G.R. No.
L-10778 March 29, 1916 the plaintiffs in their amended and supplemental complaint, that they claim to have acquired
THE MUNICIPALITY OF DUMANGAS, ILOILO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO, objector-appellant.
Facts: counsel for the municipality of Dumangas, Province of Iloilo, petitioned the Court of
First Instance of said province, in conformity with the law, for the registration of six parcels of
land of which said municipality claimed to be the absolute owner. These lands are situated in
the barrio of Balabag of the pueblo of Dumangas
The applicant alleged that it had acquired said lands by possession dating from time
immemorial; that it was occupying one of said parcels as a public market, the rest of them
being unoccupied
The application for registration was opposed by the Director of Lands, several private parties,
and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro, exclusively belonged to the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church, which had been in quiet and peaceable possession of same since time
immemorial, and therefore prayed that the petition for registration be denied.
ISSUE: whether or not the church has a right of way
RULING: The record shows that the church of the pueblo of Dumangas was constructed in or
about the year 1887; that its wall on the southeast side adjoins the building lot in question; and
that since the construction of the church there has been a side door in this wall through which
the worshippers attending divine service enter and leave, they having to pass over and cross
the land in question. It is therefore to be presumed that the use of said side door also carries
with it the use by faithful Catholics of the municipal land over which they have had to pass in
order to gain access to said place of worship, and, as this use of the land has been continuous,
it is evident that the Church has acquired a right to such use by prescription,
.R. No. L-10619. February 28, 1958.]
LEOGARIO RONQUILLO, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOSE ROCO, as
Administrator of VICENTE ROCO Y DOMINGUEZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
Moises B. Cruz for Appellants.
Vicente Roco, Jr. for Appellees.
FACTS: plaintiffs have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way
which traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to
Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for
more than 20 years;
the easement of right of way over the land of the defendants and the latter’s predecessors in
interest, Vicente Roco, thru prescription by their continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow
strip of land of the defendants as passage way or road in going to Igualdad Street and the
public market of Naga City, from their residential land or houses, and return.
ISSUE: is whether an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription
RULING: No.
Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by
prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use
is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.
G.R. No. 77628 March 11, 1991
TOMAS ENCARNACION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE
LATE EUSEBIO DE SAGUN and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ANICETA MAGSINO
VIUDA DE SAGUN,* respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta
Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay,
Batangas. ** Petitioner owns the dominant estate
when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the
national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when
private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath measuring 25
meters long and about a meter wide was constituted to provide access to the highway. One-
half meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter
portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked
and non was given for the portions constituting the pathway.1
It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land where
he also had his abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family
and for his customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it became
more and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the
nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to
buy an owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However, that jeep
could not pass through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners (Aniceta
Vda. de Sagun and Elena Romero Vda. de Sagun) and requested that they sell to him one and
one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow
passage for his jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was turned down by the two
widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 6
(Tanauan) to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width
of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land. RTC dismissed
the complaint. On appeal as well.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of
right-of-way
RULING: Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of way may be
demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if
there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the case at bar,
although there is a dried river bed, t it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no
egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must
literally jump 4-5 meters up. And during rainy season, it is impassable due to the floods. When
a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent
servient estates as a matter of law. With the non-availability of the dried river bed as an
alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate the needs of the dominant estate.
Art. 651 provides that “the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate …” To grant the additional easement of right of
way of 1 ½ meters, Encarnacion must indemnify Sagun and Masigno the value of the land
occupied plus amount of the damages caused until his offer to buy the land is considered.
SPOUSES CESAR and RAQUEL STA. MARIA and FLORCERFIDA STA.
MARIA, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES ARSENIO and
ROSLYNN FAJARDO, Respondents
FACTS: Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of
land, Lot No. 124, in Bulacan.
Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the northeast portion
thereof; by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a
portion of Lot 6-b owned respectively by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and
Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the
northwest.
On February 17, 1992, Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants Sta. Maria for the
establishment of an easement of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is
surrounded by properties belonging to other persons, including those of the defendants; that
since plaintiffs have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way
passing through either of the alternative defendants' properties which are directly abutting the
provincial road would be plaintiffs' only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the
provincial road; that plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the
properties of defendants in going to and from their lot; that defendants' mother even promised
plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way as she
acknowledged the absence of an access from their property to the road; and that alternative
defendants, despite plaintiffs' request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the
barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement. Thus, plaintiffs prayed that an easement
of right of way on the lots of defendants be established in their favor.
RTC The trial court found that based on the Ocular Inspection Report there was no other way
through which the private respondents could establish a right of way in order to reach the
provincial road except by traversing directly the property of the petitioners
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the private respondents had sufficiently
established the existence of the four requisites for compulsory easement of right of way on
petitioners' property, to wit: (1) private respondents' property was, as revealed by the Ocular
inspection Report, surrounded by other immovables owned by different individuals and was
without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) the isolation of private respondents'
property was not due to their own acts, as it was already surrounded by other immovables
when they purchased it; (3) petitioners' property would provide the shortest way from private
respondents' property to the provincial road, and this way would cause the least prejudice
because no significant structure would be injured thereby; and (4) the private respondents
were willing to pay the corresponding damages provided for by law if the right of way would
be granted.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY CAN
BE ESTABLISHED
RULING: following requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of
right of way under the Civil Code, to wit:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last
par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest (Art. 650). 8
