Adriano, Jake Zhan C.

LLB-3
Written report
Special Proceedings

SALUDO, JR., vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Facts: Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express
International, Inc. (AMEX) with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
The appellate court held that, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City.
It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is
inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices
of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial
Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.
Petitioner Saludo, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also
his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence
is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time."
And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law,
petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had
personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The latter
element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for
petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.

Issue: Whether the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was
improperly laid because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff
therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.

Ruling: YES. SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff
but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The
rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice, or the impartial and even handed determination of every action
and proceeding. The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either
the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides.
If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was
not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently
holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co.,
Inc. v. Sarmiento, the Court had the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term
"resides" for purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in
the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as
distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning.
 Benatiro vs Cuyos

Facts: Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land.

Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) filed a petition 4 for Letters of
Administration. The petition was opposed by Gloria's brother, Francisco.
Both parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. Then, the trial court
issued an Order appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was
given to Atty. Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos, respectively,
the same cannot be taken as notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyer's
authority to compromise cannot be simply presumed, since what was required was the
special authority to compromise on behalf of his client; that a compromise agreement
entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no
legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid; 19 that being a void compromise agreement, the
assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were
procured fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since
the compromise agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was
void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of
P36,000.00 to the administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the testimony of
Numeriano Cuyos admitting that he received his share of the proceeds but without
indicating the exact amount that he received; that even so, such alleged payment was
incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial court's order for the administratrix to
execute the deed of sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-
Benatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the sum of P36,000.00; that said sum
of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration
expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order
of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs.

Issue: WON the heirs has been constructively notified of the proceedings and bound by
an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to
participate therein.

Ruling: NO. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding.

The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of
an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has
been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon
(i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as
what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial
settlement among heirs.
In the case at bar, the publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive
notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was
notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the
protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation
in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these
extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their
knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned
 Avelino vs CA

Facts: Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate and asked that she
be appointed the administrator of the estate. Angelina and the siblings filed their
opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for
judicial partition, which petitioner duly opposed.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed before
the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The respondent appellate court issued the assailed decision which affirmed the order of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether respondent appellate court committed an error of law and gravely abused
its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper in this case.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows
heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being
dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs are not
required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment
of an administrator by the court.
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the
lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an
action for judicial partition. The petition was denied for lack of merit, and the assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were affirmed.
Comparative Case
#1 Nuguid v. Nuguid & Sumilang v. Ramagosa

Nuguid vs Nuguid

Facts: Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died without issue. Surviving her were
her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters.
Petitioner Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and
mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her
will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased
in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the
institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct lie, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heirs.
Petitioner’s contention is that the present case is a of ineffective disinheritance
rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the
case at bar.

Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.

Ruling: YES. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she
left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does
not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of
preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or through mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn,
is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime
for a cause authorized by law.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and
preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such
universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

Sumilang vs Ramagosa

Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for probate of the will of Hilarion Ramagosa which
instituted petitioner as the sole heir. This was opposed by Saturnina Ramagosa alleging
that the will was executed under duress and later on alleging that the will was revoked by
implication when the testator sold the parcels of land subject of the will to petitioner. The
CFI denied the motion to dismiss of the oppositors on the ground that it goes into the
intrinsic validity of the will. Hence, the present case.

Issue: WON the probate be denied.

Ruling: NO. The petition for probate is limited to the extrinsic validity that is the testator’s
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or the
legality of any devise or legacy is premature. The alleged sale in the case at bar is no
ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing, the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and
the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.
 Valera v. Inserto & Trinidad v. CA

Facts: Rafael Valera was granted leasehold rights over an 18 hectare fishpond in Iloilo
by the government to last during his lifetime. He transferred it by fictitious title to his
daughter, Teresa, to support her children with the agreement that when the children
finishes schooling, the fishpond will be returned to him.
Valera and his spouse Consolacion Sarosa and their child Teresa died.
The heirs of Teresa – her husband Jose Garin and their children bought the
fishpond from the government acquiring title thereto.
The administrators of the spouses claims that the fishpond should be returned to
the spouses’ estate.
Probate court ruled that there has been an implied trust created, therefore, the
fishpond should be restored to the estate of the spouses.

Issue: WON the probate court had authority to order reconveyance of the fishpond.

Ruling: NO. The probate court exercises limited jurisdiction and has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a 3 rd person
adversely to the decedent, unless issue is procedural. The claimant and all other parties
having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of
the question to the Probate Court for adjudgement. Or the interests of 3rd person are not
thereby prejudiced.

Trinidad vs CA

Facts: An information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional
Trial Court), herein petitioner, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, was charged for violation of PD 957
for non-delivery of title.
Petitioner, in his direct testimony and cross, testified to the fact that in the Intestate
Proceedings of the estate of the late Nicolai Drepin, he became the Judicial Administrator
appointed in the year 1976, and he presented his appointment. He testified that he took
hold of the property of the deceased including the Mother Earth Realty Development
Corporation, and also the unregistered property situated at Antipolo, Rizal. The whole lot
is titled in the name of testator. He admitted that he is the administrator of the Mother
Earth Realty Development Corporation, and that said corporation has lots for sale. He
continued to receive payments of lots for sale in installment. In 1978 the National Housing
Authority stopped the sale of lots, and his corporation was told to stop operating the
property now the place being under control of the Ministry of Human Settlements.
According to him the complainant (Ms. Francisca T. Dimabuyu) had not complied with all
the requirements for the complainant had not paid the taxes. He asked the Probate Court
as administrator to allow him to execute a Deed of Sale to his lot buyers and he was
allowed in November 1982, the authority was presented. The Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation, according to him, is not in business now, and he is not the
administrator. He was appointed by the Court as administrator in place of Atty. Guico,
and he has letters of administration. His duties as administrator are with the full authority
to take possession of all properties of the deceased.
In the cross examination of this witness he admitted that he was not able to deliver
any title to the complainant for according to him the complainant had not actually paid all
her obligations because there is no adjustment considering the value of the peso which
has declined these days. The complainant has not even paid the taxes of the land so that
the contract has not been duly complied with.
Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment against him.
Not satisfied with the foregoing decision, herein petitioner elevated the case to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, which rendered judgment against him.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue: WON the claim for delivery of title is not a duty of the buyer to file against the
estate but of the administrator to deliver the same to the buyer.

Ruling: It should not be the obligation of the buyer to file before the Probate Court her
claim for delivery of the title against the estate of the decedent. That was petitioner's
obligation as the administrator not only of the estate of the decedent but also as
administrator/manager of the development corporation. Article 1495 of the Civil Code
mandates that the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as
warrant the thing which is the object of the sale. The vendee has the right to receive, and
the vendor the corresponding obligation to transfer to the former, not only the possession
and enjoyment of the land but also the certificate of title (Gabila vs. Perez, G.R. No.
29541, 27 January 1989, 169 SCRA 517)
 Roxas v. Pecson

Facts: Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The other respondents Maria
and Pedro Roxas, sister and brother respectively of the deceased, filed a petition for the
administration of the latter's estate. Maria Roxas was appointed special administratrix
upon an ex-parte petition. Petitioner Natividad Vda. de Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas,
filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband, and for her
appointment as executrix of his estate designated in said will. In said will the deceased
bequeathed one-half of his estate to his widow, the herein petitioner, and the other half
to Reynaldo Roxas, an adulterous child 9 years old of the decedent. Upon agreement of
both parties, the intestate proceeding was dismissed and ordered closed by the court.
In view of the opposition to the probate of the will by the respondents Maria and
Pedro Roxas, the petitioner was appointed as special administratrix and qualified as such
over the objection of the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, who sought the
appointment of Maria as such. The said respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of the court appointing the petitioner as special administratrix, with an alternative
prayer that Maria Roxas be appointed as special co- administratrix, which motion was not
acted upon.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision denying the probate of
the will presented by the petitioner on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not sign
their respective names in the presence of the testator, from which the petitioner has
appealed, and the appeal is now pending.
Then, the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the
appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or special co-administratrix, and the
respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad I. Vda. de
Roxas as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and
Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to
the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
The present petition for certiorari has been filed with this Court against the last
order or resolution of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan based on the ground that the
respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing two special co-
administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas, one of the capital or properties
belonging exclusively to the deceased, and another of his conjugal properties with his
wife (now widow), the petitioner.

Issue: WON SECTION 1, RULE 81 AND SECTION 2 OF RULE 83 is applicable.

Ruling: NO. It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right
of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well
as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under
section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or
removal of an special administrator.

