Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
850
851
FERNANDO, J,:
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1 The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden
Gate Motel, Miami Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel, Flamingo Motel, Holiday
Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel,
Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New Palace Hotel,
Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
853
854
855
856
857
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4 Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. AIso: 'To
Frankfurter the police power, true to its etymology, is the power to shape
policy. It def ies legal definition; as a response to the dynamic aspects of
society, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula. The law must be
sensitive to life; in resolving cases. it must not fall back upon sterile
claims; its judgments are not derived from an abstract duel between
liberty and the police power. Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and
large-scale industry, it must meet the challenge of drastic social change.
For him as for Holmes, 'society is more than bargain and business' and
the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in vindicating interests not
represented by the items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive society, new
interests emerge, new attitudes appear, social consciousness quickens. In
the face of the unknown one cannot choose with certainty. Nor as yet, has
the whole of truth been brought up from its bottomless well and how f
ragile in scientif ic proof is the ultimate validity of any particular
economic adjustment. Social development is a process of trial and error;
in the making of policy the f ullest possible opportunity must be given for
the play of the human mind. If Congress or legislature does not regulate,
laissez faire·not the individual·must be the regulator. (Hamilton, Pre
view of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
5 Noble state Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412.
6 U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus, (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
7 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
859
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17
the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those
strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect18 [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a
narrow or "technical conception with fixed 19
content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive 20
inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."
Questions of due process are not to be treated
21
narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an
ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious
proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
authority. It would seem that what should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of
the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted
deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more
specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the
need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the
enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must
be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is
even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such
character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet
the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any
semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners'
indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds
to single out such features as the increased fees for motels
and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to
contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual
license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for
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17 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, (1938) pp.
32-33.
18 Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche, (1960) 363 U.S. 420, at 487.
19 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, (1961) 367 U.S. 1230.
20 Bartkus v. Illinois, (1959) 359 U.S. 121.
21 Pearson v. McGraw, (1939) 308 U.S. 313.
862
both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200%
for the latter, f irst-class motels being required to pay a
P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly.
It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922
that municipal license fees could be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises,
for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations
22
or
enterprises and for revenue purposes only. As was
explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2)
Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to
the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied
from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing
amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are
allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than
in the former, and aside from applying the well-known
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The
desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of
persons who might otherwise engage in non-usef ul
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in
the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee.
Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes
for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in
cases of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter
23
cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable."
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863
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24 98 Phil. 148 (1955), citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301
U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed 477;
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The Lutz decision
was followed in Republic v. BacolodMurcia Milling, L-19824, July 9,
1966.
25 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L-24322, July
21, 1967.
26 Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board, (1957) 101 Phil.
1142.
864
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27 Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila, (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing
City of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
28 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v.
Geiger-Jones (1916), 242 U.S. 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs.
Cruz (1914), 189 Ala. 66.
865
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32
measure is wider. How justify then the allegation of a
denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on
another due process ground by invoking the principle of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear/from a recital in
the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of
the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed
and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give
the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the
customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the
room with him at about the same time or coming at any
indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its
sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of
a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of
its owners or operators; another proviso which from their
standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full
rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof
means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be
asked, do these allegations suffice to render the
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867
Judgment reversed.
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