Land reform

AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

Alternative Title: agrarian reform

Land reform, a purposive change in the way in which agricultural land is held or owned, the
methods of cultivation that are employed, or the relation of agriculture to the rest of the
economy. Reforms such as these may be proclaimed by a government, by interested groups, or
by revolution.
The concept of land reform has varied over time according to the range of functions
which land itself has performed: as a factor of production, a store of value and wealth, a status
symbol, or a source of social and political influence. Land value reflects its relative scarcity,
which in a market economy usually depends on the ratio between the area of usable land and the
size of that area’s population. As the per capita land area declines, the relative value of land rises,
and land becomes increasingly a source of conflict among economic and social groups within
the community.
The patterns of wealth and income distribution and of social and political influence are partly
determined by the laws governing land tenure. These laws specify the acceptable forms
of tenure and the privileges and responsibilities that go with them. They define the land title and
the extent to which the owner can freely dispose of it and of the income accruing from its use. In
this sense, the form of tenure determines the wealth and income distribution based on the land: if
private ownership is permitted, class differentiation is unavoidable; in contrast, public
ownership eliminates such distinctions. The forms of tenure range from temporary, conditional
holding to ownership in fee simple, which confers total unencumbered rights of control and
disposal over the land.
Historically, land reform meant reform of the tenure system or redistribution of the land
ownership rights. In recent decades the concept has been broadened in recognition of the
strategic role of land and agriculture in development. Land reform has therefore become
synonymous with agrarian reform or a rapid improvement of the agrarian structure,
which comprises the land tenure system, the pattern of cultivation and farm organization, the
scale of farm operation, the terms of tenancy, and the institutions of rural credit, marketing, and
education. It also deals with the state of technology, or with any combination of these factors, as
shown by modern reform movements, regardless of the political or ideological orientation of the
reformers.

Objectives Of Reform

Reform is usually introduced by government initiative or in response to internal and external

pressures, to resolve or prevent an economic, social, or political crisis. Thus reform may be
considered a problem-solving mechanism. The true motives for reform, however, may well differ
from those announced by the reformer. The distinction between the real and proclaimed
objectives may be especially significant if the proclaimed objectives have been forced upon
reformers who do not support those objectives. The reformers may proclaim certain objectives
merely to appease the peasants, to undermine opposition, to win international backing, or to
safeguard their own positions. The proclaimed purposes of land reform, however, will be the
point of departure in this article.

Political and social objectives

The most common proclaimed objective of land reform is to abolish feudalism, which usually
means overthrowing the landlord class and transferring its powers to the reforming elite or its
surrogates. If “foreigners” happen to be among the landlord class, the objectives become the
defeat of imperialism and the end of foreign exploitation.
Another common objective is to free the peasants from subjugation to and dependence on the
exploiters and make them active citizens by restoring what assertedly had been taken away from
them.
A third objective is to create democracy—a stated purpose of both capitalist and, in the 20th
century, communist reformers. Most capitalist reforms are based on the premise that
individual private ownership in the form of independent family farms will promote and sustain
democratic institutions.
Communist reformers, in contrast, usually aimed at overthrowing both feudalism and capitalism
on the premise that, as a means of production, private ownership of land inherently breeds
exploitation. In practice, this meant “returning land to the tillers” and creating a classless,
democratic society. A more immediate and practical goal of communist reformers was to rally
the peasants in support of the new order and against the former regime.
Finally, reform may be introduced simply as the most expedient way to resolve a crisis or avoid
a revolution. The reformer, in this case, will introduce and implement just enough reform to
appease the peasants and contain the conflict. This happens especially when the reformers are
still in sympathy with the landlord class and consciously prefer a moderate rather than a radical
reform.
These political objectives tend to undergo change during the period of implementation and are,
therefore, kept vague enough to permit flexibility and modification as conditions change.

All land reforms emphasize the need to improve the peasants’ social conditions and status,
to alleviate poverty, and to redistribute income and wealth in their favour. They try to create
employment opportunities and education and health services and to redistribute the benefits to
the community at large, the younger generation as the main target.
Economic objectives

Economic development has become a major objective of governments and political parties in
recent decades. Efforts have been made to encourage agricultural progress by means of agrarian
reform in favour of the peasant who does not own his land or whose share of the crop is
relatively small, and who therefore has little incentive to invest capital or expend effort to
improve the land and raise productivity. Another mechanism has been to encourage labour-
intensive cultivation, on the assumption that traditional or feudal landowners often use their land
extensively and wastefully.
An equally important economic objective is to promote optimum-scale farming operations.
Excessively large farms (latifundia) and excessively small farms (minifundia) tend to be
inefficient. Therefore, reform aims at creating farms of optimum size given the land quality, the
crop, and the level of technology.
Finally, reform aims at coordinating agriculture with the rest of the economy. In their quest for
economic development and industrialization, reformers attempt to make the rural sector more
responsive to the needs of the industrial sector for labour, food, industrial raw materials, capital,
and foreign currency. These functions are often expected to be performed simultaneously.