Matias v. Gonzales

Facts: Petitioner Aurea Matias seeks a writ of certiorari to annul certain orders of Hon.
Primitivo L. Gonzales, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, in connection with
Special Proceedings No. 5213 of said court, entitled "Testate Estate of the Deceased
Gabina Raquel."
Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition for the probate of a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, who
died single at the age of 92 years. The heir to the entire estate of the deceased — except
the properties bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely, Victorina Salud,
Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud, Santos Matias and Rafael Matias — is, pursuant to
said instrument, Aurea Matias, likewise, appointed therein as executrix.
Basilia Salud, opposed the probate of her alleged will, and, the court, presided
over by respondent Judge, issued an order, sustaining said opposition and denying the
petition for probate. Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter on appeal to this
Court (G. R. No. L-10751), where it is now pending decision.
Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of
Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator of the estate of the deceased, and the
appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. The motion was set for hearing but the court
postponed the hearing to another date. Although notified of this order, Rodriguez did not
appear on the date last mentioned. Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for
additional time within which to answer the charges preferred against him by Basilia Salud
and for another postponement of said hearing. This motion was not granted, and Basilia
Salud introduced evidence in support of said charges, whereupon respondent Judge, by
an order, found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence, and,
accordingly, relieved him as special administrator of the estate of the deceased and
appointed Basilia Salud as special administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by
her niece, Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of
Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that "Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr.
Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby appointed as co- administrator."
Aurea Matias asked that said order, be set aside and that she be appointed special
co- administratrix, jointly with Horacio Rodriguez, upon the ground that Basilia Salud is
over eighty (80) years of age, totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the
duties of said office, and that said movant is the universal heiress of the deceased and
the person appointed by the latter as executrix of her alleged will. This motion was denied
in an order, which maintained "the appointment of the three abovenamed persons" —
Basilia Salud, Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud — "for the management of the estate of
the late Gabina Raquel pending final decision on the probate of the alleged will of said
decedent." However, Basilia Salud tendered her resignation as special administratrix by
same grounds used by Aurea Matias, and recommended the appointment of Victorina
Salud. Before any action could be taken Aurea Matias sought a reconsideration of said
order. Moreover, she expressed her conformity to said resignation, but objected to the
appointment, in lieu of Basilia Salud, of Victorina Salud, on account of her antagonism to
said Aurea Matias — she (Victorina Salud) having been the principal and most interested
witness for the opposition to the probate of the alleged will of the deceased — and
proposed that the administration of her estate be entrusted to the Philippine National
Bank, the Monte de Piedad, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, or any other similar
institution authorized by law therefor, should the court be reluctant to appoint the movant
as special administratrix of said estate. This motion for reconsideration was denied.
Shortly afterwards, respondents Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud requested
authority to collect the rents due, or which may be due, to the estate of the deceased and
to collect all the produce of her lands, which was granted on June 23, 1956. On June 27,
1956, said respondents filed another motion praying for permission to sell the palay of the
deceased then deposited in different rice mills in the province of Cavite, which respondent
judge granted on June 10, 1956. Later on, or on July 10, 1956, petitioner instituted the
present action against Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata, for the
purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders of respondent Judge, upon the ground
that the same had been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted within
the scope of his jurisdiction and without any abuse of discretion; that petitioner can not
validly claim any special interest in the estate of the deceased, because the probate of
the alleged will and testament of the latter — upon which petitioner relies — has been
denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly notified of the proceedings for his removal; and
that Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata have not done anything that would warrant their
removal.

Issue: WON an appointment of two or more special administrators is allowed, where the
rule laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson, to the effect that "only one special administrator may
be appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of the deceased.

Ruling: NO. Where it appears that there are, at least, two factions among the heirs of the
deceased, representing their respective interest in the estate, and the probate Court
deems it best to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity demands
that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased.
Thus, there were two (2) separate and independent special administrators. In the
case at bar there is only one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall be
exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. In short, the Roxas case is not squarely
in point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint
several special co-administrators.
 Eusebio- Fule
Eusebio Case
G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956

Principles:
VENUE; ESTATE OF DECEASED WHERE SETTLED; RESIDENCE AT THE
TIME OF THE DEATH; DOMICILE OF ORIGIN. — Where it is apparent, from the facts
duly established, that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he
retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once required is retained until a new domicile
is gained."
DOMICILE; NOT CHANGED BY PRESENCE IN A PLACE FOR ONE'S OWN
HEALTH. — It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a
place merely for one's own health," even if coupled with knowledge that one will never
again be able, on account of illness to return home."

Facts: Eugenio Eusebio filed with CFI Rizal, a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, allegedly residing in the City of
Quezon.
The illegitimate children of the deceased objected the petition and argued that the
decedent was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be
dismissed on the ground that venue had been improperly filed. Court overruled this
objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from
said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.
It is not disputed that Andres Eusebio was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga,
where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated
him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, Andres Eusebio bought a house
and lot at 889-A España Extension, in said City, for the purpose of his health condition.
While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a
stroke, for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his aforementioned residence, where
the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila.
He contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion
Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular
failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease". Consequently, he never stayed or even
slept in said house at España Extension.

Issue: WON the venue had been improperly laid.

Ruling: YES.
Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
"Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."
In the case at bar, it being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin
of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70)
years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the
absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once
acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained". Under the circumstances surrounding
the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one
of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose
and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to
stay therein permanently. Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a
domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise.
The decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga,
remained in that municipality. Then, again, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A
España Extension, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, or less than a month before his
death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A"
and "B" residence certificates used by the decedent in acknowledging said Exhibit 2,
before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage
contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to
Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior
to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice
that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a
witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his first
marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion and would have
objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from
appellee's failure to prove satisfactorily that the decedent had decided to establish his
home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death,
prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile
1 — which is particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2 as San Fernando,
Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been offset by the
evidence of record.
If proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted
in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in
which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and
we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. de Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should
it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly
laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings
may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in
San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority,
therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having
been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants'
opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

Fule vs CA
G.R. No. L-40502. November 29, 1976

Facts: Virginia G. Fule filed CFI of Lagunaa petition for letters of administration alleging,
that Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. At the same time, she moved ex
parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate which motion was
granted.
A MR was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, contending that the order appointing Virginia
G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the
estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment
of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be
preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor
of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular
administratrix after due hearing.
While the MR was pending resolution, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a motion to remove
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, that her appointment was obtained
through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G.
Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable
as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration
filed by Virginia G. Fule was published in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general
circulation in Southern Luzon.
Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of
Regular Administrator" filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the
original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of
Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the
names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3)
the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition,
is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her
preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4)
that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this
supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others,
that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the
court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
Thereafter, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of
interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule praying for authority to take
possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well
as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation
made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an
inventory of the personal and real properties making up the estate of the deceased."
However, Judge Malvar already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia
denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order, appointing Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition.
Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the
petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was
improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to
inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
Then, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule
as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before the
court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcaide, an illegitimate son of Andrea
Alcaide, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, one, to enjoin the special
administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which
have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate;
and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
 Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special
administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject
only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the
properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the special
administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order, to take custody and
possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with
the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado,
of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered
to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying
words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction
had already been resolved, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the
appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of
Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of
residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held
that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the
estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia to clarify or reconsider the
foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of
the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked
for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and
also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
Then, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second,
holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and
submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the orders, insofar as they
sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action)
of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal
of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and
papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc.
Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motion for reconsideration. Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders one,
directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the
statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the
corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to
Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another,
directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in
the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to
Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before
Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia
showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa
B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three
months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified
that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that
he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a
special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings
before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in
the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March
27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain
properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the
proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule
forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed
Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B.
Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta
of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on
January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-
19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the
Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being
the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings
before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case
pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on
December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question
Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance
of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that
the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before
the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, who succeeded Judge Ericta,
issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs
a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12, 1976.
On February 4, 1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition
for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No.
Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A
restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.

Issue: What does the word “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,
referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of the deceased persons means.
Ruling: Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of
jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts,
such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if
need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who
seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of
death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the
intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in
the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration.
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the
clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." 4 It could not have
been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or
authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in
a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure,
which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly
exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power
to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the
person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once
raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the
parties.
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country,
the Rules of Court, however purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates,
probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this
reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate
of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue."
The doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes
and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature —
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the
time of his death. As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented
in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last
place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside
from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his
death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning
over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973,
transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina
B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in
bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject
to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue
is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the
Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the
jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but
availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
Further, Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance
or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession
and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed. Formerly, the appointment of a
special administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is
under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. Nevertheless,
the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. That,
however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must
be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should
not y be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. Nothing is wrong
for the judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate
of the decedent. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a
property.

Comparative Analysis: