Legal Research

Stare Decisis

1.0 Ting vs Velez-Ting

G.R. No. 166562; March 31, 2009

FACTS: Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were
classmates in medical school. They fell in love and get married on July 26, 1975
in Cebu City when Carmen was already pregnant with their first child. They resided first
at Benjamin’s family at Mandaue City. When their second child was born, the couple
decided to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu City. In September 1975, Benjamin
passed the medical board examinations. On 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital,
owned by Carmen’s family, as member of its active staff, while Carmen worked as the
hospitals treasurer. The couple were blessed with six (6) children. On October 21, 1993,
after being married for more than 18 years. Carmen filed a verified petition before the
RTC of Cebu City for nullifying their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
Carmen claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of
the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that
Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. But after they were
married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight
.Benjamin physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also
instances Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected. Respondent tried to talk to
her husband about the latter’s drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge
the same. Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial
support to their family. Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.

Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care
of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both
presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each other’s claim. On January 9,
1998, the TRIAL COURT DECLARED the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void. The RTC found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision
reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at
the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories
and not on established fact, contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina. Carmen filed a MR, it
was denied then she filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, SC directed CA to decide
on Carmen’s case. On review, CA reversed it’s earlier ruling

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code has been liberalized

HELD: The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a prior assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

The Supreme Court did not grant the nullity of marriage. As between the psychiatrist
presented by the petitioner and the one presented by the respondent, the Supreme Court
adhered to the findings of the latter that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated
considering that the psychiatrist of the respondent, aside from analysing the transcripts
of the respondent’s deposition, was able to consider the psychiatric finding of another
psychiatrist who personally examined the respondents and also to interview the
respondent’s brothers compared. The psychiatrist of the petitioner however merely
evaluated the respondents by only analysing his deposition.

1.1 Santos vs Court of Appeals

240 SCRA 20; January 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the
marriage, the couple when quarreling over a number of things including
the interference of Julia’s parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally
left for the United States. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a period
of five years and she had then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be
appreciated.
HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated and must be incurable. Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as
psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.