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Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

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Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe
Transnational Migration in Its Multiplicity

Moha Ennaji
muslim moroccan migrants in europe
Copyright © Moha Ennaji, 2014.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-47648-7

All rights reserved.

First published in 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN in the United ®


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ISBN 978-1-349-50203-5 ISBN 978-1-137-47649-4 (eBook)


DOI 10.1057/9781137476494

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Design by Amnet.

First edition: November 2014

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To the memory of my dear father, Lahcen Ennaji
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Contents

List of Tables and Figures ix


Acknowledgmentsxi
Introduction: Framing and Contextualizing Muslim Moroccan
Migrants in Europe 1

PART I: Moroccan Migration Flows: Past and Present


  1 Moroccan Migration History: Origins and Causes 17
  2 How Moroccans Live in Europe 35

PART II: Being Moroccan and Muslim in Europe


  3 What It Means to Be a Muslim in Europe: Islam and Islamophobia 51
  4 Women and the Veil Debate 67
  5 How Moroccan Women in Europe Cope and Resist 77
  6 Education and Language Issues 95

PART III: Becoming Moroccan-European


  7 Challenges of Integration 115
  8 Identity and Citizenship 127
  9 Migrants’ Contributions to Development and Social Change 145
10 Success Stories 157

Conclusion181
Notes189
References203
Index221
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List of Tables and Figures

Table 6.1 The major ten languages spoken in the UK, adapted
from the 2011 Census 109
Figure 9.1 Yearly transfers by Moroccans living abroad in
­billions of US dollars 149
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Acknowledgments

A number of debts have been incurred while writing this book. The first
is to the Rockefeller Foundation’s Center in Bellagio, Italy, where I spent
four weeks in 2012 as an associate fellow. The book was then completed
­during a second stay at California State University at Pomona during the
­academic year 2013–2014. I am very grateful to Professors Patricia de
Freitas and Faiza Shereen for these opportunities. Professors Sandra Gifford
of Swinburne University of Technology, Australia; Kim Dovey of University
of Melbourne, Australia; and Yuen FoongKhong of Oxford University,
United Kingdom, offered invaluable support for which I am very grateful.
Sandra Gifford’s thoughtful comments improved the sociological framing
of the book and introduced me to valuable sources. Special words of thanks
are due to Al Amin Mazrui, Fatima Sadiqi, and anonymous reviewers who
devoted time to reading and commenting on earlier versions of this work.
I would like also to thank Ousseina Alidou, Abena Busia, and friends in other
departments at Rutgers University, who provided a rich and supportive envi-
ronment when I began working on this research project in 2007.
Several colleagues facilitated my research in Europe, and I am indebted
to all of them, including those I am unable to cite here. I would like to
mention in particular: Karen Vintges, Marjo Buitelaar, Fouad Laroui, Maati
Kabbal, Issa Ait Belize, Mino Vianello, Jan Jaap de Ruiter, Anass Bendrif,
Abderrahman El Aissati, Pilar Palacia, Ahmad Fuadi, Sonali Ojha, and
­
Antonio Damasco. The final product has benefited immensely from their
constructive remarks and suggestions.
My initial fieldwork and field trips were supported by funds from the
Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad and from the South
North Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Migration Studies at Fès,
Morocco. The book would not have been written without the help and coop-
eration of all the interviewees and respondents who agreed to take part in this
research and share their migration experiences and views with me. Finally,
I am thankful to the support offered by my family during the seven years that
this book took me to complete.
Introduction

Framing and Contextualizing Muslim


Moroccan Migrants in Europe

R
esearch on migration processes in Europe and the Mediterranean
region shows that the vast majority of Muslim immigrants are from
North Africa and the Middle East. This does not preclude the plural
and complex environment in which these immigrants move, live, and inte-
grate. Turks represent about half of the Middle Eastern people in Europe,
while North Africans constitute 37 percent (Moroccans alone 27 p ­ ercent),
Iranians four percent, Iraqis three percent and Lebanese two percent
(Al-Shahi and Lawless 2005: 10; Daoud 2011: 44). After the Arab Spring,
Muslim immigrant populations from the region have continued to increase.
The immigrant flows from Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya have
increased dramatically due to civil wars, armed conflict, political v­ iolence,
repression, and religious discrimination.
As a case in point, the number of Moroccan workers in France more than
doubled between 1990 and 2012, from 573,000 to over 1.5 million (Daoud
2011: 29). Their main destinations have been France, Belgium, Spain, Italy,
the Netherlands, and Germany. Many of these Muslim immigrants are refu-
gees and asylum seekers, and about one third of them and their descendants
have acquired the citizenship of the European host countries. The highest
rates of naturalization are attested in the Scandinavian countries and the
Netherlands. In Sweden, 60 percent of the Middle East and North African
migrants obtained Swedish citizenship by 2001. In Norway, 80 percent of
Moroccans, 73 percent of Turks and 69 percent of Iranians had acquired
Norwegian citizenship by the same year (Al-Shahi and Lawless 2005: 14).
Europe’s reaction to these flows of immigrants has been to implement restric-
tive legislations, taking tougher measures to combat undocumented migra-
tion, and adopting tighter rules regarding family reunification or formation.
2   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

North African communities, and Muslim immigrants in general, have


been the focus of unprecedented attention since the atrocious attacks of
9/11, largely after the wave of arrests of North Africans on terrorism-related
charges across the continent. Yet very little is known about exactly who these
North African migrants are, what motivates them, how and why some of
them became attracted to radical interpretations of Islam, and how they
­contribute to social change and development in Europe and in their home
country. Moroccan immigrants in Europe are far from being homogeneous;
they have different living conditions that are further complicated by variables
like age, gender, status, occupation, education, duration of migration, and
background in the home country.
In addition, migration flows within the European Union (EU) have the
characteristics of international migration: the migration of young people
and women for essentially economic reasons, the increase of undocumented
migration, illegal trafficking of persons, the migration of more or less quali-
fied labor, brain drain, etc.
As Europe grows united in its diversity, another book on the life and situ-
ation of North African Muslim migrants is timely and crucial. The issue of
North African migration is worth revisiting for three main reasons: (a) the
new relations between North Africa and Europe in the globalization process,
(b) the emergence of new national and transnational awareness of the impor-
tance of human rights, and (c) the growing role of immigrants as agents of
change and development
The book focuses on the Moroccan community in the EU, including com-
munity members who are citizens of a member state. Those with European
citizenship but with parents born in Morocco are covered in this study
because they are very much part of the problem of migration. I use the term
“immigrants” broadly here to refer to people residing in Europe who were not
European citizens at birth, and their descendants. The Dutch use the word
allochtones which defines immigrants as people born abroad or who have at
least one parent born overseas. The immigrant population includes natural-
ized citizens, lawful permanent residents, certain legal non-immigrants (e.g.
persons on student or work visas), those admitted under refugee status, and
persons illegally living in Europe. French statistics do not count immigrants’
children born in France and who have French citizenship as immigrants, but
they are considered directly connected to the issues of migration. In addition,
Moroccans (and North Africans in general) keep their initial nationality and
are considered Arab or Muslim, irrespective of whether they are French citi-
zens (Lucassen 2005: 2).
I have personally developed an interest in the issue of Moroccan Muslim
immigrants into the EU over a long period, given that I have many family
Framing and Contextualizing Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe   ●    3

members and friends who migrated to different European countries in the


1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and recently. I know also relatives who migrated ille-
gally from Morocco to Spain and Italy in order to better their lives. I have
been extremely shocked to watch and read the tragic stories of boat people
and how hundreds of illegal migrants have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea
in their failed attempts to cross to the northern side.1
The Moroccan press calls this phenomenon “the boats of death,” in Arabic
qawarib almawt. Being a linguist, I had the opportunity to translate docu-
ments for many Moroccan migrants in Europe and, through my conversa-
tions with them for my research, I came to know better their concerns and
aspirations. My academic interest in multiculturalism led me to investigate
the way the cultural and social landscape of many European cities has been
transformed by the impact of immigrants from North Africa and other parts
of the world. The heavy restrictions on visas since 1990 have, unfortunately,
prevented many young Moroccans from traveling to the EU to pursue their
higher education, which pushes many of them to use illegal means in order
to realize their dreams. Those who do manage to migrate have a hard time
finding a decent job and integrating into the host society.
In the EU, each member state adopts its own migration policies, manag-
ing migration and multiculturalism in a way that guarantees minorities’ rights
and reconciles identity-based diversity with the need for social cohesion.

Migration Discourses and Theories


A short review of migration discourses and theories from the 1960s onward
shows that they underscored the various factors determining the migration
process. They discussed the causes and effects of migration, focusing par-
ticularly on male migrants as individuals, without reference to women, who
nowadays constitute about 50 percent of international migration.
The first discourse and theory about migration laws go back to the end
of the nineteenth century (Ravenstein 1889). In the 1940s, Samuel Stouffer
(1940) argued that one migrates to a destination where one can realize one’s
migratory project, which means that migrants will move to the nearest place
offering prospects in order to achieve their objectives (Almquist et al. 1978).
The “human capital” theory can be traced back to Sjaastad’s (1962) and
Todaro (1969). Sjaastad (ibid.) argues that migration is the outcome of a
mature decision taken by an individual with the help of his or her family
for boosting one’s economic benefits and social development. Todaro (ibid.)
considers that migration is motivated by the employability of the migrant in
the host country. Ravenstein (1889) expands on the human capital theory
arguing that migration occurs in flows, generally moving from rural to urban
4   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

areas and from poor to rich destinations. He also believes that people migrate
first and foremost for economic reasons in order to improve their living con-
ditions (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008: 6).
Despite its significance and input, the human capital theory has been crit-
icized by researchers and others for being too restrictive, primarily because
migration is not always a deliberate phenomenon (Almquist et al. 1978).
Undeniably, migration may be forced by the harsh socioeconomic circum-
stances in the home country or by civil wars and other tough political factors,
such as the case of exiles forced to migrate because they are persecuted in their
own country. Migration may also be caused by social motives such as mar-
riage or family reunification.
The second dominant theoretical approach, the “push-pull” theory of
migration, was developed by Lee (1966), among others. According to this
theory, migration is provoked by encouraging factors in the country of des-
tination and unhelpful ones in the country of origin, which may go beyond
economic aspects. This analysis is also adopted by geographers like Brown
and Moore (1970), who use “place utility” as a notion to argue that eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and personal factors are behind migration flows. For
instance, many Moroccan students prefer to pursue their university studies
in the EU because of its superior resources, and many stay there after gradu-
ation because they believe that opportunities in Europe are greater than in
Morocco.
It is commonly known that a number of theories have been elaborated
to determine and account for the causes of transnational migration. These
theories subdivide into two types: the first type attempts to determine the
motivation of migration and the second one tries to explain the perpetua-
tion of migration across space and time (Lim 1993; Chant 1992). I draw on
works of sociology or political theory to analyze the different discourses about
immigration, namely Pierre Bourdieu (1982), Joseph Carens (1992, 1995),
Frederick Whelan (1992), and Michael Walzer (1983).
Those researchers who have investigated immigration have usually
defended the conformist view on the subject, which insists that liberal states
are sovereign and have strong power over immigration rules. According to
this view, these states will normally admit immigrants whose skills, capabili-
ties, and experiences are thought to be in the national interest, but they are
ethically free to constrain immigration at their convenience.
However, a few liberal democrats have recently begun to confront this
conservative attitude by advancing two arguments. The first argument, put
forward strongly by Carens (1992), affirms that immigration-restrictive laws
are incoherent with fundamental liberal democratic values, namely freedom,
equal opportunity, and social justice. According to him, liberal states have a
Framing and Contextualizing Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe   ●    5

moral obligation to adopt the policy of open borders, admitting all poten-
tial immigrants. The second argument, defended by Whelan (1992), Wilcox
(2007) and Whelan and Wilcox (1992: 3–39), maintains that developed
democratic countries have the moral obligation to welcome deprived immi-
grants as a gesture to social global injustices, such as poverty and oppression.
Defending the view of open borders, I argue in this book that affluent liberal
democratic societies have larger moral duties to admit immigrants than the
conservative position implies.
Unlike Carens, Walzer (1983) treats the question of culture and member-
ship in a society as basic to his theory of justice and argues that “states are
simply free to take strangers in (or not).” Walzer (ibid.) is not interested in the
search for universal principles and is merely preoccupied with the historical
and cultural specificity and membership in a given society. He believes that
issues of distributive justice should be tackled from the perspective of mem-
bership in a political community in which people enjoy a common culture
and a core of values about social justice.
As Carens (ibid.) argues, borders and guards are a way of keeping out
criminals, dissidents, and terrorists. However, the vast majority of immi-
grants are “ordinary, peaceful people, seeking only the opportunity to build
decent, secure lives for themselves and their families.”
I will argue, along the lines of Carens (1995), that borders ought to be
open and that people are free to migrate to, live, and work in another coun-
try, subject only to the restrictions that connect them to citizens in the host
country. I also argue, following Carens (ibid.), that international movement
from one country to another should be a human right. The state should safe-
guard the rights of citizens and non-citizens uniformly because it has “a de
facto monopoly over the enforcement of rights within its territory.” He goes
on to specify:

In particular, the need for some restriction would not justify any level of
restriction whatsoever or restrictions for other reasons, but only that level of
restriction essential to maintain public order. This would surely imply a much
less restrictive policy than the one currently in force which is shaped by so
many other considerations besides the need to maintain public order. It would
be an affirmation of the liberal character of the community and of its commit-
ment to principles of justice.

This book is also inspired by studies on multiculturalism and society as


developed in Eickelman (1992), Fairclough (2001), and Kymlicka (1996,
2009), which are applied to investigate the relationship between multicul-
turalism, minorities, citizenship, identity, and integration of Moroccans
6   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

in Europe. In line with Kymlicka (1996, 2009), I argue that group-specific


rights are consistent with citizenship and liberalism. In this framework, a
genuinely multicultural community would seek to promote the recogni-
tion of national ethnic, cultural, religious, and gender difference through
political representation, education, mass media, and other means. Following
Kymlicka (2009), it is my belief that European countries, and Western societ-
ies in general, ought to recognize the cultural specificities of immigrants and
to protect their rights to practice their customs and religious beliefs in public
and private spaces, and to be more tolerant toward migrants. Similarly, the
latter must accept the culture of the host country and become more flexible,
more engaged in the public debate, and more ready to integrate while hang-
ing on to their cultures of origin if they so choose.

The European Context


In 1995, the Barcelona Process highlighted the role played by immigrants in
co-development and cooperation among the countries of the Mediterranean.
The Euromed Civil Forum even proposed that the immigrant be considered
an agent of cooperation. It is important to underline that the link between
cooperation and immigration is woven from the positive conditionality in
order to encourage economic cooperation and provoke social change in
countries south of the Mediterranean. Economic assistance in this case is
conditioned by the political factor and the commitment of countries in the
south to democratic reforms. Sustainable development also increases by what
Aubarell and Aragal (2004) call “decentralized cooperation” that aims to
involve different sectors in civil society in support of Mediterranean coopera-
tion at the grassroots level. The goal is to emphasize the role of migrants and
their organizations in socioeconomic development.
In this spirit, in 2002 the 5+5 Dialogue proposed concrete measures for
the proper management of migration within the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership, such as measures to reduce undocumented immigration, to set up
a system of information and database at the regional level and to strengthen
co-development.2
In October 2008, the EU granted Morocco an advanced status and made
the country one of its privileged partners. This decision was made following
the approach adopted by the Moroccan authorities, particularly on issues
relating to immigration. Indeed, compared to other countries in the south-
ern Mediterranean, Morocco has been most considerate and most agreeable
to the position of Europe in the field of immigration, and thus managed to
win the confidence of the EU. As a case in point, Morocco agreed to control
its northern borders, signed agreements of readmission of undocumented
Framing and Contextualizing Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe   ●    7

migrants, and played a major role (together with Spain) in controlling and
patrolling borders, on the side of Moroccan-Spanish borders.
Unlike in the past, when most Europeans defended immigration as
­necessary for development, during today’s global economic crisis, many
European states have imposed restrictive policies to limit or stop migration
or have decided to stop regularizing the situation of undocumented migrants
across Europe. Detention centers have been created in Lampedusa in Italy,
and Patras in Greece, where undocumented immigrants (including children
and the elderly) are confined in appalling conditions before being deported
(Saaf et al., 2009).
Obviously, xenophobia and racism favor right-wing political currents,
which claim that the national identity of European countries is ­threatened
by  the waves of migrants. This explains the proliferation of measures of
acculturation that some European countries, including Belgium and the
Netherlands, have used in the past few years, such as tests on language, ­values
(e.g., attitudes toward women and homosexuals), attachment to the host
country, and nature of ties with the home country. These tests are already
common practice in the United States, but in Europe this is a new approach
that may be helpful in the integration of migrants.
In the case of Morocco, the issue of immigration is dominated by the
idea of organizing relations between immigrants and the country of origin,
and creating migration structures, namely, the Council of the Moroccan
Community Abroad and the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living
Abroad. To keep the immigrants’ remittances flowing into the country, the
Moroccan government has implemented encouraging policies and measures
to incite Moroccan immigrants to invest in their country of origin. It has also
given them significant incentives such as low bank interest rates, low prices to
purchase land for investments, and facilities to transfer foreign currency into
Morocco (see chapter 9).
Finally, the question of the relationship between immigrants and the
home country is now made even more controversial and complex, since many
Muslim countries in the region compete to control the religious leadership
institutions of Muslims in Europe. Such is the case for Morocco, which has
been sending imams (religious teachers) to host countries like France and the
Netherlands in order to promote moderate Islam.

Islam and Islamophobia


This book, which I started in November 2006, has continued through shock-
ing events directly or indirectly implicating Muslims and the West: the inva-
sion of Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the exacerbation of the Palestinian-Israeli
8   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

conflict, the Danish Cartoons Controversy, the Swiss ban of minarets, the scarf
and burqa (women’s body-covering garment) issue in France, the Arab Spring,
and the impact of the global financial crisis on migrants in Europe and beyond.
Throughout the EU, Moroccan immigrants and their descendants con-
tinue to be preoccupied as much by national politics as by a globalized form
of Islam. Little attention has been paid to the complex relationship between
militant elements and the wider Muslim communities residing in Europe.
Although the war on terror has made them feel increasingly insecure and
uncomfortable, it has arguably enabled the more politicized moderate parts
of the Islamic community to increase their role and influence, with question-
able consequences for these communities (Ramadan 2005, 2013).
Islam had long been considered non-European until very recently; today it
is the second-most widely practiced religion in Europe and visibly an internal
European phenomenon due to Muslim migrants from many different coun-
tries. In France and Italy, for instance, Islam is very present in public space,
and Muslims have built over 2,200 mosques and constituted hundreds of
associations, which has brought about a heated debate and sometimes anti-
Muslim campaigns (Daoud 2011: 60).
This book discusses the effects of the legislation banning headscarf wearing
on immigrants’ integration ten years after its implementation, and explores
the nature and place of Islam within the changing European political,
social, and cultural landscape. How is European identity being challenged
and transformed by Islam’s growing grassroots presence? Can one speak of
European Islam? What does the presence of Islam in Europe mean for the
EU’s world role or the global nature of Islam? The book deals with the rela-
tionship between Muslim immigrants in the EU and their countries of origin
(see in particular chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9). It comprises a comparative analysis
of the relationship between Islam and the EU states, and the place of religion
and secularization. It also addresses the issues of integration and identity of
Moroccan youth born and raised in Europe.
Several books have been published on the issue of Muslim North African
migration and about the headscarves problem in France. I mention only a few
here that have been central to this study: Bowen (2007), G ­ uénif-Souilamas
(2000), Silverstein and Crawford (2004), Venel (2004), Gresh and
Vidal (2004), Fetzer and Soper (2005), Tietze (2002), and Al-Shahi and
Lawless (2005), and Daoud (2011).
Daoud (2011) shows that Moroccan migration has changed dramati-
cally over the last two decades, in the sense that it is rejuvenated, feminized,
and amplified. Moroccan migrants have the double characteristic of being
strongly established in the EU and at the same time very attached to their
home country, where their economic impact is remarkable because of the
Framing and Contextualizing Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe   ●    9

huge funds transfers. Built on interviews and the results of two surveys, this
book discusses the main problems experienced by migrant Moroccans in
Europe, including xenophobia and Islamophobia.
Several studies have reflected on the issue of Islam and Islamophobia in
the EU in the gloomy environment of the war on terror and its aftermath. For
instance, Phillip (2009) argues that Europe has been too much focused on
problems, but without providing solutions. He questions what has come to
be regarded as the “Islamic problem”—which is the prevalent misperception
of Muslim communities in Europe as a disturbing problematic minority—by
wondering what these Muslims have to be optimistic about nowadays, and
how non-Muslims in the host countries might share this hope. Phillip (ibid.)
believes that there are good reasons for hope in many sectors and walks of
life, and rejects many of the misconceptions and prejudices made against
Muslims in Europe. For him, the amplified inspection of Muslim identi-
ties has occurred in a racist environment, where Muslims are targeted and
linked with new forms of “imperialism.” The book states that new “divisions
between Muslims and others echo colonial ideas of black and white, colo-
nized and colonizer, within practices of divide and rule.”
Aspects of multiculturalism and citizenship are discussed in their interac-
tion with Muslim communities in Europe by Modood, Zapata-Barrero, and
Triandafyllidou (2006). This collective book examines the European facets of
multiculturalism and immigration, arguing that political discourse of multi-
culturalism and resulting European immigration policies have been basically
influenced by the American model, and that this matter must be discussed;
the European situation is entirely distinct because ethnic and religious groups
challenge liberalism and existing notions of citizenship.
Providing a new and original view of multiculturalism and citizenship
in Europe today, this book is based on case studies that explore the scope
of European types of multiculturalism, in which some countries attend to
multicultural issues promptly while others lag behind, because they are busy
addressing more vital problems of migration such as acceptance, integration,
and undocumented immigration.
Ramadan (2005) argues that “while the media are focused on radical
Islam, Muslims actively seek ways to live in harmony with their faith within a
Western context.” The book’s goal is to create an independent Western Islam,
anchored not in the traditions of Islamic countries but in the cultural reality
of the West. Ramadan (ibid.) contends that Muslims in Europe can remain
faithful to their Islamic faith while contributing to the public life of Western
secular societies. The author provides a unique vision of a new Muslim iden-
tity, which discards once and for all the perceived idea that Islam must be
defined in opposition to the West.
10   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

In his 2013 book, Ramadan argues that to find the middle path between
assimilating with the host country and living as a Muslim, one should know
which part of one’s behavior is culturally based (and therefore negotiable to
a certain degree) and which part is Islamic/religious (and therefore not nego-
tiable). Ramadan (ibid.) shows that it is not impossible to live as a practicing
Muslim in multi-faith, pluralistic European nation states.
The present book aims to do something different, however, which is to
zero in on Moroccan Muslim immigrants, chiefly in France, Belgium, Spain,
Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, and England, and elicit how they suffer
from marginalization and Islamophobia, on the one hand, and on the other
hand how they contribute economically, politically, and culturally to the host
countries, as well as to the country of origin.
When talking about Muslim immigrants in Europe, one understands,
through the different authors and approaches, that the foremost challenges are
neither religious nor ethnic, and that it is high time one addressed issues such
as bigotry, distrust, unemployment, racial discrimination, and empowerment.
The West and Muslims will only be able to create true “spaces of hope” by
addressing the real issues, and that is why this book is relevant (Phillip 2009).

Methodology
The main approach in this book is qualitative, for it essentially involves the
collection and analysis of qualitative data on the Moroccan community in the
EU, which I gathered mostly during field trips to Europe between 2006 and
2013. In all, 116 structured and semi-structured interviews were conducted
to complement the data collection, in addition to participant observation.
The interviewed migrants were selected from different age groups, educa-
tion levels, and socioeconomic backgrounds, taking into account their status,
class, and gender. I had interviews with 69 male and 47 female participants
who were mostly intellectuals, students, businessmen and women, members
of associations, unemployed people, mothers of first and second generations,
and workers. Their ages ranged from 17 to 76. I also interviewed several
stakeholders involved in the migration debate to represent occurring events.
I interviewed many Moroccan migrants and their descendents face to
face and, in some cases, over the telephone. I used conversations (cafe chats,
casual conversations, Internet chats, arranged conversations, etc.) to elicit
their attitudes and ideas about migration. Several first-, second- and third-
generation individuals were interviewed in the host country and in Morocco
during vacation time. The language of communication was French, Berber,
or Arabic. The testimonies contained in this book are based on contributions
of participants in the interviews.
Framing and Contextualizing Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe   ●    11

The goal was to have a group of respondents who are representative of


the Moroccan migrant community. The book fundamentally focuses on and
discusses the patterns that crop up from the data collection. Sampling was
mostly organized through a personal knowledge of some of the interview-
ees, as well as suggestions from their friends and relatives through a snow-
ball method, which is a non-probability sampling technique that is used by
researchers to identify potential subjects in studies where subjects are hard to
locate.3 Other migrants were chosen with the help of Moroccan university
students and migrants’ associations.
Through the conversations, 25 life histories were collected from migrants
who related their activities before they came to Europe and their experiences
in the host country. These narratives are important in recounting the liv-
ing memory and life stories of Moroccans in Europe. Throughout this book,
I have used only the first names of the interviewed individuals to preserve
their anonymity.
This method was helpful in revealing the rich experiences of Moroccan
migrants, especially as concerns their achievements at the educational, social,
and economic levels. The interviews provided information about the degree
of their integration, their various contributions, challenges, and aspirations.
I have chosen to investigate the lives of migrants, their experiences and
trajectories, especially the youth; I did not interview decision-makers or spe-
cialists, leaving the floor to the migrants themselves to talk about different
topics that they consider essential. The aim is to focus on Moroccan migrants,
their experiences, contributions as agents of change, their links to civil society,
and their challenges while facing key political and social issues. I preferred to
investigate real-life stories, arguments, and debates, and to draw out of them
arguments and conclusions that help us account for certain actions and pro-
vide a comparative research perspective on migration and development.
Other data were also collected on the basis of my own readings of the
literature on migration, documentary research, official statistics, mass media
products, diaries, letters, and government reports, in addition to historical
and contemporary records.

Major Themes and Objectives of the Book


This book was written in response to the growing importance of immigration
as an issue in Europe and North Africa, with the purpose of participating
in and giving a different perspective to the hot debate on the topic. This is
especially important in European countries, which exploit fear and insecurity
in the host societies to depict immigrants negatively and to portray Muslims
in particular as a threat to security. This book raises a number of questions,
12   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

including cultural diversity management, the complex overlap between


immigrant communities and the state, the relationship between power and
identity, Islam and Islamophobia in Europe, and the complex interactions
between migration, education, and gender.
One of the main objectives of this book is to reflect on the place of Islam
and Muslims in Europe, and the impact of the host culture on the identity
and integration of Moroccan migrants. It also focuses on attitudes to migra-
tion, identity, and the political edge of xenophobia. Another objective is to
analyze the causes and consequences of xenophobia and anti-Islam feelings in
Europe and explain why the integration of Muslim immigrants in European
society is thought to be slow, despite many integration policies. The book
also aims to show how Moroccan immigrants (both women and men) have
been positively transformed by the migration experience and that their Islam
is both moderate and progressive.
While avoiding the danger of making sweeping generalizations, the book
provides a balanced view of Moroccan migrants, taking into account their
challenges, problems, and contributions as agents of change in European
society and in their home country. It puts forward arguments against assump-
tions shared by many European politicians who consider migrants a threat to
their security and development, and it questions claims made by conservative
intellectuals and multiculturalists that the assimilation of these migrants will
be extremely difficult or impossible.

The Structure of the Book


This book is divided into three parts: Muslim Moroccan Migration Flows:
Past and Present; Being Moroccan and Muslim in Europe; and Becoming
Moroccan-European. Each part brings to light a particular outlook address-
ing specific issues and aspects of Muslim Moroccan migrants in the EU.

Part I: Muslim Moroccan Migration Flows: Past and Present


Part One, which contains two chapters, addresses the history of Moroccan
migrants, as well as their current situation in Europe, the push/pull factors,
facilitators, and constraints. Chapter 1 outlines the history of Moroccan-
African migration to Europe. Adopting a postcolonial historical approach,
this chapter reviews the various features of North African migration to
Europe, including colonial and illegal migration, and draws a comparison
between these experiences by covering migration waves to France, Spain,
Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Chapter 2 discusses the causes of migration and the current situation of
migrants and their descendents. It shows that Moroccan migrants in Europe
Framing and Contextualizing Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe   ●    13

are not a homogeneous group, and that their living experiences are deter-
mined by factors like duration of residence in the host country, gender, socio-
economic background, and level of education. Their situation has suffered a
setback since the 9/11 events, especially with the rise of Islamophobia and the
negative effects of the global economic crisis.

Part II: Being Moroccan and Muslim in Europe


Part Two explores what it means to be Moroccan, immigrant, and Muslim
in Europe. It focuses on how Moroccan migrants are living with identity,
their sense of their community, culture, and ties with home. Chapter 3 dis-
cusses attitudes to Islam, as well as causes and effects of Islamophobia. It
shows that, like most Muslim immigrants, Moroccans in Europe are subject
to Islamophobia brought on by the European belief that Islam is incompat-
ible with democracy and human rights. The chapter highlights the challenges
facing Moroccan immigrants and their descendants in attempting to preserve
their religious beliefs and cultures in a hostile context marked by xenophobia.
Chapter 4 discusses the history and impact of the debate on the veil, espe-
cially in France. It focuses on intellectual and political discourses about the
headscarf issue, the “intolerance” of Islam, and the rise of violence in the
suburbs as a result of social exclusion and marginalization.
Chapter 5 addresses the resistance and challenges of Moroccan women in
Europe, focusing on how migration has transformed their lives and subverted
gender roles in the host country, and how that influences mindsets and the
family structure.
Chapter 6 explores the language issues and the types of bilingual edu-
cation to which Moroccan immigrants are exposed, and examines how
Moroccan children cope with the various European languages and immersion
programs while remaining loyal to their mother tongues. It argues that a ten-
sion between integration and resistance to assimilation seems to characterize
the actions of migrants and their descendants who favor multilingualism and
bilingual education as part of a national and international education strategy.

Part III: Becoming Moroccan-European


This part focuses on the experiences and contributions of Moroccan migrants
as they interact with broader Europeans societies. The problem of integration
and non-integration among Moroccans in Europe is addressed in chapter 7. It
shows that the migrants’ demography, age, gender, level of education, occupa-
tion, legal status, and duration of residence determine their degree of integra-
tion and their socioeconomic status in the host country. The chapter discusses
14   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

the public debates and policies about minorities and multiculturalism, which
are often regarded with confusion and are subject to misinterpretation.
Identity and citizenship issues are debated in chapter 8, which focuses
on Moroccan migrants as cultural intermediaries between their country of
origin and the host country, and reflects on the identity crisis and citizenship
policies that have recently marked these migrants. It proposes promoting a
cultural strategy to the issue of migration and an efficient management of
migratory flows based on the framework of close cooperation between coun-
tries on both shores of the Mediterranean.
Migrants’ contributions to social change and to development in the host
and home country are discussed in chapter 9. It argues that Moroccans par-
ticipate actively in social change, public life, and development in both Europe
and Morocco. Their immense and varied contribution to economic progress,
growth, and intercultural dialogue is a good argument for the extension of
citizenship and respect of their rights.
Chapter 10 highlights success stories among the Moroccan community
in Europe. It focuses on prominent writers and artists, and underscores the
vigorous participation and successes of Moroccans at the political and insti-
tutional levels in Europe, with the hope to stimulate the debate and inspire
those responsible for migration policies and integration, as well as grassroots
organizations and institutions in Europe and North Africa, and members of
the Muslim community at large.
PART I

Moroccan Migration Flows: Past and Present

T
his part sets the scene and contextualizes the topic of Moroccan
migration then and now, the kinds of migration, and the push/pull
factors, facilitators, and constraints. It includes two chapters that dis-
cuss the history and present-day situation of Muslim Moroccan migrants in
Europe. It discusses the origins and causes of this kind of international migra-
tion, as well as its current characteristics and challenges.
Espousing a postcolonial historical approach, chapter 1 reviews the vari-
ous causes of legal and illegal migration from North Africa to Europe, and
discusses the different experiences of migration waves to France, Spain, Italy,
Belgium, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Chapter 2, which assesses the current situation of immigrants and their
descendents, reveals that diversity is what characterizes Moroccan migrants
in Europe, and that they form a heterogeneous ethnic group living very
diverse experiences that are shaped by factors like their level of education,
duration of residence in the host country, socioeconomic background, and
age and gender. The chapter shows that Moroccan Muslim migrants have
suffered a setback since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, chiefly with the increase of
Islamophobia.
Chapter 1

Moroccan Migration History: Origins


and Causes

T
he history of Moroccan migration to Europe is one of unexpected
developments and unplanned effects. This is true of colonial migra-
tion, labor migration, and most lately, undocumented migration.
Adopting a postcolonial historical approach, this chapter reviews the various
features of Moroccan migration to Europe and tentatively draws a few paral-
lels from these experiences by covering, in particular, the cases of migration
to France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and the United
Kingdom.
Many researchers have wrongly argued that European countries intention-
ally called for colonial migrants in order to meet the demands of the postwar
economic growth. The reality is that these countries recruited the guest work-
ers from ex-colonies only after failing to secure white workers from the rest
of Europe (Hansen 2003). The late 1950s and 1960s were characterized by a
great demand for North African workers in Western Europe.
North African workers migrated because they were needed for the recon-
struction of Europe and the expansion of its economy. The migration of thou-
sands of Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians has been initiated by European
countries, namely France, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, accord-
ing to bilateral agreements signed after the North African countries gained
independence.
Initially, European trade unions were extremely mistrustful of labor
migration, as they worried that it would lead to the lowering of native work-
ers’ wages. But eventually, European governments promised the guest work-
ers the same benefits as the natives, and guest workers were later incorporated
into the unions. It was assumed that the immigrant workers would return
to their home countries once they were no longer needed. However, most of
them ended up settling in Europe and subsequently brought their families
18   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

to join them. According to El Manar Laalami (2000), at the beginning of


2000 about 1.2 million Moroccans had legal residence in one of the 15 coun-
tries of the European Union, and between 1990 and 1999 almost 300,000
Moroccans obtained European citizenship (see chapter 8).
At first, the laws and policies on migration were about the regulation and
management of these migrant flows; but lately these policies have become
more focused on issues of integration and migrants’ rights. This new ten-
dency can be explained by the intensification of migration and by the grow-
ing xenophobia toward Muslim immigrants. The conditions and rights of
these migrants have attracted little attention from researchers and experts.
Thus, undertaking research in this area and understanding the history of
Moroccan migration in Europe is of paramount importance both regionally
and transnationally.

Origins of North African Migration


The migration of North Africans to Europe started during the colonial
period with the French occupation of Algeria in 1830 and escalated in 1912,
when the French-Spanish colonization of Morocco was formally established.
In World War II, the need for a workforce again led to the recruitment of
Moroccan men by the French army.
Thus initially, North African migration was involuntary, because many
young men were forced to join the French army; later on, migration var-
ied according to the needs of the host country. Algeria experienced migra-
tion first, starting at the end of the nineteenth century. With the outbreak
of World War I, more than a million North Africans, most of whom were
Algerian, were recruited by the French army.

