People vs.

Bio

Facts:

In 2003, an asset reported to Police Superintendent Nilo Wong (P/Supt. Wong), Chief of the Station Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Unit (SAID-SOTU), Novaliches Police Station, the alleged illegal
drugs activities of appellant. P/Supt. Wong immediately formed a team composed of SP03 Mario
Concepcion, PO2 Noel Magcalayo, PO1 Edmond Paculdar, PO1 Emeterio Mendoza, PO1 Michael
Collado and PO2 Fernando Salonga (PO2 Salonga). PO2 Salonga as the poseur-buyer, and was provided
with two 100-peso bills as buy-bust money.

Thereafter, the team proceeded and arrived along Ramirez St., Brgy. Nova. The asset then introduced PO2
Salonga, as buyer of shabu, to Bio. They both agreed to the sale, thus PO2 Salonga handed to appellant
the two 100-peso bills and, in turn, the latter gave the former a plastic sachet. PO2 Salonga scratched his
head as the pre-arranged signal to his companions that the sale had been consummated. He then
introduced himself to appellant as a police officer and apprehended him. However, before he could
handcuff appellant, a woman later identified as appellant’s wife, suddenly grabbed appellant such that the
latter was able to run away. PO2 Salonga gave a chase and caught appellant, who, when searched, was
found possessing another plastic sachet suspected to contain shabu.

Appellant interposed the defenses of denial and extortion. He claimed that he was just buying charcoal
when arrested. One of the policemen who is not familiar to him demanded ₱80,000.00 for settlement.

RTC and CA: found guilty

Issue: (1) Whether the prosecution failed to show that the police officers complied with the requirements
of R.A. 9165 in handling the seized evidence, particularly with respect to the immediate marking,
physical inventory and taking of photographs of the items confiscated.

(2) Whether there is a violation of his fundamental right to due process when he was not assisted
by counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings.

Held:
(1) There was a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted against appellant wherein he sold to PO2
Salonga one plastic sachet of shabu and that an ensuing body search revealed that he possessed another
plastic sachet containing the same illegal substance.

To sustain a conviction under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, all that is needed for the prosecution to
establish are (1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor.11

In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, it is necessary to prove that: (1) the accused is
in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and, (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

In his testimony, PO2 Salonga, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the seller of the plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance which was later identified by the PNP Forensic Chemist to
be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The same sachet and substance was identified
in court by PO2 Salonga as the shabu sold to him by appellant for the sum of ₱200.00.

Further, all the elements of the offense of illegal sale of shabu are obtaining in this case. Apellant, upon
being frisked after his apprehension, was found possessing another plastic sachet containing 0.15 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. There is no evidence on record showing that he was legally
authorized to possess the same. Neither was there any explanation that he did not freely or consciously
possess the said illegal drug. Settled is the rule that "possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie
evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession."13 Clearly, all the elements of the offense of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs are likewise present in this case.

The chain of custody of the seized items was shown to be intact and unbroken notwithstanding the failure
of the apprehending officers to mark the evidence upon arrest, to make the inventory, and to take
photographs of the same in the presence of the appellant and the persons mentioned in Section 21 of R.A.
9165. As held in People v. Domado,14 mere lapses in procedures need not invalidate a seizure if the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items can be shown to have been preserved.

Links that must be established in the chain of custody in the buy-bust situation: Seizure & marking
- turnover drug seized by apprehending to investigating officer - investigating to the forensic chemist for
lab exa - forensic chemist to court.

In the present case, the links in the chain have been duly proven. During the conduct of the buy-bust
operation,PO2 SALONGA, the poseur-buyer, was able to confiscate two (2) plastic sachets of shabu from
accused-appellant: the first one was sold to him in exchange for the buy-bust money, and the second one
was recovered from the latter during the routinary frisk conducted by PO2 SALONGA. He thereafter gave
the plastic sachets to SPO3 CONCEPCION, who kept the same in his custody until they reached the
police station, where SPO3 CONCEPCION, in turn, surrendered them to the desk officer who placed the
appropriate markings thereon.1âwphi1 Subsequently, the seized items were turned over to PO1
ESTRELLES, the police officer on duty, who prepared the request for laboratory examination on the
specimens, which he delivered, together with the seized plastic sachets, to the PNP Crime Laboratory on
September 9, 2003. [Thereupon], forensic chemist P/INSP ARBAN duly received the request for
laboratory examination and the confiscated items and conducted the qualitative examination thereon,
which yielded positive results.

