Republic of the Philippines (3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion

(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for
SUPREME COURT reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).
Manila
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al., v. Hon. National
FIRST DIVISION Labor Relations Commission, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-
555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799 and
G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994 L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of
the Philippines instead of the ten-year prescriptive period under the Civil Code of the
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, et al, petitioners,
Philippines; and (ii) denied the
vs.
"three-hour daily average" formula in the computation of petitioners' overtime pay; and
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, et
al, respondents. (2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for
reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).
G.R. Nos. 104911-14 December 5, 1994
The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International Builders Corporation, et. al.,
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners,
v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al." was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
vs.
of Court:
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS (1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-
CORPORATION, respondents. 555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and
L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims of 149 claimants; and
G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as it denied the motions for
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and BROWN & ROOT
reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-230).
INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners,
vs. The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified the decision of POEA in
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary benefits only to 149 claimants and (2) directed Labor
Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive evidence on the claims dismissed by
Gerardo A. Del Mundo and Associates for petitioners.
the POEA for lack of substantial evidence or proof of employment.
Romulo, Mabanta, Sayoc, Buenaventura, De los Angeles Law Offices for BRII/AIBC.
Consolidation of Cases
Florante M. De Castro for private respondents in 105029-32.
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the Third Division while G.R. Nos.
104911-14 were raffled to the Second Division. In the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the
Second Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-
QUIASON, J.: 14, Rollo, p. 895).
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al. v. Philippine Overseas In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division granted the motion filed in G.R.
Employment Administration's Administrator, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Nos. 104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32,
Rules of Court: which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R.
Nos. 105029-30, Rollo, pp. 369-377, 426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the
(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the National Labor Relations First Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14 with G.R. No. 104776
Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos. (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 1109; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).
L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460; (2) to render a new decision: (i)
declaring private respondents as in default; (ii) declaring the said labor cases as a class suit; (iii) I
ordering Asia International Builders Corporation (AIBC) and Brown and Root International Inc.
(BRII) to pay the claims of the 1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty. Florante On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in
M. de Castro guilty of forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case No. L-86-05-460; and their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class
suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and
employment by BRII (POEA Case No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented by Atty.
Gerardo del Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in
construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit,
mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign
principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the
employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the
interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area
wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the
SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited
practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 13-14).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the complaint and was given,
together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its answer.
On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and BRII, ordered the claimants
to file a bill of particulars within ten days from receipt of the order and the movants to file their
answers within ten days from receipt of the bill of particulars. The POEA Administrator also
scheduled a pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984.
On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 23,
1984, AIBC filed a "Motion to Strike Out of the Records", the "Complaint" and the
"Compliance and Manifestation." On July 25, 1984, the claimants filed their "Rejoinder and
Comments," averring, among other matters, the failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers
and to attend the pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged that AIBC and
BRII had waived their right to present evidence and had defaulted by failing to file their answers
and to attend the pre-trial conference.
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion to Strike Out of the Records"
filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out
in the order.
On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply with the Order of
October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA Administrator
direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers, after which the case should be
deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another
complaint for the same money claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of whom
were also claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).
On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the Order dated October 2, 1984
and an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA direct the parties to submit
simultaneously their position papers after which the case would be deemed submitted for
decision. On the same day, AIBC asked for time to file its comment on the "Compliance" and
"Urgent Manifestation" of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a second motion for
extension of time to file the comment.
On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that its motion for extension of
time was granted.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and
asked that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their answers.
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying, among other reliefs, that
claimants should be ordered to amend their complaint.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to
file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the reversal of the said order
of the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and
praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in default.
On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended Complaint and/or Position Paper"
dated March 24, 1985, adding new demands: namely, the payment of overtime pay, extra night
work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay, retirement and savings benefits
and their share of forfeitures (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA
Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the amended complaint (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, p. 20).
On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary Judgment." On the same
day, the POEA issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers to the "Amended
Complaint," otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present evidence
and the case would be resolved on the basis of complainant's evidence.
On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as Improper Class Suit and
Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated March 24, 1985." Claimants
opposed the motions.
On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his directive to AIBC and BRII to
file their answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC, together with a petition for
the issuance of a writ of injunction. On September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA
Administrator from hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for the filing of the
answers of AIBC and BRII.
On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to include additional
claimants in the case and to investigate alleged wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their respective
lawyers.
On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a complaint (POEA Case No. L-
85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII with the POEA, demanding monetary claims similar to
those subject of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same month, Solomon Reyes also filed his
own complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-779) against AIBC and BRII.
On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates asked for the
substitution of the original counsel of record and the cancellation of the special powers of
attorney given the original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the claim to enforce
attorney's lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-
460) in behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-
06-555.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on February 27, 1985 and
September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA Administrator, it is not amiss to
mention that two cases were filed in the Supreme Court by the claimants, namely — G.R. No.
72132 on September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May
13, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the
POEA Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions and oppositions filed in POEA
Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460 and to decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch.
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489), questioning the Order dated
September 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer
the amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November 9,
1987, we dismissed the petition by informing AIBC that all its technical objections may
properly be resolved in the hearings before the POEA.
Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on September 22, 1988
by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants against the POEA Administrator and several
NLRC Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
The second was filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R.
Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor and social legislations. The third was
filed by Jose R. Santos, Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and
BRII of violations of labor laws.
On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution dated
December 12, 1986.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its motion for suspension
of the period for filing an answer or motion for extension of time to file the same until the
resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC dismissing the two
appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRC en banc denied the motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same
hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their
respective position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants filed their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out
Answer," alleging that the answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their
"Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with the POEA Order of June 19,
1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988,
claimants filed their "Ex-Parte Motion to Expunge from the Records" the position paper of
AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.
On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro filed their memorandum in
POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their
Supplemental Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its "Reply to Complainant's
Memorandum." On October 26, 1988, claimants submitted their "Ex-Parte Manifestational
Motion and Counter-Supplemental Motion," together with 446 individual contracts of
employments and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a "Consolidated
Reply."
On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision in POEA Case No. L-84-
06-555 and the other consolidated cases, which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in favor of
only 324 complainants.
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal"
from the decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of Appeal" filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by another
counsel for AIBC.
On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal," praying for the dismissal of the
appeal of AIBC and BRII.
On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to Complainants' Appeal Memorandum,"
together with their "newly discovered evidence" consisting of payroll records.
On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their "Manifestation," stating among
other matters that there were only 728 named claimants. On April 20, 1989, the claimants filed
their "Counter-Manifestation," alleging that there were 1,767 of them.
On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for Execution" of the Decision dated
January 30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII had failed to appeal on time and AIBC had not
posted the supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44.
On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve the labor cases.
On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their "Manifestational Motion," praying that all the 1,767
claimants be awarded their monetary claims for failure of private respondents to file their
answers within the reglamentary period required by law.
On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the POEA in these consolidated cases is
modified to the extent and in accordance with the following dispositions:
1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified and listed in Annex "A" hereof are dismissed for
having prescribed;
2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the
149 complainants, identified and listed in Annex "B" hereof, the peso equivalent, at the time of
payment, of the total amount in US dollars indicated opposite their respective names;
3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19 complainants classified and listed in Annex "C"
hereof, who appear to have worked elsewhere than in Bahrain are hereby set aside.
4. All claims other than those indicated in Annex "B", including those for overtime work and
favorably granted by the POEA, are hereby dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in support
thereof or are beyond the competence of this Commission to pass upon.
In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and authority under Article 218(c) of
the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, hereby directs Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco of
this Commission to summon parties, conduct hearings and receive evidence, as expeditiously as
possible, and thereafter submit a written report to this Commission (First Division) of the
proceedings taken, regarding the claims of the following:
(a) complainants identified and listed in Annex "D" attached and made an integral part of this
Resolution, whose claims were dismissed by the POEA for lack of proof of employment in
Bahrain (these complainants numbering 683, are listed in pages 13 to 23 of the decision of
POEA, subject of the appeals) and,
(b) complainants identified and listed in Annex "E" attached and made an integral part of this
Resolution, whose awards decreed by the POEA, to Our mind, are not supported by substantial
evidence" (G.R. No. 104776; Rollo, pp. 113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 85-87; G.R. Nos.
105029-31, pp. 120-122).
On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12
co-claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-44). The petition was dismissed in a resolution dated
January 27, 1992.
Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991 Resolution of the NLRC were filed.
The first, by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo; the second, by the claimants
represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII.
In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the motions for reconsideration.
Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No.
104776), the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro (G.R. Nos. 104911-14) and by AIBC and
BRII (G.R. Nos. 105029-32).
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and AIBC and BRII have
submitted, from time to time, compromise agreements for our approval and jointly moved for
the dismissal of their respective petitions insofar as the claimants-parties to the compromise
agreements were concerned (See Annex A for list of claimants who signed quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a compromise agreement and
the corresponding motions for the approval of the agreements were filed by the parties and
approved by the Court:
1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio Abarquez and 47 co-claimants
dated September 2, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R. Nos. 105029-
32, Rollo, pp.
470-615);
2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Bienvenido Cadalin and 82 co-
petitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 364-507);
3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose
M. Aban and 36 co-claimants dated September 17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 613-
722; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 518-626; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 407-516);
4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio T. Anglo and 17 co-claimants
dated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 530-590);
5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio Bobongo and 6 co-claimants
dated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp.
629-652);
6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio A. Evangelista and 4 co-
claimants dated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants Palconeri Banaag and 5 co-claimants
dated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,
pp. 655-675);
8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Benjamin Ambrosio and 15 other co-
claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1773-1814);
9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio Evangelista and 3 co-claimants dated May
10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Quiterio R. Agudo and 36 co-claimants
dated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,
pp. 748-864; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1066-1183);
11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo J. Alonzo and 19 co-claimants
dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1173-1235; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.
1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 896-959);
12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo C. Dayrit and 2 co-claimants
dated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 972-984);
13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante C. Aceres and 37 co-claimants
dated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1257-1375; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,
pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1280-1397);
14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V. Abella and 27 co-claimants dated
January 10, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, Vol. II);
15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B. Solano and six co-claimants dated
August 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14).
III
The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:
We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than fifty volumes now comprising the
records of these cases. From the records, it appears that the complainants-appellants allege that
they were recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown &
Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at various projects
undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia,
Libya, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and
Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the Philippine Government,
all the individual complainants signed standard overseas employment contracts (Records, Vols.
25-32. Hereafter, reference to the records would be sparingly made, considering their chaotic
arrangement) with AIBC before their departure from the Philippines. These overseas
employment contracts invariably contained the following relevant terms and conditions.
PART B —
(1) Employment Position Classification :—————————
(Code) :—————————
(2) Company Employment Status :—————————
(3) Date of Employment to Commence on :—————————
(4) Basic Working Hours Per Week :—————————
(5) Basic Working Hours Per Month :—————————
(6) Basic Hourly Rate :—————————
(7) Overtime Rate Per Hour :—————————
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C(1) of this [sic]) :—————————
Months and/or
Job Completion
xxx xxx xxx
3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as set out in Part B of this
Document.
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and Employer may, at his sole
option, change or adjust such hours as maybe deemed necessary from time to time.
4. TERMINATION
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement, the Employer may, at his
sole discretion, terminate employee's service with cause, under this agreement at any time. If the
Employer terminates the services of the Employee under this Agreement because of the
completion or termination, or suspension of the work on which the Employee's services were
being utilized, or because of a reduction in force due to a decrease in scope of such work, or by
change in the type of construction of such work. The Employer will be responsible for his return
transportation to his country of origin. Normally on the most expeditious air route, economy
class accommodation.
xxx xxx xxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory completion of contract, employee
shall be entitled to 12-days vacation leave with pay. This shall be computed at the basic wage
rate. Fractions of a year's service will be computed on a pro-rata basis.
b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the employee for every year of service for non-work
connected injuries or illness. If the employee failed to avail of such leave benefits, the same
shall be forfeited at the end of the year in which said sick leave is granted.
11. BONUS
A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be accrued and payable only upon
satisfactory completion of this contract.
12. OFFDAY PAY
The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day of rest with 8 hours regular pay. If work
is performed on this day, all hours work shall be paid at the premium rate. However, this offday
pay provision is applicable only when the laws of the Host Country require payments for rest
day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were deployed, His Majesty
Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976,
otherwise known as the Labour Law for the Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This decree took
effect on August 16, 1976. Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to
the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows (italics supplied only for emphasis):
Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage
entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-five per centum thereof for hours worked during
the day; and by a minimum of fifty per centum thereof for hours worked during the night which
shall be deemed to being from seven o'clock in the evening until seven o'clock in the morning. .
..
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
. . . an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on his weekly day of rest if
circumstances so require and in respect of which an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his
normal wage shall be paid to him. . . .
Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he
shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year's continuous service with his employer shall
be entitled to leave on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a
period not less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of
his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated
by either party thereto after giving the other party thirty days' prior notice before such
termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days' notice in respect of
other workers. The party terminating a contract without giving the required notice shall pay to
the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the
period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of
employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on the basis of
fifteen days' wages for each year of the first three years of service and of one month's wages for
each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity
upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed within a year.
All the individual complainants-appellants have already been repatriated to the Philippines at
the time of the filing of these cases (R.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 59-65).
IV
The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
First: — Whether or not complainants are entitled to the benefits provided by Amiri Decree No.
23 of Bahrain;
(a) Whether or not the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-
mentioned benefits.
(b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly prescribing a more favorable treatment
of alien employees) bars complainants from enjoying its benefits.
Second: — Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain is applicable in these cases, whether
or not complainants' claim for the benefits provided therein have prescribed.
Third: — Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class suit.
Fourth: — Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision that
is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due process;
(a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was denied its right to due process;
(b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by the POEA after these cases were submitted for
decision was valid;
(c) Whether or not the POEA acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root International, Inc.;
(d) Whether or not the judgment awards are supported by substantial evidence;
(e) Whether or not the awards based on the averages and formula presented by the
complainants-appellants are supported by substantial evidence;
(f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond what the complainants-appellants prayed
for; and, if so, whether or not these awards are valid.
Fifth: — Whether or not the POEA erred in holding respondents AIBC and Brown & Root
jointly are severally liable for the judgment awards despite the alleged finding that the former
was the employer of the complainants;
(a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root;
(b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC was a licensed construction contractor
precludes a finding that Brown & Root is liable for complainants claims.
Sixth: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator's failure to hold respondents in default
constitutes a reversible error.
Seventh: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in dismissing the following claims:
a. Unexpired portion of contract;
b. Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund;
c. Retirement and Savings Plan benefits;
d. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
e. Area Differential Pay;
f. Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits;
g. Salary differential pay;
h. Wage differential pay;
i. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS;
j. Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR;
k. Fringe benefits under B & R's "A Summary of Employee Benefits" (Annex "Q" of Amended
Complaint);
l. Moral and exemplary damages;
m. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of the judgment award;
n. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and the
accreditation of B & R issued by POEA;
o. Penalty for violations of Article 34 (prohibited practices), not excluding reportorial
requirements thereof.
Eighth: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in not dismissing POEA Case No. (L)
86-65-460 on the ground of multiplicity of suits (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51-
55).
Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple
copy of the Bahrain's Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector). NLRC
invoked Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample
discretion to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case without
regard to the technicalities of law or procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator
that the Amiri Decree No. 23, being more favorable and beneficial to the workers, should form
part of the overseas employment contract of the complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the claimants, who worked
in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA Administrator in favor of the claimants, who
worked elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the
complainants was three years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year
as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the labor cases cannot be
treated as a class suit for the simple reason that not all the complainants worked in Bahrain and
therefore, the subject matter of the action, the claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not of
common or general interest to all the complainants.
On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative
due process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA Administrator to consider the evidence
presented by AIBC and BRII; (2) some findings of fact were not supported by substantial
evidence; and (3) some of the evidence upon which the decision was based were not disclosed
to AIBC and BRII during the hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA Administrator that BRII and AIBC
are solidarily liable for the claims of the complainants and held that BRII was the actual
employer of the complainants, or at the very least, the indirect employer, with AIBC as the labor
contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA Administrator through
the summons served on AIBC, its local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was correct in denying the Motion
to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based on the Amiri Decree No.
23, NLRC ruled:
(1) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the claims for refund of the SSS
premiums and refund of withholding taxes and the claimants should file their claims for said
refund with the appropriate government agencies;
(2) the claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the claims which are not based on
the overseas employment contracts nor the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;
(3) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over claims for moral and exemplary
damages and nonetheless, the basis for granting said damages was not established;
(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract may be
allowed if filed within the three-year prescriptive period;
(5) that the allegation that complainants were prematurely repatriated prior to the expiration of
their overseas contract was not established; and
(6) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the complaint for the suspension or
cancellation of the AIBC's recruitment license and the cancellation of the accreditation of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 should
have been dismissed on the ground that the claimants in said case were also claimants in POEA
Case No. (L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460, the POEA just
resolved the corresponding claims in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other words, the POEA
did not pass upon the same claims twice.
V
G.R. No. 104776
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to a speedy disposition of
their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The POEA
Administrator allowed private respondents to file their answers in two years (on June 19, 1987)
after the filing of the original complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its
own rules, affirmed the action of the POEA Administrator;
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default
and should have rendered summary judgment on the basis of the pleadings and evidence
submitted by claimants;
(3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding that the labor cases filed by AIBC
and BRII cannot be considered a class suit;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten years; and
(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have dismissed POEA Case No. L-86-05-
460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de Castro (Rollo, pp. 31-40).
AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776, argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the delay in the disposition of the labor cases, considering
the great difficulty of getting all the records of the more than 1,500 claimants, the piece-meal
filing of the complaints and the addition of hundreds of new claimants by petitioners;
(2) that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it was impossible to prepare the
answers within the ten-day period provided in the NLRC Rules, that when the motion to declare
AIBC in default was filed on July 19, 1987, said party had already filed its answer, and that
considering the staggering amount of the claims (more than US$50,000,000.00) and the
complicated issues raised by the parties, the ten-day rule to answer was not fair and reasonable;
(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's finding that
there was no common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy — which was
the applicability of the Amiri Decree No. 23. Likewise, the nature of the claims varied, some
being based on salaries pertaining to the unexpired portion of the contracts while others being
for pure money claims. Each claimant demanded separate claims peculiar only to himself and
depending upon the particular circumstances obtaining in his case;
(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that prescribed by Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines (three years) and not the one prescribed by Article 1144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (ten years); and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA Case No. L-86-05-460 should
be dismissed, this being a private quarrel between the two labor lawyers (Rollo, pp. 292-305).
Attorney's Lien
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike out the joint
manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII dated September 2 and 11, 1992, claiming that
all the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements subject of said manifestations
and motions were his clients and that Atty. Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent them
in said agreements. He also claimed that the claimants were paid less than the award given them
by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro collected additional attorney's fees on top of the 25% which he
was entitled to receive; and that the consent of the claimants to the compromise agreements and
quitclaims were procured by fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution
dated November 23, 1992, the Court denied the motion to strike out the Joint Manifestations
and Motions dated September 2 and 11, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609).
On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's
Lien," alleging that the claimants who entered into compromise agreements with AIBC and
BRII with the assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement with his law
firm (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535).
Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del Mundo to cite Atty. De Castro
and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and for violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly misled this Court, by making it
appear that the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements were represented by
Atty. De Castro, when in fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges against Atty. De Castro for
unethical practices and moved for the voiding of the quitclaims submitted by some of the
claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for certiorari on the grounds that
NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) applied the three-year prescriptive period under
the Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied the claimant's formula based on an average
