Italy v Venezuela

Sambiaggio case - Short Summary

HJMB
Sambiaggio, an Italian, suffered damages when revolutionists extorted from him his property during the
Venezuelan civil war. Under the Treaty of 1861, Italy claims indemnification of damages from the Venezuela
government.
Umpire denies.
the Government should not be held responsible for the acts of revolutionists
because —
1. Revolutionists are not the agents of government, and a natural responsibility does not exist.
2. Their acts are committed to destroy the government, and no one should be held responsible for the acts of
an enemy attempting his life.
3. The revolutionists were beyond governmental control, and the Government can not be held responsible
for injuries committed by those who have escaped its restraint
Umpire cites:
When strangers enter a state they must be prepared for the risks of intestine war, because the occurrence is
one over which, from the nature of the case, the government can have no control, and they can not demand
compensation for losses or injuries received, both because, unless it can be shown that a state is not
reasonably well ordered, it is not bound to do more for foreigners than for its own subjects xxx
He also declared that the treaty did not expressly provide for Italy’s claim. This kind of responsibility cannot
be implied because it is a derogation of general principles of law--what state will allow itself to be held liable
for acts of individuals or groups, such as rebels or revolutionists, who/which want to destroy its government?
The umpire therefore accepts the rule that if in any case of reclamation submitted to him it is alleged and
proved that Venezuelan authorities failed to exercise due diligence to prevent damages from being inflicted
by revolutionists, that country should be held responsible. In the present instance no such want of diligence
is alleged and proved

Regina (Queen) vs Keyn

Facts

Ferdinand Keyn (defendant) was the captain of the German vessel the Franconia. While navigating less than
three miles off the shore of Great Britain, the Franconia struck a British vessel, killing a woman.
The Franconiawas not stopping at port in Great Britain but merely passing by when the accident occurred.
Great Britain (plaintiff) charged Keyn with manslaughter. The trial court convicted Keyn. Keyn appealed.

Issue:
At a technical level the case involved a question of criminal jurisdiction, the right of an English court to try a
foreigner for an offence committed on the high seas, but within British territorial waters, which, at this time,
were taken to extend three miles out to sea.

Ratio: The court considered the significance of the existence of an academic consensus as to the meaning
of an international convention. Cockburn CJ said: ‘even if entire unanimity had existed in respect of the
important particulars to which I have referred, in place of so much discrepancy of opinion, the question
would still remain, how far the law as stated by the publicists had received the assent of the civilized nations
of the world. For writers on international law, however valuable their labours may be in elucidating and
ascertaining the principles and rules of law, cannot make the law. To be binding, the law must have received
the assent of the nations who are to be bound by it. This assent may be express, as by treaty or the
acknowledged concurrence of governments, or may be implied from established usage . . ‘ and
‘Nor, in my opinion, would the clearest proof of unanimous assent on the part of other nations be sufficient to
authorize the tribunals of this country to apply, without an Act of Parliament, what would practically amount
to a new law. In so doing we should be unjustifiably usurping the province of the legislature. The assent of
nations is doubtless sufficient to give the power of parliamentary legislation in a matter otherwise within the
sphere of international law; but it would be powerless to confer without such legislation a jurisdiction beyond
and unknown to the law, such as that now insisted on, a jurisdiction over foreigners in foreign ships on a
portion of the high seas.’

CASE OF THE STEAMER THREE FRIENDS.

Argument on the Piracy Charges Preferred by the Government

Heard Before the Supreme Court of the

United States.At the Conclusion of the Argument the Court Adjourns Until the First Monday in March,
Without An.nouncing Any Opinion on the Question at Issue.

WASHINGTON, Fab. 15.—The Unitdd Bastes Supreme Court to-day heard arguments ha tne case of the
Uultadi States vs. the steamer Three Friends on the motion of the Attorney-General for a certiorari to the
Circuit Court of Appeals of tii.- Fifth District, bringing the case to the Supreme Court. The st. amer liad been
libeled tor condemnation on the charge of violating the neutrality laws cot:: rolling the relations! between the
United States and Spain.

j Assistant Attorney-General WattnsV) ; made the argument for the GovernIntent, He began by stating the
question) I briefly, and then discussed at length) [the question of the nature of a recognition of belligerency.
He explained ths effect of the Act of IM7 la the use of the words ••(• >!ony. district of people."

He said it was clear that the steamer 1 had been equipped to be employed, against the Spanish authorities
by tho Cuban insurgents. He read extracts from the President's last message t(» show that sufficient
recognition of the Cuban belligerents had been given by the executive to justify the courts in giving them
their attention. The Florida District Court had taken the position that it could not, under the statute, take such
cognisance, but Mr. Whitney argued to the contrary. The only question, he said, was whether tho statute
was applicable for the reason that the belligerency of the Cubans had not been formally recognized, it was
true in the technical meaning of international law that the Cubans had noC been recognized as belligerents,
but then if this was the case, there were other statutt s concerning the piracy and enlisting of men for
hostilities against a friendly power which were applicable. As a matter of fact there was nothing in the
statutes to require ay recognition of belligerency to set tho. law hi n .. 'jio^. W. Haiietfephillips an d A. W.
Cockrell appeared for the owners of the Three Friends

Mr. Phillips desired to know if the question as to whether the words "colony, district of people." in the law of
IM7 applied to the Cuban insurgent* as presented by the record in this case. No sin fa body as the reipublie
of Cubawas, he said, anywhere referred to. As a matter of fact, the Attorney-General had been the first
among the responsible officers Of the Government to employ this phrase. He claimed that there had been a
mistake as to the legal meaning of that word "neutrality." Which is inseparable from a belligerency to which
the neutral is not a party. He asserted that the words insurgents and revolutionists have no legal meaning,
but when recognized by a neutral Government such recognition amounts to a recognition of belligerency or
independence. He contended! that all the court could do is to decide* whether on the records presented
and;' the charges in the libel the court beloWj | was justified in sustaining the excepj tions. Mr. Cockrell urged
that the libel failed to show the original intent a 9 ! required by law of the offending person, and that it did not
even show who the offending persons ware, "Could the> Government." he asked, "establish the Specific
intention required without; prosing its existence in the mind of j the person who had fitted out the
yes-Attorney-General Harmon closed ,for the Government. He said that whlls the Cuban insurrection had
not shown itself to be strong enough to warrant I the recognition of belligerency, stilt' there had been
satficient recognition* that a state of war existed* So far as formal recognition was concerned ha [claimed
the insurgerfts were better off, without it. lb' closed with an appeal ! for the obst rvance of the neutrality j laws,
and urged that Congress had, | provided abundant means for their eni forcement. i At the conclusion of Mr.
Harmon's? argument the court adjourned without announcing tiny opinion until the firsC j Monday in March.
Filibuster* Bermuda. WASHINGTON, Feb. I...—The Secretary of the Treasury instructed the Col- ! lector of
Customs at Philadelphia to ' withhold clearance papers from the alleged filibuster Bermuda, which was
preparing to leave. The Bermuda is a ! British vessel, and it is said her nia- ! jesty's Consul at Philadelphia
has given his consent to her departure, but the ! Treasury officials require the Captain to make oath that he
will not violate the laws of the United States if granted I clearance. An Offer to George Green. | SYRACUSE,
Feb. 1...— The Empire j Athletic Club has wired George Green I (Young Corbett) an offer of a purse of
[$1,500 and $300 for expenses to meet "Tommy" Ryan in this city on April 14th. providing that Ryan wins hia
coming match with Tom Tracey in thiscity. This is a duplicate of the offer ! made by the Olympic Club of San
Francisco. ( British fleet With Strong Opposition. LONDON. Feb. lo.—The morning j papei-s publish
telegrams stating that the British naval expedition advancing; j toward Benin City for the purpose of j
punishing the King of Benin, murderer |of Consul Phillips' party, had met) [strong opposition. Commander
Pritchard was killed in fighting at Sapelo. It has recently been ascertained that almanacs and calendars date
back to the year 200 A. D.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION GR 139465, 17 October 2000

FACTS:
On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country".
On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America.
The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of the said treaty. It also
expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the
admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note
Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District
Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of
(a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts),
(b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts),
(c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts),
(d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and
(E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts).
On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999 requested copies of
the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of
the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request.
On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him
access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice
Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court;
and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to
the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice
Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

IN SUMMARY:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the United States
for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing the procedure
for extradition of persons who have committed a crime in a foreign country. Jimenez requested for copies of
the request and that he be given ample time to comment on said request. The petitioners denied the request
pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

HELD:

NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is applied
whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation where there is a conflict between a rule of the
international law and the constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the provisions so as to
give effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over the municipal law in the municipal sphere. In states where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or
employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The
convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private
respondents liberty is easily comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside
legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements.The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality,"
since private respondents due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected
by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict
construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.

Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners,
vs.

EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate
in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement
through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well
as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices
concerned therewith.
They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of
member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits
and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and
impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987
Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines.

Held:
No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty, particularly the
legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in the proper manner when it
concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly,
as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type
isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A
treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x.
A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or
derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning
such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the
termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of
commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality
be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature
of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John
F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The
age of interdependence is here.”

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot
be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law
encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of
robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and
Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to
grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 G.R. No. 101949
238 SCRA 524
December 1, 1994
Petitioner: The Holy See
Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See,
was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was
donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.
Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were
unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales
Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent
corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages
against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and
Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC
denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a
business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action
for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As
expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are
adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our
admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy
shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of
the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus
exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in
this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made
for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature.
The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but
for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of
the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character
as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said
property.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly.