TAN TAO UNIVERSITY

Lecturer: Dr. Cao Minh Man

Subject: Macroeconomics, in fall semester 2018

Academic Research

Causes and lessons from

American 2008 financial crisis

Term Paper presented by

Nguyen Van Chieu

ID: 1701007

A sophomore student of school of business and economics

 Nguyen |1

Contents

1. Introduction …............................................................................................................2

2. Cause of American financial crisis 2008.....................................................................2

2.1 The appearance of mortgage.....................................................................................2

2.2 Mortgage-backed securities (MBS)………………………………………………...4

2.3 The beginning of subprime mortgages......................................................................5

2.4 Collateralized debt obligation (CDO)……………………………………………...8

2.5 The lack of laws........................................................................................................9

2.6 Brusting the housing bubble……………………………………………………….10

2.7 The lack of responsibilities of the American International Group...........................12

2.8 The irresponsible rating agencies.............................................................................13

3. The late actions of government..................................................................................13

4. Lessons from American financial crisis.....................................................................14

4.1 The liberalization of market and late interventions of government..........................14

4.2 The derivative instruments........................................................................................15

4.3 The lack of transparency on how market was trading...............................................16

4.4 The poor incentives and human failures....................................................................18

5. Conclusion...................................................................................................................19

References.......................................................................................................................20
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1. Introduction

“The 2008 financial crisis was the worst economic disaster since the Great

Depression of 1929. It occurred despite the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department

efforted to prevent it.” (Amadeo). It all began when the US government intended to

reduce the interest rate to increase opportunities for owning houses for American

citizens. Then everything happened in a sequence that created the bubble housing. That

housing bubble burst caused a sharp drop in housing prices, affected the entire US

financial industry and spread out financial markets in the whole world. Other countries

were affected at different levels because trading with the US economy. The automobile

industry stood before the abyss. All financial stagnation halted the return of capital to

produce. The stock market fell seriously. “Share prices plunged throughout the world—

the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the U.S. lost 33.8% of its value in 2008—and by

the end of the year, a deep recession had enveloped most of the globe. In December the

National Bureau of Economic Research, the private group recognized as the official

arbiter of such things, determined that a recession had begun in the United States in

December 2007.” (Stanley).

2. The causes of American financial crisis in 2008

2.1 The appearance of a mortgage.

The basic beginning of the American crisis came from the appearance of a new

lending system, called mortgage. “A mortgage was a debt instrument, secured by the

collateral of specific real estate property, that the borrower was obliged to pay back with

a predetermined set of payments. Mortgages were used by individuals and businesses to

make large real estate purchases without paying the entire value of the purchase up

front. Over a period of many years, the borrowers repaid the loan, plus interest, until

they eventually owned the property free and clear. Mortgages were also known as “liens
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against property” or “claims on property”. If the borrower stopped paying the mortgage,

the bank could foreclose.” (Fontinelle). People also could get mortgages with the

collateral of the houses they wanted to buy by these mortgages. Basically, mortgages

were that someone wanted to buy a house, was willing to borrowing hundreds of

thousands of dollars from a bank, in return, the banks gave them a piece of paper to

demonstrate their borrowings. Every month, the homeowners had to pay back a portion

of the principal plus interest to the bank. If a mortgage recipient failed to repay the

monthly rates and interest, the exchange assets of the mortgage got into possession of

the mortgage loaner. That's called the default. A verification of employment and

financial gains were minimum necessities for taking a real estate loan. Traditionally it

was pretty hard to get a mortgage if borrowers have bad credit or did not have steady

jobs. Lenders just didn't want to take the risk that borrowers might default on their loan.

Therefore, these loans were solely created for prime market citizens, people with high

credibility for borrowing money and dealing with the lowest risk of borrower default.

But all that started to change in the 2000s.

Two main types of mortgages were fixed rate mortgages and adjustable rate

mortgages. “A fixed rate mortgage charged a set rate of interest that did not change

throughout the life of the loan. Although the amount of principal and interest paid each

month varies from payment to payment, the total payment remained the same, which

made budgeting easy for homeowners.” (Mcwhinney). The advantage of fixed-rate

mortgages was that the borrowers could avoid sudden and potentially significant

increases in the interest if interest rates rose highly in the future. The disadvantage was

that when interest rates rose, it was more difficult to shop for a mortgage because the

payments are less affordable. “The interest rate for an adjustable rate mortgage was a

variable one. The initial interest rate on adjustable rate mortgages was set below the
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market rate on a comparable fixed rate loan, and then the rate rose as time went on. If

the adjustable rate mortgage was held long enough, the interest rate would surpass the

going rate for fixed-rate loans.” (Mcwhinney). The biggest benefit of an adjustable rate

loan was that it was quite cheaper than a fixed rate mortgage, usually for the initial

three, five or seven years. Adjustable rate mortgages also more appealed to borrowers

because banks often allow the borrowers to qualify for a bigger loan and, of course, paid

less interest payment when the interest rate fell down. That people chose adjustable rate

loan more was also one of the causes to make the American crisis spread seriously.

2.2 Mortgage-backed securities (MBS).

In the 2000s, the American interest rate was so low, approximate to 1% at lowes

rate. Therefore, saving money in the banks might be not a smart decision. Investors in

the US and abroad wanted to a low risk, high return investment then started pouring

their money at the US housing market. They also got a better return from the interest

rates homeowners paid on mortgages rather than invest in things like US treasury bonds

or some other stocks which were paying very low interest. However, big global

investors did not just want to buy some individuals’ mortgages. It’s too much hassle to

deal with individuals. Instead, they bought investments called mortgage-backed

securities (MBS). “Mortgage-backed securities were investments that are secured by

mortgages. They were a type of asset-backed security. It allowed investors to benefit

from the mortgage business without ever having to buy or sell an actual home loan.

Typical buyers of these securities included institutional, corporate or individual

investors.” (Amadeo). Mortgage-backed securities were created when large financial

institutions securitized mortgages. Basically, they bought up thousands of individual

mortgages, bundled them together and sold shares of that pool to investors. For
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example, a person named John wanted to buy a house, so he got a mortgage from A

bank. He got money from A bank and agreed to pay back the money following a certain

schedule. Then A bank sold John 's mortgage to B bank which could be a governmental

or private entity and got cash to make other loans. B bank collected John 's mortgage

and some other similar mortgages it already bought (same interest rates, maturities,

etc.). B bank then sold these mortgage-backed securities that had the same interest in the

pool of various mortgages to investors in the open market and took cash to make more

MBS. After John paid his monthly money, A bank kept a fee and sent the remainder of

the money to B bank. B bank then took their fee and gave the rest of the money to the

investors who owned this MBS. Because they paid the higher rate of return investors

could not get in other places and they looked like really safe bets. For this, home prices

were going up and up. So lenders thought that even when the borrower defaulted on a

mortgage they could just sell the house for more money. Because of this thinking,

investors tried to gobble these mortgage-backed securities up.

2.3 The beginning of subprime mortgages.

At the same time, credit rating agencies were telling investors these mortgage-

backed securities were safe investments. They gave a lot of these mortgage-backed

securities AAA ratings. When mortgages were only for borrowers with good credit,

mortgage debt was a good investment. Because default rates were terribly low, the

housing prices were continually increasing and MBSs seemed to guarantee steady

interest payments, banks, pension retirement funds and other big investors invested in

MBS as much as they could. The demand for these new financial products rose heavily

and shortly banks were not ready any longer to stimulate the demand given on the

market. The utmost volumes of prime mortgage takers were reached. Investors were
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desperate to buy more and more of the MBS. Lenders did their best to help create more

of them. However, to create more of MBS they needed more mortgages so lenders

loosen their standards and made loans to people with low income and poor credit.

Besides, the prime mortgages with good credits and assured payments implied

that lots of citizens were out of the dream of homeownership. Therefore, the US

Government began to introduce a brand new loaning policy to increase the

homeownership rate for low and middle-class Americans. Old underwriting standards

like down payment were loosened. “The down payment on a mortgage was the lump

sum you paid upfront that reduced the amount of money you had to borrow. You could

put as much money down as you wanted. The traditional amount was 20 percent of the

purchasing price, but it was possible to find mortgages that required as little as 3 to 5

percent. The more money you put down, though, the less you had to finance -- and the

lower your monthly payment would be.” (Obringer, and Roos).

("Historical Mortgage Rates:

Averages And Trends From The 1970S To 2017")

Additionally, to make the dreams about owning houses for American citizens

come true, “Under President Bush, the National Bank of America – the Federal Reserve
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(FED), lowered interest rates to 1% from 2001-2004 to again enable the dream of

homeownership for middle-class citizens and also to boost economic growth. Due to

low interest rates, the demand for mortgage loans increased heavily as more and more

citizens saw their chance to own a house. At this time house prices were steadily rising

and were expected to rise further due to increased demand in the real estate market.”

(Bartmann).

The US Banks and different investors saw their likelihood make money in the

housing market. As interest rates were terribly low it had been simple and profitable for

banks to borrow cash at 1 percent for itself to form mortgages.

After the US government released underwriting standards, the money was lent to

people with a weak or limited credit history was created. At this time, a second

marketplace, also known as a subprime market, was created.

Banks secured low and versatile interest rates and sometimes allowed borrowers

to get more than one mortgage, that enabled low and moderate class Americans to

borrow even extra cash for larger homes they ordinarily could not afford. In 2006

America housing costs reached their peak and many purchasers were buying not for

staying, but to sell at a quick profit.

("Subprime
Mortgage
Originations")
 Nguyen |8

2.4 Collateralized debt obligation (CDO)

After the subprime market was established, some institutions even started using

predatory lending practices to generate mortgages. They made loans without verifying

income and offered adjustable-rate mortgages with payments borrowers initially could

succeed in but then had to suffered to pay. With these new subprime lending practices,

credit rating agencies could still point to historical data that indicated mortgage debt

was a safe bet although it was not. These investments gradually turned to a high risk.

But investors trusted the ratings and kept throwing in their money.

“Therefore, investment banks created a new financial derivative called

collateralized debt obligation (CDO). As the terms said, a CDO contains numerous debt

obligations, in fact, thousands of home mortgages and other loans like car and student

loans. As in the financial markets were investors with different risk preferences, there

was a demand for different kind of yield rates. At this time existing derivatives could

not meet all the investor’s needs.” (Bartmann).

With CDO’s there was currently an opportunity to serve the requirements of all

investors, as a result of this derivative was divided into three completely different slices,

referred to as tranches. Investment Banks then went to rating agencies to allow them to

measure the worth and risk of their CDO’s. The thought of pooling loans into one

product and later separating them into different tranches was that the danger got divided

and was seen to be less risk than only one individual mortgage loan or different types of

mortgages could be placed along into one financial product. The senior tranche was

seen to be the foremost secure. Senior holders of debt obligations were those who got

served the first once cash repayments from mortgages and different loans got stuffed in.
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For this reason, received interest rates were comparingly low however it was still a lot

of profitable than 1 percent interest given by the Federal Reserve Bank. As this

premium part of a CDO was characterized by a AAA rating, the best and safest

investment rating, investors with risk restrictions like pension and retirement funds were

currently ready to invest in this derivative. The middle slice known as mezzanine

tranche was typically rated with A and B ratings carrying moderate interest rates as debt

holders of this tranche got served second. The equity tranche was the one providing

both the highest potential risk and highest doable interest rates in the market. After all

investors of different tranches had been served with payments, cash got filled in the

equity tranche. Therefore, rating agencies gave them the bottom rating grade or even did

not give a rating for these debt obligations. Risky investment seekers like speculative

hedge funds were typical for this type of tranche.

2.5 The lack of laws.

In 2000 US Government declared the deregulating of derivatives within the

financial market. Because the financial sector had to deal with extreme competitiveness

and low-profit margins for standard product, investment banks were inspired to search

for a brand spanking new financial product. Thanks to less regulation, the financial

market was enabled to develop a financial product with speculative character and

danger. At this point, investment bankers got nearly any rights on how they needed to

make up their business and in which sectors they focused to invest in. The US banks

began to sell mortgage-backed securities to other investment institutions to sell once

more to different investors.

In the following time, the marketplace for CDO’s grew enormously because the

demand for this new financial product went world. Local banks and retirement funds
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from all the globe, particularly in Europe, began to get CDO shares. This implied that

mortgage payments from the United States house purchasers were no longer transferred

to their native investors but to banks and institutions in the world. Investment banks

received their fees for each purchased CDO share and created countless profit during

this time.

2.6 Bursting the housing bubble.

Rapid price increases were driven by irrational decisions well and made a

housing bubble that had an annoying tendency to burst. Finally, subprime mortgages

default rates began to rise as borrowers were not ready any longer to serve the monthly

payments. In 2006 the Federal Reserve raised interest rates to 5,25% that caused the

delinquency of even more and more loaners. In particular, subprime mortgages with

adjustable interest rates were affected the foremost. Their monthly payments rose

heavily as interest rates rose. Borrowers began to default on their mortgages which led

to increase a lot of houses on the market for sale. The result was that these homes went

into the properties of banks and investors who issued or bought mortgage-backed

securities. As homes costs were up, the banks still had the chance to sell their property

with a profit, as a result of rising house costs protected investors from losses. However,

shortly the house supply in the United States market exceeded the demand for homes

that indicated a stagnation of house prices immediately. That the housing supply was up

and demand was down made housing market started collapsing. Feared of a downward

trend, householders, banks and different investors needed to obviate their properties

before losing even extra money. In the subprime mortgage market, “foreclosure rates

increased by 43% over the last two quarters of 2006 and increased by a staggering 75%

in 2007 compared with 2006” (Thakor). As this was happening, the big financial
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institutions stopped buying subprime mortgages and subprime lenders were getting

stuck with bad loans.

In 2007, many huge investment institutions went to bankrupt. The problem

spread to the big investors who poured money into these MBSs and CDOs. They started

losing a bunch of money on their investments.

Therefore, in 2007, New Century Financial Corporation, Lehman Brothers and a

number one subprime mortgage investor, filed for bankruptcy. Others were forced into

mergers or needed to be bailed out by the government. “No one knew exactly how bad

the balance sheet at some of these financial institutions really was. These complicated

unregulated assets made it hard to tell.” (Clifford, and Hill). Trading and the credit

markets froze. The stock market crashed and the US economy's suddenly found itself in

a disastrous recession.

("U.S.
Foreclosure
Activity")

The downward trend within the United States of America housing market was

currently unstoppable. Even prime lenders got into hassle as their homes price was

reduced steadily. At this point, continue paying the mortgage was costlier than

merchandising the house. Some borrowers stopped paying that lead to more defaults

pushing housing prices down further.

 N g u y e n | 12

There was another financial instrument that exacerbated all of these problems

called credit default swaps (CDS) that were basically sold as insurance against

mortgage-backed securities. These credit default swaps were also turned into other

securities that essentially allow traders to bet huge amounts of money on whether the

values of mortgage securities would go up or down. All these bets, these financial

instruments, resulted in an incredibly complicated web of assets liabilities and risks.

Everything started going badly for the entire financial system.

2.7 The lack of responsibilities of the American International Group.

The world’s biggest insurance firm, the American International Group (AIG),

was not solely merchandising traditional health insurances but additionally made

insurances for the products of the financial market. A credit default swap (CDS) is

perhaps the foremost vital one. For investors who had CDOs, credit default swaps

worked like an insurance. Investors who purchased a credit default swap had to pay a

quarterly premium to AIG. Just in case the investor’s CDO defaults, AIG had to pay the

investor out for his losses. In distinction to different insurance corporations, AIG not

solely sold CDS to guard CDO holders but additionally sold them to speculators so as to

bet against CDOs they failed to own. They might additionally sell them in immense

quantities as there were no government laws for CDS requiring to place cash aside.

Instead, they paid large bonuses for their workers as soon as contracts were signed.

AIG's sold tens of billions of dollar worth of these insurance policies without money to

back them up when things went wrong. Once plenty of CDO’s failing and AIG had to

guard their investors, it had been clear that the world’s biggest insurance company

could not serve their payments duties itself.

 N g u y e n | 13

2.8 The irresponsible rating agencies

The investment sector had to form new CDO’s for the market. In distinction to

previous ones, they were currently stuffed up with lots of subprime mortgages

containing a high default risk. So as to sell them to investors, the United States

investment banks paid rating agencies to continue giving high category ratings (AAA)

to their CDO’s, though these new toxic derivatives were risky securities. Rating

agencies were not solely tripled or quadrupled their profit, they conjointly shaped

alliances with the large investments banks to continue their partnership. In fact, that

competition was high underneath the 3 main rating agencies, not giving the required

rating might have resulted that investment banks simply went to another rating agency

adjacent to finally receive their AAA rating. The rating agencies had no liability if they

justified their rating of CDO wrongly, these agencies claimed that it is simply their

personal opinion in order that they did not take responsibilities. As nobody precisely

knew what type of mortgages and loans were bundled along in a CDO, not even the

investment banks. Purchasers believed rating agencies and felt secured by the rising

house prices in the real estate market. As there have been nearly no government laws

requiring a specific quantity of remained capital for CDO’s to arrange for losses,

investment banks did not care about the risks of their CDOs and continued to sell them

in massive quantities, usually with one volume of over 700 million dollars. The

financial sector created a ticking time bomb. It had been simply a matter of the time

once the first losses for investors would occur before the entire financial market was

able to explode.

3. The late actions of government.

 N g u y e n | 14

The Federal Reserve (FED) stepped in offered to make emergency loans to

banks. The government enacted a program called the Troubled Assets Relief Program

(TARP), also known as the bank bailout. It was spending 250 billion dollars bailing out

the banks and was later expanded help automakers, AIG and homeowners. In

combination with lending by the FED, this helped stopped the cascade of panic in the

financial system. “The treasury also conducted stress test and the largest Wall Street

banks. Government accountants swarmed over bank balance sheets and publicly

announced which ones were sound and which ones need to raise more money. This

eliminated some of the uncertainty that paralyzed lending among institutions.”

(Clifford, and Hill).

Additionally, in 2009 congress also approved a large stimulus package. This

pumped over 800 billion dollars into the economy through new spending and tax cuts.

This decreased the fast spread of the damage on markets. In 2010, congress continued to

approve a financial reform known as the Dodd-Frank law. It took steps to increase

transparency and to prevent banks from taking on so much risk. Dodd-Frank helped set

up a consumer protection bureau to reduce predatory lending. It required that financial

derivatives must be traded in exchanges that all market participants could observe. It put

mechanisms in place for a large bank to fail in a controlled predictable manner.

4. Lessons from the American financial crisis.

4.1 The liberalization of the market and late interventions of government

First of all, the liberalization and opening up of the financial market to create a

dynamic financial market, thereby attracting investment capital is necessary. But

liberalization should be based on the law and strict supervision of the government. The

idea that should allow the free market to regulate everything, and the less the
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government intervened in the operation of the market, the better a government was, was

wrong. This crisis showed that the idea was outdated. The government did not regulate

and supervise the financial system. “The sentries were not at their post in no small part

due to the widely accepted faith in the self-correcting nature of the markets and the

ability of financial institutions to effectively police themselves” (Clifford, and Hill). The

financial system failed. Everybody in the system was borrowing an excessive amount of

cash and taking a huge amount of risk from the large financial organizations. The

institutions also were seizing immense debt loads to speculate in risky assets. The large

variety of house owners were seizing mortgages they could not afford as well.

Bigger consumer protections and restrictions on loaning should control the

number of dangerous loans made to reduce the intensity of the crisis. However, in some

cases, the problem was not insufficient regulation, but rather laws that created poor

incentives. For example, the utilization of credit ratings in regulation gave credit rating

agencies incentives to offer overoptimistic ratings for the structured products that were

central to the financial crisis. Loose credit and low-interest rates were actually a force

behind the housing bubble, however, this primary cause was the massive quantity of

credit flowing into America under the lack of controls of Federal Reserve.

4.2 The derivative instruments

Second , people must be cautious about new derivative instruments when they

were not legalized especially when they are speculative instruments. Speculative

activity has two positive and negative sides. When the law had not existed yet, the law

was not standardized or market surveillance was not good, the derivatives transaction

would arise negatively.

 N g u y e n | 16

That was what happened between 2004 and 2006 once the Federal Reserve

started raising the fund rates. Several of the borrowers had interest-only loans, that were

a kind of adjustable-rate mortgage. In contrast to a traditional loan, the interest rates

rose together with the Federal Reserve funds rate. These mortgage holders found they

could anymore afford the payments. This happened at the identical time that the interest

rates reset, typically after 3 years. As interest rates rose, the demand for housing fell,

and so did home costs. These mortgage holders found they could not deal with the

payments or sell the house, so they defaulted.

Importantly, some elements of the MBS were unworthy, however, nobody might

figure out that elements. Since nobody really understood what was in the MBS, nobody

knew what actuality price of the MBS really was. This uncertainty contributed to a shut-

down of the secondary market, that currently meant that the banks and hedge funds had

many derivatives that were each declining in price which they could not sell. Soon,

banks stopped loaning to each other altogether, as a result of that they were scared of

receiving additional defaulting derivatives.

4.3 The lack of transparency in how the market was trading.

Thirdly, information and transparency about the financial systems that banks,

government and other financial institutions must be paid special attention and monitored

regularly to prevent any unreasonable or violation signs. “The lack of transparency in

financial markets was a significant contributor to the 2008 financial crisis. The risks of

toxic securities were hidden behind layers of complexity, and the credit rating agencies

tasked with making the bottom line transparent to buyers had crippling conflicts of

interests.” (Stanley)
 N g u y e n | 17

At the guts of the transparency, the drawback was and complexness of the

shadow financial system, in which credit was intermediated through huge securities

market relationships. The balance sheets of traditional banks could be understood by

examining the underwriting of their loans and their comparatively restricted set of

funding sources. However universal banks have a tangled net of securities exposures

involving hugely difficult derivatives commitments, short funding collateral and

elaborately structured securities.

The power to integrate and interpret this flood of recent information continues to

be lacking. It's an open question whether all this information would show real

awakeness which will facilitate both regulators, market participants. And the public

perceived the financial system more effectively.

On the regulatory aspect, banks are currently needed to show regulators detailing

how they could be resolved in the event of monetary difficulties. These would greatly

improve regulators understanding of bank internal structure. New tracking of credit

exposures also would improve regulators understanding of interrelationships in the

industry. Regulatory stress tests had additionally improved the effective transparency of

bank activities to regulators, as these stressed tests need tracing out relationships that

might not be visible on the balance sheets.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued new rules on

disclosure needs for asset-backed securities. New SEC ruled for credit rating agencies

are designed to enhance the responsibleness of rating data and the transparency of

securities.

In addition, the new common securitization platform was being designed by the

federal housing agencies could radically increase the supply of loan-level information
 N g u y e n | 18

for mortgage-backed securities, and probably change and standardize the structure of

asset-backed securities as well. The desirability of improving the standardization of

mortgage-backed securities could create them more clear for investors.

The new monetary analysis had the power to amass data centrally to design

areas of stress in the economic system and additionally has numerous legal powers to

enhance data standardization and accessibility in the markets.

4.4 The poor incentives and human failures.

One of the key factors that led the 2008 financial crisis was perverse incentives.

A perverse incentive was when a policy ended up having a negative effect, opposite of

what was intended. Like mortgage brokers got bonuses for lending out more money, but

that encouraged them to make risky loans which could hurt profits in the end. That led

to moral hazard as well. This was when one person took on more risk because someone

else would bear the burden of that risk. Banks and lenders were willing to lend to

subprime borrowers because they planned to sell the mortgages to somebody else.

Everyone thought they could pass the risk. If banks knew that they were going to be

bailed out by the government, they had an incentive to make risky or unwise bets.

It happened in a system made up of humans with human failings. Some did not

understand what was happening. Others willfully ignored the problems and were simply

unethical motivated by the massive amounts of money.

On the one hand, there are not any rules or oversights to assist instill trust in the

market participants. Once one went bankrupt, as Lehman Brothers did, it started a panic

among hedge funds and banks that the world's governments are still making an attempt

to completely resolve.
 N g u y e n | 19

On the other hand, people became more self-satisfied because of a period of

stability and then were more possible to accept risks that could blow up the system. This

satisfaction encompassed lenders, borrowers, policymakers, and regulators and could

remove power from any of them.

Additionally, advances in computer and applied mathematics modeling gave

people the illusion of understanding, in fact, they did oversimplify a complicated world.

This inspired people to accept risks they did not really perceive that.

5. Conclusion.

The US economic crisis in 2008 caused a great loss in many aspects of the US

economy. It affected most people from mortgage borrowers, investors, banks even to

the government. Its damage was not only in America, but also in the whole world. But

all that has gone by, the only left things was valuable lessons for the economists. The

greeds of human beings with any sources without knowing the source clearly could ruin

a world economy. It has been 10 years since the 2008 crisis, and it signals another crisis

period may happen. Therefore, governments must pay hige attention to not make the

past mistakes.
 N g u y e n | 20

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