overtime pay of three hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself during the negotiation for an
amicable settlement of their money claims in Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum dated April
16, 1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R. No. 104776 that the
prescriptive period in the Labor Code of the Philippines, a special law, prevails over that
provided in the Civil Code of the Philippines, a general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the method of computing the
overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that they were not bound by what appeared therein,
because such memorandum was proposed by a subordinate Bahrain official and there was no
showing that it was approved by the Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the
averaging method was discussed in the course of the negotiation for the amicable settlement of
the dispute and any offer made by a party therein could not be used as an admission by him
(Rollo, pp. 228-236).
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when
it: (1) enforced the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and not the terms of the
employment contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime and leave indemnity pay and
other benefits, on evidence admitted in contravention of petitioner's constitutional right to due
process; and (3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for the 683 claimants
whose claims had been dismissed for lack of proof by the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself.
Lastly, they allege that assuming that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable, NLRC
erred when it did not apply the one-year prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
VI
G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. 105029-32
All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although they disagreed as to the time
that should be embraced within the prescriptive period.
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years, applying Article 1144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. NLRC believed otherwise, fixing the prescriptive period at three
years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14, invoking different grounds,
insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive period applicable to the claims was three
years, instead of ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive period was one year as
prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred to the ruling of NLRC that
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code) refer to those arising from the
employer's violation of the employee's right as provided by the Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the rights of the workers as provided
by the Labor Code, but the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which ipso
facto amended the worker's contracts of employment. Respondents consciously failed to
conform to these provisions which specifically provide for the increase of the worker's rate. It
was only after June 30, 1983, four months after the brown builders brought a suit against B & R
in Bahrain for this same claim, when respondent AIBC's contracts have undergone amendments
in Bahrain for the new hires/renewals (Respondent's Exhibit 7).
Hence, premises considered, the applicable law of prescription to this instant case is Article
1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions may be brought within ten years from the time the cause of
action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
Thus, herein money claims of the complainants against the respondents shall prescribe in ten
years from August 16, 1976. Inasmuch as all claims were filed within the ten-year prescriptive
period, no claim suffered the infirmity of being prescribed (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, 89-90).
In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the prescriptive period is three years as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the NLRC argued as follows:
The Labor Code provides that "all money claims arising from employer-employee relations . . .
shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall
be forever barred" (Art. 291, Labor Code, as amended). This three-year prescriptive period shall
be the one applied here and which should be reckoned from the date of repatriation of each
individual complainant, considering the fact that the case is having (sic) filed in this country.
We do not agree with the POEA Administrator that this three-year prescriptive period applies
only to money claims specifically recoverable under the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291
gives no such indication. Likewise, We can not consider complainants' cause/s of action to have
accrued from a violation of their employment contracts. There was no violation; the claims arise
from the benefits of the law of the country where they worked. (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
90-91).
Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as provided by the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976, NLRC opined that the applicability of said law was one of characterization, i.e.,
whether to characterize the foreign law on prescription or statute of limitation as "substantive"
or "procedural." NLRC cited the decision in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F.
2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955], where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a
case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims
would have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of
New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as
it was not "specifically intended to be substantive," hence, the prescriptive period provided in
the law of the forum should apply. The Court observed:
. . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is
not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well
as within the foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains,
we think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose this test is the most
satisfactory one. It does not lead American courts into the necessity of examining into the
unfamiliar peculiarities and refinements of different foreign legal systems. . .
The court further noted:
xxx xxx xxx
Applying that test here it appears to us that the libelant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents
have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically
aimed against the particular rights which the libelant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code
is a statute having broad objectives, viz: "The present Code regulates the relations between
capital and labor, placing them on a basis of social justice, so that, without injuring any of the
parties, there may be guaranteed for labor the necessary conditions for a normal life and to
capital an equitable return to its investment." In pursuance of these objectives the Code gives
laborers various rights against their employers. Article 623 establishes the period of limitation
for all such rights, except certain ones which are enumerated in Article 621. And there is
nothing in the record to indicate that the Panamanian legislature gave special consideration to
the impact of Article 623 upon the particular rights sought to be enforced here, as distinguished
from the other rights to which that Article is also applicable. Were we confronted with the
question of whether the limitation period of Article 621 (which carves out particular rights to be
governed by a shorter limitation period) is to be regarded as "substantive" or "procedural" under
the rule of "specifity" we might have a different case; but here on the surface of things we
appear to be dealing with a "broad," and not a "specific," statute of limitations (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp.
92-94).
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, which was applied by NLRC, refers only to claims "arising from the employer's
violation of the employee's right as provided by the Labor Code." They assert that their claims
are based on the violation of their employment contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976 and therefore the claims may be brought within ten years as provided by Article
1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244
(1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing law," which is
Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such kind of law exists, it takes
precedence over the common-law conflicts rule (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing
law.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one
year from the date of the expiry of the contract. (G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters,
such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are
governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International
Law, 131 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be
viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied the statute
of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no
showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being
considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum
on prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes
irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical
effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign
statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183
[1975]). While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though
the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]).
Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is
also barred in the Philippines Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270
of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to which were
inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is
inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras,
Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio
vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public
policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713
[1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law, the next
question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is three years, as
provided by the Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides:
Money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx
The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA
244 (1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at
bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the correct computation of overtime pay as
provided in the collective bargaining agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not make any reference as to the
computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494)
and instead insisted that work computation provided in the collective bargaining agreements
between the parties be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on
the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art.
1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by R.A. No. 19933)
provides:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be commenced within three years
after the cause of action accrued otherwise such action shall be forever barred, . . . .
The court further explained:
The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended)
will apply, if the claim for differentials for overtime work is solely based on said law, and not
on a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract. In the instant case, the claim for
overtime compensation is not so much because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended but
because the claim is demandable right of the employees, by reason of the above-mentioned
collective bargaining agreement.
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period for filing "actions to
enforce any cause of action under said law." On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing "money claims arising from
employer-employee relations." The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the employer-
employee relations, which is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from
the collective bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive period under Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable
under said Code, does not find support in the plain language of the provision. Neither is the
contention of the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims
"arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right," as provided by the Labor Code
supported by the facial reading of the provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776
A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776, claimants aver: (1) that while
their complaints were filed on June 6, 1984 with POEA, the case was decided only on January
30, 1989, a clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2) that NLRC and
the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp.
31-35).
Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all
officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy disposition of
cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded to the
accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution
prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into consideration in determining whether or
not the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" has been violated, thus:
In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain
factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for
the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The
same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person
officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the speedy disposition of cases.
Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991), we held:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,
or when without cause or justified motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served with a copy of the amended
complaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to
file their answers within the ten-day period provided in Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of the
Rules and Regulations of the POEA. At that time, there was a pending motion of AIBC and
BRII to strike out of the records the amended complaint and the "Compliance" of claimants to
the order of the POEA, requiring them to submit a bill of particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their final disposition in the
administrative level after seven years from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy
disposition of the cases of complainants.
The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767 claimants. Said
complaint had undergone several amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985.
The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were deployed in different
areas, one group in and the other groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling
more than US$65 million according to Atty. Del Mundo, included:
1. Unexpired portion of contract;
2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;
3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;
4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
5. Area Differential pay;
6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;
7. Salary differential pay;
8. Wage Differential pay;
9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to Social Security System;
10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to Bureau of Internal Revenue (B.I.R.);
11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root's "A Summary of Employees Benefits consisting of 43
pages (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
12. Moral and Exemplary Damages;
13. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of amounts;
14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and issued by
the POEA; and
15. Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited practices) not excluding reportorial
requirements thereof (NLRC Resolution, September 2, 1991, pp. 18-19; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).
Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness and clarity of some facts,
the claimants were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars. When
claimants filed their "Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike out the complaint
from the records for failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the POEA
Administrator denied the motion to strike out the complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct
the deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the complaint, the records of
employment of the more than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved from various countries in the
Middle East. Some of the records dated as far back as 1975.
The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA Administrator were interrupted
several times by the various appeals, first to NLRC and then to the Supreme Court.
Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases were filed against AIBC and
BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases Nos.
L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was filed on May 29, 1986 (POEA Case No.
L-86-05-460). NLRC, in exasperation, noted that the exact number of claimants had never been
completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991, G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three
new cases were consolidated with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in terminating the proceedings, thus:
These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route towards resolution had the
parties and their counsel been more interested in pursuing the truth and the merits of the claims
rather than exhibiting a fanatical reliance on technicalities. Parties and counsel have made these
cases a litigation of emotion. The intransigence of parties and counsel is remarkable. As late as
last month, this Commission made a last and final attempt to bring the counsel of all the parties
(this Commission issued a special order directing respondent Brown & Root's resident agent/s to
appear) to come to a more conciliatory stance. Even this failed (Rollo,
p. 58).
The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay in the disposition of the
cases, to the lament of NLRC, which complained:
It is very evident from the records that the protagonists in these consolidated cases appear to be
not only the individual complainants, on the one hand, and AIBC and Brown & Root, on the
other hand. The two lawyers for the complainants, Atty. Gerardo Del Mundo and Atty. Florante
De Castro, have yet to settle the right of representation, each one persistently claiming to appear
in behalf of most of the complainants. As a result, there are two appeals by the complainants.
Attempts by this Commission to resolve counsels' conflicting claims of their respective
authority to represent the complainants prove futile. The bickerings by these two counsels are
reflected in their pleadings. In the charges and countercharges of falsification of documents and
signatures, and in the disbarment proceedings by one against the other. All these have, to a large
extent, abetted in confounding the issues raised in these cases, jumble the presentation of
evidence, and even derailed the prospects of an amicable settlement. It would not be far-fetched
to imagine that both counsel, unwittingly, perhaps, painted a rainbow for the complainants, with
the proverbial pot of gold at its end containing more than US$100 million, the aggregate of the
claims in these cases. It is, likewise, not improbable that their misplaced zeal and exuberance
caused them to throw all caution to the wind in the matter of elementary rules of procedure and
evidence (Rollo, pp. 58-59).
Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the listing of some of the
complainants in both petitions filed by the two lawyers. As noted by NLRC, "the problem
created by this situation is that if one of the two petitions is dismissed, then the parties and the
public respondents would not know which claim of which petitioner was dismissed and which
was not."
B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be consolidated in a "class suit" because
"all the named complainants have similar money claims and similar rights sought irrespective of
whether they worked in Bahrain, United Arab Emirates or in Abu Dhabi, Libya or in any part of
the Middle East" (Rollo, pp. 35-38).
A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).
While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain Law, many of the claimants
worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia under
different terms and conditions of employment.
NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that inasmuch as the first
requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree
of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be
entitled to file their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same
(for employee's benefits), there is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are
based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but
were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in
the claims of the other employees of defendants. The named claimants have a special or
particular interest in specific benefits completely different from the benefits in which the other
named claimants and those included as members of a "class" are claiming (Berses v. Villanueva,
25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears that each claimant is only interested in collecting his own
claims. A claimants has no concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown
by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into
separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. A principle basic to the concept of
"class suit" is that plaintiffs brought on the record must fairly represent and protect the interests
of the others (Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter,
the claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial
proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them under the Rules of Court is to be allowed to
join as plaintiffs in one complaint (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the exceptions to the
condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all indispensable parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if the decision secured is
favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the decision is adverse to them, in which
case the others who were impleaded by their self-appointed representatives, would surely claim
denial of due process.
C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA Administrator and NLRC
should have declared Atty. Florante De Castro guilty of "forum shopping, ambulance chasing
activities, falsification, duplicity and other unprofessional activities" and his appearances as
counsel for some of the claimants as illegal (Rollo, pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is intended to put a stop to the
practice of some parties of filing multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues,
with the result that the courts or agencies have to resolve the same issues. Said Rule, however,
applies only to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled
"Additional Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitioners and Complainants." The first
sentence of the circular expressly states that said circular applies to an governs the filing of
petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application of the anti-forum shopping
rule to the lower courts and administrative agencies, said circular took effect only on April 1,
1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical conduct against Atty.
De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical
conduct of lawyers.
Attorney's Lien
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated December 14, 1992 was filed by Atty.
Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his claim for attorney's fees for legal services rendered in
favor of the claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 841-844).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the court or administrative agency
which renders and executes the money judgment secured by the lawyer for his clients. The
lawyer shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to his clients and to the adverse party
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The statement of the claim for the charging lien of
Atty. Del Mundo should have been filed with the administrative agency that rendered and
executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante De Castro and Atty. Katz
Tierra for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate and
appropriate proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14
Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not accepting their formula of "Three
Hours Average Daily Overtime" in computing the overtime payments. They claim that it was
BRII itself which proposed the formula during the negotiations for the settlement of their claims
in Bahrain and therefore it is in estoppel to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain dated April 16, 1983,
which in pertinent part states:
After the perusal of the memorandum of the Vice President and the Area Manager, Middle East,
of Brown & Root Co. and the Summary of the compensation offered by the Company to the
employees in respect of the difference of pay of the wages of the overtime and the difference of
vacation leave and the perusal of the documents attached thereto i.e., minutes of the meetings
between the Representative of the employees and the management of the Company, the
complaint filed by the employees on 14/2/83 where they have claimed as hereinabove stated,
sample of the Service Contract executed between one of the employees and the company
through its agent in (sic) Philippines, Asia International Builders Corporation where it has been
provided for 48 hours of work per week and an annual leave of 12 days and an overtime wage
of 1 & 1/4 of the normal hourly wage.
xxx xxx xxx
The Company in its computation reached the following averages:
A. 1. The average duration of the actual service of the employee is 35 months for the Philippino
(sic) employees . . . .
2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino (sic) employee is US$2.69 . . . .
3. The average hours for the overtime is 3 hours plus in all public holidays and weekends.
4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of service as compensation for the difference of the
wages of the overtime done for each Philippino (sic) employee . . . (Rollo, p.22).
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not prepared by them but by a
subordinate official in the Bahrain Department of Labor; (2) that there was no showing that the
Bahrain Minister of Labor had approved said memorandum; and (3) that the offer was made in
the course of the negotiation for an amicable settlement of the claims and therefore it was not
admissible in evidence to prove that anything is due to the claimants.
While said document was presented to the POEA without observing the rule on presenting
official documents of a foreign government as provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989
Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in proceedings before an
administrative body. The opposing parties have a copy of the said memorandum, and they could
easily verify its authenticity and accuracy.
The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as contained in the memorandum is
another matter. Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer to
settle a claim is not an admission that anything is due.
Said Rule provides:
Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of the record with unwanted
evidence but a statement of public policy. There is great public interest in having the
protagonists settle their differences amicable before these ripen into litigation. Every effort must
be taken to encourage them to arrive at a settlement. The submission of offers and counter-
offers in the negotiation table is a step in the right direction. But to bind a party to his offers, as
what claimants would make this Court do, would defeat the salutary purpose of the Rule.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than
those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that
"where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the
laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract." It quoted with
approval the observation of the POEA Administrator that ". . . in labor proceedings, all doubts
in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations
shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94).
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically when it refused to enforce
the overseas-employment contracts, which became the law of the parties. They contend that the
principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a contract applies only to provisions of Philippine
law in relation to contracts executed in the Philippines.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves,
provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms
and conditions more favorable that those stipulated therein. It was stipulated in said contracts
that:
The Employee agrees that while in the employ of the Employer, he will not engage in any other
business or occupation, nor seek employment with anyone other than the Employer; that he
shall devote his entire time and attention and his best energies, and abilities to the performance
of such duties as may be assigned to him by the Employer; that he shall at all times be subject to
the direction and control of the Employer; and that the benefits provided to Employee hereunder
are substituted for and in lieu of all other benefits provided by any applicable law, provided of
course, that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation
or custom, it being understood that should applicable laws establish that fringe benefits, or other
such benefits additional to the compensation herein agreed cannot be waived, Employee agrees
that such compensation will be adjusted downward so that the total compensation hereunder,
plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation herein agreed (Rollo, pp.
352-353).
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more felicitously. While a part
thereof provides that the compensation to the employee may be "adjusted downward so that the
total computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation" therein agreed, another part of the same provision categorically states "that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and custom."
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and
BRII, the parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93
SCRA 257 [1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a
prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely
"take it or leave it." The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the
other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining
power (Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-employment contracts in question as
adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed (Cheshire, Private
International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a "system" to
regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the
contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am
Jur 2d,
150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific
provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract "as a set of
terms." By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a
foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute
but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private International
Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese, Choice of Law in
Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party
expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the applicable law (Fricke
v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear
some relationship to the parties or their transaction (Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647
[1982]). There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486 (1982), the
"Employment Agreement," between Norse Management Co. and the late husband of the private
respondent, expressly provided that in the event of illness or injury to the employee arising out
of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own misconduct, "compensation shall
be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitation of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Worker's Insurance Act of registry
of the vessel, whichever is greater." Since the laws of Singapore, the place of registry of the
vessel in which the late husband of private respondent served at the time of his death, granted a
better compensation package, we applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of the
contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by AIBC and BRII is inapposite to the facts of the cases at
bench. The issue in that case was whether the amount of the death compensation of a Filipino
seaman should be determined under the shipboard employment contract executed in the
Philippines or the Hongkong law. Holding that the shipboard employment contract was
controlling, the court differentiated said case from Norse Management Co. in that in the latter
case there was an express stipulation in the employment contract that the foreign law would be
applicable if it afforded greater compensation.
B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their right to due process when said
administrative agency granted Friday-pay differential, holiday-pay differential, annual-leave
differential and leave indemnity pay to the claimants listed in Annex B of the Resolution. At
first, NLRC reversed the resolution of the POEA Administrator granting these benefits on a
finding that the POEA Administrator failed to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and
BRII, that some findings of fact of the POEA Administrator were not supported by the
evidence, and that some of the evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 35-
36; 106-107). But instead of remanding the case to the POEA Administrator for a new hearing,
which means further delay in the termination of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the
validity of the claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII complain of as being
irregular and a "reversible error."
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence submitted on appeal, the same
evidence which NLRC found to have been "unilaterally submitted by the claimants and not
disclosed to the adverse parties" (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were submitted to the POEA
administrator by the claimants after the cases were deemed submitted for resolution and which
were taken cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving the cases. While AIBC and
BRII had no opportunity to refute said evidence of the claimants before the POEA
Administrator, they had all the opportunity to rebut said evidence and to present their
counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII themselves were able to
present before NLRC additional evidence which they failed to present before the POEA
Administrator.
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined to "use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard
to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process."
In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis of the evidence of both parties
submitted before the POEA Administrator and NLRC, the latter considered that it was not
expedient to remand the cases to the POEA Administrator for that would only prolong the
already protracted legal controversies.
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the merits instead of remanding them to
the trial court for the reception of evidence, where the same can be readily determined from the
uncontroverted facts on record (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 190 SCRA 653 [1990]; Pagdonsalan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 127
SCRA 463 [1984]).
C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the POEA
Administrator to hold new hearings for 683 claimants listed in Annex D of the Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 whose claims had been denied by the POEA Administrator "for lack of
proof" and for 69 claimants listed in Annex E of the same Resolution, whose claims had been
found by NLRC itself as not "supported by evidence" (Rollo, pp. 41-45).
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218(c) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which empowers
it "[to] conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter or controversy, within
its jurisdiction, . . . ."
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority under Article 218(c) to remand a
case involving claims which had already been dismissed because such provision contemplates
only situations where there is still a question or controversy to be resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the technical rules of procedure and
evidence do not apply to the proceedings conducted by administrative agencies (First Asian
Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986]; Asiaworld Publishing
House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]). This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before NLRC.
Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of procedure and evidence in
administrative proceedings, there are cardinal rules which must be observed by the hearing
officers in order to comply with the due process requirements of the Constitution. These
cardinal rules are collated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
VIII

