Running head: ARTIFACT #5 SPECIAL EDUCATION 1

Artifact #5

Special Education

Janette Briones

College of Southern Nevada

December 11, 2018

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Abstract

Debbie Young, a high school principal, was approached by the parents of Jonathan, a severely

disabled tenth-grade student, to have their son attend one the schools in the district. Jonathan

required constant care by a specially trained nurse, due to his multiple disabilities. Young refused

the parents’ request due to extraordinary expense and a view that the school is not the most

appropriate placement for Jonathan. In this essay, this scenario will be compared with cases.

The cases Timothy v. Rochester and S.P. ex rel. M.P. v. Knox County Bd. of Educ. will be used

to support the parents. The cases McLaughlin v. Holt Public Schools and Urban v. Jefferson

County School District R-1 will be used to support Debbie Young.

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Special Education

Debbie Young served as a special education teacher and an assistant principal in a

progressive, affluent school district in the South. She is now a well-versed high school principal.

She was approached by the parents of Jonathan, a severely disabled tenth-grade student, to have

their son attend one the schools in the district. Jonathan has multiple disabilities requiring

constant care by a specially trained nurse. He is profoundly mentally disabled, has spastic

quadriplegia, and has a seizure disorder. Young refused the parents’ request due to extraordinary

expense and a view that the school is not the most appropriate placement for Jonathan.

The first case that supports Jonathan’s parents is Timothy W. v. Rochester, New

Hampshire, School District, 875 F.2d 954 (1989), in which Timothy, a severely mentally disabled

and multiply handicapped child, was denied special education. The school district denied

Timothy on the bases that “a handicapped child is not eligible for special education if he cannot

benefit from that education”. (Timothy v. Rochester, 1989) The Court concluded that “all

handicapped children, regardless of the severity of their handicap, are entitled to a public

education” and that “it is the schools district’s responsibility to avail itself of these new

approaches in providing an education program geared to each child’s individual needs.”

(Timothy v. Rochester, 1989)

The second case that will be used to support Jonathan’s parents is S.P. ex rel. M.P. v.

Knox County Bd. of Educ., No. 3:17-CV-00100 (E.D. Tenn. Sep. 12, 2018), in which Plaintiffs

claimed Knox County violated IDEA, by having a “policy and practice of busing children with

epilepsy from schools without nurses to schools with nurses for administration of the medication

Diastat.” (S.P. ex rel. M.P. v. Knox County, 2018) The Plaintiffs zoned schools offered a free

appropriate public education, but because they required a full-time nurse to administer Diastat,
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they were placed at schools that had a full-time nurse. The court stated the “unless the IEP of a

child with a disability requires some other arrangement, the child is educated in the school that

he or she would attend if nondisabled” and that “Tennessee law prohibits transferring students

with a seizure disorder to a non-zoned school”. (S.P. ex rel. M.P. v. Knox County, 2018)

The first case to support the school is McLaughlin v. Holt Public Schools, 133 F. Supp.

2d 994 (2001), in which the parents of Emma McLaughlin filed the lawsuit because the school

identified that the most appropriate education setting for the student was at their neighborhood

school instead of where the parents believed was the most appropriate and the closest to their

home. The reason for deciding on the neighborhood school was because the school believed that

a categorical classroom was appropriate for Emma, which was not available in the school closest

to parents’ house. The parents tried using the Least Restrictive Environment Act to overturn the

school placement, but the act is “silent about, where, within the school district, the

mainstreaming should take place” and that the “the educational placement of each child with a

disability [shall be] as close as possible to the child’s home”. (McLaughlin v. Holt, 2001)

The second case to support the school is Urban v. Jefferson County School District R-1,

89 f.3d 720 (1996), in which the district refused to place Gregory Urban, a multiply disabled

child, at a high school of his choice. Gregory was in a specific program that was available in the

current school, but not in his neighborhood school. The court concluded that “Gregory was

receiving a free appropriate public education at Golden High School, and noted that Gregory has

no right, as a matter of law, to placement at his neighborhood school under either the IDEA or

the Rehabilitation Act.” (Urban v. Jefferson, 1996)

Debbie Young’s decision would be defensible when siting both the McLaughlin v. Holt

and the Urban v. Jefferson cases. If the school places Jonathan in another school that provides
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him a free appropriate public education, which they would not be able to in Young’s schools,

then that placement is deemed appropriate. Both cases stated that if schools can not provide the

student an adequate program and have them placed in another school that could, as long as the

placement is “as close as possible to the child’s home”, then there is no issue.
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References

Timothy W. v. Rochester, New Hampshire, School District, 875 F.2d 954 (1989)

S.P. ex rel. M.P. v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:17-CV-00100 (E.D. Tenn. Sep. 12, 2018)

McLaughlin v. Holt Public Schools, 133 F. Supp. 2d 994 (2001)

Urban v. Jefferson County School District R-1, 89 F.3d 720 (1996)