamborough, Humberside, 324-mm o.d. steel with 1,408 — Predredged trench; pipe pulled through curved —
U.K. 40-mm CWC tunnel in cliff; four ports
256 1992 Par No. 2 (St. Austell), 660-mm steel with 10-mm 1,520 18 Extensive predesign marine geological work; 4.7.1
Cornwall, England, U.K. wall pipe bottom-pulled into predredged trench
over five days; access only from sea; four ris-
ers; 75-mm CWC; DL ⫽ 45 m; construction
cost £2.75 million
257 1992 Tywyn and Aderdyfi, Wales 406 mm steel 1,590 7 o.d. including CWC ⫽ 548 mm; 11 strings bot- —
tom-pulled into predug trench; five 219-mm
openings with covering chambers; DL ⫽ 22
m; two risers and one hatchbox
Appendix A
258 1992 Lamberts Point exten- Steel with CWC, stepped 198 3 All diffuser; 4.4 m3/s discharge into estuary; —
sion (Virginia Initiative from 1,372 to 1,067 mm 162 (76-mm-diam.) ports
Plant), Norfolk, Virginia,
U.S.
321
(contintued)
322
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
259 1992 Playa Brava, Iquique, Chile 960-mm HDPE 1,500 50 Tow and sink; concrete weights; open coast —
(ocean); Y diffuser; 10 (130-mm) top elbow
outlets
260 1992 Punta Negra, Iquique, Chile 960-mm HDPE 1,500 37 Open coast (ocean); tow and sink; concrete —
weights; Y diffuser; eight 130-mm top elbow
outlets
261 1993 Stanley WWTP, Hong Kong 600-mm steel 2,500 16 4-mm-thick cement mortar lining; CWC 4.7.1
Island South District, 55 mm thick; frequent zinc anodes; two
Hong Kong discharge risers, 65 m apart, each with two
115-mm ports fitted with duckbill valves;
midlength manway riser; limited pipe string-
ing area; bottom-pull down launchway into
excavated trench; commissioning in 1994
262 1993 Lulu Island, Richmond, 2,134-mm steel, 13- to 240 16 Diffuser stepped from 2,134 to 1,219 mm; full 12.5.2
Greater Vancouver, Brit- 16-mm wall burial; capacity 3.17 m3/s
ish Columbia, Canada
263 1993 Baltalimani, Istanbul, 1,727-mm o.d. steel with 300 75 150-mm CWC; twin pipes; stepped diffuser 11.6.3
Turkey 32-mm wall
264 1993 Brierdene storm, North 1,219-mm-diam. steel 1,050 — CWC thickness ⫽ 112 mm; drilling and blast- —
Tyneside, England, U.K. ing for 530 m of trench; completely buried;
diffuser with one riser having four ports
fitted with 700-mm duckbill valves; concrete
protection domes over diffuser
265 1993 Point Loma extension, San 3,658-mm RCP with 3,810 98 Extension begins in 62 m of water 7.5
Diego, California, U.S. 305-mm wall
266 1993 East Worthing, English 914 mm 4,800 — DL ⫽ 800 m; diffuser diameter 1,219 mm; —
Channel, England, U.K. 35 concrete diffuser protection domes,
each weighing 44 tonnes; bottom-pull into
dredged trench
267 1993 Sand Point No. 2, Shum- 254-mm HDPE 300 — Pipe with many concrete weights, laid out —
agin Islands, Alaska, U.S. along back beach; boat pulled pipe out
straight on spring high tide; 76-mm ports;
construction cost US$100,000
268 1993 Chignik, Alaska Peninsula 152-mm PE 360 21 Open end; construction cost US$80,000 —
(south side), Alaska, U.S.
269 1993 Masan Bay, South Korea 2,000-mm RCP 680 14 Design flow 2,315 L/s; DL ⫽ 210 m; 21 risers at —
10-m spacing; four 200-mm ports per riser;
multiyear construction period
270 1993 Boulder Bay, Port Stephens, 630-mm o.d., 555-mm i.d. 760 20 Twin lines; DL ⫽ 40 m; 16 (120-mm) ports; —
New South Wales, FRP design flow 0.98 m3/s; pipes in tunnel;
Australia open coast receiving water; installation cost
roughly A$8 million
271 1993 Atul, Valsad, Gujarat, India 800-mm i.d., 900-mm o.d. 600 — Industrial pipe; design flow 45,000 m3/day; —
HDPE multiport diffuser; concrete collars; 11-tonne
concrete blocks at 8-m centers; discharge to
Par River estuary; replaced later by longer
pipe
272 1993 Eastbourne (Langney Steel 3,280 19 10 (340-m-long) pipe strings bottom-pulled —
Point), East Sussex, into excavated trench, using Reynolds joints
English Channel, for tie-ins; 25 multiport diffuser risers and
Appendix A
England, U.K. five inspection hatchboxes; 219-mm open-
ings; cement mortar lining for 814-mm
overall i.d.; CWC for 1,180-mm overall o.d.;
replacement for 700-m-long former outfall
(contintued) 323
324
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
273 1993 Belmont, Lake Macqua- 1,400-mm-i.d. steel with 1,800 25 Discharge to open coast with sizable littoral 4.6.5
rie, New South Wales, CWC drift; design flow 2.6 m3/s; 144-m-long
Australia strings; diffuser added in later operation
274 1993 Green Point No. 4, Cape 800-mm HDPE 1,400 — Laborious inshore link to stub of Green Point 10.2.2
Town, South Africa No. 3 (No. 155 in this table)
275 1993 Djerba (Ile de), Mediterra- 500-mm FRP 900 9 12-m-long pipe sections; pipe laid off barge —
nean Sea, Tunisia and assembled on the seabed; lowered pipes
weighted by concrete-filled canvas bags
276 1993 Barry, Bristol Channel, 400-mm i.d. steel with CWC 1,000 — Pipe bottom-pulled into 2.5-m-deep trench —
South Wales blasted, after work by jackup barge, and then
cleaned out; 120-tonne linear winch; trou-
blesome tides and currents; pipe protected
by dumped graded rock; refinery wastewater
277 1994 Aunu’u, American Samoa 152-mm HDPE 115 — Installed in flanged segments across heavily —
exposed reef flat subject to high waves and
currents; partial burial and rock bolt anchor-
ing
278 1994 Besós No. 2, Barcelona, 2,100-mm steel, concrete- 2,900 54 Services northern metropolitan area; 40% of 4.4.1
Spain coated flow from industrial sources
279 1994 Tuzla, Turkey 2,200-mm i.d. steel with 3,200 45 Bottom-pull into Sea of Marmara after dredg- —
CWC ing; maximum flow 20 m3/s; 15 twin port
risers with discharge 2,200 m from shore
280 1994 Seascale, Cumbria, 600-mm steel with CWC 2,014 10 Flow to Irish Sea; bottom-pull of 14 strings into —
northwest England, U.K. dredged trench; DL ⫽ 60 m, risers, 150-mm
ports, duckbill valves; design discharge ⫽
0.57 m3/s; 610-mm i.d. within cement mor-
tar lining, 842-mm o.d. to outside of CWC
281 1994 Braystones, Cumbria, 600-mm steel with CWC 1,937 10 Flow to Irish Sea; bottom-pull of five strings —
England, northwest into dredged trench; DL ⫽ 30 m, four
England, U.K. 2.35-m risers, 150-mm ports, duckbill
valves; design flow 0.34 m3/s; i.d. within
cement mortar lining ⫽ 610 mm, o.d.
including CWC ⫽ 842 mm; thrust bore
under railway embankment onshore
282 1994 Whitehaven (West Strand), 1,500-mm steel with CWC 250 — Irish Sea receiving water; trench excavation —
Cumbria, northwest required some blasting (116 m); presence
England, U.K. of cliff required assembly of 215 m of pipe
20 km away and tows; five risers at 20-m
spacing; flap valves; design flow 4.0 m3/s
283 1994 Workington (Siddick), Steel 3,060 10 Flow into outer Solway Firth; bottom-pull of —
Cumbria, northwest 15 strings into dredged trench; DL ⫽ 80 m,
England, U.K. five risers, 200-mm ports, duckbill valves;
design flow ⫽ 1.35 m3/s; overall CWC o.d.
⫽ 1,228 mm with i.d. within cement mortar
lining ⫽ 950 mm; thrust bore under railway
embankment onshore; maximum pull 350
tonnes (capacity 500 tonnes)
Appendix A
284 1994 Maryport, Cumbria, Steel 981 6 Flow into outer Solway Firth; bottom-pull of —
northwest England, U.K. five strings into dredged trench; single 3.35-
m-high riser, four 600-mm ports, flap valves;
design flow 2.36 m3/s; i.d. within cement
mortar lining ⫽ 1,271 mm, o.d. including
CWC ⫽ 1,713 mm 325
(contintued)
326
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
285 1994 Chevron extension, El 1,549-mm o.d. HDPE 914 — DL ⫽ 90 m; 60 duckbill valves; dry weather 2.6,
Segundo, California, flow about 0.3 m3/s; wet weather flow 10.3.3
U.S. approximately 0.9 m3/s; manholes at two
ends; refinery wastewater; old outfall about
150 m long
286 1994 Lavernock Point, Wales 1,892-mm o.d. steel 1,250 25 Discharge to Severn River estuary 11.5.3
287 1994 West Runton, north 710-mm MDPE 2,500 12 Pipe in sacrificial tunnel 12.5.3
Norfolk, England, U.K.
288 1994 Louisiana-Pacific extension, Basic 914-mm steel, wall 1,588 25 152-mm CWC; cement mortar and PVC lining; 2.7.1,
Humboldt Bay, thickness 9.5 mm DL ⫽ 260 m; many severe problems associ- 12.4.1
California, U.S. ated with construction; two contractors
289 1994 Tomé, central Chile 900-mm HDPE 1,200 18 DL ⫽ 25 m; four 200-mm ports; open coast —
(ocean)
290 1994 Penco-Lirquen, Chile 900-mm HDPE 1,200 18 Open coast (ocean); DL ⫽ 25 m; four 200-mm —
outlets
291 1994 Niagara-on-the-Lake, 710-mm 700 5 Ordnance clearance before construction —
Ontario, Canada
292 1994 Cowlitz replacement, 1,067-mm steel with CWC 107 11 Discharge into Columbia River; T configuration —
Longview, Washington, in plan view; DL ⫽ 23 m; 14 horizontal port
U.S. extensions at top of 762-mm diffuser pipe;
barrel and diffuser on cradles, topping pairs
of steel H piles, with stainless steel straps
293 1994 Shoreham-by-Sea, West 762-mm steel 3,165 13 Outflow to English Channel; extensive double —
Sussex, England, U.K. sheet piling across sandy beach; excavated
trench; six inspection hatchboxes and
16 risers; 219-mm ports; 22 strings bottom-
pulled; overall i.d. within cement mortar
lining ⫽ 712 mm; overall o.d. over CWC ⫽
934 mm; DL ⫽ 136 m
294 1994 Gwithian (Hayle), St. Ives 900-mm FRP 2,685 — Pipe within tunnel 3.8, 8.4.3
Bay, Cornwall, U.K.
295 1994 West Point Emergency 3,658-mm RCP 170 12 Severe environmental constraints during con- 3.5
Marine, Seattle, struction; open end in large structure
Washington, U.S.
296 1995 Tipalao Bay, Guam 711-mm o.d., 610-mm i.d. 536 39 HDD installation 5.7.1
HDPE
297 1995 Berth 300 Extension, 1,829-mm i.d. RCP 1,615 11 356-mm wall thickness; DL ⫽ 244 m; 100 —
Terminal Island, Los (102-mm) lateral wall openings fitted with
Angeles, California, U.S. duckbill valves; two top-mounted duckbill
valves
298 1995 Lyme Regis (Gun Cliff), 315-mm o.d., 258-mm i.d. 680 8 HDD project; cost £700,000 5.5.2
Dorset, England, U.K. HDPE
299 1995 Penmarc’h (Pointe de), 400-mm concrete 1,700 2 Trench 2–4 m deep; pipe-by-pipe assembly; —
Brittany, France compressible foam joints, lifting lugs, and
self-anchoring tie rods
300 1995 El Hank, Casablanca, Two-part 3,700 27 Open Atlantic Ocean coastline 11.6.4
Morocco
Appendix A
301 1995 Hayden Island, Portland, 2,134-mm steel with CWC 373 17 38-mm concrete thickness; discharge into —
Oregon, U.S. Columbia River; DL ⫽ 110 m with risers and
duckbill valves; pipe on pile caps topping
sets of three timber piles; trench also
302 1995 Greystones foul, Wicklow 486-mm steel 870 — Discharge to Irish Sea; multiport diffuser; pipe —
County, Ireland pulled; surge tower at upstream end 327
(contintued)
328
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
303 1995 Aberdour West Bay 180-mm o.d., 150-mm i.d. 1,052 — Design–build project; pipe supplied in 100-m- —
(Harbour), Firth of MDPE long coils, fused together; special machine
Forth, Scotland dug the 2-m-deep trench, lay the pipe, and
then did backfilling (in less than one week);
single vertical riser at seaward end
304 1995 Celbi/Soporcel Pulp Mills, 1,200-mm o.d., 1,108-mm 1,500 14 SDR 26; pipe in trench through surf zone, then —
Figueira da Foz, Portugal i.d. HDPE exposed with concrete anchor blocks for
stability; DL ⫽ 313 m; 85 (100-mm) wall
ports; design flow 2.0 m3/s; installation by
float and sink; open coast discharge
305 1995 Fleetwood (Fylde) foul, Lan- 1,400-mm o.d., 1,293-mm 5,250 13 In same trench as shorter (1,100-m) storm 10.3.4
cashire, England, U.K. i.d. MDPE water outfall
306 1995 Utulei, Pago Pago Harbor, 610-mm HDPE 110 50 Pipe begins at reef edge (200 m offshore) and —
American Samoa plunges down steep slope; free-floating cat-
enary design that spans slope and is heavily
anchored at bottom end
307 1996 Middleton (Heysham), 800-mm PE 2,400 — Pipe bottom-pulled into predug trench; backfill —
Lancashire, England, native material; 439 L/s design flow; DL ⫽
U.K. 11 m; four risers, each with four 110-mm
ports; open coast
308 1996 Morecambe, Lancashire, 750 mm 2,550 8 Design flow 350 L/s; DL ⫽ 30 m; four risers —
England, U.K. and 16 ports
309 1996 Tafuna, Fogagogo, Ameri- 610-mm HDPE 457 29 Pipe anchored with rock bolts or toggle-type —
can Samoa sand embedment anchors as appropriate
310 1996 Campbell River, eastern 724-mm i.d. steel 540 — DL ⫽ 40 m; burial near shore; riprap protec- —
Vancouver Island, British tion on sides offshore; pipe provided by
Columbia, Canada owner; CWC (shotcrete) 150 mm thick on
trunk, and 175 mm thick on diffuser; 38
(100-mm) top outlets and hinged end gate
311 1996 Emu Bay, near Burnie, 1,000-mm HDPE 1,230 11 Paper mill outfall; design–build project 2.6,
Tasmania, Australia 10.3.5
312 1996 Pa-Li (Tamsui), Taipei, 3.6-m i.d. steel with CWC 6,660 43 Originally modeled after outfall No. 163 —
Taiwan (RCP); design flow 22 m3/s; trenched; six-
plus years to build, starting at an intermedi-
ate point; step-down (to 2.4-m) diffuser
with 50 (4-m-high, 450-mm-diam.) risers at
30-m centers; DL ⫽ 1,500 m; six 150-mm-
diam. ports per riser; terminal cleanout up
to seabed; lighted marker buoys
313 1996 Peñarrubia, Gijon East, 1,400-mm HDPE 2,590 24 Outflow to Bay of Biscay; design flow 2.5 m3/s 10.3.6
Spain
314 1996 Seabrook, New Hampshire, 610-mm o.d. HDPE 640 9 Pipe buried 10.4.1
U.S.
315 1996 Caltex Refinery No. 2, Mil- 304-mm steel with 60-mm 600 10 DL ⫽ 30 m; eight 150-mm diffuser ports; end —
nerton, Cape Province, CWC gate; 550 m of line originally buried, remain-
South Africa der on sand bottom and weighted with thin
concrete mattresses; operational problems
316 1996 Viña del Mar, Chile 1,219-mm HDPE 1,500 54 Design flow 1.5 m3/s to open coastal waters; —
DL ⫽ 95 m; diffuser stepped down twice
Appendix A
to 508-mm diameter; 20 top elbows with
single 254-mm duckbill valves; concrete
weight collars; trench excavation roughly
7,000 m3; rock protection; launching and
receiving trestles/ramps during float and
sink construction 329
(contintued)
330
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
317 1996 Angoon, Admiralty Island, 200-mm HDPE 300 40 Large tides 11.3.1
Southeast Alaska, U.S.
318 1996 Ilfracombe, south coast, 900 mm 260 — DL ⫽ 35 m; four 150-mm outlets —
outer Bristol Channel,
Devon, England, U.K.
319 1996 Cambois foul, just north of 559-mm steel with CWC 2,250 — Design–build; open North Sea coast; bottom- —
Blyth, Northumberland, pull into predug trench; 350 L/s design flow;
England, U.K. one riser with four ports
320 1996 Girvan foul, west Scotland 508-mm stainless steel 722 — Open coast; bottom-pull into predug trench; —
design flow 212 L/s; single riser with four
125-mm ports
321 1996 Hendon No. 2, Port of 1,219-mm steel with CWC 2,520 — Design–build; discharge to North Sea (open —
Sunderland, Tyne and coast); pipe bottom-pulled into trench;
Wear, England, U.K. 1,856 L/s design flow; five risers with four
ports each
322 1996 Kingston, Ontario, Canada 1,500-mm concrete pressure 1,093 — Discharge into Lake Ontario; trenching —
pipe involved drilling and blasting; construction
cost C$3.944 million
323 1997 South Coast (Needhams 584-mm i.d., 608-mm o.d. 1,150 35 Construction cost US$6.5 million 11.6.5
Point), Barbados steel
324 1997 Arauco, Chile 1,200-mm HDPE 1,040 15 Trestle and sheet piling during inshore construc- —
tion; pipe in excavated trench (4,500 m3
removed); industrial installation
325 1997 Ponce No. 2, Puerto Rico, 1,219-mm steel with CWC 5,880 125 Some ball joints 7.2.2
U.S.
326 1997 South Bay, South San — — 29 Hybrid installation, involving tunnel across 9.2
Diego, California, U.S. shoreline, riser, then 3,048-mm-i.d. RCP in
seabed trench; seabed pipe 1,420 m long
327 1997 Wellington (Moa Point 1,250-mm i.d. steel with 1,870 22 Outflow to Cook Strait; NZ$21.15 million 2.6, 4.6.6
No. 2), North Island, CWC design–build project
New Zealand
328 1997 Strategic Sewage Disposal Two-part — — Harbor diffuser rock-protected in open, deep 9.3, C.2
Scheme, Stage I, trench; originally intended as interim facility
Hong Kong
329 1997 Wheatcroft, Cayton Bay, 273-mm o.d., 255-mm i.d. 1,970 18 Effluent from food processing plant; capacity —
Scarborough, Yorkshire, steel 95 L/s; open-coast discharge; 50-mm CWC
England, U.K. over 6-mm bitumen enamel layer; inner
670 m in trench excavated through rock,
backfilled with as-dug material except in
intertidal zone (concrete); outer 1,300 m
buried 2 m nominal through fine sand, with
rock armor; single riser having four-port
crosshead and 114-mm openings; fabricated
steel tripod over riser
330 1997 Ananaust (Myrargata), 1,200-mm o.d., 1,108-mm 4,100 35 Float and sink; pipe unburied but stabilized —
Reykjavik, Iceland i.d. PE every 4–5 m with concrete anchor blocks;
DL ⫽ 432 m; 153 (75-mm) wall ports;
design flow 2.3 m3/s
331 1997 Exmouth, Devon, England, 600 mm 150 — Trenching in rock; outfall runs from —
U.K. 50°36⬘38⬙N, 3°21⬘46⬙W (shore) to
50°36⬘21⬙N, 3°21⬘42⬙W, with marker buoy
at latter station
332 1997 Doniford extension, 450-mm MDPE 400 15 Concrete collars for ballast; pipe in trench —
Appendix A
Somerset, England, U.K. covered by concrete mattresses; open end;
jackup platform used during construction
333 1997 Fairhope, Mobile Bay, 610-mm HDPE — — First 488 m by HDD; remainder laid in trench —
Alabama, U.S. across bay flats
(contintued) 331
332
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
334 1997 Cancale, Golfe de Saint 500 mm 250 3 Trench 0.5–2 m deep; 18 sections, 13–14 m —
Malo, northwestern long, made of two pipes, with or without
France elbow, assembled in factory; onshore join-
ing of sections with rubber gasket joint
335 1997 Cardiff East Moors, Bristol 2,000-mm steel 2,100 — Inshore 715 m within 6.5-m-wide sheet pile —
Channel, Wales, U.K. cofferdam used during construction as
assembly area before pull episodes; trench
almost 4 m deep; concrete connector sleeves
(grouted); big tides and fast currents
336 1997 Palermo, Sicily, Italy 1.6-m-diam. FRP 1,795 40 Design flow rate 12 m3/s; DL ⫽ 303 m; 43 —
(1-m-long) risers, each with one 200-mm
port; float and sink
337 1997 Horden, Durham Coast, Two-part — — Design–build; 844 L/s design flow; three risers 2.6
U.K. with four ports each
338 1997 Pillar Point (Tuen Mun), 1.5-m i.d. concrete Twin — Replacement of old outfall to be covered by rec- —
Hong Kong 2,070 lamation; nine risers on each pipe, six ports
per riser fitted with 300-mm duckbill valves;
average flow approximately 165,000 m3/day;
protective rock mound 2.4 m thick
339 1998 Antalya, Turkey 1,600-mm HDPE 2,440 45 Float and sink five lengths 10.4.2
340 1998 Dover foul, eastern English 813-mm o.d., 788-mm i.d. 3,132 26 Bottom-pull on a 60-deg curve into dredged —
Channel, England, U.K. steel trench; constraint posed by two high-voltage
power cables in the vicinity; 1,183 L/s design
flow; four risers with four 457-mm ports;
DL ⫽ 80 m; 150-mm CWC; 2-m minimum
cover; 85 sacrificial flush bracelet anodes
341 1998 St. George Town No. 2, 305-mm o.d., 254-mm i.d. 371 9 Processing waste discharge away from fur seal —
Pribilof Islands, Alaska, steel rookery; pipe welding on shore; sled pulled
U.S. in front; barge; lateral anchors at terminus
342 1998 Folkestone storm, Kent, 2,440-mm o.d., 2,100-mm Twin 8 Open coast (east end of English Channel); drill —
England, U.K. i.d. concrete with steel 693 and blast for 180 m of trench; tow 30-m-long
core strings (air bags inside) to site, lower from
side of spud barge (divers below), connect;
design flow 12.0 m3/s; twin risers; four
1,626-mm ports; 80-mm CWC; geotextile
bags strapped to underside of pipe string
(filled with sand later); protected by steel pile
and frame structure
343 1998 Metlakatla, Southeast 305-mm HDPE 700 24 Nighttime float out and sink to take advantage —
Alaska, U.S. of tides; fleet of six boats; 900 kN of cast
iron weights
344 1998 Alness, Cromarty Firth, 164-mm i.d., 200-mm o.d. 150 12 Distillery effluent; one 1.5-m high riser with —
north Scotland HDPE two 130-mm ports; float and sink; pipe
sleeved and weighted first 50 m; concrete
weight collars only outer 100 m
345 1998 Grangemouth, Firth of 710-mm o.d., 606-mm i.d. 1,424 2 Industrial effluent; environmentally sensitive —
Forth, Scotland HDPE mudflats led to use of HDD; three construc-
tion lengths towed to site from Norway and
welded together on barge; pilot borehole
drilled from shore in 26 hours; reamer
attached and pulled back; pipe pulled back
Appendix A
separately at roughly 10 m/min; dredging
for and installation of diffuser pipe work,
three 2.5-m-high risers, domed protectors,
and rock protection followed; 500-mm
ports; design flow 1,389 L/s
333
(contintued)
334
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
346 1998 La Trinité, Galion Bay, 315-mm HDPE 2,000 — Design–build; drilled wall ports 2.6,
Martinique 11.1.3
347 1998 Penrhyn Bay, Wales 900-mm MDPE 1,800 — Precast concrete rings as ballast; floated out and —
sunk into predredged trench; 271 L/s design
flow; two risers with four ports each; DL ⫽
19 m
348 1998 Gujarat Alkalies and 400-mm o.d., 315-mm i.d. 4,250 — Outfall for industrial complex; cast iron verte- —
Chemicals Ltd., Dahej, HDPE bra anchors; 1,875-m-long extension being
Gulf of Cambay, India added in 2002–2003, to terminate at chart
datum water depth of 10 m
349 1998 Loma Larga, Valparaiso, 1,400-mm HDPE Twin 65 Concrete weights; 6 m3/s pumping station in —
central Chile 500 rock cavern followed by WWTP on a plat-
form of reclaimed land at the ocean’s edge
350 1998 Ucluelet, western Vancou- 450-mm HDPE 1,480 28 Fish-processing wastes dominate; DL ⫽ 30 m; —
ver Island, British six 150-mm outlets with duckbill valves;
Columbia, Canada stabilization via articulated concrete block
mattresses.
351 1998 Buckhaven (Neptune), Firth 400-mm HDPE 840 15 HDD project 5.5.3
of Forth, Scotland
352 1998 Watchet, Somerset, 450 mm 1,200 15 Jackup barges in construction 3.6.4
England, U.K.
353 1999 Mönsteras Pulp Mill, 1,000-mm o.d., 923-mm 5,000 12 Open-coast discharge; design flow 1.1 m3/s; fully —
southeast Sweden i.d. PE exposed pipe design loaded with concrete
anchor blocks; DL ⫽ 275 m; 107 (75-mm)
wall ports; installation by float-and-sink
354 1999 São Jacinto, Aveiro, 1,600-mm o.d., 1,478-mm 3,378 15 Open-coast discharge; pipe bearing 290° T 10.4.3
Portugal i.d. HDPE
355 1999 Boston, Massachusetts, U.S. Concrete-lined tunnel with 15,125 35 DL ⫽ 2,000 m; stepdown diffuser with 55 8.1.1, 13
i.d. ⫽ 7.39 m risers to concrete discharge domes on the
seabed; bearing nearly N75ºE; multiyear
construction project
356 1999 Worli, Mumbai (Bombay), 3.5-m i.d. tunnel 3,400 6.5 Concrete-lined tunnel 34 m below seabed 8.1.1,
India 8.3.2,
C.2
357 1999 Crail, Fife, Scotland 315-mm high-performance 935 — Open coast; HDD; 80 L/s design flow; one riser 5.5.4
polyethylene with two 89-mm ports
358 1999 Dunfermline (North 822-mm steel with CWC 416 — Dredging; bottom-pull; two layers of rock —
Queensferry) foul, Firth armor; two diffuser risers and precast con-
of Forth, Scotland crete domes, each riser with three 168-mm
ports; DL ⫽ 20 m; design flow 506 L/s
359 1999 St. Andrews (Kinkell Ness), 450-mm high-performance 614 — HDD (to protect particularly precious natural 5.5.4
Fife, Scotland polyethylene coastal area, drill from sea to land); design
flow 213 L/s; one riser and four 89-mm
ports; DL ⫽ 15 m
360 1999 Buyukcekmece, Sea of Mar- 1,600-mm HDPE 1,879 40 Surge tower; concrete weights; DL ⫽ 170 m; —
mara, Turkey 12,000 m3 of excavation
361 1999 Foz do Arelho (Peniche), 710-mm o.d., 656-mm i.d. 2,200 — Flow capacity 31 Mld; 12-m-long sections butt- —
Portugal HDPE fused into 240-m-long strings; 14-month
construction period; float and sink; concrete
collars
362 1999 Broughty Castle (Ferry) 1,800-mm PE 200 — Flow into estuary; float and sink into predug —
storm, Tay Estuary, trench later backfilled with native material;
Appendix A
Scotland 2,258 L/s design flow; one riser with a single
1,200-mm port
363 1999 SAICCOR No. 2 exten- 920-mm o.d., 900-mm i.d. 3,500 40 Extension of outfall No. 190; 145-mm CWC 12.4.2
sion, Umkomaas, Natal, stainless steel over 6-mm coating of fiberglass-reinforced
South Africa bitumen
335
(contintued)
336
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
364 1999 Hatton, outer Firth of 1,100-mm MDPE 1,340 — Flow to estuary into North Sea, location —
Forth, Scotland between Carnoustie and Arbroath; design
flow 1,872 L/s; four risers with four 273-mm
ports; DL ⫽ 51 m; concrete circle weights;
pipe in trench topped by rock armor
365 2000 Bioko Island, Equatorial 1,219-mm HDPE Twin — Weight blocks for stability; outflow from —
Guinea, West Africa 213 methanol facility; rails for launching from
shore
366 2000 Ballynacor, Lough Neagh, 900-mm i.d. HPPE (trunk) 1,070 6 In trench with 1 m nominal of cover; one-step —
Northern Ireland, U.K. diffuser made of epoxy-coated steel; six riser
ports, each with duckbill valve and protec-
tion hood; DL ⫽ 35 m; weight collars at
3.0-m centers; float and sink; jackup barge
used in construction
367 2000 Cardiff Phase 2, Bristol 1,981-mm i.d. prestressed 2,382 — Seven 6-m-long pipe sections airlifted to area —
Channel, Wales, U.K. concrete cylinder pipe after some pipes in ship’s hold damaged
in severe storm; extension to earlier pipe;
24-m-long pipe lengths under buoyancy
tank and towed to site for lowering and
Hydro-Pull jointing by “horse”; nominal
o.d. 2.1 m; large tidal range and swift cur-
rents; design flow 6 m3/s
368 2000 Bandra, Mumbai 3.5-m-diameter tunnel 3,700 9 Lining by precast concrete segments; tunnel 8.1.1,
(Bombay), India 34 m below seabed; long delay in becoming 8.3.2,
operational (required work upstream) C.2
369 2000 Ayr storm, Firth of Clyde, 2.4-m i.d. prestressed con- 2,200 16 Peak flow 6 m3/s; single four-port riser, duckbill 3.6.5
western Scotland crete cylinder pipe valves; steel tripod protection for valves;
pipe buried with 2 m nominal cover; sheet-
piled cofferdam first 60 m
370 2000 Levenmouth, Firth of Forth, 1,600-mm o.d. HDPE 1,050 — Towout and sink; concrete weight rings; —
Scotland placed in trench and backfilled; pipe, in
two lengths, originally towed (two equal
lengths) by tugs across the North Sea from
Norway; five risers, each with four ports
having duckbill valves; pipe through tunnel
under seawall
371 2000 Baie du Tombeau, Port 1,200-mm FRP 1,294 33 Excavating took seven days in hard coral and 11.6.6
Louis, Mauritius sand
372 2000 Inverclyde, Firth of Clyde 1,000-mm PE 810 — One riser having four ports with duckbill valves; —
near Greenock, Scotland precast concrete protection dome with rock
armor; pipe towed in four lengths to site
from Norway; concrete weight collars; flange
joints; temporary sheet-piled cofferdam on
shore; float and sink into predug trench
373 2000 Sandown Bay foul, Isle of 914-mm o.d., 887-mm i.d. 3,200 17 Design flow 1,285 L/s 11.5.4
Wight, England, U.K. steel
374 2000 Penmaenmawr, North 250-mm MDPE 1,535 — First 352 m of pipe installed using land-based —
Wales equipment, rest by trenching machine
spread that excavates trench, lays pipe,
and backfills in one continuous opera-
tion; design flow 58 L/s; one riser and four
Appendix A
125-mm ports; construction cost approxi-
mately £1.6 million
375 2000 Seaham No. 2, Durham 900 mm 1,500 — Replaced 300-m-long outfall discharging —
Coast, northern untreated sewage
England, U.K. 337
(contintued)
338
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
376 2000 Tofino (Cedar St.) No. 2, 200-mm HDPE (SDR 17) 450 29 Outfall terminates in a single 200-mm duckbill —
Vancouver Island (west valve; replacement for larger and longer
coast), British Columbia, outfall
Canada
377 2000 Kirkwall, Orkney Islands, 509-mm i.d., 560-mm o.d. 330 23 HDD through rock; one 0.5-m-high riser with —
U.K. HDPE four 200-mm openings
378 2000 Tsing Yi, Hong Kong 1,050-mm steel 300 — Pipe bottom-pulled; temporary line (proposed —
three years)
379 2000 Fillyside (Portobello Beach) 2.1-m steel Twin — Floatout and sink; burial through foreshore, —
storm, Leith, Firth of 680 otherwise on seabed; rock armor; concrete
Forth, Scotland weight collars; design flow 13.2 m3/s; open
ends; discharge into estuary
380 2000 Waldronville Beach (Green 940-mm o.d., wall thickness 350 15 Coated steel Y piece to connect to original twin —
Island) extension, 36 mm HDPE outfall; pipe construction lengths 36 m;
Dunedin, South Island, bolted galvanized flanges with bolt-on
New Zealand anodes; DL ⫽ 60 m; diffuser laid on rocky
outcrop, with 38 ports fitted with 100-mm
duckbill valves; walking platform used in
construction
381 2000 Islay (Isle of), Scotland 152-mm HDPE 304 30 HDD project 5.5.5
382 2000 Erie, Pennsylvania, U.S. 2,286-mm prestressed 2,057 70 Discharge into Lake Erie; US$10.1 million 2.3.1
concrete cylinder pipe construction cost; spud barge for trench
excavation; Y diffuser, each arm 98 m long
with 45 outlets
383 2000 Stornoway, Western Isles, 560-mm MDPE 871 — Jackup barge during construction; remote, rocky —
England, U.K. location; concrete weight collars; float and
sink; burial in the intertidal zone; 225 L/s
design flow; four 219-mm ports in one riser
384 2000 Santander, Cantabria, Bay 1,400-mm o.d. HDPE 2,430 45 Design flow ⫽ 4.5 m3/s; DL ⫽ 280 m with —
of Biscay, Spain 21 outlets; concrete weight collars; inshore
portion buried and covered by concrete;
some of trench established by drill and
blast; offshore portion rock-protected; float
and sink; 160-m-long surf zone section
placed last, most of outfall a year earlier;
flow directed to outfall June 5, 2001
385 2000 Mompás, San Sebastián- Two parts 2,000-mm i.d. 1,340 50 Design flow ⫽ 6 m3/s 9.1.1
Pasajes, Bay of Biscay,
Spain
386 2001 Macduff/Banff, Moray 200-mm PE (SDR 13.6) 310 — Open-coast discharge; design flow 125 L/s; —
Coast, Scotland one riser, with four 168-mm ports; HDD
construction
387 2001 Baix Llobregat, Barcelona, 2,435-mm i.d. steel 3,745 60 CWC; design flow 14.58 m3/s; services southern 4.6.7
Spain part of metropolitan area; wastewater reuse
plant completed in 2006
388 2001 Gailes extension, Irvine, 1,400-mm o.d. PE 650 — Pipe (without risers) towed in one length to —
Ayrshire, Scotland site from Norway; concrete collars; trench-
ing; end diffuser assembly on old outfall
removed to allow extension; new tapering
diffuser with six risers, each with four ports,
and protected by concrete diffuser domes;
diffuser sections linked by bolted flanges
389 2001 Kilkeel No. 2, Irish Sea, 355-mm HPPE 750 14 Jackup platform used in excavation and pipe —
Appendix A
Northern Ireland, U.K. installation; trench excavated in stiff clay;
three risers; concrete ballast collars; stinger
frame on end of platform (floating) used for
pipe laying; six weeks for outfall installation
(contintued) 339
340
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
390 2001 Klettagardar (Laugarnes), 1,400-mm o.d., 1,292-mm 5,500 35 Float and sink; pipe unburied but stabilized with —
Reykjavik, Iceland i.d. PE concrete blocks; DL ⫽ 1,064 m; 153 (75-mm-
diam.) wall ports; design flow 3.5 m3/s
391 2001 Fraserburgh, Scotland 355-mm o.d. HPPE 644 — (Failed HDD); drill and blast trench from 5.4
(SDR 17) jackup barge; float and sink pipe installa-
tion; rock armor; 195 L/s design flow; one
riser with four 75-mm-diam. ports; concrete
protection dome; concrete weight collars
392 2001 Mutton Island, Galway Bay, 900 mm 400 — Pipe placed in trench excavated in rock seabed; —
Ireland jackup platform during construction; lighted
buoy at terminus
393 2001 EDC Ecuador, Machala, 254-mm steel 1,000 6 Installation by HDD 5.6.1
Ecuador
394 2001 Thessaloniki City, northern 1,600-mm i.d., 2,000-mm o.d. — 23 DL ⫽ 400 m; construction cost US$18 million 11.5.5
Greece bell/spigot RCP (trunk)
395 2001 Eyemouth (Gunsgreen 225-mm i.d., 255-mm o.d. 1,650 30 Renowned underwater reefs in the area; three —
Point), southeast HDPE lengths of 550 m; 225-mm outlets with
Scotland duckbill valves (risers)
396 2001 Pardigon No. 2 (La Croix- 600-mm o.d. steel cylinder 1,500 38 Protected environment; replacement outfall; 11.5.6
Valmer), Cavalaire- reinforced concrete pipe pairs of 250-mm-diam. horizontally dis-
sur-Mer, France charging ports in top half of diffuser pipe
397 2001 Gdansk (Danzig) Wschod, 1,600-mm o.d., 1,478-mm 2,470 16 SDR 26 pipe; two different sections, each 218 m —
northern Poland i.d. HDPE long, one in line with trunk, the other per-
pendicular; predug trench 3 m deep; whole
pipe floated out and sunk (some weights
in place); two types of concrete weights;
dredged material used for backfill
398 2001 Duke Point Marine, just 550-mm HDPE 285 40 Replacement for outfall of inadequate capac- —
south of Nanaimo, east- ity and length; rock protection first 170 m
ern Vancouver Island, from shore, ACBM thereafter (because of
British Columbia, anchors); discharge to Northumberland
Canada Channel
399 2002 Aboño (Gijon Oeste), Two-part 2,200 — First 703 m microtunnel pipe-jacking under —
Spain breakwater through sand with stones; 13.0-m-
diam. starting shaft; reinforced concrete
jacking pipe 1,800 mm i.d., 2,400 mm o.d.,
2.4 m long; offshore portion involves pipe in
excavated trench
400 2002 Bunbury, Western Australia, 610-mm o.d. steel with CWC 1,700 12 Construction cost A$10.0 million 4.6.8,
Australia 10.6.2
401 2002 Hornsea No. 2 foul, 324-mm steel 530 — Open North Sea coast discharge; bottom-pull —
Humberside, England, into predug trench, backfilled with native
U.K. material; design flow 85 L/s; two risers, each
with four 100-mm ports; DL ⫽ 10 m
402 2002 La Turballe, France 406-mm steel with 7-mm 1,225 — Location 30 km WNW from St. Nazaire; CWC; —
wall construction cost 3,039,531 euros
403 2002 Usgo (Miengo, Solvay), 478-mm-i.d. stainless steel 666 14 Location pocket beach 7 km west of San- —
Cantabria, Bay of Biscay, with 6-mm wall tander; hot industrial effluent; spud barge
Spain with long-reach excavator; 485 m of trench
drilled and blasted; construction cost 5 mil-
lion euros (plus)
404 2002 Cornborough, Devon, 714-mm HDPE (SDR 17) 540 — HDD project 5.5.6
Appendix A
England, U.K.
405 2002 Sainte Luce, Martinique 250-mm HDPE 1,200 42 Additional 400 m of pipe onshore 10.4.4
406 2002 Aracruz Celulose No. 2, 1,000-mm-o.d., 903-mm- 1,100 17 Open-coast discharge; design flow 1.0 m3/s; DL —
Brazil i.d. PE ⫽ 200 m; 50 (100-mm) wall ports; no burial,
but concrete ballast blocks; float and sink
341
(contintued)
342
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
407 2002 Cliffton WWTF No. 2, 305-mm HDPE 460 11 HDD project; discharge into tidal reach of 5.6.2
Newburg, Maryland, U.S. Potomac River
408 2002 Cayeli Bakiar Islmantry, 560-mm o.d. HDPE (SDR 9) 3,050 280 Submarine mine tailings outfall; first 750 m (to —
Turkey 17-m depth) in trench, last 2,300 m on sea-
bed; concrete weights every 6 m; float and
sink; construction cost US$2.6 million
409 2003 Wollongong No. 2 (Illa- Twin HDPE pipes, i.d. ⫽ 1,080 20 Tasman Sea discharge of reclaimed wastewater 12.6.2
warra, Coniston Beach), 985 mm, o.d. ⫽ 1,067 that cannot be used by industry
New South Wales, mm
Australia
410 2003 Stobrec, Split, Croatia 1,000-mm HDPE (SDR 22) 2,982 36 DL ⫽ 204 m; long-distance tow of six lengths; —
concrete collars; pipe floating two years
before lowering
411 2003 Montpellier, France 1,600-mm HDPE (SDR 26) 10,827 30 Discharge to Mediterranean Sea 10.4.5
412 2003 Saida, Lebanon 900-mm FRP 2,146 29 DL ⫽ 188 m; saddle blocks; construction cost —
US$8.0 million; World Bank funding
413 2003 Port Orford, Oregon, U.S. 305-mm HDPE 701 13 HDD project 5.6.3
414 2003 Kadikoy, Turkey Steel, diameter 2,235 mm, 2,308 52 Outflow to Bosphorus; DL ⫽ 100 m; —
wall 32 mm 13 (500-mm-diam.) outlets; CWC ⫽
205 mm; bottom-pull with target (empty)
buoyant weight 500–600 N/m; trench
3.5 m deep across shipping lane; backfill
stones and riprap
415 2003 Gullane foul, Firth of Forth, 273-mm steel with CWC 1,186 11 Various construction difficulties 11.5.7
Scotland
416 2003 Meary Veg Rock, Isle of 800-mm MDPE 428 — HDD project 5.5.7
Man, Irish Sea, U.K.
417 2003 Girvan Industrial, Scotland HDPE 1,100 — Jackup involved during construction 3.6.6
418 2003 Foca, western Turkey 500-mm HDPE 3,410 — Bolt-together concrete weights; design flow 160 —
L/s; DL ⫽ 110 m; construction cost 10.7 mil-
lion euros; started operation January 2005
419 2003 Sham Tseng, Hong Kong 650-mm HDPE 185 — Five risers —
420 2003 Marbella, Biarritz, France 1,600-mm RCP 780 15 Microtunneling project 8.5.2
421 2004 Coffs Harbour, Australia 900-mm-i.d. HDPE 1,500 20 Construction difficulties 1.7.2,
10.6.2
422 2004 Sibenik, Croatia 1,200-mm-o.d. (SDR 26) 5,000 61 DL ⫽ 406 m —
423 2004 Baie du Scall, Le Pouliguen, 800-mm HDPE 1,100 14 Construction cost 2,188,858 euros; pipe towed —
France from Norway in three parts; sinking took
two days; concrete weights
424 2004 Cleveland, Ohio, U.S. 2,743-mm-i.d. concrete 1,463 15 Discharge into Lake Erie; 278 m of line inside —
pressure pipe breakwater; US$21.0 million two-year proj-
ect; section by section into excavated trench;
restrained joints; Hydro-Pull; 27 wall ports
in diffuser; end bulkhead
425 2004 Vashon Island extension, 203-mm HDPE 440 61 Extension makes line 850 m long overall; —
Puget Sound, Washing- float and sink; outflow through open
ton, U.S. end; removal of discharge from shellfish
beds leading to later availability of 65 ha
for approved harvesting; during outfall
construction, approximately 2 ha of derelict
fishing nets removed
426 2004 Port Gardner, Washington, 1,600-mm-o.d. HDPE 1,432 107 Curved configuration led to construction dif- 10.6.1
Appendix A
U.S. ficulties
427 2004 Fort Kamehameha, Oahu, Variable 3,800 46 Trench and trenchless technology 2.3.1,
Hawaii, U.S. 2.7.1,
9.4
428 2004 Holyhead, Wales 560-mm-o.d. HDPE 1,100 — Part in HDD hole, part on seabed 5.5.8 343
(contintued)
344
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
429 2004 Kinoya, Suva, Fiji 1,400-mm-o.d. PE (SDR 26) 1,989 — Concrete collars; 250-m-long strings; galva- —
nized steel flanges; stepped diffuser down to
630-mm-o.d.
430 2004 Kingston No. 2, Washing- 457-mm steel 1,615 52 Community on west side of Puget Sound; first —
ton, U.S. 150 m off beach laid section-by-section
by derrick barge at high tide; next 670 m
involved 29-m lengths placed in trench;
final 427 m set directly on seabed; limited
diver bottom time for diffuser placement;
construction cost US$2.8 million
431 2005 Tramore, Waterford, Ireland 800-mm o.d. PE (SDR 17) 2,200 — 300-m-long section installed in cofferdam, —
with 1,500 m in trench; spud pontoon
dredger; two-section 41-m-long diffuser with
10 risers
432 2005 San Pedro del Pinatar (Cart- 1,400-mm HDPE (SDR 33) 4,800 — Location at 37.6°N 1.0°W; brine discharge into —
agena), southeast Spain Mediterranean; risers; tow of 10 (480-m)
lengths; float and sink; concrete ballast
collars
433 2005 Agadir South, Morocco Steel with o.d. ⫽ 1,016 mm 1,160 10 Bottom-pull project 4.4.2
434 2005 Montagne Jacquot, 1,400-mm FRP 816 34 DL ⫽ 60 m —
Mauritius
435 2005 Plouharnel, Quiberon, 250-mm-o.d., 222-mm-i.d. 415 9 HDD in rock; three similar lines; one outlet —
France PE per pipe
436 2006 Waimakariri, New Zealand 900-mm HDPE 1,600 14 Duckbill valves 10.5.2
437 2006 Clandeboye, Timaru, 900-mm-o.d. HDPE 810 — Industrial effluent 10.5.3
New Zealand
438 2006 Venus Bay, South Two-part 450-mm diameter 750 10 HDD for HDPE trunk; diffuser made of steel 5.6.4
Gippsland, Victoria,
Australia
439 2006 Courtice WPCP, Ontario, 1,650-mm concrete pressure 950 11 Discharge into Lake Ontario; construction cost 6.6.1
Canada pipe C$8,513,000
440 2006 Les Sables d’Olonne, France Hybrid system 1,563 — Discharge to Atlantic Ocean; first 623 m —
microtunneled, with machinery recovered
underwater; concrete pipe i.d. ⫽ 1,400 mm;
remainder of pipe on seabed
441 2006 Warrenton, Oregon, U.S. 457-mm steel 1,770 — Outflow to Columbia River; HDD project 5.6.5
442 2006 Kirkcudbright, Scotland 225-mm-o.d., 184-mm-i.d. 300 13 HDD from cliff top in rock; 150-tonne drill rig; —
PE jackup platform; single outlet
443 2006 Kinloss No. 2, Scotland, 200-mm-o.d., 164-mm-i.d. 780 10 HDD; one riser with four 100-mm ports; steel —
U.K. PE casing with PE pipe inside; Moray Firth
444 2006 Ballyshannon, Donegal Bay, 800-mm HDPE 306 — 200-m-long causeway; concrete collars —
Ireland
445 2006 Foreness Point, Kent, 1,600-mm steel 600 — Storm water outlet; 1,800-mm-diam. microtun- —
England, U.K. neling machine through chalk; pipe jacking
on upgrade into excavated seabed pit filled
with aggregate; upon completion of drive,
aggregate sucked out, and divers made
connections; mole retrieved onto jackup
platform
446 2007 CDF Marseille, Marseilles, 315-mm-o.d., 269-mm-i.d. 850 30 Actually three HDD industrial lines of same —
France PE length; 100-mm ports on risers
Appendix A
447 2007 Tangiers, Morocco 1,400-mm-diam. HDPE 2,195 43 Pipes towed in; trenching; concrete weighting —
(SDR 22) done from barge
448 2007 Tétouan, Morocco 1,200-mm-diam. HDPE 3,100 37 Pipes towed in; trenching; concrete weighting —
(SDR 26) done from barge
(contintued) 345
346
Max.
Nominal Water