The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds that
NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor
and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi,
Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving
among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and
declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during
her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs.
Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator
Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the
following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo
Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and
who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to
be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00),
Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may
have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and
residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character,
and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come
to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and
project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law
that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that
the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the
California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of
the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which
a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions
for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER
JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San
Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928,
he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year,
1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to
the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States
but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI
Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-
2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making
of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices
in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April
30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there
for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely
and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence
to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than
mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when
he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never
to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is
in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one
may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he
has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides
in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for
several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place
to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only
for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as
well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the
merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one
use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property
may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer
to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952.
But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the
case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly
cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should
govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will,
such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant,
on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a
jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of
the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This
would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be
legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of
Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical
reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws
rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have
accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit
more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two
states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should
be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with
the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts,
and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would
happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both
courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict
of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied
by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to
land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the
domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-
14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of
laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's
last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of
French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased,
thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law
is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts
statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts
the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained
in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered
by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters
and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign
law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided
according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take
into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the
American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918,
pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country,
but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means
the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel,
in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the
law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them
is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same
system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he
must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in
accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must
accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of
laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article
946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the
owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time
of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as
the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of
Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the
point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of
the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that
international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary
lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the
citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to
go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law
for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention
can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil
Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the
testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile,
the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the
country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent,
if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of
the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and
Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly
apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear
to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not
appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to
or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child,
the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of
the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor
in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States."
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward
A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items
have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15,
1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total
of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed
its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In
the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last
Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of
the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court,
on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would
not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since
the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to
the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
—
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the
old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision,
under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of
the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo,
50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void,
for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article
16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner,
vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review1 is a dismissal2 of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody agreement
for lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter,
Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the
Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree
against petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the
case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement4 ) for
the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to
adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the
Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial
court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement,
respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction
because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s motion and dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance
over the suit considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce
decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce
decree is binding on petitioner following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this
jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the
Civil Code6prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.7
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the
case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the Agreement to justify
its enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree,
modifying the terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is
independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and
enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement
which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of
petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial
court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.9An action for specific performance, such as
petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of
actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of
power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of
jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction x x
x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for
Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the
divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies
beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called "retained jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary
to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the
minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from
the beginning."13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary
Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreement’s
joint child custody stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed:
(1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2)
petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States because of
the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or
in law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory
awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy
consideration,19 subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here.20 ) Clearly then,
the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and
petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated
by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be
valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental
authority when spouses live together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother
takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the
contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of
(2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take
care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated
parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of
children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is
unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable
disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to
preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph
of Article 213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only
to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To
limit this provision’s enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private
agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children
under seven years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the
simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the separated
mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother
has seen her baby torn away from her."23 This ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can
sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."24
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the
other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs
the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated
parents.25 However, these are objections which question the law’s wisdom not its validity or
uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this
Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary
agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the father visitation and
other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal
custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of
disagreements.1avvphi1
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in
duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s
emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual
limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that
petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody
of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in
the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of
Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s enforceability. The argument
that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van
Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a
divorce decree obtained abroad.28 There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the
foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery
filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino
spouse because he no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the complaints under
Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries
as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the
alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding

Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of
action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the
mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the
default standard on child custody proceedings – the best interest of the child.30 As the question
of custody is already before the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing the Agreement,
initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition
of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on
the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court render
judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody
proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s best interest.31

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136804 February 19, 2003
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners,
vs.
RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Court of
Appeals’1 Decision of August 24, 1998 and Resolution of December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 423102 affirming the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion for partial summary
judgment.
The Antecedents
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity) filed a complaint
for damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the
Bank" for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("RTC" for brevity). Guerrero
sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests
on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to
signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero
amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation
Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law and this law does not permit any of
Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal,
temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees on the same ground alleged
in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual
damages. Guerrero opposed the motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for brevity) stated that
Guerrero’s New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that
this law bars all of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in
New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for
reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July 17, 1996, respectively. The Bank filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC Orders. In its Decision
dated August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14, 1998, the
Court of Appeals denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary
judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden affidavit does not serve as proof of the
New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The Court of
Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, as follows:
"SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents
are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
x x x."
The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule 132
should be followed in proving foreign law:
"SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Bank’s argument that Section 2, Rule 34 of the old
Rules of Court allows the Bank to move with the supporting Walden affidavit for partial
summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals clarified that the Walden affidavit is not
the supporting affidavit referred to in Section 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack of genuine
issue between the parties. The Court of Appeals concluded that even if the Walden affidavit is
used for purposes of summary judgment, the Bank must still comply with the procedure
prescribed by the Rules to prove the foreign law.
The Issues
The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in -
"x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] PROOF OF FACTS TO SUPPORT ITS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE GIVEN BY AFFIDAVIT;
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES FOREIGN LAW
AS A FACT, IS "HEARSAY" AND THEREBY ‘CANNOT SERVE AS PROOF OF THE
NEW YORK LAW RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT x x x’."3
First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use the
Walden affidavit to prove that the stipulated foreign law bars the claims for consequential,
moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Consequently, outright
dismissal by summary judgment of these claims is warranted.
Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements of Rule 35 on
summary judgments and those of a trial on the merits in considering the Walden affidavit as
"hearsay." The Bank points out that the Walden affidavit is not hearsay since Rule 35 expressly
permits the use of affidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to refute the
facts contained in the Walden affidavit, he failed to show the need for a trial on his claims for
damages other than actual.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of the
old Rules of Court which reads:
"Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move
with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either
party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no
important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. In such event, the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.4
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the
pleadings genuine, shamor fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions
accompanying the motion?5
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine
issue for trial.6
A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues of fact
that necessitate formal trial. Guerrero’s complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the
ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for damages. He is seeking damages for what he
asserts as "illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the
Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and
unauthorized conversion of his account." In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense that the
agreed foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the recovery of damages other than
actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerrero’s complaint while specific denials and
affirmative defenses are set out in the Bank’s answer.
True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based merely on the
affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. However, as correctly ruled
by the Court of Appeals, the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment as supported by the
Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham, fictitious or contrived.
On the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as pleaded by
the parties are disputed and there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material
allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.7 The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only
the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.8Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial
notice.9 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting
allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a
clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal
custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or
consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of
Appeals10 which held that:
"x x x:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule, however,
the Supreme Court held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section
41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude the
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case,
the Supreme Court considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco,
California, who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same
was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law.Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of
California as proved by the respondents’ witness. In that case, the counsel for respondent
"testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the
revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the
pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness
cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published
in Derring’s California Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his
testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence by
respondents." Likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of
the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not
meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action,
if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written
proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese
Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be competent proof
of that law." (Emphasis supplied)
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in
open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be
established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant
never testified in open court.1a\^/phi1.net The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof
of New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not
state the specific New York law on damages. We reproduce portions of the Walden affidavit as
follows:
"3. In New York, "[n]ominal damages are damages in name only, trivial sums such as six cents
or $1. Such damages are awarded both in tort and contract cases when the plaintiff establishes a
cause of action against the defendant, but is unable to prove" actual damages. Dobbs, Law of
Remedies, § 3.32 at 294 (1993). Since Guerrero is claiming for actual damages, he cannot ask
for nominal damages.
4. There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I have reviewed Dobbs, a well-
respected treatise, which does not use the phrase "temperate damages" in its index. I have also
done a computerized search for the phrase in all published New York cases, and have found no
cases that use it. I have never heard the phrase used in American law.
5. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governs many aspects of a Bank’s relationship with
its depositors. In this case, it governs Guerrero’s claim arising out of the non-payment of the
$18,000 check. Guerrero claims that this was a wrongful dishonor. However, the UCC states
that "justifiable refusal to pay or accept" as opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank refuses to
pay a check for reasons such as a missing indorsement, a missing or illegible signature or a
forgery, § 3-510, Official Comment 2. ….. to the Complaint, MHT returned the check because it
had no signature card on …. and could not verify Guerrero’s signature. In my opinion,
consistent with the UCC, that is a legitimate and justifiable reason not to pay.
6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of a justifiable refusal to pay.
UCC 1-106 provides that "neither consequential or special or punitive damages may be had
except as specifically provided in the Act or by other rule of law". UCC 4-103 further provides
that consequential damages can be recovered only where there is bad faith. This is more
restrictive than the New York common law, which may allow consequential damages in a
breach of contract case (as does the UCC where there is a wrongful dishonor).
7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to reputation and mental distress are
considered consequential damages. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319,
540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (lost profits); Motif Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 50
A.D.2d 718, 374 N.Y.S..2d 868, 869-70 (4th Dep’t 1975) damage to reputation); Dobbs, Law of
Remedies §12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress).
8. As a matter of New York law, a claim for emotional distress cannot be recovered for a breach
of contract. Geler v. National Westminster Bank U.S.A., 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Pitcherello v. Moray Homes, Ltd., 150 A.D.2d 860,540 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (3d Dep’t
1989) Martin v. Donald Park Acres, 54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S..2d 31, 32 (2nd Dep’t 1976).
Damage to reputation is also not recoverable for a contract. Motif Construction Corp. v. Buffalo
Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70.1a\^/phi1.net
9. In cases where the issue is the breach of a contract to purchase stock, New York courts will
not take into consideration the performance of the stock after the breach. Rather, damages will
be based on the value of the stock at the time of the breach, Aroneck v. Atkin, 90 A.D.2d 966,
456 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (4th Dep’t 1982), app. den. 59 N.Y.2d 601, 449 N.E.2d 1276, 463
N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1983).
10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential damages if they were the type that
would naturally arise from the breach and if they were "brought within the contemplation of
parties as the probable result of the breach at the time of or prior to contracting." Kenford Co.,
Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1989), (quoting Chapman v.
Fargo, 223 N.Y. 32, 36 (1918).
11. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees unless they are provided by
contract or statute. E.g., Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Camatron Sewing Mach, Inc. v. F.M. Ring Assocs., Inc., 179 A.D.2d 165, 582 N.Y.S.2d
396 (1st Dep’t 1992); Stanisic v. Soho Landmark Assocs., 73 A.D.2d 268, 577 N.Y.S.2d 280,
281 (1st Dep’t 1991). There is no statute that permits attorney’s fees in a case of this type.
12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of contract, even where the
plaintiff claims the defendant acted with malice. Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770
F.Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Catalogue Service of …chester11 _v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 74 A.D.2d 837, 838, 425 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (2d Dep’t 1980); Senior v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 110 A.D.2d 833, 488 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (2d Dep’t 1985).
13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where it is alleged and proven that
the wrong supposedly committed by defendant amounts to a fraud aimed at the public generally
and involves a high moral culpability. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223
N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law that exemplary damages are
not available for a mere breach of contract for in such a case, as a matter of law, only a private
wrong and not a public right is involved. Thaler v. The North Insurance Company, 63 A.D.2d
921, 406 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dep’t 1978)."12
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion of
the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in
particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute
proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of
some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with
Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and
jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how
to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the
current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
Next, the Bank makes much of Guerrero’s failure to submit an opposing affidavit to the Walden
affidavit. However, the pertinent provision of Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court did
not make the submission of an opposing affidavit mandatory, thus:
"SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days
before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except
as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis supplied)

It is axiomatic that the term "may" as used in remedial law, is only permissive and not
mandatory.13

Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Bank’s motion for partial
summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing affidavit.
Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary judgment, although he did not present an
opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing affidavit, as there was no need
for one, because the Walden affidavit did not establish what the Bank intended to prove.
Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or impliedly, the veracity of the statements in the
Walden affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New York law and jurisprudence
even if Guerrero did not present an opposing affidavit. As the party moving for summary
judgment, the Bank has the burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of
fact and that any doubt as to the existence of such issue is resolved against the movant.14

Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero to submit an opposing
affidavit considering that what the Bank seeks to be opposed is the very subject matter of the
complaint. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit because his
complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Bank’s motion and the Walden affidavit.
A party should not be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint.

There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo correctly denied the
Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment. There is a need to determine by presentation of
evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages
under the applicable laws.
This case has been delayed long enough by the Bank’s resort to a motion for partial summary
judgment. Ironically, the Bank has successfully defeated the very purpose for which summary
judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid parties in avoiding the expense and loss of
time involved in a trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 24, 1998
and the Resolution dated December 14, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42310
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145587 October 26, 2007
EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the October 18, 2000 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56120 which affirmed the January 15, 1999
Decision3 and September 30, 1999 Resolution4 rendered by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) (Third Division) in POEA ADJ (L) 94-06-2194, ordering Expertise
Search International (ESI), EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. (EDI), and Omar Ahmed Ali
Bin Bechr Est. (OAB) jointly and severally to pay Eleazar S. Gran (Gran) the amount of USD
16,150.00 as unpaid salaries.
The Facts
Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs).5 ESI is another recruitment agency which collaborated with EDI to process
the documentation and deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI to work for OAB,
in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.6
It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter for curricula vitae of qualified
applicants for the position of "Computer Specialist."7 In a facsimile transmission dated
November 29, 1993, OAB informed EDI that, from the applicants' curricula vitae submitted to it
for evaluation, it selected Gran for the position of "Computer Specialist." The faxed letter also
stated that if Gran agrees to the terms and conditions of employment contained in it, one of
which was a monthly salary of SR (Saudi Riyal) 2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for
Gran's immediate dispatch.8
After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment contract9 that granted
him a monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two years. Gran was then deployed to
Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on February 7, 1994.
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his monthly salary—his
employment contract stated USD 850.00; while his Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) Information Sheet indicated USD 600.00 only. However, through the assistance of the
EDI office in Riyadh, OAB agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a month.10
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was terminated
through OAB's July 9, 1994 letter,11 on the following grounds:
1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency primarily on your salary
and contract duration.
2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment agency[,] vide OAB
letter ref. F-5751-93, dated October 3, 1993.12
3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or instructions (non-
submittal of daily activity reports despite several instructions).
On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing his
final pay, and on the same day, he executed a Declaration13 releasing OAB from any financial
obligation or otherwise, towards him.
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July 21, 1994, against
ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western Guaranty Corporation
with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City, which was docketed as POEA ADJ (L)
94-06-2194 for underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In his February 10, 1998 Decision,14 Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, to whom Gran's case was
assigned, ruled that there was neither underpayment nor illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that there was no underpayment of salaries since according to the
POEA-Overseas Contract Worker (OCW) Information Sheet, Gran's monthly salary was USD
600.00, and in his Confirmation of Appointment as Computer Specialist, his monthly basic
salary was fixed at SR 2,500.00, which was equivalent to USD 600.00.
Arbiter Caday also cited the Declaration executed by Gran, to justify that Gran had no claim for
unpaid salaries or wages against OAB.
With regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, the Labor Arbiter found that Gran failed to refute
EDI's allegations; namely, (1) that Gran did not submit a single activity report of his daily
activity as dictated by company policy; (2) that he was not qualified for the job as computer
specialist due to his insufficient knowledge in programming and lack of knowledge in ACAD
system; (3) that Gran refused to follow management's instruction for him to gain more
knowledge of the job to prove his worth as computer specialist; (4) that Gran's employment
contract had never been substituted; (5) and that Gran was paid a monthly salary of USD
850.00, and USD 350.00 monthly as food allowance.
Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter decided that Gran was validly dismissed from his work due to
insubordination, disobedience, and his failure to submit daily activity reports.
Thus, on February 10, 1998, Arbiter Caday dismissed Gran's complaint for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, Gran filed an Appeal15 on April 6, 1998 with the NLRC, Third Division.
However, it appears from the records that Gran failed to furnish EDI with a copy of his Appeal
Memorandum.
The Ruling of the NLRC
The NLRC held that EDI's seemingly harmless transfer of Gran's contract to ESI is actually
"reprocessing," which is a prohibited transaction under Article 34 (b) of the Labor Code. This
scheme constituted misrepresentation through the conspiracy between EDI and ESI in
misleading Gran and even POEA of the actual terms and conditions of the OFW's employment.
In addition, it was found that Gran did not commit any act that constituted a legal ground for
dismissal. The alleged non-compliance with contractual stipulations relating to Gran's salary
and contract duration, and the absence of pre-qualification requirements cannot be attributed to
Gran but to EDI, which dealt directly with OAB. In addition, the charge of insubordination was
not substantiated, and Gran was not even afforded the required notice and investigation on his
alleged offenses.
Thus, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and rendered a new one, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE. Respondents Expertise Search
International, Inc., EDI Staffbuilders Int'l., Inc. and Omar Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB) are
hereby ordered jointly and severally liable to pay the complainant Eleazar Gran the Philippine
peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of SIXTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY US DOLLARS (US$16,150.00) representing his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract.
SO ORDERED.16
Gran then filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment17 on March 29, 1999 with the NLRC and
petitioner receiving a copy of this motion on the same date.18
To prevent the execution, petitioner filed an Opposition19 to Gran's motion arguing that the
Writ of Execution cannot issue because it was not notified of the appellate proceedings before
the NLRC and was not given a copy of the memorandum of appeal nor any opportunity to
participate in the appeal.
Seeing that the NLRC did not act on Gran's motion after EDI had filed its Opposition, petitioner
filed, on August 26, 1999, a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision after receiving a
copy of the Decision on August 16, 1999.20
The NLRC then issued a Resolution21 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
ratiocinating that the issues and arguments raised in the motion "had already been amply
discussed, considered, and ruled upon" in the Decision, and that there was "no cogent reason or
patent or palpable error that warrant any disturbance thereof."
Unconvinced of the NLRC's reasoning, EDI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
Petitioner claimed in its petition that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving
due course to the appeal despite Gran's failure to perfect the appeal.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA subsequently ruled on the procedural and substantive issues of EDI's petition.
On the procedural issue, the appellate court held that "Gran's failure to furnish a copy of his
appeal memorandum [to EDI was] a mere formal lapse, an excusable neglect and not a
jurisdictional defect which would justify the dismissal of his appeal."22 The court also held that
petitioner EDI failed to prove that private respondent was terminated for a valid cause and in
accordance with due process; and that Gran's Declaration releasing OAB from any monetary
obligation had no force and effect. The appellate court ratiocinated that EDI had the burden of
proving Gran's incompetence; however, other than the termination letter, no evidence was
presented to show how and why Gran was considered to be incompetent. The court held that
since the law requires the recruitment agencies to subject OFWs to trade tests before
deployment, Gran must have been competent and qualified; otherwise, he would not have been
hired and deployed abroad.
As for the charge of insubordination and disobedience due to Gran's failure to submit a "Daily
Activity Report," the appellate court found that EDI failed to show that the submission of the
"Daily Activity Report" was a part of Gran's duty or the company's policy. The court also held
that even if Gran was guilty of insubordination, he should have just been suspended or
reprimanded, but not dismissed.
The CA also held that Gran was not afforded due process, given that OAB did not abide by the
twin notice requirement. The court found that Gran was terminated on the same day he received
the termination letter, without having been apprised of the bases of his dismissal or afforded an
opportunity to explain his side.
Finally, the CA held that the Declaration signed by Gran did not bar him from demanding
benefits to which he was entitled. The appellate court found that the Declaration was in the form
of a quitclaim, and as such is frowned upon as contrary to public policy especially where the
monetary consideration given in the Declaration was very much less than what he was legally
entitled to—his backwages amounting to USD 16,150.00.
As a result of these findings, on October 18, 2000, the appellate court denied the petition to set
aside the NLRC Decision.
Hence, this instant petition is before the Court.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I. WHETHER THE FAILURE OF GRAN TO FURNISH A COPY OF HIS APPEAL
MEMORANDUM TO PETITIONER EDI WOULD CONSTITUTE A JURISDICTIONAL
DEFECT AND A DEPRIVATION OF PETITIONER EDI'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS
WOULD JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL OF GRAN'S APPEAL.
II. WHETHER PETITIONER EDI HAS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE THAT GRAN'S TERMINATION WAS JUSTIFIABLE BY REASON OF
INCOMPETENCE. COROLLARY HERETO, WHETHER THE PRIETO VS. NLRC
RULING, AS APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
III. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE THAT GRAN'S TERMINATION WAS JUSTIFIABLE BY REASON OF
INSUBORDINATION AND DISOBEDIENCE.
IV. WHETHER GRAN WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS PRIOR TO TERMINATION.
V. WHETHER GRAN IS ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES FOR THE UNEXPIRED PORTION
OF HIS CONTRACT.23
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit except with respect to Gran's failure to furnish EDI with his Appeal
Memorandum filed with the NLRC.
First Issue: NLRC's Duty is to Require Respondent to Provide Petitioner a Copy of the Appeal
Petitioner EDI claims that Gran's failure to furnish it a copy of the Appeal Memorandum
constitutes a jurisdictional defect and a deprivation of due process that would warrant a rejection
of the appeal.
This position is devoid of merit.
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that failure of appellant to furnish a copy of the appeal to the
adverse party is not fatal to the appeal.
In Estrada v. National Labor Relations Commission,24 this Court set aside the order of the
NLRC which dismissed an appeal on the sole ground that the appellant did not furnish the
appellee a memorandum of appeal contrary to the requirements of Article 223 of the New Labor
Code and Section 9, Rule XIII of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Also, in J.D. Magpayo Customs Brokerage Corp. v. NLRC, the order of dismissal of an appeal
to the NLRC based on the ground that "there is no showing whatsoever that a copy of the appeal
was served by the appellant on the appellee"25was annulled. The Court ratiocinated as follows:
The failure to give a copy of the appeal to the adverse party was a mere formal lapse, an
excusable neglect. Time and again We have acted on petitions to review decisions of the Court
of Appeals even in the absence of proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals as
required by Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court. We act on the petitions and simply require the
petitioners to comply with the rule.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
The J.D. Magpayo ruling was reiterated in Carnation Philippines Employees Labor Union-FFW
v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 Pagdonsalan v. NLRC,28 and in Sunrise Manning
Agency, Inc. v. NLRC.29
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from these cases is that failure to furnish the adverse party with
a copy of the appeal is treated only as a formal lapse, an excusable neglect, and hence, not a
jurisdictional defect. Accordingly, in such a situation, the appeal should not be dismissed;
however, it should not be given due course either. As enunciated in J.D. Magpayo, the duty that
is imposed on the NLRC, in such a case, is to require the appellant to comply with the rule that
the opposing party should be provided with a copy of the appeal memorandum.
While Gran's failure to furnish EDI with a copy of the Appeal Memorandum is excusable, the
abject failure of the NLRC to order Gran to furnish EDI with the Appeal Memorandum
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The records reveal that the NLRC discovered that Gran failed to furnish EDI a copy of the
Appeal Memorandum. The NLRC then ordered Gran to present proof of service. In compliance
with the order, Gran submitted a copy of Camp Crame Post Office's list of mail/parcels sent on
April 7, 1998.30 The post office's list shows that private respondent Gran sent two pieces of
mail on the same date: one addressed to a certain Dan O. de Guzman of Legaspi Village,
Makati; and the other appears to be addressed to Neil B. Garcia (or Gran),31 of Ermita,
Manila—both of whom are not connected with petitioner.
This mailing list, however, is not a conclusive proof that EDI indeed received a copy of the
Appeal Memorandum.
Sec. 5 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure (1990) provides for the proof and completeness of
service in proceedings before the NLRC:
Section 5.32 Proof and completeness of service.—The return is prima facie proof of the facts
indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his
agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from
the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect after such time. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Hence, if the service is done through registered mail, it is only deemed complete when the
addressee or his agent received the mail or after five (5) days from the date of first notice of the
postmaster. However, the NLRC Rules do not state what would constitute proper proof of
service.
Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, provides for proofs of service:
Section 13. Proof of service.—Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of
the party served or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving,
containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary
mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be
made by such affidavit and registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card
shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee(emphasis supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, it is obvious that the list submitted by Gran is not conclusive
proof that he had served a copy of his appeal memorandum to EDI, nor is it conclusive proof
that EDI received its copy of the Appeal Memorandum. He should have submitted an affidavit
proving that he mailed the Appeal Memorandum together with the registry receipt issued by the
post office; afterwards, Gran should have immediately filed the registry return card.
Hence, after seeing that Gran failed to attach the proof of service, the NLRC should not have
simply accepted the post office's list of mail and parcels sent; but it should have required Gran
to properly furnish the opposing parties with copies of his Appeal Memorandum as prescribed
in J.D. Magpayo and the other cases. The NLRC should not have proceeded with the
adjudication of the case, as this constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The glaring failure of NLRC to ensure that Gran should have furnished petitioner EDI a copy of
the Appeal Memorandum before rendering judgment reversing the dismissal of Gran's
complaint constitutes an evasion of the pertinent NLRC Rules and established jurisprudence.
Worse, this failure deprived EDI of procedural due process guaranteed by the Constitution
which can serve as basis for the nullification of proceedings in the appeal before the NLRC.
One can only surmise the shock and dismay that OAB, EDI, and ESI experienced when they
thought that the dismissal of Gran's complaint became final, only to receive a copy of Gran's
Motion for Execution of Judgment which also informed them that Gran had obtained a
favorable NLRC Decision. This is not level playing field and absolutely unfair and
discriminatory against the employer and the job recruiters. The rights of the employers to
procedural due process cannot be cavalierly disregarded for they too have rights assured under
the Constitution.
However, instead of annulling the dispositions of the NLRC and remanding the case for further
proceedings we will resolve the petition based on the records before us to avoid a protracted
litigation.33
The second and third issues have a common matter—whether there was just cause for Gran's
dismissal—hence, they will be discussed jointly.
Second and Third Issues: Whether Gran's dismissal is justifiable by reason of incompetence,
insubordination, and disobedience
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the local
recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by the employment contract. A
contract freely entered into is considered law between the parties; and hence, should be
respected. In formulating the contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.34
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor
Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination,
termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to
apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of
the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.35
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play.36 Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours.37 Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us.
Petitioner EDI claims that it had proven that Gran was legally dismissed due to incompetence
and insubordination or disobedience.
This claim has no merit.
In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence that the
employer should prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal and just.
Section 33 of Article 277 of the Labor Code38 states that:
ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS39
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the
requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the
causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company
rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the
workers to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional
branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination
was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. x x x
In many cases, it has been held that in termination disputes or illegal dismissal cases, the
employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just and valid causes; and failure to
do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and therefore
illegal.40 Taking into account the character of the charges and the penalty meted to an
employee, the employer is bound to adduce clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence
to prove that the dismissal is valid and legal.41 This is consistent with the principle of security
of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution and reinforced by Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code
of the Philippines.42
In the instant case, petitioner claims that private respondent Gran was validly dismissed for just
cause, due to incompetence and insubordination or disobedience. To prove its allegations, EDI
submitted two letters as evidence. The first is the July 9, 1994 termination letter,43 addressed to
Gran, from Andrea E. Nicolaou, Managing Director of OAB. The second is an unsigned April
11, 1995 letter44 from OAB addressed to EDI and ESI, which outlined the reasons why OAB
had terminated Gran's employment.
Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the Computer Specialist position because he
had "insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of [the] ACAD
system."45 Petitioner also claims that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to insubordination or
disobedience because he continually failed to submit the required "Daily Activity
Reports."46However, other than the abovementioned letters, no other evidence was presented to
show how and why Gran was considered incompetent, insubordinate, or disobedient. Petitioner
EDI had clearly failed to overcome the burden of proving that Gran was validly dismissed.
Petitioner's imputation of incompetence on private respondent due to his "insufficient
knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of the ACAD system" based only on the above
mentioned letters, without any other evidence, cannot be given credence.
An allegation of incompetence should have a factual foundation. Incompetence may be shown
by weighing it against a standard, benchmark, or criterion. However, EDI failed to establish any
such bases to show how petitioner found Gran incompetent.
In addition, the elements that must concur for the charge of insubordination or willful
disobedience to prosper were not present.
In Micro Sales Operation Network v. NLRC, we held that:
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the following twin elements must
concur: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.47
EDI failed to discharge the burden of proving Gran's insubordination or willful disobedience.
As indicated by the second requirement provided for in Micro Sales Operation Network, in
order to justify willful disobedience, we must determine whether the order violated by the
employee is reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and pertains to the duties which
he had been engaged to discharge. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show that the order of
the company which was violated—the submission of "Daily Activity Reports"—was part of
Gran's duties as a Computer Specialist. Before the Labor Arbiter, EDI should have provided a
copy of the company policy, Gran's job description, or any other document that would show that
the "Daily Activity Reports" were required for submission by the employees, more particularly
by a Computer Specialist.
Even though EDI and/or ESI were merely the local employment or recruitment agencies and not
the foreign employer, they should have adduced additional evidence to convincingly show that
Gran's employment was validly and legally terminated. The burden devolves not only upon the
foreign-based employer but also on the employment or recruitment agency for the latter is not
only an agent of the former, but is also solidarily liable with the foreign principal for any claims
or liabilities arising from the dismissal of the worker.48
Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to incompetence,
insubordination, or willful disobedience.
Petitioner also raised the issue that Prieto v. NLRC,49 as used by the CA in its Decision, is not
applicable to the present case.
In Prieto, this Court ruled that "[i]t is presumed that before their deployment, the petitioners
were subjected to trade tests required by law to be conducted by the recruiting agency to insure
employment of only technically qualified workers for the foreign principal."50 The CA, using
the ruling in the said case, ruled that Gran must have passed the test; otherwise, he would not
have been hired. Therefore, EDI was at fault when it deployed Gran who was allegedly
"incompetent" for the job.
According to petitioner, the Prieto ruling is not applicable because in the case at hand, Gran
misrepresented himself in his curriculum vitae as a Computer Specialist; thus, he was not
qualified for the job for which he was hired.
We disagree.
The CA is correct in applying Prieto. The purpose of the required trade test is to weed out
incompetent applicants from the pool of available workers. It is supposed to reveal applicants
with false educational backgrounds, and expose bogus qualifications. Since EDI deployed Gran
to Riyadh, it can be presumed that Gran had passed the required trade test and that Gran is
qualified for the job. Even if there was no objective trade test done by EDI, it was still EDI's
responsibility to subject Gran to a trade test; and its failure to do so only weakened its position
but should not in any way prejudice Gran. In any case, the issue is rendered moot and academic
because Gran's incompetency is unproved.
Fourth Issue: Gran was not Afforded Due Process
As discussed earlier, in the absence of proof of Saudi laws, Philippine Labor laws and
regulations shall govern the relationship between Gran and EDI. Thus, our laws and rules on the
requisites of due process relating to termination of employment shall apply.
Petitioner EDI claims that private respondent Gran was afforded due process, since he was
allowed to work and improve his capabilities for five months prior to his termination.51 EDI
also claims that the requirements of due process, as enunciated in Santos, Jr. v.
NLRC,52 and Malaya Shipping Services, Inc. v. NLRC,53 cited by the CA in its Decision, were
properly observed in the present case.
This position is untenable.
In Agabon v. NLRC,54 this Court held that:
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must
give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by
the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes
under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor
and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before their
employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their fault, and
(2) a second notice to communicate to the employees that their employment is being terminated.
In between the first and second notice, the employees should be given a hearing or opportunity
to defend themselves personally or by counsel of their choice.55
A careful examination of the records revealed that, indeed, OAB's manner of dismissing Gran
fell short of the two notice requirement. While it furnished Gran the written notice informing
him of his dismissal, it failed to furnish Gran the written notice apprising him of the charges
against him, as prescribed by the Labor Code.56 Consequently, he was denied the opportunity
to respond to said notice. In addition, OAB did not schedule a hearing or conference with Gran
to defend himself and adduce evidence in support of his defenses. Moreover, the July 9, 1994
termination letter was effective on the same day. This shows that OAB had already condemned
Gran to dismissal, even before Gran was furnished the termination letter. It should also be
pointed out that OAB failed to give Gran the chance to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of a representative in accordance with Article 277 of the Labor Code. Clearly, there
was no intention to provide Gran with due process. Summing up, Gran was notified and his
employment arbitrarily terminated on the same day, through the same letter, and for unjustified
grounds. Obviously, Gran was not afforded due process.
Pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Agabon,57 an employer is liable to pay nominal damages
as indemnity for violating the employee's right to statutory due process. Since OAB was in
breach of the due process requirements under the Labor Code and its regulations, OAB, ESI,
and EDI, jointly and solidarily, are liable to Gran in the amount of PhP 30,000.00 as indemnity.
Fifth and Last Issue: Gran is Entitled to Backwages
We reiterate the rule that with regard to employees hired for a fixed period of employment, in
cases arising before the effectivity of R.A. No. 804258 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act) on August 25, 1995, that when the contract is for a fixed term and the employees
are dismissed without just cause, they are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding
to the unexpired portion of their contract.59 On the other hand, for cases arising after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, when the termination of employment is without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term whichever is less.60
In the present case, the employment contract provides that the employment contract shall be
valid for a period of two (2) years from the date the employee starts to work with the
employer.61 Gran arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and started to work on February 7,
1994;62 hence, his employment contract is until February 7, 1996. Since he was illegally
dismissed on July 9, 1994, before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, he is therefore entitled to
backwages corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract, which was equivalent to USD
16,150.
Petitioner EDI questions the legality of the award of backwages and mainly relies on the
Declaration which is claimed to have been freely and voluntarily executed by Gran. The
relevant portions of the Declaration are as follows:
I, ELEAZAR GRAN (COMPUTER SPECIALIST) AFTER RECEIVING MY FINAL
SETTLEMENT ON THIS DATE THE AMOUNT OF:
S.R. 2,948.00 (SAUDI RIYALS TWO THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT ONLY)
REPRESENTING COMPLETE PAYMENT (COMPENSATION) FOR THE SERVICES I
RENDERED TO OAB ESTABLISHMENT.
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT OAB EST. HAS NO FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN MY
FAVOUR AFTER RECEIVING THE ABOVE MENTIONED AMOUNT IN CASH.
I STATE FURTHER THAT OAB EST. HAS NO OBLIGATION TOWARDS ME IN
WHATEVER FORM.
I ATTEST TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THIS STATEMENT BY AFFIXING MY
SIGNATURE VOLUNTARILY.
SIGNED.
ELEAZAR GRAN
Courts must undertake a meticulous and rigorous review of quitclaims or waivers, more
particularly those executed by employees. This requirement was clearly articulated by Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Land and Housing Development Corporation v. Esquillo:
Quitclaims, releases and other waivers of benefits granted by laws or contracts in favor of
workers should be strictly scrutinized to protect the weak and the disadvantaged. The waivers
should be carefully examined, in regard not only to the words and terms used, but also the
factual circumstances under which they have been executed.63 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court had also outlined in Land and Housing Development Corporation, citing Periquet v.
NLRC,64 the parameters for valid compromise agreements, waivers, and quitclaims:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and
may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear
proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with
full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Is the waiver and quitclaim labeled a Declaration valid? It is not.
The Court finds the waiver and quitclaim null and void for the following reasons:
1. The salary paid to Gran upon his termination, in the amount of SR 2,948.00, is unreasonably
low. As correctly pointed out by the court a quo, the payment of SR 2,948.00 is even lower than
his monthly salary of SR 3,190.00 (USD 850.00). In addition, it is also very much less than the
USD 16,150.00 which is the amount Gran is legally entitled to get from petitioner EDI as
backwages.
2. The Declaration reveals that the payment of SR 2,948.00 is actually the payment for Gran's
salary for the services he rendered to OAB as Computer Specialist. If the Declaration is a
quitclaim, then the consideration should be much much more than the monthly salary of SR
3,190.00 (USD 850.00)—although possibly less than the estimated Gran's salaries for the
remaining duration of his contract and other benefits as employee of OAB. A quitclaim will
understandably be lower than the sum total of the amounts and benefits that can possibly be
awarded to employees or to be earned for the remainder of the contract period since it is a
compromise where the employees will have to forfeit a certain portion of the amounts they are
claiming in exchange for the early payment of a compromise amount. The court may however
step in when such amount is unconscionably low or unreasonable although the employee
voluntarily agreed to it. In the case of the Declaration, the amount is unreasonably small
compared to the future wages of Gran.
3. The factual circumstances surrounding the execution of the Declaration would show that
Gran did not voluntarily and freely execute the document. Consider the following chronology of
events:
a. On July 9, 1994, Gran received a copy of his letter of termination;
b. On July 10, 1994, Gran was instructed to depart Saudi Arabia and required to pay his plane
ticket;65
c. On July 11, 1994, he signed the Declaration;
d. On July 12, 1994, Gran departed from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and
e. On July 21, 1994, Gran filed the Complaint before the NLRC.
The foregoing events readily reveal that Gran was "forced" to sign the Declaration and
constrained to receive the amount of SR 2,948.00 even if it was against his will—since he was
told on July 10, 1994 to leave Riyadh on July 12, 1994. He had no other choice but to sign the
Declaration as he needed the amount of SR 2,948.00 for the payment of his ticket. He could
have entertained some apprehensions as to the status of his stay or safety in Saudi Arabia if he
would not sign the quitclaim.
4. The court a quo is correct in its finding that the Declaration is a contract of adhesion which
should be construed against the employer, OAB. An adhesion contract is contrary to public
policy as it leaves the weaker party—the employee—in a "take-it-or-leave-it" situation.
Certainly, the employer is being unjust to the employee as there is no meaningful choice on the
part of the employee while the terms are unreasonably favorable to the employer.66
[A]ny compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon with the assistance of the Bureau of
Labor Relations or the regional office of the DOLE, shall be final and binding upon the parties
and the NLRC or any court "shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in
case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facieevidence that the settlement was
obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.
It is made clear that the foregoing rules on quitclaim or waiver shall apply only to labor
contracts of OFWs in the absence of proof of the laws of the foreign country agreed upon to
govern said contracts. Otherwise, the foreign laws shall apply.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 18, 2000 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
56120 of the Court of Appeals affirming the January 15, 1999 Decision and September 30, 1999
Resolution of the NLRC
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc.
shall pay the amount of PhP 30,000.00 to respondent Gran as nominal damages for non-
compliance with statutory due process.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, the Declaration purporting to be a quitclaim and waiver is unenforceable under Philippine
laws in the absence of proof of the applicable law of Saudi Arabia.
In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims and waivers of
employees under Philippine laws, said agreements should contain the following:

1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement;

2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding amounts, which the
employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount;

3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in English, Filipino, or
in the dialect known to the employees—that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they are
forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive the benefits which are due them under the law;
and
4. A statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily, and had fully
understood the contents of the document and that their consent was freely given without any
threat, violence, duress, intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person.

It is advisable that the stipulations be made in English and Tagalog or in the dialect known to
the employee. There should be two (2) witnesses to the execution of the quitclaim who must
also sign the quitclaim. The document should be subscribed and sworn to under oath preferably
before any administering official of the Department of Labor and Employment or its regional
office, the Bureau of Labor Relations, the NLRC or a labor attaché in a foreign country. Such
official shall assist the parties regarding the execution of the quitclaim and waiver.67 This
compromise settlement becomes final and binding under Article 227 of the Labor Code which
provides that:
G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M.
TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.
Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General and Jose A. Rico for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners pray that the order dated June 20, 1979 of the National
Seamen Board, and the decision dated December 11, 1979 of the Ministry of Labor be nullified
and set aside, and that "if petitioners are found liable to private respondent, such a liability be
reduced to P30,000.00 only, in accordance with respondent NSB's Standard Format of a Service
Agreement."
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the
Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of
his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T.
"Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of
his death was receiving a monthly salary of US$850.00 (Petition, page 5).
In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and time-off allowances,
funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in connection with the
death of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo
alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co. (PTE)
and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively, should be based on the law
where the vessel is registered. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore
should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial
notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay
private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the
Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply in this case.
The Hearing Officer III, Rebene C. Carrera of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, after
hearing the case, rendered judgment on June 20, 1979, ordering herein petitioners "to pay jointly
and severally the following:
I. US$30,600 (the 36-month salary of the decreased)) or its equivalent in Philippine currency as
death compensation benefits;
II. US$500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral expenses;
III. US$3,110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees.
It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National Seamen Board within ten (10)
days from receipt of this decision.
Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor. On December 11, 1979, the Ministry rendered its
decision in this case as follows:
Motion for reconsideration filed by respondents from the Order of this Board dated 20 June
1979 requiring them to pay complainant, jointly and severally, the amount of Thirty-four
thousand and two hundred ten dollars ($34,210.00) representing death benefits, funeral expenses
and attorney's fees.
The facts in the main are not disputed. The deceased, husband of complainant herein, was
employed as a Second Engineer by respondents and served as such in the vessel "M.T. Cherry
Earl" until that fatal day in May 1978 when, while at sea, he suffered an apoplectic stroke and
died four days later or on 29 May 1978. In her complaint filed before this Board, Abordo argued
that the amount of compensation due her should be based on the law where the vessel is
registered, which is Singapore law. Agreeing with said argument, this Board issued the
questioned Order. Hence this Motion for Reconsideration.
In their motion for reconsideration, respondents strongly argue that the law of Singapore should
not be applied in the case considering that their responsibility was not alleged in the complaint
that no proof of the existence of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore was ever presented
and that the Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore.
As an alternative, they offered to pay complainant the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as death benefits based on this Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which, they
maintained, should apply in this case.
The only issue we are called upon to rule is whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be
applied in this case.
After an exhaustive study of jurisprudence on the matter. we rule in the affirmative.
Respondents came out with a well-prepared motion which, to our mind, is more appropriate and
perhaps acceptable in the regular court of justice. Nothing is raised in their motion but question
of evidence. But evidence is usually a matter of procedure of which this Board, being merely a
quasi-judicial body, is not strict about.
It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the course of the hearing. And
following Supreme Court decisions in a long line of cases that a foreign law, being a matter of
evidence, must be alleged and proved, the law of Singapore ought not to be recognized in this
case. But it is our considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to
apply to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen
Board. For well-settled also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not
bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a
long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while
in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be
considered. We see no reason to deviate from this well-considered policy. Certainly not on
technical grounds as movants herein would like us to.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the Order of tills Board
dated 20 June 1979 affirmed. Let execution issue immediately.
In Section 5(B) of the "Employment Agreement" between Norse Management Co. (PTE) and with this Board, the terms of which have never been at issue, is shown that the monthly salary
the late Napoleon B. Abordo, which is Annex "C" of the Supplemental Complaint, it was of the deceased Remigio Roldan at the time of his death was US$80.00; such that, 36 months
stipulated that: multiplied by $80 would come up to US$2,880 and at the rate of P7.00 to $1.00, the benefits
due the claimant would be P20,160. However, since there was voluntary payment made in the
In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment amount of P6,000 and funeral expenses which under the Workmen's Compensation Law had a
and not due to his own willful misconduct and occurring whilst on board any vessel to which he maximum of P200.00, the amount of P6,200.00 should be deducted from P20,160 and the
may be assigned, but not any other time, the EMPLOYER win provide employee with free difference would be P13,960.00.
medical attention, including hospital treatment, also essential medical treatment in the course of
repatriation and until EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin. If such illness or injury WHEREFORE, the Board orders the respondent Virjen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. to
incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as pay the complainant Natividad Roldan the amount of P13,960.00 within ten (10) days from
determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness receipt of this Decision. The Board also orders the respondent that payment should be made
or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation through the National Seamen Board.
shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of The foregoing decision was assailed as null and void for allegedly having been rendered without
registry of the vessel whichever is greater. (Emphasis supplied) jurisdiction and for awarding compensation benefits beyond the maximum allowable and on the
ground of res judicata. This Court in its resolution dated October 27, 1975 and December 12,
In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the late Napoleon B. 1975, respectively dismissed for lack of merit the petition as well as the motion for
Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry reconsideration in said G.R. No. L- 41297.
of petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was
offered P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case. Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National Seamen
Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims,
The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint of Restituta C. involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts
Abordo and, therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is familiar with Singapore Law, the National involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is
Seamen Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying that law. In the case of familiar with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to workmen's compensation. Moreover,
VirJen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. vs. National Seamen Board, et al (L41297), the the Board may apply the rule on judicial notice and, "in administrative proceedings, the
respondent Board promulgated a decision, as follows: technical rules of procedure — particularly of evidence — applied in judicial trials, do not
strictly apply." (Oromeca Lumber Co. Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 1188).
The facts established and/or admitted by the parties are the following: that the late Remigio
Roldan was hired by the respondent as Ordinary Seamen on board the M/V "Singapura Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and
Pertama," a vessel of Singapore Registry; that on September 27, 1973, the deceased Remigio interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in
Roldan met an accident resulting in his death while on board the said M/V "Singapura Pertama" favor of labor.
during the performance of his duties; that on December 3, 1973, the respondent Virjen Shipping
and Marine Services, Inc. paid the complainant Natividad Roldan the amount of P6,000.00 For lack of merit, this petition is DENIED.
representing Workmen's Compensation benefits and donations of the company; that the amount
SO ORDERED.
of P4,870 was spent by the respondent company as burial expenses of the deceased Remegio
Roldan.
The only issue therefore remaining to be resolved by the Board in connection with the particular
case, is whether or not under the existing laws (Philippine and foreign), the complainant
Natividad Roldan is entitled to additional benefits other than those mentioned earlier. The Board
takes judicial notice, (as a matter of fact, the respondent having admitted in its memorandum) of
the fact that "Singapura Pertama" is a foreign vessel of Singapore Registry and it is the policy of
this Board that in case of award of benefits to seamen who were either injured in the
performance of its duties or who died while in the course of employment is to consider the
benefits allowed by the country where the vessel is registered. Likewise, the Board takes notice
that Singapore maritime laws relating to workmen's compensation benefits are similar to that of
the Hongkong maritime laws which provides that in case of death, the heirs of the deceased
seaman should receive the equivalent of 36 months wages of the deceased seaman; in other
words, 36 months multiplied by the basic monthly wages. In the employment contract submitted
ANTONIO BENGSON III, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND TEODORO C. CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen."[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the
1935 Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth
Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said
provision of law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. — A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of
the following ways and/or events:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in,
the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto,
with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said
foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of
rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance
incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign
country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election
of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the
armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country,
he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S.
Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671
votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the
following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of
such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact
that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the
HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.[7]
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino
since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995,
and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen
when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the
innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways
of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications[12] and none of the disqualifications[13] provided by law to become a Filipino
citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years
from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the
applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated
rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a
mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino
citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications[17] and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II;[20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic
necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person
desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court,
and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.][25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously
because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their
Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article
IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized
Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those
who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is
not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he
is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
elected as member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
latter.[30] In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the
latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion
in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 221697, March 08, 2016 ]
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. Nos. 221698-700]
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No.
15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and (4) 23
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-
007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3
September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968,
Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the
petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."[1]
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court
granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary
notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court
decreed adoption,[2] the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second
half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-
Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her
adoptive parents.[3] Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the
lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a
new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.[4]
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the
local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.[5]
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287[6] by
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she
renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and
DD156616.[7]
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University
of the Philippines[8] but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States
of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.[9]
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a
citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan
City.[10] Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew
back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991.[11]
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April
1992.[12] Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both
born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively.[13]
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen.[14] She obtained U.S.
Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.[15]
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave
birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July
2004.[16]
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines
upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition.[17] Her father slipped into a coma
and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care
of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.[18]
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire
family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005.[19] The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester;[20] coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods,
furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;[21] and inquiry with Philippine authorities
as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country.[22] As early
as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.[23]
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005[24] and without delay,
secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3)
children immediately followed[25] while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete
pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.[26]
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband
purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San
Juan City in the second half of 2005.[27] The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title
covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to
petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.[28] Meanwhile, her children of school age
began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of
some of the family's remaining household belongings.[29] She travelled back to the Philippines
on 11 March 2006.[30]
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the
family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S.[31] The family home was
eventually sold on 27 April 2006.[32]
Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4
May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006.[33]
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills,
Quezon City where they built their family home[34] and to this day, is where the couple and
their children have been residing.[35] A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was
issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1 June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003.[36] Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.[37] As can be gathered from its 18 July
2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to
have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the
Philippines.[38]
Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the
names of her three (3) children.[39]
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August
2006.[40] She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999.[41] This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine
Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.[42]
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).[43] Before assuming her
post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of
America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20
October 2010,[44] in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No.
9225.[45] The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the
BI[46] and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.[47] From then on, petitioner
stopped using her American passport.[48]
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila
an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."[49] On that day, she
accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she
had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others,
of relinquishing her American citizenship.[50] In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated
that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968
to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.[51]
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.[52]
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the
question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."[53] Petitioner obtained
the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.[54]
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530.[55]
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections.[56] In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months counted from 24 May 2005.[57] The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit
Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public
in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.[58]
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of
several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition
to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and
raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.[59] She is convinced that the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over her petition.[60] Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner
committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a naturalborn
Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.[61]
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-
born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling.[62] Elamparo claimed that
international law does not confer natural born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings.[63] Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen to begin with.[64] Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino,
she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American
citizen.[65] According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.[66]
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the
sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had
resided in the country for only six (6) years and six (6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her
natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency
requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July
2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption
that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that
she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.[67]
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a
petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential
elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the
BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate
intent to misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and
residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered
citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the
place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her
COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and
effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest
mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of
domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino
people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's next
leader.[68]
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that
petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations
which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate
of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and
Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is
hereby CANCELLED.[69]
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which
the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.[70]
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in GR. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the
COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure,[71] docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the
requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency.[72]
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of
unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens
since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status.[73] Tatad invoked the rule of
statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 1935 Constitution is
indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them.[74]
Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.[75]

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her
claim that foundlings have a nationality.[76]According to Tatad, international conventions and
treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to
treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.[77] He also stressed that there is no standard state
practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.[78]
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-
born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.[79]
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten
(10) year residency requirement.[80]Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in
Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime
in 2010 or 2011.[81]
Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as
evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.[82]
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as
SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow
upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.[83] He advanced the view that former natural-born
citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and
will not revert to their original status as natural born citizens.[84]
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been
a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May
2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have
validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency
requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition,[85] docketed
as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's
2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year
period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when
she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
by 9 May 2016.[86] Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's
residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.[87] He asserted that petitioner's
physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen
and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.[88]
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His
petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections
12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.[89] Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged
lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized
grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.[90]
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on
establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.[91] A petition for quo warranto falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.[92]
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents.[93] Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born
citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found.[94] Consequently, the petitioner is
considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.[95]
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated
under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.[96] Moreover, the official
acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of
the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as
MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.[97] She believed
that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.[98]
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her
domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and
schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction
of their family home in Corinthian Hills.[99]
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines
even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a
change of domicile are complied with.[100] She reasoned out that there was norequirement that
renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicilee of
choice.[101]
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator
was a mistake made in good faith.[102]
In a Resolution[103] promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled
that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year
residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she
declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and
National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First
Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions
for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining
order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015,
temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its
representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders
from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner
in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe Llamanzares and to ANNUL
and SET ASIDE the:
Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares.
Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated
cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-
139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
Llamanzares, respondent.
Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the I December
2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December
2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a
QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC
and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if,
as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The
COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof
of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article
IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials
and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and
accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means,
or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national
affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their
registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all
forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its
directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article
VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the
Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by
the Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections,[104] which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v.
COMELEC[105] is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25
§ 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied
by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a
substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art.
IX, A, § 6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from
the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially
involves an inquiry into qualificationsbased on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art.
IX, C, § 2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but
also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a
declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in § 12 and § 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate
or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is
to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply
that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473)
That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the Law does not imply that he does not
suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in § 4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice
Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining
before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be
disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined
lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why
it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be
voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some
reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his
proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in
this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquinos residence was
still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes
the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The
law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the
position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after
the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No.
7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.[106]
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led
to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule
25. This, the 15 February 1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.[107]
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final
decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as
presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a
competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one
to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the
COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by
a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy
be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior
decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that
deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and
residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings[108]are not mentioned
in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution,[109] they then cannot be citizens.
As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling,
she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after
saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino
citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she
now has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on
Paternity and Filiation.[110] That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was
on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents
should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that
her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but
whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters. - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or no existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of
improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA)[111] that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was
99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and
1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669
Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing
ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or
99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In
1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1,190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same
year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%.
COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during
the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population
in Iloilo was Filipino.[112]
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino
features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.[113] All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with
typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population
of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99%
chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and
the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the
words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so
they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where
the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a
50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero.
What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos?
99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there
were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children
in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino
children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability
that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the
total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-
Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am
confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural
born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the
likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%.
Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners
abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better
economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising
abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child
excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there
may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child
of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty 99.9% - that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use
an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of
human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not
separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[114] this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.[115]
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is
inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not
recognized by the father.
xxxx
President: [We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the
amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols: To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of
unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola: For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes
consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all
children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered
Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is
the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child
of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and
there is no need...
Sr. Rafols: There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to
be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola: But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for
amendment.
Sr. Rafols: The amendment should read thus: "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father
and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown
parentage."
Sr. Briones: The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown
parentage.
Sr. Rafols: The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not
recognize the child, is not unknown.
President: Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols: I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the
children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child.
Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino
mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos.
President: The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the
Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion: Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the
hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas: Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and Jar in
between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law
the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents
are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a
provision on the subject exhaustively.[116]
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection
to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their
number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account,[117] cited by
petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as
Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of
the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of
the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution
of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016
Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the
proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to
explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas
which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers
of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even
wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola
and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to
expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and
the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as
Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried
over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was
paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently
vocal.[118]
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and
humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon
them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications
of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records
of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the status
of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and
inflict this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the
present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which
mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."
Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of
their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws
do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil
Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal
capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the
adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,[119] a child left by an unidentified mother
was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the
parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status
of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not
over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.[120](Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise
known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts
to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at
best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act
must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is
done not by the child but by the authorities.[121] Secondly, the object of the process is the
determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the
process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino
mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as
evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.[122] The Decree of Adoption issued
on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling
parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.[123]
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into
a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as locallegislation.[124] On the other
hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.[125] International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.[126] "General principles of
law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or
judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally,"[127] such as
"general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general
principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect
of Employment and Occupation."[128] These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Bill of Rights.[129]
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of
the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.[130] Article 15
thereof states:
Everyone has the right to a nationality.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7
The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for
by his or her parents.
States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national
law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular
where the child would otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are
required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that nochild is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at
the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization
laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the
applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention
on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the
child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in
cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the
State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he
is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the
nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which[131] effectively affirms Article 14 of the
1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.[132] In Razon v.
Tagitis,[133] this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that
the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding
as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for
declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention
had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the
ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was
content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in
Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada,[134] where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"[135] the 1966
"Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that
nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments
Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally
accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in
Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are
"basic to legal systems generally,"[136] support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as
"generally accepted principles of international law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence[137] shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America,
and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those
countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the
1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also,
the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189
countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances,
including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in
which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle
of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on
Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the
Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues
passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the
executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided
by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of
foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor
General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties
and conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of
foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court
ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool
to deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.[138]
The COMELEC also ruled[139] that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions
of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC
reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born"
citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
 application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the
In the seminal case of Bengson III v. HRET,[140] repatriation was explained as follows: Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court
also said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized reliance thereupon should be respected."[148]
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural born Filipino. Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a
falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They
under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC[141]where we described it as an "abbreviated
she was a natural born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of
repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreño v.
her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
Commission on Audit,[142] which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,[143] where we said that
"[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects
citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on Audit[144] is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his
of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except
Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."
when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."[149] Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner
was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as
of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended
implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
issue."[150] That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole
cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree
other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
confidential."[151] The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were
COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the
policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was
she was an adoptee.
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET[145]where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to
mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the
country, is a natural born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect"
same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is,
one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types
moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse
of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there
of discretion.
is no third category for repatriated citizens:
On Residence
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there
are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural- committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and
born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear:
as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on
for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural born Filipino. As such, The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9
Representatives.[146] May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten
(10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while
to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her
we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively
pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for
applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,[147] where we
good from the U.S.
decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.[152] To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In
other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.[153]
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S.
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former
U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time
she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a
freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000
pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how
to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in
Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for
petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006
and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005
from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family;
March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final
statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on
27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where
petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her
family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from
petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in
2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family
home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed
as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the
presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but
maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.[154] The COMELEC disregarded the import of
all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest date that
petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application
under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v.
COMELEC,[155] Japzon v. COMELEC[156] and Caballero v. COMELEC.[157] During the
oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.[158] Respondents
contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until
he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa free entry
under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May
2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,[159] the only evidence presented was a community tax
certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC[160] did not involve a candidate who wanted to count
residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that
residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after
reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC,[161] the candidate
admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent
vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,[162] the candidate was found to be an American citizen
who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her
U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she
offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by
this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the
respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house,
taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the
U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the
Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S.
house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence
here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying
property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad,
her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it
is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise
known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding
intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the
law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines."[163] The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail
of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members
of society upon their return to the country"[164] in line with the government's "reintegration
program."[165] Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate
into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that
the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to
allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to
the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner
did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the
return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is
extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,[166] and the other
cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a
situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided
particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the
COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six (6) years and six (6) months as
"period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the
COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the
COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COCas
false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the
2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said
that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house
was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her
lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13
May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by
the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not
have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house
and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before.
Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was
by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of
residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,[167] the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence
where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence,
not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement." The
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the
truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it
would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period
of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and
physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC
took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality,
petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When
she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so
in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August
2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence,
petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for
purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC,
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this
point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period
of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already
matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo
warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a
mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six (6) years and six (6) months as she misunderstood
the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case
was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for President
on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous
statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the
2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her
side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his
COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but
should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications to run for public office.[168]
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number
of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non
revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying
home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the
petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to
a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence
sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the
residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing
jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines
residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for
election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency
have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in
number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.[169] It ignores, above all else,
what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her
COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her
eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has
been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013
Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator
which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral
arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not
have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never
made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016.
Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy.
There are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such
other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. [petitioner's] husband however stayed
in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner]
enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in
Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she
was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer
who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating
that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of
some of the family's remaining household belongings. [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on
11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the
family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the
Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they
eventually built their family home.[170]
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall
under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned
by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En
Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-
001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9,
2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P
Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and
SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and
National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of
the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999 ]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO AND
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not
a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELEC's Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios
Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based
on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955
of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco,
California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino
and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which
he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The motion remained
pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.[4] Petitioner's
motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor
of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution
of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws
under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as
his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents
brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also
registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien
certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship,
as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United
States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself
as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his
US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on
May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand
eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who
obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two
thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty
four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be
far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues
involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf.
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second
Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of
candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the
position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper
notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano
as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of
August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en
banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati
City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already
37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in
the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of
Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on
7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner
even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-
Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano ¾
whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an
original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's
motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore,
cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. ¾ Any person allowed to
initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be
permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he
has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or
proceeding.
....
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. ¾ In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention,
the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or
proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor
an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati
City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came
out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation
at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent
from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in
several cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and
the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention"
on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position"
under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the
action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered
the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after constitutional provisions on citizenship.
election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of
substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was
citizenship. included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
its necessity as follows:[10]
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual
citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of . . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have
Makati City. circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance - and I
reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the
accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double
citizenship at all.
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the
any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated
problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of
in the Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600
chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with
known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of
him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland
"command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold
China in the People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
local elective office."
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries
were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or
of jus soli;
Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown
Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese ¾ it is of common knowledge in Manila.
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means
fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;
economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered
And so, this is exactly what we ask ¾ that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
citizenship.
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH
ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:[11]
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in
the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who
spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which
pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which
elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national
security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave
of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic
of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to
Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance
to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary
of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep
concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant
to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be
left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real
impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of
double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed
amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship,
it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
"[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control."[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following
discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any
person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but
his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that
such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine
citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of
his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation
disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he
would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or
the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce.
There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect,
be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at
birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question.
So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of
Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President.
He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that
he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty"[14] of which at the
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen
of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of
our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts.
The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the
requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we
would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be
resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will
and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4,
1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while
the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a
national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held
that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
"effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made
when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether
by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over
foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate
foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post,
private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the
following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE
FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL
ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION
OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN
ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At best,
Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but
before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioner's contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority
since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There
is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere
fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of
said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship
must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is

not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves nodoubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared
in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 195649, July 02, 2013 ]
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013
and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010
elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his
term of office. While the relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for
reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnado’s election or affirm
that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Court’s
Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only
twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his
renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before
this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as
having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American
Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship.
If indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was
still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this
claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,[1] which must be presented as public
documents[2] of a foreign country and must be “evidenced by an official publication
thereof.”[3] Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be
considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States
“providing that a person who is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of
Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to
expatriation.”[4]
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time
Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own
declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law
that serves as the basis for Arnado’s disqualification to run for any local elective position.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that
“all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.”[5] This policy pertains to the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)[6] requires those who have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign
citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code[7] which disqualifies those with dual citizenship
from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for
public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who
reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport – which indicates the
recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national – even after the Filipino has
renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen
of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued
it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American
citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship.
It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S.
passport at least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado’s renunciation of his
American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be
made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to
remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because
it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of
taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado “a man without a country”. On the
contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision
does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he
also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with SO ORDERED.
by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless
the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence.[8] They are accorded not
only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the
administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an
extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.[9]

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his
U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked
by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times,
and which agreed with Arnado’s claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those occasions
because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that
Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following
dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4
June 2010.

None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived
in the Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his
nationality is USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the
Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon
departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and
upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that “the use of the US passport was because to his
knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use.”[10] This conclusion,
however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on
18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already
received his Philippine passport. Arnado’s travel records show that he presented his U.S.
passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were
never refuted by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the
use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport.
Arnado’s continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to
what the dissent wants us to believe.

It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively
Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for
public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign
passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking
the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby DENIEDwith finality.
[ G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015 ]
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
FLORANTE CAPITAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines could run for and hold elective public office.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Per Curiam Resolution[2] dated December 9, 2013 of respondent
Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), which affirmed the
Resolution[3] dated September 6, 2013 of the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec, relying
on our ruling in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,[4] disqualified petitioner Rommel C.
Arnado (Arnado) from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, set aside his proclamation as
elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and declared respondent Florante T. Capitan
(Capitan) as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in
preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225[5] (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention
and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US
citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines
after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.
While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed
the winning candidate.
On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado's
continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation
and held that the rule on succession should be followed.
Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling),
another mayoralty candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in
the case. He argued that the Comelec First Division erred in applying the rule on succession.
On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution reversing the ruling of the
Comelec First Division. It held that Arnado's use of his US passport did not operate to revert his
status to dual citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found merit in Arnado's explanation that he
continued to use his US passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a
Philippine passport at the time of the relevant foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted
that, after receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his subsequent trips.
Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition docketed as G.R No. 195649.
While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local elective officials
for the May 13, 2013 elections officially began. On October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his
CoC[6] for the same position. Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan.
On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it annulled and
set aside the Comelec En Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualified Arnado from running
for elective position, and declared Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
Del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections. In so ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court
opined that in his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively disavowed or recalled
his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus:
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado's act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." Tills
does not mean that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he
in fact did. It was after complying with the requirements that he perfonned positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced
his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any
public office.
xxxx
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.[7]

The issuance of this Court's April 16, 2013 Decision sets the stage for the present controversy.
On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling, Arnado executed an
Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April3, 2009."[8]
The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado's lone rival for the mayoralty post,
filed a Petition[9] seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan
and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. The case was docketed
as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and was raffled to the Comelec's Second Division. The resolution of
said petition was, however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado garnered
8,902 votes (84% of the total votes cast) while Capitan obtained 1,707 (16% of the total votes
cast) votes only.
On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition[10] this time seeking to nullify Arnado's proclamation.
He argued that with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt
that Arnado is disqualified from running for any local elective office. Hence, Arnado's
proclamation is void and without any legal effect.
Ruling of the Comelec Second Division
On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a Resolution granting the
petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and disqualify Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013
elections. Following Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the time he filed his CoC on October 1,
2012, Arnado still failed to comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. While he executed the April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn or recalled when he subsequently
traveled abroad using his US passport, as held in Maquiling.
The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute another Affidavit of
Renunciation for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections. While a May 9, 2013 Affidavit
Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3, 2009" was submitted
in evidence, the same would not suffice because it should have been executed on or before the
filing of the CoC on October 1, 2012.
The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Division's Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is granted. Respondent Rommel
Cagoco Arnado is disqualified from running in the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration.[12] He argued that the
Comelec Second Division erred in applying Maquiling claiming that the said case is not on all
fours with the present controversy; that Capitan's Petition was filed beyond the 25-day
reglementary period reckoned from the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the
Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the
ballots, their overwhelming support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the Comelec
Second Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed and that he be declared as eligible
to run for mayor ofKauswagan.
On December 9, 2013, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Comelec Second
Division. It accordingly annulled the proclamation of Arnado and declared Capitan as the duly
elected mayor of Kauswagan. The dispositive portion of the Comelec En Banc's Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby
DISMISSED. The Proclamation of Private Respondent Rommel C. Arnado as the duly elected
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. FLORANTE
T. CAPITAN is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
inthe May 13, 2013 Elections.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence, on December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition with ancillary prayer for
injunctive relief to maintain the status quo ante. On December
26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order or Temporary
Restraining Order[14] in view of the issuance by the Comelec En Banc of a Writ of Execution
to implement its December 9, 2013 Resolution.
On January 14, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution[15] requiring the respondents to file their
respective comments on the petition. In the same Resolution, this Court granted Arnado's
ancillary relief for temporary restraining order.
Capitan thus filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order dated
January 14, 2014,[16]contending that the acts sought to be restrained by Arnado are already fait
accompli. He alleged that the Comelec En Banc had already issued a Writ of Execution[17] and
pursuant thereto a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers was convened. It proclaimed him to
be the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014 he took his oath of office.
Since then, he has assumed and performed the duties and functions of his office.
In a Resolution[18] dated February 25, 2014, this Court ordered the issuance of a Status Quo
Ante Order directing the parties to allow Arnado to continue performing his functions as mayor
of Kauswagan pending resolution of this case.
Issues
In support of his Petition, Arnado raises the following issues:
I Finally, Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the notarial register of his former
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2ND DIVISION VIOLATED
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO DISMISS THE PETITIONS OF RESPONDENT CAPITAN ON THE GROUND
OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND/OR LATE FILING, ETC.
II
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY ALLOWING COM. ELIAS YUSOPH
TO REVIEW THE DECISION HE WROTE FOR THE 2NDDIVISION.
III
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISENFRANCHISING 84% OF THE VOTERS OF KAUSWAGAN IN THE MAY 2013
ELECTIONS.
IV
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER WHO HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225 BEFORE THE FILING OF HIS COC ON OCTOBER 1,
2012.[19]
Arnado claims that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and violated his right to
procedural due process in not dismissing Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC). He avers
that Capitan is guilty of forum-shopping because the latter subsequently filed a similar case
docketed as SPC No. 13-019. In addition, SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day
prescriptive period reckoned from the time of the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.
Arnado likewise claims that the proceeding before the Comelec is peppered with procedural
infirmities. He asserts that the Comelec violated its own rules in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC)
without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate; that SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was not set
for trial and no hearing for the reception of evidence was ever conducted; and, that the Comelec
did not follow its own rules requiring the issuance of a notice of promulgation of resolutions.
Arnado further claims that the Comelec En Banc not only committed grave abuse of discretion
but also violated his constitutional right to due process when it allowed Commissioner Elias R.
Yusoph (Commissioner Yusoph) to participate in the review of the Decision he penned for the
Second Division. Furthermore, the Comelec En Banccommitted grave abuse of discretion when
it disqualified him from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, thereby disenfranchising 84% of
the voters of Kauswagan who all voted for him.
counsel, Atty. Thomas Dean M. Quijano, revealed that he executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance[20] on November 30, 2009. Hence, at the time he filed
his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to
any other country and, therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13,
2013 elections.
Our Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Petition for certiorari is limited to the
determination of whether the respondent
tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a
matter of policy, this Court will not interfere with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is
shown that it had committed grave abuse of discretion.[21] Thus, in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave
abuse of discretion as the "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction."[22] "Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave."[23] Grave
abuse of discretion has likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the Constitution, the
law or jurisprudence.[24]
In this case, and as will be discussed below, there is no showing that the Comelec En Banc acted
capriciously or whimsically in issuing its December 9, 2013 Resolution. Neither did it act
contrary to law or jurisprudence.
Arnado's allegations that Capitan
violated the rule against forumshopping
and that the latter's petition in
SPA No.13-309(DC) was filed late,
unsubstantiated and erroneous.
There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause,
are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.[25] It exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[26] Thus, there is forum-shopping
when in both actions there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would
represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars
is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[27]
Here, Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping. He merely made a general
averment that in resolving the petitions of Capitan in SPA No. 13-309 (OC) and SPC No. 13-
019, the Comelec En Banc, as well as its Second Division, failed to comply with this Court's
Revised Circular No. 28-91,[28] without demonstrating how forum-shopping was supposed to
be present. He has not shown that the petitions in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019
involved the same parties, issues, and reliefs. In fact, Arnado did not even bother to submit to
this Court a copy of the Petition in SPC No. 13-019 (annulment of proclamation case). As the
party insisting that Capitan committed forum-shopping, Arnado bears the burden of establishing
the same. After all, it is settled that he who alleges has the burden of proving it; mere allegation
is not sufficient.[29]
Besides, and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the parties in SPA No. 13-309 (DC)
and SPC No. 13-019 are not the same. In the first case, the parties are only Capitan and Arnado.
In the second case, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is
impleaded as respondent. There is also dissimilitude in the reliefs sought. The former case
sought to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC while the latter case prayed for the
annulment of Arnado's proclamation as mayor of Kauswagan.
With regard to the alleged tardiness in the filing of Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC),
it appears that Arnado either failed to grasp the import of Capitan's allegations therein or he
made a deliberate partial misrepresentation in stating that the same is one for cancellation of
CoC. A copy[30] thereof annexed to Arnado's herein petition states that it is a petition "to
disqualify and/or cancel the certificate of candidacy" of Arnado. The allegations therein state
in no uncertain terms that it is one for disqualification based on Arnado's failure to comply with
the requisites of RA 9225 and on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. Thus, the Comelec
Second Division appropriately treated it as a petition for disqualification with the alternative
prayer to cancel Arnado's CoC. It is elementary that the nature of the action is determined by the
allegations in the petition.[31]
Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,[32] a petition for disqualification
should be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than
the date of proclamation." Here, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14,
2013.[33] Thus, the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10,
2013.[34]
The other procedural lapses allegedly
committed by the Comelec are likewise
unsubstantiated. Assuming the allegations of
Arnado to be true, the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Arnado's claim that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC)
without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate likewise lacks substantiation. In the first
place, Arnado has not attached a copy of said motion to his petition. This alone is sufficient
ground for the dismissal of his Rule 64 Petition, filed in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, for not being accompanied by pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto.[35] Also, it was Capitan who filed the motion for consolidation. Not being the movant,
Arnado is not in a position to question the alleged inaction of the Comelec on said motion. And
even assuming that he has, by filing a Verified Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec En
Banc and subsequently appealing to this Court despite the still unresolved motion for
consolidation, Arnado effectively abandoned said motion for consolidation. In Cayago v. Hon.
Lina,[36] it was held that once a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the
appellant is deemed to have abandoned the unresolved motion which remains pending with the
tribunal of origin. "[I]t is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and
deny that same jurisdiction."[37]
In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, consolidation is only
permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9 reads:
Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.- When an action or proceeding involves a question of law and
fact which is similar to or common with that of another action or proceeding, the same may be
consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number.
In Muñoz v. Comelec,[38] this Court accentuated "that the term 'may' is indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or
faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply
with the conditions attached thereto, which in this case require that the cases to be consolidated
must involve similar questions of law and fact."[39] In this case, the consolidation of SPA No.
13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 does not appear to be necessary. As earlier mentioned, said
cases do not even involve the same parties and reliefs sought. Hence, no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the Comelec in not consolidating them.
Arnado's protestation that the Comelec violated its own rules when it decided SPA No. 13-309
(DC) without setting it for trial likewise deserves scant consideration. The proceedings in a
special action for disqualification of candidates under Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure are summary in nature where a trial type proceeding may be dispensed
with.[40] In Diangka v. Comelec,[41] this Court held that:
Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously
applied in administrative proceedings specially where the law calls for the proceeding to be
summary in character. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, petitions for disqualifications are subject to summary hearings. In relation thereto,
Section 3, Rule 17 of the said Rules provides that it remains in the sound discretion of the
COMELEC whether clarification questions are to be asked the witnesses-affiants, and whether
the adverse party is to be granted opportunity to cross-examine said witnesses affiants.
Furthermore, when the COMELEC en banc reviews and evaluates a party's petition, or as in the
case at bar, a party's answer and the supporting papers attached thereto, the same is tantamount
to a fair "hearing" of his case.[42]
Arnado's claim that the Comelec En Banc
committed grave abuse of discretion and violated
his right to due process in allowing Commissioner
Yusoph to participate in the deliberation of the assailed
Comelec En Banc Resolution is likewise bereft of
substantiation.
Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6, 2013 Resolution of
the Comelec Second Division and the December 9, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is
not correct. While Commissioner Yusoph, together with Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca and Luie Tito F. Guia, signed said Resolution, there is nothing therein which would
indicate that Commissioner Yusoph was the writer or the ponente of said Resolution. The
September 6, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division does not state who
the ponente is. The same goes true with the questioned December 9, 2013 Per
Curiam Resolution[43] of the Comelec En Banc. As a per curiamresolution, it was arrived at by
the Comelec En Banc as a whole and without any particular ponente. Hence, we need not
belabor Arnado's claim of denial of due process as his basis therefor lacks factual moorings.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin
requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at
the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013
elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice.
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is
disqualified from running for any elective local position. In Mercado v. anzano,[44] it was
clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring
to "dual allegiance.''[45] Subsequent, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens
of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon
compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the
Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath46
prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Thus:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, ruled
that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as
held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,[47] his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation
was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit.
Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013
elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The Comelec also noted that
while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.
The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in upholding the
Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running for public
office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for public office
during the 2010 elections — being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on
October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom.
Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the
deficiency in his qualification because at the time this Court promulgated its Decision
in Maquiling on April 16, 2013, the period for filing the CoC for local elective office had
already lapsed. Or, as Justice Arturo D. Brion puts it in his Dissenting Opinion, "[t]o the extent
that Arnado was denied the chance to submit a replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, then
there was an unfair and abusive denial of opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion."
Besides, shortly after learning of the Court's April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling or on May 9,
2013, Arnado substantially complied therewith by executing an affidavit affirming his April3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with the
effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-
born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges
under RA 9225. It was settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport amounts to
repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel and of
first impression, plus the fact that Arnado could not have divined the possible adverse
consequences of using his US passport, the Court in Maquiling did not act with leniency or
benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with
qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with. Otherwise stated, the
Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly
complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office or to simply allow him to
correct the deficiency in his qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is
with more reason that in this case, we should similarly require strict compliance with the
qualifications to run for local elective office.
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office during the
May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same. Arnado's use
of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification
to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his
CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling,
therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case following the salutary doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things
which are established.[48] Under the doctrine, "[w]hen the court has once laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases where facts are substantially the same."[49] It enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents and bars relitigation of the same issue.[50]
It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a petition to
disqualify him, Arnado has gotten wind that the use of his US passport might pose a problem to
his candidacy. In other words, when Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he was not
totally unaware that the use of his US passport after he had executed the Affidavit of
Renunciation might have an impact on his qualification and candidacy. In fact, at that
time, Maquiling had already reached this Court. But despite the petitions filed against him
questioning his qualification to run for public office in 2010, Arnado filed his CoC on October
1, 2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in his candidacy for the 2013 elections and
without executing another Affidavit of Renunciation. In short, the argument that Arnado should
be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his CoC since Maquiling was promulgated
after the lapse of the period for filing a CoC for the 2013 elections, is totally bereft of merit.
Consistent with our April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling, Arnado should be made to face the
consequences of his inaction since he could have remedied it at the time he filed his CoC on
October 1, 2012 or even before that. There is no law prohibiting him from executing an
Affidavit of Renunciation every election period if only to avert possible questions about his
qualifications.
The alleged November 30, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance cannot be given any
probative weight.
As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath
of Allegiance, the same is highly suspect. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
original or certified true copy thereof was not presented. In addition, such crucial evidence
sufficient to alter the outcome of the case was never presented before the Comelec much less in
the Maquiling case. Curiously, it only surfaced for the first time in this petition. In Jacot v.
Dal,[51] this Court disallowed the belated presentation of similar evidence on due process
considerations. Thus:
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings
below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court, administrative agency or quasi- judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing
court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of
fairness and due process impel this rule. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to
accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly.
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. Petitioner should
have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence of any
applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect." Section 34 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not
formally presented:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.- The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent
had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to
due process. Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly
justice.[52]
Moreover, in Maquiling it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport on January 12,
2010 and March 23, 2010. Thus:
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 201 0,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following
pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700[53]
Despite the existence of such statement in Maquiling, We are puzzled why Arnado never
bothered to correct or refute it. He neither alleged nor presented evidence in this petition to
prove that he did not travel abroad on those dates using his US passport.
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains the same position he had taken
in Maquiling that Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 is an isolated act justified by the
circumstances at that time. At any rate, Arnado started to use his Philippine passport in his
travels abroad beginning December 11, 2009 and thenceforth. This, according to J. Leonen, is
borne out by Arnado's Philippine passport.
With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not only reviving an
issue that had already been settled with finality in the Maquiling case, but he is also going
beyond the issues raised in this petition. To reiterate for clarity, Arnado's argument in this case-
that he is qualified to run for mayor as he has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225
relative to the May 13, 2013 elections- is premised only on the alleged newly discovered
November 30, 2009 Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not claim in this case that his use of US
passport in his travel abroad in 2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen insists. In Vazquez v. De
Borja,[54] it was held that courts do not have jurisdiction over issues neither raised in the
pleading nor tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. They cannot render
judgment based on issues that have never been raised before them. Equally settled is the rule
that "points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
[tribunal] need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these
cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie
this rule."[55] The same goes true with J. Brion's theory that what was cancelled by virtue
of Maquiling was only the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation where Arnado expressly
renounced any foreign citizenship; not the July 10, 2008 Oath of Allegiance which carried with
it an implied abdication of foreign citizenship. For J. Brion, "[t]he requirement of an express
renunciation x x x does not negate the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit
renunciation of citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the oath of allegiance." Again, this
was never raised in this petition. At any rate, the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required
by Section 3[56] of RA 9225. For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for
public office, Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their
CoC. Definitely, the provisions of Section 5(2) are not useless or meaningless surplusage. When
the law expressly requires an explicit renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient.
Furthermore, even assuming that Arnado's 2008 implied renunciation is sufficient, the same has
also been negated by his use of his US passport in 2009, following the ruling in Maquiling.
Otherwise, we would give more weight to an implied renunciation than to an express one
specifically required by law.
Besides, the Decision of this Court in Maquiling holding that Arnado's use of his US passport
effectively recanted his Affidavit of Renunciation has already become final and immutable. We
can no longer resurrect in this case the issues that have already been resolved there with fmality.
In maintaining that Arnado used his Philippine passport in travelling abroad in the first quarter
of 2010, J. Leonen relies on the copy thereof attached to the rollo of the Maquiling case. But
said copy of Arnado's Philippine passport[57]is a mere "CERTIFIED TRUE COPY FROM
THE MACIDNE COPY ON FILE" as attested to by Rosario P. Palacio, Records Officer Ill of
the Comelec.[58] This is clearly stamped on aforesaid copy of Arnado's Philippine passport. A
machine copy or photocopy is a mere secondary evidence.[59] As such, it cannot be admitted in
evidence until and unless the offeror has proven the due execution and the subsequent loss or
unavailability of the original.[60] In this case, however, Arnado's Philippine passport is not
missing. Thus, said photocopy of Arnado's Philippine passport cannot sway us to depart from
the uncontroverted certification of the Bureau ofimmigration that Arnado used his US passport
on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Consequently, even assuming that the recently
discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance is true and
authentic, Arnado once more performed positive acts on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010,
which effectively negated the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit resulting in his
disqualification to run for an elective public office.
Landslide election victory cannot
override eligibility requirements.
In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a
candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections,
garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same "cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications."[61] In Velasco v. Comelec,[62] this
Court pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will
become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
specifies the basic positive qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the Court
ruled that popular vote cannot override the required qualifications under Section 39,[63] a
fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow the same policy when it comes to
disqualifications enumerated under Section 40[64] of the same law. After all, "[t]he
qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the requirements for election to local
public offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section which lays down the
circumstances that disqualify local candidates."[65]
Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v. Comelec.[66] In that case,
petitioner Lopez was also a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of RA
9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy for Chairman of BarangayBagacay, San Dionisio,
Iloilo in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29,
2007 without first making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In spite
of the fact that Lopez won in the elections, this Court still affmned the Resolution of the
Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a candidate for a local elective position for his failure to
comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225. Thus:
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the
functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering
the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.[67]
In fine, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec En Banc in
sustaining the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running
in the May 13, 2013 elections and in accordingly setting aside his proclamation as elected
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and proclaiming Capitan as the duly elected mayor of
said municipality.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec
Resolutions are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995 ]
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed.[1] The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to
the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
election."[2] The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973
Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted
with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community."[3]
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:[4]
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________________ Years and seven
Months
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification"[5] with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent
contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates to the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter
Registration Record 94-No. 3349772[6] and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."[7]
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing
the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.[8] On
the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed
on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed
on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.[9]
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private
respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same
day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original
Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation"[10] which she sought to
rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence."[11] Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her
disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city
but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa
following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with
the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill,
along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill
did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition
for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the
judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.[12]
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a
vote of 2 to 1,[13] came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy.[14] Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and
petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
"Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven"
(months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and,
therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that
what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or
domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood."
In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven
months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the
District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of 'honest misinterpretation or honest mistake.' Besides,
the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she
was quite aware of 'residence of origin' which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious
why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she
thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe
because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the
Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of 'Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to
be elected immediately preceding the election.' thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is
devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case
of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is
misplaced. The case only applies to the `inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the
result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and
orderly conduct of elections.' The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as
a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the
place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her
qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended
certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, to
the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to
prolong it by claiming it was 'since childhood' is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent
indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of
Brgy Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A,
Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan,
Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent
conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only
for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8,
1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe
in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by
this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not
complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term `residence' has always been considered as synonymous with
'domicile' which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon v. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez v. RTC-
Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991,
the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since
childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the
respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was
elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered
voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In
1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her
certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of
San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with
the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration
in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a
resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile,
she registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a
resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have
abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of
Romualdez v. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by
choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to
remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically
be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in llocos and
later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned
Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative
of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one
year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was
that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte
"since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of
Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995;
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she
placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers
only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the
First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that
she had been a resident of the district for six months only."[15]
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration[16] of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring
her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte.[17] The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY
it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification.[18]
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.[19]
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May, 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte
held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on
May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471
votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat
of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues
may be classified into two general areas:
I. The Issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for
a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner
outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under
Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in
the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs
Republic[20] this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home",
"a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."[21] Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence.[22] It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile
of choice. In Uytengsu vs Republic[23], we laid this distinction quite clearly:
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; 'domicile' denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria
of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile.
In Nuval vs Guray[24], the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."[25] Larena vs Teves[26] reiterated
the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs Quirino,[27] held that the
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence.[28] So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court
has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile
or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, `and a resident thereof', that is,
in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was
in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile.[29]
xxx xxx xxx
Ms. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to
actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical residence.[30]
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[31] this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence
in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.[32]
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied
the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence
in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears
to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting down
the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa,
Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the
space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when
herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible
to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of
actual residence in the First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently
noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the
possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately
by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:______________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of
stay in her actual residence in a space which required her period of stay in her legal residence or
domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 - the first requiring actual residence
and the second requiring domicile - coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for
which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate
the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing
than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District
of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24, 1995
maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally
cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where
she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter.
Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in
San Miguel, Manila where she registered as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served
these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here
is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence
and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs Teves[33], supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives
with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and
without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in
the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other
municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,[34] we explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to
improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to
improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or
business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or
business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one
and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the
government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to
his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not
been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification
in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong
feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of
abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of
(actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).[35]
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution:[36]
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from
1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St.
Pauls College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in
Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952
she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office
in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when
he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband
was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan,
Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter
in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the past four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept
her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-
publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political
power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the
ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized
ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos
power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the
majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of
petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of
origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving
the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and ... (could not)
re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again."
We do not agree.
First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family
back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate:[37]
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can
the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time.[38] In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former
domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in
1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
"domicile" and "residence."[39] The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the
term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the
two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms
imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while
in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence.[40]
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 110. - The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as
they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female
spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence
upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales,
sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer
his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place
of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a
fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one
place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law
to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into
the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity,
be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding
Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Article 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the
case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical
to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be
faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional
or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile. - Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate
decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is
used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one
another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a
place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
residence. Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has
been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence
is also established in some other place.[41]
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle. In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations[42] where
the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons,
revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs
Villareal[43] this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has
given cause for divorce."[44] Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new
residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually
opts, under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence
or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to
live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs Vasques de Arroyo[45] the Court held
that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded,
an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the
doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective
for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience
of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England,
formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the
instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would
make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience,
requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice
was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in
Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree
of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be
obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in
obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884)
abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can
still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an
order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover,
has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the
other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who
had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn vs. Darby,
36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of
the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order
of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and
in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money
and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the
ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property
which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than
the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her
property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been
followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner
was obliged- by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code- to follow her husband's actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing
which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr.
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the
Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from
that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses.[46]
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar
as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term
residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married
the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home,
not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in OIot, Leyte...to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland."[47] Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her
home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by
vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila
merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding
from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her
domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be
highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of
her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the
subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to
this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.[48] Moreover, petitioner contends that it
is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has
jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory,[49] "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it."[50] The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities,
this court in Marcelino v Cruz held that:[51]
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation
of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was
held that `the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or
time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some
incident of the essential act.' Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed
merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked
jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to
render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of
B.P. 881[52], it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction
over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives.[53] Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to
either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of
a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and
spirit of EDSA by ourselves bending established principles of law to deny an individual what he
or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board
of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.

SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. L-21289, April 05, 1924 ]
IN RE ESTATE OF ENGRACIO ORENSE, DECEASED. EUGENIA M. SANTOS, VIUDA
DE ORENSE, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP
OF NUEVA CACERES, OPPONENT AND APPELLEE.
DECISION
OSTRAND, J.:
It appears from the record of this case that the appellant's husband, Engracio Orense, a resident
of the municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, died on October 8, 1918, leaving an
estate which, according to the inventory filed by the appellant on May 19, 1919, was worth the
sum of P43,382.27 over and above all debts, expenses of last illness and the funeral, as well as
expenses of administration. The only claim presented to the committee on claims and approved
was one for P6,720 in favor of Asuncion Fortic de Morata, which has been paid.
The deceased left a will, according to which six parcels of land were left to the Roman Catholic
Church as trustee for various purposes, subject to a life estate in favor of the appellant who, in
the absence of descendants, ascendants and collateral heirs of the deceased, was made his
universal testamentary heir.
The will was probated on March 6, 1919, and the appellant was appointed executrix. In the
meantime, on January 29, 1919, the appellant, as special administratrix of the estate, filed a
motion reciting that the deceased, in his lifetime, had obtained a franchise to establish and
operate an electric light plant in the town of Guinobatan and had signed a contract with the
Pacific Commercial Company whereby the latter agreed to furnish him the machinery for the
plant for the sum of P15,590; that the machinery had begun to arrive and that the company was
urgently demanding payment of the second installment of the purchase price amounting to
P6,236 and that besides the said appellant was bound to continue to pay the sum of P779.50 per
month for ten months in order to completely extinguish the obligation; that she had no funds
with which to meet the obligation except liberty bonds to the amount of P5,000 and that it
would be necessary to borrow P10,000 from the National Bank or mortgage certain lands with
Torrens titles. She therefore asked for authority to sell or mortgage the liberty bonds or obtain a
loan of P10,000 from the bank. The desired authority was granted by the court two days later,
on January 31, 1919.
On November 20, 1919, the appellant who had then been appointed administratrix with the will
annexed, filed a motion with the court of First Instance asking that the declaration of heirs made
by the testator in his will be confirmed, and that a commission be appointed to make a nominal
division of the estate, the word "nominal" being used because, according to the terms of the
will, all of the property was to remain in possession of the appellant in usufruct. This motion
was granted by order of December 13, 1919, the court declaring the appellant the universal heir
of the testator and providing that the various legatees under the will should not take possession
of their respective legacies during the lifetime of the appellant or while "the debts of the
deceased occasioned by the establishment of the electric light plant in Guinobatan remained
unpaid." In the same order the court also appointed a commissioner to partition the estate in
accordance with the will and declared that the purpose of the partition was to secure the
termination of the testamentary proceedings and have the interests of the parties recorded in the
registry of deeds.
On September 1, 1920, the appellant submitted the commissioner's report of the nominal
partition, in which report the six parcels of land above referred to were duly assigned to the
Roman Catholic Church. In the report mention was made of the conditions of the will that the
legatees cannot take possession of the legacies while the widow lived, and as a special reason
why the legatees cannot take possession, it is further stated that "the deceased, and now the
estate, is in debt to the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P35,000 and to the Pacific
Commercial Company in the sum of P15,000, making in all P50,000." The court approved the
"nominal" partition of the estate by an order dated September 4, 1920.
On April 7, 1921, the appellant filed another motion in which she alleged that the debt of the
Pacific Commercial Company had been paid in full, but that the estate still owed the bank the
sum of 29,500 which, with other expenses, interest, etc., would amount to a total indebtedness
of P38,000 or P40,000; that the bank was demanding payment; that the estate was without funds
and that, because Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Niieva Caceres of the low price of
abaca, the income was not sufficient to pay the interest due the bank. After various other
allegations to the same effect, the motion concluded with a prayer for authority to sell four
parcels of land, three of which were devised to the Roman Catholic Church. The following
indorsement appears at the bottom of the motion:
"Conforme y recibi copia de la mocion precedente hoy 9 de abril de 1921.
"Julian Ope
"Parroco de Guinobatan"
On June 30, 1921, the appellant filed another motion in which she stated that "in conformity
with the bank and the legatees she had been seeking buyers for the properties included in the
former motion and that offers had not reached even half of the debts which amounted to
P40,000," and she therefore asked for authority to sell three more parcels of land, all of which
pertained to the devise in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. This motion also contained the
indorsement of Julian Ope, the parish priest of Guinobatan.
On July 6, 1921, the court dictated an order authorizing the disposal of the aforesaid parcels of
land, either at public or private sale as thought best, subject to the confirmation of the court.
On July 27, 1922, the appellant reported to the court that she had sold the smallest of the parcels
willed to the Roman Catholic Church for P350 and asked the approval of the court. This sale
was approved by an order dated August 12, 1922.
On February 5, 1923, the appellant again filed a motion asking for authority to sell seven small
parcels of rice land which had been devised to different nephews and nieces of the deceased.
The motion states that these small parcels adjoin one of the large parcels of abaca land devised
to the church and that a buyer has been found who was willing to pay P8,000 for the land
provided these small parcels were included. Before this motion had been acted upon, the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Nueva Caceres, a corporation sole, on February 12, 1923, filed a motion
asking that the order of June 16, 1920, authorizing the sale of the property willed to the Roman
Catholic Church be revoked on the ground that parish priests have no control over the Barlin vs. Ramirez and Municipality of Lagonoy, 7 Phil., 41; Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil, 315;
temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church and that, therefore, the consent given by Father Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 26 Phil.,
Julian Ope was invalid and of no legal effect and that the debts to which the proceeds of the sale 300; Harty vs. Sandin, 11 Phil., 450.) As all other facts upon which the order appealed from is
are to be devoted are not the debts of the deceased, but were incurred during the administration based appear in the record, it was unnecessary to require the presentation of other evidence.
of the estate by the administratrix through the mismanagement of its property.
We find no error in the order appealed from and the same is therefore affirmed, with the costs
The appellant, through her attorney, filed a lengthy answer to this motion, in which the against the appellant. So ordered.
questions involved were extensively discussed and in which the appellant insisted that the
motion having been filed one year and seven months after the issuance of the order of June 16,
1921, the order could not then be revoked. Upon argument by counsel for both parties, but
without any testimony being offered or received, the court, by an order dated July 3, 1923,
revoked the license to sell granted by the order of June 16, 1921, on the ground that the consent
to the sale given by the parish priest at Guinobatan was of no legal effect and that the license,
therefore, was improvidently granted.

The case is now before us upon appeal from said order of July 3, 1923, and the appellee argues
that the order appealed from, not constituting a final determination of the rights of the parties,
the appeal is premature and should be dismissed. In this we think counsel is mistaken. An order
for a license to sell real estate in administration proceedings, ordinarily, is in the nature of a
judgment upon the issues involved and an appeal may be taken therefrom as in the case of any
other judgment.

The appellant presents one assignment of error, involving two principal propositions, neither of
which is, in our opinion, tenable.
It is first argued that the motion for the revocation of the license to sell was presented out of
time and after the order granting the license had become final. There might be some force in this
contention if the motion were based on mere errors of procedure not affecting the jurisdiction of
the court, but, from our point of view, such is not the case here.

At the time of the granting of the license, a distribution of the estate of the deceased had been
made, the order of distribution had become final and the title to the estate in remainder devised
to the Roman Catholic Church had become vested. As far as the title to the property was
concerned, the administration proceedings were then terminated and the court had lost its
jurisdiction in respect thereto. There might still be a lien on the property for the debts of the
deceased and legitimate expenses of administration, but it seems obvious that the court could
have nojurisdiction to foreclose this lien and order the property sold unless some sort of notice
was given the holder of the title. No notice, neither actual nor constructive, was given in the
present case. It does not even appear that the order of sale was recorded in the office of the
registry of deeds as required by subsection 7 of section 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
order of sale was therefore void for want of jurisdiction in the court and could be vacated at any
time before it had been acted upon and a sale made and confirmed. (24 C. J., 615.)
The appellant also maintains that the court below erred in vacating the order of sale upon an
unverified motion and without the presentation of evidence. In answer, we may say that the
court could properly take judicial notice of the fact that the corporation sole, the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Nueva Caceres is the administrator of the temporalities of that church in
the diocese within which the land in question is situated and that the parish priests
have no control thereover. (See sec. 157, Act No. 1459; Dougherty vs. Evangelista, 7 Phil., 37;
[ G.R. No. 88831, November 08, 1990 ]
MATEO CAASI, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MERITO C.
MIGUEL, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 84508. NOVEMBER 8, 1990]
ANECITO CASCANTE, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
MERITO C. MIGUEL, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective: the disqualification
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel, for
the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local
elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence: a permanent
resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988 of
the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No.
87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the
disqualification of Merito C. Miguel, filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision
dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition
for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card
holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the
US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He
allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United
States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is
a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including
the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the
congressional elections on May 18, 1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC, with the exception of
Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
"The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that
he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green
card. Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as
shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent
meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local
officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is no legal
obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan." (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
"A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and
respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he was ‘has waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant’ to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has
not done." (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel,
respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R.
Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied
Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals
ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in
the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
"x x x it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the qualification of
the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner
meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local
officials (sic) and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner,
considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election
Code are appealable to the COMELEC." (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder
is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his
status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections
on January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all
times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.”
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
"SEC. 68. Disqualifications. x x x. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec.
25, 1971, EC)."
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in the
present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign
countries, their effect on the holders’ right to hold elective public office in the Philippines is a
question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State)
which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila
before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein
regarding his “Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state).” Miguel's answer
was: "Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of
Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies
him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion the
following information is printed:
"Alien Registration Receipt Card.
“Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United
States.” (Annex A, pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted
an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to
the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there: he entered the United
States with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant’s (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by
the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
"Immigration is the removing into one place from another: the act of immigrating; the entering
into a country with the intention of residing in it.
"An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose
of permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a broader
meaning to the term ‘immigrant.’" (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the
country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during
the period of his residence therein.
“Aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain, are in general entitled
to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil
and criminal responsibility.
“In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain, are entitled
to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of person and property and to
their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of
the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that no state shall deprive
‘any person’ of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to 'any person' the
equal protection of the law, and the protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a
livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the protection
of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he
acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office,
not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which
provides:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code unless such person has waived his status
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws."
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a
candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local elections, waive his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate
who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of
a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in
the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act
or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec.
68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly
bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor
of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a
candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the
municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of
filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public
office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not
possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he
resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to
the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January
18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess
dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast
their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption
is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to
the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must
keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to
preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the
United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a
green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have
this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S.under false pretenses; that all this
time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if
that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to
benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such
immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he
made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January
18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his
election thereto was null and void.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos.
87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The
election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby
annulled. Costs against the said respondent.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. NO. 159507, April 19, 2006 ]
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. AMERICAN EXPRESS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND/OR IAN T. FISH AND DOMINIC MASCRINAS,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001
and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding judge[2]thereof from
conducting further proceedings in said case, except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on
ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate court's
Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express
International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager,
and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of
legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is
a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit
facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street,
Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas)
are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and other court processes
at their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner
Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first
dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay
her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when
petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo,
Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional
Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from
respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its
balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the
corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late
payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled
by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental
anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a
result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him,
jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they
raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter,
respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was
improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that
respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his
complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that
his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their
contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay
City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and
Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which
petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper
Venue. He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless
and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time
of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular
fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his
admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he
has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event,
the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses
interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative
defense that venue was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the
incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence.
As a high-ranking government official of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial
notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of
abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly
stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for
purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the
permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A
person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at
place of his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])[3]
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order
dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a
quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting
of a bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which
enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from conducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents'
petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to
vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the
presiding judge thereof from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is
governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions
basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at
the election of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one
of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo
was not a resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the
residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or
place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.[4]
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals[5] where the
Court distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the
term residence, for it is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the
relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a
person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the
Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving
stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention
to remain for an unlimited time.A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose
at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is
his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."[6](Italicized for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate
court referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the
same community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against
respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160,[7] the community tax
certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the individual, or in the place where the
principal office of the juridical entity is located.[8] It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's
law office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing
circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo
which are conclusive upon him and no longer required proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone
district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's
residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the
congressman of Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in
Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is
inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of
venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the
option of petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his
caprice and cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of
Court.[9] Further, fundamental in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing
real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to
the party litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both
plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts of justice.[10]
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents'
affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's
motive in filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience
respondents or even to wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a
powerful and influential figure in the said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded
as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in Investors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle[11] where the
Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the court in Pagadian City "was a
specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was an influential person in the
locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they
hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in his
place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case, except to
dismiss it. The temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of
preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners [herein respondents], within
five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent [herein petitioner] may
sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that
petitioners are not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional
Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the
Resolution dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the
instant petition for review with the Court alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision
and Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or
with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein
petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is
a residence (sic) of said district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due
to the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court; and
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and
even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only
to vex the respondents.[13]
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court
committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil
Case No. R-3172 because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein,
was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a
personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to
plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.[14] The rule on venue,
like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or
the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding.[15] The option of
plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides
or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited
to that place.[16]
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the
court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a
member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to
comply with the residency requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner
Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged
the said finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated
in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay
City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court as negating
petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a
resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding
that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Sarmiento,[17] the Court had the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides"
for purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on
venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the
situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest
convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum
accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is
not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established
principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a
person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this
distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must
necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing
its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that "
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence
generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile." (Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court)
in referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled,"
thus:
"Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." (Italicized for emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private
respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his
manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to
justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is
entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or
where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to comply substantially with the
requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v.
Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules
of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v.
Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this
Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the
actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal
rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence" is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile.No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary."[18]
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone
district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the
appellate court admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever
so often travels to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower
house."[19]
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the
court a quo as possessing the requirements for the said position,[20] including that he was then a
resident of the district which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for
purposes of election law, the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence,"
as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. x x x[21]
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more
stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term
"residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."[22]When parsed, therefore, the
term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2)
personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law."[23]
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted.
Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile."[24]
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern
Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election
laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for
filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner
Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because
"residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals[25] is misplaced. Contrary to its
holding,[26] the facts of the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the
complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff
who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up
in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement,
plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident therein at the time of the
filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein because
although he manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element of personal
presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as
synonyms, imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."[27]
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the
time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is
deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident
therein. And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law,
petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal
presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his
bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be
considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place.
A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
(Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1,
page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can
exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently,
even if residence is also established in some other place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in
Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another
house in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three
places (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990
Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or physical
residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with intention to stay there
permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his
profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing
business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically,
personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then
be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman
of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing
thereat, when such residence is required by law.[28]
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is
of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the
same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man
can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence.[29]
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern
Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this
connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte,
the district he was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be
faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions."[30] Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines,[31] including its
Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been
explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it
unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among
reasonable men."[32] Moreover, "though usually facts of "common knowledge" will be
generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be
known in the local community where the trial court sits."[33] Certainly, the fact of petitioner
Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly
taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the
community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken
judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the
qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a
residence in the district in which he shall be elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be
characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules,
as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by
petitioner Saludo deserves scant consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and
belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.

Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read
the contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of my
own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The same clearly
constitutes substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22,
2003 and Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil
Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.