Migration to France
The first Moroccans who migrated to France were from the Souss region in
the south of Morocco, and had been recruited by the factories of Nantes in
1909. By 1966, Moroccan migrants from the south constituted 50 percent
of the overall migrant population in France (Daoud 2011: 39). During colo-
nization, a significant number of Moroccans moved to France. From 1914
to 1918, there were more than 35,500 Moroccans working in agriculture
and mining in France, replacing French men sent to the front, and about
40,000 Moroccan men were recruited by the French army (Khachani 2004:
15; Daoud 2003: 38). The Moroccan soldiers were from the Middle Atlas
and the High Atlas. In all, 200,000 North African men fought in the French
army during World War I.
Moroccan Migration History: Origins and Causes   ●    19

Thousands of North African migrants participated in World War II on


the side of France. According to de Haas (2005), approximately 126,000
Moroccan men fought in the French army during that war and in the ensu-
ing Indochinese and Korean wars, and many spread out over the three wars.1
After the war ended in 1945, many of these migrants took part in the
reconstruction of France. At that time, there were about 250,000 North
African migrants in France—220,000 Algerians, 25,000 Moroccans, and
5,000 Tunisians (Guennouni 2004: 25).
After independence (1956 for Morocco and Tunisia, 1962 for Algeria),
migration increased, and the countries of destination began to vary, as new
destinations, such as Germany and Belgium, were available. The main cause
of this migration flow was the need for manpower for the reconstruction
of Europe after World War II and resulting economic growth after World
War II. However, many immigrants settled permanently in their host country
because the investment and employment environment in their former home
country was extremely difficult.
Emigration was encouraged by successive North African governments,
especially in Morocco and Tunisia, because of its alleviating effect on unem-
ployment, and its positive impact on the balance of payments through
migrants’ remittances. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia signed bilateral
agreements with the major European countries of destination concerning
migrants’ rights and obligations. Subsequently, emigration to France and
Belgium became more organized as offices of recruitment began to sign work
contracts with potential migrants. In 1974, the number of North African
migrants reached nearly 1.5 million (Guennouni 2004: 25).
Beginning in the 1960s, the number of Moroccan migrants progressively
increased from 3,000 per year in 1959 to 17,000 in 1963 to 30,000 in the
mid-1970s, according to the Moroccan Ministry of Employment’s 1986
report. The migrants at this epoch were mainly single men, and their increas-
ing number was accompanied by a diversification in countries of destina-
tion, France having been the chief destination up until then. Morocco signed
agreements of recruitment of guest workers with the then West Germany
(1963), France (1963), Belgium (1964), and the Netherlands (1969).
This diversification sprang from the need for manpower in European
countries during the phase of reconstruction that followed World War II.
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands created immigration offices in big
Moroccan cities like Casablanca, Rabat, Fès, and Marrakesh to recruit
Moroccans chiefly from rural areas.2 Over 300,000 Moroccan workers
left for European countries, particularly France. In 1973, the Moroccan
migrant population in Europe totaled 500,000 (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008:
82–84).
20   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Official recruitment by intermediary companies (called in Morocco at


that time Bureaux de Placement) was significant in the 1960s. According
to Daoud (2003: 15), the selection of workers was done through slavelike
criteria. She cites a recruiter called Félix Mora, who went to the Souss region
in 1960 to engage workers. He selected 1,000 men out of 10,000 candidates
and most of them signed the job contract by pressing their thumb against the
piece of paper without reading it, for they were illiterate. “He looked at their
half-naked bodies, checked their teeth, touched their biceps, before they were
accepted,” recalls M’Barek, one of the selected workers who subsequently
spent most of his life in France, adding that “there was a migration organiza-
tion that used to come to Morocco; they passed in front of the candidates,
looked at those who were in good shape, stout men, in order to recruit them
to work in the industry. Those who were not in good shape were not selected.
The workers who were chosen had to be strong, healthy, and ready to adapt.”
Most immigrant workers joined coal mines, in which the French men refused
to work. They worked under appalling conditions, slept in dormitories with
other North African workers, and cooked their own meals. A few of them
returned to Morocco because they could not stand the conditions; others
struggled and stayed because it was shameful to go home empty-handed, and
their families in Morocco would not appreciate their return.
Most of them could not read their pay checks, were underpaid (they earned
less than minimum wage), and were under-represented in the trade unions,
particularly in the Confédération Générale de Travail (CGT), which initially
ignored North African workers. Later, CGT helped these workers create
their own body to protect their rights, Le Comité de défense des travailleurs
marocains en France, whose headquarters were in the city of Gennevilliers
(Daoud 2003: 38). North African workers, however, did not integrate easily,
as they were keen on preserving their Muslim faith and identity; they lived
together in nostalgia and often in regret, for they felt uprooted, exploited,
and ill-treated by their employers.
According to de Haas (2009), migrants who were informally recruited by
businesses and industries, or through relatives in Europe, were significantly
more numerous than those who had migrated through formal recruitment
in the 1970s.3 Migrants were often assisted by family members or friends
who had already settled in Europe, and who acted as intermediaries between
European employers and the would-be migrants. In the 1970s and 1980s,
most migrants traveled to France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and
elsewhere in Europe without a visa (because there was no visa for Moroccans
at that time) and resided in Europe as undocumented migrants before being
subsequently regularized. The visa was not imposed by most European coun-
tries until 1990. Thousands of North African migrants managed to obtain
Moroccan Migration History: Origins and Causes   ●    21

the status of permanent resident through a number of documenting processes


in the Netherlands (1975), Belgium (1975), and France (1981–1982).4
North African Jews have also experienced international migration. Their
relatives and connections abroad helped them to migrate and to reside in
France (Paris, Marseilles), the United Kingdom (Manchester), and North
America (Montreal, New York). After the creation of Israel, most Jews left
North Africa. Out of 250,000 Moroccan Jews, only 5,000 stayed in Morocco.
Approximately 700,000 Jews of Moroccan descent live in Israel today.5

Other Countries of Destination


The main destination for most former and current Moroccan migrants is
Europe. Only 4 percent left for a non-EU country. As we have seen above,
France is the number one destination for Moroccans (35 percent), followed
by Italy (22 percent), and Spain (17 percent) (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008,
ch. 6). The preferred country of destination is strongly related to the region
of origin. The vast majority of Moroccan migrants from Larache prefer to
emigrate to Spain or the United Kingdom (UK), while Italy is preferred by
migrants from small towns like Mrirt, Fkih Ben Salah, Beni-Mellal, or Tiznit.
In Khenifra, both France and Italy are the preferred countries of destination.
Finally, migrants from the northern provinces of Al-Hoceima and Nador have
shown a variety of preferences by emigrating to Belgium, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, and Spain.
The relevant factors in choosing a country of destination by Moroccans are:
job opportunities, previous colonial links, common language, well-established
networks (family and friends), and geographical proximity, which means that
the country of destination is chosen depending on whether it offers good
employment possibilities and on whether the migrant has relatives in it.

Migration to Spain
Along with France, Spain is one of the preferred countries of destina-
tion by Moroccan migrants. Migration to Spain goes back to the colonial
period, which started in 1912. Even though about 40,000 Moroccans from
the northern area of Rif fought in the ranks of General Franco during the
Spanish civil war (1936–1939), it turned out that migration to Spain was
extremely slight. Spain was economically poor, as it was isolated from the rest
of Europe under the Franco regime, and until the 1970s was itself a sending
country, as many Spanish workers migrated to France and Germany for bet-
ter economic opportunities (de Haas 2009).6 The number of Moroccans in
Spain was below 10,000 in 1975.7
22   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

During the late 1970s, the Spanish economy grew considerably, and this
attracted many Moroccan workers. It wasn’t until the mid-1980s that Spain
began to receive larger numbers of Moroccan migrants. Up until 1991,
Moroccans did not need a special visa to enter Spain. However, there was a
growing issue with undocumented migrants from Morocco, and a boat full
of illegal immigrants was intercepted in 1989. As a consequence, the visa
requirement was imposed in 1991 to comply with the Schengen Agreement
of 1985.8 That year, there were probably 200,000 undocumented immi-
grants in Spain, most of whom were from Morocco. In the early 1990s, Spain
organized an amnesty plan whereby around 130,000 undocumented immi-
grants were legalized and given work permits. There have been other periods
of general amnesty for illegal migrants, allowing them to reside and work
legally in Spain.9
In 2005, the number of Moroccan migrants in Spain reached 400,000.
In 2008, this number jumped to 671,669 according to the survey by the
Institut National des Statistiques et de l’Economie, but today it is impossible
to know the exact number of Moroccans in Spain due to the large number of
undocumented immigrants.10

Migration to Belgium
Belgium, like its European neighbors, has received pre- and post-war
Moroccan labor migrants (or so-called guest workers) and their families,
whose children are forming an emerging second generation. The history of
Moroccan migration to Belgium goes back to the period after World War II,
when Belgium needed North Africans to work in its coal and heavy-metal
mines to expand the country’s economy. Moroccan migration to Belgium saw
its peak in the 1960s, when the country extended the scope of labor recruit-
ment to non-European countries.
Most Moroccans initially came to Belgium as laborers. Many stayed and
subsequently brought their families over to reside with them. The commu-
nity increased in number over the years, especially through family reunification
and new family formation, as many Moroccan-Belgians marry from Morocco,
thus creating a continuous flow of immigration and increasing the number of
Moroccan migrants in the country. The pre-war immigration to Belgium had
been almost exclusively white, as most immigrants were Catholic and European,
and mainly from Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece. In contrast, the post-war
immigration was much more diverse, seeing a great number of non-Europeans
and non-Christians from North Africa and Turkey (Lesthaeghe 2000).
Additionally, the employment of immigrants diversified, as workers were
contracted into different industries and were hired for building, service and
Moroccan Migration History: Origins and Causes   ●    23

manual jobs (Martens and Moulaert 1985). The economic crisis of the 1970s
into the late 1980s led to the closing of the mining industries, a rise in immi-
grant unemployment, and the end of migrant worker recruitment. The crisis
in Belgium was more unexpected and overwhelming than it was in France
or Germany (Lesthaeghe 2000). Since then, family reunification and forma-
tion became the major source of long-term immigration and replenishment
of North African immigrant communities in Belgium. In 1974, Belgium
imposed strict conditions on the entry of foreign labor, but remained one of
the most liberal countries in Europe concerning family reunion policy.
Today, the Moroccan migrant population can be classified into three
major waves (Lesthaeghe 2000): the first wave of guest workers arrived in
the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s; the second wave were family members
who joined the first generation in the late 1970s and in the 1980s; the sec-
ond generation were their children who were born or grew up in Belgium;
and the third wave were mostly partners of the second generation who con-
tinued to migrate to Belgium through “cross-border” marriages (Phalet and
Swyngedouw 2003).11
The 1991 census counted 153,000 Moroccans in Belgium (Phalet and
Swyngedouw 2003).12 With the shortage of employment, integration of
Moroccan immigrants became difficult, adding to the negative and xeno-
phobic feelings of the Belgian people toward Muslim migrants. However, the
topic of migrants’ rights and reform of migration policies became part of the
national debate in the 1990s (Foblets and Pang 1999).
With the rise to power of the extreme Right in Flanders in 1991, after an
electoral campaign that effectively exploited anti-immigrant attitudes, and in
direct reaction to the urban riots staged by immigrant youth in Brussels, the
Belgian government agreed to the necessity of reforms and national integra-
tion policies (Phalet aand Swyngedouw 2003).
However, the Belgian government and parliament approved a different
type of integration policy than the Germans or the British. Whereas the latter
opted for multiculturalism and respect of diversity, in Belgium, integration
meant protection from discrimination; social integration; and adaptation of
migrants to the Belgian culture and way of life, but permitting them to prac-
tice rituals and celebrate cultural events in the family and community circles
only (Lucassen 2005: Part I).
Unfortunately, the complex structure of Belgium as a bi-national state
made the enacting and implementation of integration laws ineffective because
of the political tensions and attitudes at the local, regional, national, and
European levels (Foblets and Pang 1999). The consecutive legislative reforms
made since the 1980s have remarkably led to more integration of Moroccan
Muslim migrants, as it became less difficult to obtain Belgian citizenship by
24   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

significant numbers of immigrants (Daoud 2011). However, non-EU immi-


grants did not have local voting rights, for the different political parties could
not agree on the issue.
Nonetheless, the number of elected council members of non-EU origin
has increased. As a result, the political representation of ethnic minorities in
the area of Brussels is now on a par with the national minority (Foblets and
Pang 1999). Moroccans in Belgium are in both a current and post-­migration
situation; they experience social change as new migrants arrive, most of
whom are undocumented. It would be interesting to understand the views
and expectations of this new group of migrants in relation to immigration
policies and rules (Bousetta 2008).
Surveys from 2003 showed a heavy concentration of Moroccans (125,000)
and Turks (70,000) with smaller numbers of Algerians (8,500), and Tunisians
(4,000). According to Daoud (2011: 19), 50 percent of Muslim immigrants
acquired Belgian nationality between 1985 and 1997. Between 2003 and
2007, estimates show that these figures have significantly increased. Accord­
ing to a study done by the Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition
to Racism, on January 1, 2005, there were 242,802 Moroccans living in
Belgium.13

Migration to Italy
Migration to Italy is a relatively recent phenomenon. Since the 1970s, and
particularly since the 1980s, Italy has been transformed from a country of
emigrants into an immigration destination. The first wave of Moroccan immi-
grants arrived in Italy in these periods as a result of the restrictive measures
adopted by the countries of Northern Europe, namely France and Germany,
especially after the oil crisis in 1973. They came to fill a need in the service
sector and in agriculture.
Most of the Moroccan migrants came from the cities of Khouribga, Fkih
Ben Saleh and Beni Mellal. They worked in agriculture, in services, and as
street vendors of carpets and handicrafts. Then they moved from southern
to northern Italy because of better employment opportunities in the north.
In 2002, 172,834 Moroccans had a residence permit; that is, 11.4 percent
of the total population of migrants in Italy.14 Most of the Moroccan immi-
grant community resides in Milan and Turin. Approximately 60 percent of
them have settled in three Italian regions: Lombardy, Piedmont, and Emilia-
Romagna. As a result of the process of family reunification that began in the
1990s, women make up 40 percent of that population. A large number of
Moroccan migrants have entered Italy illegally. After 2003, those prevented
from entering the EU illegally through Spain—which has reinforced its
Moroccan Migration History: Origins and Causes   ●    25

enclave’s fences—crossed the Mediterranean in small boats to Italy via Algeria


and Libya with the help of traffickers.
In 2005, Italy’s interior minister, Giuseppe Pisanu, told a cabinet meeting
in Rome that one third of all illegal immigrants seeking to enter Italy during
the past two months arrived from Morocco.15 In 2010, the number of North
African migrants arriving by sea was slight because of bilateral agreements with
Libya and Tunisia that cracked down on trafficking in the region. With the
2011 uprisings in the region, Italy’s migration policy was troubled. Since the
beginning of the Arab spring more than 25,000 migrants arrived in Italy by
sea, many of whom landed on the tiny island of Lampedusa. The majority were
Tunisians fleeing the economic problems that helped trigger the uprisings. The
interim governments in Tunisia and Libya, which were facing a massive refugee
problem on the Libyan border, could not give priority to helping Italy.16
Most Moroccan immigrants reside in central northern Italy, where there
are more job opportunities. Large cities, especially Rome (more than 100,000
immigrants) and Milan (more than 50,000 immigrants), host large numbers
of Moroccan and Tunisian communities. Unfortunately, with the current
economic crisis, immigrants suffer from unemployment and poor housing
conditions.

Migration to the Netherlands


The flow of the Moroccan immigrants to the Netherlands began in the early
1960s. Recruitment agreements were signed by Morocco and the Dutch
authorities in the 1960s (Heering et al. 2002) so that Moroccans could
live and work in the Netherlands. This allowed thousands of Moroccans to
enter the Netherlands legally and obtain work permits (Bilgili and Weyel
2009).17 Like other European countries, the Netherlands discontinued the
recruitments in the mid-1970s because of the oil crisis. But that did not stop
Moroccan immigrants from flowing into the country, so immigration contin-
ued as chain migration, because of family reunification and, later on, family
formation, both of which have been increasing since the 1980s.
Most Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands came from the north of
Morocco, the Rif, which is a Berberophone mountainous region, and most
of them were unskilled and did not speak Dutch. The Moroccan community
continued to increase as a result of family reunification and chain migration
throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. They were the fifth-largest migrant
community (330,000) in the Netherlands in 2007—about 2 percent of the
total Dutch population of 16.4 million, according to the Dutch Central
Bureau of Statistics—because of the soaring birth rate among the Moroccans
(Bilgili and Weyel 2009).
26   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Today, approximately 47 percent of the Moroccan immigrants in the


Netherlands reside in the four main big Dutch cities: The Hague, Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, and Utrecht (Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics). They make up
20 percent of the non-European immigrant population in the Netherlands,
and more than half of Dutch-Moroccans are second-generation (Bilgili and
Weyel 2009).

Migration to Germany
After World War II, Germany’s economy grew to the extent that the country
called for North African labor migration. The first Moroccan migrants left for
Germany in the 1950s and the second wave (18,000, from the Rif region in
northern Morocco) in 1962 after Morocco signed a contract with Germany
about labor migration. Most of them worked in coal mines, but because of
the global economic crisis in 1973, Germany canceled this contract.
The cause of this migration was essentially economic, yet there was also
a tradition of migration in the Rif region. In the early 1980s, many men
from the region of Nador and Al Hoceima, migrated to Germany to work
in construction, textiles, services, and the car industry. Some of them found
jobs through connections and family members who were already working in
Germany. In many cases, they did the work that no German national wanted.
Migration to Germany was initially circular, as 84 percent of male migrants
were married but only 5 percent took their wives and children with them
(Bossard 1979). When recruitment stopped in 1973, ending temporary migra-
tion, many Moroccans stayed in Germany and arranged for their spouses and
children to join them. This gave rise to a new group of immigrants and to the
expansion of the Moroccan community in Germany over a short period of time.
Moroccan men often brought their wives and younger children to Germany
first, followed by children of school or college age once it became obvious
that they were going to reside permanently in Germany. Family reunification
increased because of new child-benefit and tax laws, which specified that only
children living in Germany qualified for these benefits (Hansen 2003).
Family reunification was followed by a new type of migration created
by Moroccans resident in Germany marrying their partners who lived in
Morocco. This tendency was motivated by the will to evade immigration
restrictions (Berriane and Mohamed 2008).
Since the end of the 1980s, a growing number of Moroccan students have
traveled to Germany to study. Moroccans today are practically the largest
group of African students in Germany. According to the German Federal
Statistical Office, 8,213 Moroccan nationals were enrolled as students in
the 2005–2006 academic year, most of whom were graduate students of
Moroccan Migration History: Origins and Causes   ●    27

engineering, mathematics, or economics. Moroccan students choose German


universities because they enjoy high standards, have a great reputation in
many disciplines (including science, technology, and computing) and most
of them charge very low or no tuition fees.
In contrast, a slight number of Moroccan asylum-seekers obtained asy-
lum. Between 1984 and 2006, only 55 candidates were granted asylum
(see the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)). In
comparison to other countries, rather few Moroccans migrated to Germany
between the 1960s and the 1970s. After Morocco signed recruitment agree-
ments with Germany, at the beginning of the 1980s, approximately 22,400
Moroccans were residing in Germany (Hansen 2003). At the end of 2005,
71,639 Moroccans were recorded in the German central immigration registry
(Berriane and Mohamed 2008).
This number soared to 102,000 in 2012, according to the Moroccan con-
sulates. Unlike German statistics, Moroccan figures also comprise Moroccan
immigrants who hold a German passport. This explains the divergence between
Moroccan and German statistics. According to estimates by the German
Federal Statistical Office in 2012, 19 percent of Moroccans living in Germany
were actually born there, and Moroccans were one of the migrant communi-
ties that applied most for German citizenship, which shows that most of them
are relatively integrated and have settled down in the host country.

Migration to the United Kingdom


Motivated by imperial guilt and optimism for the future of the Commonwealth,
in the 1950s the UK was largely in favor of colonial migration. It preferred
to bring guest workers from its ex-colonies like Pakistan, India, and Nigeria.
In the 1940s, Moroccans, mainly Sephardic Jews, were among the pioneers in
Manchester City. The first significant wave of Moroccan Muslim immigrants
arrived in the UK in the 1960s, largely from the northwest of the country, namely
the cities of Tangier, Tetuan, and Larache. These cities had strong historical links
with Great Britain going back to the nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth century, when Tangier had the status of an international city. In
the 1970s, through social networks and family reunion, many more Moroccans
(some from Gibraltar) joined their friends and relatives in the UK, as they were
recruited to work in the hotel and catering industries (Cherti 2008; Jamai 2012).
The third wave of migrants was made up of young semi-skilled professionals
and entrepreneurs, who came in the 1980s, mostly from Casablanca, Rabat,
Meknès, Fès, Oujda, and Marrakesh. The fourth wave arrived in the 1990s with
the immigration of greatly competent Moroccan professionals, many of whom
found work in “the city,” the financial market in London (Cherti 2009).18
28   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

The principal destination for Moroccans in the UK has overwhelmingly


been London, which has 69 percent of the total Moroccan-born population.
Outside London, there are important communities in Crawley, St Albans,
Slough (still in relative proximity to London), but also in Trowbridge (in
southeast England) and Edinburgh (in Scotland) (Cherti 2008). The most
significant area of settlement in London is North Kensington, chiefly the
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, with Golborne Road (in the
vicinity of Ladbroke Grove) known as the “Little Morocco.” There are also
some smaller communities in the boroughs of Westminster, Hammersmith,
Lambeth, Barnet and Croydon (Communities 2009: 29). Those living in
Crawley came originally from Meknes and neighboring villages; those in
Slough essentially originated from Fès, Casablanca and Marrakesh; and
Moroccans in Trowbridge came from Oujda (Communities 2009: 28).
Moroccan communities have grown significantly because of high birth rates,
as well as sponsored migration of dependents. However, for linguistic reasons,
the UK is not regarded as a traditional destination for Moroccan immigrants.
The 2001 Census listed 12,348 Moroccan-born people residing in the UK.
A recent report by the Change Institute suggested that between 65,000 and
70,000 people of Moroccan origin reside in the UK (Communities 2009).
Although the Moroccan community in the UK has a long history along
with its rich narratives and experiences, “it remains one of the most ‘invis-
ible’ and least researched in Western Europe,” according to Cherti (ibid.).
Migration issues were generally overlooked or heavily politicized from the mid-
1960s till the late 1970s. Throughout these years immigration crises constantly
erupted, after which the far-right parties in Britain led by the National Front,
which opposes non-white immigration, won a few local elections. Immigration
was only taken away from national politics from 1979 until the 1990s, when
asylum-seekers and their families brought it back with a vengeance.

From Family Reunification to Family Formation


In France and Germany, immigration issues became politicized only when it
became obvious to both countries, especially Germany, that migrants were
going to stay permanently. In France, the issues were first local—focused
on Moroccans’ appalling housing conditions and mayors’ opposition to
immigration—but later they became national due to the growing popularity
of the racist party National Front, which in 1988 won 15 percent of votes,
and its indefatigable leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, scored 17 percent in the 2002
presidential elections (Khachani 2004: 129).
As mentioned above, in the mid-1970s Europe decided to limit migra-
tion because of economic recession brought on by the oil crisis that in turn
Moroccan Migration History: Origins and Causes   ●    29

engendered unemployment. Family reunification became the only way out


for those North Africans interested in migration. Restrictions on migration
gave birth to illegal migration, temporary migration, and migration toward
North American and Gulf Countries.
Thus, migration within the framework of family reunification supplanted
individual migration. It was authorized because it was believed that family
facilitated the integration of the migrant in the socioeconomic environment
of the host country. This form of migration resulted in the reduction of money
transfers to Morocco and the stabilization of many families in the receiv-
ing countries, notably France, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. For
the case of France alone, 336,325 Moroccans joined their migrant relatives
between 1963 and 2000 (Office des Migrations Internationales-Statistiques
(OMISTATS) 2000).19 Gradually, family reunification led to the feminiza-
tion of the migrant population and to the increase of women and youth
migration, as wives and children joined the male migrant workers in Europe
(Freedman and Tarr 2000: 24; Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008).
However, in 1980 women started to migrate alone. This was especially the
case among divorced women and widows, but also among married women
with or without children, all in search of work that could improve their
standard of living. Their new destinations were France, Italy, and Spain. In
France, for instance, the number of female immigrant workers doubled and
the educational level of Moroccan immigrants improved, while the percent-
age of illiterate ones diminished drastically. Nonetheless, neither previous
research nor media acknowledge these women’s significant socioeconomic
contributions to the host country and country of origin (see chapter 5).
Though family reunification was drawing to an end in the late 1980s, fam-
ily formation gained momentum in the 1990s as a major new form of migra-
tion from Morocco. Many Moroccans chose to marry a partner in Europe
to facilitate legal entry into a European country and integrate into the work
force. A large number of the second-generation Moroccan descendants also
married partners from their country of origin. They often had a higher birth
rate than the host country population. The consequence for every nation in
Europe was the emergence of multicultural and multilingual societies.
Another change was the increase in the number of qualified workers and
professionals among these new migrants; many of them were university gradu-
ates who could not find proper jobs in Morocco. Migration slowly moved from
provisional to permanent, which pushed many European countries to adopt
policies of integration. Another result was the spread of the culture of migration
in North Africa, as migration interested not only rural but also urban youth,
and spread to middle-class and professional circles. Likewise, many Moroccan
students refused to return to their home countries after graduation in Europe.20
30   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

As a result of restrictions on migration since the 1980s, temporary (or


circular, seasonal) migration has developed to satisfy demand in the fields
of agriculture, construction, and services. In 2000, Morocco occupied the
third position for the provision of temporary workers in France. They totaled
229,712 in all (OMISTATS 2000), which supports that Morocco has become
one of the principal providers of these seasonal migrants. Other European
countries count on this form of migration because it provides cheap, unskilled
labor. For example, Spain signed a bilateral agreement with Morocco about
temporary workers on September 30, 1999 (Khachani 2004: 21).21

Causes of Migration
There are various reasons for migration. According to Lahlou (2005), poverty
and unemployment are the main causes. When the economic levels of Spain
and Morocco were the same in the 1960s, Moroccans did not immigrate
to Spain. “But now the economic difference between Spain and Morocco is
20 to 1” (Lahlou 2005).22
“Morocco’s gross national product per inhabitant is just $3,600—hardly
a sixth of Spain’s. The unemployment rate, which is around 20 percent in
urban zones, is double that of its northern neighbor,” according to Lahlou
(ibid.). There are also huge discrepancies in healthcare and social opportuni-
ties. Nearly half of the Moroccans are illiterate, whereas 97 percent of Spanish
people are literate.23
Poverty, unemployment, the huge social gap between the rich and the
poor, and the discrepancy between the incomes in Morocco and in the coun-
tries of destination are all among the push factors. Abderrahman (39, taxi
driver in Montpellier) explains: “I migrated to France because I had a dream
to live in Europe and improve my situation.”
In 2004, the overall unemployment rate reached 13 percent in Morocco
and was higher among youth and graduates (30 percent), a situation that wors-
ened with the world financial crisis (Guennouni 2004: 28). One of the conse-
quences of this crisis was the considerable increase in migration flows toward
Europe, North America, and the Persian Gulf countries (Ennaji 2010b).
Other causes of migration are historical and geographical. The fact that
many migrants choose France and Spain as their destination can be accounted
for by the historical links with both countries, which had colonized Morocco
for decades. Many Moroccan immigrants choose France and Spain for lin-
guistic and cultural reasons, as they feel less culture shock and less uprooted
in France, Belgium, and Spain than in any other Western country. The prox-
imity of Europe is of paramount importance, given the fact that Morocco is
only 7 miles away from the European continent. Morocco is the gate to both
Moroccan Migration History: Origins and Causes   ●    31

Europe and Africa, and it has long been at the crossroads of many cultures
and civilizations (Ennaji 2005, ch. 1).
There are also psychological and cultural reasons behind migration. Many
young people are keen on migration because of the influence of migrants
returning to Morocco each summer vacation in beautiful cars, boasting their
success and social promotion in Europe. The national media also influence
the youth as they present migrants as successful individuals who live com-
fortably in the host countries. For example, Moroccan television programs
like Noujoum Al Hijra (Migration Stars) and Les Marocains du Monde, inter-
view Moroccan migrants who have “made it” abroad. Such programs directly
encourage Moroccans to think about migration as an alternative (Ennaji
2012a). Because they feel threatened, the ruling elite in Morocco encourage
young unemployed people to migrate in order to make a living; otherwise,
they will constitute a political and security threat to the regime (El Baroudi
1989: 86).
As mentioned above, many Moroccans migrate to join their partner
abroad or to study. Another motivation for migrating is the existence of
networks and traffickers in the country of destination, which make a for-
tune from migrant trafficking (Khachani 2004: 29). Many interviewed
migrants also claimed that they had migrated to have dignity, a decent life,
and a better future.24 Abdelwahab (a 42-year-old Moroccan immigrant liv-
ing in Belgium) said that his emigration twelve years ago was due to feeling
exploited and underpaid by the owner of the company he worked for in
Morocco:

I was a manager at a textile company, and I had a huge responsibility, but


I was paid only 2500 Moroccan dirhams per month (that is about $230)25,
while the owner of the company was making a fortune; most employees had
the lowest salaries, with no health coverage or insurance; then began the idea
of emigration.

Another push factor is “injustice and absence of prevailing democracy,”


according to Rachid, a 41-year-old resident of Norway. For Mohamed, a 32-year-
old resident of France, people migrate mainly for dignity and for a decent life:

I was not satisfied with the backward way of life in Moroccan society, in addi-
tion to the lack of freedom and of democracy. I am impressed with rational
thinking and civilized behavior in the West.

When asked if they regret their decision to migrate, most of the respon-
dents answered that they had no regrets. “Definitely, if I had to go back,
32   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

I would do it again; anyway, it’s destiny, God’s will,” said Younes, a 55-year-
old immigrant in Italy. While Abderrazak (39, resident in the Netherlands)
answered:

Without hesitation I can say that the decision to migrate was right, given the
circumstances in which I lived; the poverty and the exploitation were unbeliev-
able . . . the thing that I regret is that I had not migrated earlier; my friends
who have university degrees in Morocco tell me I was lucky because things in
Morocco are deteriorating.

The majority of interviewees argued that in Europe they enjoyed many


benefits like social security, unemployment benefits, healthcare, and other
amenities. Many of them said they had relatively well-paid jobs and that their
children had access to education, employment, and insurance.
Mohamed (33, a resident of Nancy, France) said that he left Morocco
because there were no prospects for the future. Rachid (26, street vendor)
summarizes his situation in Amsterdam as follows: “Here in Holland, though
I am an illegal, I have the right medication and buy medicine for free; these
are things we lack in our motherland.”
However, the search for a better future is not the only factor pushing a
number of Moroccans towards immigration, including Kamal, a 29-year-old
migrant in Spain, who said:

Even if I had had good financial conditions, I would have had migrated any-
way because I always wanted to live in a democratic state, and in a free society,
with civilized people.

Ahmed (49, mechanical engineer in France) stated:

Here in France everything is well-organized; administration is free of flaws like


bribery, and you are treated with respect . . . there is no difference between the
rich and the poor.

“In Morocco,” says Karima (28, nurse in Spain), “women are not respected
and more reforms are necessary.” Yassine (34, worker in Italy) responds that
“the Moroccan government must have the courage to confront the real prob-
lems and to create jobs for the youth.”
Thus, each Moroccan migrant has a story to tell. One of the results of this
study is undoubtedly the multiplicity of aspects and characteristics of the
Moroccan migrant community. The sociodemographic data collected reveal
Moroccan Migration History: Origins and Causes   ●    33

that the reasons behind migration are basically economic, but also social (in
relation to family reunification), geographic, political, cultural, and histori-
cal. As we shall see in chapter 5, thanks to migration, family structure and
identity have, on the whole, undergone significant changes toward greater
diversity (Saaf et al. 2009).

Conclusion
Historically, international migration in North Africa started with the recruit-
ment of Moroccan soldiers to partake in World Wars I and II (Daoud 2003).
This first migration wave was the outcome of a specific geopolitical and eco-
nomic context, as Morocco was under French occupation. Including soldiers,
most migrants of this era originated from southern Morocco and targeted
France to take up jobs that Frenchmen either left to serve in the army or
were reluctant to take. After World War II, most migrants (mainly soldiers)
returned to Morocco, as Europe’s economy during this period was in a deep
recession (Chattou 1998).
By the mid-1950s, European countries were experiencing economic
growth and had a high level of demand for labor that could no longer be
satisfied domestically or by guest-worker migration from Eastern Europe.
Most European countries had turned first to southern Europe, namely
Portugal, Spain, and Italy, thinking that this type of migrant could adapt
to the Western European society more easily than the Muslim Moroccans
(Hansen 2003).
A huge wave of migrants from both southern and northern Morocco tar-
geted Western Europe in the mid-1960s. Most of these young migrants came
from the Rif rural areas and spoke Berber as their mother tongue. Many left
Morocco illegally, but the host countries were tolerant because they needed
manpower, and jobs were available. Afterward, migration changed from tem-
porary to permanent and involved young people from both urban and rural
zones. As most of these migrants were single, family reunification and forma-
tion consequently attracted more migrants.
By the early 1970s however, vast numbers of Moroccan migrants arrived
in France and Germany despite the slowing economy. In the lack of assurance
that guest workers could easily return to France or Germany when they wanted
to, most migrant workers decided to remain in the host country. With the
support of churches, non-government organizations (NGOs), and sympathetic
academic activists, they secured a number of legal judgments guaranteeing
their right to remain. After 1973, all European countries drastically reduced
labor migration or simply stopped it altogether. By then, however, thousands
34   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

of colonial migrants had been naturalized as European citizens, and as a con-


sequence had the right to family reunification. Some governments decided to
curb family reunification, while others fostered repatriation, but it was to no
avail.
The 1980s witnessed a spectacular rise in the number of migrants to
various destinations. In addition to France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Germany, migrants traveled to Spain, Italy, and the UK. This emigration
movement grew in intensity because it suited the home country’s national
strategies of benefiting from migrants’ remittances capable of potentially
reducing the economic deficit and resolving the problem of high unemploy-
ment (see chapter 9).
Thus, Moroccan migrants in Europe have a relatively long history; they
have accumulated various experiences of discrimination, assimilation, accul-
turation, and identity transformation or fluidity in the midst of a foreign
culture. They hold on to their Moroccan identity (mainly religion and lan-
guage), but embrace positive aspects of the Western culture (democratic val-
ues and respect of diversity). Some of them are more integrated and more
thriving than others; a few have managed to obtain European citizenship and
reached top decision-making positions or have become successful in their
own careers, as we shall develop in chapters 8, 9, and 10.
Chapter 2

How Moroccans Live in Europe

A
s we saw in chapter 1, Moroccan migrants in Europe are not a homo-
geneous group. Their living conditions vary according to status, age,
gender, level of education, and occupation. Their situation is ren-
dered more complex by factors like duration of residence in the host country,
their socioeconomic situation, and their immigration background.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Moroccans have migrated primarily
for economic reasons, and the majority, but not all, are practicing Muslims
(Kepel 1987; Daoud 2011: 122). Despite their naturalization as Europeans,
even second and third generations are still considered immigrants threatening
security and social cohesion (Begag 2011). Many are either unemployed or
obliged to do manual work to survive because they are considered unedu-
cated or under-qualified. As a result, many of them have experienced social
and economic deprivation.
This chapter explores the living and working conditions of Muslim
Moroccan migrants in Europe, their aspirations, challenges, and concerns. It
investigates their demographic characteristics, situation in Francophone and
non-Francophone host countries, resilience in the face of discrimination and
economic hardship, and positive attitude to their migration projects.

Demography
According to the 2013 survey by the Ministry in Charge of the Moroccans
Living Abroad, about 3.7 million Moroccans live abroad (roughly 10 percent
of the country’s population), with 1.1 million in France alone. Women make
up 48 percent of the Moroccan migrant community, and 70 percent of the
community is less than 45 years old, while 29 percent of them were born in
the host country.1
36   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Although they are scattered all over the world, it is in the European Union
that most Moroccan migrants live (84.4 percent), the majority of whom
are based in France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany.
Moroccan migration has evolved over the years; today’s migrants are mostly
young, and more and more women migrate on their own or as a result of
family reunification (Chekir et al. 2004: 244).
According to the landmark study Immigrants and descendants of immigrants
in France, undertaken by the French newspaper Le Figaro and published on
October 10, 2012, nearly 654,000 immigrants born in Morocco had settled
in France in 2008, representing 12 percent of the entire immigrant population
(5.3 million immigrants in all). This represents 8 percent of the total population
of France. France hosts the largest community of Moroccans, which is today the
second-largest community of immigrants, after the Algerians (36 percent). Their
number has nearly tripled since 1975, when Moroccan immigration accounted
for 6 percent of the immigrant population.2 The study also reveals that the direct
descendants of Moroccan immigrants, those born in and residing in France with
at least one immigrant parent, outnumber immigrants. They total 660,000,
nearly 10 percent of the population of descendants of immigrants (6.7 million);
this last category represents 11 percent of the population of France.3
Spain is home to Europe’s second-largest Moroccan community. Spain and
Italy, which have become destination countries for Moroccans in recent years,
host a large population of Moroccans (Spain 547,000, Italy 379,000). As a
consequence of the earlier labor migration agreements, a considerable number
of Moroccans also reside in the Netherlands (278,000), Belgium (285,000),
and Germany (130,000). A little more than 26,000 of them live in the United
Kingdom (figures of the Moroccan Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living
Abroad). Exactly how many Moroccans live in Europe is difficult to pinpoint
given the important number of undocumented migrants.4
There are variations in the figures provided by the Eurostat, and the numbers
given by the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad. According to
the statistics provided by the latter, in 2012 there were 2,185,894 Moroccans
in Europe.5 Moroccan migrants occupy the second position after the Turks
in Europe, and they are the largest North African community in Europe.6
Moroccans represent the largest Muslim community in the Netherlands.7 In
Belgium, they represented 12.4 percent of the foreign population in 2012, in
Italy 11.5 percent, and 14 percent in Spain.8
Large-scale family reunification has led to permanent migration, and an
increasing number of Moroccan immigrants in Europe. Between 1973 and
1993, the registered immigrant population with Moroccan citizenship in the
Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Germany multiplied from 400,000 to
around 1 million (de Haas 2007b).
How Moroccans Live in Europe   ●    37

As far as work is concerned, most Moroccan immigrants are workers


or employees, and only a few are employers or independent businessmen.
Like other North Africans, they face the problem of integration and suffer
from precarious employment and hard working conditions. The reluctance
of many European countries to ratify the Protection Agreement concerning
migrants and their families illustrates their denial of migrants’ rights.
According to the national official statistics of 2002, the average annual
income of an immigrant worker was around 12,200 euros, which is lower
than the average income of a French worker (22,870 euros). Moroccan immi-
grants are among the least paid category, and in the last decade their incomes
have decreased due to the economic global crisis (Musette et al. 2004: 65;
Ennaji 2010b).
For the sake of comparison, in the following sections we will examine
cases studies of the situation of Moroccans in four countries: the Netherlands,
Belgium, Spain, and Italy.

The Case of Moroccan Migrants in the Netherlands


Moroccan migration to the Netherlands is strongly characterized by the
recruitment of unskilled workers. The average annual income for a Moroccan
family totals 21,300 euros, compared to 30,200 euros for Dutch natives. To
compensate for this gap, many Moroccans benefit from financial and social
aid. In 2007, 16 percent of Moroccan women obtained aid, as opposed to
2 percent of Dutch native women (Bilgili and Weyel 2009). Yet the number
of Moroccans who have been receiving this aid has decreased since 2005
(Moroccan Arabic daily Assabah of August 13, 2010). The family allocations
have been cut for those families whose children reside in Morocco, which has
sparked a movement of protests.9
In 2008, the unemployment rate was at a very high level (24 percent), but
with the economic crisis that began in 2009, unemployment has continued
to rise, as shown by official statistics (Bilgili and Weyel 2009). According to
a survery carried out by the Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad
(CCME) in 2009, Dutch-Moroccans were the least happy in Europe because
they felt unwanted more so than their fellow Moroccans in other European
countries. The survey, which was conducted in Belgium, Germany, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, indicated that social relations with the sec-
ond generation of Moroccans in the Netherlands were “significantly more
tense” than elsewhere (De Haas (2009).10
Of those surveyed in the Netherlands, 64 percent felt rejected by soci-
ety, 14 percent more than the European average. The Dutch-Moroccans also
reported that they did not have easy access to social security and employment.
38   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

The report stated that it is “alarming” that the problems seem to persist with
the second generation.11 The research also revealed that, whereas most sec-
ond-generation Moroccan immigrants went to mosques less often than their
parents, the tendency was the opposite in the Netherlands, where half of the
immigrants’ children said they visited the mosque regularly, 4 percent more
than the first generation.
What is worrying is that 40 percent of respondents answered that they had
been jobless for over three years. Unemployment is particularly high among
Moroccans in the Netherlands (38 percent), as well as in Spain (61 percent),
and Italy (41 percent).12 In a report by the Dutch-Moroccan Monitor (2011),
crime was widespread in the districts where Moroccan immigrants lived, and
the youth crime rate attained 50 percent. The report also showed that most of
the Moroccans charged with criminal activities were born in the Netherlands.
The report, which was the result of the survey carried out by the Rotterdam
Institute for Social Policy Research, studied the extent and characteristics of
crime among the Dutch-Moroccan community in 22 municipalities in the
Netherlands. Both reports reveal that the youth of Moroccan descent have
not fully integrated into Dutch society, due to the inadequacy of the Dutch
immigration policies and to the failure of Moroccan parents to instill in their
children the values of hard work, tolerance, dialogue, and good citizenship
(Bilgili and Weyel 2009).
The Dutch journalist Fleur Jurgens in her book The Moroccan Drama
(Het Marokkanendrama) heavily criticizes the Dutch long-standing model
of multiculturalism for failing to provide solutions. She puts the blame on
two groups: the Moroccan migrants, who claim the Dutch are responsible
for their conditions, and leftist intellectuals and multiculturalists, who depict
Moroccan immigrants as the powerless victims of an inequitable state. The
Dutch government has lately claimed that it will discard the old form of mul-
ticulturalism that has encouraged Moroccans and other Muslim immigrants
to erect “a parallel society within the Netherlands.”13
Less than half of the Moroccans I interviewed in the Netherlands, Spain,
France, and Italy said Europeans had unfavorable attitudes toward them.
By contrast, most second-generation interviewees in Germany and Belgium
believed that they were regarded relatively favorably.

The Moroccan Community in Belgium


A report by the Belgian Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition
to Racism, indicated that in 2005, there were 242,802 Moroccans resid-
ing in Belgium, about 20 percent of whom were concentrated in the city
of Brussels. More than 50 percent live in the Brussels metropolitan area or
How Moroccans Live in Europe   ●    39

Brussels Region. Other Moroccans reside in the cities of Antwerp, Liege, and
Charleroi; and in the provinces of Hainaut and Limburg.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Moroccan immigrants have unemployment rates
much higher than those of native Belgians. Both activists and the media have
reported cases in which Moroccans with university degrees could not find
employment for years, and their job and apartment applications were turned
down because of their Muslim names.
Immigration policy and political discourse have become more focused
on  economic matters since October 2007, when Christian democrats and
liberals agreed on sturdy migration policies. Under this agreement, migrants
from outside Europe will be able to take jobs only if there is a shortage of
European candidates. It has also imposed tough standards concerning
income, language, and time requirements as immigration criteria.
A report released by the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition
to Racism prepared by the Universities of Antwerp and Leuven (2006) stated
that stricter immigration laws had rendered immigrant women from Turkey and
Morocco distinctly underprivileged and vulnerable to abuse by their husbands.
The study also revealed that Moroccan married women who arrived in Belgium
in 2000 were the most socioeconomically deprived, as only one-third of them
had found a job three years later, compared to higher rates for Eastern Europeans.
Large regional differences were found in the rates of poverty,showing the
Moroccan community in Wallonia as the worst-off among Moroccans in
Belgium (Saaf et al. 2009). Women and youth remained marginalized in the
labor market because of segregation, lack of qualifications, or male pressure
on women to stay at home.

Moroccan Migrants in Spain


As mentioned in chapter 1, in the 1960s Spain was a transition country for
Moroccan migrants, as it was not their final destination. However, since
Spain joined the EU, and with the implementation of the Schengen visa
restrictions in 1990, emigration to Spain has become significant.
Since 1993, Spain has hardened its migration laws, which reduced
the migration flows drastically. Yet it has become the primary destination
of undocumented migrants from Morocco and the rest of Africa.14 Most
Moroccan immigrants in Spain originated from the north of Morocco, partic-
ularly the regions of Tetuan, Nador, Al Huceima, Larache, and Chefchaouen.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, migrants have come from the
center of  Morocco, namely Casablanca, Rabat, Settat and Beni Mellal
­
(Kachani 2004: 26)
40   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

The investigation of about 600 Moroccan migrants in Spain was under-


taken by van der Erf and Heering (2002) from July to November. This
study asserted that the prevalence and importance of networks were key
factors in migration. At the time of their migratory move, more than half
of the males and three quarters of the female migrants mentioned hav-
ing relatives or friends in the country of destination, which contributed to
the development of a migration culture in the community. That is to say,
migration has become deeply ingrained into the repertoire of this group’s
behavior, and the values associated with migration have become part of
their values.
According to van der Erf and Heering (2002), about 60 percent of the
Moroccan migrants in Spain were men and 40 percent were women. Men’s
level of education was higher than that of women—about 30 percent of the
men had attained secondary or higher education as opposed to 15 percent of
the women. Most Moroccan men in Spain (60 percent) came individually
but were married, leaving the spouse at home, whereas Moroccan female
migrants in Spain (80 percent) came individually and were single, and
10 percent were married but left the spouse back in Morocco.
Approximately 50 percent of Moroccans in Spain—men and women
alike—chose to stay in the host country because of their secure job situation.
It is often said that migrants use the southern European countries as bridges
to move to the northern parts of the EU. Only about 20 percent intended to
migrate to a third country. The important reasons for returning home were
family problems, unemployment, or dissatisfaction with life in the host coun-
try (van der Erf and Heering 2002).
The concentration of Moroccan immigration in Spain is in five areas: the
Mediterranean coast, the Balearic and Canary Islands, the metropolitan area
of Madrid and in agricultural areas in southwestern Spain. The community
is quite spread out, but it is strong in Catalonia, Andalusia, and Madrid
(Alegret and Solana 2004). The largest number of Moroccan undocumented
immigrants is in these areas. Van der Erf and Heering (2002: 80) argue that
over 60,000 Moroccan immigrants in Spain received residence permits dur-
ing five operations of regularization beginning in 1980. However, most of
those who work in rural and semi-rural zones are underpaid and exploited
by Spanish land and business owners, live in precarious housing conditions,
and lack health care and social security (Derose et al. 2007).15 They face high
risks every day in the workplace because they are mainly employed in the so-
called “secondary labor market.” This shaky situation makes their integration
into the host society quite a challenge (Khachani 2004: ch. 6). According
to Spanish government statistics of 2006 nearly 200,000 Moroccan
migrants were actively working, 96 percent of whom worked in agriculture,
How Moroccans Live in Europe   ●    41

construction, and services. Self-employed migrants worked mainly in small


trade and services (Khachani 2009a; Daoud 2011; Ennaji 2012c).
Moroccans in Spain make up the largest immigrant community, fol-
lowed by the Ecuadorian and Colombian communities. The number of legal
Moroccan residents in Spain amounted to 160,000 in the 2000s. The actual
number of Moroccans is undoubtedly significantly higher, as the number of
undocumented Moroccan immigrants in Spain was estimated to be around
400,000 in 2002 (van der Erf and Heering 2002).16 This increase in the
number of Moroccan immigrants in Spain is due to the country’s close prox-
imity (just 14 kilometers away) as well as to the wide gap in incomes between
the two countries. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Moroccan incomes
are five times lower than Spanish incomes, so it is no wonder Moroccans are
interested in migrating to Spain (Lahlou 2008).
Attitudes toward Moroccan migrants are rather negative; there exist many
stereotypes and false value judgments against them, especially among rac-
ist circles and the political right. The February 2000 events in the small
Andalusian town of Eljido, during which Moroccan undocumented migrants
were violently attacked, and their shops, mosques, and houses burnt down
and looted by the Spanish population, were indicative of the xenophobic
attitudes toward Muslim migrants (Khachani 2006a).17
A survey published by the Spanish newspaper El Pais reveals that the
majority of Spanish people (80 percent) were afraid of migrant invasions.
This survey showcases that even university students and educated people,
who are generally tolerant, hold negative attitudes toward African migrants.
Accordingly, 56 percent of students thought Spain should ban immigration,
and 47 percent stated that immigrants were a security threat.18

Moroccan Migrants in Italy


Daly (2004) has described the difficult conditions of Moroccan construc-
tion workers living in the city of Modena in the Italian region of Emilia-
Romagna. He argues that these workers suffer not only from health and
safety problems, but also from racism and marginalization. They are vulner-
able because they earn low wages, have a low social status, are isolated, and
lack language proficiency, social security, and health care. They are also dis-
advantaged during an economic crisis, as they are the first to lose their jobs.
Trade unions, which are required to play a key role in improving the work
conditions and in fighting against discrimination, have failed to protect the
rights of migrants. As (Derose et al. 2007) put it, “more opportunities for
immigrants to obtain legal residency and citizenship may be the best route
to expand access to care.”
42   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Kamal (36 years old) worked for three years in a ceramics factory in
Milan. He has a BA in biology from Morocco, but could not find a better
job. Unfortunately, one day an accident in the factory left his hands severely
injured, and he had to be hospitalized for a month, after which he was
expelled from his job without compensation. He complained:

I suffered a lot because of racism and discrimination. I was in hospital for four
weeks because I needed to have surgery. The factory covered the hospital fees
but that’s all. After a month, I wanted to go back to my work, but the boss said
no way, because my position had been filled by another worker. I wasn’t even
thanked nor compensated for my three years of hard work. I talked to the local
trade union about it, but I was told they could not do anything.

Thus Moroccan immigrant workers are usually viewed as merely exiled


units of manpower. They are treated harshly and often threatened with expul-
sion if they fail to comply to the rules of the land because they are considered
“poor third-world workers” (Andall 2000 and Allasino et al. 2004). Those
who are active have job contracts that are usually limited in time. One of my
interviewees, Hamid (29 years old), who worked near Florence in construc-
tion for four and a half years, was fired without any written notice and for
unknown reasons. Here is part of the interview:

I considered the company like my home; I worked so hard to get a promo-


tion to improve my standard of living. After three years and a half, at the end
of the month, after I got my low pay, the director informed me verbally that
he decided to terminate my contract. When I asked why, he told me that it
was true that I worked very hard, but the company was not satisfied with my
productivity.

Thus, in many cases no protection, either social or economic, is given to


the migrants and their families, who live on the margin of the host society.
Similarly, the state’s advocating of mono-cultural and mono-ethnic orienta-
tions excludes the migrant’s cultural and ethnic rights and identities, giving
birth to xenophobia and racist attitudes toward the migrants, manifested in
different ways.
The vulnerability of Muslim Moroccan migrants is often aggravated by
the problem of language, unfamiliarity with local culture, and lack of social
support networks. This is particularly true for undocumented migrants in
Italy who are constantly threatened by deportation. As a result, migrants’
integration into the host country turns out to be a difficult matter (Cesarani
and Fulbrook 1996).
How Moroccans Live in Europe   ●    43

The Negative Impact of the Economic Crisis on Migrants


The global financial crisis has had a devastating impact on Moroccan Muslim
migrants. Thousands of Moroccan workers in Europe were laid off, and
unemployment rates have reached record proportions in Spain, Italy, France,
Belgium, and other European countries. For example, in June 2009 the
unemployment rate reached 21 percent among Moroccan immigrants living
in Spain; according to the OECD, based in Paris, and the unemployment
rate among the Spaniards reached 14 percent.19
Moroccan immigrants lost more jobs than the Spaniards because they worked
in areas hard hit by the crisis, including construction and public works, catering
services, and seasonal work. Moroccans were most affected by the crisis as they
were the largest foreign community in Spain from outside the EU. According
to the OECD, rising unemployment among Moroccans is also linked to the
return of Spaniards to jobs they had refused prior to the crisis (Ennaji 2010b).
Statistics compiled in 2010 by the Association of Moroccan Workers
and Immigrants in Spain (ATIME) showed that the number of unemployed
Moroccans exceeded 80,000. Faced with this situation, the Moroccan NGO
Cooperation and Development with North Africa (CODENAF) asked the
different Spanish municipalities, which benefited from stimulus funds to fos-
ter the economy and employment, to take into account the Moroccan immi-
grant population which “should enjoy the same employment opportunities
as the rest of Spanish citizens.”20
For illustration, Hasna (51 years old) lost her job in 2011, and to make ends
meet she worked from home as a tailor. In the interview I conducted, she said:
“There is no solution, no near solution. I work at home as a tailor; before it was
my hobby to do this, now I do it to help my family.” Her husband, Mohamed
(53 years old), was out of work for two years. He lived only on social security,
earning 426 euros per month and 200 euros allocation for his two daughters.
During their unemployment, Moroccan immigrants were not allowed to leave
Spain for more than a week, otherwise they could not benefit from this social
security aid, and they would have to reimburse all the financial help they had
received from the government. Mohamed went to Morocco for a week and
when he returned, he was told to reimburse 1340 euros to the Spanish authori-
ties, and that he should not count on any more assistance. He added:

Personally, I’d prefer to return to Morocco, but if I do, I’ll have to reimburse
everything I received since I lost my job two years ago, as I have been living on
the dole since then. If I leave Spain, I have to reimburse 14,300 euros.

Severe austerity measures have been taken by the Spanish authorities


that affect Spanish people and immigrants all the same. Another Moroccan
44   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

immigrant, Mustapha (34 years old) was jobless after the lumber mill he’d
worked in for five years went out of business. He moved in with friends and
was unemployed for over one year. Every month he had to go to the local
authorities to have his passport stamped to prove that he was still in Spain.
“I live with a Moroccan friend, and thanks to him I survive here; without his
support, I would have returned to Morocco long ago.”
Many migrants had two families to support—their own in Spain and their
large family back home. This situation was further complicated by the lack of
income, health care, and insurance. Asked whether Moroccan immigrants were
marginalized and discriminated against by the Spanish government, Nadia El
Othmani, president of the Amel Association for immigrants in Madrid stated:

Everybody is surely suffering from the crisis, Spaniards and immigrants; yet, we
need to sensitize the Moroccan community about their rights and obligations,
and we have to defend our rights.

Raouf (62 years old), has been residing in Murcia, Spain, for 20 years. He
is a businessman who owns a café, a supermarket, and a few apartments that
he rents to immigrants. He said in the interview:

I barely pay the workers, but I don’t make any money. Real estate has decreased
in value, too: my house which cost me 200,000 euros six years ago, now would
cost between 50,000 and 60,000 euros only. I just can’t sell my house so cheap
and go back to Morocco. Worse, I have to pay over 30,000 euros of debts and
taxes. The government is exploiting the crisis by putting pressure on migrants
to return home; if they manage to push even 25 percent of migrants to return,
that will be a good achievement for the government.

A Spanish lawyer, C. Perini, from the region of Barcelona said to me:

The Spanish economy needs migrants; we need guest workers to build the
country again; but there is a crisis now affecting everyone, Spanish people and
immigrants. Even for the Spanish it’s hard to find work, let alone Moroccan
immigrants. The difference perhaps is that the Spanish can get support from
their families, but not the immigrants.

Driss (52 years old), who is a wealthy developer in the south of Spain, used
to own exchange offices in many parts of Spain. Now he invests in real estate.
He studied law in the United States, and has a long experience in finance and
business management. In the interview, he states:

My business has been growing very well until the crisis started, and then real
estate collapsed. I own several apartments which I am selling. I have actually
How Moroccans Live in Europe   ●    45

sold three in the last two months. People are buying, even some Moroccan
immigrants and mostly Spanish people are buying real estate, because this is a
golden opportunity.

Moroccan students also have serious problems, as the tuition fees have
increased from 400 euros to between 3,000 euros for humanities programs
and 6,000 euros for science and technology schools. Hassan, a biology stu-
dent in Madrid, declared in the interview:

Before the crisis, the Spanish government provided help and support to Moroc-
can students and many facilities to study, especially engineering, pharmacy, and
medicine. This help is now impossible, and many services have been reduced
at the University of Madrid, where I study because of austerity measures.21

As a consequence of the financial crisis, remittances fell by 15 percent


in 2009, and thousands of Moroccan immigrants returned home. The
Moroccan government took measures to encourage returning migrants to
invest in Morocco, and training seminars and workshops were organized for
their benefit. The goal was to inform them about investment opportunities in
their regions and to train them to run small and medium enterprises (Ennaji
2010b). The government’s new strategy aims for optimizing the contribution
of the returnees. Additionally, the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living
Abroad took incentive measures, with the support of Moroccan banks, to
facilitate the transfer of funds by Moroccan immigrants thus increasing their
investment in Morocco (see the Moroccan daily Le Matin of June 6, 2009).22
However, for return migration to be beneficial, Morocco and destination
countries must find better policies and alternatives (Cassarino 2008). The
incentives for the Moroccan migrants to return on a voluntary basis were very
low, and consequently many of them preferred to remain in Europe.

Return Migration
There are no reliable figures on the recent return migration to Morocco, and
the current data are too fragmented to provide an objective idea. The most
significant data, however, are based on the general population census of 2004,
which revealed that the number of returnees had reached 315,000 between
1994 and 2004, mostly from France (Khachani 2006b). One of the most
recent studies conducted by Migration Retour au Maghreb (MIREM) in
2008 shows that migrants who returned of their own free will were likely to
invest in Morocco and unlikely to re-emigrate.23
To the question whether they intended to return to Morocco and reset-
tle there, many interviewees said they would return after retirement. Malika
46   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

(54, teacher in France) replied: “my dream is to return to Morocco, and I pray


God that I will one day.” Meryem (56, a secretary in Germany) answered:
“Of course I strongly intend to go back to Morocco for good when my hus-
band retires. God willing, we will return to Morocco to live together with our
relatives.”
M’hamed (36, sales manager in Germany) shared the view of Meryem and
Malika, by saying: “Yes, I want to return to my country, because I feel that
I am far from my family and my friends, and I miss Morocco.”
However, there are many Moroccans in Europe who do not think about
returning at all, or at least at the moment, as is the case of Abdelaziz (45, police
officer in Belgium) who does not think to return to Morocco, “because my
life is in Belgium, which will not prevent me from loving my home country.”
Fouad (44, shop owner in France) does not think of going back at all and
the reason is simple:

I find myself tied to the fate of my children; my children are studying here and
will eventually integrate the job market. So it is very difficult for me to return,
and it is hard after all these years to adapt to life in Morocco.

Most of the respondents affirmed that they would definitely go to


Morocco for vacations, and to visit their families and friends. Abdelkrim (36,
taxi driver in Italy) said: “my goal is to get the citizenship, because there is no
hope in Morocco and it is not developed, but I will come only for holidays.”
Two other factors have encouraged most immigrants to settle in their host
country. First, the new technology and the modern means of transporta-
tion have reduced the distances between the home and the host countries.
Information technology and social media have particularly facilitated com-
munication with the relatives in the home country. Today, Moroccan immi-
grants living in Europe can share information with their relatives in Morocco
by watching the same television programs and speaking to each other on
the phone (or using Facebook or Skype) on a daily basis. Second, with the
growing Moroccan community in the host country, immigrants can find
everything they used to miss; for instance, they can go to the mosque, buy
Moroccan groceries, eat in a Moroccan restaurant, meet Moroccan friends,
read Moroccan newspapers, listen to Moroccan music, and watch Moroccan
television. Immigrants have also established associations and clubs that have
led to the creation of an important infrastructure (see chapter 9).

Conclusion
The living conditions of Moroccan migrants in Europe vary according to
marital status, migration category, age, gender, level of education, occupation,
How Moroccans Live in Europe   ●    47

duration of residence, level of integration, and citizenship. Their situation is


rendered more complex by other factors like their socioeconomic situation
in the host country and their immigration background. The chapter shows
that Moroccan immigrants and their descendants constitute a heterogeneous
group to the point that it would be better to talk about Moroccan communi-
ties in Europe.
They face many challenges in their daily lives, such as living between two
cultures, experiences with racial segregation, and negotiating their identity
as Muslims in a non-Islamic environment. Many are either unemployed or
obliged to do low-level jobs to survive because they are treated as uneducated
or under-qualified. As a result, many have experienced social and economic
deprivation. Despite their naturalization as European, even second- and
third-generation Moroccans are still regarded as immigrants and a threat to
security and social cohesion in the adopted country. Their situation has dra-
matically worsened since 9/11, with the rise of Islamophobia and, recently,
with the depressing impact of the economic crisis. The vast majority of active
Moroccan immigrants are workers, and only few are employers or entrepre-
neurs. Many complain about insecure employment, low pay, tough working
conditions, and lack of social benefits like insurance and health care.
Nonetheless, Moroccan migrants show strong resilience and positive atti-
tude toward the realization of their migratory projects. They demonstrate a
constructive vantage point related to the impact of the Western lifestyle on
them and their family, which facilitates their integration into the country of
immigration and the improvement of their social status (see chapter 7).
Most of the respondents hope to go back for good to Morocco, but only
one third of their children express the wish to return. Significantly, the deci-
sion to return is linked to different factors: willingness of children, reach-
ing the retirement age, favorable conditions of investment in Morocco, and
so on. The intention of return reveals the attachment of migrants to their
country of origin. However, the decision not to return is justified by certain
factors such as citizenship, better future prospects in the host country, better
social services, economic status, and other considerations relative to family
and children.
PART II

Being Moroccan and Muslim in Europe

T
his part focuses on how Moroccan Muslim migrants are living with
their identity, sense of community, culture, and ties to home. It shows
that cultural diversity is a source of wealth and progress that should
not be perceived as a threat, provided it is well-managed by governments and
communities. The chapters in this part highlight the challenges, benefits, and
role of multiculturalism in the integration of migrants. Respect for cultural
diversity protects migrants and minorities in democratic countries and con-
tributes to their integration and well-being.
However, the European conservative Right and critics of multiculturalism
argue that fostering cultural diversity may cause internal conflicts and ten-
sions in their societies. This means that migrants whose cultures are different
from the Western culture of the dominating majority may be accepted, but
rarely as equals.
The four chapters in this part focus on the concerns and challenges of
Moroccan migrants in Europe, particularly the problem of Islamophobia,
and the need for intercultural dialogue at different times and contexts. Three
related topics are discussed relative to discourse on the veil: women’s expe-
riences and resistance, language issues and the performance of migrants in
education, and the challenge of job insertion.
Chapter 3

What It Means to Be a Muslim in


Europe: Islam and Islamophobia

T
oday we live in a shrunken world where millions of people are on the
move; one of the biggest challenges is how to live together and respect
diversity—different skin colors, beliefs, and ways of life.
Muslims constitute more than 4 percent of the European population.
Large-scale immigration to Europe, a trend going back to the end of World
War II, may not be new, but the crisis currently facing the continent is excep-
tional (Ennaji 2010a). As second- and third-generation immigrants from the
Middle East and North Africa come of age, Europe is grappling with the
challenge of protecting its values while searching for a solution to the social
ills—alienation, segregation, poverty, oppression, and terrorism—associated
with immigration.1
On May 25, 2010, the Council of Europe published the report Islam,
Islamism, and Islamophobia in Europe, recognizing that Muslims have lived
in Europe for centuries, and acknowledging the contribution of Muslims
and Islamic culture to European civilization.2 However, the report went on
to observe that Muslims in Europe today suffer from marginalization and
discrimination because of prejudices and stereotypes against their religion
and culture (Ihsanoglu 2011).3
The Muslim communities in Europe are ethnically diverse, and dis-
tinguish themselves according to their national or ethnic origin. They are
divided at the sectarian level: about 80 percent are Sunni and 20 percent are
Shi’a. Their frame of reference in terms of tradition, sect, rituals, and iden-
tity, is often their country of origin, not Islam or Muslims (Ramadan 2005;
Phillip 2009:11).
According to the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion in Public
Life’s September 2010 report, there are more than 17 million Muslims in
Europe, 3.2 million of whom live in Germany. The majority are immigrants
52   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

and their descendants. The concept of “Euro-Islam” is a way to promote a


pluralist Islam among Muslim communities in Europe, and it is a concept
that is increasingly affecting the Muslim way of life in Europe (Modood et al.
2006).
Muslims in Europe have created non-governmental organizations (NGO)
and mosques that represent them and their interests. One of the aims of these
organizations is to collectively defend Islam and clarify misunderstandings
about it. According to surveys, about 55 percent of Muslims attend mosques
to pray and observe religious traditions (Phillip 2009: 7; Daoud 2011: 126).
Islamism may be defined as a term for political ideologies that seek to do
away with secular governments, often through violent means, and establish a
political system based on Shari’a (Islamic law). These ideologies see religion
and politics, the law of God and the law of the state, the public and the pri-
vate spheres, as inseparable (Ramadan 2013).
Islamism entails Islamic extremism and political Islam, which have a
global dimension, ramifications for social policy, and individual and public
freedoms. In Europe in general, and in France in particular, Islamism restricts
one’s freedom and contradicts the values of French society (liberty, fraternity,
and equality). In her book Defusing Radical Islam, French anthropologist
Bouzar (2014) denounces the amalgamation and confusion made between
Muslims and radicals and argues that the government must protect its citi-
zens from sectarian drifts and violence (Phillip 2009).4
The main aspiration of the vast majority of Moroccan migrants was, and
remains, the realization of their dream, which is the improvement of their
well-being and that of their families. Over the years, the migration waves led
to the emergence of a nuclear family in the host country, engendering chal-
lenges for migrants and their children, as well as for the receiving and sending
countries. In general, the first and second generations face social segregation
and experience loneliness and homesickness. Their children are torn between
two cultures: the culture of the country of origin and that of the host coun-
try (Ennaji 2010a). Like the rest of Muslim immigrants, they are subject to
Islamophobia because most Europeans consider Islam a totalitarian religion
that is incompatible with their values and lifestyles (Ramadan 2005).

Islamophobia
Islamophobia is an unfounded fear of the Islamic faith and an issue that first
appeared when Islam became a mainstream religion the world over. It started
in the Middle Ages with the Crusades against Islam, and after that, other wars
and conflicts against Islam became common. While it is an ancient issue, it
returned to the spotlight after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Islamophobia may be
What It Means to Be a Muslim in Europe   ●    53

defined as a feeling of hostility toward the Islamic religion. Many Europeans


are Islamophobes because they think of Islam as a totalitarian religion that is
irreconcilable with the European (and Western) values of religious freedom,
gender equality, and human rights. The rise of terrorism the world over, tar-
geting not only Europe and America, but also Asia and Africa, has nourished
Islamophobia, particularly in Europe (Cesarani and Fulbrook 1996; Ennaji
2010a).
The media exaggerate the threat of Muslim migrants as potential terror-
ists (Bowen 2007). In France, Spain, and the Netherlands many Muslim
Moroccan migrants, for example, are steadily exposed to all types of violence
and charges.5 The national debate over wearing the headscarf and the sub-
sequent law banning it in French schools, is a good case in point (see chap-
ter 4). The 2009 Swiss law against minarets and the 2007 Danish Cartoons
Controversy are other instances of European Islamophobia. One may raise
the questions of why and how Islamophobia came about.

Causes and Forms of Islamophobia


Islamophobia in Western people can be caused by misconceptions and a lack
of information. For instance, it is wrongly believed that Islam shares no com-
mon values with any of the other major religions, and that the traditions and
beliefs of Muslim migrants are essentially opposed to Judeo-Christian values
or the principles of the Enlightenment, namely gender equality and secular-
ism. It is also wrongly thought that Islam refuses to adapt to modernity, is
no longer relevant, is incompatible with democracy and human rights, and
is tied to terrorism, thus promoting violence. This sentiment commonly held
by many European people—including scholars, politicians, and journalists—
is absolutely untrue. There is no link between Islam and terrorism, and this
type of incorrect information is a leading cause of Islamophobia (Ramadan
2005).
Islamophobia stems mainly from ignorance and biased media coverage.
Even though it is the fastest-growing religion in the world and the second-
largest faith after Christianity, Islam is misunderstood, as many people still
make false judgments about it. Islam has unfortunately been commandeered
by terrorists and terrorist organizations that seem to want to eliminate every-
one, including other Muslims. Adding this misappropriation of Islam for
terrorist purposes to the already misunderstood Islamic culture contributes
to Islamophobia, and creates an unpleasant environment for Muslims around
the world (Modood et al. 2006; Ennaji 2010a).
Fear of the new migrants has many root causes, varying from rac-
ist attitudes held by conservative forces to the impact of the traditions of
54   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

the Enlightenment and the French revolution on the left-wing parties. As


Lucassen (2005: 2) states:

Thus, opposition to the rise of Islam, and thereby to the continuing immigra-
tion from Muslim countries, can be heard in both neo-Nazi and leftist-inspired
intellectual circles. A good example of the latter is the leading French intel-
lectual Alain Finkielkraut, who as far back as the 1980s voiced his concerns
about cultural relativism and more recently has criticized the radicalization
of Muslims in Western Europe, as well as the celebration of cultural differ-
ences. The media’s misconception of Islam pictures Muslims as the “attackers”
or the “enemy” of the West. A whole movement against Islam has been growing
through media coverage, movies, politics, and social media.

Islamophobia is also retaliation against global radical-Muslim funda-


mentalism, which is itself the result of the American foreign policy denying
Palestinians their right to a homeland, a situation made worse by the US inva-
sion of Iraq (Carter 2007). The atrocities and violations against human rights
committed by Islamist countries such as Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan—
which empowered and armed different Islamist groups equally—exacerbated
Islamophobia and racism against Muslims in the West, in general, and in
Europe, in particular.
Religion and culture have become predominant over color and race, as a
result of the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979, other major events like the
Salman Rushdie issue in 1989, and the first Gulf War against Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait in 1991 (Lucassen 2005: 3). From the 1980s onward the prin-
cipal catchphrase has been culture, not race. The anti-immigrant discourse
has become culture-driven, repeatedly shaped in universal stipulations, as
Huntington observes in his book on the clash of civilizations (2006: 254).
All these factors have led to the perception that Muslim immigrants are a
threat to security.
Other researchers have argued that “cultural” and “racial” specificities are
also social constructions. For example, historically, Jewish and Italian immi-
grants were referred to as “alien” or “black” and their culture and race were
characterized as irreconcilable with Western (German and American) val-
ues. Today, Muslims (including Moroccans, for our purposes) are regarded
by most Europeans as “black”, not because of their skin color, but chiefly
because of their religion and low economic status. In the Netherlands, the
term “black schools” designates those schools attended by Moroccan and
Turkish students. Their Surinamese friends are considered “white” because
they do better at school and in the job market. Thus, it is important to note
that “black clearly transcends its original racial meaning and has turned into
a proxy for class” (Lucassen 2005: 12). Similarly, in France and Germany,
What It Means to Be a Muslim in Europe   ●    55

Moroccan immigrants are viewed as more alien and darker than the blacks
from western Africa because of their low socioeconomic status, and partly
because of the past French colonization of North Africa and the ensuing
unreasonable “colonizer-colonized” relationship (Fanon 1963). These cases
remind us of the situation of immigrants in the United States, where Arab
and Muslim diasporas have become more “black” than the much darker-
skinned population since 9/11 (Ennaji 2010a).
However, Muslim immigrants are considered more of a threat in Europe
than in America because the former does not have a long history of migra-
tion. Indeed many European countries have experienced more emigra-
tion than immigration in their recent history. Many Italians, Spanish, and
Portuguese used to migrate to countries like France or Germany to work;
others migrated to the United States particularly in the first two-thirds of
the twentieth century. However, many Western European countries started
to receive huge numbers of colonial migrants from Africa and Asia starting
in the 1950s. Most of these migrants were actually needed to compensate for
the slow population growth in Europe (see chapter 1). The fact that immigra-
tion is new in Europe, coupled with the received idea that immigration is an
abnormal trend, has made many Europeans think of migrants as temporary
guest workers. Consequently, most European states today refuse to acknow­
ledge the new reality that they truly have become immigration countries. As
a result, they view Muslim migrants as a threat, and their different cultural
traditions as conflicting with Western values and lifestyles.
The Danish Cartoons Controversy is a good illustration of the fear of
the Muslim presence in Denmark.6 In September 2007, the right-wing
newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, published 12 insulting pictures of the Prophet
Mohammed, with one showing him with a bomb under his turban.7 From
the beginning, the press added fuel to the fire by focusing almost entirely on
the problems with Muslim immigrants and presenting social issues involving
immigrants from a religious angle.8
There were distressing events in Germany as well, such as the proposal by
the former interior minister of Lower Saxony,9 Uwe Schünemann, to make
“radical Islamists” wear electronic foot tags. “Doing so,” he said, “would allow
the authorities to monitor the approximately 3,000 violence-prone Islamists
in Germany, the hate preachers [i.e., Islamist imams], and the fighters trained
in foreign terrorist camps.” The tagging of Muslims and the numbering of
Jews in Nazi Germany rings a very dangerous bell for the future of Muslims
in Europe.10
On July 1, 2009, during a full court session in East Dresden, Germany,
Alex Wiens, a 29-year-old German man of Russian origin, stabbed to death
Marwa El-Sherbini, a veiled Egyptian woman who was testifying against
56   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Wiens at the trial. Wiens was sentenced on November 11, 2009, to life in
prison for the racist murder of the 31-year-old woman. El-Sherbini, who was
three months pregnant at the time, was nicknamed “martyr of the veil” by
the Egyptian press. The incident provoked outrage in the Muslim world, and
mass demonstrations in Egypt and Iran in particular, because of the delayed
response by Germany to denounce the crime (Ennaji 2010a).
Since the 2007 presidential elections in France, feelings and discourses
about Islamophobia have intensified.11 In 2008, three Muslim organizations
in France sued the well-known French publication Charlie Hebdo for inciting
hatred against Muslims.12
The League for the Defence of Muslims’ Rights, represented by its presi-
dent Karim Achoui, took to court Charlie Hebdo for blasphemous discourse
on Islam. On July 10, 2013, Charlie Hebdo published on its main cover the
title “le Coran c’est de la merde” (The Qur’an is shit).13
We may also cite the case of the Norwegian mass killer, Anders Behring
Breivik, who on July 22, 2011, murdered 77 innocent young people at a
summer camp—the deadliest attack on Norwegian soil since World War II,
according to The New York Times. He claimed he acted out of necessity and
that his objective was to kill as many of the next generation of Norwegian
social democrats as possible, because he holds the party responsible for allow-
ing large-scale Muslim immigration.14

Effects of Islamophobia
Islamophobia may have a negative impact on Islamophobic people who feel
outraged by Islam, but it has the worst impact on Muslims in the diaspora. As
a result, it leads to an unfair demeanor toward someone’s right to a personal
choice and it has dire effects on the social life of Muslims in the host country.
As mentioned in chapter 2, Muslim minorities in Europe suffer from the
many results of discrimination like stereotyping, unemployment, rejection,
poor housing, racism, and alienation to violence. According to a survey by
the Institut Français d’Opinion Publique (IFOP), published by the French
newspaper Le Figaro on October 25, 2012, 60 percent of French people think
that religion has too much importance in the public space, and 43 percent
consider Islam a threat. To clinch this kind of fear of Islam, 82 percent say
they are against the building of mosques on French territory. Moreover,
68 percent think that Muslim migrants are rejected because they refuse to
integrate in France.15 This reveals that French society is moving from phobia
to paranoia, due to immigrants’ identity crisis, as they have lost the sense
of belonging and identity and feel torn between cultures and continents,
and their children do not really know where they belong and do not usually
What It Means to Be a Muslim in Europe   ●    57

appreciate the sacrifice their parents made for them. “France, which experi-
ences identity crisis, invented a ‘metaphysical Muslim’, an attitude that aims
to refer to what we do not want to be,” stated Raphaël Liogier, director of
the Religious Observatory in Paris, in an interview with the French magazine
Le Point of November 1, 2012. It is true that Muslims in Europe must also
adapt to the new environment and respect the laïcité, which separates religion
from the state (Ramadan 2013). Laïcité must be obeyed, and the law must be
general and applicable to all, whatever their religious beliefs.16
Although everybody agrees that terrorism under the cover of religion
should be severely opposed and condemned, the extreme right wing parties
use anti-Islam sentiments, especially during election campaigns, thus confus-
ing Muslim fundamentalism with moderate Islam (Bouzar 2014). Marine Le
Pen, who took over the leadership of the National Front from her father, has
continued the same anti-Muslim migrants discourse for electoral purposes.17
In his book Covering Islam (1981), Edward Said underscores numerous
stereotypes and prejudices in the portrayal of Muslims by the Western media,
how the latter have used and perpetuated a negative image of Islam, and how
this has prevented mutual understanding while providing an invented com-
mon enemy for the diverse Western peoples (Vidal 2005).
Muslims across Europe are associated with extremism and violence. They
are accused of being the source of tensions in the public space, and acts of
discrimination against them remain under-reported (Bowen 2005). Young
Muslim Moroccans suffer from permanent stigmatization, humiliation,
and police harassment in the cities. They live in areas with underprivileged
housing conditions and are obliged to take low-level jobs with small wages18
(Phillip 2009: 9; Ennaji 2010a).

The Amalgam of Islam and Violence in France


Much ignorance, not to mention hypocrisy, is necessary to support
Islamophobic arguments that Islam is incompatible with freedom of speech
and human rights. Freedom of expression has its limits in all Western coun-
tries for two reasons: the law and a certain social consensus.
In public opinion, there is also a varying threshold of tolerance. No
respectable magazine today would publish an interview with Dieudonne—a
French-Cameroon comedian who caused major controversies in 2007 and
2014 over satires containing anti-Jewish hate speech—though he has not yet
been convicted of anti-Semitism.19 No major newspaper would publish car-
toons making fun of Jews, the blind, homosexuals, or gypsies, more for fear
of poor taste than legal prosecution. But with Islam, poor taste is accepted
because public opinion is more susceptible to Islamophobia. What offends
58   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

the moderate Muslim is not the representation of the Prophet, but the fact
that there is a double standard (Phillip 2009:10; Rayski 2014).
Subsequent to the French banlieues (low-income suburbs) riots of
November 2005, many European analysts warned that what had occurred
in France would trickle over to other European countries as they, too, have
large Muslim populations (Boubekeur and Amghar 2006). The mistaken
connection between the riots and Islam was obvious. The popular Jewish
philosopher, Alain Finkielkraut, declared in an interview in the Israeli daily
Haaretz, on November 19, 2006 that the “riots were not linked with the
injustices and racist discriminations faced by the rioters at the hands of the
much-acclaimed French Republican Model of Integration, but were caused
by the fact the rioters are Blacks, Arabs, who identify themselves with Islam.
Hence the problem is linked with religion and ethnicity.” He went on to add
that the riots were “a clear gigantic anti-republican pogrom.”20
This connection with Islam is used as a tool to hide realities in French
society. The lack of integration of Muslim immigrants in France is ascribed
to a deep attachment to Islam, which according to officials is fundamentally
incompatible with democracy (Tibi 2009).
The social reality of Muslim immigrants is indeed a paramount factor in
the rise of extremism and xenophobia. For instance, unemployment among
the youth in the banlieues has reached approximately 40 percent, compared
to the national average of 10 percent, and the unemployment rate among
university-educated second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants is
around three times the national figure.21
Thus, it was important that the French government address the root causes
of the riots: institutional racism, poverty, unemployment, and ­exclusion.
Given the hard circumstances in which they lived, Muslims had reasons to be
anxious and concerned (Ramadan 2005).
Despite his negative discourse about immigrants and illegal migration,
Nicolas Sarkozy was the first French minister of the interior to set up the
French equivalent of the UK’s Muslim Council of Britain, the Conseil
Francais Du Culte Musulman (CFCM). Then, against a very hostile Centre-
Right and Far-Right backlash, he “extended a hand to the French Muslims to
officially join the Republican table.” It was about time he proclaimed to take
Islam out of “caves and garages” and be part of an “official French Islam.”22
But many academics and political analysts are raising alarms about the
subtle but quite calculated ways French politics and policies are shifting dan-
gerously from Right to extreme Right.
On December 27, 2005, Christiane Chombeau, in an article in the
French newspaper Le Monde, wrote about the LePenisation of the French
government’s responses and policies following the riots. That is, how the
What It Means to Be a Muslim in Europe   ●    59

Centre-Right Chirac government has in effect adopted and practiced policies


long preached by the Far Right National Front Leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen.
According to the article, several magistrates were voicing serious concerns
about the government’s heavy-handed tactics in dealing with immigration
issues, asylum-seekers, expulsions, court procedures, and police interventions.
Historically, immigrants have been the scapegoats of French politicians.
In the 1980s, socialist president François Mitterrand talked about “France
having exceeded its immigration tolerance limits,” while Gaullist Giscard
d’Estaing warned of “invasion,” and Jacques Chirac frequently spoke of an
“overdose of immigrants” (Barats-Malbrel 1998; Chombeau 2005). Since
9/11, the racist French expression sale Arab (dirty Arab) has been supplanted
by more foul words, les Islamistes and les barbus (the bearded ones).
Radical Islamophobic discourses in France provoke fear of anything
associated with Islam, and a humiliation of Muslims. Between 2006 and
2008, more than 23 radical imams were extradited to their countries of ori-
gin. Measures such as expulsions and stripping-off of nationalities are stark
reminders of France’s totalitarian past.23
When ministers adopted xenophobic discourses as part of their strategy
to establish themselves as future presidential candidates, they tended to send
a signal that xenophobic and other discriminatory practices were to be toler-
ated if not given an official assent. This was clearly the case with la soupe au
Cochon (pork soup). The extreme Right Wing organization, Bloc Identitaire
(Identity Bloc) started distributing sandwiches and a popular soup made of
pork to homeless people, with a clear motive to exclude those of the Jewish
and Muslim faiths. In a leaflet, another group linked with Bloc Identitaire,
Soulidarieta (solidarity) explained that pork has always been a historical
ingredient in French cuisine symbolizing French culture and heritage. The
pork soup was distributed exclusively to the poor among non-Muslims in sev-
eral French cities, including Paris, Nice, Strasbourg, Nantes, and Mulhouse.
Extreme groups in Belgium, namely in Charleroi and Brussels, followed suit
with their own pork soup distribution and identical leaflets (as reported in
the Moroccan daily Attajdid, Feb 10, 2007).
On April 6, 2008, 148 Muslim graves in the military cemetery of Notre-
Dame-de-Lorette, near Arras (Pas-de-Calais), were desecrated. President
Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Francois Fillon expressed outrage at the
“heinous act.” The prosecutor for Arras, Jean-Pierre Valensi stated that the
inscriptions on the graves were “aimed directly to insult Islam and e­ x-Minister
of Justice, Rachida Dati born in France of a Moroccan father and an Algerian
mother.24
“This desecration is an unspeakable insult on three levels: an insult to
Muslim fighters of the Great War who died for France, an insult to all Muslim
60   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

fighters who fought for our country in all wars, and an insult to all freedom
fighters . . .; this insult to the memory of the dead is a worrying sign of a
deeply rooted ailment which is installed in total impunity: ‘Islamophobia,’”
said Jean-Marie Bockel, former secretary of state for defense and veterans
affairs, on the Luxembourg RTL TV channel.25
In fall 2009, France launched a country-wide debate on national identity, the
aim of which was to discuss cultural values on a large-scale level and strengthen
French nationalism. However, immigrants and French citizens of Muslim or
North African origin felt targeted, as they were identified in this debate as aliens
and outsiders. As a result, immigrants rejected this debate, which many quali-
fied as racist and anti-democratic (Daoud 2011; Ramadan 2013).
Ansari (24-year-old Moroccan) confided to me his rejection of the whole
idea of the debate: “As a French young man of Saint-Denis Department,
I would like to say that I don’t feel at home in this France.”
In a letter addressed to French President Nicolas Sarkozy on December
24, 2009, and in reaction to racist accusations by the government toward
migrants and the Muslim community in general,26 Mustapha Kharmoudi,
writer and former member of the Council of the Integration of Immigrant
Populations, declared simply “Your France, I don’t want anymore . . . I am
not from this cold, racist, and reserved France which depicts a French young
man from Muslim faith as an alien, a dangerous asocial person.”
In the same vein, in 2010 a great number of French and non-French intellec-
tuals and civil-society activists signed a petition addressed to President Sarkozy
asking him to abolish the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National
Identity, and Co-development, which he had created immediately after being
elected president. This ministry, according to them, stigmatizes immigrants and
widens the gap between them and French nationals, as the ministry’s main
objective was to deport 27,000 illegal immigrants every year and extradite
immigrants seeking exile in France.27 The petitioners demanded the abolish-
ment of the ministry altogether, as it was a danger for democracy in France.

Islam and Muslims in the United Kingdom


The Muslim presence in the UK dates back to the eighteenth century when
Muslim sailors, serving on British merchant ships began to settle in the port
cities of Cardiff, Liverpool, Glasgow, and London. These sailors played a cru-
cial role in maintaining trade across the Atlantic during World War II (Dwyer
and Uberoi 2009: 201).
The largest wave of Muslim migration began in the 1950s, coming
mostly from South Asia and settling in London, the industrial towns of the
Midlands, and the textile towns of Lancashire, Yorkshire, and Strathclyde
What It Means to Be a Muslim in Europe   ●    61

(Datta 2009: 120). The 2001 census found there were around 1.5 million
Muslims in the UK, making them the largest religious minority, at 3 percent
of the total population. That figure may now be as high as 2 million (Phillip
2009: Introduction).
British Muslims are ethnically and culturally diverse. According to the
2001 census, 74 percent are of Asian origin, 11.6 percent are white, 6.9 per-
cent are black, and 7.5 percent are other ethnicities. Almost half of British
Muslims were born in the United Kingdom. Others have immigrated from
South Asia (31 percent), the Middle East (6 percent), South and East Africa
(6 percent), Eastern Europe (4 percent), and North Africa (2.5 percent).28
Muslims are the youngest of Britain’s faith communities. Over half of
British Muslims are under age 25, and Muslim households have the largest
numbers of dependent children. They generally live in social rented housing
and more than half of them are unemployed, compared to a third of the gen-
eral population (Phillip 2009: 12; Ahmad and Sardar 2012: 5).
The UK has the highest number of Muslim parliamentarians in all Europe,
and over 200 Muslim councilors. The first British Muslim parliamentarian
was Lord Stanley of Alderley who converted to Islam in the late nineteenth
century. He was followed by Lord Headley, who converted to Islam in 1913.
Today, many Muslim institutions and organizations are engaged in promot-
ing and protecting the needs and interests of British Muslims over a range of
areas including youth, work, education, and social services.
The first Muslim school in the UK was created in the late nineteenth cen-
tury in Liverpool. There are now over 110 Muslim schools, only five of which
are state-owned. The headscarf has been integrated into the school uniform
for Muslim girls (Mirza 2012: 121). Oxford and Cambridge Universities
established Chairs of Arabic in the 1630s, and the first English translation
of the Qur’an was published in 1649. The first mosque was built in Woking
in 1889, and there are now more than 1,200 mosques in the UK. Among
the many Muslim charities established in the UK, the most well known are
Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid.
Populations in the Pakistani communities of Bradford, Oldham,
Manchester, and Leicester have trebled during the last decade. Muslims born
and educated in Britain were made to feel like outsiders.29 The feeling among
Muslims that they are unwelcome in the UK is undermining endeavors to
integrate into wider society. Most of them state that they have experienced
race discrimination and religious prejudice. Islam is pictured by the British
elite and media as an extremist and separatist religion, which negatively
impacts Muslim community life and social cohesion. The number of racist
incidents in London Borough of Redbridge’s schools reached their highest
levels between 2006 and 2012 (Ahmad and Sardar 2012: Introduction).
62   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

A city or locality where Muslims are in the majority is considered a ghetto,


although there is a tendency for people of similar backgrounds (not just
Muslims) to live together in communes and neighborhoods. Muslim com-
munities in the UK are increasingly targeted in a trend that diminishes hopes
of Muslim immigrants’ integration (Ryan 2012: 101). Not surprisingly, Jamai
(2007) reports that Manchester and Bradford risk becoming a front line in the
global clash between the West and Islam. Since 1991, the flight of natives from
Bradford’s inner-city districts has clearly revealed an increase in tense race rela-
tions and segregation in the city. Native British parents tend to avoid sending
their children to state schools where Muslims and other minorities are pre-
dominant. The dominance of Pakistani Muslims in the city has made Bradford
bicultural.
However, it is well known that Islam and Muslims are not at odds with the
notions of pluralism, secularism, and globalization. They have contributed
to the creation of new wealth in the UK. Ironically, inner cities suffer from
unemployment and lack necessary amenities and above all, social cohesion.
Although many native British people regard such areas as ghettoes, integra-
tion is first and foremost economic, not religious and cultural. Most Muslims
are quite integrated into British society and at the same time proud of their
Islamic, linguistic, and cultural identities, despite the discrimination they
face in all walks of life.
It is often stated by the Western media that Muslim schools ghettoize
the children, and even lead to their radicalization if they are not integrated.
Yet there is no evidence that Muslim schools lead to a ghettoized education
or to extremism. Nevertheless, the integrationist approach merely results in
Muslims feeling that their faith, language, and culture are not respected.
It is difficult to talk about integration under these circumstances.
Integration means different things to the host society than to the immigrants.
For the former, it means the immigrants must adopt European values by
learning the language, customs, culture, and code of conduct of the receiving
society. But since many Europeans’ customs, culture, and code of conduct are
tied in with their religious beliefs, this may not easily conform with Muslim
traditions and values. Muslim immigrants consider this notion of integra-
tion to be uni-directional in the sense that it requires them to change their
behaviors and practices, but does not require any effort from the European
host society.
This situation reminds us of the lack of information among many
Westerners about the shared roots and historical relations connecting the
Islamic world to the West (particularly Britain, France, Spain, Italy, and
Germany). It is also reminiscent of the need to build bridges between the
two worlds to strengthen mutual understanding, global peace, harmony, and
What It Means to Be a Muslim in Europe   ●    63

respect for cultural diversity. Cultural dialogue and respect of diversity are
badly needed to enhance tolerance, stability, and prosperity both locally and
globally.
Racism can be used to exploit anti-immigrant feelings as an excuse for
current woes of local populations, unfairly blaming the immigrants alone for
their economic problems. Concerns about illegal migration, employment,
or security can spill over to ill feelings toward the majority of Muslim immi-
grants who are law-abiding and contributing to the economy.
As mentioned earlier, the media’s negative portrayal of Islam and Muslim
immigrants has been quite mainstream in Europe since 2001. As Randall
(2003) observes, three major British papers, the Daily Telegraph, The Guardian,
and The Independent—from the political right, left, and center, respectively—
reveal a common set of problems and similar levels of bias against immi-
grants in general, and Muslims in particular. Irrespective of party, leading
European politicians repeatedly highlight fears of “invasion, alleged threats
and actual prejudices—conveying a very negative image of immigrants
despite their statistically small impact on society . . . Concerns over crime,
disease, terrorism, detention, and surveillance are consistently pushed well to
the fore.”30 The rising tide of Islamophobic rhetoric can equally be seen in
Europe’s mainstream political parties, such as the Danish People’s Party, the
Dutch Freedom Party, the French National Front, the Swiss Peoples’ Party,
the English Defence League, the Italian Northern League, and the Austrian
Freedom Party.31
This kind of mindset can be ascribed to a number of cultural, social, and
economic factors, including the existence of a covert racist ideology at the
societal level, which often jeopardizes immigrants’ rights.
Honest consideration of immigration issues should involve a far more
diverse range of topics, reflecting the complexity of the issues at hand, such
as multiculturalism, demography, human rights, refugee health, economic
policy, and moral responsibility. Governments, civil society, migrants, and
their NGOs must work together toward mutual understanding and respect
of diversity, human rights, and rights of migrants.

Action against Islamophobia


As long as racism and Islamophobia are part of European society, there can-
not be peace or coexistence of any kind, and the solution requires everyone
to become part of the movement to fight discrimination, xenophobia, and
Islamophobia head on.
Many European governments and civil society organizations have taken
action to stamp out xenophobia and Islamophobia. On May 29, 2007 French
64   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

president Nicolas Sarkozy espoused an anti-racist strategy by appointing


Muslims as members of his government; Rachida Dati, the former Minister
of Justice, is a case in point (Ennaji 2010a).
Newly-elected French president François Hollande followed suit in 2012
by appointing immigrants to key government positions, such as Minister of
Justice Christiane Taubira, originally from French Guiana, and Minister of
Women’s Rights and government spokeswoman, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem,
originally from Morocco (Ennaji 2010a). This kind of pedagogy is indis-
pensable in changing xenophobic mentalities and perceptions about Muslim
migrants and promoting diversity, intercultural dialogue, and mutual respect.
Respect for difference and diversity is useful and necessary. The accep-
tance and value of cultural specificities help us achieve social democracy both
locally and globally, as the world globalizes in terms of nations’ economies,
trades,  and investments. Touraine (1995: 125) argues that “in our post-
industrial societies, we need a new relationship between the universal and the
particular, between rational law and the rights of the subjects, between social
integration and individual freedom.”
Many reports have revealed that racial discrimination and xenophobia
were never totally eliminated in Europe and have recently resurfaced as a
result of migration flows and the increasing diversity of European countries.
A few interesting studies and reports have been published in this respect by
the European Commission (1992), the European Parliament (Bell, 1998),
and the European Council for Religious Leaders (ECRL, 2012).32 These
reports made cases for action against racism, including potential action by
both government and civil society to curb racism.
On the political level, the Starting Line Group campaign achieved a little
progress in the 1990s; however, the Council of Ministers and the European
Commission continued to argue that European institutions had no powers
to take action against racism. The Starting Line Group is a coalition of more
than 400 non-governmental organizations from across the European Union,
all active in the field of anti-discrimination.33 It made a proposal for a new
law to be included in the EU Treaties that would indicate such powers. This
proposal, named the Starting Point, turned into a campaign again racial dis-
crimination in 1997.
To face the ethnic tensions and violence against immigrants across Europe,
the Council of Europe created the European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance (ECRI) in 1993. This commission aimed to produce policy pro-
posals and research on anti-racism legislation. In 1994, the European Union
established the Consultative Commission on Racism and Xenophobia, which
recommended European legal measures against racism. To provide further
support of a European strategy against racism, 1997 was officially declared
What It Means to Be a Muslim in Europe   ●    65

the European Year Against Racism. Additionally, the Intergovernmental


Conference (IGC) discussed proposals for treaty changes, one of which was a
proposal for the insertion of an anti-discrimination clause. The Starting Line
Group informed the public about the dangers of racism and about the discus-
sions on the anti-discrimination clause. This clearly showed that racism and
xenophobia were now on the European agenda. Later on, the Starting Line
Group made law proposals including the mention of discrimination on the
basis of race, ethnicity, religion, and belief. This led to the Amsterdam Treaty,
which amended the European Treaties and provided European institutions
with significant powers to act on racial and ethnic discrimination in accor-
dance with the Racial Equality Directive. The law was then incorporated
into the National Laws of the Member States in July 2003. This offers civil
society enormous opportunities to press governments to act more efficiently
against racism. The European Union has come to the conclusion that robust
legislative measures must be taken against racism that is well entrenched
in European societies; the recently implemented Directive is a step in that
­direction (Daoud 2011; Niessen 2000).
Research has played a key role in policy making and in the debate about
racial discrimination and xenophobia. It is used as a tool to raise aware-
ness and to sensitize decision-makers to formulate measures and take action
according to well-defined strategies. Civil society, on the other hand, uses
and applies existing research or undertakes new research with the goal of
curbing racism. The experience of the Starting Line reveals that solidarity
between government and non-government organizations can provoke impor-
tant and fruitful discussions that lead to measures fighting racism and dis-
crimination. Scientifically based research is sorely needed to make effective
use of it in policy making and in the ongoing struggle against xenophobia
and Islamophobia (Ennaji 2010a; Ramadan 2013).

Conclusion
Despite being discriminated against because of their faith and cultural back-
ground, Moroccan Muslim migrants in Europe are keen on realizing their
migration project, improving their incomes, providing quality education for
their children, and protecting their dignity and human rights. They are ready
to make compromises in order to integrate into the host society; yet the lat-
ter is not fully ready to make any efforts to accommodate the immigrants’
culture and religion.
Recent scholarly debate in North America has stressed the importance
of normative multiculturalism. Well-known supporters of cultural diversity
like Kymlicka (1995) and Taylor (1992) believe that Western societies have
66   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

to acknowledge the rights of migrants, or any minorities, to practice their


beliefs and cultures in the private as well as the public spheres. They stress
that migrants are not to be regarded as a threat, but as wealth and that by
accepting other cultures, Western societies will become more democratic, tol-
erant, and respectful of diversity. Likewise, immigrants must acknowledge
and understand the customs and ways of life of the host society, be flexible,
more active in public space, and more prepared to integrate while still main-
taining cultural traditions.
Acknowledging cultural diversity facilitates Muslim immigrants’ and
minorities’ integration and requires a continual investment in people. A soci-
ety that is diverse must be ready to stay keenly engaged in building bridges
for the long term.
Criticism of Islamophobia does not mean that Muslims are perfect nor
does it deny the existence of hatred toward other religions. That most of the
Islamic world is lacking in human rights, gender equity, and democracy, gives
rise to anti-Islamic feelings in both Europe and North America.
Globally, the radical mullahs (religious leaders) exhorting their followers to
jihad (fight in the name of Islam), the spiritual leaders issuing violent fatwas
(legal opinions), the organized terrorists united and motivated by Islamic
identity, all these factors encourage xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe
and beyond. Muslim scholars and leaders have emphasized that terrorism and
killings are “anti-Islamic” (Ramadan 2005; Modood et al. 2006; Ahmad and
Serdar 2012, among others).
European Muslims must join forces with the rest of the international com-
munity in the fight against extremism and terrorism, as well as in the struggle
to build a peaceful, multicultural, democratic, and prosperous world. Perhaps
European Muslims will provide a good model to follow and leadership for the
future. More dialogue and joint-venture projects between Muslims and non-
Muslims must be developed and sustained, and following the recent changes
and reforms in the Middle East and North Africa after the so-called “Arab
Spring,” these new relations have become more pressing and welcome than
ever before.
Chapter 4

Women and the Veil Debate

T
his chapter retraces the steps of the veil debate in France through a
historical and political analysis, revealing a deep malaise in French
society. This societal problem has sprung from France’s unwillingness
to accept differences, especially those of a Muslim community that publicly
manifests its cultural identity. In January 2004, French authorities enacted a
law forbidding women to wear headscarves, burqas, or any signs that revealed
students’ religious orientation in schools. A burqa is a garment that com-
pletely covers a woman’s body and face, except for her eyes. A headscarf is a
scarf covering most of a woman’s hair, head, and neck, often worn tied under
the chin. To many Muslim women and men, it was Islam and Muslims that
were being targeted, as the law specifically aimed to prohibit wearing the
hijab (veil) in public schools. Bowen (2007) discusses at length the history
and arguments for and against this new law. He did not focus on the lack of
integration of immigrants in France, but tried to trace and explain the his-
torical, cultural, and political reasons for this new law, which most Europeans
would consider as strange and against human rights.
The French state is based on secularism, or the separation of religion and
the state (laïcité), and the distinction between the public and private spaces.
By passing the law prohibiting headscarves in schools, the French legisla-
tion and the political elites consolidated a French tradition from the time
of eighteenth-century philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which emphasized
common values over individual concerns and behaviors.

The Issue of the Headscarf


A hot public debate about the headscarf took place among French officials,
intellectuals, and media. The latter ascribed many social problems in France
to headscarves and Islamic fundamentalism. They also blamed Muslims for
68   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

the disorder in schools, increasing number of ghettos, and rise of violence


in the suburbs. It was thought that the struggle against headscarves would
support Muslim women’s endeavors for emancipation and liberation. The
question is, why would a law prohibiting the wearing of the headscarf be so
important at the national level? This issue is closely related to the history of
religion in France, to the colonial relationship with its Muslim immigrants,
and to the role of television in shaping public opinion (Ennaji 2010a).
Why is the headscarf a problem at a time when most Muslims wearing it are
French citizens? The problem began during the colonial period in North Africa
when the nationalist movement encouraged Muslim tradition and decency,
resurfaced in 1989 when the first incident involving headscarves cropped up in
France when two veiled girls were refused at school, and increased in intensity in
2003 heading toward the passing of the law mentioned above. The whole issue
of the headscarf is related to politics. We will discuss the growing importance
of communautarism—a concept that emphasizes the connection between the
individual and the community—the impact of international Islamism and the
discrimination against Muslim women in the ghettos (Ennaji 2010a). The law
banning headscarves was regarded by many observers in France as a probable
answer to a wide variety of issues, such as the subjugation of women and the
problem of the integration of the Muslim community.
The first headscarf issue in France occurred in 1989 when Salman Rushdie’s
The Satanic Verses was heavily criticized by Muslim extremist regimes like that
of Iran. That year, three girls showed up at school wearing the Islamic veil
and refused to remove it. The national and international atmosphere made
headscarf-wearing a national problem. Subsequent to 9/11, new perceptions
of Islam appeared; the Europeans in general began to perceive Islam as a
violent religion that is incompatible with modern life, and Muslims became
more attached to the headscarf as a sign of their cultural and ethnic identity.
The significance of the law banning the headscarves is evident from the large
quantity of publicity and objection it elicited.
The legislation reveals the increase of public awareness of integration
issues. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe and globally, and the
growing racism against immigrants fostered by the extreme right, pushed
politicians and the intellectual elite to the forefront, as they felt they had to
take measures regarding Islam. The headscarf caused a crisis because it was
closely associated with three issues in France: communautarism, Islamism,
and sexism, about which people became gravely concerned. Nonetheless,
the problem of headscarves in schools received extensive media coverage and
political attention at the expense of the fundamental problems of Muslim
immigrants such as integration, unemployment, discrimination, and poverty
(Ennaji 2010a).
Women and the Veil Debate   ●    69

The Paris banlieues street riots of 2005 were a harsh reminder of how little
progress had been made toward the integration of immigrants. Bowen (2007)
states the violence was an indication of government policy failure to improve
the socioeconomic life in the suburbs. The issue of identity is very significant
throughout French society, and public debate about Islam and the headscarf
consequently became significant. Additionally, concerns about French-born
Muslim girls defiantly wearing a symbol of their culture provoked French
people’s anger because of the considerable discrimination against Muslims
in France. Bowen (2007: 29) emphasizes the relative novelty of girls wearing
headscarves not because of parental pressure but as “part of a conscious effort
to create a new identity . . . defining themselves in Islamic terms.”
The identity movement began in the early 1980s but shifted in the 1990s
from a North African immigrant identity to a Muslim one. The French public
opinion was disturbed by other Islamic public ritual practices, especially sac-
rifice and prostrations in mysterious edifices, or Friday prayers in the streets.
Some consider these rites a direct menace to public order because of the
politicians’ endeavor to keep religion in private spheres, prevent Islam from
dominating young people’s minds, and build a common French identity with
shared values to which all French people adhere.

Internal and External Factors


French colonial power and postcolonial connections have also a role to play
in the spread of Islam in France. Historically, the French colonial rulers sup-
ported Islam to facilitate the occupation of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia
(Laroui 1980). After the colonies’ independence, France encouraged a mod-
erate, tolerant Islam in its former colonies to ensure stability in the region.
At home, the French state helped Muslims to build mosques, establish cem-
eteries, and create Islamic schools and institutions. The state was keen on
creating decent worship spaces for Muslims in order to make them visible
and accountable.
However, as mentioned in chapter 3, the new generation of Muslim immi-
grants faced an identity crisis. Some of them joined the Socialist party like
their fathers, because that party defended the rights of workers and immi-
grants. Many others decided to adhere to the Islamic movement because
Islam gave them their identity and a new way of living in Europe (Bowen
2007, ch. 4). Thus, as early as 1980, Moroccan and Algerian workers started
to demand their rights to wear Muslim dress and practice Islamic rituals like
the sacrifice. The conservative forces in France, and in other European coun-
tries like the Netherlands, did not appreciate these demands, and the extreme
Right used this fact to wage a war against Muslim immigrants.
70   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

In many European countries, namely France, Belgium, Germany, the UK,


and the Netherlands, the state did help Muslims build mosques, train imams
(religious teachers) and fundraise through foundations created by the state.
The question is: why did the headscarves cause public and media uproar,
while in the 1960s and 1970s when the first Muslim women arrived from
Morocco wearing headscarves, this did not attract any attention or protest?
But when school girls started wearing the headscarves, the problem cropped
up. Instead of teaching introduction lessons about Islam trying to accommo-
date Muslims, the authorities and the media launched a campaign against the
wearing of headscarves in schools.
The public (teachers, pupils, intellectuals, politicians, etc.) reacted against
the headscarves in schools because of internal and external factors. Internally,
with the increasing population of Muslims and violence in the suburbs came
a growing threat of Muslim extremism and terrorism. Externally, one recalls
the terrorist attacks on Madrid, London, and New York, and the role of polit-
ical Islamists manipulating Islam as their ideology for political power. All
these reasons make the headscarf an emblem of outrage rather than a simple
outfit or public alertness about the scarves themselves.
According to my conversation with female immigrants in France,
Moroccan girls wear the headscarf either because they want to reassure their
families—especially their fathers and brothers—that they observe the Islamic
way of life and will pass smoothly through adolescence, or because they want
to proudly reveal their Muslim identity. These girls often practice all the ritu-
als of Islam like praying, fasting, wearing the Islamic dress, and celebrating
Muslim feasts. According to Gaspard and Khosrokhavar (1995), cited in
Bowen (2007: 71), these girls did not adhere to “political Islam, nor did they
belong to any extremist or terrorist group, but took the decision to wear the
headscarves on their own, as part of their attempts to assert their Islamic
identity,” and “to negotiate their own authority with respect to their family,
workplace, or society at large.” Bowen (2007: 72)
Due to the remarkable media coverage of the issue of headscarves between
2003 and 2004, during which politicians and the intelligentsia argued
against wearing headscarves in schools, it is not surprising that the overall
public opinion accepted the new law banning religious signs in schools. The
French people wanted a law that would put an end to this dilemma and
polemic. The December 8, 2003 issue of the French magazine Elle published
an article criticizing the headscarf, which it claimed facilitated male discrimi-
nation against women. The prohibition of religious signs in public schools
was implemented in September 2004 after a few practical clarifications.
Although the French newspaper Le Monde defended secularism in French
society, it denounced the new law because the law discriminated against the
Women and the Veil Debate   ●    71

Muslim population and fostered fracture rather than integration (Le Monde
of December 7, 2003).

Communautarism, Islamic Fundamentalism, and Sexism


Communautarism may be defined as the refusal by a minority to assimilate,
to be part of the country, as well as a potential threat to the unity of the coun-
try. During the national debate on headscarves, many journalists, politicians,
and civil society activists related the issue of headscarves to communautarism,
Islamic fundamentalism, and sexism. Communautarism entails the seclusion
of an ethnic group or community or its closing on itself, and means a break
in communication with other ethnic groups and the rest of the society. The
French became concerned with the growing influence of communautarism
on the youth, especially in the suburbs. The Muslim Moroccan community
started to assert its identity by claiming the right to build mosques, have
Friday prayers in the streets if the mosque was over-crowded, freely create
Islamic cultural associations, claim different swimming pools or swimming
hours for women (who could wear the burqini, a combination of burqa and
bikini) and give Muslim women the right to wear headscarves in public
spaces.
Most French intellectuals and politicians advocated the French values of
freedom, justice, equality for men and women, and the exclusion of reli-
gion from the public space. The French people became worried about the
Islamization of their country, as many Islamic associations endeavored to
spread the word of Islam in mosques, where imams inspired Muslims to go
back to their roots and religious identity, and to claim their ethnic specificity
and their faith in public. These associations also called for the application of
the shari’a (Islamic law), thus contradicting the European idea that religion
should be practiced in the private space only.
For the French political elite, Muslim immigrants, like all citizens, must
adopt the same values in public, but people are free in the private sphere
(Ganley 2010). President Chirac, in his speech of December 17, 2003, men-
tioned the shared values of the French, their cultural and religious diversity,
but warned against the danger of social discrimination and threats posed
by the tough situations in the suburbs.1 Some young Muslim Moroccans
turned to communautarism as a last resort after losing all hope for the future
since dropping out of school and failing to find a job. One of the signs of
communautarism is districts, like Barbès in France, that are almost totally
inhabited by Muslims, where many men wear the beard and women the
headscarf, where halal meat is sold,2 and where people pray in the streets
near the mosques during Friday prayers. As a result of the increasing number
72   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

of Muslim districts, many French non-Muslims expressed their protest and


anger against this Islamization of France, the country that is based on secular-
ism and that fought dearly for laicité (Giry 2006; Ennaji 2010a).
For many critics, the headscarf is symbolically linked to the oppression
of and discrimination against Muslim women. This argument is provided
by anti-headscarf people as another piece of evidence of the threats and dan-
gers of Islamic extremism (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2011). However, according to
research, it seems to be the case that most violence is either domestic or com-
mitted by non-immigrants (Le Monde Diplomatique of May 2005: 12–13).
Women’s organizations counter-attacked Islamism by launching large cam-
paigns to sensitize the public against the headscarf, associating it with com-
munautarism and sexism, which together with Islamization seek to subjugate
women in France and throughout Europe (Bowen 2007: ch. 7). The heads-
carf also symbolizes the vulnerable situation of women in Islam.
However, it is well known among politicians and the intelligentsia that the
problem of communautarism and Islamic extremism is related to the situation of
Muslim immigrants and their poor living conditions in the suburbs. Their lack
of integration is largely due to the failure of the socioeconomic policies adopted
regarding Muslim immigrants and their families. Racism, poverty, and unem-
ployment are conspicuous in the suburbs, especially following the world financial
crisis. The anger of the new generation of Muslims in France led to new Paris riots
that caused at least two deaths, left dozens wounded, and hundreds of burned cars
on the streets in September and October 2006. However, politicians and jour-
nalists blamed it on the headscarves and on the Muslim identity of immigrants.
To the French general public, banning the scarf meant saving schools from
the pressures of religious groups and extremists. To respect laïcité at school, all
students were neutral learners, but in their private spheres they were free to
behave as they wished and practice their own religion. Furthermore, support-
ers of the law argued that the scarf would encourage political Islam and the
Islamization of France. The feminists adopted this attitude, and by stressing
sexism, they blamed patriarchy and the behavior of some traditional con-
servative Muslims, not Islam itself. For the feminists, the scarf implied the
subjugation of women by men and their oppression by the system of patri-
archy in Europe and the rest of the world. Not only feminists made such
arguments, but also many intellectuals and politicians. The feminist social
figure Yvette Roudy claimed that the scarf was a sign of the oppression of
women by Muslim fundamentalists (quoted in Bowen 2007: 209). The left
wing feminist Gisèle Halimi (of Algerian origin) denounced the wearing of
the scarf, as for her it symbolized misogyny, women’s submission, and gender
inequality in France. Thus, the struggle was no longer about public schools,
but about values and attitudes of the French people.
Women and the Veil Debate   ●    73

Two young French Muslim women, age 21 and 22 and residing in Orne,
were excluded from their school because they had worn the headscarf during
a sport session. They challenged this exclusion but on December 2, 2008,
the Court rejected their claim that they had been discriminated against. They
complained of being excluded permanently from their school because they
had refused to remove their headscarves during physical education classes and
sports. As a result of their exclusion, they had to continue their education by
correspondence. Their appeals to the French administrative courts had all
been rejected. Before the European Court of Human Rights, they invoked
Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) and Article
2 of Protocol 1 (right to education) of the European Convention on Human
Rights. However, some women’s organizations opposed the law prohibiting
scarves in public schools. The women’s organization Ni Putes Ni Soumises
(Neither Whores nor Submissives) refused to march with groups supporting
the law. Chollet (2005) advocated women’s freedom to choose their appear-
ance, and hence supported the idea that Muslim women were free to choose
their clothing and their personal lives.
In an interview with the French newspaper Libération on April 23, 2003,
French philosopher Elisabeth Badinter stressed the importance of all women
joining forces to eradicate gender-based segregation. For her, the headscarf
was linked to “a system that excluded the freedoms and rights acquired by
women (sexual freedom, freedom of movement, freedom to marry who they
want, etc.).” These rights must be “guaranteed for all women, not just for
French women.” She added that a “different treatment” for Muslim women
was unacceptable, and all feminists must have the same discourse against the
headscarf and against women’s subjugation. She viewed gender discrimination
as harmful to both the individual and society and emphasized that a “firm
political stance on laïcité and gender equality is highly needed, as this is the
thermometer of the advancement of democracy” (see also Badinter 2006).3
Many scholars rose to fight the campaign against Islam and Muslims, criti-
cizing the simplistic general views about Islam. For instance, Ramadan (2005)
argued against the law banning headscarves, which was likely to discriminate
against Muslims and impede their integration. Modood (2003) made the
claim against the attack on Islam, which up until 1989 was regarded as a reli-
gion of peace. They recommended respecting diversity and strengthening the
ties with the Muslim community in France in order to help them integrate.
Other Muslim scholars, like Chebel (2013), criticized the idea that to be a
good Muslim, a woman must wear the headscarf.
Yet Muslim Moroccan immigrants are not one homogeneous group.
Among them, we find Islamists, secularists, and simple moderate Muslims.
The Islamists are but a small minority who are active in mosques and other
74   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

public spaces, trying to advance their ideology, defend the Muslims’ right
to difference and to freely practice their religion in Europe. Most Muslim
Moroccan immigrants are pacifists who relinquish violence. They claim their
Muslim identity and are not necessarily opposed to France, although they
defy traditional notions of being French.
The secularists, who believe in the separation of the state and religion, are
mostly highly educated professionals and intellectuals who are more passion-
ate about modernity, democracy, and human rights than about religion. The
vast majority are ordinary moderate Muslims who practice their religion in
peace (pray, fast, observe rituals), and who seek the spirituality of Islam to
cope with the Western lifestyle and the effects of globalization (Ennaji 2010a).

The Burqa, the Niqab, and the Law


Muslim scholars have stressed that Islam does not oblige women to cover
up their faces with a burqa or niqab (veil covering all the face but the eyes)
(Modood et al. 2006, Ahmad and Sardar 2012, and Ramadan 2013).4 After
banning the wearing of headscarves and other “ostentatious” religious sym-
bols in the classrooms in 2004, France targeted Muslim dress again in subse-
quent years, banning both the burqa and the niqab.
Like most French politicians and intellectuals, François Baroin, member
of Parliament and mayor of Troyes, favored the proposed law forbidding the
burqa on French soil. He stated in an interview with Le Monde on Dec. 19,
2009, that the “burqa has no place on French territory, therefore we conclude
that a law must be enacted to ban the burqa in France.”5
The law against the burqa, combined with the debate on national iden-
tity, poisoned race-relations and strengthened the ranks of the right-wing
party National Front, which took control of 11 town halls in local polls in
March 2014.6 The despoliation of a mosque in Castres, a small town outside
Toulouse, testifies to the uneasy relations there between Muslim communi-
ties and the native French population.
Faiza Silmi, of Moroccan origin, whose husband is French and whose
children were born in France, argued that she had been denied her French
citizenship only because of her burqa. In 2010, President Nicolas Sarkozy
encouraged the ban of the head-to-toe-robe, stressing in a parliament session
that such dress “is not welcome” in France.
Thus France, considered by many immigrants to be a safe haven for
democracy and human rights, imposed legal restrictions on Muslim women
who wear burqas or other full-face veils. On September 14, 2010, the burqa
and the niqab, or any full-face veils, were formally banned by law, in public
places like schools, hospitals, administrations, airports, etc.7
Women and the Veil Debate   ●    75

Women’s associations, some of which included Muslim women, strongly


endorsed the ban of the full-face veil because the veil reflected women’s servil-
ity. But the young Muslim women I interviewed responded that they wore
the burqa of their own accord to affirm adherence to a fundamentalist version
of Islam.
France’s Muslim organizations, including the government-backed French
Council of the Muslim Faith stated that nothing in Islam requires women to
wear full-face veils. However, the council’s leader, Mohammed Moussaoui,
has expressed concern that the ban would stigmatize Muslims.8
In Great Britain, students at a Birmingham college were banned from
wearing the niqab, after the headmaster had ruled students’ faces must be
visible at all times for security reasons.9
Birmingham Metropolitan College told its 9,000 Muslim students they
were not allowed to wear niqabs, in order to be “easily identifiable at all
times,” but Muslim students at the school branded the ban “disgusting.”10
Naima, a 16-year-old Moroccan girl wearing the niqab, said to me:

It is a personal choice, so I find it absolutely ridiculous that this has happened


in Birmingham city, which is so multicultural and has a large Muslim com-
munity. It’s part of my faith to wear the niqab. This has never prevented me
from learning or talking with anyone, and I’ve never had any problems in the
city before.

The main argument supporting the ban is that the face veil prevents the
clear identification of a person, which constitutes both a security threat and
a social barrier within a society that relies heavily on facial recognition and
expression in communication. The major criticism leveled against the ban is
that it encroaches upon individual freedoms.

Conclusion
The debate on the veil reveals the deep unwillingness of European societ-
ies to acknowledge diversity, especially nowadays with the Muslim commu-
nity eager to retain its customs, beliefs, and identity. The law against the
headscarf, the burqa, and the niqab, together with the debate on national
identity in France, has exacerbated the tense race-relations in this country.
Fear of Europe’s growing Muslim population has bred tension across the con-
tinent. This kind of concern and fear pushed Switzerland to ban minarets
in November 2009 and set limits on immigration in 2014.11 These mea-
sures intensify Islamophobia and deepen the anxiety and marginalization of
Moroccan Muslim communities, leaving their real problems such as educa-
tion, unemployment, poverty, and poor housing unattended to.
Chapter 5

How Moroccan Women in Europe


Cope and Resist

T
he emergence of a literature on migrant women owes much to two
factors. One is a wider feminist debate about women’s social role;
the other is recognition of the vital socioeconomic role of migrant
women. The rising feminization of migration constitutes a global fact and
does not concern Moroccan women only. A growing number of women
migrate alone, partly because of wealthy countries’ need for workers to fill
traditionally feminine jobs—elder and child care, housework, etc.—but also
because women aspire to live in societies offering them more opportunities,
equality, emancipation, and a better future for their children. Unfortunately,
the reality in the host countries coupled with women’s vulnerability as immi-
grants may at times preclude them from realizing their ambitions.
As mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, the number of Moroccan women in
Europe has been increasing for the last two decades. Family reunification
is considered the main reason for their mobility, and what has come to be
termed the “feminization” of the labor market has accelerated the rate of
female migrants for economic reasons. Moroccan women’s migration has not
received enough attention, and slight research has been undertaken to exam-
ine its peculiarities and the mutations it has undergone in the last decades.
Female migration has for a long time been considered a mere consequence of
male migration, mainly because of the family reunification that began in the
1970s, and because of the subsequent family formation process, but today it
constitutes an independent phenomenon with its own specificities and issues
(Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008: ch. 4; Killian 2006: ch. 1).
As a result of integration difficulties faced by Moroccan women, nowa-
days their problems are multiple—changes in gender relations, evolution
of the family structure, conflicts of authority, language problems, and mat-
ters related to children’s education and future marriage.1 These problems are
78   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

sometimes aggravated by the differences in legal regimes between the host


and home countries, making matters sometimes very complicated, especially
in cases of divorce, child-support conflicts, mixed marriages, or death of a
spouse.
In this chapter, the status of Moroccan women within the changing
European economic context will be discussed before investigating the effects
of migration on their lives, and the new gender roles they adopt in the host
country. The chapter examines the main activities and sources of employment
for Moroccan migrant women. The situation of Moroccan women in Italy,
the UK, and the Netherlands is surveyed. The final section discusses how
migration transforms Moroccan women’s lives and mentalities, and impacts
the family structure.

The Status of Women Migrants


The situation of Moroccan women migrants raises a number of questions in
relation to their status, contributions, and challenges, which deserve more
research and attention from migration policy-makers and civil society actors.
However, as mentioned in chapter 2, they are a heterogeneous group, with a
disparity between their circumstances and living conditions across their differ-
ent countries of residency, which have their own economic, political, cultural,
and legal specificities. They may be single, married, divorced, or widowed;
they are housewives, mothers, students, workers, businesswomen, unem-
ployed, etc.; they may be highly educated, semi-educated, or illiterate; work-
ing, middle or upper class; monolingual, bilingual, or multilingual; they may
have rural or urban roots; they are Arab, Berber, Muslim, Jewish, Christian, or
secular; they may have dual citizenship, permanent residence, or visa.
In general, Moroccan women—including those who have recently
migrated or those of the second generation—are younger than their male
counterparts. Many of them are illiterate or without any qualifications, espe-
cially those who migrated for family reunification. The educated ones are
usually young women of the second generation, those who have recently
migrated, or those who have finished their studies and opted to stay in the
host country. They often come from a modest social background. In the job
market, these women usually occupy low-level jobs with a heavy time load.
They generally do hard tasks, are less protected, and thus are vulnerable to
unemployment. The integration of Moroccan women into the job market
depends on their status and qualifications. Those with the citizenship of the
host country fare better than those who are in an irregular situation, and
those with the highest degrees are in a much better position than those with
poor credentials or no qualifications.
How Moroccan Women in Europe Cope and Resist   ●    79

As mentioned in chapter 1, women’s migration became more visible in


the 1980s. Unlike men, women started to migrate individually only relatively
recently, and are now present in the economic and social sectors. But like
men, they take part in economic growth and social development in both the
host country and their homeland (Killian 2006: ch. 1).
In the past, women’s migration was associated with such concerns as fam-
ily reunification, children’s education, and health. Women have been cultur-
ally associated with males’ migration, have developed strategies to deal with
the impact of migration on their lives, and they support their husbands and
male relatives in migration. Most women who have migrated to reunite with
their husbands have remained housewives, especially those from the north
of Morocco, because of language barriers, lack of qualifications, or because
of husband’s or wife’s negative attitude toward work. Women left behind in
Morocco were responsible for the household and the education of the chil-
dren during the absence of their husbands (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008: ch. 8).
Three main phases can be distinguished in the history of Moroccan wom-
en’s migration to Europe. The first occurred in the 1970s within the context
of family reunification; the second phase (1980s and 1990s) was within the
framework of family formation; and the third phase (2000s) is characterized
by the feminization of migration. It was very hard for these female family
members to adjust in the host country. Souad Tlasi, who runs the Al-Hasaniya
Moroccan Women’s Centre in London, talks about her experience:

It is awfully difficult to leave your friends, your school, your culture and every-
thing else that you have always known, at the age of twelve, to come to a com-
pletely different foreign land, different language, different weather, absolutely
everything was very different. Having said that, it was not a shock, it was not
a surprise either. I think when you have a very strong family, it sort of holds it
together. (interview 2010)2

This led to the growing presence of Moroccan women on the job market
of the receiving countries, especially in France where the number of active
Moroccan women increased from 26.7 percent in 1975 to 39 percent in
2002 (Khachani 2004: 28). Most of these women were recruited with a work
permit, and special quotas were used for the employment of domestic work-
ers in hospitals, hotels, schools, administrations, and private homes, espe-
cially in France, Spain, Belgium, and Italy. In Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Germany a significant number of these women worked in different sectors,
especially services, because thousands of women had migrated within the
framework of family reunification, which was happening on a large scale in
those countries. However, in Spain and Italy only a low number of women
were in the job market given the small scale of family reunification.
80   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Two categories of women migrants can be distinguished. First, there are the
women of rural origin who continue their traditional lifestyles, continuing to
work in the home taking care of the household and children while their hus-
bands were the providers. The second category is that of women who worked
outside of the home in an effort to conform to the lifestyle in the host country.
Since the 2000s, more and more women have migrated as economically
autonomous individuals, independently from male migrants. The new genera-
tion of female migrants is young and works in various economic fields. They
are classified in the third phase of migration, characterized by the feminization
of migration.
Women’s immigration to Spain, Italy, and Germany has been develop-
ing since the early 1990s. In Italy, the number of Moroccan women work-
ers reached 37.4 percent of the overall population of Moroccan migrants
in 1993, and the number of work permits delivered in favor of Moroccan
women was multiplied by six between 1993 and 2002 (Salih 2002).
Comparatively, Moroccan women outnumber their North African
counterparts—according to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT),
in 2012 Moroccan women represented 31.9 percent compared to 24.1 per-
cent for Tunisian women and 20.5 percent for Algerian women.3 In 1990s
Spain, Moroccan women were the main migrant female community from out-
side the EU. Moroccan women represented one third of the overall migrant
group, while Algerian women represented only 20 percent of the North African
community.
Following the work of King (1989), Collins (2000), and Killian (2006:
10), which demonstrates the intersectionality of ethnicity and gender, I will
argue in the remainder of this chapter that Moroccan women in Europe defy
multifaceted discrimination as North Africans, Muslims, migrants, and as
women. Their case is similar to African and African-American women in the
United States who suffer similar forms of oppression and are caught between
their identity as women and their identity as a minority.
As we saw in chapter 4, the headscarf issue is a revealing example of how the
media and several pressure groups instrumentalize women in political fights and
debates about identity and integration, and how Muslim women seek to dissi-
pate fear of their religion, fighting back in the settlement country (Killian 2006).

Causes of Feminine Migration


Feminine migration is economically motivated (25 percent) and related to
family reunification or family formation (75 percent).4 Most female eco-
nomic migrants are in search of a stable job and a decent life. More than a
third of them are university graduates who could not find jobs in Morocco.
From 1980 to 1990, the successive droughts in Morocco led to a crisis in
How Moroccan Women in Europe Cope and Resist   ●    81

the agriculture and trade sectors, which brought about more unemployment
among women, educated and non-educated alike. The Structural Adjustment
Program, which was created by the World Bank, imposed a reduction of
employment in general and was disadvantageous to women, particularly
young women, who were hard hit by the restrictions. Likewise, the liber-
alization of the economy and privatization of many government companies
pushed many women to seek work in the sectors of agriculture, textiles, and
trades. The Moroccan economy has also been negatively affected by the Gulf
War, the rise of oil prices, and the global financial crisis. For example, in
2009, 33.2 percent of women between the ages of 15 and 24 were unem-
ployed (Moroccan Department of Statistics 2009). Today, women suffer from
unemployment more than men in Morocco, regardless of education, because
of gender discrimination (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008: ch. 4; Khannous, 2010).
Thus, economic reasons are behind the recent favorable attitude toward
women’s migration. Over 53 percent of the population think that it is good
for women to migrate abroad, which indicates a change in attitude and per-
ception regarding women’s migration (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008: ch 3).
All these factors have contributed to the birth of a culture of migration,
which has become deeply rooted, even in school children. According to a
1995 survey of school children, administered by the Moroccan Association
for Studies and Research on Migration, young kids were often in favor of
migration, and 13 percent of young girls stated that they would migrate
in the future if necessary. Thus it seems that there is some sort of psycho-
logical pressure on young people to migrate outside Morocco legally or
illegally (Ennaji 2012c). Although less than 10 percent of women claimed
they had migrated to pursue their training and education, for the vast
majority migration was the only solution to escape poverty and financially
support the extended family left behind in Morocco (Ennaji and Sadiqi
2008: ch. 3).

Migrant Women and Work


The employment rate of Moroccan migrant women differs from one coun-
try to another. In France, for instance, the rate of active Moroccan women
(29 percent) is lower than that of men’s (64 percent), according to the 2010
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) survey on
employment.5
In Belgium, the rate of active migrant Moroccan women is also less high
(38.3 percent) than that of men (55.4 percent), yet the number of unem-
ployed women is higher than that of men (33.3 percent versus 28.7 per-
cent). If one considered all inactive women, who for some reason remained
outside the labor market, the rate would increase to 61.7 percent (INSEE
82   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

2010 survey on employment). Gender-based discrimination may be one rea-


son that prevents women of immigrant origin from joining the workforce.
Indeed, as shown by one of my interviewees, Zahra S., a 29-year-old woman
employed in the public health department in Belgium:

Even with my Belgian citizenship, I feel discriminated against at the workplace


as a woman originating from Morocco. As a pregnant woman, I feel unwanted
in my job.

In the Netherlands, the employment rate of Moroccan women is around


22 percent, which is lower than among other migrant communities (De Haas,
2009). The weak participation of Moroccan women is due to cultural factors,
for these women mostly originate from the north of Morocco (Rif ), where
families are very conservative and do not appreciate women’s work outside
their homes. In the Rif, women are not encouraged to work or participate
in public life by their husbands and male relatives. In host countries like
France, Belgium, and Germany, emancipated Moroccan women are usually
the younger generation who have considerable qualifications for work. In
Spain, active Moroccan women represent 19 percent of the migrant female
population, while in Italy they represent approximately 15 percent, according
to the statistics of the Italian Ministry of Interior (Salih 2002).
Moroccan women have come to dominate particular sectors, such as
domestic services, the clothing industry, and small entrepreneurship. Increas-
ingly, women have found employment in other skilled areas, such as nursing,
teaching, and computing. However, because of racial discrimination, they are
forced to work in the least-desirable sectors. This has led to “de-skilling” as
there is often a wide gap between their qualifications or educational back-
ground and the jobs they are offered. Still, Moroccan migrant women con-
tribute to the economic and social life of receiving countries, although their
work may be undervalued and unrecognized.
Moroccan women are usually considered disciplined and hard working,
but due to their generally low qualifications or lack of employment oppor-
tunities, most of them work in the informal sector as merchants, domes-
tics, cleaners, or in services such as restaurants, cafés, and hotels. These jobs
offer no access to medical care and social welfare (Khachani 2004: 41). In
France, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, most women work in the service
sector. The importance of domestic work in Europe can be accounted for by
the growth of the middle class in Western Europe—modern couples both
have jobs and can afford to hire a domestic to help with the housework.
Domestic work is a job opportunity for undocumented migrants who cannot
be recruited in the public or formal sectors. Many of these Moroccan women
How Moroccan Women in Europe Cope and Resist   ●    83

accept a small salary and prefer to live with their employers to avoid having
to pay rent elsewhere.
Migrant women usually work under appalling conditions—their poor
knowledge of the host country and its language, weak qualifications, igno-
rance of their rights and obligations, and political inexperience make them
relatively vulnerable. They usually have part-time or seasonal jobs; however,
domestic and temporary work does not foster integration, as immigrants
feel cut off from public relations and often work overtime—between 8 and
14 hours a day (Khachani 2009b).
As far as salaries are concerned, Moroccan women are discriminated
against for gender and ethnic reasons. In many cases, the average salary of a
Moroccan woman is much less than that of a French or Belgian worker. This
difference can be accounted for by the fact that a great number of Moroccan
women apply for a limited number of low-paying jobs. Moreover, even those
who undertook training found that their employment opportunities were
limited because of discriminatory hiring practices (El Ghali 2003). With the
financial crisis, migrant Moroccan women may remain unemployed for a
period of time before finding a job.
There are three major reasons behind the rising demand for Moroccan
women in the textile industry or the domestic sphere. The first is the with-
drawal of state services for the young and the elderly. The second reason is the
mounting rise of women in waged work without a parallel transformation in
attitude toward the traditional division of labor in the domestic sphere. The
third reason is the development of the tourism industry and the dislocation
of the male workforce whose needs must be met (Truong 1996).
The exploitation of Moroccan migrant women in the host country due to
racism and a lack of integration and citizenship rights, is worse in domestic
work, especially when the migrant is illegal. Research conducted in 1996
by Anderson (2000) in five European countries, shows that hiring undocu-
mented migrant women to fill domestic jobs is also prevalent because they are
cheap labor.6 The number of working women in Europe and North America
has increased, so too has the demand for maids to fill the gap in the domestic
chores.7
Among other factors that increase the employment of migrant women
in the domestic sphere are the aging population in Europe and the fall of
the extended family, which is a family form that consists of several genera-
tions of a family. It has been supplanted by the nuclear family, which consists
of parents and their children (orsini-Jones and Gattullo 2000). Countries
like Italy, France, and Spain admit their need for domestic labor and opt for
either legalizing a significant number of undocumented migrants, or imple-
menting a certain quota of work permits each year in this sector.8 In Spain,
84   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

the annual quota of 9,000 work permits for domestic workers has histori-
cally been used to legalize the status of Moroccan women working illegally.
Domestic employment is a sector largely avoided by European nationals, and
is widely perceived as “migrant women’s work.”9 In 1986, the vast majority of
regularized immigrant women in Italy were from Morocco (Salih 2002). The
granting of a regular migrant status would reduce the social costs of female
migration by allowing women to return home more often to visit family and
still have access to decent work.10
In addition to the large number of Moroccan women in Europe doing
low-level jobs, a significant number of highly skilled Moroccan women
migrants have high positions in medicine, engineering, finance, etc. This is
due to the increasing presence of women in higher education, the develop-
ment of trade, international division of labor, as well as to the rise of multi-
nationals since the 1990s.
However, many highly or sufficiently skilled women end up in unskilled
jobs like receptionist, cashier, or waiter, after their migration. This raises the
issue of “de-skilling” or “brain waste”, as migrants find themselves forced
to work in low-skill sectors that have nothing to do with their qualifica-
tions (Sadiqi 2007). As El Ghali (2003) points out, most Moroccan migrant
women in Spain are in employment sectors associated with hard work and
illegality, as well as exploitation, poor housing, health issues, low pay, and job
insecurity (Phillips and Taylor, 1980).
Nevertheless, most Moroccan women in Europe are insistent to render
their migratory experience a process of empowerment. Many women have
opted for self-employment as a means of partaking in a lucrative ethnic
business, such as in the fashion and food industries (Raghuram and Hardill
1998). Some of them have created small businesses in partnership with their
husbands, who usually seek the collaboration of their spouses, as this state-
ment made by Driss, a 44-year-old Moroccan travel agent in Montpellier,
indicates:

My wife and I own this travel agency which we started ten year ago. We col-
laborate and we consult each other on many things. We are doing fine. My wife
is in charge of everyday administration of the agency and paper work. I focus
on the finances, income and expenditure.

The women in these family businesses consider their participation in the


business as part and parcel of their responsibility for the family. Moreover, it
is an empowering factor in their lives because they can assert themselves in a
male-dominated space (see section below on Migration as a Transformative
Experience).
How Moroccan Women in Europe Cope and Resist   ●    85

Thus, although there is a tendency to focus on the negative facets of


migration, and the problems linked to female migrants—exploitation, dis-
crimination and job loss—migration also has advantages, namely economic
and social benefits. It is well known that a large number of these women earn
a living they never could have dreamed of in Morocco and send large parts of
their savings to their families back home.

The Case of Moroccan Women Migrants in Italy


As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, Moroccan migrants did not appear in Italy
until the 1980s. However, the majority of women arrived in that country as
single migrants during the 1980s and 1990s rather than as followers of their
husbands, as it is usually assumed (Salih 2002).
Further, Italy has been recruiting Moroccan women to migrate and repop-
ulate the country, especially before the economic recession. In this respect,
Moroccan women fill the gaps left by the crisis of the welfare state in postin-
dustrial societies by taking jobs in the domestic cleaning sectors, care-related
occupations and, in rare cases, small industries.
What is worth mentioning, however, is that according to a survey I under-
took among Moroccan female migrants in Italy, most of them are unpro-
tected, without social benefits like medical care or insurance. They express
contradictory feelings about their situation and use different strategies to
cope and survive.
In order to sustain their families left behind, many Moroccan women
in Italy save up to purchase houses or invest their savings in Morocco. This
tendency is diminishing with the process of family reunification, as children
usually push their families to tailor their lifestyle to the Italian model so as
to gain a certain social recognition and ensure their integration. Unlike their
parents, children (mainly those raised in Italy) have fully acquired Italian lan-
guage and culture, which may reduce their transnational practices, because
they seek to integrate entirely in their adopted country rather than live as
mediators between two cultures.
However, the additional stress that money transfers cause to the sending
migrants and their families, and the economic choices Moroccans engage in,
pave the way to a different type of education for children and deepen the
exclusion of migrants on economic, social, and cultural levels in the host
country. These transfers put more constraints on the family budget, which
often leads to less education and less health care for the family members
(Martin 2010).
A sort of hybridity of class among Moroccan women migrants in Italy is
also noticeable as they lead two paradoxical social lives. In the host country,
86   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

they have a low social status, whereas in Morocco they enjoy a prestigious posi-
tion. This is the case of Halima, who works as a maid in Milan, but once back
in Morocco her social position changes to master, as she is able to, in turn,
have a maid working for her. Migration indirectly enhances not only the social
status of migrants in Morocco, but also that of their families. This is evident
during wedding celebrations, for example, where the family’s housework is per-
formed by hired women outside the family circle (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2004).
However, Moroccan women feel anxious about their transnational identity,
as they are not always able to rid themselves of the feelings of guilt, rupture,
and stress, which are direct results of their wish to belong to both countries.
To validate this argument, I quote Lamia, whom I interviewed in Florence:

For my family and me, it’s better to return to Morocco. We have enough savings
now, and we prefer to educate our children in a Muslim environment. Being
a migrant, you belong neither here nor in your home country. In Morocco,
we are called “fakans” (holiday-makers) or “ttalian” (Italians) and in Italy, we
are called Moroccans or immigrants. There is an identity issue and the uncer-
tainty of the future. We are not sure our kids have a better opportunity here,
especially with the economic crisis today, which does not seem to want to end.

Transnationalism for Moroccan women means a wise and reasonable distri-


bution of resources between Italy and Morocco. It implies both satisfying the
needs of children in Italy and meeting relatives’ expectations in Morocco.
However, this entails sacrifices and psychological strains for the women
migrants. In the past, Moroccan migrants used to invest in projects that gave
the illusion of return. Today, most migrant women engage in transnational
practices that could enable their simultaneous integration and insertion in
both countries (Killian 2006: ch. 3). Transnationalism has a dark side, as well,
for the long quest for the ultimate home is made at the expense of the future
of the children and their education, and at the expense of achieving secure
identities and a long-term symbolic capital. This kind of transnationalism
linking migrants with their country of origin is also experienced by Moroccan
women in the UK, as the following section shows.

Moroccan Women in the UK


Research about Moroccan women in the UK is scarce. Historically, and
unlike in other European countries, Moroccan women immigrants in the
UK have outnumbered men from the outset. As we stated in chapter 1, the
first wave of Moroccan migration to Great Britain took place during the early
1960s and involved mainly women who came from the regions of Berkane
How Moroccan Women in Europe Cope and Resist   ●    87

and Meknès. They had work permits and worked largely in the fields, picking
fruits and vegetables.11
The second wave took place in the early 1970s as a result of employment
contracts obtained by guest workers from northern Morocco, chiefly Larache,
Asilah, Tetuan, and Tangiers. This group comprised essentially women who
held jobs in hotels and hospitals, and most of them were single, unlike in
other European countries where women migrated with their husbands or
joined them in family reunification. Many of these women married non-
Moroccans, and were the only breadwinners in their families, because their
husbands were often jobless. Because of this, Moroccan women had a more
advantageous position when it came to decision-making and autonomy and
as a result became actors of change and integration.
Moroccan women in the UK have played a great role in the advance-
ment and welfare of their families. Their profile has changed significantly
with the family reunification that began in the 1970s, and the great majority
of the first generation of Moroccan women migrants now has British citizen-
ship (Cherti 2008: 80). The current female migration from Morocco, which
started in the 1990s, consists mainly of skilled Moroccan professionals, most
of whom work in business and finance sectors in London. This group is rather
small, not exceeding a thousand women (Cherti 2008: 81).
There are many women’s civil society organizations in Britain. One of
the most well known is the Al-Hasaniya Moroccan Women’s Centre, which
celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary in 2010. It is a grassroots organization
providing guidance and counseling to Moroccan women and their families
concerning benefits, housing, homelessness, domestic violence, education,
and health. The association also organizes social and cultural events and
offers English and Arabic classes, as well as various activities for the youth
and elderly (Communities 2009: 49). It aims to promote positive citizenship
and greater understanding among communities. This association has become
“by default a mouthpiece for women, not only in London area but also on
an international level.” For instance, it was very active in the campaign for
women’s rights in Morocco (Talsi interview).12
In 2011, Souad Talsi, founder of the Al-Hasaniya Moroccan Women’s
Centre in London, was named on the Queen’s Birthday Honours List to
receive an MBE13 for her services to the Moroccan community in Britain.
She remembers how her friends, when they reached the age of sixteen, were
married off to cousins from Morocco, who then came and joined their spouses
in Britain.14
Given the fact that British society is more open and cosmopolitan than
France, and has no colonial past with Morocco, Moroccan women easily
adapt and integrate in the UK. They have professionally evolved over the
88   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

years, from simple cleaners and employees to executives, bank managers,


engineers, financial analysts, lawyers, doctors, etc. They are very ambitious
about their offspring’s education and future, and they are keen on transmit-
ting the cultural values of their home country.
Women seem more committed than men to their homeland, since they
have kept close ties with family and relatives in Morocco, where they have
invested economically, purchasing property and opening personal businesses.
In 2007, remittances sent by Moroccans living in Great Britain reached
almost 2.5 billion dirhams, and women made half of these transfers. These
transfers exceeded those from Germany, which hosts a larger Moroccan
immigrant community.15
Anglo-Moroccan women of the third generation do not intend to return
permanently to Morocco for several reasons: lack of opportunities in the
home country, paucity of social benefits, problems of re-adjustment, and lack
of freedom for women.

Moroccan Women in the Netherlands


In the Netherlands, the emancipation of Moroccan women has recently
become a major goal of the state. Muslim Moroccan women are being
focused on as a group that badly needs emancipation, as they have been for a
long time invisible and voiceless as wives and daughters of immigrant guest
workers. Most of them were dependent on the male migrants who brought
them to the Netherlands for family reunification or arranged marriages.
Dutch policies have started to involve women more in the education of
their families, giving them a prominent place in government measures, with
the understanding that this will help them emancipate but also bridge the
social and cultural dichotomy between “liberal citizenship and Muslim iden-
tity” and reduce the gap between the native Dutch people and the Moroccan
community (Roggeband and Verloo 2007). Thus there is emphasis on the
cultural dimension, assuming that the Muslim culture is the problem, not
the dominant Dutch culture. This implies that Muslim migrants should first
change their culture before they can integrate and participate in Dutch soci-
ety. This strategy perpetuates the gap between the Dutch people and the other
ethnic groups, and recreates the dichotomy between men and women, as well
as between Muslim and modern Western (Dutch) cultures. However, the gov-
ernment limits its role to providing advice and proposing criteria in a pater-
nalistic manner, but without offering any resources. This framing ignores the
very disadvantageous socioeconomic situation of Moroccan women migrants,
their often low level of education and discrimination against them.
How Moroccan Women in Europe Cope and Resist   ●    89

The negative representations of Moroccan women as traditional, back-


ward, and oppressed by Muslim male domination will increase prejudices
against Muslim women as being submissive, passive, and ignorant, and may
diminish their emancipation and participation in Dutch society, and thus
may have the reverse impact of what the state seeks to achieve (Roggeband
and Verloo 2007).
When asked to provide a list of four problems Moroccan immigrant
women face, most respondents first mentioned unemployment, which affects
women in real and disproportionate ways; second, racism; third, Dutch and
European people’s disrespect for “our religion;” and fourth, being treated as
foreigners, even with their Dutch passport.

Migration as a Transformative Experience


Moroccan migrant women today struggle to secure employment, ensure
their financial independence, and integrate in European society. For many
of them, migration is a transformative experience. Once they have discov-
ered a new degree of freedom, they refuse to return to “the restrictive social
environment of their native land” (Killian 2006: 64). Their participation in
economic development is remarkable and has an impact on family relations
and gender roles. It contributes to their emancipation and empowerment, the
transgression of the conservative image of women, and the rupture of tradi-
tional gender relations. Both the women left behind by male migrants and
women migrants themselves subvert gender roles by participating in public
life, and economic and social development. As Tahar Ben Jelloun (2004) put
it, “they fight with all their energy in Morocco and in Europe, and manage
to introduce considerable changes in traditional society; they blow up the
harem metaphor and the negative aspects it entails like resignation, servility,
and fatality.”
Many of the women I interviewed or talked to stated that migration was
an opportunity for them to evolve and be emancipated. Most of them yearned
to become more economically independent because they “felt subordinated
and subjugated by their husbands and male relatives.” Fayza (a 37-year-old
French teacher in Belgium), decided to divorce her husband and sue him,
because “he was a drunkard and violent.” To make ends meet, she had to
teach extra private lessons in order to educate her two sons, and spent the rest
of her free time learning English.
Most of my respondents mentioned that they were less discriminated
against than men for they were seen by Europeans first as women, and sec-
ond as Muslim or migrant. In addition, European men are often gallant and
courteous toward women of any nationality. It is also perhaps because women
90   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

are considered less of a threat in the street, and are responsible, peaceful, and
hardworking. “French men in particular are more courteous with us than
with men, which is unjust to men,” says Ghita, a 45-year old pharmacist in
France. This perception is confirmed by Killian (2006: 80) who explained:
“This was particularly true of women who played the game, “doing” gender
according to French norms, and thus got more aid from French people.”
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the integration of women in the job
market had positive effects on their families and households. For many
migrant women, work enabled them to acquire a new status as bread ­winners
or economic agents, helping them integrate into society and partake in active
life. They also achieved independence and an improved lifestyle. Salaried
women, for instance, no longer depended on their husbands’ income and
contributed to the family budget, savings, and the management of their
household. Siham (39, cleaner in France) stated:

Unlike Morocco, here it’s impossible to stay without a job, unless the husband
has a very good income . . . You need to pay the bills, to pay for the kids school,
to pay the rent, in addition to the high cost of living.

Active women also make important decisions concerning their children’s


education, and contribute to the growth of the family. It is actually the finan-
cial and economic circumstances of the household that push many husbands
to allow their wives to work outside the home, which is, for many of these
men, a revolutionary step that leads to relaxation of family and social con-
straints on women. This status of autonomy is strong among career and
entrepreneur women.
Many migrant Moroccan women believe that work gives them their eco-
nomic independence and freedom, and reinforces their need for entrepre-
neurship. Karima (47, nurse in Italy) explains:

Since I have started working, I pay for my kids’ school, pay for their food and
clothing, and buy what I need. I go out to work, to do some shopping and to
get things done in town. When I joined my husband twenty years ago, I was a
housewife. But now with my job, I feel liberated and independent.

Thus, work is the means by which women can alleviate the difficult socio-
economic context in which they live. As mentioned above, a small category
of women have created their own businesses after a long, unsuccessful job
search. Thus for them, designing their business entails creating their employ-
ment and being responsible, knowing that running one’s enterprise is not an
easy task, as it requires skill and hard work. Here as well, the support of the
family is crucial for the success of the business.
How Moroccan Women in Europe Cope and Resist   ●    91

Numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations have put in


place programs for training migrant women and others from diverse cultures
and backgrounds to become successful entrepreneurs. The United Nations
Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) has trained over 3,000
women migrants in Europe at different stages in their businesses.16 Women
entrepreneurs can seek the support of different organizations to improve
their productivity. Most of the businesses created by Moroccan women are
service-related (hotels, restaurants, cafés, hair salons, shops, food stores, etc.).
Moroccan entrepreneurial women represent 22 percent of Moroccan entre-
preneurship in France. They come first, before Algerian women (5 percent)
and Tunisians (10 percent). These figures do not, however, mean that a femi-
nine middle class is emerging. These women are part of the elite who have
received higher education and sophisticated training, and have accumulated
the required experience.
In Belgium, the Moroccan community has the highest number of women
entrepreneurs compared with other migrant communities. In Spain, self-
employed women represent 3 percent of the Moroccan female workers. They
are particularly active in commerce, are often highly educated, have been
living in Spain for a long time, or have originated from a family of entrepre-
neurs or trade people.
In general, Moroccan women entrepreneurs are active and successful.
Nadia, a 47-year-old woman with a clothing business in Spain, said to me:
“I want to be my own director.” Naima, 41, entrepreneur in Belgium, states:
“I want to show people what I am capable of after my husband left me”.
A third woman, Souad (36, restaurant owner in France), asserts: “I am proud
to be my own boss and to be responsible for my family.”17
Migration has contributed to the emergence of a generation of responsible
and enterprising Moroccan women as much as at the economic level as at
the sociocultural and political levels; they are symbolic figures who, while
integrated in their host societies, participate in the human development of
their country of origin. A survey led by Anthias et al. (2013) reveals that these
businesswomen have acquired experience, capital, and family support, and
are involved in networks, which enable them to start and succeed in their
project. The cultural hurdles are, thus, less important than the hard regula-
tions and gender-based discrimination.
Moreover, Moroccan women have reached top decision-making posi-
tions. By way of illustration, in France we can mention former Minister of
Justice Rachida Dati, and current Minister of Women’s Rights Najat Vallaud-
Belkacem. In Italy, we can mention Souad Sbai, member of Parliament, and
in Belgium there is Nadia Sminate, who is the first Moroccan mayor (see
details in chapter 10 on success stories).
92   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Thus, Moroccan women have become visible in European public life, as


most of them are no longer restricted to doing the traditional tasks of house-
work and child-rearing. They enjoy more freedom, autonomy, and emancipa-
tion, thanks to their participation in active life. This has changed the image
of the Muslim woman in general, and of the Moroccan woman in particular,
who hitherto was “referred to as the traditional mother of a large number of
kids,” as Lebon (1983: 55) states.18
Moroccan women have transformed gender relations and transgressed
old family traditions and rules of conduct. They have become independent
individuals with a responsibility to contribute to the development of their
host and home countries, in addition to the well-being of their families.
Entrepreneurship has allowed Moroccan women to “get rid of the old men-
tality of the Harem and has opened all doors for women to be creative, inno-
vative, and productive.”19
Female migration has also a positive impact on families left behind;
for instance, the remittances sent back home contribute to improving the
housing conditions, health, and socioeconomic status of their families, and
especially improves educational opportunities for their children back home
(Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008: ch. 9).
The amount of remittances sent by migrant women to their families back
in Morocco is roughly the same as for male migrants. However, studies sug-
gest that the share of income repatriated is more important than in the case
of men (Cherti 2008: 21). In addition, remittances are more regular, extend
over a longer period, and are most often sent to other women who have cus-
tody of their children.
On a cultural level, Moroccan women’s experience in Europe shows how
contact with dissimilar cultures, languages, and faiths has brought about a
unique third space—a kind of hybridity between Western lifestyles and mul-
ticultural realities where gender relations, identities, power, and religions are
negotiated, and where there is a cross between two separate cultures: Muslim/
African and Western (Bhabha 2004). As Martin (2010: 1) puts it:

This space creates an opportunity for change propelled principally by the cour-
age, agency, and mobility of female characters that weaken patriarchal domina-
tion in Muslim society and counter powerful Western ideologies.

The interaction between European and Moroccan cultures permeated by


individual values and experiences regenerates Morocco’s historical links with
different European countries and allows opportunity for a revived multicul-
tural, multilingual, multiethnic European society. Women migrants’ partici-
pation and contribution have impacted the transformations taking place in
How Moroccan Women in Europe Cope and Resist   ●    93

twenty-first century Europe, which, according to many researchers, could


foster migrants’ integration and the strengthening of Europe’s relations with
North Africa. This encounter could equally contribute to consolidating the
dialogue between Muslims and Westerners and developing economic, social,
and cultural exchanges between Europe and North Africa.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the issue of Moroccan women’s conditions in
Europe, and the factors that characterize their employment in the European
context. The overwhelming majority of these women are largely confined to
the least prestigious jobs in services, domestic work, and the clothing indus-
try. Because their skills are not always acknowledged, they are compelled to
work in areas that have nothing to do with the training they received. Given
the increasing rate of racial and gender-based discrimination, a significant
number of women have resorted to self-employment in pursuit of economic
and social welfare. Governments and civil society organizations in both the
sending and receiving countries are required to reaffirm their commitment
to the cause of migrant women and their empowerment. The priority is
to ensure that their migration experience is constructive and conducive to
development.
This chapter has also discussed the negative stereotypes of Muslim women
as oppressed and passive human beings with no power whatsoever to make
any change in their lives. It underlines female agency in international migra-
tion, and shows, on the contrary, that Moroccan women make such brave
decisions as migration, despite its challenges, in order to better their lives and
to be free and independent.
This study corroborates recent research that Moroccan women regard
migration as an opportunity to build a new life, whereas men consider it
an occasion to display their masculinity (Killian 2006; Martin 2010). Male
migrants often associate migration with the loss of power and control over
their family, especially the women, and retaliate by constructing hurdles
trying to prevent Western influences that disturb or threaten their control.
When they see that women have achieved strength and financial indepen-
dence, they feel insecure to the extent that some of them turn to domestic
violence, while others turn to religion, in this case Islam or Muslim funda-
mentalism. Consequently, the popular stereotypes of men being strong and
dominant contrasted with the weak and obedient women are eliminated,
provoking a sort of anxiety that shatters the patriarchal system.
Thus, women’s emancipation through migration undermines the patriar-
chal authority that traditionally subjugates women and relegates them to the
94   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

home and the rearing of children. This is one of the main reasons why the vast
majority of women believe that migration is irreversible and a survival strat-
egy that helps them focus on building a better future in their new country.
Thus, they represent a new type of feminism that contributes to gender equity,
a culture of sharing and dialogue, social development, and the s­ ubversion of
old gender roles.
In contrast with the theory of Orientalism, which portrays women as
weak, subdued, and powerless, Moroccan women show a strong resistance
to the current stereotypes and to the status quo (Said 1977). They have the
ability to adapt to Western values, negotiate their own culture through the
complex aspects of modernism and liberalism, and adopt a critical female
non-­Western viewpoint which, unlike Orientalist theory, considers woman a
strong, ­independent, and dynamic individual who does have agency in soci-
ety, a “Reverse Orientalism,” as Martin (2010: 1) formulates it.
Chapter 6

Education and Language Issues

T
his chapter is based on a number of recent education surveys and
sociolinguistic studies within the lines of Merryfield (2010), Jenks
(2010), and Shohamy (2004), which consider linguistic and educa-
tional development a complex cultural activity that is inseparable from the
individual’s historical, socioeconomic, and cultural context. Language learn-
ing and socialization through language are part of the integration process in
the host society, where the identity of children and adults is formed through
the social norms and meanings shared by the linguistic community at large.
Similar studies in the United States have underscored the important role of
the sociocultural factor in any analysis of language and education achieve-
ments among immigrants. See, for example, the work of Fishman (1989),
Gallimore and Goldenberg (1993), Schiffman (1996), Schechter and Bayley
(1997), Cooper, Shohamy and Walters (2001), and Grant and Sleeter (2011).
According to these studies, parents adopt different strategies depending
on their attitudes toward the dominant language and culture. While some
of them endeavor to assimilate to the target culture, thereby rejecting their
language of origin, others resist the assimilation process and affirm their heri-
tage by maintaining the family language and cultural values. This chapter
also borrows from Bourdieu’s (1977) critical theory of linguistic exchanges,
which suggests that in a social context of inequality some groups must invest
more energy and work more strategically than others to acquire the neces-
sary resources for survival in the competitive linguistic and job markets. For
Bourdieu (ibid.), these resources include linguistic competence that func-
tions, like any other capital, in close relation with the employment market.
The analysis in this chapter corroborates the findings of Dagenais and
Day (1998) and Dagenais and Jacquet (2000), which show that immigrant
families value bilingual education while resisting assimilation through the
maintenance of (and loyalty to) the mother tongue. Along the lines of Hurd
96   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

(1993) and Lamarre (1997), the chapter shows that bilingual education is
advantageous, especially when the first language is maintained and valued.
Hurd (ibid.) emphasizes that students from linguistic minorities can succeed
in immersion programs on the condition that they pursue studying their lan-
guage of origin at home and at school. The chapter will explore the kind of
bilingual education that Moroccan immigrants are exposed to, and how chil-
dren cope with the different European languages and immersion programs
while continuing to speak and preserve their mother tongue. The chapter
will focus on the tension between integration and resistance to assimilation
that seems to characterize the actions of Moroccan children and parents who
encourage multilingualism and bilingual education as part of a national and
transnational education strategy.
The present chapter is based on semi-structured interviews with 14 fami-
lies with school-age children, 12 teachers, and 20 Moroccan students in pri-
mary, secondary and higher education. The participants in the survey were
originally from northern and central Morocco, and most spoke both their
mother tongue and the official language of the host country. The parents
received at least elementary education, and the majority finished their sec-
ondary education. Some of them were unemployed but most had jobs in ser-
vices, agriculture, and industry. This survey sought to find out their children’s
school attainment and the degree of their integration or assimilation in the
host country.
From the semi-structured interviews and conversations I had with some
respondents, the native language was affirmed to be the language of interac-
tion with parents, extended family members, and their linguistic commu-
nity. The main remark was that parents gave a lot of weight or “symbolic
importance” to bilingualism and multilingualism, as Bourdieu (1977) states.
Parents chose bilingual education for their offspring as a means to facilitate
their integration in the European society and were basically keen to ensure a
“brighter tomorrow” for their children, as Suarez-Orozco (1991) mentioned
in relation to Latino-Americans in the United States.
According to the statements of Moroccan parents, their support of learn-
ing additional languages did not seem to be a hindrance to the maintenance
of the language of origin, in line with Schechter and Bayley’s (1977) findings
about Latino-Americans in the United States. Different immigrants actually
adopted different strategies with the goal of maintaining their mother tongue.
Concerning school achievement among children of Moroccan heritage,
there was an overall positive outcome for both sexes. The degree of satis-
faction ranged from satisfied to very satisfied according to various factors,
namely age, gender, social class, legal status, and family environment.
Education and Language Issues   ●    97

Language Education and Performance


The Moroccan communities in France and Belgium seemed fluent in French, as
about two-thirds of them spoke and wrote it fairly well. Approximately half of
the Moroccan population in the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, and Great Britain
mastered the target language to a satisfactory degree (De Haas et al. 2010; Jamai
2008). Multilingualism was favored by these communities because it allowed
the acquisition of a linguistic capital inside and outside the host country.
This multilingual strategy adopted by Moroccan families not only encour-
aged their children to learn other languages that their parents usually did not
speak or had not mastered, but also allowed them to build linguistic identities
different from those of the first generation. As a result, children of Moroccan
descent became members of the bilingual community in the host country
and of the international multilingual community.
This survey revealed that language learning and socialization were more
than simply the transmission of values and the enriching of the linguistic
repertoire of the immigrant child, but it reflected the collective construction
of new identities and linguistic practices by family members. The interpreta-
tion of language learning among Moroccan students upholds the findings in
Toohey (1998) and Ibrahim (1999), carried out among bilinguals in Canada,
where bilingual education lead to the building of a new identity.
While parents adopted the strategy of integration, they resisted the lin-
guistic assimilation by adopting strategies of maintenance and loyalty to the
language of origin and by stressing their identity through the affiliation to
their family members and linguistic community in Europe and Morocco. As
immigrants, these parents knew very well the importance of linguistic capi-
tal for their survival and they hoped that multilingualism would give their
children an advantage over monolinguals and bilinguals, in whatever country
they eventually chose to live.
The findings confirmed that there was a huge difference between parents’
and children’s performance because parents often had a low educational
background, and there was an increasing trend toward higher achievement
in average education in the host country. Similar results were obtained by
Pereira and Tavares (2000) about Portuguese children in France.
Yamna, 49, a housewife originally from Tawnate, Morocco, who has lived
in the Netherlands for 20 years, says she still has difficulties speaking Dutch:

I understand Dutch but I can’t speak it fluently. It’s because I am a housewife,


and I devoted all my stay here to educate children and to do housework. I have
started going out to the market to do errands only two years after the kids have
all gone to university. Children first.
98   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

However, many migrants, both men and women, try to improve their lan-
guage skills because they certainly know that lacking command of the target
European language is a significant barrier to communication and to their inte-
gration in the host society. Some take evening classes, some are helped by associa-
tions because they do not want to remain dependent on their children or others.
Naima and Fatiha, two female cleaners in their late thirties from the north
of Morocco, have lived in Germany for over 19 years and take evening classes
in order to be able to speak and write German. When they first arrived in this
country, they did not speak a word of German. For their transactions, they
needed a translator, usually a family member or friend. But now, they are
quite fluent in the language. Naima had this to tell me:

It was extremely hard for me to communicate with people here when I first
came to Germany with my mother. I spoke only French and Arabic, not
­German. I was frustrated since I could not do any errands on my own or find
a job. Now, after many language classes and certificates, I feel confident, and
I am optimistic to find a better job in the future, especially that I am taking
computing skills in order to become a secretary.

When migrants speak French, German, English, or Dutch, they usually do


it with a Moroccan accent that discloses their identity and origin and marks
them as foreigners. Migrants with language problems suffer from isolation
and marginalization and usually do manual jobs or domestic work.
According to many interviewees, there are several hurdles in education
that prevent migrants’ children from staying in schools. Aicha, a 34-year-old
Dutch-Moroccan woman noted in the interview:

I think the obstacles in education and in employment are a matter of prejudices


against migrants and their descendents. Most Moroccan immigrants’ children
are obliged to choose technical and professional training instead of finishing
their general education up to university. I was told that my written Dutch was
not very good, so I was barred from reaching higher education. I was then
oriented to vocational training.

This challenging situation is also the outcome of a lack of monitoring and


support from the parents, many of whom are semi-literate or illiterate and
ignorant of the education system of the host country.
Another young girl named Halima, age 22, told her story: her headmaster
had asked her father to come to school to sign documents for her to do tech-
nical studies because she was “weak” in math. Her father was semi-literate
(he barely knew how to read and write Dutch), and had no knowledge of
the Dutch system of education or about the document he was going to sign.
Education and Language Issues   ●    99

But luckily Halima dissuaded him from signing, and she fought to continue
her general studies because of her good grades, and recently she managed to
obtain a degree in chemistry.
The difficult access to proper education is probably also the result of inad-
equate migration policies. Mehdi, a 29-year-old software engineer in France,
explained:

I think initially, the French authorities did not believe that these immigrants
would have children, and anyway, for them, the children of immigrants were
only good as a potential workforce. So there was no social or educational sup-
port for these children. This is why their schools directed them to vocational
training. However, many of these students felt disoriented, as they loathed
what they were studying, and many eventually dropped out of school. Because
of lack of support, a few of them turned to drugs and to delinquency.

One way of comparing the performance of Moroccan migrants’ children


in Europe is by looking at how they compare with their cousins who stayed
back in Morocco. Migrants’ children are expected to have higher attain-
ment given the sophisticated infrastructure and the higher levels of educa-
tion in Europe. Additionally, it would be interesting to compare immigrants’
children with European children; however, one must be careful to take into
account class and the social background as important variables, since first-
generation migrants mostly belonged to the working class.
According to Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen (2007)’s empirical study,
academic competence in language and math is not determined by ethnicity
or parents’ occupation, but by social class and merit. Their findings reveal
that Moroccan students have generally lower achievements at the high-school
level. Nevertheless, given the complex nature of education systems, it is dubi-
ous whether “class versus ethnicity” models can truthfully contrast accom-
plishments of native and immigrant Moroccan students in the Netherlands.1
The big difference is between Moroccan parents and their children, for
their performance is considerably distinct. Children improved over the years
in spectacular ways and had usually a better level of education than their
parents. Yet, only a comparison with neighbors can help us address the issue
of assimilation, because it is with Europeans that migrants’ children compete
for employment in the job market. The social success and ascension of these
children is dependent on the high qualifications they obtain.
The results of this survey show that the performances of the second-gener-
ation migrants and their neighbors of the same age were extremely different.
A young migrant whose father is a manual worker usually spends about nine
years in school, whereas his European neighbor in the same situation often
stays in schools for over 12 years.2 Moroccan Migrants who arrived after the
100   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

1980s seem to appreciate education more than the first wave of migrants,
and their children have a higher probability to finish 12 years of education.
The findings also reveal that the young Moroccans who stayed in the
home country had also the same probability of spending not more than nine
years on average in school (Ennaji 2005, ch. 10). In terms of their qualifica-
tions and performance, young immigrants were very much comparable to
their neighbors than to their cousins who did not migrate. Girls of Moroccan
heritage had more probability to reach university than boys, as female sec-
ond-generation migrants competed with their European neighbors to achieve
more qualifications and higher education. The social milieu, notably the par-
ents’ occupations and educational level, had an impact on the educational
attainment of their children. The blue-collar worker with low education has
less probability to ensure high qualifications for his children than a qualified
worker. The same remark applies to the European non-migrant neighbors.
In the Netherlands, Moroccan students are more likely to be in schools that
disallow pursuing higher education, and their chances to enter university are
rather slim in comparison with native students. There are many reasons for this
tendency, but suffice it to mention the factor of merit, the low educational level
of parents, lack of command of Dutch language, and discrimination. Because of
their limited qualifications and opportunities, most of the students end up doing
a manual job and earning a low income (Amersfoort and Doomernik 2005:
83). After about 25 years of the community’s existence in the Netherlands, the
Dutch educational system was only able to manage to send one single student of
Moroccan origin to university in the academic year of 1986/87 (De Haas 2009).
Since then, the representation of Moroccan students in Dutch universi-
ties has been steadily increasing. The number of students of Moroccan origin
was 170 in 1997, 154 in 1998, 175 in 1999, 239 in 2000 and 203 in 2001
(Severiens and Wolff 2008). On the other hand, the accumulative dropout
rate was respectively 24.21 percent in 1997, 25.20 percent in 1998 and
27.88 percent in 1999 (Jamai 2012).3
As the first generation of Moroccan migrants are preparing themselves for
their retirement, the second and third generations are increasingly moving
toward jobs within the European Union requiring higher levels of education and
sophisticated training. In 2010, over 90,000 Moroccan students were studying
in European universities, where the majority of them selected subjects such as
computer science, economics, engineering, and social studies (Daoud 2011).

Education and Integration


Education is another way to measure the extent of Moroccans’ integration
in Europe. First-generation migrants for the most part came with little or no
Education and Language Issues   ●    101

qualifications, with the exception of those highly qualified Moroccans who


came to study at European universities (Neels 2000; Sadiqi 2003; Ennaji
and Sadiqi 2008, ch. 6). Second-generation men and women have improved
their lot, with the latter at times even performing better than second-gener-
ation men (see chapter 5). The learning achievements of second-generation
Moroccans vary and are usually underrated depending on the host country
and region of residence.
According to Phalet and Swyngedouw (2003), there are discrepancies due
to regional factors in so far as they differ in the quality of immigrants they
attract and in the infrastructures and support they provide to immigrants.
For example, the qualifications of Moroccan men in Belgium suggest some
progress in Flanders, but not in Wallonia. However, large-scale surveys and
objective analyses of educational practices are needed to find out how regional
educational disparities may contribute to ethnic inequalities within regions.
Neels (2000), who analyzes school attainment of Moroccan students
in comparison with their Turkish counterparts, observes that Moroccan
students perform well in Flanders and Brussels, although their failure rate
may be higher because they choose risky and ambitious specialties, whereas
their Turkish fellows adopt the avoid failure strategy by selecting voca-
tional training or less demanding subjects, reducing their failure and school­
dropout rate.4
However, in general, Moroccan students are at a disadvantage if compared
with the attainment of native Belgians or other Europeans, although there
are variations in educational achievement and progress across the Moroccan
community (Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003).
Generally, the small income of Moroccan immigrants is closely linked
to their low level of education and their poor housing conditions. By con-
trast, with regard to education, their children—at least those who remain
in school—are among those immigrant students who obtain relatively good
results. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the number of Moroccan c­ hildren
in primary and secondary schools usually outweighs that of students in higher
education (Jamai 2012).
In France, the question of the education of immigrant children was raised
as an issue for the first time in the 1970s due to increased contributions of
immigrant guest workers. Measures were taken to deal with immigrant stu-
dents in French public schools, sparking a debate about their school difficul-
ties and the uncertainty about their future. The issues of language, ethnicity,
religion, and secularism were discussed. Religion, mother tongue, and culture
of origin were considered obstacles to Moroccan learners’ achievements.
In the 1980s, research showed that French public schools were only barely
concerned with the issue of immigrants’ education. To help reduce their
102   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

school difficulties, the state adopted intercultural training and programs,


based on the intercultural approach that fosters fundamental values of toler-
ance and non-discrimination. Today, with their arrival on the political scene,
young Moroccans of immigrant descent have decided to claim their civil and
social rights—without feeling disloyal toward the adoptive country (see chap-
ter 10). Second-generation migrants are, however, ghettoized in the same
category as their parents (Noiriel 1988), although they were born and raised
in France but within families that have different cultures and traditions than
the native French people.
The Moroccan immigrants’ children have to make cultural choices, while
the French school ignores their heritage and difference. Most parents thought
that school would facilitate the integration of their children and would help
them attain social mobility. Despite differences in culture and ethnicity, par-
ents expect their children to succeed so that they can enjoy a better life than
they had, and be more accepted and integrated in the host society.
Not always knowing the French school system well, many parents tend
to expect too much from their children and their school. Leman (1991)
shows that there is a misunderstanding of the school system, not realizing
that the primary school determines their children’s path later, which does
not often allow the children to acquire skills that will be beneficial for the
future and will determine their socioeconomic status later (Chouarra 2006).
Most Moroccan parents do not know, for example, that school has two major
roles: first, the socialization role, which is learning the rules of social life that
lead to cultural assimilation and citizenship; and second, the transmission of
knowledge and skills to integrate in the job market.
The early years of schooling of young Moroccan children are usually about
learning new rules, a lifestyle different from that they experience in their
homes with their parents, through learning a European language, and acquir-
ing Western behaviors, rules, and values. Their integration will be consid-
ered as school integration, which is probably the factor that determines social
and economic integration. School integration is measured by (1) the quality,
quantity, and content of the studied curriculum, (2) the success of the learn-
ers, (3) the qualifications they acquire and credentials obtained at the end
of training. These conditions constitute the criteria for social mobility and
success.
Wallet et al. (1996) argue that school has an assimilation role, as it is the
process whereby immigrants or children of immigrant descent learn the new
culture, improve their knowledge, and converge to that of native students.
However, assimilation is realized through time and it is achieved when immi-
grant learners’ achievements are high, and when parents’ expectations are
higher than those of the average immigrant in the community. For instance,
Education and Language Issues   ●    103

Moroccan families invest in the education of their children because they


want to give them the best chances and opportunities to ensure their upward
mobility and their socioeconomic advancement.
Because of families’ positive attitude toward education, students are
encouraged to perform well at school and use education as the tool of inte-
gration. However, children are supposed to appropriate a culture that is not
their own in order to succeed, sometimes leading to an identity crisis, which
is experienced in the discomfort in their speech or in the uncertainty about
their goals and their future.
Tribalat (1995) argues that North African children born in France have
managed to perform slightly better than French children when their par-
ents have a good occupational status or a mastery of French. Success has an
important meaning for this category of Moroccan students who do not wish
to remain in the social class or status of their parents. Descendants of immi-
grants feel valued and recognized when they are assimilated to the dominant
culture in a society in which they participate actively through their school
achievement or successful professional career.
Assia, 20 years old, of Moroccan origin, was wearing a skirt and t-shirt
when I interviewed her about her integration in her French school in
Montpellier. Here is what she told me:

I wear Western clothes, I dye my hair and wear colored blue eye-lenses and lis-
ten to music in the street using my iPod. I am French from Moroccan descent
and I feel like other students. I am well integrated, and I study hard to get
the best grades in order to succeed in my studies because I aspire to become a
medical doctor in the future.

Various approaches have shown that once the learners know their roots
and accept their own identities, they have a sense of control over their own
development and what they want to achieve (Manço and Tap 1999: 183).
This consolidates their self-confidence and self-esteem and facilitates their
integration. Thus, immersion in the culture of origin seems to favor the
personal development of the migrant and the reduction of identity tensions
­arising from a multicultural context.
There is a link between the objective of social mobility through school
attainment, identity, and the desire to meet the requirements needed for eco-
nomic integration in the host country. Most Moroccan migrant youth have
in mind to go to university to get a good degree that will help them achieve
social mobility and socioeconomic integration. Their attachment to their cul-
ture of origin does not prevent them from realizing their dreams nor does it
preclude integration (Amersfoort and Doomernik 2005).
104   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Along with these findings, Manço and Tap (1999) consider that the fact
these young people claim identity is relevant in the sense that they are trying
to link their past full of struggle for survival with the experiences of the pres-
ent and expectations of the future. This balance is defined by El Moubaraki
(1989) as a harmony between the home country values and the requirements
of socioeconomic integration, and is the result of a concord between the
rules of conduct in the society of origin and the new values and aspirations.
Therefore, integration does not imply a rejection of the culture of origin, but
the articulation of these cultural specificities (see chapter 7).
This idea of integration is confirmed by Hassan (a 22-year-old univer-
sity biology student in France), who stressed the importance of his cultural
identity:

My parents are originally from Meknès, Morocco. I was born and raised here
in Dijon. I feel both Moroccan and French. I have two identities let’s say. I am
proud of my ethnicity as a Moroccan, Berber, and Muslim. My dream is to
become a computer scientist and earn a lot of money to be able to live well
and help my parents who support me a great deal. I am appreciated in class by
my teachers and class-mates, and I don’t feel discriminated against or bullied.

Thus, migrants or their descendents who succeed in their integration and


assimilation are usually those who are firmly aware of their cultural roots,
who feel a sense of identity. This category of people generally ends up achiev-
ing integration in the host society socially, professionally, and economically.
Admittedly, even though second-generation migrants are better integrated
in the host society than their parents, they remain stigmatized in the media,
which portray them as a homogeneous ethnic group and as a source of many
social evils. In addition, the way the media target Islam as a “violent” religion
makes it harder for the young of the second generation to strike the balance
between their culture of origin and the new culture.
Foner (2013, ch. 1), who analyzed the similarities and differences between
European and US experiences of migration, found that in the US as well,
fears that second-generation children would not learn English or perform
well at school were unfounded. She argued that many second-generation
Asians or Italians in America achieved outstanding levels in their English
language proficiency, as well as in their careers and social status. Most of
them also spoke English better than their parents and enjoyed social upward
­mobility. With respect to the United States, she noticed that despite the anxi-
ety and worry, the general prospects were positive. Nevertheless, Foner (ibid.)
observed the existence of significant dissimilarities among the diverse immi-
grant groups. For example, while Asian and European second-generation
migrants surpassed the children of native white Americans in school, many
Education and Language Issues   ●    105

black and Latino second-generation migrants dropped out of school. This


category of immigrants’ children faced discrimination and prejudice, espe-
cially those with poor or undocumented parents (ibid.).
Thus, the overall outlook is positive, especially as second-generation
Moroccans are concerned. Recent studies on second-generation Moroccans
in Europe confirm that most children of immigrant descent cope well in
schools, speak the host country language better, and feel more integrated
than their parents. In the Netherlands, for example, many second-gener-
ation Moroccans are reported to have a mastery of Dutch language skills.
In Germany, most Moroccan children speak German fluently and are quite
integrated in the German system of education. In France, their educational
level has surpassed that of their immigrant parents and in some places is
equivalent to those of native-born French learners. This glowing picture of
second-generation Moroccans in Europe, however, contrasts with the diffi-
culties they encounter on the job market. They suffer from discrimination
in employment, job insecurity, and inequality in different walks of society,
chiefly regarding their religion and native language.

Mother Tongue Learning


Empirical studies have shown that intercultural measures such as integrating
elements of minority groups’ culture in the curriculum or recruiting teachers
from minority communities, have a positive impact not only on minority
students’ achievement, self-esteem, and development, but also on the native
students’ and teachers’ acceptance of and respect for cultural diversity. I adopt
the approach of integration as a two-way process developed by Munoz (1999)
and Ogbu (2008). This theoretical model is supported by empirical evidence
from well-known countries of immigration with various ethnic minorities
like the United States and Canada (Maiztegui-Oñate and Santibáñez-Gruber
2008, 2010).5
A distinction should be made between first-generation and second- or
third-generation Moroccans in Europe. The first tends to master Colloquial
Arabic or Berber (Amazigh for the natives) and has a relatively average knowl-
edge of the language of the host country. As mentioned above, second- and
third-generation migrants tend to have a good command of a European lan-
guage, but weak mastery of Colloquial Arabic or Berber.
More than half of first-generation Moroccans in Belgium speak Colloquial
Arabic fluently and about one-third can read and write Classical Arabic. Less
than half of the respondents residing in Belgium and Germany said that they
spoke Berber (Amazigh) quite well, while a majority did not read or write it.6
This may be due to the fact that Berber has only recently been codified using
106   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

its own writing system, Tifinagh, which is less widespread. Berber language
has been used in Moroccan schools since 2003.7 It should be noted that it
has three major dialects in Morocco—Tarifit in the north, Tamazight in the
center, and Tachelhit in the south—and is essentially acquired and transmit-
ted orally as a mother tongue (Ennaji 2005: ch. 4).
A large number of Moroccans in Europe teach Arabic and Berber to their
children in order to preserve their culture of origin. For the majority of respon-
dents, it is essential to teach the mother tongue to their children because their
families speak it, and when they go back to Morocco on vacation they will
need it. Mohamed (46, caretaker in Germany) was concerned about this issue:

I teach my kids Amazigh because we come from Tiznit, south of Morocco,


where everybody speaks it on a daily basis. I and the kids feel better when
we communicate with our family there in Amazigh. Their grandparents don’t
speak any German or French. Everyone must follow their traditions. Also if
I don’t teach my kids their mother tongue, they’ll probably hold it against me
when they grow up.

Only two out of ten did not teach the mother tongue to their offspring—
mostly women married to Western fathers. At home, they spoke the host
country language to their children to help them communicate with their
classmates in school. Halima (35-year-old engineer in Spain) told me:

I speak only Spanish to my son Rachid because his father is Spanish and both
don’t understand Arabic. Rachid is in elementary school and he needs to use
good Spanish when talking to his friends and to have a very good level at
school . . . knowing the language is very important for his school achievement.

Concerning the acquisition of the Arabic and/or Berber languages, there


was a relatively low degree of satisfaction of the population investigated. In
this regard, there is no gender differentiation, as both sexes are deficient in this
domain. The percentage of achievement in Colloquial Arabic is higher than in
Classical Arabic for girls and boys, because the former is the mother tongue of
their parents, whereas Classical Arabic is the written variety learned at school
only. Thus, while the majority of parents reported being moderately satisfied
with their children’s performance in their native language, a minority said they
were hardly satisfied. Interestingly, the main institutions involved in the teach-
ing of Arabic language are family and mosque (El Manar Laalami 2000). The
Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad has sent 600 Arabic
teachers to different European countries to ensure the teaching of Classical
Arabic to Moroccans and their children, and has created an e-learning system
for Moroccan communities.8
Education and Language Issues   ●    107

The following section looks at the extent to which Moroccan children


are integrated in Spanish schools and their Moroccan culture and language
included or taught in these schools.

Moroccan Children in Spanish Schools


Diversity has lately become a fact of life and subject of debate in Spanish society.
Intercultural education is the new approach and strategy adopted in Spanish
schools to acknowledge and value diversity, which also entails recognizing and
valorizing other cultures. Many schools have incorporated cultures of immi-
grant or minority children in their curriculum (Carbonell 2005; Epps 1995).
The program Teaching the Language and Culture of Origin (ELCO) has
been developed in Spain with the support of the EU to foster minority edu-
cation. In 1994, a language curriculum was established for the benefit of
Moroccan students within the framework of the bilateral Spanish-Moroccan
cultural cooperation. Its main objective was to teach Classical Arabic and
culture to Moroccan children in Spain.9
According to fieldwork data gathered from teachers and Moroccan stu-
dents in primary schools of Costa del Sol, Granada, Seville, and Madrid,
not all schools had Arabic classes or any teaching of Moroccan culture, but
most of them taught Moroccan culture in relation to Islam. In those schools
that taught Arabic, the teacher was Moroccan and Arabic was part of the
syllabus. Moroccan children usually took other Arabic classes outside school,
especially in mosques or Islamic centers. School for them was not the main
source for learning Arabic or studying Islam or Moroccan history and cul-
ture. They relied heavily on their parents, friends, Internet, and satellite tele-
vision channels. However, Moroccan students suffered from many prejudices
against Morocco, Islam, and Muslims, which were unfortunately common-
place among Spanish students and teachers. All respondents emphasized the
difficulties faced by these learners to attain linguistic competence in Spanish,
and even greater difficulties to integrate the job market.10
The survey revealed the concentration of Moroccan students in certain
schools and discrimination based on social inequality and ethnicity because
the media propagated the idea that immigrant children lead to a decreas-
ing level and quality of education and degrading school facilities (Carbonell
2005; Aramburu 2005). This kind of discourse and attitude affects migrant
parents who state that the number of students of Moroccan origin is rather
small. Mohammed (49-year-old salesman in Marbella) told me:

It’s false what the media say. There are only a few kids of immigrants in Spanish
schools, and they are often times much disciplined, hard working, and bril-
liant. This is just plain unfounded prejudice.
108   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

As a result, a number of Moroccan pupils were worried that they would


never make it to university or realize their dream of getting a good job.11
Spanish educational authorities have attempted to meet the learning needs of
Moroccan children and integrate them into the Spanish school system. To pro-
tect them from racism and Islamophobia, municipalities and non-­governmental
associations have organized sensitization campaigns in the hope of raising the
public’s awareness and appreciation of cultural diversity. Nevertheless, these
efforts have been for the most part ineffective or limited in scope.
Empirical research in this area is badly needed to determine the quality of
Moroccan children’s education and the degree of their integration in Spanish
schools. It is also important to find out whether school has determining rami-
fications for the success or failure of Moroccan children (and other minori-
ties, for that matter) and their assimilation in the job market, social mobility,
and integration in Spanish society. To support their integration, in 2012, the
Moroccan Minister for Moroccans Living Abroad, Abdellatif Mâazouz, asked
governments in Europe to make the teaching of Arabic part of the European
school syllabus.12

Mother Tongue Teaching and Learning in Germany, the Netherlands,


the UK, and France
In Germany, the teaching of Arabic and Berber as supplementary courses
was introduced in the late 1960s within the framework of “Mother Tongue
Education.” The aim was to contribute to the social integration of immi-
grants’ children attending mainstream classes during their residence in
Germany. While legislation in Germany is indifferent to language issues, its
constitution guarantees freedom of speech and language choice.
Students in primary schools can take classes in their native language as part
of the curriculum, depending on the parents’ wish. This is in harmony with
the recommendation of the EU Ministers of Education with respect to inter-
cultural education. Although this is noticeably a positive step, it is actually
impossible to predict the evolution of Mother Tongue Education, because it
all depends on policy and funding. Incidentally, it is often argued that native
language teaching is too costly, for the public system does in no way guarantee
success in predominantly German schools (Gogolin and Hans 2001).
Germany achieves better results than the Netherlands with the integration
of Moroccan kids in schools. According to Paolo de Mas, former education
attaché at the Dutch Embassy in Rabat, Germany offers better education
routes for youth, and the job market offers greater possibilities, because the
German approach is keen to quell criminality and unemployment (personal
communication).
Education and Language Issues   ●    109

In the Netherlands, 15 mother tongues are taught, including Arabic and


Berber. Most of the Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands, Germany, and
Spain originate from the Rif area, in the north of Morocco, where Berber
is widely spoken. Parents encourage their children to learn both Classical
Arabic and Berber, because the former is the language of literacy and of the
Qur’an, and the latter is their native language.
Since 1992, the Dutch system of education has allowed parents to choose
their mother tongue as a means of instruction for their children in primary
and junior secondary schools, depending on the availability of teachers, text-
books, and teaching materials. In general, the books published in Morocco
fail to address the experiences of Moroccan children born in Europe, and
their language level is rather advanced for those children (El Aissati 2012;
Avoird et al. 2001, Benjelloun et al. 2001).
In the UK, Arabic is one of the top ten languages of London schools.
Arabic ranks seventh, while Berber is unclassified (Baker and Mohieldeen
2000: 5). Here is a breakdown of the main 10 languages spoken in the
UK, following the 2011 Census revealing the numbers of speakers of each
language.13
Although the state encourages Mother Tongue Education in primary pub-
lic schools, it is actually migrant parents associations that take the responsibil-
ity of putting mother language teaching into effect.
On September 12, 2013, Qatar and the UK signed an agreement sup-
porting the teaching and learning of Arabic language and culture across UK
schools. The UK agreed to significantly increase the number of students and

Table 6.1  The major ten languages spoken in the UK, adapted from the 2011 Census

Language Number of speakers % of the population

  1 - English 49,808,000 92.3%


  2 - Polish 546,000 1%
  3 - Punjabi 273,000 0.5%
  4 - Urdu 269,000 0.5%
  5 - Bengali 221,000 0.4%
  6 - Gujarati 213,000 0.4%
  7 - Arabic 159,000 0.3%
  8 - French 147,000 0.3%
  9 - Chinese 141,000 0.3%
10 - Portuguese 133,000 0.2%
110   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

teachers of Arabic with the support of the Qatar Foundation.14 Arabic classes
usually emphasize spoken communication, Arabic grammar, and vocabulary
(Extra and Gorter 2001).
In France, the teaching of Arabic and Berber has been progressing since
the 1970s. In 1999, Berber became one of the “non-territorial languages.”
Recall the diglossic dichotomy between Colloquial and Classical Arabic,
which are quite distinct at the phonological, morphological, and syntac-
tic levels. See Ennaji (2005, ch. 4) for examples and details on this point.
Colloquial Arabic is a mother tongue, learned orally and spontaneously,
whereas Classical Arabic is a written language that is the mother tongue of no
one and is associated with learned knowledge, religion, and media.15
As in many European countries, there are no statistical data regarding
language because the population census does not refer to mother tongues in
France. It is also hard to know which language Moroccan immigrants and
their children speak at home, Arabic or Berber. Chaker (1997) states that
Berberophones of Algerian origin represent 40 percent of the overall Algerian
diaspora in France, and Moroccan Berberophones make up 50 percent of
Moroccan immigrants. This would mean that over half a million Moroccans
in France speak Berber (Eurostat 2011).16
A good number of Moroccan students between the ages of 18 and 21 took
the Colloquial Arabic course as part of the baccalaureate exam. According
to Caubet (2001), a total of 529,611 students took Colloquial Arabic, and
1,751 took Berber in the 1999 baccalaureate exam. As many Moroccan chil-
dren do not usually take these courses, the actual number who speak Arabic
or Berber is much higher. The rate of success in Arabic exams was high (70
percent), showing a good mastery of the language. Altogether, around 10,000
students of North African origin (including Algerians and Tunisians) took
Colloquial Arabic exams in 1999, which reveals not only its vitality, but also
the great extent to which North African children have acquired and main-
tained the language (ibid.).
As we have mentioned above, Colloquial Arabic and/or Berber are largely
spoken in Moroccan families in Europe, where it is transmitted orally from
first to second generation. However, the variety of Arabic learned at school or
in evening classes is Classical Arabic, a prestigious form of Arabic.
France started teaching Classical and Colloquial Arabic in the sixteenth
century in the Collège des Lecteurs Royaux. Napoleon enhanced Arabic
instruction with the creation of l’Ecole Spéciale des Langues Orientales in
1795, where Classical and Colloquial Arabic were taught (ibid.). Since 1995,
Colloquial Arabic language and culture have been taught in primary and
secondary schools in cities with large North African communities, such as
Montpellier and Mantes.
Education and Language Issues   ●    111

The children of North African origin felt proud that their culture had a place
at school and that their parents approved of the choice. Only a few parents of
French origin in Montpellier were reluctant, but most of their children had no
prejudice and felt happy to learn a new language. (Caubet 2000: 268)

ELCO is outdated today because most Moroccans are certainly going to


settle permanently in France. It was used by the country of origin to keep
an eye on the Moroccan community in France and the rest of Europe. Thus,
the experiment in Montpellier and Mantes is to be generalized to other
­cities and regions since Moroccan children are part of the cultural diversity
in France.
From 1962 until the 1990s, only Classical Arabic was taught in French
secondary schools and universities. But since 1994, Colloquial Arabic has wit-
nessed a vast evolution, which shows its vivacity. Today, Institut National des
Langues et Cultures Orientales (INALCO) offers a wide range of courses on
North African Colloquial Arabic and Berber, including bachelor’s and mas-
ter’s degrees. Since 1996, it has also offered doctoral programs in Colloquial
Arabic or Berber.
However, in September 1999, Colloquial Arabic was dropped from the
list of baccalaureate language exams so that only Classical Arabic is accepted
for taking these tests, under the excuse that Classical Arabic is the language
of erudition, media, and knowledge production. This decision to eliminate
Colloquial Arabic penalizes students who have been learning this variety as a
first or second language. As a result, the number of students taking Colloquial
Arabic has decreased from 10,111 in 1999 to 4441 in 2002, according to
Caubet (2001).

Conclusion
This chapter has shown that language activities in the family environment
are dynamic and multidimensional; the social structure of participants, the
language functions, the styles of interaction and the degree of participation
of children are interrelated in a complex way.
Moroccan students are exposed to bilingual education in many European
countries; they aim to attain a good command of the different European
languages they are exposed to while learning and preserving their mother
tongues. We have seen how language loyalty and learning include more
than language skills, as they comprise new practices and language identi-
ties. Anxiety over integration and attachment to native language and culture
characterizes the actions of children and parents who, despite discrimination,
favor bilingual education as part of a family strategy.
PART III

Becoming Moroccan-European

T
his part focuses on the experiences of Moroccan Muslim migrants as
they interact with broader European societies. It includes four chap-
ters that discuss important issues of identity, integration, citizenship,
the close link between migration and development, and the major contribu-
tions of Moroccan communities in Europe, namely civil and political partici-
pation, socioeconomic development, social change, art, and culture.
This part argues that Moroccans in Europe participate actively in pub-
lic life and economic growth, which is a good reason for the extension of
citizenship and respect of migrants’ rights. Chapter 10 focuses on success
stories among Moroccan migrants in Europe, especially writers, artists, and
political and civil society leaders. This part aims to shed light on the enor-
mous contributions of migrants that should enrich the debate and inspire
decision-­makers to adopt a positive attitude toward southern Mediterranean
migrants and to craft the necessary reforms in recognition of migrants’ ben-
eficial impact on host societies.
Chapter 7

Challenges of Integration

M
uslim Moroccan migrants encounter numerous hurdles upon their
arrival in the host country. They must adjust to a new climate, way
of life, code of conduct, and legislation. Their integration depends
on many factors, namely level of education, economic status, age, gender,
legal status, duration of residence, social support (or lack of it), attitude,
mastery of language and other skills, and personality traits. Migrants with a
high level of education often integrate more easily than those with low or no
education. Similarly, those with a good economic status, material resources,
positive attitude, and social support adapt faster than migrants with limited
resources, no family support, or a negative attitude. Adaptation causes stress
and feelings of isolation, and discrimination usually prevents migrants from
integrating.
The integration of Muslim minorities in Europe, specifically Moroccans,
has been of national and regional concern since the early 1980s. Public
debates and policies about minorities and multiculturalism are often regarded
with confusion and mistrust. Regardless of political and sociocultural obsta-
cles, minorities are expected to integrate into the host society and circumvent
communautarism and ghetto practices that might be understood as a rejec-
tion of the host nation (Phaneuf 2012).
Throughout the 1990s, diversity was celebrated as a central value (Young
1990; Roggeband and Verloo 2007). Conversely, since 9/11, multicultural-
ism as a societal project has been strictly criticized in Europe (Joppke 2004;
Kofman 2010; Vertovec 2010). It has been challenged as essentialist and revi-
talizing ethnic and cultural differences (Fraser 2000). Others have stressed the
risk of cultural separatism and isolation. Barry (2002: 3) points to the risks
of granting cultural groups special rights and suggests that “the specter that
now haunts Europe is one of strident nationalism, ethnic self-assertion and
the exaltation of what divides people at the expense of what unites them.”
116   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

There is also opposition between multicultural rights and feminism.


Feminists have reservations about aspects of multiculturalism as a philoso-
phy, because it may allow certain sexist cultures to continue downgrading and
marginalizing women. For Okin (1999), multiculturalism may be in opposi-
tion to gender equality because multiculturalism fosters respecting all cultures,
even those that contradict liberal thinking, freedom, and gender equity. Okin
(ibid.) stresses that multiculturalism may promote patriarchy, gender-based
discrimination, domestic violence, and women’s marginalization. Others con-
test the existence of an inherent antagonism between multiculturalism and
feminism (Roggeband and Verloo 2007). The criticism leveled against multi-
culturalism has led to the European politicians’ reservations about it as a policy
and a target since the early 2000s. Terrorism and extremism have provided an
impulsion to this change in attitude, and consequently some Western politi-
cians and intellectuals have become wary about the prospect of Muslims’ inte-
gration in European societies (Modood 2003; Joppke 2004; Kofman 2010).
Similarly, there is a close link between multiculturalism and the phenom-
enon of transnationalism, which refers to the plurality of cultural identities.
As an important aspect of globalization affecting migration, transnationalism
expresses the continuation of political and cultural ties with the country of
origin (Okome and Vaughan 2012).1 Multiculturalism in European coun-
tries, which is partly the result of migration flows, is an asset not a threat,
provided it is well managed by governments and communities. On another
level, international migration has the potential “to promote an exciting and
enriching exchange between cultures and civilizations,” as stated by Migliore
(2008: 169). Yet there are hurdles such as laws and policies marginalizing
immigrants’ cultural and religious traditions. Migliore (ibid.) stresses the lat-
est tension among Moroccans of migration descent, particularly the recent
violence in French banlieues, which is due partly to their social exclusion and
unemployment (see Chamie and Dall’Oglio 2008: 11).
This chapter highlights the close relationship between migration, cultural
diversity, and integration. It argues that respect for cultural diversity protects
minorities and contributes to the integration of immigrants. Since the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century, societies have become increasingly com-
plex and multicultural because of migration and globalization.2 As a result,
the demands for rights of minorities and migrants have become stronger. It
is well known that among the advantages of multiculturalism there is cel-
ebration of diversity, respect of difference, and otherness. This means that
multiculturalism is to be distinguished from strong assimilation models of
integration (Ennaji 2014).
In Europe, there are two major criticisms leveled against multicultural-
ism. The first comes from the conservative right and specifies that societies
Challenges of Integration   ●    117

encouraging cultural diversity are by definition less cohesive and homoge-


neous because of internal tensions and contradictions. The second, which
comes from the political left, suggests that while multiculturalism promotes
difference, it does so within a pre-existing system of values. This implies that
immigrants whose cultures are different may be accepted, but rarely as equals.
That entails that their cultural beliefs would be rejected if they were in con-
tradiction with the predominant values in the host society. The two criticisms
share the idea that multiculturalism as practiced sparks social tension, but
their approaches stem from opposing attitudes; one prefers large uniformity
and the other favors difference (Duncan 2004).
Most liberal democracies foster multiculturalism and celebrate it as long as it
does not conflict with human rights, national legislation, the cultural values of
the host country, and the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Multiculturalism
and integration are compatible, and while integration requires the adapta-
tion of the migrant to the host society, it demands a constant investment in
immigrants. Thus, a society that respects diversity must be prepared to remain
actively engaged in building bridges between cultures and fighting discrimina-
tion and racism for the long-term (Collett 2011; Ramadan 2013).

Fighting Discrimination and Racism


In the UK, between 1993 and 2012, immigrant workers experienced higher
average unemployment rates than their British-born counterparts.3 Similarly,
in Germany, the unemployment rate among immigrants reached 16.4 per-
cent, double that of the national population in 2000. In France, there was
also a much higher level of unemployment among Moroccan immigrants.
These unemployment levels were partly due to the generally low educational
levels of immigrants and to the anti-immigration feelings in the host coun-
try (Hansen 2002). In Belgium, according to a survey by Saaf et al. (2009),
only 31.7 percent of respondents were employees with a permanent contract,
and 5 percent had temporary work. The proportion of the unemployed with
or without welfare was 32 percent. The survey also revealed a percentage of
14.3 percent of women and girls staying at home.
Consequently, many EU member states have tightened immigration poli-
cies and control over the last five years. Even in countries like France and the
Netherlands with an established tradition of migration, right-wing political
parties claim that immigrants have unraveled their national cultures and taken
the jobs of the indigenous populations. Many European leaders have shifted
to a re-assertion of nationalism and national identity, questioning the validity
of integration, which has become a hot debate in many media and political
circles since 2010. This is the case in France, where the Sarkozy government
118   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

launched a long and provocative campaign in 2010 about French national


identity (see chapter 3). Another case is Germany, where Angela Merkel, in
2009, announced publicly on television that multiculturalism failed, and
that Germany was first and foremost a country with Christian values. In the
Netherlands, recent immigration policies have underscored the importance of
integration and the necessity of all would-be migrants to learn Dutch language
and be familiar with Dutch cultural values before they are admitted in the
country (Entzinger 2008; Modood 2003; Joppke 2004; Kofman 2010). The
Netherlands adopted its integration policy at the national level in 1981, whereas
in France and Germany, integration measures have often been the responsibil-
ity of local councils and intermediate bodies like unions (Hansen 2003).
The UK passed anti-discrimination laws in 1965 to stop discrimination in
employment, housing, and services; however, these laws were hardly helpful
in promoting the integration of immigrants. In summer 2013, the British
government, in an attempt to curb illegal migration, sent six trucks to tour
London city carrying billboards that read “In the UK illegally? Go home or
face arrest.” This heavy-handed campaign, which exhorted undocumented
migrants to leave the country, was badly received by the public.4 Thanks to
public outcry, the government of David Cameron had to stop the hateful
campaign. “Go home” vans were removed from the London streets after this
experiment was deemed a failure: shouting stupid slogans at random passersby
was totally ineffective. Yet the government’s aim is to drastically trim the num-
ber of immigrants allowed in the country.5 However, history has shown that
nations that celebrate immigration prosper, and those that do not decline.6
Among the causes of dissatisfaction among Moroccan immigrants, dis-
crimination in recruitment and employment was regularly mentioned.
Mohamed, a 27-year-old Franco-Moroccan computer engineer of the second
generation, explained during the interview:

As French citizens of Moroccan origin, we face many problems at the moment


of hiring, and if you are lucky to get the job, you are given a lower pay, and
you are constantly harassed or socially marginalized because of your skin color,
religion, or culture of origin.

Farida, Moroccan woman age 33 from Italy, seconded this observation:

There is discrimination in employment against Moroccans . . . With the crisis,


it is much worse, and international events like terrorism sometimes influence
behaviors and create obstacles to recruitment.

Conversely, because of its aging population, Europe needs immigrants.


For instance, Italy, Germany, and Spain all have low birth rates and will
Challenges of Integration   ●    119

probably face a population decrease over the next few decades.7 Thus, the
integration of Moroccan Muslims in European society is not an easy matter,
but it can be achieved through access to education, employment, tolerance,
respect of diversity, and participation in public life (see chapter 8).8

Extent of Satisfaction and Integration


Several authors have criticized the normative overtones of the terms “inte-
gration” and “assimilation.” Others have used different words to refer to the
same notion, namely inclusion, adaptation, insertion, or fusion. But what is
more important is the question of what we want to assimilate or integrate
into. Lucassen and Penninx (1997) have argued that according to migra-
tion history in the Netherlands, assimilation has always been the outcome of
migration.9 Phalet and Swyngedouw (2003) think that the political collapse
of assimilationism in Europe has resulted in the adoption of policy models
based on “integration,” especially in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
However, each country has its own integration strategies and migration poli-
cies based on its sociohistorical context. For Phalet and Swyngedouw (ibid.)
integration entails the “extension to non-nationals of legal, social, cultural
and political rights and opportunities that were once the exclusive entitle-
ments of nationals.” Moreover, the integration process is complex, as it refers
to several aspects of full citizenship (Phalet and Swyngedouw 2002).
In this book, I adopt the term “integration” which may be defined as the
overall procedure or process whereby one individual or community mixes
with or adapts to the host society without losing their identity. This general
definition does not entail that integration will lead to the uniformity of soci-
ety, but allows variables like ethnicity, gender, race, class, and religion to be
part of the broad picture of integration.
According to Gordon’s approach, quoted in Lucassen (2005), the fact of
defining integration as a process precludes the normative view, and indicates
that it is a two-way mechanism, whereby not only the migrants are trans-
formed, but also the host society changes with time, although relatively more
slowly. Skin color, weak income, low-level of education, and religion make
the process of integration slow. As already stated, the higher the income and
educational level of the migrant, the faster the integration process; the less
religious the migrant is, the more likelihood that he or she will integrate
rapidly. To test these assumptions, the following section will investigate the
degree of integration of Moroccan migrants in Europe.
The fact that migrants are perceived not only as different, but also a threat
to security and a source of social woes like criminality and juvenile delin-
quency, is conducive neither to their integration, nor to their acceptance by
120   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

the host country. Young second-generation Moroccans in Amsterdam are


often accused of crimes like theft, murder, drug dealing, and sexual assault.
But the question is why they behave in this manner. The answer may be
because most of them are school dropouts, unemployed, discriminated
against, and feel rejected by Dutch society. According to a 2011 report by the
Dutch Ministry of Interior, 40 percent of Moroccan immigrants (boys and
girls) in the Netherlands between 12 and 24 had been arrested and charged
with committing a crime during the previous five years. This means that the
second generation has not integrated completely into Dutch society, which
confirms that the Netherlands needs a more global strategy to immigration. It
also reveals, according to this report, that Moroccan parents have failed to do
their duty of educating their children and encouraging them to stay in school
and integrate in the host society.10
Hajar (26-year-old girl, born in Amsterdam) stated that she suffers from
her family’s control over her life. She is not free to go out at night or spend
time with her friends. In part of her testimony, she says:

I had to give up my family . . . I had to leave them behind . . . so that I could


be myself . . . I am a mature girl, and I work in a supermarket; but I want to
empower myself and be independent.

Like many other Muslim friends, Hajar has been trying to negotiate between
two worlds that most would see as incompatible: the Islamic culture of her
parents, and the Dutch culture where she was born and grew up.
The major aspiration of Moroccan migrants has been the realization of
their migration project, which is the improvement of their well being and that
of their families. Concerning the degree of realization of migratory projects,
49.7 percent of Moroccan migrants have realized the essential part, namely
in terms of education, employment, and housing, and 17.5 percent have fully
realized their project, according to a survey by El Manar Laalami (2002). This
difference is dependent on the factors of qualifications and age. The higher
the degree of qualifications of the migrant, the more successful he or she is in
the project. In addition, the older the migrants, the more achievements they
make. According to Saaf et al. (2009), 28.9 percent of Belgian-Moroccans
own their home in Belgium, 52.4 percent are tenants, and 15 percent live
in the family home. The degree of realization of projects also increases with
the duration of stay: the longer the migrant’s stay, the more likely that their
project is realized (Ennaji, 2010a). To determine the degree of integration of
immigrants into the host country, we will examine their sociability, potential
memberships in clubs and associations, political participation, and potential
exposure to segregation (in the work place or neighborhood).
Challenges of Integration   ●    121

Among the people interviewed, about two-thirds declared that they were
quite integrated as they had friends in the host country; the remaining inter-
viewees acknowledged that they did not have any European friends. If we
consider the professional qualifications, the rate rises in relation to the degree
of integration (the degree of integration ranges from over half of non-qual-
ified workers to a vast majority of the well-qualified immigrants). Likewise,
as mentioned above, the rate of integration increases with the duration of
stay in the host society; for instance, those who have resided in Europe for
more than five years tended to integrate better than those who have lived in
a European country for just a year or two. By contrast, membership in clubs
and associations depended on the level of education and status: people with
no qualification or employment barely participated in any such activities.
In general, there is a positive perception of migrants, especially those with
a good socioeconomic status in the receiving society. For instance, engineers,
doctors, professors, artists, actors, NGO leaders, politicians, and experts are
held in high esteem. According to this survey, a slight majority of profes-
sionals have revealed their satisfaction with integration, in contrast with one
third who have declared that they feel rather excluded. The percentage can
be differentiated in connection with gender, as a vast majority of women feel
integrated against a little more than half of men.
This investigation also reveals that one out of three migrants has been
subject to racist behavior at work, and a quarter of them has experienced rac-
ist behavior in the neighborhood where they live. Kenza (33 years old), who
works in a health public service confirmed that racism was a fact of life in her
host country, France:

I am a nurse. A couple of weeks ago, a French nurse made insulting remarks


about a Moroccan patient. This had bad consequences for her. I think racism is
still present. I feel it not only at work, but also at the store, at the restaurant and
in many public spaces. It is hard to get rid of racism in this country.

However, two-thirds of the respondents have not been exposed to racism.


Additionally, the risk of being subject to racist acts at the place of work
diminishes when the professional status or the degree of qualification of
the migrant is high. From all these observations, it may be inferred that the
degree of qualification in general and the professional status are viewed as
explanatory factors and strong determinants of the integration of Moroccan
migrants into the host country.
Immigrants’ integration likewise depends on their attitude toward politi-
cal participation, citizenship (whether for migrants or their children), and
mixed marriages. A good proportion of respondents (more than half ) approve
122   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

of active political involvement at the local or national level; however, if we


consider the professional status, we deduce that the number of those in favor
of participation increases when the job quality is high. Likewise, the rate of
participation rises according to the level of education.
According to the survey data by Saaf et al. (2009), the rate of participation of
respondents in the various associations in Belgium amounted to 22.4 percent,
with a significant difference between men (27 percent) and women (17.7 per-
cent). The participation rate varied also with age, especially the fact that women
over 34 years old were much less active in associations, and after the age of 55,
most men became partially or totally disengaged (Andrès 2009). Overall, it
seems that of all social categories, men are more willing to get involved in vol-
unteer work than women, although women’s involvement in associations allows
them some recognition within society and gives them autonomy (see chapter 9).
Fatima (39 years old, housewife in France) says on this subject:

I used to spend most of the time at home doing housework or helping the
kids with their homework. But now that they are at university, I have more
free time, and I prefer to spend it in the association helping other women
and children to integrate into the host society. Civil society has offered me an
opportunity to be active and useful.

Among those participating in community life, 36.55 percent were unionized


migrants, 22.58 percent members of sports associations, 16 percent belonged
to cultural associations, 12 percent were active in religious associations, and
13 percent in miscellaneous associations (Saaf et al. 2009: 85).
In general, one out of five migrants declared that they had the citizenship
of the country of immigration. While the majority did not have citizenship,
about 20 percent wanted to acquire it. In addition, the number of those who
obtained citizenship increased in accordance with the duration of stay, but
the desire to acquire it varied with duration. As for their children, about one
third have obtained it (Saaf et al. 2009: 89).
Furthermore, this investigation shows that while most migrants disapprove
of mixed marriages, this attitude is changing because of cultural encounters,
particularly among the second and third generations (ibid.).
Nevertheless, sexual freedom and homosexuality are broadly disparaged.
Marriage to a non-Muslim is rather stigmatized, and non-mixed marriage is
preferred to mixed unions. Regarding social and cultural relationships, the
majority of the interviewed Moroccan migrants thought they were socially
integrated, sustained relationships with native Europeans, and were open
to European and Western culture while remaining attached to Moroccan
cultural values. However, many respondents also said there was a growing
Challenges of Integration   ●    123

importance of the nuclear family and that exchanging visits with Moroccan
relatives and friends was limited. Hence, the Moroccan community in Europe
is multilayered and diverse (Saaf et al. 2009: 101).
By contrast, according to a recent survey realized by the French daily
Le Figaro in October 2012, 67 percent of French people believe that French
Muslims and immigrants of Muslim origin are not well integrated into French
culture, against 33 percent who believe otherwise. Similarly, 68 percent state
that this non-integration is due to the fact that Muslims refuse to integrate, and
52 percent think it is because there are too many cultural differences between
Muslim immigrants and French people in particular (See chapter 4).11
However, this survey by Le Figaro, which the French sociologist Raphaël
Liogier describes as “worrying for living together,”12 shows the way Muslim
migrants are perceived by the French at a time when, paradoxically, the
Muslim Moroccan immigrants for the most part feel quite integrated in the
host society. Thus, it would seem that while the host society has a nega-
tive attitude in general toward migrants, as they do not think that they have
integrated (enough or at all), the Muslim Moroccan immigrant community
perceive of themselves as being at least partially integrated.
In comparison with other European states, Belgium has been quite liberal. In
October 2007, a survey published by the EU rated Belgium third among 25 EU
countries in facilitating the settling-in of immigrants. The survey took into con-
sideration factors such as employment rights, anti-racism laws, and opportuni-
ties for permanent residence and family reunification. Belgium also gave foreign
immigrants the right to vote in local elections in 2004 (Saaf et al. 2009: 121).
The most important immigration legislation was passed in 2000, allowing
immigrants born in Belgium, having at least one Belgian parent, or residing
in the country for at least seven years, to become citizens. Those residing in
Belgium for over three years must satisfy language and cultural requirements
to obtain citizenship. The Belgian state officially recognizes Islam as one of
the major religions in the country. It helped create an Islamic organization
(the Belgian Muslim Council) to express the interests of the Muslim popula-
tion in Belgium. In 2001, the government recognized 75 mosques and began
paying the wages of the imams working in these mosques (International
Religious Freedom Report 2002).13
In 2004, there were 319 mosques in the country: Flanders (162), Wallonia
(80), Brussels (77). These mosques are usually in normal buildings that have
been transformed into prayer places. Only a few mosques have the tradi-
tional architecture with domes and minarets. The 2003 anti-discrimination
law in Belgium criminalizes any witnessed incitement to discrimination,
hate, or ­violence against a person or community. Under this law, imams
can be punished or deported if they make hate speeches or attack the state.
124   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

On  October  31, 2012, an imam, Mohammed Hammami, was deported


from Paris to Tunisia for “anti-Semitic hate sermons” and because he called
for “whipping to death adulteress women,” according to the French Ministry
of Interior. The ministry considered Hammami a “threat to French society
and its security.”14 In the next section, we will discuss issues of the integration
of the Moroccan community in the Netherlands.

Integration of Moroccan Migrants in the Netherlands


Compared to the migrants from former Dutch colonies (particularly Surinamese
and Antilleans), Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands are generally in a disad-
vantageous situation because of their lower revenues, which does not facilitate
their integration. About 40 percent of Moroccans in the Netherlands are rated
in the low-income group, whereas only 10 percent of native Dutch people are
in this category (Bilgily and Weyel 2009). Nevertheless, if we compare their
situation today with that of two decades ago, we will remark that their living
conditions and incomes have much improved (Forum 2009). According to the
Annual Report on Integration of 2007 (compiled by the Netherlands Institute
for Social Research), the rate of unemployed Moroccan youth is very high com-
pared to 9 percent for the native Dutch (Bilgily and Weyel 2009).15 More than
26 percent of Moroccan youth were unemployed in 2008 (Forum 2009). By
contrast, entrepreneurship among the Moroccan community doubled from
3.4 percent to 7.3 percent between 1998 and 2005 (Forum 2009).
The social interaction between Moroccans and native Dutch people has
been improving, with the second generation in particular interacting more
with the Dutch compared to the first generation, who, as we said before,
have not mastered Dutch (Esveldt et al. 2000). Similarly, new immigrants
from Morocco are more motivated to learn the Dutch language than their
predecessors, and research outlines that more and more Moroccans in the
Netherlands speak Dutch at home (ibid.). Despite progress in the sociocul-
tural integration of the Moroccan community in the Netherlands, there are
factors that negatively affect the group’s welfare. One of these factors is educa-
tion; in comparison with the Dutch indigenous population, the average edu-
cational level of Moroccans is low, despite improvements in the last decade.
In all, one witnesses a balanced improvement of the living and working
conditions of Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands; nonetheless, most
of them are less productive than the native Dutch population, and their
lower socioeconomic status negatively impacts on the degree of their inte-
gration. Additionally, as Bilgily and Weyel (2009) indicate, second- and
third-­generation Moroccans are more integrated in the society than the first
generation and identify less with the Moroccan community. Educated and
Challenges of Integration   ●    125

high-income Moroccan women and men feel more integrated in Dutch soci-
ety and less attached to their ethnic group than uneducated or low-income
Moroccans. In the following section, we will discuss facts and problems of
women’s integration.

Women and Integration


Women can be either facilitators of integration or guardians of the culture of
the home country (Kibria 1993: 248). They become an obstacle to integra-
tion when they cling to their old traditions and customs instead of open-
ing up to the host society. The idea that Moroccan women are preservers of
culture that they transmit faithfully to their children has been discussed by
researchers (Sadiqi 2003: ch. 3).
As discussed in chapter 5, the number of Moroccan immigrant women
residing in Europe has increased, and their status, level of education, and
involvement in social life are far from uniform. The main obstacles encoun-
tered by Moroccan women are language problems, especially for first-genera-
tion women, and social isolation resulting from time and energy spent on the
many household duties required to care for and manage a large family. The
legal status of immigrant women often depends on the restrictive conditions
regulating family reunification. Many women are subject to exploitation and
domestic violence and are threatened with deportation because their status
depends on the spouse (see chapter 5).
Similarly, women’s lack of qualifications may be a serious obstacle to their
integration. Illiteracy is high among first-generation immigrant women who
often have a rural background, barring their rapid integration in an urban
Western society (Anthias et al 2003). In 1985, the Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO)
regional association for the first time drew attention to Moroccan women in
Germany. The report showcased that this category of migrants suffered from
illiteracy (78 percent, according to a 1985 federal report) and utter isolation.
Most came from Berber rural areas in the Rif of Morocco and had a low level
of education and vocational skills. This fact complicates their social and occu-
pational integration (see chapter 5). To break with the old family traditions
that oppress women, these immigrants have lately started to make their voices
heard and struggle for decent and free lives, which is hard to attain without
financial independence (Daoud 1995).

Conclusion
It is self-evident that integration is crucial for the well-being of migrants
and social cohesion in the host country. It is critical for Europeans states to
126   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

further invest in integration programs in favor of migrants, because integra-


tion has a positive effect on both the migrants and the societies they live in.
As the experiences from several European countries show, Muslim Moroccan
migrants are significantly vulnerable, especially during economic and politi-
cal crises. While some countries have attempted to protect them and have
bolstered programs in favor of their integration, as in the case of Germany,
the Netherlands, and the UK, others have unfortunately turned their backs
to immigrants.
This chapter has shown that the major challenges to the integration of
Moroccans in Europe are related to their education, their often disadvanta-
geous status in the labor market, and poor housing conditions. Diversity
within this ethnic group is remarkable to the extent that low-educated and
low-income Moroccans in Europe face serious socioeconomic barriers and
are more socioculturally at a disadvantage than educated and high-income
ones who are more integrated and satisfied with their migration project.
Chapter 8

Identity and Citizenship

T
ransnational links between immigrants of different origin are estab-
lished by maintaining their own traditions and identities, as evi-
denced by the cultural diversity of many European cities, creating
a kind of globalization from below. The globalized city allows immigrants
to participate in public life and city management (Rouse 1995). As a case
in point, many Moroccans have become members of parliament or of gov-
ernment cabinets in Europe; for example, Rachida Dati, former minister of
justice in France, and Ahmed Aboutaleb, member of the Dutch parliament
and mayor of Rotterdam (see chapter 10).
This new development changes the traditional models of migration and
poses new questions on identity and citizenship. What does citizenship entail
in terms of rights and obligations? How do national identity and loyalty
interact when people live in more than one country and have more than
one nationality? These issues, which pose significant challenges to the states’
administrative systems, will be addressed in this chapter focusing on Muslim
Moroccan migrants and their descendents (Vertovec 1998, 1999, 2004; Pries
2001; Lazăr2011).