Const. Depth
449 2007 Midway Sewer District, Des 1,219-mm steel 640 52 First 88 m in trench under bluff (subcontract); 2.7.1
Moines, Washington, next 175 m shore crossing within sheet-pile
U.S. cofferdam (subcontract); tidal and environ-
mental constraints; pipe buried in trench out
to water depth of 17 m, then on-bottom with
concrete weights; DL ⫽ 91 m
450 2007 Saint-Jean-Cap Ferrat, — 110 36 HDD; confined site for drill rig; entry angle —
Côte d’Azur, France 22°; 200-mm-diam. pilot hole; hole reamed
to 864 mm
Note: Under the More Info. column is a listing of the sections of the book where text discusses this outfall.
Appendix A 347
Outfalls Described in Tables 1-1 and A-1
Aberdeen, Scotland, No. 73, Table A-1 Baie du Scall, Le Pouliguen, France,
Aberdour Silversands, Firth of Forth, No. 423, Table A-1
Scotland, No. 250, Table A-1 Baie du Tombeau, Port Louis, Mauritius,
Aberdour West Bay (Harbour), Firth of No. 371, Table A-1
Forth, Scotland, No. 303, Table A-1 Baix Llobregat, Barcelona, Spain, No. 387,
Aboño (Gijon Oeste), Spain, No. 399, Table A-1
Table A-1 Ballynacor, Lough Neagh, Northern
Afan, Wales, No. 84, Table A-1 Ireland (U.K.), No. 366, Table A-1
Agadir South, Morocco, No. 433, Table A-1 Ballyshannon, Donegal Bay, Ireland,
Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, U.S., No. 118, No. 444, Table A-1
Table A-1 Baltalimani, Istanbul, Turkey, No. 263,
Ahirkapi, Istanbul, Turkey, No. 187, Table A-1 Table A-1
Akhiok, Kodiak Island, Alaska, U.S., Bandra, Mumbai (Bombay), India,
No. 80, Table A-1 No. 368, Table A-1
Aldeburgh, Suffolk, England, U.K., No. 77, Barmouth, Western Wales, No. 183,
Table A-1 Table A-1
Alki STP extension, Seattle, Washington, Barry, Bristol Channel, South Wales,
U.S., No. 171, Table A-1 No. 276, Table A-1
Alness, Cromarty Firth, north Scotland, Bayamon, Puerto Rico, U.S., No. 93,
No. 344, Table A-1 Table A-1
Ananaust (Myrargata), Reykjavik, Iceland, Bayona, northwest Spain, No. 242,
Anchorsholme No. 2, Blackpool, U.K., Beirut East No. 1, Lebanon, No. 158,
Angoon, Admiralty Island, Southeast Beirut East No. 2, Lebanon, No. 159,
Alaska, U.S., No. 317, Table A-1 Table A-1
Antalya, Turkey, No. 339, Table A-1 Beirut South No. 1 (Ghadir), Lebanon,
Antibes, Côte d’Azur, southern France, No. 124, Table A-1
No. 142, Table A-1 Belmont, Lake Macquarie, New South
Aracruz Celulose No. 1, Aracruz, Brazil, Wales, Australia, No. 273,
Aracruz Celulose No. 2, Brazil, No. 406, Berth 300 Extension, Terminal Island,
Table A-1 Los Angeles, California, U.S., No. 297,
Arauco, Chile, No. 324, Table A-1 Table A-1
Arbroath, Scotland, No. 107, Table A-1 Besós No. 2, Barcelona, Spain, No. 278,
Arecibo, Puerto Rico, U.S., No. 119, Table A-1
Table A-1 Bethany Beach, Delaware, U.S., No. 59,
Arica, northern Chile, No. 173, Table A-1 Table A-1
Ashbridge’s Bay, Toronto, Canada, No. 4, Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea, West
Table 1-1 Africa, No. 365, Table A-1
Atka, Aleutian Islands, Alaska, U.S., Black Rock, Geelong, Victoria, Australia,
Atul, Valsad, Gujarat, India, No. 271, Blaine, Washington, U.S., No. 57,
Table A-1 Table A-1
Aunu’u, American Samoa, No. 277, Bo’ness (Grangemouth), Firth of Forth,
Table A-1 Scotland, No. 74, Table A-1
Ayr storm, Firth of Clyde, western Bondi, Sydney, New South Wales,
Scotland, No. 369, Table A-1 Australia, No. 219, Table A-1
Baglan Bay, South Wales, U.K., No. 37, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S., No. 355,
Table 1-1 Table A-1
Boulder Bay, Port Stephens, New South Carolina (Loiza), Puerto Rico, U.S.,
Wales, Australia, No. 270, Table A-1 No. 149, Table A-1
Braystones, Cumbria, northwest England, Carry-le-Rouet, Golfe du Lion,
U.K., No. 281, Table A-1 Mediterranean Sea, France, No. 168,
Bridlington, Yorkshire, U.K., No. 103, Table A-1
Table A-1 Cayeli Bakiar Islmantry, Turkey, No. 408,
Brierdene storm, North Tyneside, England, Table A-1
U.K., No. 264, Table A-1 CDF Marseille, Marseilles, France, No. 446,
Broadstairs, Northeast Kent, England, U.K., Table A-1
No. 176, Table A-1 Celbi/Soporcel Pulp Mills, Figueira da Foz,
Broughty Castle (Ferry) storm, Tay Estuary, Portugal, No. 304, Table A-1
Scotland, No. 362, Table A-1 Central Marin, San Rafael, San Francisco
Buckhaven (Neptune), Firth of Forth, Bay, California, U.S., No. 133, Table A-1
Scotland, No. 351, Table A-1 Central Treatment Plant, Tacoma,
Bude, North Cornwall, England, U.K., Washington, U.S., No. 218, Table A-1
No. 239, Table A-1 Charmouth (Lyme Bay), Dorset, England,
Bunbury, Western Australia, Australia, U.K., No. 212, Table A-1
No. 400, Table A-1 Chemainus, southeastern Vancouver
Burcom (Tioxide), Humber Estuary, Island, British Columbia, Canada,
England, U.K., No. 178, Table A-1 No. 217, Table A-1
Burwood Beach, Newcastle, New South Chevron extension, El Segundo, California,
Wales, Australia, No. 216, Table A-1 U.S., No. 285, Table A-1
Buyukcekmece, Sea of Marmara, Turkey, Chevron Refinery extension, Carquinez
No. 360, Table A-1 Strait, California, U.S., No. 184,
Calback, Sullom Voe, Shetland Islands, Table A-1
U.K., No. 55, Table A-1 Chignik, Alaska Peninsula (south side),
Caltex Refinery No. 2, Milnerton, Cape Alaska, U.S., No. 268, Table A-1
Province, South Africa, No. 315, Chung-Chou, Kaohsiung City, Taiwan,
Table A-1 No. 134, Table A-1
Cambois foul, just north of Blyth, Clacton foul No. 2, Humberside, England,
Northumberland, England, U.K., U.K., No. 131, Table A-1
No. 319, Table A-1 Clandeboye, Timaru, New Zealand,
Campbell River, eastern Vancouver Island, No. 437, Table A-1
British Columbia, Canada, No. 310, Cleveland, Ohio, U.S., No. 424, Table A-1
Table A-1 Cliffton WWTF No. 2, Newburg, Maryland,
Camps Bay, Cape Province, South Africa, U.S., No. 407, Table A-1
No. 52, Table A-1 Clover Point Extension No. 2, Victoria,
Camuy-Hatillo, Puerto Rico, U.S., No. 92, British Columbia, Canada, No. 75,
Table A-1 Table A-1
Cancale, Golfe de Saint Malo, Coffs Harbour, Australia, No. 421,
northwestern France, No. 334, Table A-1
Table A-1 Colaba, Mumbai (Bombay), India,
Cannes, France, No. 42, Table 1-1 No. 150, Table A-1
Cape Lazo, Comox, east side of central Conwy No. 2, North Wales, No. 182,
Vancouver Island, British Columbia, Table A-1
Canada, No. 174, Table A-1 Cork, Ireland, No. 104, Table A-1
Cape Peron, south of Perth, Western Cornborough, Devon, England, U.K.,
Australia, Australia, No. 130, No. 404, Table A-1
Table A-1 Coronel, Chile, No. 224, Table A-1
Cardiff East Moors, Bristol Channel, Wales, Courtice WPCP, Ontario, Canada, No. 439,
U.K., No. 335, Table A-1 Table A-1
Cardiff Phase 2, Bristol Channel, Wales, Cowes (Old Castle Point), Isle of Wight,
U.K., No. 367, Table A-1 England, U.K., No. 198, Table A-1
Appendix A 349
Cowlitz replacement, Longview, Eyemouth (Gunsgreen Point), southeast

Washington, U.S., No. 292, Table A-1 Scotland, No. 395, Table A-1
Crail, Fife, Scotland, No. 357, Table A-1 Fairhope, Mobile Bay, Alabama, U.S.,
Dam Neck (Atlantic Plant), Virginia Beach, No. 333, Table A-1
Virginia, U.S., No. 88, Table A-1 Fillyside (Portobello Beach) storm, Leith,
Dan Region (Soreq, Shafdan) Excess Sludge, Firth of Forth, Scotland, No. 379,
Tel Aviv, Israel, No. 97, Table A-1 Table A-1
Dana Point (SERRA), California, U.S., Five Finger Island, British Columbia,
No. 58, Table A-1 Canada, No. 40, Table 1-1
Deal, New Jersey, U.S., No. 2, Table 1-1 Flamborough, Humberside, England, U.K.,
Delray Beach (Latrobe Valley), Ninety No. 255, Table A-1
Mile Beach, Victoria, Australia, No. 253, Fleetwood (Fylde) foul, Lancashire,
Table A-1 England, U.K., No. 305, Table A-1
Discovery Bay, Hong Kong, No. 89, Foca, western Turkey, No. 418, Table A-1
Table A-1 Folkestone storm, Kent, England, U.K.,
Djerba (Ile de), Mediterranean Sea, No. 342, Table A-1
Tunisia, No. 275, Table A-1 Foreness Point, Kent, England, U.K.,
Doniford extension, Somerset, England, No. 445, Table A-1
U.K., No. 332, Table A-1 Fort Bragg extension, California, U.S.,
Dover foul, eastern English Channel, No. 62, Table A-1
England, U.K., No. 340, Table A-1 Fort Kamehameha, Oahu, Hawaii, U.S.,
Duke Point Marine, just south of No. 427, Table A-1
Nanaimo, eastern Vancouver Island, Foz do Arelho (Peniche), Portugal,
British Columbia, Canada, No. 398, No. 361, Table A-1
Table A-1 Fraserburgh, Scotland, No. 391, Table A-1
Dumbarton (Castlegreen), Firth of Clyde, French Creek, Regional District of
Scotland, No. 205, Table A-1 Nanaimo, Vancouver Island, British
Dunbar (Belhaven Bay), Lothian, Scotland, Columbia, Canada, No. 60, Table A-1
No. 215, Table A-1 Gailes extension, Irvine, Ayrshire, Scotland,
Dunfermline (North Queensferry) foul, No. 388, Table A-1
Firth of Forth, Scotland, No. 358, Ganges, Salt Spring Island, British
Table A-1 Columbia, Canada, No. 83,
East Bay Dischargers Authority, Oakland, Table A-1
California, U.S., No. 79, Table A-1 Garnock Valley, Stevenston, Strathclyde,
East Worthing, English Channel, England, Scotland, No. 141, Table A-1
U.K., No. 266, Table A-1 Gdansk (Danzig) Wschod, northern
Eastbourne (Langney Point), East Sussex, Poland, No. 397, Table A-1
English Channel, U.K., No. 272, Girvan foul, west Scotland, No. 320,
Table A-1 Table A-1
Eastney Beach, Portsmouth, Hampshire, Girvan Industrial, Scotland, No. 417,
England, U.K., No. 213, Table A-1 Table A-1
EDC Ecuador, Machala, Ecuador, No. 393, Gisborne, New Zealand, No. 25,
Table A-1 Table 1-1
Edinburgh, Scotland, No. 53, Table A-1 Glenelg, South Australia, Australia, No. 3,
El Hank, Casablanca, Morocco, No. 300, Table 1-1
Table A-1 Gloucester No. 2 extension, Gloucester,
Emu Bay, near Burnie, Tasmania, Australia, Massachusetts, U.S., No. 231, Table A-1
No. 311, Table A-1 Gloucester No. 2 original, Gloucester,
English Bay, Kenai Peninsula, Alaska, U.S., Massachusetts, U.S., No. 135, Table A-1
No. 181, Table A-1 Gordano Valley, Bristol Channel, U.K.,
Erie, Pennsylvania, U.S., No. 382, Table A-1 No. 208, Table A-1
Exmouth, Devon, England, U.K., No. 331, Grangemouth, Firth of Forth, Scotland,
Great Grimsby (Pyewipe No.2), South Hydaburg No. 2, Southeast Alaska, U.S.,
Humberside, England, U.K., No. 115, No. 238, Table A-1
Table A-1 Hyperion No. 6, southern California, U.S.,
Great Yarmouth (Caister), Norfolk, No. 6, Table 1-1
England, U.K., No. 116, Table A-1 Hyperion No. 7, southern California, U.S.,
Green Point No. 3, Cape Town, South No. 12, Table 1-1
Africa, No. 155, Table A-1 Hyperion Sludge, California, U.S., No. 11,
Green Point No. 4, Cape Town, South Table 1-1
Africa, No. 274, Table A-1 Hythe foul, South Kent, England, U.K.,
Greenock (Battery Park), Firth of Clyde, No. 139, Table A-1
Scotland, No. 201, Table A-1 Ilfracombe, south coast, outer Bristol
Greystones foul, Wicklow County, Ireland, Channel, Devon, England, U.K.,
Guia, Costa do Estoril, Portugal, No. 244, Ingoldmells, Lincolnshire, U.K., No. 29,
Table A-1 Table 1-1
Gujarat Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd., International Paper, Gardiner, Oregon,
Dahej, Gulf of Cambay, India, No. 348, U.S., No. 19, Table 1-1
Table A-1 Inverclyde, Firth of Clyde near Greenock,
Gullane foul, Firth of Forth, Scotland, Scotland, No. 372, Table A-1
No. 415, Table A-1 Iona, Vancouver, British Columbia,
Gwithian (Hayle), St. Ives Bay, Cornwall, Canada, No. 185, Table A-1
U.K., No. 294, Table A-1 Ipanema Beach, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
Harmac, Nanaimo, British Columbia, No. 46, Table 1-1
Canada, No. 45, Table 1-1 Ironmill Bay, Fife, Scotland, No. 226,
Hastings and Bexhill (Bulverhythe), Table A-1
southeast England, U.K., No. 117, Irvine Valley, Troon, Scotland, No. 67,
Table A-1 Table A-1
Hastings, Hawkes Bay, New Zealand, Islay (Isle of), Scotland, No. 381, Table A-1
No. 85, Table A-1 James River Marathon paper mill, Lake
Hastings, U.K., No. 27, Table 1-1 Superior, Ontario, Canada, No. 136,
Hatton, outer Firth of Forth, Scotland, Table A-1
No. 364, Table A-1 Kadikoy, Turkey, No. 414, Table A-1
Hayden Island, Portland, Oregon, U.S., Kasaan, Southeast Alaska, U.S., No. 180,
Hendon No. 2, Port of Sunderland, Tyne Kawana, Bokarina, Sunshine Coast,
and Wear, England, U.K., No. 321, Queensland, Australia, No. 113,
Table A-1 Table A-1
Highland Creek Sewage Treatment Plant, Kenai, Alaska, U.S., No. 82, Table A-1
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, No. 72, Kiel extension, Baltic Sea, Germany,
Hollywood, Florida, U.S., No. 26, Kilkeel No. 2, Irish Sea, Northern Ireland,
Table 1-1 U.K., No. 389, Table A-1
Holyhead, Wales, No. 428, Table A-1 King Cove Downtown, Aleutian Islands,
Honouliuli, Oahu, Hawaii, U.S., No. 49, Alaska, U.S., No. 169, Table A-1
Table 1-1 Kingston No. 2, Washington, U.S.,
Horden, Durham Coast, U.K., No. 337, No. 430, Table A-1
Table A-1 Kingston, Ontario, Canada, No. 322,
Hornsea No. 2 foul, Humberside, England, Table A-1
U.K., No. 401, Table A-1 Kinloss No. 2, England, U.K., No. 443,
Hout Bay, Cape Province, South Africa, Table A-1
No. 234, Table A-1 Kinoya, Suva, Fiji, No. 429, Table A-1
Humacao, Puerto Rico, U.S., No. 203, Kirkcaldy, Firth of Forth, Scotland,
Appendix A 351
Kirkcudbright, Scotland, No. 442, Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Mexico, No. 151,