Types Of Reform

Whether it is called land reform or agrarian reform, the operational concept covers five main
types of reform, classified according to whether they deal with land title and terms of holding,
land distribution, the scale of operation, the pattern of cultivation, or supplementary measures
such as credit, marketing, or extension services.
Reforms concerned with the title to land and the terms of holding reflect a transition from
tradition-bound to formal and contractual systems of landholding. Their implementation
involves property surveys, recording of titles, and provisions to free the landholder from
restrictions or obligations imposed by tradition. Property surveys are conducted wherever land is
held by a tribe or clan or where reallocation of cultivable land routinely follows tradition. In
these situations the landholder may lack the incentive to improve the land because the right of
disposal belongs to the tribe, clan, or feudal lord, as in medieval Europe and in parts of present-
day Africa and the South Pacific islands. Such reform affects landholding in at least three ways:
it may increase security of tenure and hence incentives; it may reorganize the system
of inheritance in favour of offspring; and it may bring land onto the market so that land
transactions become possible. This reform, however, has little immediate effect on the scale of
operation, but it does facilitate future land concentration and fragmentation. In countries where
the terms of holding and tenancy are regulated by tradition, reform may seek to convert tenancy
into a contractual agreement that offers some protection to the tenant and more security and
incentive to improve the land and advance technology, as in Japan, India, and Pakistan.
Peasants at work before the gates of a town. Miniature painting from the Breviarium
Grimani, c. late 15th century.The History Collection/Alamy
The most common type of reform involves the redistribution of land titles from one individual to
another, from individuals to a group or community at large, or from a group to individuals. The
land of one landlord may be redistributed to many individuals, as in Egypt, Iran, or Ireland. Or
the land of individuals may be reallocated in favour of the community at large by abolishing
private ownership, as in Cuba. Or, again, public land may be distributed to individuals, as in
various parts of Latin America.
The impact of redistribution on the scale of operations and on marketability of the land depends
on the form it takes and the restrictions attached to it. If the redistributed farm was previously
operated as a unit, its division means fragmentation and reduction of scale; however, if it was
operated in fragments by tenants, transfer of title to the tenants would not affect the scale. The
final results depend on the measures taken to prevent adverse effects.

Land-tenure reform, of course, can improve the scale of operations by enlarging the farm or by
reducing it. Enlargement applies when the holding is increased in size, either by adding to it or
by consolidating its fragmented parts. Farm consolidation involves reallocation of the total
farmland within a region by land exchange, sale, or lease such that no one loses and all gain by
increasing efficiency. The scale of operations may be increased by pooling resources, as in
farm cooperatives and collectives that offer facilities otherwise inaccessible to a small farm.

Cooperative workers drying coffee on racks in Nyeri, Kenya.Brian Seed from TSW—
CLICK/Chicago
An equally common approach is to divide large, extensively cultivated farms into smaller and
more intensively cultivable units. Reduction of the scale, however, has potential problems since
it may result in excessively small units or in the breakup of efficiently run farms. Operations
below the optimum level may inhibit improvements in technology, capital investment, and
diversification.
Changes in the pattern of cultivation relate directly to cultivation, land yield, and labour
productivity. While other types of reform may influence productivity indirectly
by enhancing security of tenure and the scale of operation, improvements in the pattern of
cultivation affect productivity directly, through advances in technology, improved irrigation, and
the application of chemicals.
Technological advance usually implies mechanization, although it may be biological and
organizational only, as in crop rotation, reconditioning of the soil, improved seeding, or better
utilization of available technology. The state of technology determines the level of productivity
or the ratio between outputs and inputs. More advanced technology permits the cultivation of
more land per unit of labour, deeper plowing, better timing of farm operations, reclamation of
areas previously inaccessible, and possibly wider diversification of the crops than previously
attainable. By easing the physical burden of farm work, it helps to conserve human energy.
Improved technology may also be the most direct way to modify tradition without an open
confrontation or a political revolution. Mechanization and advanced technology may, of course,
cause displacement of labour, unemployment, or the absorption of capital at the expense of other
sectors, at least in the short run; in the long run, the positive effects tend to prevail.
Improvements in irrigation include increasing the water supply, draining swampy land, and
regulating the quantity and quality of water flow. Irrigation is especially important in that it
involves large investments and infringes on tenure rights, both matters that invite public
responsibility and intervention. Irrigation and technology are closely related to the use
of fertilizer and other chemicals. Chemicals may be difficult to apply without irrigation, and
neither may be practical unless farming technology has advanced beyond relatively primitive
methods. Improvement of the pattern of cultivation may be inhibited, however, by traditional
attitudes, the lack of skills, or the scarcity of capital. Another difficulty is that changes in the
pattern of cultivation are usually long-term investments that may be too slow to satisfy
immediate pressures for reform.
Many improvements and changes may have to be implemented in areas outside the immediate
sphere of agriculture, such as credit, marketing, and education. Unless the farmer is able and
ready to take advantage of new opportunities and his product can be marketed profitably, reform
efforts may be futile. Costly or inaccessible credit and the excessive charges of middlemen
increase the relative costs of farming. Therefore, supervised credit, subsidies, and low-interest
loans that help to replace traditional sources of credit have been common, and credit and
marketing cooperatives and market regulation have been used to protect farmers against
exploitation by middlemen.
Finally, improvements in general education are essential in any reform that involves the
modernization of agriculture. Extension services, literacy promotion programs, the teaching of
home economics, and vocational training are of special importance in helping the young.

Evaluation And Criteria Of Success

Agrarian reform is a complex process of directed change, and its effects touch society in many
ways. Therefore its evaluation may be difficult because the various social, political, and
economic objectives may be inconsistent with each other. Even champions of reform and
planners may have different ideas about it. Moreover, there are no generally accepted criteria for
determining the success of such a program, nor adequate tools for measuring its progress.
 China: A land revolution

One reason for communist success was the social revolution in rural China. The CCP
was now unrestrained by the multi-class alliance of the…

Economic criteria

Economic indicators and criteria are basically the requisites of economic development.
Economic development may be defined as a sustained increase in and achievement of a given
level of per capita real income. To be sustained, the rise of per capita real income must be
accompanied by changes in the economic and social structures of society, increase in
total investment (capital formation), higher productivity, and full employment.
Capital formation in agriculture implies that more resources will be put at the disposal of the
farmer in the form of machinery, fertilizers, and irrigation and drainage facilities, all of which
contribute to the productive capacity and productivity of the land and the worker. Because
capital formation partly depends on domestic saving, a higher rate of capital formation may thus
be an indicator of the success of the reform in aiding economic development.
Another indicator is change in land yield or labour productivity. A rise in yield or productivity
implies higher efficiency, better use of resources, and an advance in the state of technology. It
also suggests an increase in the level of income and potential saving and investment. In fact, the
increase in productivity may be the most important single indicator of the contribution made by
reform to economic development. Change in the level of rural employment or unemployment
provides another indicator, which should be reflected in the level and distribution of income.
Finally, an important indicator may be the change in agriculture’s responsiveness to the demands
of industry and manufacturing. The ability of agriculture to provide labour, food, industrial raw
materials, and a market for industrial products is a significant measure of its contribution to
industrialization and development.