Thus, the prosecution in this case was able to establish the integrity and the evidentiary value of the shabu
seized from accused-appellant, hence, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
It must be stressed that non-compliance with Sec.21 of [R.A.] 9165 does not render an accused’s
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. The requirements under [R.A.]
9165 and its implementing rules are not inflexible. What is essential is ‘the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.

(2) the Court cannot accord credence to the same because this issue(without assistance of counsel) cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal without offending the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

Besides, the fact that he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings does
not in any way affect his culpability. It has already been held that "the infractions of the so-called Miranda
rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation." Here, appellant's conviction was based not on his alleged uncounseled confession or
admission but on the testimony of the prosecution witness.

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Enrile and several others were charged by Ombudsman with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of
their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF). As such, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental
Opposition, praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against
him. the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail,
on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been
placed under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his
medical examination.

In support of Enrile’s Motion for Detention at PNP General Hospital, Enrile argued that he should be
allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal
, not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further
be seriously considered.

Sandiganbayan denied the same and ruled: It is only after the prosecution shall have presented its
evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound
to fix the amount of his bail.

That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence
of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.

Enrile’s contention before SC:

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it
is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the
exception (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong) and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish
that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two
mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward
with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a
flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing.

Held:

1. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The
presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any
punishment on the accused.

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes.[[21]
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by
the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as
a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or
during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

2. Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution. This
constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under
arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt
is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized.

All criminal cases within the competence of the MTC, MTCC are bailable as matter of right because these
courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the RTC for any offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years x x x.
 3. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is
subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court but such discretion may be exercised only after
the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the
guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

4. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail

We do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable
with reclusion perpetua , simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to
be made by the trial court.

In now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required
by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also
to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to
bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his
choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will
guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

To mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application
for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either
admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already
consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances
the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at
the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail.

Sps. Santiago vs. Raffy Tulfo

Facts:

Petitioners just came back from a vacation. They waited for the arrival of their baggage but were
eventually informed that it was offloaded and transferred to a different flight. Aggrieved, petitioners
lodged a complaint before the Cebu Pacific complaint desk. As they were complaining, they noticed a
man taking photos of Claudine with his cellular phone. Ray mart approached the man and asked what he
was doing. Suddenly, the man, later identified as Ramon "Mon" Tulfo (Mon), allegedly punched and
kicked Raymart, forcing the latter to fight back. When Claudine saw the commotion, she approached Mon
and the latter likewise allegedly kicked and pushed her back against the counter. At that instance, Raymart
rushed to defend his wife, while one Edoardo Benjamin Atilano (Atilano) joined in the brawl.
Immediately thereafter, several airport security personnel came to stop the altercation and brought them to
the Airport Police Department for investigation.

Days after the incident, respondents Raffy, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo (respondents), brothers of Mon, aired on
their TV program comments and expletives against petitioners, and threatened that they will retaliate. 6
Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo against respondents on May 11, 2012 before the RTC.

Judge Vargas initially issued a TPO then upon retiring, was replaced by Judge Singh and the latter
ordered for dissolution of TPO and held that the petition is not a proper subject of a writ of amparo
since the rules were intended to apply solely to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, noting that the purpose of the law is to, among others, ascertain the whereabouts of an
aggrieved party, recover evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the
petition, and determine the facts surrounding the death or disappearance of a missing person.
Consequently, it held that it did not have the authority to issue said writ in favor of petitioners.

Issue: Whether RTC's dismissal of petitioners' amparo petition was correct.

Petitioners argue that the issuance of a writ of amparo is not limited to cases of extrajudicial killings,
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. They submit that they need not undergo the human rights
abuses such as extrajudicial killings or enforced disappearances, as is common to landmark decisions on
military and police abuses, before their right to life, liberty, and security may be protected by a writ of
amparo.

Held:

Yes.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the Court has already
explained that the writ of amparo, under its present procedural formulation, namely, A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC, otherwise known as "The Rule on the Writ of Amparo," was intended to address and, thus, is
presently confined to cases involving “extralegal killings” and/or “enforced disappearances, or
threats thereof.”

The present Amparo Rule has limited the remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof. "Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are generally
characterized as "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings," while "enforced disappearances, "means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by,
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time."