The third requisite is that the isolation of plaintiffs-appellees' property should not have been
due to their own acts. In the case under consideration, the isolation of their lot is not due to
plaintiffs' acts. The property they purchased was already surrounded by other immovables
leaving them no adequate ingress or egress to a public highway.
FLORO V LLENADO
Facts:
Simeon Floro owned a piece of land known as “Floro Park Subdivision” situated in Barangay
Saluysoy, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It has its own egress and ingress to and from the McArthur
Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing. Orlando A. Llenado, on the
other hand, was the registered owner of two parcels of land known as the “Llenado Homes”.
Prior to its purchase by Llenado from Francisco de Castro, the land was known as the Emmanuel
Homes Subdivision, duly licensed and registered subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega.
Bounded on the South by Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park subdivision,
and on the west by ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo, Montaos and Guevarra, the Llenado
Homes does not have existing road or passage to McArthur Highway. However, a proposed
access road traversing the idle Riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the
subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes, which was duly approved by the defunct Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission.
Llenados were permitted by Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park as a passage to
and from McArthur Highway. However, Floro later barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks,
wooden posts and adobe stones, preventing its use by Llenado. Llenado filed a complaint for
easement of Right of Way. During pendency of case, Orlando Llenado died and was substituted
by his wife, Wenifreda. Trial court dismissed the case for lack of merit. CA set aside the decision
of trial court.
Issues:
1. ) Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?
Held: It is not disputed that Floro granted the Llenados verbal permission to pass through Floro
Park. No such contract of easement of right of way was perfected. Citing Dionisio v Ortiz, the
use of Road Lot 4 and 5 by Llenados during the month of March was by mere tolerance of Floro
pending the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the right of way. Although such use was
in anticipation of a voluntary easement of right of way, no such contract as validly entered into
by reason of the failure of the parties to agree on its terms and conditions. Thus, Llenados cannot
claim entitlement to a right of way through Floro Park on the basis of voluntary easement.
2.) W/N they are entitled to compulsory servitude of right of way?
Preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of NCC:
a. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway
b. After payment of proper indemnity
c. That the isolation was not due to acts of proprietor of the dominant estate
d. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate
The burden of proving these pre-conditions lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
First precondition is not met since there is an existing right of way over the Ipapo Property.
Payment of proper indemnity was also not proven since there the complaint by Llenado did not
contain fixing of amount that he must pay to Floro in the event the easement of right of way be
constituted. Also, third requisite has not been met.
Moreover, in order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real,
not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what
is required by lawas the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude, the same should not be imposed.
This easement can also be established foe the benefit of tenement with an inadequate outlet, but
not when outlet is merely inconvenient.
QUIMEN V CA
Facts:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister
Rufina inherited a piece of property in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property
equally among themselves with the share of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the
municipal road. Anastacia’s was located at the extreme left, bounded on the right by property
of Sotero. Adjoining Sotero’s were Rufina’s and Suplicio’s, but latter was acquired by certain
Catalina Santos. Behind lots of Anastacia and Sotero is Antonio’s which was later divided into
two. One of these was purchased by Yolanda from her uncle Antonio through her aunt
Anastacia, who was then acting as his administratix. At first Yolanda was hesitant to buy the
same because it had no access to public road but Anastacia prevailed upon her to but the lot,
with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200 per
square meter. Yolanda constructed a house on the lot using as her passageway to the public
highway a portion of Anastacia’s. But when finally Yolanda offered to pay for the use of
pathway, Anastacia refused to accept the payment and barred Yolanda from passing through her
property.
Yolanda later purchased other lot of Antonio located directly behind the property of her parents
who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about 19 m from
Yolanda’s lot behind the sari-sari store of Satero, and Anastacia’s perimeter fence. Although the
pathway leads to municipal road, it is not adequate for ingress and egress because the store
obstructs the pathway. Yolanda filed an action for right of way. Trial court dismissed the
complaint but it was reversed by CA.
Issue: Which right of way should be granted?
Held: The conditions sine qua non for the grant of the easement of right of way are:
a. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway
b. After payment of proper indemnity
c. That the isolation was not due to acts of proprietor of the dominant estate
d. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate
Applying Art 650 of NCC, the proposed right of way of Yolanda was the least prejudicial as
compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda’s father which would mean
destroying the sari-sari store of strong materials.
36. PACITA DAVID-CHAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES,
INC.
G.R. No. 105294. February 26, 1997
FACTS
Petitioner alleged that her property, consisting of around 635 square meters, situated in
Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga and covered by TCT No. 57596-R, located around the
property are the following:
Northern and western sides: various business establishments.
Southern boundary: land of the Pineda family
East-northeastern boundary: a lot with an area of approximately 161 square meters owned
by private Philippine Rabbit Lines, which lied between her property and the MacArthur
Highway.
On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with
prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from fencing
its property and depriving her of access to the highway. In short, petitioner’s lot was almost
completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the highway. Her only access to
the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four inches wide through the
aforementioned property of private respondent, which was now being obstructed by the bus
lines’ construction of a concrete fence. Petitioner believed she was entitled to a wider
compulsory easement of right of way through the said property of private respondent.
ISSUE
WON petitioner is legally entitled to a right of way through private respondent’s property?
HELD
Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, petitioner submits that “the owner of an
estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or she) has established the existence
of four requisites, namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not due to
the proprietor’s own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.”
While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she
nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their requirements.
Evaluating her evidence, respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not “without adequate
outlet to a public highway” since she built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her
property to separate it from the property of the Pineda family. Worse, during the pendency of
the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a means to reach the National
Highway without passing through the property of defendant. If plaintiff wants a bigger opening,
then she can always destroy a portion of the concrete fence which she erected and pass through
the property of the Pineda family which, as shown on the attached sketch on the Commissioner’s
Report, has an open space on the southern boundary of plaintiff’s land.
The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement
because she caused her own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda property,
The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of
the proper indemnity, since her complaint contained no averment that demand for the easement
of right of way had been made after payment of the proper indemnity.
LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CA- Easement of Right of Way

Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement cannot be extinguished except by
voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of
the dominant lots.
FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15
meter wide road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista
Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on
the south. The said road was originally owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to
Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the
Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of the tuasons, to
AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to
Maryknoll the western portion of the land. Tuason developed their land which is now known
as La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or
a Mutual right of way wherein the parties would allow the other to use their half portion of the
Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the other way
around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola
Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the
road. However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using
6 cylindrical concrete and some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of
the residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn
filed a third party complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that
Loyola residents had adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also that
AdMU has not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?
RULING: YES.
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by
the Tuasons and Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the Tuasons but I don’t
think I can find the details regarding it in the case… I just saw the one regarding
“acknowledgement” between admu and the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4 requisites for a
compulsory easement need not be met. And like any other contractual stipulation, the same
cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude
or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-
interest of both parties recognized the existence of such easement and there was no agreement
yet to revoke the same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the
voluntary agreement is thus demandable.
The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but merely declaring one
(there no such thing as a judicial easement)
G.R. No. 106082 June 27, 1995
LORETO VDA. DE BALTAZAR and NESTOR BALTAZAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DANIEL PANGANIBAN, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, of Malolos and ordered petitioners to grant the right of way
claimed by private respondent.
The instant petition for review on certiorari presents two issues for resolution, namely: (1)
whether or not an easement of right of way can be granted to a person who has two other
existing passageways adjacent to his property which he is using in going to and from his
property; and, (2) whether or not an easement of right of way can be established through the
alleged continuous use thereof in light of the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case
of Ronquillo v. Roco 1 which held that an easement of right of way is discontinuous in nature
since the dominant estate cannot be continually crossing the servient estate but can do so only
at intervals.
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of a parcel of residential land consisting of 117 square meters
denominated as Lot no. 1027 located at Sta. Ines, Bulacan. Immediately to the front of said
land is Lot 1026 of Loreto Vda. de Baltazar and her son Nestor Baltazar. Immediately behind
is the Sta. Ana River. On either side are Lots 1025 and 1028 owned by Ricardo Calimon and
Jose Legaspi, respectively. Braulio Street, a provincial road, runs along the frontage of Lots
1025, 1026 and 1028.
Sometime in 1989, Daniel Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars who are owners
of Lot 1026 for the establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of right of way for
him to have access to the provincial road. In said complaint, he prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.
In their answer, petitioners opposed the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction arguing that there exists two other rights of way adjacent to private respondent's
property. They likewise argue that private respondent had abandoned the alleged right of way.
The court a quo, after conducting an ocular inspection and hearings for the issuance of the writ
prayed for, dismissed the complaint based on the following findings:
Immediately in front of the plaintiff's aforedescribed property is
Residential Lot 1026 with an area of 119 square meters belonging to
herein defendants. On this lot is constructed the residential house of the
defendants, immediately in front of which is the provincial road. Running
along one side of this property is a 1.20-meter wide, 10.40 meter long
passageway which the plaintiff claims to have previously made use of as
an ingress to and egress from his property in going to or coming from the
provincial road, until some three (3) years before he instituted the instant
action when the defendants somehow prevented him from using the same.
It is significant to note that, aside from the passageway which the plaintiff
seeks to be established as a permanent easement, the property of the
plaintiff is accessible to and from the provincial road via two (2) other
passageways, viz:
1) a passageway running immediately alongside the
concrete fence of the properties of plaintiff and the
defendants, over the properties of Loreto Bernardo and
Jose Legaspi. This passageway ends in a gate which
serves as a point of entry into or exit from the property
of the plaintiff; and
2) a passageway similarly running alongside the
opposite concrete fence of the properties of the
plaintiff and the defendants, over the properties of
Encarnacion Calimon and Ricardo Calimon. This
passageway, which ends in a gate leading into the
plaintiff's property, is the right of way presently
availed of by the plaintiff.
Daniel Panganiban appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that the court a quo erred in
dismissing the complaint for reasons of pragmatic considerations and in flagrant and clear
violation of Articles 649 and 650 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed decision, 2 reversed the order of dismissal of the court a
