Descriptive

Framework for
Analysis of Social Media Use
Deliverable 1.4

Lead Author: Utrecht University

Co-funded by the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the

European Union

PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS REPORT IS A FINAL DRAFT AND IS AWAITING FINAL
ACCEPTANCE BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION.
When citing please use: MEDIA4SEC (2016) Descriptive Framework for Analysis of Social
Media Use

Authors:
R. Dekker and A.J. Meijer (Utrecht University),
H. de Vries, A. de Vries, M. Rijken, A. Roosendaal, P. Vermeulen (TNO)
J. Coaffee, K. Hadjimatheou (University of Warwick),
S. Denef (Fraunhoffer IAO),
E. Fontanille, P. de la Torre (EFUS), ,
E. Kermitisis, N. Moustakidis & D. Mytts (KEMEA)
K. Tani (EOS),
J. Modic, M. Cecowski (XLAB)
J. L. Diego, M. Gil, J. Diego, R. Fernández (Valencia Local Police)
U. Williamson, V. Sloss, F. Williamson (Police Service Northern Ireland)

Contents

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................ i

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 MEDI@4SEC ...................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Work Package 1 ............................................................................................................................... 1

1.3 Deliverable 1.4 ................................................................................................................................. 2

1.4 Methodology ..................................................................................................................................... 2

1.5 Deliverable outline ........................................................................................................................ 3

2. Relevant findings WP1 ........................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Deliverables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 ...................................................................................................... 4
2.2 Social media users .......................................................................................................................... 4
2.3 Public security tasks ..................................................................................................................... 5
2.4 Organisational, ethical and legal criteria ............................................................................. 6
2.5 Summarizing the building blocks for the framework ..................................................... 8
3. Theoretical foundations ........................................................................................................................ 9
3.1 Technology adoption by (government) organisations .................................................. 9
3.2 Two axes of descriptive framework ..................................................................................... 10
4. Descriptive framework and decision tree ................................................................................... 11
4.1 Initial framework ......................................................................................................................... 11

4.2 Descriptive framework .............................................................................................................. 11

4.3 Decision tree ................................................................................................................................... 17
4.4 Organisational, ethical and legal criteria per type of social media practice ....... 19
5. Integration of descriptive framework and decision tree in MEDI@4SEC workshops
26
6. Conclusions and recommendations ............................................................................................... 29
7. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................. 31

Executive Summary

This deliverable develops a framework to analyze social media use within the domain of
public security. This entails a typology of various social media practices and a decision
tree which can be used by public security actors when considering (responding to) a
specific social media practice. The aims of this descriptive framework are threefold:
1. It helps practitioners in the field of public security to recognize various types of
social media practices and distinguish them from other types of practices;
2. It offers decision-support in implementation of social media practices in various
public security routines based on ethical, legal and organisational criteria;
3. It forms input to the six policy and practice dialogue workshops in the
MEDI@4SEC project.

This task combines the inventories of D1.1, D1.2 and D1.3 into a meta-view of findings
relevant to the aims and objectives of MEDI@4SEC. It develops a framework of analysis
to be used and refined throughout the project, specifically during the project workshops
(WP2).
The framework distinguishes 12 types of social media practices in public security based
on three core actors (public security actors; citizens and criminals) and four key public
security tasks (Communication & Public engagement; Surveillance & Intelligence;
Criminal Investigation; and Emergency Services & Crisis Management). Based on
organisational, ethical and legal criteria the framework helps public security actors to
determine whether social media practices can be incorporated in existing public
security routines or require new public security routines to be established.
The descriptive framework was used to develop a decision tree which supports public
security actors’ decision-making in dealing with social media practices. Furthermore,
the various categories of the framework are connected to the different themes of the
MEDI@4SEC policy and practice dialogue workshops.

1. Introduction

1.1 MEDI@4SEC

MEDI@4SEC aims to achieve a better understanding of the opportunities, challenges and

ethical considerations of social media use for public security: ‘the good, the bad and the
ugly’. The good comprises using social media for problem solving, fighting crime,
decreasing fear of crime and increasing public security. The bad concerns the increase of
digitized criminality and terrorism with new public security threats emerging through
the use of social media. The ugly comprises the grey areas where trolling, cyberbullying,
online threats, or live video-sharing of tactical security operations are social media
practices to deal with.

For various public security actors, making use of the possibilities that social media offer
and adequately responding to new social media phenomena is key. MEDI@4SEC
explores various challenges of this through a series of communication and
dissemination activities that engage extensively with a range of end-users of social
media. By this, the project seeks to better understand the usage of social media for
security activities and to highlight ethical, legal and data-protection-related issues and
implications. Activities center around six relevant themes: DIY Policing; Everyday
security; Riots and mass gatherings: The dark web; Trolling; and Innovative market
solutions.

The results of MEDI@4SEC will support decision-making and policy implementation

related to social media use in public security. By structuring our understanding of the
impact of social media on public security routines, MEDI@4SEC will provide an
evidence-based roadmap for better policymaking, including:

• Best practice reports;

• A catalogue of social media technologies;
• Recommendations for EU standards;
• Future training options; and
• Ethical awareness raising.

1.2 Work Package 1

The role of Work Package 1 (WP1) is to link the project activities and outcomes to the
existing body of knowledge through a series of stocktaking and inventories on the
influence of social media on public security planning and the potential threats and
challenges this uptake brings about.
In this project, social media are defined as “a group of internet based applications that
build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the
creation and exchange of User Generated Content” (Kaplan & Haenlein 2010: 61). Social
media that we predominantly focus on are the more widely used social media apps,
notably Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Youtube, and Instagram, but also (new) emerging
social media that are widely adopted and that we come across. Online chat groups,

forums and market places our not our key focus, but will be touched upon where
relevant.

1.3 Deliverable 1.4

This deliverable develops a framework to analyze social media use within the domain of
public security. This entails a typology of various social media practices and a decision
tree which can be used by public security actors when considering (responding to) a
specific social media practice.

This task combines the inventories of D1.1, D1.2 and D1.3 (MEDI@4SEC 2016a; 2016b;
2016c) into a meta-view of findings relevant to the aims and objectives of MEDI@4SEC.
It develops a framework of analysis to be used and refined throughout the project –
specifically during the project workshops (WP2).