Table A-1 Table A-1
Kirkwall, Orkney Islands, U.K., No. 377, Meary Veg Rock, Isle of Man, Irish Sea,
Table A-1 U.K., No. 416, Table A-1
Klettagardar (Laugarnes), Reykjavik, Metlakatla, Southeast Alaska, U.S.,
Iceland, No. 390, Table A-1 No. 343, Table A-1
La Trinité, Galion Bay, Martinique, Middleton (Heysham), Lancashire,
No. 346, Table A-1 England, U.K., No. 307, Table A-1
La Turballe, France, No. 402, Table A-1 Midway Sewer District, Des Moines,
Lamberts Point extension (Virginia Washington, U.S., No. 449, Table A-1
Initiative Plant), Norfolk, Virginia, U.S., Minehead No. 2, Somerset, England, U.K.,
Lavernock Point, Wales, No. 286, Table A-1 Mobil North Sea, St. Fergus, Scotland,
Les Sables d’Olonne, France, No. 440, No. 225, Table A-1
Table A-1 Modare, Colombo, Sri Lanka, No. 165,
Levenmouth, Firth of Forth, Scotland, Table A-1
No. 370, Table A-1 Mokapu, Kailua, Hawaii, U.S., No. 47,
Lions Gate STP, Vancouver, British Table 1-1
Columbia, Canada, No. 36, Table 1-1 Mompás, San Sebastián-Pasajes, Bay of
Loma Larga, Valparaiso, central Chile, Biscay, Spain, No. 385, Table A-1
No. 349, Table A-1 Monaco No. 1, Mediterranean Sea,
Longview Fibre, Longview, Washington, Monaco, No. 76, Table A-1
U.S., No. 249, Table A-1 Mondi, Richards Bay, Natal, South Africa,
Louisiana-Pacific extension, Humboldt No. 146, Table A-1
Bay, California, U.S., No. 288, Table A-1 Monmouth County, New Jersey, U.S.,
Loy Yang saline water (McGaurans Beach), No. 39, Table 1-1
Ninety Mile Beach, Victoria, Australia, Mönsteras Pulp Mill, southeast Sweden,
Lulu Island, Richmond, Greater Vancouver, Montagne Jacquot, Mauritius, No. 434,
British Columbia, Canada, No. 262, Table A-1
Table A-1 Monterey Bay, Marina, California, U.S.,
Lyme Regis (Gun Cliff), Dorset, England, No. 114, Table A-1
U.K., No. 298, Table A-1 Montpellier, France, No. 411, Table A-1
Lynetten, Copenhagen, Denmark, No. 64, Morecambe, Lancashire, England, U.K.,
Macauley Point, Victoria, British Morfa Bychan, Porthmadog, North Wales,
Columbia, Canada, No. 32, Table 1-1 No. 156, Table A-1
Macduff/Banff, Moray Coast, Scotland, Mornington, Victoria, Australia, No. 1,
No. 386, Table A-1 Table 1-1
Malabar, Sydney, New South Wales, Morro Bay-Cayucos, California, U.S.,
Australia, No. 220, Table A-1 No. 96, Table A-1
Marbella, Biarritz, France, No. 420, Morrum Pulp Mill extension, southern
Table A-1 Sweden, No. 177, Table A-1
Margate, North Kent, England, U.K., Mount Pleasant, Charleston, South
No. 148, Table A-1 Carolina, U.S., No. 194, Table A-1
Marske (Langbaurgh), Cleveland, England, Mundesley (Knapton Road), Norfolk, U.K.,
U.K., No. 140, Table A-1 No. 78, Table A-1
Maryport, Cumbria, northwest England, Mutton Island, Galway Bay, Ireland,
U.K., No. 284, Table A-1 No. 392, Table A-1
Masan Bay, South Korea, No. 269, Narragansett No. 2 (Scarborough WWTF),
Table A-1 Rhode Island, U.S., No. 132, Table A-1
Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, U.S., No. 94, Nassau County, Long Island, New York,
Table A-1 U.S., No. 41, Table 1-1
Nelson, New Zealand, No. 30, Table 1-1 Penco-Lirquen, Chile, No. 290, Table A-1
New Plymouth City, North Island, New Penmaenmawr, North Wales, No. 374,
Zealand, No. 144, Table A-1 Table A-1
Newbiggin-by-the-Sea foul, Penmarc’h (Pointe de), Brittany, France,
Northumberland, North Sea, England, No. 299, Table A-1
U.K., No. 227, Table A-1 Pennington No. 2, Hampshire, U.K.,
Newhaven Seaford Bay, English Channel, No. 86, Table A-1
East Sussex, England, U.K., No. 211, Penrhyn Bay, Wales, No. 347, Table A-1
Table A-1 Peter Pan reconstruction, Valdez, Alaska,
Newport City extension, Oregon, U.S., U.S., No. 137, Table A-1
No. 222, Table A-1 Peterhead No. 2 (Sandford Bay), Scotland,
Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, Canada, No. 200, Table A-1
No. 291, Table A-1 Petersburg City, Alaska, U.S., No. 56,
North Berwick, Firth of Forth, Scotland, Table A-1
No. 228, Table A-1 Pillar Point (Tuen Mun), Hong Kong,
North End extension, Tacoma, No. 338, Table A-1
Washington, U.S., No. 230, Table A-1 Pinedo, Valencia, Spain, No. 245,
North Head, Sydney, New South Wales, Table A-1
Australia, No. 221, Table A-1 Pittsburg, Suisun Bay, California, U.S.,
North Miami Beach, Florida, U.S., No. 20, No. 13, Table 1-1
Table 1-1 Playa Brava, Iquique, Chile, No. 259,
Norton reconstruction, Yarmouth, Isle of Table A-1
Wight, U.K., No. 69, Table A-1 Plouharnel, Quiberon, France, No. 435,
Oban Bay, Strathclyde, Scotland, No. 70, Table A-1
Table A-1 Point Loma extension, San Diego,
Ocean City, Cape May County, New Jersey, California, U.S., No. 265, Table A-1
U.S., No. 81, Table A-1 Point Loma, San Diego, California, U.S.,
Old Harbor, Kodiak Island, Alaska, U.S., No. 18, Table 1-1
No. 145, Table A-1 Ponce No. 2, Puerto Rico, U.S., No. 325,
Orange County No. 1, California, U.S., Table A-1
No. 9, Table 1-1 Pondicherry Paper Mills, Pondicherry,
Orange County No. 2, California, U.S., India, No. 95, Table A-1
No. 35, Table 1-1 Pontevedra, northwest Spain, No. 223,
Owl’s Head, New York, New York, U.S., Table A-1
No. 233, Table A-1 Port Alice Pulpmill, Port Alice, Vancouver
Palermo, Sicily, Italy, No. 336, Island, British Columbia, Canada,
Pa-Li (Tamsui), Taipei, Taiwan, No. 312, Port Fairy, Victoria, Australia, No. 38,
Table A-1 Table 1-1
Palm Beach, Florida, U.S., No. 10, Port Gardner, Washington, U.S., No. 426,
Table 1-1 Table A-1
Par No. 2 (St. Austell), Cornwall, England, Port Lincoln, South Australia, Australia,
U.K., No. 256, Table A-1 No. 14, Table 1-1
Pardigon No. 2 (La Croix-Valmer), Port Orford, Oregon, U.S., No. 413,
Cavalaire-sur-Mer, France, No. 396, Table A-1
Table A-1 Portsmouth, New Hampshire, U.S.,
Pedder Bay, Metchosin, south Vancouver No. 23, Table 1-1
Island, British Columbia, Canada, Powell River, British Columbia, Canada,
No. 204, Table A-1 No. 43, Table 1-1
Peekskill, New York, U.S., No. 68, Prince Rupert, British Columbia, Canada,
Table A-1 No. 34, Table 1-1
Peñarrubia, Gijon East, Spain, No. 313, Psyttalia Island effluent, Athens, Greece,
Appendix A 353
Punta Negra, Iquique, Chile, No. 260, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, Canada, No. 128,
Table A-1 Table A-1
Québec East, Québec, Canada, No. 63, Sausalito-Marin City, San Francisco Bay,
Table A-1 California, U.S., No. 160,
Raccoon Strait, Tiburon, California, U.S., Table A-1
No. 106, Table A-1 Saxman, Southeast Alaska, U.S., No. 202,
Renton, Seattle, Washington, U.S., Table A-1
No. 167, Table A-1 Scalby Mills, Scarborough, North
Richmond, San Francisco Bay, California, Yorkshire, England, U.K., No. 207,
U.S., No. 66, Table A-1 Table A-1
Rochester, New York, U.S., No. 33, Scarborough, Maine, U.S., No. 125,
Table 1-1 Table A-1
Ryde, Isle of Wight, England, U.K., Seabright extension, Hamilton, Bermuda,
SAICCOR No. 2 extension, Umkomaas, Seabrook, New Hampshire, U.S., No. 314,
Natal, South Africa, No. 363, Table A-1 Table A-1
SAICCOR No. 2, Umkomaas, Natal, South Seaham No. 2, Durham Coast, northern
Africa, No. 190, Table A-1 England, U.K., No. 375, Table A-1
Saida, Lebanon, No. 412, Table A-1 Seascale, Cumbria, northwest England,
Sainte Luce, Martinique, No. 405, U.K., No. 280, Table A-1
Table A-1 Seaton Carew foul, Hartlepool, Durham,
Saint-Jean-Cap Ferrat, Côte d’Azur, France, U.K., No. 232, Table A-1
No. 450, Table A-1 Serena (La), Chile, No. 195, Table A-1
Samoa Packing/Starkist, Pago Pago, Seven Mile Beach, Cape May County,
American Samoa, No. 236, Table A-1 New Jersey, U.S., No. 152, Table A-1
San Mateo Bridge, San Francisco Bay, Sewer Authority Mid-Coastside Regional
California, U.S., No. 28, Table 1-1 No. 2, Half Moon Bay, California, U.S.,
San Pedro del Pinatar (Cartagena), No. 112, Table A-1
southeast Spain, No. 432, Table A-1 Sham Tseng, Hong Kong, No. 419,
Sanary, Mediterranean Sea, southern Table A-1
France, No. 126, Table A-1 Shanganagh (Killiney Beach), Dublin,
Sand Island No. 1, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S., Ireland, No. 138, Table A-1
No. 7, Table 1-1 Shoreham-by-Sea, West Sussex, England,
Sand Island No. 2, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S., U.K., No. 293, Table A-1
No. 44, Table 1-1 Sibenik, Croatia, No. 422, Table A-1
Sand Point No. 2, Shumagin Islands, Sitka City, southeast Alaska, U.S., No. 100,
Alaska, U.S., No. 267, Table A-1 Table A-1
Sandown Bay foul, Isle of Wight, England, South Bay, South San Diego, California,
U.K., No. 373, Table A-1 U.S., No. 326, Table A-1
Sandy Bay, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia, South Coast (Needhams Point), Barbados,
No. 17, Table 1-1 No. 323, Table A-1
Santa Barbara, California, U.S., No. 48, South Queensferry, Firth of Forth,
Table 1-1 Scotland, No. 229, Table A-1
Santa Cruz No. 3, California, U.S., Southend extension, Thames River
No. 199, Table A-1 Estuary, England, U.K., No. 191,
Santa Isabel, Puerto Rico, U.S., No. 120, Table A-1
Table A-1 Southport Broadwater, Nerang River
Santander, Cantabria, Bay of Biscay, Spain, Estuary, Queensland, Australia, No. 98,
Santos/Sao Vicente, Brazil, No. 51, Southwest Ocean, San Francisco,
Table A-1 California, U.S., No. 163, Table A-1
São Jacinto, Aveiro, Portugal, No. 354, Spaniard’s Bay, Newfoundland, Canada,
St. Andrews (Kinkell Ness), Fife, Scotland, Tondo, Manila Bay, Philippines, No. 127,
St. George Industrial, Pribilof Islands, Toulon, France, No. 121, Table A-1
Alaska, U.S., No. 206, Table A-1 Tramore, Waterford, Ireland, No. 431,
St. George Town No. 1, Pribilof Islands, Table A-1
Alaska, U.S., No. 170, Table A-1 Trieste, Gulf of Trieste, extreme northeast
St. George Town No. 2, Pribilof Islands, Italy, No. 214, Table A-1
Alaska, U.S., No. 341, Table A-1 Triomf, Richards Bay, Natal, South Africa,
St. Paul, Pribilof Islands, Alaska, U.S., No. 147, Table A-1
No. 186, Table A-1 Tryon Creek STP extension, Portland,
Stanley WWTP, Hong Kong Island South Oregon, U.S., No. 241, Table A-1
District, Hong Kong, No. 261, Table A-1 Tsing Yi, Hong Kong, No. 378, Table A-1
Stavanger, Norway, No. 235, Table A-1 Tso-Ying, Kaohsiung City, Taiwan, No. 91,
Stevenston (Ardeer No. 2, Irvine), Table A-1
Strathclyde, Scotland, No. 87, Table A-1 Tuzla, Turkey, No. 279, Table A-1
Stobrec, Split, Croatia, No. 410, Table A-1 Tyonek, Cook Inlet, Alaska, U.S., No. 210,
Stonecutters Island, Hong Kong, No. 248, Table A-1
Table A-1 Tywyn and Aderdyfi, Wales, No. 257,
Stonehaven, northeast Scotland, No. 164, Table A-1
Table A-1 Ucluelet, western Vancouver Island, British
Stornoway, Western Isles, U.K., No. 383, Columbia, Canada, No. 350, Table A-1
Table A-1 Unalaska, Aleutian Islands, Alaska, U.S.,
Straight Point, South Devon, U.K., No. 31, No. 129, Table A-1
Table 1-1 Upper Pyewipe, Grimsby Humber Estuary,
Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme, Stage I, U.K., No. 251, Table A-1
Hong Kong, No. 328, Table A-1 Usgo (Miengo, Solvay), Cantabria, Bay of
Suffolk County, Long Island, New York, Biscay, Spain, No. 403, Table A-1
U.S., No. 71, Table A-1 Uskudar, Istanbul, Turkey, No. 246,
Swanbourne, Western Australia, Australia, Table A-1
No. 15, Table 1-1 Utulei, Pago Pago Harbor, American
Tafuna, Fogagogo, American Samoa, Samoa, No. 306, Table A-1
No. 309, Table A-1 Varo Pulp and Paper Mill extension, 80 km
Ta-Lin-Pu, Kaohsiung City, Taiwan, No. 90, south of Gothenburg, Sweden, No. 157,
Table A-1 Table A-1
Tanajib, Saudi Arabia, No. 102, Table A-1 Vashon Island extension, Puget Sound,
Tangiers, Morocco, No. 447, Table A-1 Washington, U.S., No. 425, Table A-1
Tatitlek, Prince William Sound, Alaska, Venus Bay, South Gippsland, Victoria,
U.S., No. 240, Table A-1 Australia, No. 438, Table A-1
Teignmouth, Devon, England, U.K., Villagarcia, northwest Spain, No. 243,
Tenby, South Wales, No. 143, Table A-1 Viña del Mar, Chile, No. 316, Table A-1
Terminal Island, Los Angeles, California, Waianae extension, Hawaii, U.S., No. 153,
U.S., No. 65, Table A-1 Table A-1
Tétouan, Morocco, No. 448, Table A-1 Waimakariri, New Zealand, No. 436,
Thessaloniki City, northern Greece, Table A-1
No. 394, Table A-1 Waimea, New Zealand, No. 105, Table A-1
Timaru, South Island, New Zealand, Waitara, New Zealand, No. 50, Table 1-1
No. 172, Table A-1 Waldronville Beach (Green Island)
Tipalao Bay, Guam, No. 296, Table A-1 extension, Dunedin, South Island,
Tofino (Cedar St.) No. 2, Vancouver Island New Zealand, No. 380, Table A-1
(west coast), British Columbia, Canada, Waldronville Beach original (Green
No. 376, Table A-1 Island), Dunedin, South Island,
Tomé, central Chile, No. 289, Table A-1 New Zealand, No. 197, Table A-1
Appendix A 355
Wanganui City, North Island, New Whitehaven (West Strand), Cumbria,

Zealand, No. 99, Table A-1 northwest England, U.K., No. 282,
Warrenton, Oregon, U.S., No. 441, Table A-1 Table A-1
Watchet, Somerset, England, U.K., Whites Point No. 2, southern California,
No. 352, Table A-1 U.S., No. 5, Table 1-1
Watsonville No. 1, California, U.S., No. 8, Whites Point No. 4, southern California,
Table 1-1 U.S., No. 21, Table 1-1
Watsonville No. 2 extension, California, Wicklow Town foul, Wicklow, Irish Sea,
U.S., No. 193, Table A-1 Ireland, No. 209, Table A-1
Watsonville No. 2, California, U.S., No. 16, Wied Ghammieq, Valletta, Malta, No. 54,
Table 1-1 Table A-1
Wellawatte, Colombo, Sri Lanka, No. 166, Wildwood, Cape May County, New Jersey,
Table A-1 U.S., No. 175, Table A-1
Wellington (Moa Point No. 2), North Withernsea No. 2, Humberside, England,
Island, New Zealand, No. 327, U.K., No. 237, Table A-1
Table A-1 Wollongong No. 1, New South Wales,
West Point Emergency Marine, Seattle, Australia, No. 162, Table A-1
Washington, U.S., No. 295, Table A-1 Wollongong No. 2 (Illawarra, Coniston
West Point, Seattle, Washington, U.S., Beach), New South Wales, Australia,
No. 24, Table 1-1 No. 409, Table A-1
West Road (Clacton) storm, Essex, Woodman Point, Fremantle, Western
England, U.K., No. 189, Table A-1 Australia, Australia, No. 22, Table 1-1
West Runton, north Norfolk, England, Workington (Siddick), Cumbria, northwest
U.K., No. 287, Table A-1 England, U.K., No. 283, Table A-1
Weymouth (and Portland) (West Bay), Worli, Mumbai (Bombay), India, No. 356,
Dorset, England, U.K., No. 122, Table A-1
Table A-1 Yap Lagoon extension, Yap, Western
Wheatcroft, Cayton Bay, Scarborough, Caroline Islands, No. 110, Table A-1
Yorkshire, England, U.K., No. 329, Zarauz (Zarautz), northern Spain, No. 196,
Table A-1 Table A-1
Appendix B
Wave-Related Concepts
and Calculations for
Outfall Design-Build
B.1 Ocean Waves

B.1.1 Big Seas
In many parts of the world, the anchored government “weather buoy” is the source
of a whole set of deep water oceanographic and atmospheric information that
includes wave heights, periods, and spectra. The responsible federal agency in the
United States is the National Data Buoy Center (NDBC), part of the National Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (Moersdorf and Meindl 2003; Crout
and Burnett 2008).
On August 18, 19, and 20, 2007, steadily intensifying Hurricane Dean powered
its way through the Caribbean Sea. U.S. weather buoy No. 42059, to the east, gave
an hour-by-hour peak significant wave height of 10.0 m, and later, buoy No. 42056
in the western sector showed 11.0 m. There were undoubtedly individual waves as
high as five-story buildings out there. The design of any outfall/rock complex for
Martinique, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, or any such island of the region, must consider
the thunderous surf in such a tempest. The accompanying storm surge must not be
forgotten.
A forecast of large ocean waves for a coastal locale means different things to
different people. The big-wave surfer sits impatiently in his truck overlooking the
water, scanning the horizon for the first signs. A civil defense official has the fishing
pier cleared of people and declared off-limits. The last person off the pier looks back
and wonders whether the old structure will survive the onslaught. The oil refinery
superintendent hurries to finish offloading the tanker at her offshore mooring, and
worries about the stability of her ship-to-shore seabed pipelines. A marine contrac-
tor, placing rock on the breakwater, pulls the four anchors on his derrick barge, sum-
mons his tug, and starts the tow into a safe haven. A dredge superintendent stops
357
work on replenishing the local beach, buoys and drops his hoses, and similarly has
his craft towed into port. The responsible engineer for the local wastewater agency
frets that more armor rock may be torn off the top of her outfall by the furious sub-
sea water motion that will occur within hours.
The offshore “spread” for an outfall contractor may well include both a dredge
and a derrick barge. A temporary work pier, or “trestle,” may be involved. There are
worries about the stability of laid pipe and its rock protection. On an open ocean
coast, big waves are an occasional fact of life. Temporary and permanent structures
must be designed and constructed to withstand the unrelenting, incredibly powerful
water motion under storm seas and big swell. This is not a gentlemanly interaction
with formal rules and blown whistles. This is a prolonged attack of such ferocity as to
be unbelievable to those of us brought up in a civilized manner. Absolutely no “quar-
ter” is given, and there is not disengagement when serious damage is imminent.
One can never predict the size of the largest wave during a local tempest or an
episode of giant swell from a distant disturbance whatever probability models are
being used to represent the distribution of heights. On February 13, 1997, two expe-
rienced big wave surfers were “doing their thing” at an outside reef off Oahu’s North
Shore. They paddled over a wave of no great consequence and were suddenly con-
fronted with the first of a pair of colossal waves that both broke right on them, held
them down interminably in the massive turbulence, and drowned one individual.
Afterwards, the shaken survivor reportedly said that “the next wave was so big I
couldn’t even comprehend how big it was,” and added: “Mother Nature can just
take you.”
Data from weather buoys in the open ocean off the Americas indicates that
individual ten-story waves are possible during great storms. A height of 31.0 m was
recorded by a U.S. buoy on October 31, 1991, during the “Perfect Storm” in the
North Atlantic off Massachusetts (FitzGerald et al. 1994). Individual heights of
30.4 and 30.8 m were measured by Canadian buoys in the North Pacific off British
Columbia on December 20, 1991, and December 10, 1993, respectively (Gower and
Jones 1994). The latter was associated with a nearby deep 952-millibar low pres-
sure area, a storm that will be referred to again below. Moving from extratropical to
tropical storms, individual waves to 27.7 m were measured during Hurricane Ivan
(September 2004), in the Gulf of Mexico, and analysis suggested waves to 40 m near
the eyewall (Wang et al. 2005).
Marine projects in general, and outfall jobs in particular, are at the mercy of
large seas. In some cases, as an extra precaution, the contractor may choose to install
its own wave buoy, presumably some distance seaward of the actual work site to
provide warning. Recent examples of such installations concern the 2007–08 pair of
New Zealand outfalls and the same contractor: Tahuna (Dunedin, section 9.1.2) and
Christchurch (section 9.1.3).
B.1.2 Wave Particulars

Out on the deep sea we imagine long “lines” of successive wind-generated waves
propagating towards shore. This is virtually exactly what does occur for big swell from
Appendix B 359
a distant storm. There is an important and oft-used equation (from the “linear” or
“Airy” theory) that relates the horizontal distance between crests well offshore (the
deep water wave length, LO) and the elapsed time between these crests at a fixed point
(the period T):
LO ( g/2π)T 2 (B-1)
where 3.14159 . . . and g the gravitational acceleration. For a hurricane-gener-

ated swell of period 11 sec, LO 189 m; for the typical 1982–1983 El Niño winter
storms off California and T 19 sec, LO 564 m. The deep water wave height is
represented by HO.
If a couple were to sit on a coastal headland somewhere, and make observations
of approaching waves, their attention would probably be acute during the arrival of
larger waves in the “sets” but would wane during the “lulls” of minor consequence.
At the end of this experience, the observers would indicate an inflated “average”
because of their inattention during times of little action. The idea of the so-called
“significant wave height,” duplicates this human tendency by first removing from
a measured wave sequence all heights that rank in the lower two-thirds. The result-
ing average of the higher one-third of the wave heights is then the “significant wave
height,” customarily represented by the symbol HS. The wave height data given by
the NDBC always use this statistic.
Although ratios of Hmax/HS can be derived analytically, knowing the number of
waves in the wave train, such numbers (typically 1.6 to 1.8) are not necessarily reli-
able for real seas. As an example, Gower and Jones (1994) have described the large
British Columbia storm waves of December 10, 1993. During the interval of peak
wave activity, with the significant wave height at 12.3 m, the maximum height was
an astounding 30.8 m. This gives a ratio Hmax/HS 2.50, a number which is report-
edly not overly unusual in the region and one that would, on theoretical grounds,
unrealistically require many thousands of waves. The so-called Draupner (North
Sea) freak wave, on New Year’s Day 1995, involved Hmax/HS 2.37. Once, anchored
in coastal waters off Oahu, Hawaii, I had the life-threatening experience of encoun-
tering Hmax/HS 2.33. The ocean does what it wants, whatever human pronounce-
ments predict.
B.1.3 Wave Transformations

As waves move from deep water into coastal depths, they undergo a set of com-
plex transformations detailed in conventional coastal engineering textbooks such as
Dean and Dalrymple (1984) as well as government reports, notably Coastal Engi-
neering Research Center (1973). When the wave enters coastal waters, the length
between crests shortens and the height changes. At some location where the “still
water depth” (SWL)” is h, we can establish the value of the ratio h/LO. This parameter
is the starting point for “mathematical or numerical models” dealing with waves.
Moving such a wave into the outfall area is a standard coastal engineering exercise,
and a simplified version will appear shortly. This is a procedure readily carried out by
computer, and such programs are available to the public (Cialone 1994; Leenknecht
et al. 1995).
In order to illustrate the idea, we consider here a deep water wave moving
directly onto a coast whose depth contours and shoreline are parallel to that front
and where the seabed slope is gradual. Linear tables in the above-mentioned coastal
engineering books allow one to chart the theoretical height and length changes of
the wave, as it advances shoreward, due to the phenomenon called “shoaling.” Table
B-1 tracks the trends for an individual deep water design wave realistically taken to
have a height HO 15.25 m and a period of T 16.0 sec. In Table B-1, the symbols
h and L refer respectively to the local water depth and wave length. The last row has
the wave at the point of breaking, with the ratio H/h 0.78.
B.1.4 Depth-Limited Design Criteria

Consider a large swell whose biggest individual wave broke in 20 m of water. Leav-
ing out the possible occurrence of an out-of-line “freak wave” for the moment, it is
reasonable to assume that the second largest wave in the sequence broke in slightly
shallower water, the third highest a bit further inshore, and so on and so on. The
whole coastal area, inshore of the 20-m depth contour, saw its largest possible wave
at one time or another. Within this region, the water depth governs the specified local
wave height.
A complication to the above scenario concerns astronomical tides but especially
storm tides. At the height of Hurricane Iwa in November 1982, a friend of mine liv-
ing on his boat on Oahu, fully 200 km from the eye, stepped down roughly 0.5 m
onto his vessel’s finger pier. Storm surge deepens the water and allows bigger waves
than normally possible to appear at any given location.
B.1.5 Stream Function Theory

We have already mentioned the linear theory, and another (more complex, but more
realistic) approach is the “stream function theory” of Dean (1974). In this formu-
Table B-1. Approximate Transformations as Design Wave Moves Shoreward

h (m) H (m) L (m)
15.25 400
200 15.10 399
80 14.00 355
50 14.00 308
40 14.22 284
32 14.56 260
26 14.97 238
20 15.60 212
Appendix B 361
lation, a second parameter of importance (beyond h/LO) is Hb/h, where Hb is the

breaking wave height in that water depth. A local wave has a height H that is some-
where between 0 and 100% of Hb. The tables of Dean (1974) are for various discrete
values of h/LO and 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of Hb/h. The local wave length can be
obtained from tabulated L/LO. Importantly, the proportion of the wave height lying
above and below the SWL is available. See Table B-2.
Although sea surface descriptions are very useful, and will be employed later,
the main engineering feature of the tables (or the available computer program) is
the determination of water motion (speeds and accelerations) under the surface dur-
ing the passage of the wave. This statement is true because it is the interaction of
that time-varying flow with vertical piles and seabed pipes that causes loading to be
evaluated in assessing structural stability. It is not only the design consultant who
may need to make such calculations, but also the contractor’s engineers.
We will represent the whole back and forth motion of an “undisturbed” (i.e. no
pipe present) near-seabed water particle by three particular features: the maximum
horizontal flow speed under the wave crest, UC, directed in the same direction as the
sea surface advance of the wave; UT, the peak horizontal flow speed in the rearward
direction, under the trough; the maximum value of the total horizontal water par-
ticle acceleration (Amax) that occurs somewhat in advance of the wave crest.
First, the stream function values assembled in Table B-3 implicitly reflect the
assumption that the ocean bottom slope is gradual. Second, a range of water depths
has been selected for which breaking wave conditions are not out of the question.
Third, the periods chosen reflect a reasonable range for big-sea events, with 11 sec-
onds appropriate for some hurricanes and 20 seconds having been experienced in
Table B-2. Depth-Limited Surface Features of Waves

Water Depth (m) T 11 s T 14 s T 17 s T 20 s
10 7.772 7.795 7.781 7.768

6.491 6.695 6.869 7.000
12 9.203 9.359 9.346 9.330
7.563 7.941 8.147 8.316
14 10.590 10.920 10.910 10.893
8.569 9.190 9.406 9.611
16 11.934 12.443 12.475 12.458
9.517 10.402 10.654 10.890
18 13.234 13.885 14.040 14.024
10.410 11.491 11.900 12.155
20 14.488 15.300 15.600 15.588
11.251 12.538 13.148 13.409
Note: In any cell, the entries are first the wave height and second the extent of that height
above the still water level, both in meters.
Source: Interpolated from Dean (1974).
Table B-3. Depth-Limited, Near-Bottom, Wave-Induced Peak Water Motion

Water depth (m) T 11 s T 14 s T 17 s T 20 s
10 2.880 3.264 3.544 3.719

1.173 0.981 0.820 0.690
1.709 1.751 1.772 1.772
12 2.980 3.431 3.762 3.972
1.367 1.151 0.974 0.837
1.707 1.724 1.748 1.778
14 3.064 3.552 3.929 4.194
1.547 1.319 1.127 0.972
1.704 1.717 1.737 1.762
16 3.134 3.652 4.066 4.376
1.717 1.479 1.275 1.105
1.701 1.712 1.729 1.751
18 3.195 3.739 4.183 4.530
1.879 1.632 1.418 1.237
1.699 1.709 1.723 1.742
20 3.249 3.813 4.284 4.661
2.032 1.780 1.558 1.366
1.697 1.706 1.719 1.735
Note: In any cell, the entries are respectively UC (m/s), |UT| (m/s), and Amax (m/s2)
Source: Interpolated from Dean (1974).
the north Pacific Ocean on various stormy occasions since 1982. I do not mean to
imply that the numbers are as accurate, in the real world, as represented by the three
decimals listed. These values are the predictions only of a good theory, and might be
taken (to reasonable accuracy) for development of quadratic splines for interpola-
tion purposes. Too often engineers view values, as in Table B-3, as mere numbers
that need to be inserted into some equation or other. I would like to stress that these
figures are manifestations of the power of natural phenomena, and should be appre-
ciated as such.
B.1.6 The Meaning of the Numbers

On June 19 and 20, 1984, during a moderate “south swell” along the Honolulu
coastline, three of us worked on an undersea experiment in 5 m of water. From time
to time on these days, we experienced sets wherein one to several individual waves
broke directly over the test site (and partly over the project boat). Considering the
dominant wave period of 17 seconds on that day, stream function theory predicts UC
2.809 m/sec, |UT| 0.400 m/sec, and Amax 1.907 m/sec2 under a breaking sea, a
short distance above the seabed. These values were corroborated by actual kinemati-
cal measurements that we made. The flow speeds given here are less than the entries
Appendix B 363
in Table B-3, a point I wish to stress because it was all I could do to maintain hold of
a steel bar and “flag out” during the passage of these wave crests. My facemask would
have been torn off had I not been wearing a hood that covered the strap.
Let us address two problems for a person underwater. First, ones effective weight
is gone. It is not possible, without ballast, to stand “heavily” on the seabed. Thus
ones resistance to being displaced sideways is absent, and even the tiniest “puffs” of
water motion from a passing days-old swell will cause one to lurch.
Now, consider when the water moves strongly. It is perhaps easiest to portray
the enormity of the resulting (drag) force by referring to wind speed, because many
individuals have a vague “feel” for such loads. Assuming equal drag coefficients, we
can write that
(␳V 2 )sea water (␳V 2 )air (B-2)
where means density and V denotes flow speed. Using the previously given value
of 2.809 m/sec as Vsea water and the ratio of the two densities as 835, we compute
Vair 81.2 m/sec (158 knots), a full Category 5 hurricane!
B.2 Wave-Related Computations for Trestles

B.2.1 Freeboard
As discussed in Chapter 3, by far the most common way of establishing a solid
marine working base through the surf zone is to create a temporary pier, an essential
extension of the land called a “trestle” (Fig. 3-1). Either wide-flange (i.e., H/Univer-
sal Column) or tubular (i.e., pipe) piles are driven sufficiently far into the seabed
to provide adequate support and lateral restraint even if wave action strips away an
appreciable amount of seabed material. Cross-members link lateral pairs of piles,
and longitudinal beams connect the pile bents together. Rails may be placed longi-
tudinally. Full decking may be added. In some cases the pipe is laid directly under
the trestle, and in some cases along one side.
We imagine that an outfall contractor plans on using a trestle as the base of
inshore operations. Consider a design still-water-depth of (h ) 8.0 m towards the
end of this structure. First, what under-deck “freeboard” is required to ensure that
the highest (T 16.0 sec) wave passes underneath? Second, what are the loading
and overturning moment on a single proposed 0.660-m-diam. trestle pile during the
passage of this wave? From Eq. B-1,
LO (9.81/ 2␲)(16)2 400 m
and
h / LO 8.0 / 400 0.02.
A breaking wave for this situation is precisely Dean’s Case 4D, which gives
H 0.778h 0.778(8.0) 6.22 m

and indicates that 88.9% of the height lies above the SWL. Then the minimum verti-
cal distance from that level up to the underside of the trestle deck is
R 0.889H 0.889(6.22) 5.53 m.
Thus the reach of this wave is up to 13.53 m above the (assumed stable) seabed.
Note (for later reference in Table B-4) that this distance is 1.691 times the still
water depth.
B.2.2 Interaction of Wave and Single Pile

Man-made ocean structures must be able to withstand episodes of very powerful
water motion that imposes enormous destabilizing forces on them. Such interac-
tion is clearly a physical process, but in order to quantify what is going on we need
to reduce this to a mathematical description. Some engineers get this backwards. The
reality is the non-mathematical part, the powerful surge of water and the straining
of the material bathed in that water. The mathematical model is a mere artifice that
seeks to capture the essence of the interaction.
As the design wave passes, its associated seabed-to-water-surface water motion
interacts strongly with the support piles (Wiegel et al. 1957). Various outfall con-
struction trestles have gone down over the years (Grace 1978, 2001). The peak flow
force and moment must be estimated in order to appraise the adequacy of a prelimi-
nary trestle design.
Sarpkaya and Isaacson (1981), present the prevailing idea that, in general, wave
force depends upon both the flow speed and acceleration in what is known as the Mor-
ison equation. The smallness of the pile diameter here, relative to the wave size, means
that acceleration effects can be ignored. The peak flow force and overturning moment
will then occur as the wave crest is temporarily centered on the (vertical) pile. Table
B-4 presents the spatial variation of theoretical horizontal flow speed with normalized
distance S up the pile, starting at the seabed. Again, the water depth is h 8.0 m.
Table B-4. Variation of Horizontal Peak Flow Speed within the Water Column
S/h U/(H/T) U (m/s) S/h U/(H/T) U (m/s)
1.691 19.899 7.74 0.8 10.113 3.93

1.6 18.167 7.06 0.7 9.657 3.75
1.5 16.533 6.43 0.6 9.278 3.61
1.4 15.137 5.88 0.5 8.968 3.49
1.3 13.942 5.42 0.4 8.722 3.39
1.2 12.919 5.02 0.3 8.535 3.32
1.1 12.043 4.68 0.2 8.404 3.27
1.0 11.294 4.39 0.1 8.326 3.24
0.9 10.655 4.14 0.0 8.300 3.23
Appendix B 365
The so-called “drag force” on an incremental length of pile S is
ΔFD CD (␳ / 2)D(ΔS)U 2 (B-3)
Here CD drag coefficient (1.05 suggested by Dean, 1974);

water density;
D (outside) pile diameter; and
U representative (horizontal) local flow speed.
One needs to add up all the incremental forces to obtain the overall force FD and sum
all the incremental moments (M SFD) to find the total overturning moment
(Dean 1974).
Alternately, one can repetitively apply the idea of “quadratic splines,” as long as
each part is monotonic, and I have done this to this problem. We start by considering
the lowest three stations on the pile and let Y U2 in each case. We imagine that
Y aS 2 bS c (B-4)
and solve for the three coefficients. We can then integrate this equation over the
particular span to yield (with a coefficient) the total drag force over that segment.
By integrating the product (S Y), again with a coefficient, we obtain that increment’s
contribution to the total pile overturning moment about the seabed.
We move up to the next increment which must have, as its bottom point, the top
point in the previous analysis. Step by step the whole pile is covered, and the total
force or moment is obtained by summing all the separate parts. Note that the top
increment is irregular and merits particular care.
The computed values (for the whole pile) were FD 104 kN and M 920 kN-m.
Note the substantial magnitudes of these two numbers.
Finally, if a structural member is used rather than a tubular pile, it is probably
best to use CD 2.0 (Hoerner 1965) whatever the orientation.
B.3 The Old Pipe and the Sea

At the present time, in the gas and oil industry, an unburied submarine pipeline is a
rarity in water depths less than 30 m. This is particularly true in the Gulf of Mexico
following boat-caused explosions in July 1987 and October 1989. But exposed pipes
were not unusual in the early 1960s when the 3390-m-long pair of lines in Table B-5
was constructed. These were to connect a shore-based refinery in Hawaii and a tanker
offloading site offshore in 20 to 23 m of water.
Symbols used in Table B-5 are as follows: CWC represents the concrete weight
coat added to the exterior of most subsea steel pipes; B is the buoyant force on the
total pipe, assuming no water absorption by the CWC; WB is the buoyant weight of
the pipe, namely air weight less the buoyant force.
Because of both land and marine constraints, the route for the pipelines was
unusual, diagonal to the coastline along a bearing of roughly southeast. The pipe-
lines were placed in a common (backfilled) trench for their first 1230 m, to a water
Table B-5. Features of Example Pipelines Pair

Specific Basic Steel Somastic
Gravity Pipe Coating Thickness
of Dimensions Thickness of CWC B WB
Pipe Use Liquid (mm) (mm) (mm) (kN/m) (kN/m)
Ship bunkering 0.90 o.d. 508 16 25 2.75 1.36

i.d. 489
Crude oil 0.82 o.d. 762 17 51 6.35 2.96
offloading i.d. 737
depth of 6 m. Thereafter, they lay exposed on the uneven limestone seabed, with a
block/chain stabilizing arrangement and the smaller pipe on the offshore (south-
west) side of the larger one. At the mooring, they both terminated in “subhoses” for
connection to tankers, typically 70,000 “dead weight ton” vessels.
The position and orientation of the pipes was such that seas generally approach-
ing the area from the southwest were directly on their beam. After two intense local
winter storms early in 1963, the lines were found in considerable disarray. Astonish-
ingly, in the trench area, some 430 m of the smaller pipe had been draped up and
over the larger one, meaning that vertical wave forces on it were larger than its buoy-
ant weight. Further offshore, seabed scarring attested to sustained movement of the
pipes, as did heavy wear of the CWC.
During an ambitious rehabilitation operation later, the smaller pipe was lifted
off the larger one, and the two lines repositioned with centerline to centerline spac-
ing between 1.2 and 1.8 m. In intermediate 6 to 14-m water depths, over a length
of 1,270 m, tremie concrete was then poured between the pipes, with monel straps
added around the whole ensemble. These ties did not last long, as I observed during
a pair of dives along the lines on September 23, 1973, in the company of master
diver E. R. Cross. Over the ensuing years, in the name of enhanced stability, the
shoreward side of the non-stabilized outer portion of the larger pipe received many
discarded concrete pile caps.
In the early 1980s, a hurricane generated large waves that crossed the pipeline
pair at right angles. Hindcast sea conditions featured the following hour-by-hour deep
water significant wave heights (meters) through the peak of such activity: 11.9, 12.8,
13.0, 12.8, and 12.3. The associated periods were in the range of 14.4 to 15.1 sec.
When divers surveyed the line afterwards they were astonished at the result. The pile
caps had been scattered as if they were mere trifles. The outer 890 m of the larger
pipe had been bent into a giant catenary-like bow whose average offset was 76 m and
maximum 125 m toward the northeast. Because of the yielding nature of the basic
steel pipe, there was fortunately no rupture and resultant outflow of crude oil. The
seabed was largely stripped of protrusions, and parts of the crude oil line ended up
perched on coral heads at least 0.5 m high.
Net transverse movement of this pipe was obtained by measuring at 30-m inter-
vals from the bunkering line. There is not agreement on whether this smaller pipe
Appendix B 367
stayed in position or shifted slightly during the storm. Observations at the mooring
itself seemed to indicate that the end of the smaller line might have moved 14 m to
the NNE, but this interpretation was not conclusive. For certain was the fact that the
end of the larger line after the storm stopped 40 m short of the end of the smaller
one, and 7 m away laterally. The 406-mm-diameter subhose, connected to the end
of the crude oil line, was found severely kinked. Clearly the hose and its gear had
provided a measure of restraint.
In the area of maximum curvature, at the inshore end of the outer 890 m next to
the concrete encasement, the CWC was cracked and broken. Regular contract inspec-
tion divers fully bared (including mastic) a 6-m length of pipe in this region, so that
a separate team of contracted technical divers could run non-destructive tests.
1. Using an ultrasonic gage, they confirmed that the nominal steel wall thick-
ness (12.7 mm) had not suffered. The data mean was 12.497 mm and the
standard deviation a tight 0.132 mm.
2. Caliper measurements between 9 and 3 o’clock on the pipe showed definite
ovalling. The minimum distance was 727 mm. No vertical (6 to 12 o’clock)
measurements could be taken because of the presence of the seabed.
3. Fitting of offset measurements from a straight chord through a 4.6-m-long
arc in the tight bend yielded a ratio of radii of 11.2 (bend radius divided by
pipe radius). Thus the plastic strain on the outside of the curve was (11.2)1
0.09 mm/mm. The angular change through the measured bend was a
notable 61°.
The decision was reached to not attempt returning the pipes to their former
positions. Fourteen months after the storm, the lines were stabilized in-place with
2500 m3 of poured tremie concrete. Roughly 900 m of the larger line was involved.
Some 200 m of the smaller line was also included, especially in regions where spall-
ing of the CWC had occurred.
B.4 Wave Force Considerations for Exposed Submarine Pipelines

B.4.1 Strong Wave Surge and Resultant Forces
We have seen, in the previous section, what extraordinary things big waves can do
to an exposed gas/oil industry pipeline of inappropriate orientation and insufficient
self-weight. The papers by Ghoneim (2006) and Clinton (2008) document the enor-
mity of the wave damage to Gulf of Mexico submarine gas/oil lines after 2005 Hur-
ricanes Katrina (latter August) and Rita (latter September). Figure B-1 shows the
shattered remnants of a 610-mm steel pipe in shallow water. The separated CWC is
102 mm thick.
In April, 1972, I was asked to travel from Oahu to the Island of Hawaii, to
dive on the Hilo outfall whose flow was reported by fishermen to be gushing to the
sea surface substantially too far inshore. This was a flush-joint 1,219-mm reinforced
concrete pipe exposed across a channeled calcium carbonate seabed. The scene at
the site, in 7 to 8 m of water, can only be described as “unbelievable,” with displaced
ballast rock, broken pipe, and twisted reinforcing bars lying all along a 37-m-long
Figure B-1. Remnants of submarine steel pipe and concrete weight coat.
stretch between the (weakly flowing) inshore stub and the intact offshore continua-
tion. After other possible factors (e.g., strong earthquake) were discounted, the only
conclusion was that severe wave action had initiated the pipe separation and then
gone to work on the weakened line.
Within this text we have seen other examples of waves destroying ocean outfalls:
the steel Peterhead (Scotland) outfall in 1979 (section 4.3.2); the cast iron Agaña
(Guam) pipe in 1976 (section 5.7.2); the Green Point (South Africa) HDPE outfall
at Cape Town in both 1984 and 1989 (section 10.2). In this latter case, since HDPE
is lighter than sea water, pipes of this material must be ballasted, and usually this
makes use of discrete concrete collars of various designs. Often, the offshore por-
tions of these pipes are unburied, with the undersides of the weights resting on the
seabed and the pipes themselves off-bottom. These discrete “bracelets” must clearly
be of adequate size to keep the ensemble on-bottom and not sliding during the
occurrence of very powerful wave surge.
As a related matter, in April, 2001, I received an e-mail enquiry from an experi-
enced engineer working for a marine contractor. This company was planning to bid
on a particular HDPE outfall job on a coast with occasional episodes of very large
seas. Hard bottom conditions offshore precluded pipe burial over the second half
of the line, and the engineer wanted to check a major European hydraulic institute’s
evaluation of wave forces, done to determine the necessary weight of concrete collars
to ensure stability.
Appendix B 369
Let us assume that the engineer’s situation is as follows. An HDPE outfall of

outside diameter (D ) 800 mm is to be maintained with its underside some 200
mm (G) off-bottom. At a station along the pipeline where the water depth is (h )
20 m, the breaking design wave of 16-second period (T) is crossing the centerline at
an angle of ( ) 45°.
The wave characteristics here conform exactly to Case 5D in the realistic tables of
Dean (1974), and these arrays yield UT 1.628 m/sec, Amax 1.715 m/sec2, and
UC 4.140 m/sec. (Alternately, one can interpolate in Table B-3.) The reader must
understand that the undisturbed flow referred to mathematically above is, physi-
cally, a true torrent. We will return to this example case later, after we have collected
the necessary data and developed calculation aids.
Figure B-2 provides a view of what a concrete collar could look like, if the intent
was to have the pipe well off-bottom. Here, the ratio G/D 0.65. Note that if the
seabed were erodible, the tips would enter the sand and the clearance would be less,
perhaps much less. Another development with an erodible sea floor is that localized
heavy scour could have the star weight itself completely off-bottom, providing a
heavy point load on the pipe rather than support.
A mathematical model for the assessment of the forces exerted on an exposed
submarine pipeline by big seas must have provision for non-zero pipe gaps (G). The
model must also allow for various orientations () of the storm wave fronts with
respect to the pipe axis, even though outfalls are customarily aligned to be generally
perpendicular to wave fronts. There are certainly locations where refracted waves of
consequence can approach a site through fully 45°. In some unusual environmen-
Figure B-2. Example weight collar for HDPE pipe.

tally-driven cases, as for the Monterey Bay outfall in section 6.3, it is even possible
to have design-level waves approaching an outfall directly on its beam, that is, 0°.
In summary, it would be advantageous to have wave force computational aids for
0 G/D 1 and 0 60°, where D is the outside pipe diameter. The horizontal
and vertical forces on the pipe will be F and P respectively, with the maximum values
Fmax and Pmax. Note that the force F is always taken perpendicular to the pipe and that
the vertical force is up.
B.4.2 Wave-Forces-on-Pipes Research in the Ocean

One morning during all of the offshore research efforts involved in what follows,
a co-worker and I were loading and readying our project boat at a public pier in a
Honolulu harbor named Kewalo Basin. A man milled around for a time in our area
and then stopped to chat. It turned out that he had been working professionally
in the offshore industry in Houston, Texas, and was in the process of moving back
to Singapore and a similar assignment. He asked why we were going to sea, and in
fits and snatches we explained the situation. After a while, he looked quizzically at
us and asked “well, don’t you have a wave flume?” He couldn’t understand why we
would be making the great but perhaps frivolous effort to go offshore when one
could apparently gain the same information and never leave dry land.
Years earlier, in fact during the first few months of 1969, I worked in the Paris
headquarters of a French offshore drilling contractor. Near the end of my stay, one
of the company’s engineers and I made a short trip across the English Channel. One
of the stops we subsequently made was at the hydraulics research station at Walling-
ford, and there we were given an advance copy of the landmark paper by one of its
engineers (Rance 1969). Here, a hydraulic researcher was debunking the basis of his
trade, presenting empirical evidence that the process of pulsating flow past a sub-
merged circular cylinder cannot be physically modeled. He stated: “The findings of
this work cast doubts on the validity of tests on model structures subjected to wave
action.” For one representative case, Rance found that directly extrapolating model
results to prototype predictions results in an overestimation by a factor of three.
There was no question in my mind, when I first sought funding in 1973, about
where I would do research on wave forces on pipes. I would take advantage of the
active marine waters surrounding Hawaii; I would, therefore, avoid similarity prob-
lems identified by Rance. Subsequently, our work, compared to a specific University
of California Berkeley laboratory investigation of wave forces on pipes, showed that
the model results overpredicted the field data by average factors ranging from 2.3 to
5.5 (Grace 1979a). The paper by De Rouck et al. (2007) takes us up to date in terms
of faulty prototype predictions from wave-structure interaction model data.
Despite the myriad laboratory tests on wave forces that would have one thinking
otherwise, any process that involves equating both Froude and Reynolds numbers,
using the same test medium, cannot be physically modeled—unless one has learned
how to make corrections as have naval architects and marine engineers since Victo-
rian times, by using at-sea trial data from real ships to provide a method of adjusting
raw data from ship model towing tanks. Returning to the pipe, the wake structure is
Appendix B 371
not properly simulated by a model unless the Reynolds numbers concerned equals
that of the prototype. All the high-power analysis in the world cannot change the
basic fact that model wave force data are fundamentally flawed in terms of real world
applicability.
B.4.3 Our Initial Pipe Tests

From 1967 to 1992, co-workers and I set up and carried out a series of wave and
wave force experiments offshore from Honolulu, and in the process I logged some
three thousand scuba dives. Various types of seabed structures were involved, but a
1974–1988 subset of the above work involved wave-forces-on-pipes research. In all
the different segments of the research to be presented below, the general approach
was always the same. A flow meter “off to one side” on the seabed provided a con-
tinuous record of the pure (“undisturbed”) wave-induced water motion parallel to
the seabed. A field-calibrated internal pair of special “strain gage beams” yielded the
instantaneous horizontal and vertical wave-induced force on a central portion of
the test pipe. The relatively high natural frequency of this system meant no dynamic
amplification complications. Cables linked the seabed instruments with recorders in
the project boat four-point-moored directly overhead. Scores of hours of concurrent
kinematics and force data were obtained.
A systematic effort was made in the pipe research to cover meaningful discrete
ranges of both clearance off the bottom (G) and the angle of the pipe with respect
to the passing wave fronts overhead. Because the force sensor part of the pipe, sup-
ported at its ends by strain gage beams, had to be free to move (a miniscule amount),
it was not possible to obtain data for G 0. A minimum clearance as high as 13 mm
was always used as a hedge (albeit unnecessary) against the jamming of the pipe,
underneath, by a stray piece of coral rubble. Since a zero clearance has to be regarded
as the base condition, our ocean data had to have ultimate help from a reasonably
high Reynolds number laboratory undertaking (Wilkinson et al. 1988) in order to
extrapolate the results the short distance to the boundary.
The first four years of research were primarily to deal with the angle question,
and related references are as follow: Grace and Nicinski (1976); Grace (1979b);
Grace et al. (1979); Grace and Zee (1981). The test site was in 11.3 m of water off-
shore from Honolulu, with a 406-mm-diameter steel pipe mounted on a 114-mm-
thick steel and concrete base faired in with the surrounding very rough seabed. See
Fig. B-3. Details on the separate components of the research are presented in Table
B-6, where is the height of roughness elements on the pipe surface.
B.4.4 Initial Findings

The kinematical measurements we made were for “undisturbed” flow, in the
absence of the pipe. The water motion that actually operates is “disturbed.” The flow
approaching the pipe at any instant contains elements that, a few seconds ago (when
the flow direction was reversed) were in its “roller” and wake. When the pressure
gradient is reversed, the lower portion of the wake (already moving rearward) passes
Figure B-3. Author’s test pipe arrangement 1975–1976.
Table B-6. Initial Offshore Pipeline Research by the Author

No. of
G Surface Waves
Phase Part Dates (°) (mm) Finish /D Processed
1 A 5/6–9/25/75 0 76 Bare 0.0001 155

1 B 3/23–5/28/76 0 13 Corrosion 0.0025 92
1 C 6/22–8/16/76 0 13 Ribs 0.016 55
2 A 3/30–5/16/78 15 13 Ribs 0.016 219
2 B 10/13–10/22/78; 35 13 Nuts 0.016 298
4/8–5/9/79
2 C 6/14–6/26/79 52 13 Nuts 0.016 200
quickly up and over the pipe, causing a spurt in vertical force and a closely-following
bulge in the horizontal force trace. It is this pair of transitory peaks that is of primary
concern to the outfall designer.
For robust flows, the vertical force trace displays a strong pulse that peaks near
the instant of flow reversal. There follows a ragged essential plateau where the force
appears of “lift” type, reflecting the horizontal flow speed (squared) under the crest.
The trace of F lags that of P by a fraction of a second. Again for vigorous flows, the
Appendix B 373
F history does not display a clear peak, but an elevated essential plateau. Our data
always displayed a faint trace of the (well higher) natural frequency of the pipe test
section over this violent interval.
One of the maddening things about ocean data is the element of randomness.
Two measured (undisturbed) water motion traces, seemingly interchangeable, may
yield widely differing forces, for example one of them half the other. The researcher
who works in the laboratory is used to orderly phenomena, is convinced that the
real situation mirrors this, and is adamant that anything to the contrary is the result
of gross experimental error. The mariner, on the other hand, recognizes the true cha-
otic nature of the offshore environment and the accompanying variability.
Of note is the finding that an order of magnitude change in absolute pipe rough-
ness makes no (discernible) difference to the force results, presumably because of
the massive turbulence in the near-pipe flow at all times, due to the return flow—
abetted by a rough seabed.
The concept of “crossflow” is found to be defensible. In a word, this idea says
that if there are two different flow fields, at different angles to the pipe, they cause
the same forces if their flow components perpendicular to the pipe are the same.
Thus an undisturbed flow of 1 m/sec at 30° would give the same loading as
3 m/sec at 60°. While the idea of crossflow means that one consider only the
flow speed and acceleration components perpendicular to the pipe, it must be noted
that the flow components parallel to the pipe act on the weight collars and tend to
drive them along the pipe. Collars’ clamping arrangements may tend to loosen up
with time due to the constant push and pull associated with wave-induced water
motion. These units on the destroyed Green Point No. 4 outfall (South Africa)
ended up in bunches.
There is a whole school of thought that pictures wave-induced flow pouring
through the narrow gap under a pipe, causing a zone of low pressure and leading to a
large net force on the pipe downwards. In the real ocean, this does not happen, at least
for 0.031 G/D 0.039 that we tested. Many times, I have placed small coral frag-
ments directly in the gap. They do not move, even when the wave surge is ferocious.
B.4.5 Follow-Up Pipe Work

The research undertaking described in Grace et al. (1987) was a transition undertak-
ing between the variable- work in Table B-6 and the variable-G work to be described
below. The 1982–1984 project was carried out at a site in only 5 m of water. A 324-mm-
diameter steel pipe was oriented at roughly 55° to the wave fronts and maintained
well above (nominally 90 mm) a very rough mainly limestone seabed. Figure B-4
depicts the project. Of note is the fact that the last day of data-taking involved design
conditions, with breaking waves occurring time after time at the site.
The last project was set up to answer the question of how much the peak hori-
zontal and vertical forces on a pipe are diminished as it is moved progressively fur-
ther and further off-bottom. A special pig rig was designed, fabricated, installed, and
tested at the former site in 11.3 m of water. The 324-mm-diameter test pipe had end
tracks and could be raised and lowered, then set in place at various discrete posi-
Figure B-4. Author installing test section in pipe rig in 1982.
tions. The main settings gave the following discrete G values (mm): 13; 63; 165; 241;
318; and 470. The pipe was oriented parallel to the wave fronts. Dozens of hours of
related data were obtained during 1987 and 1988 (Grace 1990).
B.4.6 Predicting Wave Forces

The idea of the Morison wave force equation (for horizontal forces) was presented
in Section B.2.2. The wave-induced force at any time is the sum of two terms, one
involving the undisturbed flow speed of the moment (the drag force), the other the
instantaneous undisturbed flow acceleration (the inertia force). Whereas this formu-
lation continues to be in vogue when computing the loadings on vertical piles, it has
fallen out of favor in situations involving seabed pipes. The reason is that the wave-
induced (undisturbed) kinematics of the moment are not reflected in the forces at
that instant.
An additional consideration for a seabed pipe is that an additional force is
involved, one perpendicular to the wall—because of the asymmetry of the flow. In the
past, it was supposed that this could be calculated per a lift-force-type of equation.
Jacobsen et al. (1984) stated: “Constant force coefficients and free stream kine-
matics in conjunction with Equation (1)” [Morison’s equation] “and Equation (2)”
[lift force equation] “cannot accurately describe the complete time history of forces
in oscillatory flow.” Because the pipe keeps encountering its own swept-back “roller”
and wake generated in the previous half-wave cycle and earlier, there is a strong effect
Appendix B 375
of flow history on the wave-induced pipe forces at any time. This phenomenon is
completely ignored by the Morison (horizontal) and “lift” (vertical) formulations
(e.g. Fyfe et al. 1987).
Valiant efforts have been made to quantify the altered water movement, and
the forces involved. The approach using an approximation to the disturbed flow
involves “wake models” to account for the influence of flow history (e.g. Soedigdo
et al. 1999). An early version (Lambrakos et al. 1987a) was incorporated into a Rec-
ommended Practice issue of the standards/classification/certification organization
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) (Veritec 1988), with later updates (Smith 2008). A pre-
dicted force trace is produced by the wake model. I have preferred to attempt to tie
the forces back to the undisturbed flow through an appropriate new mathematical
model that implicitly (rather than explicitly) takes account of the alteration in flow.
Furthermore, I have preferred to deal only with force maxima, and those ideas will
be developed in Section B.5.
B.5 Research Results

B.5.1 Prediction of Horizontal Forces
Arguably the most understandable approach (of several techniques I have attempted)
is to normalize the peak horizontal force as follows:
Fmax
Cmax (B-5)
⎛ ␳⎞
⎜⎝ 2 ⎟⎠ (Dl)(U C cos ␪)
2
where is the liquid density and is the length of pipeline considered.

Many wave force researchers have recognized the importance of what is known
as the “period parameter.” Because the flow under ocean waves is not strictly peri-
odic, I have long used an “adapted” form which for crossflow is:
(U C cos ␪)2 ⎡ (U C )2 ⎤
␺ ≡⎢ ⎥ cos ␪ (B-6)
DAmax cos ␪ ⎣ DAmax ⎦
Our data resulted in 2 12.

There is some scatter typical of ocean data, but for a given G/D the mean coeffi-
cient Cmax displays a clear monotonic tendency to decrease with increasing . Fitting
of the data locus has been done using the regression equation
′ ␤
Cmax , 2 ␺ 12 (B-7)
␺a
The best value of the exponent for all data sets is a 0.7, and the coupled least
squares best coefficients () are shown in Table B-7. What this means, inciden-
tally, is that Fmax varies as D1.7 for given kinematics. This makes sense, intermediate
between the diameter to the first power for drag loadings and the diameter squared
for inertia forces.
Table B-7. Research Results for Cmax when a 0.7 in Eq. B-6
G/D Sample size Standard error of estimate for Cmax
0.039 96 7.350 0.273

0.196 55 5.706 0.202
0.510 50 5.059 0.267
0.745 35 4.572 0.193
0.980 51 4.425 0.180
1.451 50 4.132 0.191
Note that because of the steep nature of the early versus G/D locus, curve fitting
mathematically (quadratic or offset exponential) does not work out at all well, the
former because of intermediate zero-slope situations. The best approach for obtain-
ing in-between values is simply to interpolate graphically, and we will do that later.
There is no question that the ratio |UT |/UC plays a role in determining individual
wave forces, but on average it is a minor player and, although used before (Grace
1992) will be excluded from the present mathematical model.
B.5.2 Prediction of Vertical Forces

We focus here on the upwards vertical force, chiefly because that is the only direction
of force for small gaps. As the clearance increases, one observes the development
of vortex shedding (frequency f) and concurrent momentary downward forces. As
examples, the Strouhal numbers (f D/UC) average 0.23 and 0.21 for G/D 0.980
and 1.451 respectively.
The simplest accurate way of predicting Pmax is via the ratio Pmax/Fmax. This
parameter is a function of G/D as shown in Eqs. B-8a and B-8b.
⌫′ 0.472 0.605 exp {15.3 G / D}, 0 G / D 0.2 (B-8a)
⌫′ 0.360 0.370 exp {4.865 G / D}, 0.2 G / D 1.5 (B-8b)
Both the peak horizontal and vertical forces occur well before the passage over-
head of the wave crest. The reader will then question the inclusion of UC in wave
force equations. How (discounting the Back to the Future film series) can a future
event influence the past? The somewhat weak answer is that the level of UC indicates
how sustained was the accelerating flow.
B.5.3 Return to Hypothetical Assessment Case

We are now in a position to deal with the example wave force appraisal problem
given in Section B.4.3.
Appendix B 377
Using Eq. B-6, 8.83. Graphical interpolation within the (plotted) numbers of
Table B-7 produces 5.60, and Eq. B-7 then yields Cmax 1.22. Using Eq. B-5, this
then translates into Fmax 4,280 N/m. Use of Eq. B-8b produces Pmax 2,010 N/m.
There is a wave force determination section in the polyethylene pipe industry
standard Karlsen (2002). For this example case the loadings are predicted to be Fmax
2,710 N/m and Pmax zero. One is struck and concerned by the substantial differ-
ences between the two sets of results which, in the second case, would seem to be the
linking of theoretical inertia coefficients and steady flow force coefficients (drag, lift)
to undisturbed flow kinematics that peak well lower than disturbed ones.
B.5.4 Local Pipe Stability

A cursory method of evaluating submarine pipeline stability, is to: first, evaluate the
buoyant weight of the filled pipe (WB), namely the weight of the pipe and contents
less the buoyant force, with possible allowance for sea water absorption in a CWC;
second, estimate the static coefficient of friction (μS), between the underside of the
pipe and the seabed, one of the most imprecisely known quantities in ocean engi-
neering; and, third, calculate the peak horizontal (Fmax) and vertical (Pmax) wave-
induced forces on a segment of the pipe. Although the latter usually occurs in time
a fraction of a second before the former, it is conservative to assume that the two
maxima act concurrently, and we will adopt this approach herein. Fmax attempts to
push the pipe across the seabed, whereas Pmax seeks to destabilize the pipe by reduc-
ing the normal force (N) between the pipe and boundary, thus decreasing the maxi-
mum frictional resistance force that can be mobilized, per the equation
Ff (max) ␮ S N ≡ ␮ S (WB Pmax ), Pmax WB (B-9)
If Fmax Ff(max), the pipe slides.

In the limit, Pmax can exceed WB, causing the pipe to rise temporarily off the sea-
bed (and making μS irrelevant). This is a very serious situation with the pipe at the
mercy of the flow. It has been argued elsewhere that the vertical force can be ignored
due to its relatively short duration. I do not echo this position, since pipes can and have
failed by moving large cumulative distances in little jumps and slides, as the case study
oil line (Section B.3) would appear to have done. As an aside, a single kick delivered
by a karate “black belt” lasts only a fraction of a second, but it can do a lot of damage.
Repeated kicks can drive an opponent steadily across the mat.
B.5.5 Comprehensive Pipe Stability

The above simplified analysis leaves out the pipe’s beam strength and longitu-
dinal distribution of forces contained in standard pipe stability approaches: Huang
and Hudspeth (1982); Lambrakos (1982); Geustyn and Retief (1986); Zimmerman
et al. (1986); Holthe et al. (1987); Lambrakos et al. (1987b); Wolfram et al. (1987);
Chao (1988); Lammert et al. (1989); Hale et al. (1989, 1991); Huang and Leonard
(1990). See also Gao et al. (2006).
At a point where the crest is instantaneously directly over the pipe, the momen-
tary forces are Fmax and Pmax. At a distance of (L csc ) away, along the pipe, it is the
same story at that same time. For crude conservative analysis purposes of the whole
pipeline, we can adopt an instantaneous spatial distribution of force that follows a
cosine function.
Note that, in a complete HDPE pipe stability study, wave-induced forces on
the collars themselves (both transverse and inline) would have to be estimated and
incorporated.
B.6 Pipe Protection by Quarry Rock

B.6.1 Introduction
There are various ways of stabilizing submarine pipes beyond the concrete collars
cited earlier for HDPE pipes. On hard substrates, holes can be drilled into the seabed
(Fig. B-5), threaded stud pairs placed and cemented into place. After pipe placement,
straps with holes are placed over the pipe and possible saddle, then nuts run down
onto the studs to hold the strap (and pipe) in place. Figure 10-1 shows a 305-mm-
diameter HDPE pipe stabilized in this way.
B.6.2 Rock Stability under Waves

Rock is frequently specified to protect and stabilize submarine pipelines, ballast rock
along the sides and armor rock over the top. Given a rock of specified specific gravity,
its size must be adequate not to be swept away by the strong flows associated with the
passage of large waves overhead. Two outfalls in Table A-1, Camps Bay (No. 52) and
Zarauz (No. 196) are examples where such rock removal took place.
The Sand Island No. 2 and Honouliuli (Barbers Point) outfalls are Nos. 44 and
49 in Table 1-1. The original design wave for both lines, based on local Hurricanes
Nina (late season 1957) and Dot (August 1959), had the following deep water speci-
fications: height H 14.0 m; period T 11.7 sec. Throughout the long lengths of
these outfalls outside the breaking depth of such a wave, the armor and ballast rock
selected had to be stable under that shoaled wave’s near-bottom water motion.
The original sizing of armor and ballast rock for several operating outfalls was
done by a California Institute of Technology professor, using an approach appar-
ently developed by him and another Caltech faculty member. Examples are the two
Hawaii outfalls mentioned above. There is no evidence known to me, and I have
dived on both the Hawaii lines, that this mounded rock has been displaced during
the large wave episodes of local Hurricanes Iwa (November, 1982) and Iniki (Sep-
tember, 1992).
The starting point is the local periodic (T) design wave represented by height
(H) and direction of advance in the assigned water depth (h). The nominal rock
diameter (d) that will just resist movement is determined from a Froude number
defined as
Fr = U/[g h]0.5 (B-10)

Appendix B 379
Figure B-5. Research diver drilling test hole in seabed.
where g is the acceleration of gravity and U is the beneath-crest water flow speed
averaged vertically over the water column. The Caltech approach arrives at a value
of the Froude number by patching together, in tabular columns, information from
both the solitary (no period) and cnoidal wave theories.
For the seminar Grace (1993), I reduced the steps implied above to a single
equation. This simplification was done through relationships for the solitary wave
appearing in Ippen and Mitchell (1957). An equation for the Froude number (Fr)
was derived, a complicated function of H/h. Surprisingly, however, despite this com-
plexity, the Froude numbers could be accurately forecast (especially for the higher
H/h values) through a zero-intercept linear relationship with H/h. The resulting
equation was
⎛ H⎞ ⎛ H⎞
Fr ′ 0.820 ⎜ ⎟ , 0.00 ⎜ ⎟ 0.78 (B-11)
⎝h⎠ ⎝h⎠
Note should be made of the fact that whereas the Caltech approach distinguishes
between the true water depth and the depth under the trough of the periodic wave,
no such distinction has been used in my approach.
At this point in the Caltech development, there is the assumption that there is a
steady two-dimensional flow over the rocky bottom, where the average normalized
flow speed in the boundary layer is as given in the numerator of the right hand side
of Eq. B-10. Three formulas are now brought into the analysis: one expressing the
boundary shear stress in terms of the Darcy-Weisbach friction factor and the velocity
head of the flow; one connecting the Darcy-Weisbach friction factor, the water depth,
and the particle size (d) in the hydraulically rough bed; and one presenting the nor-
malized boundary shear stress (T) as in the Shields curve for sediment instability
(Vanoni, 1975). The resulting equation has
U
{8 T[(␥S /␥) 1](d/h)}0.5[2 log(h/d) 2.11] (B-12)
( gh)0.5
Here, and S represent the specific weight of water and solid respectively. The logarithm
is to base 10. A conservative value of T is 0.03, whereas an oft-used value is 0.04.
If Eq. B-11 is inserted in Eq. B-12 and then rearranged, we have
H ⎡ 2 log(h/d) 2.11 ⎤ H
3.449{T[(␥ S /␥) 1]}0.5 ⎢ 0.5 ⎥ , 0.00 0.78 (B-13)
h ⎣ (h/d) ⎦ h
It is to be noted that Eq. B-13 is backwards, in terms of use by the designer, since
he/she would tend to know the left hand side and be seeking that marginally stable
nominal rock size (through h/d).
If T 0.03, and sea water and basalt constitute the liquid and solid respectively,
then B-13 can be written
H ⎡ 2 log(h/d) 2.11 ⎤ H
0.752 ⎢ 0.5 ⎥ , 0.00 0.78 (B-14)
h ⎣ (h/d) ⎦ h
As an example, assume a depth-limited ocean design condition in (h ) 12.0 m

of water over a relatively flat bottom. Then H/h 0.78. (This gives H 8.8 m.) The
wave period is not considered here explicitly, but obviously it cannot be too short.
Typically, 12 T 18 sec. In Eq. B-14, H/h 0.78 results when h/d 21, meaning
that d 12.0/21 0.57 m. How does this stack up with reality? The situation given
represents the worst seas (with storm surge) during Hurricane Iwa (November 1982)
at our test site (off Honolulu) at the time. I know that all my loose (solid) concrete
cubes (roughly 0.3 m on a side) were swept well away during that tempest.
B.6.3 Representative Rock Mixes

The top layer(s) of armor rock for an outfall cannot simply involve a single (calcu-
lated) stone diameter but a range of sizes to prevent inner backfill layers or bedding
Appendix B 381
Table B-8. Armor/Ballast Rock Mixes for Santa Cruz No. 3 Outfall, California
Percent Smaller by Weight Percent Smaller by Weight
Weight of Rock (N) (Type 1) (Type 2)
8900 100 —
7120 80–98 —
6670 — 100
5780 65–90 —
5340 — 80–98
4450 35–75 65–90
3270 — 35–75
2890 5–20 —
2220 -— 5–20
1450 0–20 —
1110 — 0–20
from escaping through the matrix. As an illustration, consider the two top-rock mixes
used for the Santa Cruz No. 3 outfall (No. 199 in Table A-1) shown in Table B-8. Type
1 was used as armor out to the beginning of the diffuser, in 27 m of water, whereas
Type 2 was placed as ballast along the diffuser. The specifications developed for the
outfall contained the following passage concerning this protection: “. . .shall consist of
well-graded crushed rock . . . hard, sound, durable, angular pieces having minimum
specific gravity of 2.65 . . . Rock shall be free of cracks, seams, laminations, and other
defects which would tend to increase its deterioration from natural causes, . . .”
Tables 6-1, 6-4, and 7-2 contain related information. Further discussion of stable
rock mixes appears in Grace (2001).
References
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Appendix C
Immersed Tubes as
Big Outfalls
C.1 The Concept

Within the marine disposal of wastewaters, there is occasional call for an exception-
ally large outfall to carry prodigious flow. The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Sta-
tion (discussed in Chapter 3) had two concrete pipe outfalls for its spent cooling
water, each with an inside diameter of 5,486 mm, near the size limit for such pipe.
The Boston municipal outfall (discussed at length in Chapter 13) was a mined tun-
nel with inside diameter of 7,391 mm. The reader should be aware of existing tech-
nology beyond the pipe and the bored tunnel.
The approach used here is decades old. As an early example, a road tunnel of this
type was created across the Detroit River (between the United States and Canada)
in 1928. Here, long boxlike structures are constructed “in the dry,” perhaps in a
large dry dock. Upon completion, the structures are floated out of the enclosure and
then towed to the worksite, perhaps hundreds of kilometers. One of the immersed
tubes is carefully lowered into place on a prepared bed, usually within a deep seabed
trench (Veeckman 1999). There it is linked up with the previously laid tube. The
work progresses until all the tubes are in place and united. Backfill is then placed
over and around the system.
There is definitely a large spoil disposal problem with immersed tubes. Another
disadvantage is the preference for extended slack-water periods during unit lowering.
But there are clear advantages, too. The fabrication work, done above water, can be of
high quality. Vis-à-vis normal bored tunnels for the same function, immersed tubes
can be quicker to execute, and they have no dewatering problems. For transportation
systems, the fact that the immersed tube can be substantially shallower than the tun-
nel means far less access distance. Table C-1 lists 27 installations.
385
Table C-1. Selected Immersed Tubes over Four Decades

No. Name Use References
1 Bay Area Rapid Transit, San Rapid transit Murphy and Tanner 1966
Francisco, California, U.S.
2 Parana-Santa Fe, Argentina — “The Parana-Santa Fe”
1969
3 Hong Kong I (Cross Har- Vehicular traffic “First” 1970; “Traffic” 1972
bour Tunnel)
4 Mobile, Alabama, U.S. Vehicular traffic Slocum 1972
5 LNG Terminal, Chesapeake Pipe transport of “Largest” 1975
Bay, Maryland, U.S. LNG
6 Hong Kong II Rapid transit Haswell et al. 1980
7 Dainikoro, Tokyo, Japan Vehicular traffic Paulson 1980
8 Fort McHenry, Baltimore, Vehicular traffic Hebenstreit and Wilson
Maryland, U.S. 1980
9 Kilroot Power Station, Cooling water Carvell and Roberts 1982;
Northern Ireland Pearse 1982
10 Elizabeth River, Virginia, — “How” 1983; “Sunken”
U.S. 1985
11 Hampton Roads III, Vehicular traffic “Foreigners” 1986; Carr
Virginia, U.S. 1988; Carr and May
1988
12 Hong Kong III (Eastern Combined road Ferguson 1988
Harbour Crossing) and rail
13 Pulau Seraya, Singapore Power cables Montague 1985; Weeks
and Rasmussen 1988
14 Conwy, Wales, U.K. Vehicular traffic Reina 1988; Stone and
McFadzean 1993
15 Sydney Harbour, New Vehicular traffic “Joint” 1988; Saito
South Wales, Australia and Neilson 1990;
Grad 1992; Saito and
Yamazaki 1993
16 Ted Williams (Third Har- Vehicular traffic “Boston” 1993; Robison
bor), Boston, Massachu- 1996
setts, U.S.
17 Bilbao, Spain Rapid transit Darling 1994
18 River Medway, U.K. Vehicular traffic Court 1994; Parker 1995
19 Sizewell B Power Station, Cooling water Barratt and Sheridan 1995
U.K.
(continued)
Appendix C 387
Table C-1. Selected Immersed Tubes over Four Decades (Continued)

No. Name Use References
20 Power Station, Grimsby, Cooling water Page 1996b

U.K.
21 Cork, Ireland, U.K. Vehicular traffic “Casting” 1996; “First”
1996; “Environmental”
1998
22 Hong Kong IV (Western Vehicular traffic Hartley 1996; Robertson
Harbour Crossing), 1998
Hong Kong
23 Piet Hien, Amsterdam, Vehicular traffic Gardner 1996; Page 1996a
Netherlands
24 Preveza-Aktio, Amvrakikos Vehicular traffic “Greek” 1996; “Immersed“
Gulf, Greece 1999; Greeman 1997
25 Øresund, Copenhagen, Combined rail Soudain 1997; Bolton
Denmark and highway 1998; Lykke et al. 1999;
Busby and Marshall
2000
26 Fort Point Channel, Boston, Vehicular traffic Angelo 1999, 2000; Brown
Massachusetts, U.S. 2001
27 Bosphorus, Istanbul, Turkey Urban railroad Reina 2006, 2008; Unlutepe
2008
C.2 Use of Immersed Tubes

The cross-sectional size of such installations is normally well larger than the standard
outfall. As an example, the Osaka Port (Japan) immersed tube, opened in October
1997, had an external cross section of 35.2 m width and 8.6 m height. The proposed
Oslo, Norway, immersed tube has a cross section of 30 ⫻ 8 m. However, for very
large flows, the immersed tube must be considered a viable option, as it was for a
time in the late 1980s and early 1990s during the redesign of the Worli (No. 356
in Table A-1) and Bandra (No. 368 in Table A-1) outfalls at Mumbai, India. I was
involved in that effort.
The preliminary design report for Hong Kong’s Strategic Sewage Disposal
Scheme, Stage I outfall (No. 328 in Table A-1) involved an immersed tube design
extending from Stonecutters Island, through the Northern Fairway to discharge in
the Western Dangerous Goods Anchorage Zone.
Original planning for Hong Kong’s ultimate “oceanic outfall,” distant from
the extensive urban area, involved three alignment options. For the shortest one of
these, the immersed tube was predicted to be the cheapest. This concept had two
flow passageways, square (except for chamfered corners), 3 m to a side. However, a
Figure C-1. Immersed tube being prepared at dockside in South Boston.
Figure C-2. Ballasted immersed tube unit in open-center laying barge.

Appendix C 389
longer tunneled (5-m-diam.) conduit, discharging in 30 m of water, was the choice

on environmental grounds. The outfall terminus was 10 km from the southern tip
of Lamma Island, itself 13 km south of central Kowloon. The 2,000-m-long diffuser
would involve 16 (900-mm-diam.) risers with unprecedented heights of 180 m.
General references on immersed tubes are Kuesel (1986); Culverwell (1989);
Reina and Usui (1989); Brudno and Lancellotti (1992, 1995); as well as Baltzer
and Hehenberger (2003). Significantly, the Institution of Civil Engineers, London,
has sponsored two conferences dealing with immersed tubes. The 58 total papers
and discussion were published by Thomas Telford in 1990 (Immersed Tunnel Tech-
niques) and 1997 (Immersed Tunnel Techniques 2). Many of the 27 important instal-
lations in Table C-1 were covered. In September 1993, I was able to tour several of
the No. 16 units while they were being readied at dockside in South Boston. See
Figs. C-1 and C-2.
Finally, I have learned second-hand that two small-scale immersed tube waste-
water outfalls exist. These involve an industrial conduit at Macchiareddu (Sardinia,
Italy) and a twin municipal one at Sha Tin (Hong Kong). Both were apparently
installed in the late 1970s.
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Index
Accurate subsea positioning, 48–49 bedding placement, 99

pulses of acoustic energy, use of, 48–49 clamshell excavation bucket, 98f
Actual outfall trestle, makeup of, 60–62, grout bags, placement, 99
60f, 61f, 62t jet pumps, use of, 98
minimum trench width, 60 offshore pipe path, dredging of, 97–98
nominal beach elevation, 60 steel beam launch, capping of, 99
pile embedment, 61 Bottom-pulled conduits, modern, 100–102
tubular piles, positioning of, 61 Bottom-pull operation, 91–92
Ahirkapi, Istanbul, Turkey, 106 buoys, 91
Association of Diving Contractors movement of material into the trench,
International, 52 92
Ayr Stormwater outfall, U.K., 79 pipe laying, 91
bottom material removal, 79 sediment removal, 92
three-leg jackup platform, use of, 79 Bottom-pull operation, crucial numbers
for, 111–112
Baix Llobregat, Barcelona, Spain, 108 applicable friction coefficients, 111
Belmont (Lake Macquarie), New South cable and pipe friction coefficients, 111
Wales, Australia, 107 concrete volume, calculation of, 111
Besos No.2 outfall, Barcelona, Spain, 100 past target submerged weights for
cement mortar inner lining, 101 bottom-pull pipelines, distribution
outflow capacity, 101 of, 111t
soft clay, dredging of, 101 target submerged weight of pipes, 111
steel pipe, welding of, 101 water absorption amount, 112
Bethany Beach, Delaware, 103 Bottom-pull outfalls, additional, 109t
Bids for West Point Emergency Marine Bottom-pull outfalls, notable, 97–100, 98f
outfall construction, 72t Broodstairs, Northeast Kent, U.K., 106
Big pipe with strict environmental Bunbury, Western Australia, Australia,
stipulations, 71–75, 72t, 74f, 75f 109
Black Rock, Geelong, Victoria, Australia, 97 Burwood Beach, New South Wales,
Bass Strait, 97 Australia, 191
393
California spectrum, two ends of the, 8 Ryde outfall, 110

Arcata Marsh and Wildlife Refuge, 8 stringing yard, location of, 110
impact of wastewater on San Francisco Cyclindrical blockouts, 74
Bay water, 8
Cape Peron outfall, Western Australia, Dam Neck outfall, Virginia Beach, Virginia,
92–97, 94f, 95f 77–78
bottom-scan profiling, 95 Hydro Pull process, use of, 78
Cockburn Sound, 92 prestressed concrete cylinder pipe, 78
engine and air compressor mounting, 93 Desalination, 2–3
limestone groin, temporary, 94 effects on the environment, 3
limestone ridges, submerged, 93 Singapore desalination facility, 2–3
mild steel pipe, use of, 93 Design-build 45–46
pipe moving, 96 clifftop grassland, removal of, 45
pipe strings, 94f Emu Bay, 45
pullhead fabrication, 95f partnering, 45
pumping station location, 93 thrust wall, construction of, 45–46
rock outcrops, 94 tunnel boring machine, 46
seabed condition studies, 93 Difficult or impossible outfalls, 261–280
vertical crown port, 93–94 Diver’s legs, numbing of, 51
Water Authority of Western Australia, 92 Divers underwater at ambient pressure,
Woodman Point, 92 49–51
Central Pacific Ocean HDD jobs, decompression sickness, 50
129–131 nitrogen narcosis, 50
Christchurch, New Zealand outfall, 203 Office of Underwater Research, 49
bottom-dumping hopper bags, 203 Scuba, 49
human costs, 203 surface-applied diving, 49–50
polyethelene pipe, use of, 203 Diving experience, a personal, 51
work site, 203 dysbaric osteonecrosis, 51
Commercial diving facilities within Double trestle, building of, 70
OSHA’s jurisdiction, 53t Drought times, 2
Conserving water, 7–8 California drought, 2
Orange County aquifers, 8 water importation, 2
Construction, moving toward, 29–57
Corners, the idea of, 15–16 Eastney Beach, Portsmouth, Hampshire,
Cortez Bank, 15 U.K., 106
Honouliuli diffusers, 15
mixing zones, 15 Fort Kamehameha No.2 outfall, Hawaii,
Sand Island No. 2, the, 15 213–218, 216t
Crane barge working alone, the, 157–161, bund, the, 216
158f, 161f design wave loads, reevaluation of, 217
Courtice outfall, Ontario, Canada, 157 diffuser site, 215–216
East Bay Dischargers Authority outfall, environmental impact statement, 214
San Francisco Bay, California, 158 flexible air bags, use of, 218
Waianae outfall extension, Hawaii, and ground penetration, monitoring of, 217
its problems, 158–161 humans and marine mammals, danger
Creating tunnel outfalls and their risers, to, 215
185–199, 186f jet grouting, 217
Crossing the coastal strip, impediments to, nearshore developments, 214–215
109–111 outfall sections, 216
burrowing, 110 pile caps, size and weight of, 217
hatchboxes, 110 silt curtains, 216
Margrate outfall, 110 substrate exploration, 216
Newhaven Seaford Bay outfall, 111 USS Port Royal, damage to, 218
Index 395
Full-length outfall trestle at McGaurans dewatering pumps, removal of, 292

Beach, Australia, 65–67 drop shaft, 293
local trench, backfilling of, 66 fire, 293
Ninety Mile Beach, 65 engineering team, assembly of, 284
sacrificial nodes, placement of, 66 former outfalls, fate of, 295
tubular piles, 66 geophysical program, 284
Full-length outfall trestle at New Plymouth, jack up rigs, use of, 285
New Zealand, 62–65, 64t outfall tunnel, progress with, 290
concrete weight coat, 63 plugs, removal of, 291
fiber-reinforced plastic, 63 pressure relief caps, removal of, 292
five-sheave lowering system, 63 risers, installation of, 287
mean tide range, 63 sludge pelletizing plant, building of, 286
monorail system, 63 taxpayer revolt, 286
rail-mounted bottom-dump hoppers, 63 tunnel outfall, driving of, 289–291, 290t
Te Rewarewa Pa, 63 pipe description, 289
tunnel inflow, 289
Gas and oil industry shore crossing, 118–120 work stoppage, 289
controlled S-bend, development of, 120 tunnel size reduction, 291
drill rig set up, 119 tunnel surveys, 291
pipe filling, 121 tunnel ventilation, 292
pipe land entry points, 120 U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service
roller track, building of, 119 investigative report, 286
weights and buyos, use of, 121 worker deaths, 292
Geophysical and related methods, 36 Girvan Industrial outfall, Southwest
ground truth operations, 36 Scotland, 79
magnetometers, 36 trench, pretreatment of, 79
multibeam echo sounder, 36 backfilling, 79
sidescan sonar, 36 trenching grab, use of, 79
subbottom profiling devices, 36 Grand Strand, South Carolina, 154
Geotechnical work, 37 beach replenishment, 154
cone penetration test, 37 design storm conditions, 154
vibracore work, 37 offshore work costs, 154
Giant tunnel outfall as part of the Boston prestressed cylinder pipes, use of, 154
Harbor cleanup, 281–298, 282f, Great Grimsby outfall, North Sea, U.K., 104
283f, 285t, 290t buoyancy tanks, 105
Boston Harbor Cleanup change orders, cement grout, use of, 104
effects of, 290t diffuser risers, attachment of, 105
Boston Harbor Cleanup, 283–284 plastic liner, fiberglass reinforced, 104
Boston’s water and wastewater, 281–284 pull winch, use of, 104
Boston Harbor, pollution of, 283
Boston, Massachusetts and environs, Haut Bay, Cape Province, 225–226
282f HDD outfall case studies in the United
liquid sludge, disposal of, 282 Kingdom, 122–126
Metropolitan Boston and offlying Buckhaven (Neptune), Firth of Forth,
islands in Massachusetts Bay, 283f Scotland, 123
commissioning, 293–294 Cornborough, Devon, England, 124
contract infractions, 294 Cowes, Isle of Wight, England, 122
secondary plant, construction of, 294 Holyhead, Wales, 125–126
trial operation, 293 Islay (Isle of), Scotland, 124
wastewater flows, termination of, 294 Lyme Regis (Gun Cliff), Dorset England,
continuing monitoring, 294–295 123
plant performance data, collection of, Meary Veg Rock, Isle of Man, 125
294 Port Orford, Oregon, 127
HDD outfall case studies in the United Jackup barge or platform, 75