quo and granted respondent's right of way. The dispositive portion of said decision states:
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to grant the
right of way of plaintiff-appellant, designated as Lot 1026-B, after
payment of the proper indemnity, to be determined after hearing in the
Court below.
WHEREFORE, the case is hereby ordered remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals found the following based on the evidence on record:
1) Plaintiff-appellant's Lot 1027 (Exh. D) is bounded on the south by Lot
1026-A, owned by defendants-appellees; on the north by Sta. Ana River;
on the east, by Lot 1025 (Legaspi's property); on the west, by Lot 1028
(Calimon's property) [Exh. 3-T.D. No. 10998];
2) The only accessible road from Lot 1027 is Braulio Street. This road
runs across the frontage of Lot 1025, Lot 1026-A and Lot 1028;
3) The shortest, direct and convenient way to gain access as an egress and
ingress to said Braulio Street from the appellant's dominant Lot 1027 is to
pass through the appellees' servient estate Lot 1026-A (Exhs. 4-G, A, B,
B-1, and C);
4) That Lot 1026-B (Exh. 4-l) which is a strip of land and a portion of
appellees' Lot 1026-A, with steel gates (Exhs. I-1 and F-2), has been
existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used by the appellant as
a right of way for thirty (30) years during the lifetime of appellees'
grandfather, Fidel, and his father, Onisimo Baltazar;
 5) That it was closed and obstructed by the appellees when it closed the
gate and placed plants across the gate of Lot 1026-B, when appellees
constructed their present residence;
6) That appellant was compelled to request for a temporary pathway on
the eastern side, Lot 1025, and when it was closed, on the western side,
Lot 1028, of his Lot 1027.
It is worth noting that there is a discrepancy in the findings between the court a quo and the
Court of Appeals regarding the existence of two passageways from respondent Panganiban's
property to Braulio Street. The court a quo ruled that while the passageway through petitioner
Baltazar's property is the least prejudicial to the servient estate and the shortest distance
between respondent Panganiban's property and the provincial road, the claimed easement
cannot be granted due to the strained relations between the parties. 3 The court a quo added
that if the other two passageways will no longer be available to respondent, then the claimed
easement of right of way over petitioner's property would be granted. 4 It appears that the two
passageways are simultaneously existing as alternative pathways for respondent Panganiban.
The Court of Appeals, however, found that the two passageways mentioned were mere
temporary pathways which respondent Panganiban requested successively from his two
neighbors Calimon and Legaspi when petitioner Baltazar closed the passageway through his
property. When the path on the eastern side (Lot 1025) was closed to the respondent, he was
granted the use of the other on the western side (Lot 1028). 5
The finding of the Court of Appeals that the existence of the two passageways was not
simultaneous and was granted by respondent's neighbors, Calimon and Legaspi only upon
respondent's request when petitioner Baltazar closed the claimed passageway is supported by
the evidence on record. 6
In light of the above findings of the Court of Appeals, the underlying issue begging resolution
is whether or not respondent Panganiban is entitled to claim an easement of right of way over
the Baltazars' property.
In Locsin v. Climaco, 7 this Court said:
By express provision of Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the
owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he has
established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (1) the estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was
not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at
a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
For respondent Panganiban to claim a compulsory easement of right of way, he must,
therefore, first establish the existence of the four requisites stated above.
It is not disputed that the first requisite has been established by the court a quo in its Order
dated May 22, 1990. 8 Respondent Panganiban's property is indeed surrounded by immovables
on three sides and a river on the fourth.
As for the second requisite, Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate Court 9 states:
There would indeed be some point in looking askance at a reading of the
law which would impute to it a strict requirement to pay "proper
indemnity" in advance of a suit the purpose of which, in addition to
creating an easement, is precisely to fix the amount of the indemnity to be
paid therefor.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it ordered the remand of this case to the lower court
for the purpose of fixing the proper indemnity. 10
With respect to the third requisite, respondent Panganiban was likewise able to establish that
the isolation of his property was not due to his own act for he merely bought Lot 1027, which
was formerly part of the Baltazars' Lot 1026-A, 11 from petitioner Nestor Baltazar's
predecessors-in-interest. The Court of Appeals found that Lot 1026-B 12 which the
respondents have been using as a right of way, has been "existing, recognized, acknowledged,
tolerated and used by the appellant as a right of way for thirty (30) years during the lifetime of
petitioner's grandfather, Fidel and his father, Onisimo Baltazar." 13 It was also established that
the right of way was "closed and obstructed by the petitioners when they closed the gate 14 and
placed plants across the gate of Lot 1026-B when petitioners constructed their present
residence." 15
As regards the fourth requirement, both parties agreed that the passage claimed by respondent
as his right of way, compared to the other passageways, is the shortest distance from
respondent's lot to Braulio Street. 16
Petitioners could not have been inconvenienced by the passageway for, as borne out by the
records, the same is separate and distinct from the gate used by them to enter their lot and
residence. Such being the case, we conclude that respondent is entitled to claim a compulsory
easement of right of way over petitioners' Lot 1026-B.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 911
MAXIMO CORTES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE PALANCA YU-TIBO, defendant-appellant.
Felipe G. Calderon, for appellant.
Simplicio del Rosario, for appellee.