Social criteria

Social and political accomplishments are more difficult to measure. One of the important
indicators may be the degree of peasant participation in activities such as voting, representation,
and decision making. Social and political stability, or the tendency to change governments
by constitutional and nonviolent means and continuity of the social and political order without
resort to force, are other indicators.
But these various indicators can only suggest that change has taken place. The results depend on
the magnitude and relevance of the change. Assuming that measurement is feasible, three
approaches to evaluation may be followed: the goal achievement approach, the perceived
achievement approach, and the closing-the-gap (integrative) approach.
Goal achievement considers a program successful to the extent that it realizes the goals specified
prior to the reform. Probably the most common economic goal is maximization, according to
which efficiency dictates that reform should continue up to the point where the marginal benefit
of reform is equal to its marginal cost. Land distribution in this case will continue up to the point
where its net benefit is zero. Another common goal is to realize incremental gains as the reform
proceeds. The reform would be successful to the extent that the effects have been positive. A 20-
percent increase in capital formation in a capital-poor economy, however, may be more
significant than a 20-percent increase in a capital-rich economy. Similarly, a 20-percent decline
in the number of dissatisfied peasants in a peaceful or democratic society may be
more conducive to stability and harmony than a 20-percent decline in a radical or violent society.
Hence, this approach requires that a critical minimum achievement be specified as a criterion of
success in each situation. Or, as a third alternative, the evaluation may compare the results with
targets proclaimed in advance. The degree of success will be the extent to which those targets
have been realized. Problems, however, will arise, especially when the goals happen to be
contradictory or change over time.
Perceived achievement considers reform successful if the relevant parties perceive their goals as
having been satisfied. One of the main objectives of reform has been to reduce conflict and
promote harmony, both of which depend on whether a person or group perceives its expectations
as fulfilled, whether it has hope that these expectations will be fulfilled, and whether it is able to
express these expectations openly. The evaluation, therefore, is primarily subjective, and the net
impact can be assessed only by synthesizing the views of the parties affected, including those
who might be satisfied to have their losses minimized, just as much as others would want their
gains maximized.

The closing-the-gap approach considers a reform successful to the extent that it closes the gap
between the sector subject to reform and the more advanced sectors in society; in other words,
reform would be expected to help integrate agriculture with the rest of the economy and the rural
population with the urban community in terms of opportunities and levels of living. In this sense
the reform would remove the dualism between the agrarian and the nonagrarian, between the
technologically backward and the technologically advanced, and thus would increase labour
mobility in response to the demands of the economy and development.

History Of Land Reform

The ideas and principles discussed so far may be illustrated by a selective survey of the history
of land reform.
Ancient reforms

The recorded history of reform begins with the Greeks and Romans of the 6th and 2nd
centuries BCE, respectively. Land in ancient Athens was held in perpetuity by the tribe or clan,
with individual holdings periodically reallocated according to family size and soil fertility.
Population increase, expansion of trade, growth of a money economy, and the opening up of
business opportunities eventually made financial transactions in land an economic necessity.
Land itself continued to be inalienable, but the right to use the land could be mortgaged. Thus,
peasants could secure loans by surrendering their rights to the product of the land, as “sale with
the option of redemption.” Lacking other employment, the debtor continued to cultivate the land
as hektēmor, or sixth partner, delivering five-sixths of the product to the creditor and retaining
the rest for himself. Mortgaged land was marked by horoi, or mortgage stones, which served as
symbols of land enserfment. When Solon was elected archon, or chief magistrate, c. 594 BCE,
his main objective was to free the land and destroy the horoi. His reform law, known as
the seisachtheia, or “shaking-off the burdens,” cancelled all debts, freed
the hektēmoroi, destroyed the horoi, and restored land to its constitutional holders. Solon also
prohibited the mortgaging of land or of personal freedom on account of debt.

Solon.© Photos.com/Thinkstock
The impact of the reform was extensive but of short duration. The hektēmoroi were freed, but
since no alternative sources of support or credit were provided and creditors were
uncompensated, dissatisfaction and instability persisted. Two decades of anarchy were followed
by a revolution, c. 561 BCE, that brought Peisistratus to power. He enforced the reform and
distributed lands of his adversaries (who were killed or exiled) among the small holders. He also
extended loans to aid cultivation and prevent migration to the city and expanded silver mining to
create employment. Although the amount of land redistributed is unknown, Peisistratus was
apparently able to satisfy the peasantry, secure their loyalty, and stay in power for life, but the
economic effects are too vague to evaluate.
The Roman reform by Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus came between 133 and 121 BCE. The land
reform law, or lex agraria, of Tiberius was passed by popular support against serious resistance
by the nobility. It applied only to former public land, ager publicus, which had been usurped and
concentrated in the hands of large landholders. Land concentration reduced the number of
owners and hence the number of citizens and those eligible to serve in the army. In addition,
such concentration was accompanied by a shift from cultivation to grazing, which reduced
employment and increased the poverty of the peasants, producing a crisis. The motives of the
reformers continue to be debated, but it would appear that concern for the poor and political
stability were major factors.
The lex agraria specified minimum and maximum individual landholdings, with an allowance
for male children of the family. Excess land would be expropriated and compensation paid for
improvements. A standing collegium, or commission, was to enforce the law, but implementation
was delayed because Tiberius was killed in the year of its passage. When Gaius was elected
tribune about a decade later, he revived the reform and went even further. He colonized new land
and abolished rent on small holdings since rent on large holdings had been suspended as
compensation for expropriation. Gaius was killed in 121 BCE, however, and within a decade the
reform was reversed: private acquisition of public land was legalized, the land commission was
dissolved, rent on public land was abolished, all holdings were declared private property, and
squatting on public land was prohibited. Even colonization was ended, and colonies established
by Gaius were broken up. Another period of land concentration was inaugurated.
Modern European reforms