The aims of this descriptive framework is threefold:

1. It helps practitioners in the field of public security to recognize various types of
social media practices and distinguish them from other types of practices;
2. It offers decision-support in implementation of social media practices in various
public security routines based on ethical, legal and organisational criteria;
3. It forms input to the six policy and practice dialogue workshops in the
MEDI@4SEC project.

1.4 Methodology

In order to develop this framework, we combine three sources of knowledge. Firstly, we

combine the inventories of D1.1, D1.2 and D1.3 into a meta-view of relevant findings. By
this we build upon knowledge from various sources of literature, current best practices
and ethical and legal issues.
Secondly, our framework was informed by academic literature on the uptake of social
media in (government) organisations. Insights on relevant public security tasks, social
media users and ethical, legal and organisations requirements were collected and
integrated. This provided the theoretical foundations of this framework.

Thirdly, a conceptual framework of social media practices in the public security domain
was subjected to ex ante evaluation in cooperation with project partners involved in this
deliverable. This includes two police organisations which can be considered as end
users. Each partner was asked to add six specific examples of social media practices to
the concept framework. They were asked to evaluate the fit of the framework. Two
specific questions were asked:

1. Is the framework exhaustive (does it fit all types of social media practices or are
there practices that do not match any of the categories)?
2. Are the categories of the framework clear and mutually exclusive (could you
place practices in only one or in multiple categories)?
Based on the ex ante evaluation, the preliminary framework was further elaborated into
a fitting typology and decision tree to be used during the project workshops (Work
package 2). The evaluation indicated that the framework fitted relatively well, but that

there was a need to depart from traditional public security tasks. As a result, four key
public security tasks were added to the framework.
Due to the fast changing social media landscape and intrinsic characteristics of various
EU countries, the framework is a working model and will be further refined during the
workshops.

1.5 Deliverable outline

In the following chapters of this deliverable, we will first summarize relevant findings
from D1.1, D1.2 and D1.3 that provided the building blocks for this framework (Chapter
2). Thereafter, we will provide theoretical foundations of our framework of social media
use based on academic literature (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, we introduce the framework
and a decision tree based on this framework is presented. Each type of social media
practices is elaborated with an example, and relevant organisational, ethical and legal
criteria. In Chapter 5, the various categories of the framework are linked to the themes
of the MEDI@4SEC policy and practice dialogue workshops in order to provide relevant
input to these workshops. In the final chapter of this deliverable, we provide
conclusions and recommendations for the use of this framework in the project
workshops (Work package 2).

2. Relevant findings WP1

2.1 Deliverables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3

D1.1 (MEDI@4SEC 2016a) created an inventory of the existing body of written

knowledge on the influence of social media on public security planning and the threats
and challenges the uptake of social media brings about. The deliverable took into
account academic literature, grey literature and EU funded research reports. It
established a state-of-the-art of social media use not only by police and other public
security planners but also by criminals (as this group is very active in applying new
possibilities). The deliverable report illuminated challenges and opportunities for the
six project themes that showcase the ways social media are used and have an
increasingly prominent role in, or impact on, public security.
D1.2 (MEDI@4SEC 2016b) presented an inventory of best practices of social media in
the public security domain. This inventory was created in a bottom-up fashion: by
collecting examples from the literature (D1.1) and by interviewing practitioners. It
searched for general patterns in the types of practices that were encountered. The key
aim of this report was to provide an overview of social media practices for public
security that will spark and enable discussion among practitioners and policy makers.
D1.2 illuminated at a process of social media adoption that goes through different
stages. Only a few LEA’s have adopted the full scope of social media practices. Most LEAs
only adopt a selection of practices relating to certain public security tasks, depending on
their organisational culture and resources and the local context.

D1.3 (MEDI@4SEC 2016c) studied the ethical and legal implications of social media
practices in the domain of public security in the EU-context. The report focused on the
current state-of-the-art of social media use and impact in relation to: ethical and legal
concerns with police and municipal authority uses, ethically risky, anti-social and illegal
uses and ethical and legal issues arising in connection with public security responses.
This report has important implications for new public security routines since it stresses
that the involvement of citizens in the provision of public security and criminal justice
raises significant concerns both from a legal and an ethical perspective. The analysis
highlights that these relate primarily to the difficulty of ensuring transparency,
accountability and non-discrimination in the delivery of public security when functions
are carried out by citizens driven by their own interpretations of the law and morality
and without democratically legitimised authority.

2.2 Social media users

The previous deliverables in work package 1 (WP1) indicate that social media are
appropriated in the public security domain in a large variety of ways. This includes ways
in which public security planners are using social media to ask information from citizens
for criminal investigation, to inform them about accidents, to influence the behavior of
crowds, etc. The media landscape, however, does not only change because public
security planners use social media but also because others – citizens and criminals – use

social media in different ways. Citizens and criminals are key actors who are using social
media to either enhance or threaten public security. This for example concerns DIY
policing activities of citizens which support the work of public security planners but
may also interfere with police investigations. Also criminals are using social media, for
example in Dark Web activities or online identity theft and fraud. Our framework should
fit this variety of actors and practices.

D1.2 distinguished social media practices by three types of actors in the public security
domain:

1. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs);

2. Citizens;
3. Criminals.
D1.3 distinguishes between social media use by:

1. LEA’s
2. Other actors in society (citizens, criminals)

The report D1.3 stresses that citizens and criminals should not be seen as fixed
categories. Social media uses by citizens can in some cases be criminalized as illegal or
criminal acts while in other cases, they are not and perhaps only considered unethical.
In this deliverable we firstly also focus on LEAs but decided to refer to them in a bit
more general sense as ‘public security actors’. This label is chosen because the
information and advice can also be used by for example private actors which are dealing
with public security.
Secondly, while we fully agree that citizens and criminals do not comprise separate and
fixed categories, we decided to uphold this distinction in this descriptive framework
since the questions that are raised by social media uses are quite different for citizens
and criminals. We distinguish these user groups in order to be able to capture a large
variety of social media uses, either supporting or threatening public security.

2.3 Public security tasks

Public security actors, citizens and criminals play various roles in public security tasks –
either enhancing or challenging public security. D1.1 recognized the use of social media
in six public security tasks based on commonly distinguished tasks in the literature:
1. Communication and engagement;
2. Emergency services and crisis management;
3. Surveillance;
4. Criminal investigation;
5. Community policing; and
6. Intelligence;

In a bottom-up fashion, D1.2 distinguished five types of public security practices in

which social media are used:
1. Social media foundation;
2. Intelligence;

3. Law enforcement;
4. Criminal investigation; and
5. Engagement & Communication.
In this deliverable these two typologies of public security tasks in which social media
can play a role, are integrated in the following four public security tasks:
1. Communication & Public engagement;
2. Surveillance & Intelligence;
3. Criminal Investigation; and
4. Emergency Services & Crisis Management.
In this typology, ‘surveillance’ and ‘intelligence’ are combined as D1.1 noted that the
presence of social media creates a cross-over between surveillance and intelligence
tasks (p. 10). ‘Social media foundation’ concerning the overall uptake of social media by
LEAs as a basic requirement for use of social media in specific public security tasks is
considered in this deliverable as one type of criteria for the use of social media.

2.4 Organisational, ethical and legal criteria

Based on D1.2 and D1.3, this deliverable distinguishes several organisational, ethical
and legal criteria that determine whether social media can be integrated in current
public security routines, or whether they require the development of new public
security routines.

Organisational criteria for the integration of social media in public security routines
were selected from the ‘social media foundation’ patterns described in D1.2. This
deliverable distinguishes the following organisational criteria:
1. Social media education: Using social media requires new knowledge and skills.
Therefore, LEAs run trainings and have simulated environments to make officers
familiar on how to make best use of it;
2. Social media accounts: When using social media, the question is how to create
and organize social media accounts and it is a challenge to develop a wide reach
for the accounts;
3. Social media strategy: Effective and efficient social media use requires goals
and an action plan. Therefore, LEAs define a social media strategy that defines
such issues and goals;
4. Social media policy: Social media usage must respect the legal framework of an
organisation, it might require official approval and is carried out by a larger
group of people who might have different ideas and experience how to use it.
Therefore, LEAs create social media policies and guidelines that describe how to
act on social media. Policies describe e.g. communication with citizens and legal
aspects of investigations.
5. Social media use often requires the integration with existing LEA services,
mobile computing, software and real-time information. Therefore, LEAs update
their IT infrastructure and toolbox to enable social media usage.

a. The use of social media during the day requires officers to have mobile
access. Therefore, LEAs equip their officers with smartphones or tablets
with mobile Internet access.
b. In a crisis situation, international public attention can easily exceed server
capabilities of a local authority. Therefore, LEAs use social media channels as
an extra communication infrastructure that can handle heavy server loads.
6. Social media offer the ability to improve internal knowledge exchange and
communication. Therefore, LEAs introduce internal (enterprise) social media
solutions that help them share information/knowledge and collaborate
internally.

Based on D1.3, we also distinguish several ethical and legal criteria for social media use
in the public security domain. This deliverable distinguishes:

1. Ethical and legal concerns with police and municipal authority uses of social media;
2. Ethically risky, anti-social and illegal uses of social media by citizens and ethical and
legal issues arising in connection with public security responses.
The latter relates primarily to the difficulty of ensuring transparency, accountability and
non-discrimination in the delivery of public security when functions are carried out by
citizens driven by their own interpretations of the law and morality and without
democratically legitimized authority. These concerns are likely to persist and indeed
grow as it becomes apparent that police and other formal public security providers are
unable for a range of reasons to deal with the proliferation of illegal and unethical
behaviour online. Key challenges and risks for public security providers in responding
to such behaviour, especially on the Dark Web, include distinguishing between illegal
and merely offensive or otherwise unethical behaviour, and determining the line
between justified covert interactions with criminals and unjustified entrapment.
Legal issues fall into three categories for the framework:
1. The position or role of public security agents, not only as enforcers of the law but
also as data controllers;
2. The fundamental rights of the citizens; and
3. The involvement of citizens in the provision of public security.
Ethical issues included in this framework are:

1. Risks of disproportionate interference with the privacy of innocent individuals;

2. Risks of outright discrimination or unwarranted stigmatization of individuals or
groups as criminally suspicious as well as risks of discrimination;
3. Unfair (because less easy or reliable) access of some vulnerable or disadvantaged
groups to criminal justice or public security resulting from their relative lack of
technology and/or technological skills; and
4. The rights of police officers to a private life and to freedom of expression on social
media.

2.5 Summarizing the building blocks for the framework

Based on the insights of D1.1, D1.2 and D1.3, we will structure our framework according
to four key public security tasks and three categories of social media users. The four
public security tasks are:

1. Communication & Public engagement;

2. Surveillance & Intelligence;
3. Criminal Investigation; and
4. Emergency Services & Crisis Management.

The three categories social media users are:

1. Public security actors;
2. Citizens; and
3. Criminals.
For various types of social media practices for public security that can be defined
according to this framework, we will define applicable organisational, ethical and legal
criteria which have been defined in D1.2 and D1.3. Organisational criteria are:

1. Social media education;

2. Social media accounts;
3. Social media strategy;
4. Social media policy;
5. Integration with existing public security services; and
6. Internal collaboration and information sharing.

Ethical criteria are:

1. Risks of disproportionate interference with the privacy of innocent individuals;
2. Risks of outright discrimination or unwarranted stigmatization of individuals or
groups as criminally suspicious as well as risks of discrimination;
3. Unfair (because less easy or reliable) access of some vulnerable or disadvantaged
groups to criminal justice or public security resulting from their relative lack of
technology and/or technological skills; and
4. The rights of police officers to a private life and to freedom of expression on social
media.
And (categories of) legal criteria are:

1. The position or role of public security agents, not only as enforcers of the law but
also as data controllers;
2. The fundamental rights of the citizens; and
3. The involvement of citizens in the provision of public security.

3. Theoretical foundations

3.1 Technology adoption by (government) organisations

Academic literature on the use of new technologies by (government) organisations and

individuals demonstrates that outcomes cannot only be understood in instrumental
terms. New technologies are not only instruments that are used for established
practices: they also change what organisations and individuals do. This means that
instrumental questions about the suitability of social media for certain public security
tasks only partly explain social media practices in the public security domain. Social
media also create and structure new public security practices and routines by LEAs but
also by citizens and criminals.