MAPA, J.:
Facts: The case was brought for the purpose of restraining the continuation of certain
buildings commenced by the defendant. The wife of the plaintiff owns house No. 65 in Calle
Rosario. House No 65. Has windows which receives light and air from the adjacent house,
which is house No 63 of the same street. Plaintiff contends that these windows have been in
existence since 1843. The defendant, tenant of house No 63 has commenced works that raised
the roof of house No 63 which covered house No 65, depriving house No 65 of air and light
formerly received through the window.
The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the
windows referred to above during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired from prescription an
easement of light in favor of the house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63, and,
consequently, has acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvements in the latter
house which might in any manner be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the said easement. He
contends that the easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for
the purposes of the acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the
enjoyment of the same commenced.
The defendant, on the contrary, contends that the easement is negative, and that
therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin from the date on which
the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the
servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for the existence of the
easement.
The court below in its decision held in the easement of light is negative, and this ruling has
been assigned by the plaintiff as error to be corrected by this court.
Issue: Was the easement positive or negative? When did the prescriptive period start to run?
Doctrine and Held: Ruling 1 - The Court clarified that mere act of opening one own’s
window is an act of dominion not of easement. The easement here is the (possible) prohibition
of creating any improvements on the property of the defendants (negative easement) that may
impede or limit the use of the window. Thus, plaintiff is totally wrong in saying that
prescription for the easement starts to kick in when the window was made and acknowledge
by the adjacent owner. In fact, what is needed in this situation is a formal act through a
notarial prohibition so that prescriptive period will start. The fact that the defendant has not
covered the windows of the apellant/ plaintiff does not necessarily imply the recognition of the
acquisitive prescription of the alleged easement as this might just be a result of a mere
tolerance on the part of the defendant.
Plaintiffs asked for a rehearing but was again denied! Plaintiff mentions about their windows
and watersheds to be apparent easements, or just projitiendi and jus spillitiendi. The court says
that the plaintiffs are obviously confused between the right exercised by owners and the rights
provided in easements.
Ruling 2 - GENERAL RULE: No part owner can, without the consent of the other, make in a
party wall a window or opening of any kind (Art. 580)
The very fact of making such opening in such a wall may be the basis for acquisition of a
prescriptive title without the necessity of any active opposition because it always presupposes
the express or implied consent of the owner of the wall, which in time, implies a voluntary
waiver of the right to oppose.
EXCEPTION: When the windows are not opened on the neighbor's side, there is need of a
prohibition from exercising that neighbor's right to build on his land or cover the closed
window on the party wall.
The period of prescription starts to run from such prohibition if the neighbor consents to it.
Note: The law refers to all kinds of windows, even regulation windows. According to article
528, windows with "similar projections" include sheds.
The exception applies in this case because
1) what is concerned is a party wall;
2) there was no prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the Cortes' window
(Yu-Tibo wanted to raise his roof which would in effect cover 1/2 of the window).
SPA. DE LA CRUZ v. RAMISCAL
G.R. No. 137882
February 4, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land. Petitioner, Spa. Elizabeth
and Alfredo De La Cruz are occupants of a parcel of land located at the back of Ramiscal’s
property, owned by the mother of Alfredo. The subject matter of this case is a long strip of land
owned by respondent which is being used by petitioners as their pathway to and from the nearest
public highway from their property.
Respondent leased her property, including the building thereon, to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil.
Orient Motors also owned a property adjacent to that of respondent’s. Years later, Phil. Orient
Motors sold its property to San Benito Realty. It was only during the relocation survey and
location plan for both contiguous properties of respondent and San Benito Realty that
respondent discovered that the aforementioned pathway being occupied by petitioners is part of
her property.
Respondent filed a complaint, seeking the demolition of the structure allegedly illegally
constructed by petitioners on her property. Respondent asserted in her complaint that petitioners
have an existing right of way to a public highway other than the current one they are using,
which she owns.
Petitioners claimed that such use was with the knowledge of respondent. They also alleged that
respondent initiated the construction on her property of a motor shop known as Phil. Orient
Motors and they, as well as the other occupants of the property at the back of respondent’s land,
opposed the construction of the perimeter wall as it would enclose and render their property
without any adequate ingress and egress. They asked respondent to give them an easement on
the eastern side of her property, which would be reciprocated with an easement by the owner of
another adjacent estate. Respondent did not want to give them the easement on the eastern side
of her property but, instead, offered to them the disputed passageway, which offer they had
accepted.
Issue: W/N Petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of right of way
Ruling:
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of
another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do,
something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person.
Petitioners herein failed to show by competent evidence other than their bare claim that they
entered into an agreement with respondents. The hands of this Court are tied from giving
Paredes constructed a new house, the roof was 2-1/2 meters longer than the length allowed in
credence to petitioners’ self-serving claim that such right of way was voluntarily given them by
respondent for the following reasons: the Decree of Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20 meters, protruding over

First, petitioners were unable to produce any shred of document evidencing such agreement. the lot of Purugganan, which is .20 meters wider than that allowed, and the rainwater from the
The Civil Code is clear that any transaction involving the sale or disposition of real property
must be in writing. Thus, the dearth of corroborative evidence opens doubts on the veracity of GI roofing falls about 3 meters inside lots 1 and 2 of Purugganan.
the naked assertion of petitioners that indeed the subject easement of right of way was a
voluntary grant from respondent. Second, as admitted by the petitioners, it was only the
foreman, Mang Puling, who talked with them regarding said pathway on the northern side of
respondent’s property. Thus, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz testified that she did not talk to Purugganan filed a case prohibiting Paredes from proceeding with the construction of the roof,
respondent regarding the arrangement proposed to them by Mang Puling despite the fact that
she often saw respondent. It is, therefore, foolhardy for petitioners to believe that the alleged which exceeds the allowed dimensions. Trial court, in a summary proceeding decided in favor
foreman of respondent had the authority to bind the respondent relating to the easement of right of Purugganan. CA affirmed.
of way. Third, their explanation that said Mang Puling submitted said agreement to the Quezon
City Engineer’s Office, in connection with the application for a building permit but said office
could no longer produce a copy thereof, does not inspire belief.

ISSUE:

PURUGGANAN V. PAREDES, 69 SCRA 69- Easement of Drainage

Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to the measure of the roofing?

In an easement of receiving rainwater, the distances prescribed in the decree of registration

HELD: No.
should not correspond to the width and length of the roof of the house but on the distance of

the rainwater falling inside the land of the servient estate. Paredes have made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in the decree of registration

to the roofing of their house. They failed to comprehend the meaning of the phrase

“servidumbre de vertiente de los tejados” constituted on the land of Purugganan. Translated, it

FACTS: means the easement of receiving water falling from the roof which is an encumbrance imposed

on the land of Purugganan because the encumbrance is not the roof itself but the rain water
Purugganan is the owner of a piece of residential lot adjacent to and bounded on the north by
falling inside the property of Purugganan. The report submitted by the court-appointed
the lot of Paredes. The lot of Purugganan is subject to an easement of drainage in favor of
commissioner clearly shows that Paredes exceeded the dimension allowed in the decree of
Paredes annotated in the Decree of registration, which read in part:
registration.

“XXX the applicant agrees to respect an easement or servitude over a portion of the lots No. 1

and 2 which is EIGHT and ONE HALF (8-1/2) meters in length…and the width is ONE (1)

meter, in order that the rainwater coming from the roofing of a house to be constructed by the

oppositor over the ruins of her brick wall…shall fall into the land of the applicant.”