The French Revolution brought a new era in the history of land reform. Reform meant dealing
with survivals of the medieval tenures that had left a common heritage in most
European countries and, through them, in the colonies. The measures and approaches varied
from place to place and period to period.
On the eve of the Revolution, French society was polarized, with the nobility and clergy on one
side and the rising business class on the other. The middle class was relatively small, especially
in the rural areas. The majority of the peasants were hereditary tenants, either censiers, who paid
a fixed money rent, or mainmortables, or serfs, who paid rent in the form of labour
services, corvée, of about three days a week. The peasants paid various other feudal dues and
taxes, from which the nobility and clergy were exempted. The Revolution overthrew the ancien
régime and the feudal order and introduced land reform.
The reform repealed feudal tenures, freed all persons from serfdom, abolished feudal courts, and
cancelled all payments not based on real property, including tithes. Rents based on real property
were redeemable. Once the law had been passed, however, the peasants seized the land and
refused to pay any rents or redemption fees; in 1792 all payments were finally cancelled. Land of
the clergy and political emigrants was confiscated and sold at auction, together with common
land. The terms of sale, however, often favoured the wealthy, which may explain the rise of a
new class of large landowners among the supporters of Napoleon.
The social and political objectives of the reformers were fully realized. The censiers and serfs
became owners. Feudalism was destroyed, and the new regime won peasant support. The
economic effects, however, were limited. Incentives could not be increased substantially since
the peasants already had full security of tenure prior to the reform. The scale of operations was
not changed; and no facilities for credit, marketing, or capital formation were created. The major
achievements were the reinforcement of private, individual ownership and perpetuation of the
small family farm as a basis of democracy. The small family farm has characterized
French agriculture ever since.
There were other reforms in most European countries. England resolved its land problems by
the enclosure movement, which drove the small peasants into the towns, consolidated
landholdings, and promoted large-scale operation and private
ownership. Sweden and Denmark pioneered between 1827 and 1830 by peacefully abolishing
village compulsion, or imposed labour service, and the strip system of cultivation, by
consolidating the land, and by dividing the commons among the peasants. Though influenced by
the French Revolution, only after the 1848 revolutions did Germany, Italy, and Spain free the
peasants and redistribute the land. Reform in Ireland took a whole century
before substantive results were achieved, in the mid-1930s, after Ireland was divided
into Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. The tenants were converted into owners by
subsidized purchase of the land.
The first major Russian reform was the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. At the time of
emancipation about 45 percent of the land was private property and the remainder was held as
allotment land, cultivated in units averaging 9.5 acres (3.8 hectares) by the peasant serfs against
rent in kind and labour, payable to feudal lords. In contrast, fewer than 1,000 noble families
owned about 175,000,000 acres (70,000,000 hectares) and received rent therefrom. Conflict
between such extremes of poverty and wealth caused restlessness among the peasants and
rendered reform inevitable. As Tsar Alexander II put it: “It is better to abolish serfdom from
above than to await the day when it will begin to abolish itself from below.”
Tsar Alexander II.© Photos.com/Thinkstock
The Emancipation Act of 1861 abolished serfdom and distributed allotment land among the
peasants. The homestead became hereditary property of the individual, but the field land was
vested in the village mir as a whole. The peasant paid redemption through the village authority,
while the landlord received state bonds as compensation equal to 75 to 80 percent of the land
market value. Though legally freed, the private serf had to ransom his freedom by surrendering a
part of the allotment land. In contrast, serfs belonging to the imperial family were emancipated in
1863 and received the maximum amount of land fixed by law. Serfs of the state were
emancipated in 1866 and allowed to keep the land they occupied against money rent. The
Cossacks received two-thirds of the land, to be held in common, but in lieu of redemption
payments they had to serve 20 years in the army. The serfs in mines and households were freed
but received no economic assets.
Redemption payments, however, soon proved too burdensome, village restrictions were tight,
and the allotment land area declined, all of which led to renewed restlessness and disturbances.
Following the revolt of 1905, the government, under Pyotr Stolypin, tried to create middle-class,
independent farmers by replacing the village tenure with private ownership, consolidating
holdings, and encouraging land purchase by individuals; but the time was too short for effective
implementation. The Soviet Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime and introduced the concepts
of public ownership and collectivization.
By decree in 1918, the Soviets abolished private ownership of land, made farming the sole basis
of landholding, and declared collectivization a major objective of policy. Marketing of
agricultural products became a state monopoly. In 1929 Stalin embarked on a full course of
collectivization, and by 1938 collective farms occupied 85.6 percent of the land and state farms
9.1 percent. Credit facilities and tractor stations supplemented collectivization, while agricultural
production was integrated in the national plan for industrialization and development.
The costs of Soviet reform included the destruction of capital and the death of large numbers of
kulaks, or rich peasants. Total output and productivity increased, however, and capital formation
was made possible through forced saving, taxes, and regulated prices. The peasant received
extensive social services such as health care, and education and better working conditions. The
objectives of the decree of 1918 have been fully realized.