The technological design of specific social media creates, limits and structures their
usage (Van Dijck 2013). Therefore, organisations using social media, do not only shape
the use of these technologies but these technologies also shape what organisations do
(Orlikowski 2000). Also within specific social media spaces, a certain technological
culture is created that normatively delimits the spectrum of uses and practices that are
deemed acceptable (Wilson & Peterson 2002). This interaction between technological
and cultural factors determining social media use is referred to as social media
‘affordances’ (Hutchby 2001). Affordances are features of technologies that condition
the social practices that emerge from their usage. Social media have ‘affordances’ that,
for example, facilitate certain practices such as fast, horizontal diffusion of information
while inhibiting other practices such as central control over information.

Figure 3.1 Basic Framework

Public security Social media

practices affordances

Context & Conditions

Social media can thus be understood as both being shaped by and shaping of the
practices of actors that use these media. Technologies are not only used for the
functionality for which they were designed, but also allow for new purposes or new

practices. These new functionalities stem from interaction between technology and the
social context in which they are used (figure 3.1).

3.2 Two axes of descriptive framework

Based on these important insights from academic literature on technology adoption by

(government) organisations, we developed a descriptive framework that includes not
only the use of social media in existing public security tasks, but also includes new
public security practices that are developed due to the use of new social media (by
public security actors or others). In the latter case, social media use is requiring, or
leading to new public security practices. This may entail new practices of public security
actors to enhance public security (such as social media monitoring), but also practices
by citizens and criminals that may possibly threaten public security (such as trolling).

Specifically in the framework we distinguish:

1. Social media incorporated in existing public security routines;

2. Social media requiring new public security routines.

The distinction between the two is not always clear-cut, but in general one can state that
organisational, ethical and legal criteria determine whether specific practices belong to
the former or the latter category. Social media that result in significant challenges to or
changes in the organisation, ethical procedures or legal frameworks are said to require
new public security routines.
Existing or new routines can concern public security practices of public security
planners, but also those of criminals and citizens. These stakeholders are also
sometimes challenged by social media, for example when citizens are posting
information about their holidays on social media that are public to others – including
burglars - this poses a public security risk to them. When criminals are leaving a digital
trace of their activities, this can be monitored by the police.
This brief exploration of the literature highlights that we need to develop a decision tree
that acknowledges the difference between usage of social media within existing
practices and social media practices that require new routines. The latter group may be
more challenging for the organisation but also offers greater potential. Public security
planners need to make decisions about the use of these new technologies and a decision
tree is an instrument that is suitable for supporting the organisational decision-making
process.

10



4. Descriptive framework and decision tree

4.1 Initial framework

Integrating the findings from the previous deliverables (MEDI@4SEC 2016a; 2016b;
2016c and our theoretical foundations, we created a 2x3 matrix of social media
practices distinguishing three types of public security actors (Public security actors,
Citizens and Criminals) and two types of social media practices (social media practices
that can be integrated in existing routines of public security actors and social media
practices that require new routines from public security actors).

1. Social media practices that can be integrated in existing routines of public

security actors
a. Social media practices of public security actors
b. Social media practices of citizens
c. Social media practices of criminals
2. Social media practices that require new routines of public security actors
a. Social media practices of public security actors
b. Social media practices of citizens
c. Social media practices of criminals

Table 4.1 shows how this framework covers a variety of public security practices.
Table 4.1: Examples of practices

Social media practices that Social media practices that

can be integrated in existing require new public security
public security tasks of routines of public security
public security actors actors

Social media practices of Neighborhood police officer Personal usage of social

public security actors uses social media to engage media by police officers
citizens in crime control creates security breaches

Social media practices of Citizens use social media to Citizens shame alleged
citizens organize a neighborhood criminals on social media
watch

Social media practices of Criminals share information Criminals use social media
criminals about their activities on for online scams and
social media blackmailing

4.2 Descriptive framework

Based on the results of the ex ante evaluation, this initial framework was refined with a
focus on four key public security tasks:
1. Communication & Public engagement;
2. Surveillance & Intelligence;

11



3. Criminal Investigation; and

4. Emergency Services & Crisis Management.
This leads to a typology with 24 categories (2 types of practices x 3 actors x 4 public
security tasks) of social media practices in public security. There are 12 final steps in the
decision making in which organisational, ethical and legal criteria determine whether
social media practices can be incorporated in existing public security routines or
whether they require new public security routines. Overall, this led to a final descriptive
framework which is presented in Table 4.2. In each cell of the framework, specific
organisational, ethical and legal criteria are specified that public security actors should
consider when dealing with this type of social media practices.

12


Table 4.2: Descriptive framework including ethical, legal and organisational criteria
Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by
public security public security citizens – Can be citizens– Requiring criminals – Can be criminals – Requiring
planners – Can be planners – Requiring incorporated in new public security incorporated in new public security
incorporated in new public security existing public routines existing public routines
existing public routines security routines security routines
security routines
Communication & A B C
Public engagement • Ethical issues and privacy concerns may • Suggestive comments and tagging by • This activity of criminals is linked to
emerge when information on or images of citizens online has privacy implications and surveillance/intelligence (D) and criminal
individual citizens or offenders is shared in risks visiting criminal suspicion on innocent investigation activities (G) of public
public social media platforms. people or stigmatizing them as criminal. security actors. This may require new IT
• Trust in/legitimacy of police can be • Criticism of police is fine, harassment of tools and analysis methods. Social media
undermined in some types of social media police or abusive content is unethical and use often requires the integration with
practices. may be punishable existing LEA services, mobile computing,
• Also, unauthorized use of open source software and real-time information.
material by officers can be problematic • Freedom of expression is the main issue
because it means not all evidence here.
influencing a case is properly logged as • Recruitment for criminal or terrorist
such and therefore subject to proper activities (grooming) is unethical and often
scrutiny punishable
• Attempts to define, detect and prosecute
grooming run the risk of over
criminalization

Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by
public security public security citizens – Can be citizens– Requiring criminals – Can be criminals – Requiring
planners – Can be planners – Requiring incorporated in new public security incorporated in new public security
incorporated in new public security existing public routines existing public routines
existing public routines security routines security routines
security routines
Surveillance & D E F
Intelligence • This requires an up-to-date IT • Lack of professional and democratic • Existence of reasonable suspicion (or
infrastructure and toolbox. This often safeguards, the risk of people taking the law whatever the necessary criteria is for
requires integration with existing LEA in their own hands. monitoring) is required.
services, mobile computing, software and • Risk of stigmatizing individuals and groups • Collateral intrusion (i.e. intrusion into the
real-time information. as criminal and discrimination privacy of individuals not suspected of any
• Online surveillance has the risk of • Ethical issues arise when social media crimes) should be taken into account.
becoming structural, which is subject to activities of citizens facilitate or encourage
additional legal requirements. Essential is illegal practices/criminal offenses.
that the police does not copy or store
information.
• Online covert/undeclared/invisible
surveillance needs to be justified even
when it pertains to open source material.
• Big data analysis/intelligence raises data
protection and privacy issues, especially
when data can be linked to individuals.
14


Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by
public security public security citizens – Can be citizens– Requiring criminals – Can be criminals – Requiring
planners – Can be planners – Requiring incorporated in new public security incorporated in new public security
incorporated in new public security existing public routines existing public routines
existing public routines security routines security routines
security routines
Criminal Investigation G H I
• Social media platforms used by public • The use of public social media data by • Investigation of online crime requires a
security bodies should be designed to police about victims or criminal suspects modern IT infrastructure and toolbox. This
discourage individuals to develop publicly raises various privacy concerns often requires integration with existing
their own theories and speculate about the • There is an additional concern that LEA services, mobile computing, software
possible guilt of people they identify as information may be unreliable and real-time information. It also requires
possible suspects. • Naming and shaming of criminals can be skills and integration of online
• If a connection is made between a location unethical and can become a form of investigation with internal knowledge
and a victim, privacy laws apply. If data defamation or online harassment and, thus, exchange and communication.
includes addresses, even without adding result in an unlawful or criminal act itself. • Criminal investigation of online practices
names, the data will very easily be personal • It should be considered how naming and requires a form of targeted or structural
data. shaming of criminals might add to formal surveillance and this requires additional
• The extent to which the monitoring of punishments and therefore how sentencing legal safeguards.
victims’ profiles or other social media data authorities should take naming and
requires prior consent should be shaming into account when deciding on the
addressed. sentence of those found to be guilty
15


Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by Social media use by
public security public security citizens – Can be citizens– Requiring criminals – Can be criminals – Requiring
planners – Can be planners – Requiring incorporated in new public security incorporated in new public security
incorporated in new public security existing public routines existing public routines
existing public routines security routines security routines
security routines
Emergency services & J K L
Crisis management • Using social media to monitor crises and • A modern IT infrastructure and social • Tracing and eliminating bots requires
public events can be highly privacy media presence of public security actors is modern ITs and skills and expertise.
invasive. Safeguards, such as a prior required to manage this and be • Ethical issues around freedom of
permission from legal authorities to responsive to emergencies. expression and association raise questions
monitor social media (accounts) related to • There should be built in mechanisms about what kind of events should and
the specific event, are needed and there preventing abuse of emergency reporting should not be approved in the first place.
need to be clear arrangements on who tools • When online surveillance and investigation
monitors what, who is responsible, etc. • There needs to be more clarity on when includes accessing computers at a
• Monitoring should be evidence-based and citizens can be held responsible for distance, specific legal requirements apply.
it is unclear as yet how reliably hostility creating risky public security situations via
and violence can be predicted. social media mobilization.
• Events may be religious and/or political in
which case they enjoy special protection by
human rights in a liberal society.





16



4.3 Decision tree

The descriptive framework is transformed into a decision tree which supports decision-
making of public security actors whom are confronted with an opportunity or challenge
of dealing with social media. This decision tree first inquires to what public security
tasks a social media practice relates (Figure 4.1). Thereafter, the decision tree asks who
the main social media user is or will be. This leads to a decision tree that in total consists
of 12 final categories (4 public security tasks x 3 types of users) of social media use
(Figure 4.2). For each of these categories (A-L) specific organisational, ethical and legal
criteria are specified that help determine whether social media practices can be
incorporated in existing public security routines or require new public security routines.

Figure 4.1: Step 1 decision tree

Communication &
Citizen engagement

Surveillance &
Intelligence

As a public security agent,

To what public security
you encounter a type of
task does it relate?
social media practices

Criminal
investigation

Emergency Services
& Crisis
Management

17



Figure 4.2: Decision tree

18



4.4 Organisational, ethical and legal criteria per type of social media practice

Each of the twelve types of practices (A-L) are characterized by specific ethical, legal and
organisational criteria which determine whether a social media practice can be
incorporated in existing public security routines or require new public security routines.
This chapter addresses each of the twelve types of practices. For each type of social
media practice, we first provide an example. Thereafter, we address what
organisational, ethical and legal criteria that are relevant here (What do we know?).
Thereafter, we provide decision-support to public security actors by addressing the
question what does this mean for public security actors?

A. Social media use for communication and public engagement by public security actors
Example: Police officers using YouTube videos to engage citizens in crime control
What do we know? Social media use for communication and public engagement is
relatively common and can relatively easily be implemented in existing organisational
structures of public security actors. Social media platforms which are popular among
citizens such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube have the best reach. Commercial social
media platforms however delimit the ways in which public security actors can
communicate with the public and which publics are reached.
Ethical issues and privacy concerns may emerge when information on or images of
individual citizens or offenders is shared in public social media platforms. Also,
unauthorized use of open source material by officers can be problematic because it
means not all evidence influencing a case is properly logged as such and therefore
subject to proper scrutiny. The type of content that is shared should therefore should be
evaluated based on privacy regulations.

Trust in and legitimacy of police can be undermined in some types of social media
practices when their communication is seen as unprofessional. When public security
actors are communicating with the public they should be mindful of their professional
role. Social media platforms often have networked structure in which social relations
are non-hierarchical and on the basis of equality. This may not fit the professional role
of public security actors. This requires a social media strategy and policy. Personal
usage can create privacy issues for public security actors.

What does this mean for public security actors? Social media use for communication and
public engagement offers great potential when media are used that are popular among
citizens. Public security actors, however, should develop a policy and a training program
that takes at least the following issues into account: (1) guidelines for sharing images of
individual citizens or offenders, (2) guidelines for using open source material by
officers, (3) guidelines for professional communication by individual.

B. Social media use for communication and public engagement by citizens

Example: Citizens share information on police activities through social media.