Kingdom (continued) Croyde outfall, 76
Two at Fife, Scotland, 123–124 tugboats, 76
Venus Bay, Victoria, Australia, 127
Warrenton, Oregon, 128 Kawana, Queensland, Australia, 104
High-density polyethelene pipes in South Kirkcaldy, Firth of Forth, Scotland,
Africa, 222–226, 223f 105–106
concrete batch plant, construction of, 224
pipe ballasting versus waves, 222–223 Large power plant outfall, a, 67–71, 68t, 69f
twin-tower drilling framework, 224 contractor’s major steel purchases, 68t
High-density polyethelene, specific gravity cooling water arrangement, 67
of , 221 cutter suction dredge, 69
High-tech outfall installation in deep inflow lines, 67
water, 165–184 pile-driving template, 68
Horizontal direct drilling (HDD), San Onofre Nuclear Generating
115–118, 116f Station, 67
bent housing, 117 wheel-mounted platforms, 69
cable-free steering tool system, 117 Leapfrog trestle, 157
dimensional limits in HDD, 115
outside diameter, maximum, 115 Marine data, the most crucial, 34–37
pilot hole drilling, 117 abandoned gas lines, removal, 35
shoreline crossing, 115 Erie outfall, 35
slant-drilling rig, 117 mixing zones, 34
washover pipe, 117 savage surf zones, 34
Horse, 53 Marine environment, multiple uses of,
Hybrid design outfalls, 201–220 14–16
chlorination and odor-control Marine outfall as the disposal method of
facilities, 202 choice, 21–28
land-based pipe-jacking, 202 Australia, an example from, 22
Lawyers Head outfall, 202 Coffs Harbour, 22
microtunneling machine, retrieval of, 202 proposed outfall, public opposition
Mompas outfall, 201 to, 22
Samut Prakarn outfall, 201 New Zealand, an example from, 22–23
Hythe Foul, South Kent, U.K., 105 South Island, 22–23
Avon, the, 23
Independent marine review committee, Headcote River, 23
formation of, 70 Christchurch City project, 23
Injection wells, outfall replacement by, 20 Waimakariri River, 23
Boynton-Delray pipe, 20 Pegasus Bay, 23
Clogging, 20 wastewater, dealing with, 21–22
Iona, Vancouver, British Columbia, Marine outfall construction, bracketing of,
Canada, 173–176 31–34, 32f
big bolting tool, 174 Ash Wednesday Storm, 31–32
catamarans, use of, 174 beach repair costs, 32
minimum trench depth, 175 Central pipeline, 33
pipe assembly, 173–174 Lewes-Rehoboth Cana, 32
pipe jointing, 175 Northern conduit, 33
pipe protection, 173 Ocean County Utilities Authority, 33
radio communications, maintenance of, post-calamity inspection, 33
174 sewage disposal methods, alternative, 32
trench excavation, 175 Southern outfall, end of the, 33
trench siltation, 175 structural imperfection, 33
welding stations, semi-automatic, 174 Marine outfall in context, the, 1–28
Index 397
Microtunneling and pipe-jacking to create diffuser dimensions, 252

outfalls, use of, 194–196 outfall trunk, placement of, 252
Marbella outfall, France, 196 Guia outfall, Costa do Estoril, Portugal,
microtunnel boring machines, 195 252
pressurized bentonite injection, 195 Gullane sewage outfall, Firth of Forth,
thrust wall, 195 Scotland, 254–255
Microtunneling operations, 54 pipe bending, 254
Mondi and Triomf outfalls, 224–225 pipe bundles, construction of, 255
discrete concrete fixtures, 225 site problems,254
effluents, 225 soil liquefication, 254
inshore rubber-lined pipelines, 224–225 trench, trapezoidal, 255
Monterey Bay outfall, 146–150, 149t Lavernock Point outfall, Wales, 252–253
alignment, Z-shaped, 147 mill sections, butt-welding of, 253
bids, soliciting of, 146 Site of Special Scientific Interest, 253
early offshore work, 148 trench excavation, 253
finishing the outfall, 150 Pardigon no.2 outfall, La Croix-Valmer,
heavy weather, 148–149 Cavalaire-sur-Mer, France, 253–254
inshore construction, 147 Sandown Bay Foul outfall, Isle of Wight,
inshore work, completion of, 149 U.K., 253
protected species, 147 Thessaloniki City outfall, Northern
submarine pipeline, 146 Greece, 253
trouble offshore, 149 Novel designs: other countries, 255–258
Moroccan outfall, a, 102 Bale du Tombeau outfall, Port Louis,
anticorrosion coatings, 102 Mauritius, 257–258
significant wave height, 50–year, 102 above-water bund, construction of, 258
towing arrangement, 102 offshore pipes, installation of, 258
Mundesley, 12 outfall capacity, 257
high-density polyethelene outfall, 12 pipeline cost, 257
trench excavation, 261 self-propelled rock cutter vessel, use
of, 257
Nautical charts and beyond, 30–31t Baltalimani outfall, Istanbul, Turkey, 256
Approaches to Chesapeake Bay, 30 El Hank outfall, Casablanca, Morocco,
Dam Neck, sewage outfall, 31 256–257
outfall designer concerns, 31 Pardoe Beach outfall, Devonport,
Soutwest Ocean Outfall, 30 Tasmania, Australia, 255–256
unexploded ordnance, 31, 35 dune crossing, excavation of, 256
Yaquina Bay and River, 30 manned underwater excavator, use of,
North Head, Bondi and Malabar tunnel 256
outfalls, 188 offshore trench, digging of, 256
claystones and sandstones formations, South Coast outfall, Barbados, 257
189 Timaru outfall, South Island, New
density stratification, 188–189 Zealand, 255
moored systems, 188 Novel designs: the Americas, 245–250
nozzles, blocking of, 191 Chevron Refinery outfall extension,
oil and gas field submersibles, 190 Carquinez Strait, California,
Surface dispersion experiments, 189 247–250, 248t
Sydney sewage and deep water outfalls, access channel, dredging of, 249
basic data on, 189t bottom-pulling, use of, 249
traveling drogues, 188 curved launch way, building of, 249
tunnel and riser, link between, 190 heavy current, avoidance of, 249
Novel designs: Europe high water absorption, 249
Arboath outfall, Scotland, 250–255, Clover Point Extension no. 2 outfall,
250f, 251f, British Columbia, Canada, 246–247
Novel designs: the Americas (continued) Detroit Water and Sewerage District, 278
Kenai outfall, Africa, 247 Mumbai, India, 276–278
Suffolk County outfall, Long Island, bull-nosed steel grill work, fabrication
New York, 245–246 of, 277
Colaba pipe, 277
Occupational Safety and Health project startup, delay in, 277
Administration (OSHA), 52 pump station, problems with, 277
Ocean City outfall, Cape May County, seabed profile, 277
New Jersey, 77 semisubmersible catamaran, use of,
Offshore and underwater operations, 277
46–52, 48f, 49f,50f, 52f sewage outflow volume, 276
environmental impact statement, 46 production wells, drilling of, 279
Notice to Mariners, 46 riser shafts, 278
permissions and notification, 46
Open coast, the, 35 Peterhead No. 2 at Sandford Bay, Scotland,
beach excavation, 35 99–100
diffuser outflow, 35 replacement outfall design, 100
Outfall extension at Fort Bragg, California, seabed composition, 100
80–84, 81t, 82t, 83t, 84f Placing outfalls under protected sites or
contract documents and specifications, obstructions, 115–133
contents of, 82t Point Loma Extension, San Diego,
fluid concrete, transport of, 82 California, 176–183, 179f, 181f,
information in Fort Brag outfall plans, 81t 182ft, 183t
pipeline installation details, 83t 1–atmosphere subsea control pod, 180
pneumatic drill, 81–82 allowable pipe joint gaps, 182t
seabed anchor bolts, 80 clamshell, use of, 178
spud, use of, 81 derrick barge, use of, 180
steel template, 82 diving services, costs of, 180
submersible barge, 81 embedded polyvinyl chloride, 177
vertical risers, use of, 80 extension stones and rocks, 183t
Outfalls in remote locations, 241–245 heavy weather, episodes of, 178
kelp, cutting of, 242 horse landing using sonar data, 181
pipe innertubes, discarding of, 242 joint venture bids, 177
St. George Industrial outfall, Pribilof old outfall, extension of, 176
Islands, Alaska, 243–245 pipe foundation laying, 177–178
St. George Town, no. 1 outfall, Pribilof remotely-operated vehicle, use of, 181
Islands, Alaska, 243 seabed material, removal of, 179
St. Paul Outfall, Pribilof, Islands, Alaska, sensors, 178
242–243 systems mounted on the horse, 181
mean low water, 242 Polyethelene outfalls, installation
outfall placement, 242–243 problems with, 233–236
pipe sections, floating of, 243 Coffs Harbour outfall, New South Wales,
raft system, destruction of, 243 Australia, 234–236
weather window, 242 pipe lengths, damage to, 235
tidal window requirement, 242 barge anchor lines, failure of, 235
Outfalls that couldn’t be built, 276–279 Bunbury outfall, 234–235
blind drilling, 278 pipe-jacking, 234
Clover Point no.1, British Columbia, stranded pipes, removal of, 235
Canada, 276 Tropical Cyclone Grace, 235
construction contract, termination of, vibrohammers, use of, 235
279 Port Garner outfall, Washington, 233
Detroit River outfall tunnel no. 2, concrete pipe, use of, 233
Michigan, 278 joint sealing, 234
Index 399
Polyethelene outfalls, the latest, 231–233 Lulu Island replacement outfall, British
Clandeboye, New Zeland, 232–233 Columbia, Canada, 272–273
South Island, New Zealand, 231–232 flow reversal, 272
Waimakariri, New Zealand, 232 outfall trench, excavation of, 273
Polyethelene outfalls: second set, selected, waterway, environmental impact of,
229–231 273
Antalya, Turkey, 230 Murphy’s Laws, 274
Montpellier, France, 230–231 SAICCOR Mill, Natal, South Africa,
flexible concrete mattresses, placement 270–271
of, 231 lignosulfate plant, building of, 270
outlet repairs, 231 pull barge anchoring system failure,
pipe ends, butt-welding of, 231 271
towing clamps, use of, 231 stainless steel, use of, 270
Sainte Luce, Martinique, 230 water clarity, impairment of, 270
Sao Jacinto, Aveiro, Portugal, 230 West Runton outfall, U.K., 273–274
Seabrook, New Hampshire, 229 water flow reduction, 273
ocean pipe dimensions, 229 Wollongong no. 2 outfall, New South
outfall stabilization, 229 Wales, Australia, 274–276
seabed composition, 229
trench conditions, monitoring, 229 Racoon Strait, Tiburon, California, 103f
Polyethylene outfalls: first set, selected, Reinforced concrete pipe outfalls, section-
226–229 by-section installation of, 135–136,
Chevron Extension, El Segundo, 136f
California, 226–227 derrick barge, use of, 136
Emu Bay, Tasmania, Australia, pipe horse, special, 136
227–228 reinforced concrete pipe construction, 135
damaged concrete pipe, removal of, Renton, Seattle Washington, 170–173
228 inshore work, 171
internal temporary ballast, installation offshore work, 171–172
of, 228 bolt-up tool, 172
Fleetwood Foul, Lancashire, U.K., 227 hydraulically-operated alignment
Peekskill, New York, 226 frame, 172
Penarrubia, Gijon East, Spain, 228–229 pipe sandblasting, 172
Southport Broadwater, Queensland, pipe concrete weight coat, absence of, 171
Australia, 226 prestressed concrete cylinder pipes, use
Precast concrete saddles, 73 of, 170
Precise ship positioning, 47–48 underwater assistance, 172
Andrews Survey, 47 airlift bags, use of, 173
global positioning system, 47 two-person submersible, use of, 172
position, establishing, 47
selective availability, 47 Sacrificial tunnels for outfalls, 192–194
standard positioning system, 47 Gwithian, St. Ives Bay, Cornwall, U.K., 194
Pulling an outfall seaward along the ocean Irvine Bay installation, Scotland,
bottom, 91–114 192–193, 193t
Pulp and paper mills, problems at, Lowestoft outfall, 192
268–271, 269t predesign geological investigations, 193
Camps Bay Outfall, South Africa, 271 Santa Cruz No. 3, California, 151–152,
Louisiana Pacific Pulp Mill, Northern 151f, 152f
California, 268 barge and horse, use of, 151
blind flanges, removal of, 268 clamshell dredge, 151
internal lines, collapse of, 269 horse modification, 152
Louisiana-Pacific outfall separation pipeline depth, 151
distances, 269t trench sideslopes, 152
Saturation diving, 165–167 Basic Data Report Onshore Boring, 39

atmospheric diving system, 167–168 Geological Exploration Studies, 39
deck decompression chambers, 166 Preliminary Report Offshore Gelogical
diving support vessel, 166 Survey, 39
final decompression, 165 Seismic Geological Evaluation, 39
remotely operated vehicles, 166, wave hindcasts, 39
168–170 environmental impact statement, 37
saturation diving setup, 165 Hetch Hetchy Reservoir, 37
saturation diving system, purchase price later work, 39–42
of, 167 Coastal Engineering Evaluation, 39
submersible decompression chamber, Final Design Report-Non-Flow Related
166 Elements, 40t
submersible, the, 167 overflow criteria, 42, 42t
Scarborough outfall, 262 Preconstruction Planning Report,
first session construction, 263 41, 41t
butt-fusing, 263 Preliminary Design Report, 39
lobster migration, impact on, 262 rate of infill of pits, 41, 41t
seabed composition, 263 slope stability, examination of, 41, 41t
second session construction, 263 National Environmental Policy Act, 37
blind flanges, placement of, 263 Water Quality Control Plan for Ocean
wave action, 264 Waters of California, 37
Seattle’s West Point plant, 71 Southwest Ocean outfall, San Francisco,
eelgrass, areas of, 72 California, 137–146, 137f, 141f,
Emergency Marine Outfall, 71 142t, 143f,144f, 145f
limited use of beach, 71 configuration and bidding, 137
wet concrete curing time, 71 diffuser arrangement, 141
Selected polyethelene outfalls, 221–235, laying RCP in exposed coastal waters,
222t 139–140
Sheetpiling, driving of, 108f bedding stone, 140
South Bay Ocean outfall, San Diego, grippers, use of, 139
California, 204–210, 205f, 208f, joint sealing, 140
209f, 210f tremie pipe, 140
construction problems, 206 trench excavation, 139
earth pressure balanced tunnel boring manholes, installation of, 146
machine, 206 outflow ports, 142
mantrip, 207 outflow units, 142t
outside tunnel void, grouting of, 206 pipe laying through the surf zone, 138
provisioning barges, 208 gantry, 138
riser, 209f remotely operated vehicles, 146
San Diego Formation, 206 riser spacing, 141
seabed pipe bid, 207 starting offshore work, delay in,
South Bay Land Outfall, 205 138–139
special concrete plug, 210 anchor lines, 139
wave conditions, 207 derrick barge, use of, 138
Southwest Ocean Outfall, development of salvaging, 139
the design of, 37–42, 38f, 40–42t trestle work, 138
additional matters, 42–45, 43,t, 44t, 45t winter storms, 138
bid bond, 44 total excavation volume, 143
engineer’s estimate, 44 wastewater flow peaks, 146
payment bond, 44 waves, trouble caused by, 143
performance bond, 44 Stonecutters Island, Hong Kong, 107
California Environmental Quality Act, 37 Stormwater outfalls on the lower U.S. East
early work, 38–39 Coast, 152–154, 153f
Index 401
runoff from heavy rains, dealing with, limestone excavation, 130

152–154 Outfall damage from storms, 129
above-grade outlets, 153 reaming operations, 130
first flush, release of, 154 recent projects in the region, 131
pipe accident, 153 Tondo, Manila Bay, Philippines, 105
pipeline termination, 153 Total reuse, idealistic, 21
Strategic sewage disposal scheme, Stage 1 outfall-related alternatives, 21
outfall, Hong Kong, 211–213, 212t Trestle, 52, 59–62, 63–64
chemically enhanced primary treatment, cantilevered template, 59
211 surf zone, 59
diffuser discharge head height, limits waste water treatment plant, 59
on, 212 Troubled U.S. West Coast project, a,
drop shaft, 212 264–268
outfall inspections by divers, 213 diffuser description, 265
stepped diffuser arm, 212 diffuser, operational trouble with,
Stonecutters Island, 211 267–268
Submarine pipeline construction, possible effluent discharge into shallow water, 264
negative effects of, 46–47 Granada Sanitary District, 264
Conakilty Bay, 47 Montara Sanitary District, 264
Malakal outfall, 46 non-low bidders, protest from, 265
seabed organisms, blanketing of, 47 pipe repair, 266
Submarine pipelines, placement of, 53 platform immobilization, 266
Surfers and effluents, 14–15 risers, flange-connection of, 267
Makaha sewage release, 14 Sewer Authority Mid-Coastside, 264
Waianae outfall, 15 sheet piling, driving of, 265
steel piling, removal of, 266
Taking individual outfalls out of service, work platform, assembly of, 265
16–21, 17t Tunnel boring machines, 185–188
big picture, the, 18–20 Aberdeen, Scotland, tunnel outfall, 187
coastal victory, 18 Chunnel, 185
environmental victory, 18 drill and shoot technique, 185
Majuro and Ebeye, 19 Scottish tunnel, outfall, 186
Markham Ice Shelf, 19 shields, 185
ocean water, acidity of, 19 Weymouth tunnel outfall, 187–188
sea level, rise of, 19
seawater temperature, rise of, 20 Unfulfilled horizontal drilling attempts,
surf shoal, 20 121–122
Wilkins Ice Shelf, 19 boulders and freshwater seeps, 122
injection wells, the idea of, 16 Unusual outfalls, 237–259
orientation, 16–18, 17t Aberdour Silversands, 238
Boca Trench, 17 Aldeburgh outfall, Suffolk, England,
Boynton, Delray outfall, 17 238–239
distributed outflows, 17 air jets, use of, 237
multi-port diffusers, 16–17 high-pressure water guns, use of, 239
Point Woronzof outfall, 17 bottom-pull method, 237
secondary effluent, 18 Dunbar outfall, Scotland, 239–241
wastewater plumes, 16 air bags, use of, 240
Tipalao Bay outfall, 129–131, 131t diffuser site excavation, 240
bentonite mud, 129 pipe burial machine, fabrication of,
concrete discharge structure, securing 240
of, 130 seabed composition, 240
drill pipe preparation, 130 seabed sampling and inspection, 240
ground material, 129 La Trinite, Galion Bay, Martinique, 238
Unusual outfalls (continued) Wastewater reuse, 6–9

lay barge, 237 Wastewater reuse, problems with, 9
North Berwick and South Queensferry E. coli, 9
outfalls, Scotland, 241 Monterey Bay outfall, 9
reel barge, 237 Wastewater, direct use of, 6–7
agricultural reuse, 7
Virginia Beach, Virginia, 155–156 environmental reuse, 7
discharge locations, 155 industrial reuse, 7
manhole risers, 156 recreational impoundments, 7
oceanfront replenishment, 155 urban reuse, 7
storm drains, elimination of, 155 Wastewater, marine disposal of, 3–6, 4–5t
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 155 outfall, the idea of, 3–5
lawsuit against, 156 inshore trunk, 3
receiving water, 3
Walking platforms, more, 84–90, 85t, outfall, the role of the, 5–6t
86t, 87t wastewater treatment plant, 6
clamshell excavation, 87 Watchet outfall, Somerset, England, 78–79
crane barge and horse, use of, 87–88 inshore ductile pipe, 78
Dana Point outfall, 85 plastic pipe laying, 78–79
hardhat, 86t Water quality protection during
Southeast Regional Reclamation excavation, 73
Authority, 85 Water use, 1–2
Wastewater effluents and the ocean, natural fuel, effect on water supply, 2
12–14, 13f Wellington, North Island, New Zealand,
Blue Flag beaches, 13–14 107–108
Humboldt Bay, 12–13 Working in the sea, 29–31, 30f
Mad River, 13 Kodiak, 29
Wastewater release to the environment, mean high water, 29–30
10–14 neap tides, 30
Cook Strait seawater, 10 Sea Level Datum of 1929, 30
raw effluents, 10–11 spring tides, 30
official position, the, 11–12 Worli and Bandra in Mumbai, India,
chemically-enhanced primary 191–192
treatment, 11–12 reinforced concrete pipe, 191
Schaumberg, curve, 11 seawater conditions, improvement of,
secondary treatment, lobbying for, 11 192
About the Author
Robert A. Grace grew up in southwestern Ontario, Canada, bounded by the “big

water” of Lakes Huron and Erie. He was attracted to civil engineering because of
its direct link with the natural world. He obtained his master’s degree and Ph.D. in
hydrodynamics and water resources from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
He has been on the teaching faculty of the University of Hawaii since 1966, where
his research until 1992 involved at-sea underwater experiments on the interaction of
wave-induced water motion with subsea structures, such as pipes, rocks, simulated
diver habitats, and artificial reef units. This work involved roughly 3,000 scuba dives.
Sabbaticals and leaves of absence have involved extended work stints in France, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, South Africa, and at Oregon State University in the USA. He
also has two years of formal academic study in fisheries biology and has served as a
deckhand on commercial salmon boats in Alaska, as recently as 1986.
Dr. Grace’s major professional interest has involved marine outfalls, with a fas-
cination for the succession of stages: planning, design, construction, and operation
and maintenance. His 1978 textbook, Marine Outfall Systems: Planning, Design, and
Construction, dealt with the entire sequence. Subsequent journal articles have covered
developments with the design and operation and maintenance spheres, leaving this
volume to concentrate on the many ways in which marine outfalls can be installed,
with many supportive case studies.
403

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Marine Outfall

Advances in Water and Wastewater Treatment, edited by Rao K. Surampalli and

Sedimentation Engineering, edited by Vito A. Vanoni (ASCE Manuals and Reports on

Sedimentation Engineering: Processes, Measurements, Modeling, and Practice, edited

Treatment System Hydraulics, by John Bergendahl (ASCE Press, 2008). Addresses

Water Resources Engineering: Handbook of Essential Methods and Design, by Anand

Grace, Robert A., 1938–

Published by American Society of Civil Engineers

ASCE makes no representation or warranty of any kind, whether express or implied,

Copyright © 2009 by the American Society of Civil Engineers.

1 The Marine Outfall in Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

2 Moving toward Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

3. Providing a Stable Work Base within the Surf Zone . . . . . . . . . .59

4 Pulling an Outfall Seaward along the Ocean Floor . . . . . . . . . . .91

5 Placing Outfalls under Protected Sites or Obstructions . . . . . .115

6 Crane Barge Offshore, Trestle Inshore, Trouble Ahead. . . . . . .135

7 High-Tech Outfall Installation in Deep Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165

8 Creating Tunnel Outfalls and Their Risers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185

9 Hybrid-Design Outfalls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .201

10 Selected Polyethylene Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221

11 Unusual Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .237

12 Difﬁcult or Impossible Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261

13 Giant Tunnel Outfall as Part of the Boston

Appendix A: Selected World Outfalls, Continuing after Table 1-1 . . .299

Appendix B: Wave-Related Concepts and Calculations

Appendix C: Immersed Tubes as Big Outfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .385

It is not sensible, in this volume, to wade directly into construction operations

Appendix C provides coverage of a type of underwater structure that could lend

ACBM Articulated concrete block mattress

FEMA (U.S.) Federal Emergency Management Agency

SSDS Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme (Hong Kong)

Advanced primary treatment—An alternative to secondary (biological) treatment that utilizes

Bearing—A direction according to true (abbreviated T) or magnetic compass angles, north

Mattress—Multiple-cell ﬂexible blanket placed over laid pipe for stability.

Reynolds number—Dimensionless ﬂuid mechanics parameter involving the ratio of inertia

1.1 Precious Water

1.1.2 Drought Times

1.2 Marine Disposal of Wastewater

Table 1-1. Outfall Identiﬁcation in Grace (1978)

Table 1-1. Outfall Identiﬁcation in Grace (1978) (Continued)

1.2.2 The Role of the Outfall

1.3 Wastewater Reuse

1.3.2 Conserving Water

1.3.3 Two Ends of the California Spectrum

1.3.4 Problems with Wastewater Reuse: Actual and Perceived

1.4 Releasing Wastewater to the Marine Environment

environment. In Mumbai I witnessed the disgusting situation of countless bobbing

1.4.2 The Ofﬁcial Position

1.4.3 Wastewater Efﬂuents and the Ocean

Figure 1-1. Surfer “dropping in” on Hawaii swell.

1.5 Multiple Uses of the Marine Environment

It is possible for wastewater assimilation to co-exist with other beneﬁcial uses

1.5.2 The Idea of “Corners”

1.6 Taking Individual Outfalls Out of Service

Table 1-3. South Florida Ocean Outfalls

1.6.3 The Big Picture

1.6.4 Outfall Replacement by Injection Wells

1.6.5 Idealistic Total Reuse

1.7 The Marine Outfall as the Disposal Method of Choice

1.7.2 An Example from Australia

1.7.3 An Example from New Zealand

1.7.4 The Next Step

design efforts of perhaps several different oceanographic, environmental/planning,