Reform in eastern Europe was complicated by the fact that most of the eastern European
countries remained under foreign rule until the middle of the 19th century or later. In Hungary,
the Decree of 1853 abolished the robot, or forced labour and feudal dues, freed the serfs,
liberalized land transaction, and encouraged consolidation. The Romanian reform of 1864 freed
the serfs and distributed both the land and the redemption payments in proportion to the number
of cows or oxen each peasant had. Formal emancipation in Bulgaria was introduced by the
Turkish government in the 1850s, but actual reform came in 1880, after independence. Each
peasant, including sharecroppers and wage workers, who had worked the land for 10 years
without interruption, was entitled to the land he had cultivated. With the exception of Bulgaria,
the distribution of ownership throughout most of eastern Europe remained highly uneven.
Political instability reached a dangerous point between the two world wars. From the end
of World War II to 1989–90, eastern European countries ruled by communist governments
displayed a strong tendency toward collective, cooperative, and mechanized agriculture.

Mexico
The Mexican reform of 1915 followed a revolution and dealt mainly with lands of Indian
villages that had been illegally absorbed by neighbouring haciendas (plantations). Legally there
was no serfdom; but the Indian wage workers, or peons, were reduced to virtual serfdom through
indebtedness. Thus, the landlords were masters of the land and of the peons. The immediate aim
of reform was to restore the land to its legal owners, settle the title, and use public land to
reconstruct Indian villages. The motives were mainly to reduce poverty and inequality and to
secure political stability, which was then in the balance. A decree of 1915 voided all land
alienations that had taken place illegally since 1856 and provided for extracting land from
haciendas to reestablish the collective Indian villages, or ejidos. The 1917 constitution reaffirmed
those provisions but also guaranteed protection of private property, including haciendas.
Nevertheless, a combination of loopholes, litigation, and reactionary forces slowed
implementation, and effective reform came only after passage of the Agrarian Code of 1934 and
the sympathetic efforts of Pres. Lázaro Cárdenas.
The reform restored many villages and freed the peons, but land concentration and poverty
continued. In 1950, more than 31 percent of the private cropland was owned by fewer than 0.5
percent of the owners. Small-scale operation was retained or encouraged, a fact explaining the
decline of output in the early years. More recently, efficiently run farms have been exempted
from distribution.

The social and political impact was more positive. The peasants acquired more land and liberty,
and control by landlords was reduced, although it was replaced by village restrictions. At least
legally, farming became the basis of landholding. Some have seen in land reform the reason for
Mexico’s political stability, although there have been sporadic peasant uprisings and other
violent encounters.
Reforms Since World War II

Recent decades have witnessed widespread, comprehensive reform programs, but the concept
has undergone major changes. The eastern European countries and China originally followed the
Soviet model, with different modifications in the individual countries. A few other countries
have continued to follow that model, with major emphasis on “land to the tiller,” cooperation,
collective ownership, large-scale operation, and mechanization, and with economic development
as the common denominator. In capitalist-oriented reforms, private ownership, family farming,
and dual tenures have remained basic objectives with the aim of promoting democracy, equality,
stability, and development. Under the influence and with the guidance of the United Nations,
nonsocialist reforms of the 1950s were equated with community development and emphasized
institutional and rural self-help in addition to land redistribution. In the 1960s the emphasis
shifted to agricultural productivity and economic development by means of large-scale operation,
new technology, and cooperation. The 1970s witnessed the advent of “integrated rural
development” as the focus of reform and as a way of combining productive activities with
improvements in the social and physical infrastructure. The integrated approach, however, soon
proved to be unmanageable, and the emphasis shifted to the “target” group as the focus of
reform. The most recent conception of reform has been to satisfy “basic needs,” with or without
land distribution, although no policymaker in the capitalist countries would openly question the
idea of land redistribution or the creation of small family farms. These experiments with the
concept of reform have been accompanied by attempts to broaden the concept to incorporate
women as equal beneficiaries of reform in their own right. The results have been mixed.
Japan
The Japanese reform came immediately after World War II at the insistence of the Allied
Occupation Army. The reform was designed to fit the uniquely high literacy rate and advanced
industrial level of the country. Although the Meiji government had formally
abolished feudalism and declared the land to be the property of the peasants, usurpation of land
by the rich and by moneylenders had created classes of perpetual tenants and absentee landlords.
In 1943, 66 percent of the land was operated by tenants against rent in kind that averaged 48
percent of the farmers’ product, while population pressure resulted in fragmentation of holdings.
The social class structure was closely tied to tenure, the owners in each village being at the top of
the structure. Conflict between landlords and peasants was widespread.
After the war, the crisis was revived by food shortages, the breakdown of the urban economy,
and the return of absentee landlords to the land. The Occupation Army insisted on reform,
presumably to democratize the society and rehabilitate the economy. The reform law of 1946
established a ceiling on individual holdings and provided for expropriation and resale of excess
land to the tenants against long-term payments. The government compensated the landlords in
cash and bonds redeemable in 30 years. Tenants were protected by contract, and rents were
reduced to a maximum of 25 percent of the product. The redistributed land was made
inalienable, though this restriction was relaxed four years later. The program also provided for
marketing and credit cooperatives. An important supplementary measure was the
Local Autonomy Law of 1947, which decentralized the power structure and put village affairs in
the hands of the villagers.
Within two years tenancy declined by more than 80 percent. Rent control and land distribution
helped to equalize incomes in the villages and rehabilitate the sociopolitical status of the
peasants. Crop yields per unit of land increased, but despite improved techniques the output per
worker declined. In general the reform seemed to realize the objectives of the reformers and the
peasants, although smallness of scale, low per capita incomes, underemployment, and
insufficient mechanization have persisted. Even black market rents developed. These problems
were tolerable because their effects were mitigated by the upsurge of the urban economy and the
ability of the Japanese farmer to supplement the family income from nonagricultural
employment. Even so, the farmers continue to depend on government subsidy to stay in farming.
Egypt
The Egyptian reform of 1952 followed the revolution that overthrew the monarchy and brought
young middle-class leaders to the helm. Though affecting only about 12 percent of the arable
land, it was applied thoroughly and touched all aspects of rural life. Egypt had two main forms of
tenure: private ownership and waqf, or land held in trust and dedicated to charitable or
educational purposes. Waqf land was inalienable, but private land was subject to speculation and
concentration. In 1950, 1 percent of the owners had more than 20 percent of the private land, and
7 percent had more than two-thirds. The operating unit was small, with 77 percent of all the
holdings occupying less than one acre each. Tenancy was widespread and rents were exorbitant.
The peasants were exploited by middlemen who sublet the land to tenants, mediated between
them and the market, and extended credit at high rates of interest.
The revolutionary reformers aimed at abolishing feudalism, recruiting peasant support,
promoting economic development, and bringing the villagers back into the stream of national
life. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 put a ceiling on individual holdings at 200 faddāns
(one faddān = 1.038 acres), later reduced to 100 faddāns, with special allowance for male
children. The excess land was expropriated and distributed to the peasants in parcels not
exceeding five faddāns. Compensation was given in bonds, while land recipients had to repay in
annual installments. The new owners were obligated to join cooperatives for production,
marketing, and credit. Tenancy conditions were also regulated, with contract replacing traditional
terms; rent could not exceed 50 percent of the product, nor could a tenant hold more than 50
acres, to avoid subletting. An interesting feature of the reform was the special attention given to
college graduates by allowing them up to 20-faddān parcels.
The reform was enforced quickly and had a great impact on the morale of the peasants. The
economic effects, however, were minor since agriculture was intensive and land yield high.
Producer cooperatives served only to offset the impact of distribution on the scale of operation.
Some increases in yield have been claimed, but the evidence is still inconclusive. Furthermore,
little capital was redirected into productive investment since the compensation bonds were not
negotiable. Peasant savings remained limited, income increments being spent mostly
on consumption. Finally, underemployment in agriculture has remained widespread. The defects
of the agrarian structure continue to prevail, and relatively large ownerships exist, while certain
groups in Egypt are calling for reversal of the reform.
The social and political effects, however, were far reaching. Redistribution and regulation of rent
raised the incomes of small owners and tenants. Cooperatives replaced the middleman and
captured his share for the farmer. The peasant gained social status and enjoyed a higher level of
political participation, mostly in support of the revolutionary regime. These effects, however, can
be easily exaggerated. The peasants became dependent on the cooperatives whether they liked
them or not. Great differences in landholding continued to exist, and peasant incomes remained
low. Black market rents appeared. The example of Egypt suggests that successful reform in
densely populated countries requires an upsurge in the industrial sector to relieve population
pressure and permit technical advance and higher productivity in agriculture.
Southeast Asia
The model of Japan’s reform has been attempted in Southeast Asia, especially in Taiwan, South
Korea, and the former South Vietnam, all influenced by American experts and by the
anticommunism of their respective governments. The objectives were to sustain the political
order, raise living standards, and promote some degree of economic development. The reforms
began with regulation of tenancy, restriction of rent, and the institution of written contract for
leases, following which tenants were to be transformed into owners. Taiwan’s reform
was implemented between 1949 and 1953, in three stages. First, rents, which had sometimes
reached 70 percent of the product, were reduced to 37.5 percent. Next, tenant-farmed public land
was sold to the tenants. Finally, tenant-farmed private land was bought by the government and
resold to the tenants.
The Vietnamese reform was introduced in 1955. Rents were reduced to a maximum of 25
percent of the product. A ceiling of 247 acres (100 hectares) was put on individual holdings,
however, and only the excess land was subject to redistribution in parcels of 7.4 to 12.4 acres (3
to 5 hectares) to the tenants. The collapse of the South Vietnamese regime and the unification of
South and North Vietnam ended that reform and replaced it with the socialist model of North
Vietnam.

The reform in Taiwan, as in South Vietnam prior to unification, was supplemented by other
measures described as community development, such as adult education, credit facilities,
improved technology, and other social services. Though land consolidation was attempted, the
scale of operation was little affected. The main effect seems to have been the regulation of
tenancy and the redistribution of rent incomes. An innovation of Taiwan’s reform was the partial
compensation of landlords with industrial shares in public enterprises, which helped them and
helped industry.
Taiwan’s reform has been hailed as a major success, in both economic and political terms. Some
observers, however, are unwilling to reach such a conclusion until restrictions are removed and
the peasants have a free choice of tenure and farm organization.

South Korea’s land reform (under the Land Reform Law of June 1949) roughly followed the
Japanese model by removing tenancy, creating small ownerships, implementing the law
thoroughly and promptly, and depending heavily on nonagricultural (basically industrial)
employment to absorb labour and supplement rural income. Like the Japanese and Taiwanese
reforms, Korea’s successful reform was generously supported by foreign aid.
The Philippines introduced a reform program in 1963, which aimed primarily at replacing share
tenancy with lease contracts and eventually with ownership, and at revitalizing agriculture
through extension services. By the mid-1980s the program had given titles to about 400,000
tenants and secure leases to another 600,000, but the economic viability of the new units has
been uncertain because of their small scale and the lack of supplementary facilities. The main
effects initially were seed improvement, greater use of fertilizers, and an increase in contractual
tenancy. To combat the negative effects of small-scale farming, the Philippine government has
resorted to what it calls the “compact farm,” which is a voluntary grouping of small farms to be
operated under one management as one consolidated farm. The problem of surplus labour,
however, remains to be solved.
Various other reforms have been introduced in Southeast Asia, but the only innovative program
has been that of Malaysia. The program in Malaysia has been highly organized and development
oriented. It tries to promote social and economic objectives by emphasizing the production of
rubber and palm oil for export and gradually transforming the landless into hereditary tenants on
newly reclaimed and settled plantations. A typical plantation covers 4,500 to 5,000 acres (1,800
to 2,000 hectares) of jungle land and absorbs about 400 families. The land is cleared and planted
by contract, and a village is constructed, with all the necessary services, before the settlers arrive.
Each house has a quarter of an acre for a household garden. Cropland is divided in blocks of 120
to 200 acres (48 to 80 hectares), to be worked by a team of 15 to 25 people until the plants have
matured. Upon maturation, each settler receives a share by lottery and a lease title for 99 years.
This tenure arrangement precludes alienation, subdivision, or subleasing; it thus protects the
tenant farmer and sidesteps the Islamic laws of inheritance, which tend toward fragmentation of
the land.
The settler is responsible for the cost of clearing and planting, but the government pays the
administrative costs. The settler is guaranteed supplementary employment to earn subsistence
income pending maturity of the plants, and cultivation is guided by experts. The rate of
settlement is determined by the overall economic plan. It is clear that landholding has become
tied to cultivation; fragmentation and diseconomies of scale have been avoided, and cultivation
has become a rational economic operation. The Malaysian program has much in common with
the cooperative settlements of Israel and the Gezira Scheme in Sudan.

Latin America
Except for the early example of Mexico, reform in Latin America has been recent and appears to
have come only in response to the threat of social and political instability and mounting
international pressures. Reform in Latin America after World War II must be seen against a
background of rapidly increasing population and of extreme contrasts between plantation
economies and small units; high concentration of land ownership, income, and power and dire
poverty; modern farming and relatively backward cultivation methods; and nationalism and
extensive foreign ownership of land. In addition, Latin-American society is complicated by its
ethnic mixtures and by dependence on staple trade items such as sugar, tobacco, cocoa, coffee,
and beef cattle.
Reform in Latin America has reflected the ideologies and objectives of the regime in
power. Brazil has had several attempts at reform. The measures have been indirect and relatively
mild, the most important being taxation of idle land and large plantations and reclamation and
settlement of the Amazon region, with provisions for credit and tenancy protection. The results
have been modest, however, largely because of the physical and biological hardships faced by
settlers in the tropical Amazon environment. Peru has deviated by
creating collective administrations of the nationalized feudal estates. The title resides in the
nation, and the estates are run by the Agricultural Societies of Social Interest (SAIS), a
mechanism devised to avoid breaking up economically efficient enterprises rather than to modify
the tenure institutions.
At the other end of the Latin-American spectrum is the Cuban reform that followed the
revolution of 1958. Cuba retained private ownership but reduced it substantially in favour of
the public sector. As proclaimed a few months before the overthrow of the old regime, the
reform aimed at the elimination of latifundia tenure, expropriation of land owned by foreign
companies, higher standards of living for the peasantry, and national economic development. It
began by setting a ceiling of 30 caballerías (one caballería = 33 acres, or 13.4 hectares) on
individual holdings, with a maximum of 100 caballerías if economic operations required such a
scale. All foreign-owned land was nationalized. Public land on which rice and cattle were raised
was converted into state farms, and the peasants became permanent wage workers on these
farms. Sugar plantations were converted into cooperatives to avoid their subdivision into small
uneconomic units. Before long the ceiling on individual holdings was lowered to
five caballerías, and all such holdings became private family farms. The rest were nationalized,
and the expropriated owners were compensated with a pension for life. The reform was
supplemented by the organization of national farmer associations; people’s stores; credit,
housing, and educational facilities; and the production of machinery and fertilizers. In 1963 a
major reorganization of state farms took place; they were subdivided on the basis of crop
specialization into smaller operational units of about 469 caballerías.
Effects of the reform were comprehensive and immediate. The tenure institutions were radically
changed in favour of public ownership, while minifundia and tenancies were abolished. Socially
and politically, the reform realized the objectives of the reformers. Economically, the
government claimed higher yields of sugarcane, vegetables, and fruit, but this claim has been
disputed by foreign observers.
Other Latin-American reforms fall between those of Brazil and Cuba, though closer to the
former than to the latter in comprehensiveness and thoroughness. For example, the reform
in Costa Rica has overlooked land concentration and income inequality and concentrated on the
squatters, or parásitos, who in 1961 numbered between 12,000 and 16,000 people. The reform
aimed at legalizing existing squatter holdings, preventing further squatting, and conserving
virgin land. Even this modest program was implemented very slowly. As late as 1973, 7.3
percent of the landholdings comprised 67 percent of the total agricultural land. Colombia has had
reform programs for at least 30 years, but concentration of ownership, fragmented holdings,
backward methods of cultivation, inequality of income distribution, and widespread poverty have
remained characteristic; in 1970, 4.3 percent of the holdings contained 67.4 percent of the total
area.
Chile undertook various reform programs before achieving concrete results. In 1962 a program
was enacted to encourage settlement of new land, but only about 1,000 families were settled. A
comprehensive reform was introduced in 1965 with three main objectives: to make the
agricultural workers owners of the land they had cultivated previously, to increase agricultural
and livestock production, and to facilitate social mobility and peasant participation in political
life. The Chilean reform was unique in its method of implementation. Once the plantation had
been designated for expropriation and the prospective owners selected, they were organized
into asentamientos, or settlement groups. The group elected a committee to take charge of
settlement. The members cultivated the land as a team for three to five years. Meanwhile they
received training and guidance in social participation, decision making, and modern farming.
Upon completion of the transition period, the land was divided among those who had shown
promise, to be held outright and without restriction. All new owners were obligated to join
cooperatives, the form of these being determined by the members. The socialist regime that came
into office in 1970 expedited the expropriation process and the creation of settlement groups
or cooperative farms under peasant committees. By 1972 all the potential land, which had been
in farms larger than 200 acres (80 hectares), had been expropriated and reallocated. The military
dictatorship that took over in 1973 decided, however, to privatize the land and reverse much of
the reform by returning large areas to the former owners, dissolving the cooperatives, and
creating private ownerships in their place. Most of the reverse changes had been completed by
1979. Nevertheless, most of the excess land in farms of more than 200 acres remained in the
hands of the reform beneficiaries. Owners of less than 12 acres (5 hectares) were hardly affected;
those who owned between 12 and 50 acres (5 and 20 hectares) benefitted most. In the final
analysis, less than 15 percent of the agricultural land was affected by the reform between 1965
and 1979 under three regimes.
Observers of the Latin-American scene have been pessimistic regarding the adequacy of these
land reform programs. With the exception of Cuba, capital formation in agriculture has not
increased substantially; the pattern of land distribution has undergone little change; social and
political stability have remained in question; and the agrarian structure is still considered
defective.