19



What do we know? Citizens share information on police activities through social media
may support activities of public security actors. However, suggestive comments and
tagging by citizens online has privacy implications and risks of visiting criminal
suspicion on innocent people or stigmatizing them as criminal.
In some cases, citizens criticize or ridicule the actions of public security actors on social
media. Criticism is fine but harassment of police or abusive content is unethical and may
be punishable.
What does this mean for public security actors? Social media use for communication and
public engagement by citizens can help public security actors and sharing of certain
messages – e.g. calls for information about missing persons or criminal acts – can be
actively stimulated. It can, however, also be damaging. Public security actors cannot
prevent this usage of social media but they should monitor communication that is
related to their activities and react immediately if this communication (1) has a negative
effect on other citizens or (b) contains police harassment or abusive content.

C. Social media use for communication and public engagement by criminals

Example: Recruitment of youth for terrorist or criminal activities.
What do we know? This activity of criminals is linked to surveillance/intelligence (D)
and criminal investigation activities (G) of public security actors. Surveillance and
investigation of social media use by criminals for communication may require new IT
tools and analysis methods. This likely also requires the integration with existing LEA
services, mobile computing, software and real-time information, as these types of
activities often take place on the Dark Web or in other non-public social media venues.
Freedom of expression is the main issue. This should be protected and safeguarded in
case of non-punishable activities. Recruitment for criminal or terrorist activities
(grooming) is unethical and often punishable. Attempts to define, detect and prosecute
grooming run the risk of over-criminalization.
What does this mean for public security actors? Surveillance of online, potentially
criminal communication can help prevention and investigation of criminal activities.
This requires not only suitable social media monitoring and analysis tools and
integration of these tools and data that it yields in the (police) organisation. Also, ethical
and legal issues are at stake here. What social media communication is criminal
requires careful definition and runs the risk of over-criminalization. Searching for and
monitoring social media information infringes on the privacy of other messages of other
parties as well and runs the risk of becoming structural. A policy should be developed to
safeguard the terms on which potentially criminal online communication can be
monitored, stored and used.

D. Social media use for surveillance and intelligence by public security actors
Example: Online patrol of police in social media networks.

20



What do we know? This requires an up-to-date IT infrastructure and toolbox. This often
requires integration with existing LEA services, mobile computing, software and real-
time information.
Online covert/undeclared/invisible surveillance needs to be justified even when it
pertains to open source material.
Incidental online surveillance has the risk of becoming structural or involving different
purposes (‘function creep’), which is subject to additional legal requirements. An
essential legal requirement is that the police does not copy or store information.

Big data analysis/intelligence raises data protection and privacy issues, especially when
data can be linked to individuals.

Data retention generate data protection issues since the data contain privacy sensitive
data.

What does this mean for public security actors? Surveillance of online, potentially
criminal communication can help prevention and investigation of criminal activities.
This requires not only suitable social media monitoring and analysis tools and
integration of these tools and data that it yields in the (police) organisation. Also, ethical
and legal issues are at stake here. What social media communication is criminal
requires careful definition and runs the risk of over-criminalization. Searching for and
monitoring social media information infringes on the privacy of other messages of other
parties as well and runs the risk of becoming structural. A policy should be developed to
safeguard the terms on which potentially criminal online communication can be
monitored, stored and used.

E. Social media use for surveillance and intelligence by citizens

Example: Citizens organize their own neighborhood watch, supported by social media
use, e.g. WhatsApp groups and specific apps.

What do we know? This type of social media practices by citizens is characterized by a

lack of professional and democratic safeguards. There is a risk of people taking the law
in their own hands.
An additional ethical and possibly legal risk exists of stigmatizing individuals and groups
as criminal and discriminating them.
Ethical issues arise when social media activities of citizens facilitate or encourage illegal
practices/criminal offenses, for example by tracking and warning for police surveillance.
What does this mean for public security actors? Public security actors should not
automatically encourage or prevent surveillance and intelligence activities of citizens.
Various practices may have different ethical and legal implications. Public security
actors could define which citizens practices are ethical and legal and provide guidelines
to citizens on how to develop helpful practices.

21



F. Social media use for surveillance and intelligence by criminals

Example: Criminals monitor victims´ social networks in order to plan attacks or
robberies
What do we know? Existence of reasonable suspicion (or whatever the necessary criteria
is for monitoring by LEAs) is required.
Collateral intrusion (i.e. intrusion into the privacy of individuals not suspected of any
crimes) should be taken into account when surveilling these practices of criminals.
What does this mean for public security actors? Reasonable suspicion should be present
to monitor criminal activities.

G. Social media use for criminal investigation by public security actors

Example: Any type of Geomapping, Geolocation, GeoIP embedded to social media that
can allow law enforcement to pin the location of victims but also create patterns for
potential targets.

What do we know? This requires organisational change including modern IT

infrastructure with mobile devices, and social media education for persons using them.

If a connection is made between a location and a victim, privacy laws apply. If data
includes addresses, even without adding names, the data will very easily be personal
data.
The extent to which the monitoring of victims’ profiles or other social media data
requires prior consent should be addressed.
Social media platforms used by public security actors should be designed to discourage
individuals to publicly develop their own theories and speculate about the possible guilt
of people they identify as possible suspects.
What does this mean for public security actors? Usual precautions in criminal
investigation apply. Additionally, legal guidelines of dealing with privacy issues and
consent should be developed. Organisational change and IT facilities may be required
for criminal investigation of online data.

H. Social media use for criminal investigation by citizens

Example: DIY policing activities distributing pictures of alleged offenders or missing
persons.

What do we know? The use of public social media data about victims or criminal
suspects raises various privacy concerns. There is an additional concern that
information may be unreliable.
Naming and shaming of criminals can be unethical and can become a form of defamation
or online harassment and, thus, result in an unlawful or criminal act itself.

22



Naming and shaming of criminals might add to formal punishments and therefore how
sentencing authorities should take it into account when deciding on the sentence of
those found to be guilty.
What does this mean for public security actors? These citizen practices are ethically and
legally ambivalent. Awareness about ethical and legal risks among citizens can be
created via awareness and information campaigns. These should specify the roles of
citizens and police.

I. Social media use for criminal investigation by criminals

Example: Online crime such as the use of social media for online scams and blackmailing.
What do we know? This type of social media practices entails activities of criminal
investigation involving social media practices by criminals.
Investigation of online crime requires a modern IT infrastructure and toolbox. This
often requires integration with existing LEA services, mobile computing, software and
real-time information. It also requires skills and integration of online investigation with
internal knowledge exchange and communication.
Criminal investigation of online practices requires a form of targeted or structural
surveillance and this requires additional legal safeguards.

What does this mean for public security actors? It is not always clear what online
activities are criminal and should be subject to criminal investigation. Furthermore,
criminal investigation should be done in according to legal safeguards. Modern tools and
training on using these tools are required.

J. Social media use for emergency services and crisis management by public security actors
Example: Social media communication and monitoring of social media information
during public security crises.
What do we know? This requires a modern IT infrastructure and expertise in (real time)
analysis of social media data. It requires the integration with existing LEA services,
mobile computing, software and real-time information. Therefore, LEAs update their IT
infrastructure and toolbox to enable social media usage.
Using social media to monitor crises and public events can be highly privacy invasive.
Safeguards, such as prior permission from legal authorities to monitor social media
(accounts) related to the specific event, are needed and there need to be clear
arrangements on who monitors what, who is responsible, etc.

In case of prediction of riots and protests, monitoring should be evidence-based and it is

unclear as yet how reliably hostility and violence can be predicted.

Events may be religious and/or political in which case they enjoy special protection by
human rights in a liberal society.

23



What does this mean for public security actors? Usual criteria about public events and
emergencies apply: what public events are permitted and how unannounced events and
could be monitored and prevented. Monitoring should be evidence-based and it is
unclear as yet how reliably hostility and violence can be predicted. Monitoring
furthermore requires a suitable IT infrastructure and guidelines on how to find and
interpret relevant data.

K. Social media use for emergency services and crisis management by citizens
Example: Citizens using social media to organize unauthorized gatherings which pose a
public security risk.
What do we know? This category includes social media activities by citizens which
influence emergency services and crisis management activities by public security actors.
For public security actors, a modern IT infrastructure and social media presence is
required to manage this and be responsive to citizens’ social media use during
emergencies and crisis.
There should be built in mechanisms preventing abuse of emergency reporting tools.
Furthermore, there is no legal clarity on when citizens can be held responsible for
creating risky public security situations via social media mobilization.

What does this mean for public security actors? Citizens’ use of social media during
emergency situations and crises can be helpful to but also challenging the activities of
public security actors. A way to institutionalize good practices is to develop emergency
reporting tools and instructions of using these. Social media monitoring and informing
citizens via social media during crises can be an important crisis management activities.
This requires proper tools and legal safeguards.

L. Social media use for emergency services and crisis management by criminals
Example: Botnets distribute false information or create a trend with misinformation
with the aim of diverting attention of law enforcement for the coverage of unlawful
activities.

What do we know? Criminals can use social media to create public security crises or to
prevent public security actors from adequately handling these crises. In order to
respond to these activities, public security actors need to deal with several
organisational and ethical or legal issues.
Tracing and eliminating bots requires modern ITs and skills and expertise.

Ethical issues around freedom of expression and association raise questions about what
kinds of public events should and should not be approved in the first place.

When online surveillance and investigation (D) includes accessing computers at a

distance, specific legal requirements apply.

24



What does this mean for public security actors? Addressing unlawful activities on social
media that are causing or taking place during emergency services or crises firstly
requires modern tools and training on how to use them. Furthermore, it requires ethical
and legal safeguards to prevent unlawful accessing of computers at a distance and risks
of monitoring and investigative activities becoming structural.

25



5. Integration of descriptive framework and decision tree in

MEDI@4SEC workshops

This chapter links specific types of social media practices as defined in our descriptive
framework to the six themes of the MEDI@4SEC workshops. All categories of our
framework belong to one or multiple of the workshop themes, indicating that the
MEDI@4SEC workshops cover a large variation of social media practices for public
security.
For each of the six workshop themes, the three predominant organisational, ethical
and/or legal criteria for social media appropriation are listed. These should be
discussed during the workshops to enable practitioners in the field of public security to
evaluate the appropriateness of various social media practices and to offer decision-
support (aims 2 and 3 of this deliverable).

5.1 DIY Policing

DIY policing involves citizens employing social media for criminal investigation, crime
prevention or ensuring public security independent of police. Citizens are taking
initiative or taking over police tasks.
This workshop theme mainly relates to social media practices E and H: social media
practices by citizens concerning intelligence and surveillance and criminal investigation.
Citizens are taking the initiative to prevent, monitor or solve crime.
Most relevant organisational, ethical and legal criteria are therefore:

• Ensuring professional and democratic safeguards. There is a risk of people

taking the law in their own hands;
• An ethical and possibly legal risk exists of stigmatizing individuals and groups as
criminal and discriminating them;
• Various privacy concerns when citizens are using public social media data about
victims or criminal suspects.

5.2 Riots and mass gatherings

The role of social media (data) during riots and mass gatherings entails ensuring public
security by monitoring, signaling and communicating with the public.
This workshop theme relates to social media practices J, K and L: Social media practices
for emergency services and crisis management by public security actors, citizens and
criminals.
Most relevant organisational, ethical and legal criteria for social media practices related
to this theme are:
• A modern IT infrastructure and social media expertise of public security to
manage crises and be responsive to emergencies. Monitoring should be
evidence-based and it is unclear as yet how reliably hostility and violence can be
predicted;

26



• Using social media to monitor crises and public events can be highly privacy
invasive. Safeguards, such as a prior permission from legal authorities to
monitor social media (accounts) related to the specific event, are needed and
there need to be clear arrangements on who monitors what, who is responsible,
etc. ;
• Ethical issues around freedom of expression and association raise questions
about what kind of events should be approved according to human rights in a
liberal society.

5.3 Everyday security

Everyday security concerns the everyday policing of public security, including

cooperation with citizens via social media ‘community policing’ and social media/big
data intelligence.
This concerns different forms of social media use for communication and public
engagement (A & B). Also surveillance & intelligence (D & E) activities can contribute to
everyday security. This project theme involves social media practices by both public
security actors and citizens.
Most prominent organisational, ethical and legal criteria are as follows:
• Ethical issues and privacy concerns when information on or images of individual
citizens or offenders is shared in public social media platforms. There are risks
of visiting criminal suspicion on innocent people or stigmatizing them as
criminal;
• Online surveillance has the risk of becoming structural, which is subject to
additional legal requirements;
• There may be a lack of professional and democratic safeguards and a risk of
people taking the law in their own hands.

5.4 The dark web

The dark web theme involves organized (international) crime with an online component
that influences public security and counters policing activities.
This concerns online criminal activities (F, I), including communication activities (C, for
example, recruitment for criminal or terrorist activities).
Specific organisational, ethical and legal criteria in dealing with the dark web, are:

• Investigation of online crime requires a modern IT infrastructure and toolbox.
This often requires integration with existing LEA services, mobile computing,
software and real-time information. It also requires skills and integration of
online investigation with internal knowledge exchange and communication;
• Criminal investigation of online practices requires a form of targeted or
structural surveillance and this requires additional legal safeguards. Collateral
intrusion (i.e. intrusion into the privacy of individuals not suspected of any
crimes) should be prevented;

27



• Recruitment for criminal or terrorist activities (grooming) is unethical and often

punishable. However, Attempts to define, detect and prosecute grooming run the
risk of over criminalization and limiting freedom of expression.

5.5 Trolling

Trolling includes all kinds of online bullying (cyber bullying), of which some activities
are criminal offences and some are not.
As these activities can be criminal or not, they relate to citizens’ or criminals’ social
media practices. They concern communicative activities (B & C) but sometimes can be
characterized as online crime (F).
The main organisational, ethical and legal criteria for dealing with trolling are:
• IT resources, online presence and skills are required to monitor and possibly act
on trolling;
• Protecting freedom of expression while being sensitive to punishable activities
such as abusive content or harassment;
• Collateral intrusion (i.e. intrusion into the privacy of individuals not suspected of
any crimes) should be taken into account.
5.6 Innovative market solutions

Innovative market solutions are new commercial products for including social media in
the work or public security actors. These can for example be apps for smartphones or
social media monitoring tools.

Innovative market solutions may relate to various social media practices and are
particularly relevant for public security actors and citizens aiming to enhance public
security. They may concern practices related to communication and public engagement
(A & B), surveillance and intelligence (D & E) criminal investigation (G & H) and
emergency services and crisis management (J & K).
The main organisational, ethical and legal criteria in using these products are:

• Tools also require skills and expertise in using them and interpreting the data.
Public security actors can professionally develop this. This cannot be expected
from citizens using these tools;
• Evaluation of how big data analysis/intelligence tools safeguard data protection
and privacy issues, especially when data can be linked to individuals;
• Public security actors should be transparent and accountable about the use of
these tools.

28



6. Conclusions & Recommendations

Building upon knowledge from previous deliverables in WP1, this deliverable develops
a descriptive framework of social media practices in the domain of public security. This
framework can be used by public security actors to recognize specific practices and
distinguish them from others, but also to evaluate the appropriateness of social media
practices and make decisions on using them, based on organisational, ethical and legal
criteria. As such, this descriptive framework also functions as a decision-support tool.
Lastly, it forms input to the six policy and practice dialogue workshops in the
MEDI@4SEC project.

This framework of social media practices for public security combines three sources of
knowledge. Firstly, it combines the inventories of D1.1, D1.2 and D1.3 of various sources
of literature, current best practices and ethical and legal issues into a meta-view of
relevant findings. Secondly, the framework was informed by academic literature on the
uptake of social media in (government) organisations. Thirdly, a concept framework of
social media practices in the public security domain was subjected to ex ante evaluation
in cooperation with project partners involved in this deliverable. Each partner was
asked to evaluate the fit of the framework.
This final deliverable of WP1 resulted into a hands-on typology to be used both in the
research project to guide our exploration of issues and directly by public security actors
to guide their decision-making processes. It helps them to recognize certain social media
practices based on the main user and the related public security task. For each of the
twelve types of practices this framework results in, organisational, ethical and legal
criteria are specified that should be considered by public security actors when engaging
in or with these social media practices. Based on these criteria, they can distinguish
whether a social media practice can be incorporated in existing public security routines
or require new public security routines.
D1.2 points at a process of social media adoption going through different stages
(MEDI@4SEC 2016b). Typically, LEA’s start their social media efforts with practices of
informing citizens, which has become a quasi-standard. Additionally, LEAs widely
acknowledge the benefits of using social media for law enforcement, especially in crisis
situations. With regards to social media monitoring and criminal investigation the scope
and technological depths of adaptation varies. Other practices such as online patrol are
still in its infancy and require LEAs to establish a visible presence in online spaces. Some
social media practices in this framework are thus relatively well known and regularly
adopted by public security actors. In these cases, the relevant criteria are clear. Other
social media practices are relatively new and have not yet been implemented. In that
case, organisational, legal and ethical criteria are still subject to discussion.

This framework and the decision tree are to be further refined during the project
workshops (WP2). As social media, but also public security tasks and the social context
in which they take place continuously develop, this framework should be updated and
refined for specific contexts. As chapter 5 of this deliverable indicates, the framework of
social media practices can be linked to the six workshop themes. All categories of our

29



framework belong to one or multiple of the workshop themes, indicating that the
MEDI@4SEC workshops cover a large variation of social media practices for public
security.

30



7. Bibliography

Hutchby, I. (2001). Technologies, texts and affordances. Sociology, 35(2), 441-456.

Kaplan, A. M., & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the world, unite! The challenges and
opportunities of Social Media. Business Horizons, 53(1), 59-68.

MEDI@4SEC (2016a). D1.1 Report on State-of-the-art Review.

MEDI@4SEC (2016b). D1.2 Worldwide Mapping of Best Practices and Lessons Learnt.

MEDI@4SEC (2016c). D1.3 Ethics and Legal Issues Inventory: Positive and Negative
Societal Impacts of the Adoption of Social Media across the Public Security Community.
Meijer, A., & Thaens, M. (2010). Alignment 2.0: Strategic use of new internet
technologies in government. Government Information Quarterly, 27(2), 113-121.
Orlikowski, W. J. (2000). Using technology and constituting structures: A practice lens
for studying technology in organisations. Organisation science, 11(4), 404-428.
Van Dijck, J. (2013). The culture of connectivity: A critical history of social media. Oxford
University Press.
Wilson, S. M., & Peterson, L. C. (2002). The anthropology of online communities. Annual
review of anthropology, 449-467.

31