Consistent therewith, the delimitation of our current writ of amparo to extralegal killings and/or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof, is explicit from Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, which reads:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC's first paragraph, does state that the
writ is a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail of it, the
same section's second paragraph qualifies that the protection of such rights specifically pertain to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which are more concrete cases that
involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and security. The two paragraphs should indeed be read
together in order to construe the meaning of the provision.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any case of
extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses above-described.
Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents' purported violation of their right
to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect
government participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail.
Mison vs. Gallegos

The privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of
extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and
granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of Amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

Facts:

The records show that on 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of
Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and
deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of
Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request to
petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest
and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien.

Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Ku’s visa expired.

Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public and this
finding was approved by the BI Board of Commissioners which, on 16 January 2014, issued a Summary
Deportation Order.12

On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant
and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained and the
Republic of Korea Passport voided his passport.

Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies and Supplemental
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.

Finding said supple mental petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Judge Gallegos, in an Order
dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo.17 On 24 January 2014, Ku filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO). Judge Gallegos then set the hearing on the TPO on 27
January 2014 at 8:30 a.m., while he set the hearing on the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo on
29 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m.

In the afternoon of 27 January 2014, petitioner filed his Return of the Writ. He was then notified that a
hearing on the TPO was held earlier in the morning and that the same was already submitted for
resolution.

Petitioner then filed an Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of TPO on 28 January 2014.

On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of
TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard
Gordon, and directing the Philippine National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG)
to protect Ku and his immediate family. On 29 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the second assailed
Order directing the transfer of custody and protection of Ku to the PNP-PSPG. Petitioner challenged these
orders before the Court via a Petition for Certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 210759.

On 4 February 2014, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 210759 issuing a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and directing the BI
to retain custody of Ku, as well as requiring Ku to comment on the petition. In issuing this resolution, the
Court intimated the possibility of misuse by Ku of the writ of amparo given that he was validly arrested
and placed under the jurisdiction and custody of the BI; thus the case cannot be categorized as one of
extralegal killing or enforced disappearance.

Owing to the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, in the hearing set on 11 February 2014 before the
trial court, petitioner verbally moved for the dismissal of the amparo petition. On 18 February 2014,
however, Judge Gallegos issued the third assailed order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
Thus, petitioner appealed the matter to the Court via the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 211403.

On 25 February 2014, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his deportation order addressed to the Office
of the President (OP).

On 14 March 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution granting the privilege of the writ of
amparo: [Ku] is ordered immediately released from [petitioner’s] custody without prejudice to the
institution of the proper remedy to extradition. Moreover, the [petitioner] and/or agents are ordered to
cease and desist from further violating the right to liberty of [Ku] and the members of his family by filing
cases to legitimize his detention.
Issue: Whether the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.

Held:

No.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power
to promulgate rules to protect our people’ s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the
1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule
was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v.
Macapagal-Arroyo where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined
only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what
constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting
"enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9851, to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the Amparo Rule is now a procedural law
anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory
definition as well of what an ‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC’s reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary
disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced
disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851.

Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come
under the statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by
agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there
any refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any
intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.

Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that he was not read
his rights under the constitution and was not informed of the reason for hi s arrest, nor provided a copy of
any document leading to his arrest and detention, the arresting officers are all consistent in testifying that,
upon Ku’s arrest, they introduced themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of
Deportation, and informed him of his constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his visa.

More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the
Bureau, Ku’s arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-
documented as evidenced by the Return of Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 2014 and the After-
Mission Report dated 17 January 2014.

Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which is the
right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits, to wit:

SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. – The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
 (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long period of time
without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him to hold him under
detention.

According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an amparo petition is the protection it will give to his
person against the actions of some government officials who will likely take advantage of their positions
and use the power of the government at their command. Ku adds that the longer he stays in confinement
the more he is exposed to life-threatening situations and the further the violation of his guaranteed rights.

The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties
to establish their claims by substantial evidence. Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku
was not able to present evidence that he was exposed to "life-threatening situations" while confined at the
BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has
access to his counsel.

Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition, was that the BI would trump
up charges against him so as to justify his detention. The fact remains, however, that even before his
arrest, deportation charges against him were already duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.

As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was
improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his
life, liberty and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the
fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the
extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts
were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at
bar.