Other recent reforms

Attempts to reform the agrarian structure have been made in most other countries, with varying
degrees of seriousness. India and Pakistan have concentrated on abolishing intermediaries who
prevailed as survivals of traditional and feudal tenures. In India the tenants have become
hereditary holders, with the title vested in the state. India has left reform to the states and
emphasized peaceful and compensatory methods; hence the results have varied from one state to
another. Pakistan, following the revolution of 1958, enacted a reform that made most of the
tenants owners. In both countries, however, small-scale farming has persisted, while Pakistan has
continued to tolerate and protect owners of up to 500 acres (200 hectares). In neither country has
fragmentation been effectively reduced or have capital formation and cultivation methods
significantly advanced.
In contrast, after the communists came to power in China, private ownership was eliminated, and
the peasants were organized in village communes. Extensive supplementary measures were tried,
and the role and organization of the commune varied according to the pressures on the economy.
One innovation in China’s agriculture was the “production responsibility system,” which allowed
the commune to contract with its members for quotas of output; the members were free to sell
the surplus on the open market. The change was seen as an incentive generator, but land could
not be rented, bought, sold, or used except as authorized by the commune. The effects of China’s
agrarian policy on peasant living conditions and the Chinese economy were generally accepted
as positive, genuine, and impressive.
In 1962 Iran made owners of most of the former sharecroppers, in the classic tradition of
Western-type reform, mainly to create political stability. Given Iran’s revolution of 1979,
however, the reform evidently was not sufficient to sustain the old social order. Reform was also
introduced in Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and other countries of the Middle East and North
Africa following independence or revolution. Most of these reforms were influenced by the
Egyptian example, with the state playing a major role. In all cases emphasis has been placed on
farm cooperatives, although they have been largely ineffective.
In contrast, tropical Africa has witnessed a wave of innovative reform in recent years. Reform
has sometimes come in “packages,” which combine tenure reform and other measures affecting
cultivation and productivity. Among the innovations was the “villagization,” or ujamaa, program
of Tanzania, according to which a group of families live, work, and make decisions together and
share the costs and benefits of farming the land. The program began as a voluntary movement in
1967, but by 1977 it had become almost mandatory. At the same time, “block farming” and
individual holdings had become acceptable forms of cooperation. The Ujamaa Villages Act of
1975 made the village the main rural administration and development unit. The most radical
reforms in Africa, however, were those of Ethiopia in 1975 and of Mozambique in 1979. Both
vested the land title in the nation and abolished rent, sale, and absentee control of the land. The
land was placed in the hands of the tillers, who had guaranteed right of use for themselves and
for their descendants. Except in the public sector, farming was a small, family operation with a
high degree of equality of landholding but of uncertain efficiency.

Conclusions

Land reform and agrarian reforms have become synonymous, indicating that reform programs
have become more comprehensive and encompass much more than the reform of land tenure or
land distribution. Reform movements have recurred throughout history, as have the crises they
are intended to deal with, because reform has rarely dealt with the roots of the crises. Reform has
served as a problem-solving mechanism and therefore has only been extensive enough to cope
with the immediate crisis. Reformers have often faced hard choices: to promote and sustain
private ownership with inequality or to institute public or collective ownership with equality but
with restrictions on the individuals’ private interests; to spread employment by supporting
labour-intensive, low-productivity techniques or to promote high productivity through capital-
intensive, efficient methods; to pursue gradual “repair and maintenance” reform that is basically
ineffective or to promote revolutionary, comprehensive, effective but disruptive reform. In
capitalist reforms these contradictions have usually been resolved in favour of the first set of
options; in socialist reforms, in favour of the second. Land tenure reform seems to have been of
little significance in creating substantive economic change, although it has been important for
improving the status of peasants and maintaining social and political stability. Most reforms have
narrowed the gap between reform beneficiaries and other farmers through land redistribution and
tenancy control, but only the comprehensive socialist reforms have narrowed the gap
between agriculture and other sectors of the economy.
Land redistribution programs have had limited success for several reasons. They often have
deprived the farm of the former landlord’s contributions without providing a substitute. They
have inhibited mobility of labour by giving the peasant a stake in the land, though only in the
form of an inefficient minifarm. They frequently have threatened large, efficiently run farms and
therefore have had to be compromised. They have provided compensation for the expropriated
land and hence left wealth and income distribution largely unaffected. They have been
conditional upon peasant participation in social and political activity
and cooperative organization, even though the peasant was unprepared for these activities.
Moreover, the redistribution of land has rarely been fortified by protective measures that could
prevent reconcentration of ownership and the recurrence of crises. Nevertheless, major efforts
have been expended by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other
international bodies and by governments to devise viable frameworks for solving agricultural and
rural problems emanating from defective agrarian structures.