Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline

2019-2020
Part IB Paper 01: Knowledge, Language and World

Syllabus
 Nature of Knowledge: analyses of knowledge; Externalism and internalism
 Scepticism: the problem of scepticism; Responses to scepticism
 Primary & Secondary Qualities: The primary and secondary distinction;
Response-dependence
 Logical Form: The purposes of formalization; Logical form and
grammatical form; Davidson on logical form
 Truth: Deflationary theories, Correspondence theories; Coherence
theories
 Modality: semantics; Metaphysics

Course Outline
This course is compulsory for all students taking Part IB.

Assumed Knowledge
There are no procedural pre-requisites. However, every topic uses elementary
notions from formal logic. These notions are fully covered in Part IA Paper 5
(Formal Methods); students who have not taken this paper should either attend
the Part IA lectures on Formal Logic, or work through ‘forallx: Cambridge’
independently.

Objectives
Students taking this paper will be expected to:

1. Acquire a detailed knowledge of some of the concepts, positions and

arguments in the central literature on the topics of the course.
2. Acquire some sense of how the positions on different topics relate to each
other.
3. Engage closely and critically with some of the ideas studied.
4. Develop their ability to think independently about the topics covered.

Preliminary Reading
As mentioned under Assumed Knowledge, familiarity with elementary formal
logic is assumed. This will be adequately covered by sitting Part IA Paper 5; but
those who are not taking Paper 5 will want to work through:

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Magnus, P.D., and Tim Button, 'forallx: Cambridge' [Online]. Available at:
http://www.nottub.com, under the "OERs" section (Accessed: 23 August
2019).

Reading List
*Material marked with an asterisk (*) is important

The Nature of Knowledge

Analyses of Knowledge
One central question is whether it is possible to give an account of knowledge in
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

*Gettier, Edmund, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' Analysis, 23, no. 6
(1963): 121-23. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922 [Famous
discussion of the definition of knowledge]

*Nozick, Robert, Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981),

ch. 3, sects. 1, 'Knowledge'.

*Williamson, Timothy, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2002), Introduction & ch. 1. Also available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1093/019925656X.001.0001.

*Zagzebski, Linda, 'The Inescapability of Gettier Problems', The Philosophical

Quarterly, 44, no. 174 (1994): 65-73.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2220147.

Feldman, Richard, Epistemology (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003),
chs. 2 & 3. [But see also for foundationalism and coherentism, pp. 49-60;
and pp. 60-70]

Goldman, Alvin I., 'A Causal Theory of Knowing', The Journal of Philosophy, 64,
no. 12 (1967): 357-72. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024268.

Others have suggested that rather than trying to analyse the concept of
knowledge, we should examine its function.

*Craig, Edward J., Knowledge and the State of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990). Also available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1093/0198238797.001.0001.

Haslanger, Sally, 'What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values
and Normative Epistemology', Philosophical Perspectives, 13 (1999):
459-80. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2676113.

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Yet others have suggested we study knowledge as a “natural kind”:

*Kornblith, Hilary, Knowledge and Its Place in Nature (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2002), chs. 1 & 2. Also available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1093/0199246319.001.0001.

Nagel, Jennifer, 'Knowledge as a Mental State', in T.S. Gendler and J.

Hawthorne, eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), pp. 275-310. Also available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.003.0010.

Quine, Willard. V.O., 'Epistemology Naturalized', in his Ontological Relativity

and Other Essays (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp.
69-90. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.7312/quin92204-004.

Externalism and internalism

A central disagreement in epistemology concerns the nature of epistemic
justification. Does justification depend only on an agent’s mental states or also
on what is going on in the ‘external' environment? A second, related dispute
concerns whether we always have access to what justifies our beliefs.

*BonJour, Laurence, 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge', in S.

Bernecker and F. Dretske, eds., Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary
Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Reprinted in H.
Kornblith, ed., Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2001) and in E. Sosa et al., eds., Epistemology: An Anthology.
2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). Also available on Moodle.

*Feldman, Richard, and Earl Conee, 'Internalism Defended', American

Philosophical Quarterly, 38, no. 1 (2001): 1-18.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010019. Reprinted in H. Kornblith, ed.,
Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).

*Goldman, Alvin, 'Internalism Exposed', Journal of Philosophy, 96, no. 6

(1999): 271-93. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2564679. Reprinted in H.
Kornblith, ed., Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2001). Also in E. Sosa et al., eds., Epistemology: An
Anthology. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

*Goldman, Alvin, 'What Is Justified Belief?' in G. Pappas, ed., Justification and

Knowledge (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 1-23. Reprinted in E. Sosa
et al., eds., Epistemology: An Anthology. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell,
2008). Also in D. Pritchard and R. Neta, eds., Arguing about Knowledge
(London: Routledge, 2009). Also available on Moodle.

BonJour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification (Malden, MA:

Blackwell, 2003).

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Plantinga, Alvin, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993). Also available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1093/0195078624.001.0001.

Sosa, Ernest, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1991), pp. 270-95 'Intellectual Virtue in Perspective'. Also available
online at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625299.017.

Sosa, Ernest, 'The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the
Theory of Knowledge', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, no. 1 (1980):
3-26. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00394.x.

Stroud, Barry, 'Understanding Human Knowledge in General', in H. Kornblith,

ed., Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (Oxford: Blackwell,
2001). Reprinted in B. Stroud, ed., Understanding Human Knowledge
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199252130.003.0008.

Wedgwood, Ralph, 'Internalism Explained', Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research, 65, no. 2 (2002): 349-69.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3070996.

Williamson, Timothy, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2000), ch. 9 'Evidence'. Also available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1093/019925656x.003.0010.

Scepticism
The problem of scepticism
What is the best argument for scepticism?

*Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations 1 and 2. [Any

edition]. The Cambridge University Press Cottingham edition is also
available online at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139042895.

*Hume, David, Treatise on Human Nature. Any ed., Book I, part IV, sect. 2.
The Past Masters Green, Grose and Kemp Smith editions is also available
online via:
https://idiscover.lib.cam.ac.uk/permalink/f/t9gok8/44CAM_ALMA6152986
6690003606.

*Stroud, Barry, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1984), ch. 1 'The Problem of the external World'. Also
available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0198247613.003.0001.

*Unger, Peter, 'A Defense of Skepticism', The Philosophical Review, 80, no. 2
(1971): 198-219. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184030. Reprinted in S.
Bernecker and F. Dretske, eds., Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000).

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Williams, Michael, 'Skepticism', in J. Greco and E. Sosa, eds., The Blackwell
Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 35-69. Also
available on Moodle.

Williamson, Timothy, 'Knowledge and Scepticism', in F. Jackson and M. Smith,

eds., The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005). Also available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.003.0023.

Responses to scepticism
There are many different strategies for responding to scepticism. For a general
overview, see:

DeRose, Keith, 'Introduction: Responding to Scepticism', in K. DeRose and T.

Warfield, eds., Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999). Also available on Moodle.

Moorean responses:
*Kelly, Thomas, 'Moorean Facts and Belief Revision or Can the Skeptic Win?'
Philosophical Perspectives, 19 (2005): 179-209.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3840894.

*Moore, G. E., 'Extracts From "Proof of an External World", "Four Forms of

Scepticism" and "Certainty"', in E. Sosa, et al., eds., Epistemology: An
Anthology. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

Pryor, James, 'What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?' Philosophical Issues, 14

(2004): 349-78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3050634.

Rinard, Susanna, 'Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common-Sense', Oxford

Studies in Epistemology, 4 (2013): 185-213.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.003.0007.

Sosa, Ernest, 'How to Defeat Opposition to Moore', Philosophical Perspectives,

13 (1999): 141-53. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676100. Reprinted in E.
Sosa et al., eds., Epistemology: An Anthology. 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2008)

Dogmatist responses:
*Pryor, James, 'The Skeptic and the Dogmatist', Noûs, 34, no. 4 (2000): 517-
49. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2671880

White, Roger, 'Problems for Dogmatism', Philosophical Studies, 131, no. 3

(2006): 525-57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25471823

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Contextualist responses:
*Cohen, Stewart, 'Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems',
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, no. 2 (1998): 289-306.
http://doi.org/10.1080/00048409812348411. Reprinted in E. Sosa, et al.,
eds., Epistemology: An Anthology. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

*Dretske, Fred, 'Externalism and Modest Contextualism', Erkenntnis, 61, no.

2\3 (2004): 173-86. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20013286.

Hawthorne, John, 'Sensitive Moderate Invariantism', in J. Hawthorne, ed.,

Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), ch. 4. Also
available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/1099269556.003.0004.
Reprinted in E. Sosa, et al., eds., Epistemology: An Anthology. 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

MacFarlane, John, 'The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions',

Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1 (2005): 197-233.
https://johnmacfarlane.net/relknow.pdf. Reprinted in E. Sosa, et al., eds.,
Epistemology: An Anthology. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

Denying closure:
*Dretske, Fred 'Epistemic Operators', Journal of Philosophy, 67, no. 24 (1970):
1007-23. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024710. Reprinted in K. DeRose
and T. Warfield, eds., Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999).

*Nozick, Robert, Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981),

ch. 3, sects. 1 & 2, pp. 167-247.

Inference to the best explanation:

Fumerton, Richard, 'The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism', in M. Steup and E.
Sosa, eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Malden, MA:
Blackwell, 2005; 2nd ed. 2013), pp. 85-97. Also available online via:
https://idiscover.lib.cam.ac.uk/permalink/f/t9gok8/44CAM_ALMA5152930
0730003606.

Vogel, Jonathan, 'The Refutation of Skepticism', in M. Steup and E. Sosa, eds.,

Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005;
2nd ed. 2014), pp. 72-84. Also available online via:
https://idiscover.lib.cam.ac.uk/permalink/f/t9gok8/44CAM_ALMA5152930
0730003606.

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Primary and Secondary Qualities
The primary and secondary distinction
Locke distinguishes between primary qualities, like shape and size and
secondary qualities, like colour and sound. His argument for this distinction can
be found in:

*Locke, John, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 2, ch. 8 'Some

further considerations concerning our simple Ideas'. Also available online
via:
https://idiscover.lib.cam.ac.uk/permalink/f/t9gok8/44CAM_ALMA5153317
0360003606.

See also:

*Galileo, 'Two Kinds of Properties', in A. Danto and S. Morgenbesser, eds.,

Philosophy of Science: Readings (New York, NY: Meridian Books, 1960),
pp. 27-32. Also available on Moodle.

For criticism by Berkeley, see:

*Berkeley, George, Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge,

sects. 1-15. Also available online via:
https://idiscover.lib.cam.ac.uk/permalink/f/1ii55o6/44CAM_ALMA515297
43940003606.

*Berkeley, George, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Dialogues

1 & 2. Also available online via:
https://idiscover.lib.cam.ac.uk/permalink/f/1ii55o6/44CAM_ALMA515297
43940003606

For attempted reconstructions of Locke’s argument and discussion:

*Bennett, Jonathan, Learning from Six Philosophers Vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 2001), ch. 25 'Secondary Qualities'. Also available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1093/0198250924.003.0005.

*Mackie, J.L., Problems from Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976),
ch. 1 'Primary and secondary qualities'. Also available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1093/0198750366.003.0002.

*Wilson, Margaret D., 'History of Philosophy in Philosophy Today; and the Case
of the Sensible Qualities', The Philosophical Review, 101, no. 1 (1992):
191-243. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185046. [Section 2, pp. 209–33
for a survey of interpretations of Locke’s argument for the primary-
secondary quality distinction and Section 3, pp. 234–43 for some
philosophical questions raised by Locke’s discussion]

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Bolton, Martha Brandt, 'Locke and Pyrrhonism: The Doctrine of Primary and
Secondary Qualities', in M. Burnyeat, ed., The Skeptical Tradition
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 353-75. Also
available on Moodle.

Jacovides, Michael, 'Locke’s Resemblance Theses', The Philosophical Review,

108 (1999): 461-96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2998285

Smith, A.D., 'Berkeley's Central Argument against Material Substance', in H.

Robinson and J. Foster, eds., Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial
Celebration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 37-57.

Response-dependence
Response-dependent concepts are those whose extension is in some way
essentially determined by human responses. Some have thought that colours
are response-dependent. Are response-dependent properties less objective?

*Johnston, Mark, 'How to Speak of the Colors', Philosophical Studies, 68, no. 3
(1992): 221-63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320356.

*Pettit, Philip, 'Realism and Response-Dependence', Mind, 100, no. 4 (1991):

587-626. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255012.

*Smith, Michael, David Lewis, and Mark Johnston, 'Dispositional Theories of

Value', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary
Volumes, 63 (1989): 89-111, 113-37 & 139-74.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106918.

Wedgwood, Ralph, 'The Essence of Response-Dependence', European Review

of Philosophy, 3 (1997): 31-54. Also available on Moodle.

Logical Form
A helpful guide to the whole area is:

Oliver, Alex, 'The Matter of Form: Logic's Beginnings', in J. Lear and A. Oliver,
eds., The Force of Argument (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 165-85.
Also available on Moodle.

The purposes of formalisation

For classic statements of the purpose of formalisation, see:

Quine, W.V., Word and Object. New ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), ch.
5, especially sect. 33.

Sainsbury, Mark, Logical Forms. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), ch. 1,
sects. 10-12 & ch. 6, sects. 1-3.

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Further interesting reflections are found in:

Geach, Peter, 'Quine's Syntactical Insights', in D. Davidson and J. Hintikka,

eds., Words and Objections: Essays on the Works of W. V. Quine
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), pp. 146-57. Reprinted in P. Geach, Logic
Matters (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972).

Quine, W.V., Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1976), ch. 6 'Logic as a source of syntactical
insights'.

And for a discussion of the kinds of inference we should be trying to capture

with formal logic, and why, look at:

Prior, Arthur N., 'What Is Logic?' in P.T. Geach and A.J.P. Kenny, eds., Papers in
Logic and Ethics (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976),
pp. 122-29. Also available in Moodle.

Read, Stephen, 'Formal and Material Consequence', Journal of Philosophical

Logic, 23, no. 3 (1994): 247-65. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227075

Smiley, Timothy, 'A Tale of Two Tortoises', Mind, 104, no. 416 (1995): 725-36.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254480

Logical form and grammatical form

Start with an excellent introduction:

Sainsbury, Mark, Logical Forms. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), ch. 6 'The
project of formalization'.

Then look at:

Etchemendy, John, 'The Doctrine of Logic as Form', Linguistics and Philosophy,

6, no. 3 (1983): 319-34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25001132

Evans, Gareth, 'Semantic Structure and Logical Form', in G. Evans and J.

McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1976), pp. 199-222. Also available online at:
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cam/reader.action?docID=496282
0&ppg=223. Reprinted (with an afterthought, pp. 405-7) in his Collected
Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 49-75; and in P.
Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1997).

Oliver, Alex, 'A Few More Remarks on Logical Form', Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 99 (1999): 247-72.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545309

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Davidson on logical form
Davidson, Donald, 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', in his Essays on
Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). Also
available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.003.0006. [Read
also the reply to Cargile, pp. 137-46]

Then consider the following:

Sainsbury, Mark, Logical Forms. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), ch. 4, sect.
6.

For further reflections on Davidson's project, and his notion of logical form, look
at:

Cargile, James, 'Davidson's Notion of Logical Form', Inquiry, 13 (1970): 129-

39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201747008601603

Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1984), ch. 4 'Semantics for Natural Language'. Also
available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0199246297.003.0004.

Grandy, Richard, 'Some Remarks About Logical Form', Noûs, 8, no. 2 (1974):
157-64. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214783

Wiggins, David, '"Most" and "All": Some Comments on a Familiar Programme,

and on the Logical Form of Quantified Sentences', in M. Platts, ed.,
Reference, Truth and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980),
pp. 318-46. Also available on Moodle.

Truth
Here are two very helpful introductions, to be read before you embark on
anything else:

Blackburn, Simon, and Keith Simmons, Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), 'Introduction', pp. 1-28. Also available on Moodle.

Walker, Ralph, 'Theories of Truth', in B. Hale and C. Wright, eds., Companion to

the Philosophy of Language. Vol 2 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 309-
30. Also available on Moodle.

Across this topic, you will find frequent references to the work of Tarski. A
detailed knowledge of Tarski’s technicalities is probably not necessary, since the
technical semantic concepts can be set up in alternative ways. Indeed, when
you learned how to construct interpretations for first-order logic, you essentially
learned (something like) Tarski’s theory of truth. Nor will we be focussed on one
of the main issues motivating Tarski, an attempt to avoid the problems created
by the paradox of the liar. However, some familiarity with the basic idea is
absolutely essential. And it is worth reading:

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Tarski, Alfred, 'The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of
Semantics', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4, no. 3
(1944): 341-76. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2102968.

For a wide-ranging discussion of the need for truth, see:

Williams, Bernard, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). Also available online at:
https://www.degruyter.com/view/product/451243.

Correspondence theories
For an overview, read:

Kirkham, Richard, Theories of Truth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), ch. 4
'The correspondence theory'.

Two highly influential articles, the first more sceptical of a role for
correspondence, the latter less so, are:

Davidson, Donald, 'True to the Facts', The Journal of Philosophy, 66, no. 21 (1969):
748-64. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2023778. Reprinted in his Inquiries into
Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). Also
available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0199246297.003.0003.
Field, Hartry, 'Tarski's Theory of Truth', The Journal of Philosophy, 69, no. 13 (1972):
347-75. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024879.

Deflationary theories
Here are two nice overviews of deflationary approaches to truth:

Armour-Garb, Bradley, 'Deflationism (About Theories of Truth)', Philosophy

Compass, 7, no. 4 (2012): 267-77. Available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00464.x.

Bar-On, Dorit, and Keith Simmons, 'Deflationism', in E. Lepore and B. Smith,

eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008). Also available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0025.

But the fullest single defence of deflationary theory is:

Horwich, Paul, Truth. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Also
available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0198752237.001.0001.

This has attracted many interesting critical responses, including:

Field, Hartry, 'Truth, by Paul Horwich', Philosophy of Science, 59, no. 2 (1992):
321-30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/188251

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Davidson, Donald, 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth', The Journal of
Philosophy, 93, no. 6 (1996): 263-78.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2941075

Gupta, Anil, 'A Critique of Deflationism', Philosophical Topics, 21 (1993): 57-

81. http://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199321218 [Advanced]

Bar-On, Dorit, and Keith Simmons, 'The Use of Force against Deflationism:
Assertion and Truth', in D. Graimann and G. Siegwart, eds., Truth and
Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language (London:
Routledge, 2007), pp. 61-89. Also available online at:
http://philosophy.sites.unc.edu/files/2013/10/Bar-
On_Simmons2007_UseOfForce.pdf. [Advanced]

Coherence theories
Coherence theories are one among various approaches that want to deny an
independent metaphysical weight to truth, and to embed it in our epistemic
practices instead. A good introduction to the general approach is:

Kirkham, Richard, Theories of Truth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), ch. 3
'Nonrealist theories'. Also available on Moodle.

To get a flavour of recent work in the pragmatic version of this, see:

Price, Huw, 'Truth as Convenient Friction', The Journal of Philosophy, 100, no.
4 (2003): 167-90. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3655652

Modality: Semantics and Metaphysics

Semantics
Three philosophically minded introductions to modal logic are:

Kuhn, Steven T., 'Modal Logic', in E. Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (1998) [Online]. Available at:
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/modal-logic/v-1
(Accessed: 1 July 2019).

Melia, Joseph, Modality (London: Acumen, 2003), chs. 1 & 2. Also available
online at:
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cam/detail.action?docID=1900150.

Sainsbury, Mark, Logical Forms. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), ch. 5
'Necessity'.

For semantics and modal logic consider:

Priest, Graham, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic. 2nd ed. (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2008), chs. 2 & 3. Also available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511801174.

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Magnus, P.D., and Tim Button, with additions by J. Robert Loftis and Robert
Trueman, remixed and revised by Aaron Thomas-Bolduc and Richard Zach
‘Forallx: Calgary Remix: An Introduction to Formal Logic’ (ch.40
'Semantics for Modal Logic')' [Online]. Available at:
http://forallx.openlogicproject.org/forallxyyc.pdf (Accessed: 1 July 2019).

Here are some further textbooks on modal logic. (Note that these textbooks
typically go well beyond what is required in the syllabus):

Hughes, George E., and Maxwell J. Cresswell, A New Introduction to Modal

Logic (London: Routledge, 1996), parts 1 & 2. [NB: they use 'L' for
necessity and 'M' for possibility]

Garson, James W., Modal Logic for Philosophers. 2nd ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013). Also available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139342117.

Mints, Grigori, A Short Introduction to Modal Logic (Stanford, CA: CSLI, 1992).

Metaphysics
What is the nature of modality? For an overview over the philosophical terrain,
see:

Melia, Joseph, Modality (London: Acumen, 2003), chs. 4-7. Also available
online at:
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cam/detail.action?docID=1900150.

Central debates concern the nature of possible world, the analysis of our modal
concepts and whether we can give a fully reductive account of modal language.

*Forbes, Graeme, The Metaphysics of Modality (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1985), ch. 1 'Propositional modal logic'. Also available on Moodle.

*French, P.A.,T.E. Uehling, and H.K. Wettstein, eds., Studies in Essentialism,

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11 (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1986). Also available online at:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/misp.1986.11.issue-
1/issuetoc. [Papers by Adams, Stalnaker and Van Inwagen]

*Kripke, Saul, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). [Look in the
index for the references to 'possible worlds']

*Lewis, David, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), ch. 1,

sect. 1-2; ch. 2; ch. 3, sects. 1-2; ch. 4, sects. 1-2.

*Loux, Michael, The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1979). [Loux's introduction and the papers by Adams, Lewis,
Plantinga and Stalnaker]

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*Plantinga, Alvin, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1974), chs. 1 & 4. Also available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1093/0198244142.001.0001.

Armstrong, D.M., A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1989). Also available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139172226.

Baldwin, Thomas, 'The Inaugural Address: Kantian Modality', Proceedings of

the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol., 76 (2002): 1-24.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106963.

Bennett, Karen, 'Two Axes of Actualism', The Philosophical Review, 114, no. 3
(2005): 297-326. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30043678

Lowe, E.J., A Survey of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),

ch. 7 'Possible worlds'.

Rosen, Gideon, 'Modal Fictionalism', Mind, 99, no. 395 (1990): 327-54.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255102.

We welcome your suggestions for further readings that will improve

and diversify our reading lists, to reflect the best recent research, and
important work by members of under-represented groups. Please email
your suggestions to phillib@hermes.cam.ac.uk including the relevant
part and paper number. For information on how we handle your
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Page 14 (Last updated 7 October 2019)