Negotiating Cultural Identity


Cultural identity may be defined as the need of individuals to belong to a
group within which they feel recognized and accepted. It is a modality of the
distinction between us and them, based on cultural difference (Cuche 2004).
According to social identity theory, identifying oneself with a community
allows one to develop an identity that has an attachment or commitment to
the group (Turner 1989). For Waters (1990), “ethnic identity” is a fluid pro-
cess that changes over time for most people, including migrants.
128   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Moroccans in Europe have four distinct identities: they are North African,
Muslim, immigrant, and have home or host country citizenship or both.
These identities are rendered complex by age, gender, class, language, edu-
cation, and religion. Evidently, the identity questions encountered by a
Moroccan Muslim male immigrant in Europe would be more complicated
than those faced by a Polish Christian male immigrant, for example. Because
of their brown complexion, religious dress, and hair form, they are visibly
non-European and are likely to be categorized as “immigrant” or “African,”
which can lead to discrimination. Learning how Moroccans cope with and
negotiate cultural identity in Europe in different contexts is important in the
fight against discrimination and marginalization. Most Moroccans feel good
about their migratory experience by adopting a positive attitude, which helps
to understand how individuals manage integration and identity issues.
As mentioned in chapters 6 and 7, because young Moroccan-Europeans
who descend from immigration are exposed from their earliest years to
two different cultural systems—the culture of the host country and that of
Morocco—it is difficult for them to achieve cultural coherence or build a
cultural identity or multiple identities. How do these young people reconcile
between the two cultures? How can they build a national identity at a time
when the social environment in which they live denies them an identity? Do
they identify themselves as Moroccan or European? These are the questions
that we will address in this chapter.
Born in Europe or arrived in Europe after their birth, having kept or not
their nationality of origin, young people facing the problem of identity con-
struction fall into three categories. First, those who have adopted syncretic
cultural identity have an active identity strategy, which draws from the two
systems of cultural reference (Chourra 2006); while integrating into the com-
munity of young people in the host country, they do not reject their tradi-
tional values. Most of them plan to integrate the host society by continuing
their studies, and then entering into a profession. They wish to fit into the
society by adopting the European way of life without denying their roots.
The second category claims a religious identity, yet they do not have the
same relationship with their origins. Their religious Islamic identity is for them
a source of strength and balance between the home and host country cultures.
These young people do not feel affected by the confrontation between Islam
and Western modernity; in effect, they reconcile religion and citizenship in
a smooth way. The only problem for them is how to be accepted as they are,
namely, European Muslims, insofar as European countries are secular, with the
prevalent religion being Christianity. This category of youth adheres to spiri-
tual Islam, which is more modern than that of their parents, and their religious
practices are more elaborate, researched, analyzed, and less traditional.
Identity and Citizenship   ●    129

The third category faces the phenomenon of assimilation, which may be


defined as the process whereby a minority adopts the cultural values, lifestyle,
and beliefs of the dominant society. Moroccan young people in this category
often reject their original language, religion, culinary habits, way of life, some-
times denying even their physical aspects and their first or last names. They
do not identify themselves as originating from Morocco, but rather from
European society. This category is quite common in France, which is host to
the largest Moroccan community in Europe. They neither know Arabic nor
practice Islam. Girls dye their hair blonde and adopt French names. I  dis-
cussed this with Heba (31-year-old nurse in Nice), and she confirmed this
idea of denying one’s roots and family origins. In the interview, she stated:

I dye my hair blonde, and I wear blue (lenses) to make my eyes appear blue.
I like it this way. I’m French and I was born in France. I love the French atti-
tude and civilization. French is my native language, not Arabic.

A middle-aged naturalized Moroccan working in Strasbourg (Abdul, 52


years old) said in the interview that he defined himself as French:

I’m a French citizen. I grew up in this country, got married to a French woman,
have three kids. I work in a big electronics company. I have many French
friends. In fact, all my friends are French. I hardly know or speak to Moroccans.

The denial of origins is what distinguishes this group from the previous
ones. Most of these people were either born in France or spent most of their
lives there. In their eyes, the culture of the host country is more tolerant
and liberal, and they are keen to minimize the antagonisms with this cul-
ture. Some adopt this strategy out of fear of rejection or by choice. However,
although they are less numerous than the previous two categories, they are
very different from them.
To the question whether they felt Moroccan or European, 58 interviewees
chose Moroccan, 32 of them mentioned their European host country, and
90 responded that they felt both Moroccan and European. In answering this
question, respondents stated that the longer they stayed in the host country,
the less attached to Moroccan traditions they became, irrespective of whether
they had European citizenship or not. Assia (54 years old), who came to
Belgium at the age of 19, noted that even if she wanted to be one hundred
percent Belgian, Moroccan comportment and behavior would continue to
recur and have the upper hand:

I grew up in Brussels, where I went to school; I have been working here as a


nurse for over 25 years, and I now am a Belgian citizen. Still, I don’t feel entirely
130   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Belgian. Deep down I’m Moroccan, and my behavior is that of a Moroccan,


um . . . likes, dislikes, etc.

Ali (49 years old), who has been working as an engineer in London for
seven years, confided that he juggles the Moroccan and the British cultures:

I am definitely more Moroccan than British because of the language. I speak


English with a Moroccan accent. But I’m learning every day about the British
way of life and institutions, so I’m trying to adapt without losing my identity.

Some felt European, not because they have lost their Moroccan cultural
identity, but because they have acquired European citizenship—some to
secure a permanent stay in the host country, others to avoid going back to
Morocco because of problems with family members or because they think
Morocco has no opportunities for them.
Thus, migration flows have immediate and important consequences for
individuals and society. The first consequence is spatial—space is the most
crucial basis of migrants since the migration project has a direct link with
the abandonment of the country of origin for the host country. The second
consequence is related to the immigrant’s strategy to live in a different social
context, a different society in which he or she has to adjust while contribut-
ing to its transformation or redefinition. This transformation of space can
be considered from the “intermediate spaces between the individual and
the State” (Aubarell and Aragal 2004), since different cultures and identities
come together in a space that had been designed as a homogeneous soci-
ety. This raises the problem of managing cultural diversity in conformity to
its history and its new reality in order to reconcile identity, citizenship, and
social cohesion.
Well-established immigrant communities in the receiving countries
maintain cultural and trade links to their home countries. These links are
extremely important contributors to the continued economic development
of the sending countries, but they also contribute to social and cultural
changes in receiving countries: witness the transformation of Europe’s major
cities by vibrant immigrant communities (Phaneuf 2012).
Their attachment to the country of origin is manifested in the family struc-
ture and social lives of Moroccan migrants. For example, over 86 percent of
Moroccans in Belgium have spouses of Moroccan origin, compared with only
8.5 percent who are married to Europeans (Saaf et al., 2009: 121). While a third
of the Moroccans interviewed own their own homes in Europe, two-thirds of
them have purchased property or own a business in Morocco. In the case of
Moroccan immigrants in Belgium, 60.6 percent are homeowners in Morocco
Identity and Citizenship   ●    131

(ibid.). The purchase of property in the country of origin may be related to


several factors. The first factor seems to be related to the political strategy in
Morocco, which encourages foreign investment through the implementation
of tax reforms, economic, and administrative facilities. The second factor is the
possibility of owning an affordable second property for holidays in a sunny
climate. The third factor may be related to the attachment of Moroccans in
Europe to two countries, Morocco and the host country. The following testi-
mony of Ahmed (age 34), a Moroccan-European in Italy is significant:

When I was a child, I used to travel with my parents by car to Morocco to


spend our summer holidays there. I was constantly asked this question: what
do you prefer, Morocco or Italy? I did not know what to answer, but to please
the relatives, I usually said Morocco. Honestly, I hated that question, because
in fact I liked both countries.

These are just a few quotes of Moroccan immigrants that confirm their
dual identity, which attests to a deep attachment both to the country of
­origin, Morocco, and to the host country. There are many comments in the
data collected that support these findings.
Hamid (59 years old, resident in Brussels) considers Morocco his “mother
country” and Belgium his “adopted home country.” In the interview he also
said:

I have been working for 39 years in Belgium. I have my family here, and
I own an apartment where we live. I also have an apartment in Morocco. I go
to Morocco once a year, because I feel profoundly Moroccan. But I am very
attached to Belgium, because my life is here.

In general, most respondents held positive feelings toward Morocco.


Many of them idealized their home country and stated that they were often
optimistic about Morocco but rather pessimistic about the future of the
European states (in a time of austerity), even though instinctively they also
felt quite happy in Europe.
However, when asked about specific issues, they mentioned a number of
problems relevant to each country. They stated that Morocco suffered from
unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, corruption, and a deficit of democracy
and human rights; whereas they criticized European countries for being less
tolerant toward Islam, for racist behaviors, and discrimination in education,
housing, and employment.
The attitudes of Moroccan immigrants toward the institutions in
Morocco and in the host country varied according to their experiences.
Most of the interviewees recognized that the Moroccan state had made great
132   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

progress in the path of modernization, political participation, and good


governance, but that there were still serious difficulties related to health
care, social security, and education. The respondents spoke favorably about
the facilities offered by the host country, namely the role of trade unions,
political representation, social and health services, freedom of expression,
and the independence of media.
For Moroccan immigrants, plurality is an outcome of permanent ties with
Morocco. Ethnic identities are generally less central for the second genera-
tion of migrants, for the highly qualified ones, or those who have a signifi-
cant length of residence. However, they remain of paramount importance
for the majority of Moroccan Muslims in Europe. Therefore, the fact that
migrants have a multiplicity of identities consolidates the idea of “transna-
tional” ­citizenship in the host country, as we shall discuss in the section below
(Guarnizo et al. 2003).

Multiple Identities
Moroccan immigrants are generally united by a sense of belonging to a nation
and ardently claim their Moroccan nationality. Even the vast majority of the
naturalized (those in possession of the passport of the host country) feel that
they are Moroccan, Arab or Amazigh, and Muslim. I have collected these
feelings during formal and informal interviews with Moroccan immigrants
in Europe. They are unlikely to claim their new citizenship, with some excep-
tions or with the exception of the second generation, because it does not
mean anything deep for their identity (ElKhayat 2004).
Another no less important identity that Moroccans in Europe have is their
Islamic identity. About one third of interviewees feel that they are first and
foremost Muslims before being Moroccan or European. They identify with
a neutral transnational Islam, which illustrates that religiosity is high among
Moroccans in Europe, all generations alike. About half of the respondents
stated that their religious beliefs have been consolidated over the last few
years. This finding is corroborated by the survey data of Saaf et al. (2009:
109). A Dutch-Moroccan woman, 52 years old, says that Islam is very impor-
tant for her as a faith, because Islam gives her respect and autonomy. She
explains:

I’m proud to be Muslim. Islamic values are human values. They teach us to be
good to each other and to be helpful. I believe in moderate Islam which is open
to other religions and cultures. I pass on these values to my children, who are
also practicing Muslims.
Identity and Citizenship   ●    133

Even when the original national sentiment fades in favor of that of the
new citizenship, Moroccans remain faithful to their Muslim religion. Indeed,
their Islamic identity is as strong as their national identity because of the rise
of Muslim fundamentalism since the 1990s (see chapter 3). Individuals may
have become French, Belgian, Spanish, or Dutch, but they have remained
Muslim Moroccans.
For the Moroccan migrants, Islam is conceived not only as a unifying ele-
ment but also as a marker of identity or even citizenship. Many Moroccan
immigrants identify themselves as Muslims first before giving their nation-
ality. Immigrants mix generally “under the banner of Islam” as stressed
by ElKhayat (2004), because it is the unifying element of all immigrants
who have a cultural identity that is structured around Islam. Islam is what
enables the migrants to preserve their cultural and religious values, giving
meaning to the migration process, which does not operate an irreversible
loss of being.
For many Moroccan Muslim migrants, the work visa or passport of the
host country is only a travel document to which they attach secondary impor-
tance. They perceive these documents as passes to facilitate their movement;
that is, documents that help them cross borders and give them rights such as
access to social security and family benefits.
It should not be forgotten that the loss of identity is dangerous for peo-
ple with strong cultural and national identity feelings. One cannot waive
one’s identity while adopting the values and principles of the host country
and blending in religion, morality, and language. Such assimilation is fatal
because it leads to loss of self and the end of one’s membership in a strong
group identity.
Most Moroccans in Europe consider their country of origin as the most
beautiful in the world, even forgetting the reasons that pushed them to leave.
They continue to boast the Moroccan lifestyle by furnishing their homes in
the Moroccan way, watching Moroccan satellite television, cooking Moroccan
tagine and couscous, and organizing festivals and religious ceremonies. These
feelings of belonging to the culture of origin and permanent nostalgia for the
home country are generally more apparent among women than men to the
point that some women (of the first generation mainly) refuse to learn the
language of the host society. They see their role as limited to the preservation
of Islamic values and Moroccan cultural identity. The fact that they are very
attached to the Moroccan identity sometimes prevents them from integrating
into European society.
Amina (Franco-Moroccan, 28 years old) underlines the weight of preju-
dice and discrimination against migrant Muslim communities in France. She
134   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

explains that with the advent of new immigrants from Eastern Europe, espe-
cially the Polish, Kosovares, and Slavs, Moroccan immigrants have become
less valued. She goes on to say:
Religion is considered a major identity marker; if you are from Eastern Europe
you are better respected because you are Christian. Moroccans are at a disad-
vantage because they are Muslim. Whenever there is violence or a problem
in which Moroccans or Algerians are involved, the authorities and the media
point out that these are Muslims or young Islamic extremists. Everything is
explained by religion when North Africans are involved.

Facing major economic challenges, many Moroccan immigrants have


opted for citizenship of the host country in the hope of improving their lives
through acquisition of political rights. According to the interview data, the
proportion of those who already have European citizenship reached less than
two thirds. One may wonder to what extent this new identity has facilitated
their political and cultural integration.
When asked which country they felt closer to, more than half of the ­people
interviewed replied they had a mixed identity and that they loved both the
mother country and the adopted one. The testimony of Amine, a 19-year-old
young man from the third generation in France, is significant:
I am Franco-Moroccan. I have a dual citizenship, a dual identity. I think it is
a richness.

A Belgian-Moroccan young woman, Zahra (18 years old), confirmed the


same attitude:
I am both Belgian and Moroccan. Each year, I spend three months in Morocco
and nine months in Belgium. I love both countries.

The frequent visits to Morocco demonstrate the strength of links that


respondents have with their country of origin. More than two-thirds affirm
that they return to Morocco at least once a year, and a quarter go there once
every two years. Only a few state they rarely visit Morocco. The fact that
the majority entertain strong ties with the country of origin despite their
European citizenship reinforces their multiple identities and illustrates how
they value the cultures of both the home and host countries.
About one third of those interviewed with a European passport responded
that they were first Moroccan then European (French, or German, or
Belgian) irrespective of whether they were born in Morocco or Europe. Less
than a quarter answered that they were first Muslim, then Moroccan, then
European. Only very few respondents (less than 5 percent) said they were
only European.
Identity and Citizenship   ●    135

One can safely state that Moroccans with dual citizenship have for the
most part adopted the principles of democracy built around the values of
freedom, justice, gender equity, tolerance, and respect. The embracing of
these values by Muslim Moroccan immigrants reflects the emergence of an
individualized Islam that promotes autonomy and freedom of choice, includ-
ing the choice to observe or not the constraints of Islamic tradition (Ramadan
2013; Modood et al. 2006; Phillip 2009).1
The majority of Muslim Moroccan immigrants practice Islam privately
because they are not interested in ideologies propagated in mosques and
Islamic centers in Europe. This shows, contrary to popular belief, that Islam
can be circumscribed in private space, and it is possible to separate religion
from secular life. In addition to this private type of Islam, there is ideological
Islam that is organized in associations, mosques and Islamic centers (Hamidi
2003; Ennaji forthcoming). Even in the case of associations of ideological
domination, authorization from local authorities is critical, causing them to
introduce changes in their attitudes and adapt Islam to the principles of secu-
lar European society.
In immigration, there is an overlap between particularism and
­universalism—Muslim immigrants seeking to reconstitute the cultural life of
the village in containing the Moroccan community are often also looking for
wider membership by joining groups with multiples identities.

The Muslim Syndrome


The problematization of Muslim migration had started well before the rise
of Muslim fundamentalism in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in France.
The numerous problems suffered by the second generation known as the
beurs (unemployment, poor housing, and drug addiction) and the negative
stereotyping of “Arabs,” complicated the issue further. The beurs asked for
equal rights and opportunities and organized protests and demonstrations
to fight against racism. Racial segregation against North Africans was stron-
ger in France than in other European countries because of the colonizer-
colonized relationship between the French and North Africans, and because
France was host to the majority of North African immigrants in Europe
(Fanon 1961). With the relative popularity of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s racist
party National Front in the 1980s, attacks against immigrants multiplied.
As a retaliation, the second generation of Moroccans and Algerians organized
anti-racism protests by joining forces with NGOs like SOS-Racisme in 1984
and France Plus in 1985 (Lucassen 2005: 185). Riots nearly always resulted
in car-burning, looting, and clashes with police, especially in the suburbs.
Because these youths had a different religion from the native French (for they
136   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

were almost exclusively Muslim), it was believed by the government and civil
society that they constituted a threat to security and social cohesion, making
them the odd ethnic group whose assimilation was extremely difficult and
slow. The case of the first-generation Moroccan immigrants who refused to
ask for French citizenship in the 1970s clinched the argument that the inte-
gration of Muslim immigrants was impossible. Only 11 percent of Moroccan
immigrants and 13 percent of Algerian guest workers had acquired French
citizenship in 1990 (Lucassen 2005: 193).
For the second generation, obtaining French citizenship was not a prob-
lem, as most of them acquired it by birth. But the real issue for the French
authorities is that most of the second- and third-generation migrants are actu-
ally Muslim who may be impacted by Muslim fundamentalism. However, as
noted by Roy (1994) and Lucassen (ibid.), the majority of French youth of
North African origin are more influenced by French culture than by Islam,
as most of them do not implement the major principles of Islam like prayer,
haj (pilgrimage), and Ramadan (fasting). The fear of the Moroccan community
in France and of Islam as a religion is groundless. The violence that the suburbs
witness from time to time is not due to Muslim extremism, but to the frustra-
tions of the youth who suffer from unemployment and social exclusion. Thus,
their culture and religion do not represent an obstacle to their integration, but
rather discrimination and racism are the real hurdles, and the received old idea
that the “Arabs” are impossible to integrate should be scrapped for good.
In the Netherlands, a large number of Moroccans choose by conviction their
Muslim identity, because it gives them a sense of belonging.2 This is also the con-
clusion of the PhD research thesis prepared by Ketner (2008) at the University
of Groningen. The researcher, who worked on the issues of integration in the
province of Overijssel, stated that the majority of respondents claimed that they
could not do anything about their Moroccan identity, while they have con-
sciously chosen Islam as a religion. “Of course, religion is one of the things that
they receive at home, but by paying attention to the respondents I have found
out that the Moroccan youth have adopted Islam of their free choice: you can
choose between being a Muslim or not,” says Ketner. The distant relationship
between the young Moroccans and their host country is ascribed, according to
the researcher, to racial discrimination. “Muslims suffer from racial discrimina-
tion, but it appears that Islam gives them more power.”3 However, she affirms
that racism does not affect everyone negatively, for some young people work
harder to improve the reputation of the Moroccan community.
Adolescents face many challenges in their daily lives, such as living between
two cultures, their experiences with racial segregation, living with parents,
and creating their identity as Muslims in a non-Islamic country. Ketner
believes that Islam gives youth the self-confidence and support needed to
Identity and Citizenship   ●    137

cope with the challenges and contradictions of Muslim and Dutch cultures.
The Islamic culture also provides them with special help in their conversa-
tions with their parents.
The study also shows that young people, mostly from the cities of Gouda,
Groningen, and Rotterdam, do not take their religion from their parents in
a mechanical way. Most respondents (95 percent) say they get their informa-
tion independently from Internet sites, libraries, as well as mosques. Similarly,
they share their knowledge with each other, which brings about their own
perceptions of Islam, away from what is believed by their parents.
It is no secret that young people of Moroccan origin are on top of the list
of priorities in most municipalities of the Netherlands, because of the prob-
lems they cause or the hard conditions they live in. In a statement to Radio
Netherlands International, Abdelouahed Abali, an expert on youth issues,
stated that the root causes of youth turning to their Islamic identity at the
expense of a sense of belonging to the motherland can be summarized in four
points: (1) a sense of repression in the home country and the belief that they
do not have the freedom to choose the identity they want; (2) the feeling that
their identity is suppressed in Morocco; (3) the belief that Islam gives them a
sense of respect and valorises them as individuals; and (4) the conviction that
Islam belongs to them and no one can extort it from them. The other factor,
according to Abali, is that Moroccans in the Netherlands seek to escape their
negative image in the media by turning to Islamic identity.
According to Habib Kaddouri, member of the Moroccan association for
joint action in the Netherlands, showing their adherence to Muslim identity
does not provide an answer to the problems they suffer, like their bad repu-
tation and discrimination against Muslim immigrants. They are “still at an
experimental stage of exploring their religion, and thinking that their attach-
ment to Islam would remove their negative image. In reality, their religiosity
does not help them face their dilemmas,” Kaddouri declared in a statement to
Radio Netherlands International. He added that young people actually want
to achieve some kind of “rehabilitation” of the Islamic religion in a challenge
to Dutch politicians, particularly the extreme right-wing among them, who
accuse Islam of extremism and backwardness.
Their degree of religiosity is higher in Amsterdam, but also in other European
large cities where there is a huge Muslim immigrant agglomeration such as
Brussels, Dusseldorf, Rome, and the banlieues of Paris (Saaf et al., 2009).

Political Participation
The political incorporation of immigrants as new citizens in the host society
is crucial to theoretical debate, political scrutiny, and immigrant integration
138   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

policy. However, there is a shortage of studies and fieldwork about the politi-
cal participation of immigrants. Integration implies access to political rights
combined with the attachment to the national identity. Thus, from an integra-
tion perspective, immigrants with a long duration of residence and high levels
of education are likely to steadily move from ethnic to national identities,
and to political participation in the host country. Nevertheless, immigrant
populations, because of dual citizenship or mixed identity, usually nurture
political attachments and participation in both home and host countries. As
a result, their political choices and identities reflect new “transnational” types
of citizenship (Phalet and Swyngedouw 2002).
Political participation among Moroccans in Europe is normally a good
indicator of active citizenship. However, only a third of respondents asserted
their membership in political parties. More than two-thirds of them said that
they had no affinity with any political party in the host country.
Most Moroccan communities in Europe are actively involved in informal
political and civil society activities. They work for anti-racist associations,
youth clubs, charities, school boards, and volunteer organizations. Overall,
the informal political participation of the Moroccan communities is strongly
directed toward the host country.
Political participation is a means whereby active citizenship is put into
practice. One of the most important forms of this participation is voting.
More than two-thirds of naturalized Moroccans, who have the right to vote
in their host country, declared that they actually took part in elections. One
third of Moroccans with a European citizenship adhered to political par-
ties, mostly the socialist, liberal democratic, or ecologist parties. Very few of
them adhered to extremist left-wing or right-wing parties. Samir (Franco-
Moroccan, age 45) declared that he belonged to the Socialist Party and that
he had always voted socialist. In his testimony, he gave the reasons:

I think that Franco-Moroccans and Franco-Maghrebis in general are with the


Socialist Party or the political left in France. They belong or they sympathize
with the Socialist Party, because the socialists use the topic of immigration as
an electoral card, and they have this reputation that they defend communities
from migration origins. The migrants also feel somewhat protected by socialist
governments. However, recently some Franco-Moroccans have moved to the
center right and they defend the rights of migrants and minorities in their
discourse too.

About half of those who did not participate in the host country’s political
life were either non-citizens (and do not therefore have the right to vote), or
they had a low educational level and socioeconomic status that made them
oblivious to anything political. Quite a few chose to be apolitical for personal
Identity and Citizenship   ●    139

reasons. Nevertheless, Moroccan immigrant integration in European society


has remained deficient in formal political rights, access to full citizenship, and
voting rights for immigrants.

The Issue of Citizenship


Nation-states have established a particular form of membership: citizenship,
which is acquired by birth and exceptionally by naturalization. In all countries,
migration of persons coming from other nations engenders non-citizens. Rights
and privileges enjoyed by non-citizens are fewer than those reserved for citizens
and often differ according to the home and host countries. For instance, in the
European Union, citizens from another member state have a legal status closer
to that of citizen than do citizens from a non-EU country (Brubaker 1992).
The concept of citizenship has been a hot topic for debate in the EU for
the last two decades mainly because it is closely related to the issue of migra-
tion. Efforts have been made to harmonize the conditions and prerequisites
of citizenship, which organizes and structures this political and social mem-
bership, which should be democratic and egalitarian (Brubaker 1998: 132;
Al-Ali 2003).
The ambiguities presented in the nation-state have often given birth to
diverse political and legal approaches relevant to access to citizenship. France
and Germany are cases of two very different models of citizenship and nation-
hood. While the French state can admit migrants to citizenship and hence
grant them full civil and social rights, in Germany only a small portion of
immigrants will be able to access German citizenship.
According to the November 2011 report of the department of European
Statistics (Eurostat), 64,300 Moroccan immigrants obtained the citizenship
of a European country in 2011, making Moroccans the first community
of naturalized Europeans in France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.4
Saaf et al. (2009)’s survey indicated that the rate of Moroccans with Belgian
nationality was 78.1 percent; 81.8 percent of Moroccan women surveyed
had Belgian nationality against 74.4 percent of men. For the rest, 4.5 per-
cent started the naturalization process, 11 percent intended to do so, while
5.7 percent did not intend to ask for naturalization. The rate of naturalized
Moroccan married women was higher (56 percent) than that of married men
(44 percent). The frequency of naturalization was generally associated with
the level of education. More women obtained citizenship because it provided
them with protection and security. Likewise, the more migrants were edu-
cated, the more they obtained naturalization.
Nezha (50-year-old housewife and mother of three children) is illiterate
and has been living in France for 30 years. In the interview, she confided:
140   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

I can barely read and write, but my spoken French is acceptable. I was married
to a Moroccan from the Rif and my kids were all born in France. Although
I have been living in France for so long, I have never taken any classes or done
any advocacy training. I am just a housewife and mother. I have devoted all my
time to my children’s education. Now they are in high school and university.
I tried six years ago to obtain French citizenship, but unfortunately a French
administrator in the immigration office wanted to blackmail me . . . he said
he would help me get this citizenship if I slept with him, so I decided to give
up the whole process. But now that my kids are young men and ladies, I will
again apply for my citizenship which I will eventually get because my children
are French.

Non-naturalized married women were for the most part uneducated or


had little education. By contrast, educated emancipated women considered
citizenship an opportunity to acquire rights and to expand their freedom.
While the liberalization of the Belgian Nationality Code has been designed
to foster the integration of immigrants, its impact remains limited and is not
translated into significant improvements in the position of naturalized immi-
grants in the labor market—recently naturalized persons feel marginalized in
the job market or have to work for more hours for low wages in sectors where
jobs are insecure.5 Nonetheless, this liberalization may constitute an oppor-
tunity for future generations.
In an interview, 52-year-old Adil, a Belgian-Moroccan factory manager,
explained the situation of Moroccans in Belgium as follows:

The vast majority of Moroccans who have obtained Belgian citizenship here
belong to the working class; they work for long hours doing difficult tasks for
small salaries. Their situation is precarious. Many are unemployed and live on
the welfare, and spend most of their time in cafés.

Fatiha (20 years old), a young Belgian female student at Antwerp University,
originally from Morocco, stated that she was pessimistic about the future. She
described the situation as dramatic:

As a student, I know that after graduation, I will go unemployed for months


or years, unless I want to do a manual job or I am obliged to do a work that is
below or has nothing to do with my university degree.

Many naturalized and non-naturalized Moroccan immigrants felt rejected


due to “institutionalized racism,” which was apparent in many walks of life.
For most young Belgian-Moroccans, racism, explicit or implicit, can result
Identity and Citizenship   ●    141

from stereotypes and prejudices. The majority of those interviewed claimed


to have been victims of racism in schools and the workplace.
Saaf et al. (2009)’s survey showed that, while more than two-thirds of
Moroccans who had been living in Europe for over 25 years acquired
European  citizenship, they (together with the second and third genera-
tions) were still regarded by native Europeans very much as immigrants, not
European citizens, and their living conditions remained precarious for the
most part, particularly in Spain, Italy, and France.
So far as attitudes to migration among Moroccans are concerned, there is a
big difference between the 1960s and the 2010s. In the past, Moroccan people
shied away from migration and discouraged their relatives and friends from
migrating because it was a shame to leave one’s country and family behind. It
was considered a form of treason. Today, attitudes are rather positive toward
migration. Paradoxically, many families push their children and relatives to
migrate to Europe and elsewhere to seek better opportunities to improve their
life standards. However, respondents still complain about how negatively they
are viewed back in Morocco, where they are considered neither Moroccan
nor European. Some view them positively though, especially the youth who
long to realize their migration dream one day. At times, they are considered
rich and fortunate as migrants, at other times they are treated like aliens in
Moroccan society. Brahim (29 years old), who grew up in the Netherlands,
had this to say:

Because I live in Amsterdam, many Moroccan family members see me as lucky


and superior because I drive a beautiful Mazda, dress in the Western way, think
differently, and because I eat well.

Many of those who have French or another European citizenship hide it


from their friends because they feel guilty about becoming citizens of a dif-
ferent country. They inform only their closest family members. When I asked
Abderrahman (49-year-old salesman in Montpellier), he said this:

When I got my French citizenship in 2005 after a long battle with the
immigration office in Montpellier, I felt relieved and happy because that
would be the end of the ordeal of having visas and migration documents
renewed every time. When I came to see my mother and family back in
Morocco, I told no one about it. I told only my eldest brother, who is a
teacher at the university, because he recommended that I should get French
citizenship since I was married and had two kids there; then I told him in a
low voice that I actually got it finally, and he congratulated me. But I would
not tell others.
142   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Many Moroccans in France attribute the negative attitude to European


citizenship among Moroccans back home to envy. However, a large num-
ber of Moroccan immigrants in Europe were interested in obtaining citizen-
ship in the host country because they did not want to be labeled immigrant
for the rest of their lives, as it was debasing and low status. They also thought
that European citizenship helped them to be “treated better” and provided
them with more security and rights. For social identity theory, people in gen-
eral need to feel positive about their identity and status (Tajfel 1981; Killian
2006: 135).
Whereas many Moroccan immigrants thought that they were visibly North
African because of the complexion and curly hair, others said they were easily
confused with South American, Greek, or other Mediterranean ethnic groups.
Some Moroccan women stated they were taken for Italian, Spanish, Portuguese,
or Brazilian. In France, North Africans were viewed as “Arab” irrespective of
whether they were from Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Libya, Tunisia, or
another Arab country. In June 2003, an officer of a French court wrote on
a legal form on behalf of a Moroccan that his nationality was “Arab.” This
was ridiculed in the Moroccan press and social media.6 However, regardless
of whether Moroccans were considered Arab or not, French people’s attitude
toward them was usually negative (Killian 2006: 136; Geisser 2003). French
perceptions also depended on the immigrants’ level of education, socioeco-
nomic status, and their degree of integration in French society. Nadia (23-year-
old student at a Paris business school)commented on this particular point:

French men and women look upon Moroccans who are highly educated and
well dressed with respect. They view positively those Moroccan immigrants
who have made it at the economic and financial levels. They respect you if you
are a professional or a wealthy businessman, or if you are a well mediatized art-
ist, singer, writer, politician, etc.

Nevertheless, many of those born in France, the beurs, can hardly make it and
have a hard time finding a job although they have a good level of education.
The media often convey a negative image of beurs, worsening their marginal-
ization in French society, as we mentioned above.
According to French statistics, the North African community in France
is composed of three categories: (1) the North African immigrant popula-
tion, (2) North Africans naturalized French, and (3) French population
whose parents are North African immigrants. The North African immigrants
who were born in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, or Mauritania, and kept their
own nationality are thus one category. The North Africans who have been
naturalized French are not considered immigrants (Lucassen 2005: 187).
Identity and Citizenship   ●    143

According to Moroccan law, Moroccans can never lose their citizenship,


even if they adopt a second or third nationality. Thus, naturalized Moroccans
abroad are still counted as Moroccan by the Moroccan State.
To be integrated in the Spanish society, a great number of Moroccan
migrants apply for Spanish citizenship. Since 1990, nearly 11,000 have
obtained citizenship (Khachani 2004, ch. 6). However, even if they legally
have Spanish citizenship, socially they are still stigmatized as Moroccans.
In 2006, the number of Moroccans who obtained Dutch citizenship,
including those holding dual citizenship, was almost 314,000. If we do not
count individuals with dual citizenship, there were about 86,000 Moroccan
nationals in the Netherlands. These figures show that although naturaliza-
tion rates have skyrocketed in the last decade, a significant proportion of
Moroccans in the Netherlands still do not hold Dutch citizenship (Bilgili and
Weyel 2009; Esveldt et al. 2000).
Citizenship is linked to the fact that migration for most Moroccans has
changed from temporary to permanent. Despite their European citizenship,
many migrants find it hard to integrate in the European society as they are
often required to make compromises with the host country, pushing many
migrants to espouse a minority discourse. They celebrate their cultural speci-
ficity and marginality and struggle against all forms of segregation (Ennaji
2010a).

Conclusion
The participation of Moroccans in European political life is fundamentally
informal and principally geared to strengthen social cohesion in the host
country. As concerns the cultural dimension of identity, we have seen that
Moroccan communities have developed a multiplicity of identities and
behaviors, albeit with different layers of cultural adjustment according to
generation, gender, and class. While most host countries admit some level of
cultural diversity in the private space, they do not tolerate as much the visibil-
ity of ethnic cultures in public life, which creates racial and ethnic tensions
and weakens opportunities for Muslim migrants’ integration.
The majority of Moroccans in Europe express a temperate religiosity that
is open to other cultural values and codes of conduct, such as secularism.
Consequently, Islam in Europe has become a neutral individualized religion
compatible with modernity and democracy. European states can then take
the necessary steps to join forces with the predominantly moderate Islamic
organizations to promote a European modern soft Islam. This kind of policy
would be precious in the integration of Muslim immigrants and a valuable
means in the fight against religious extremism.
144   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

A European moderate Islam would also be helpful in the development


of progressive Islamic practices in Muslim-majority countries like Morocco,
which endeavors to conciliate Islam and modernity (Ennaji 2014: 7). I advo-
cate a comprehensive and integrated approach to the migration issue, an
approach that emphasizes respect for cultural diversity and the human and
socioeconomic dimension, and that operates a close correlation between the
fight against illegal migration and the preservation of the rights and achieve-
ments of the immigrant community abroad, for at the heart of the issue of
migration is cultural and socioeconomic development.
This approach is corroborated by the fact that most immigrants, including
those with European citizenship, do not cut ties with their country of origin;
they keep close relationships with their families and culture in the society of
origin and maintain close contact with members of their community in the
host country.
Chapter 9

Migrants’ Contributions to
­Development and Social Change

T
he socioeconomic impact of Muslim Moroccan migrants on the host
countries is generally positive. They have contributed to the develop-
ment and growth of the economy and to cultural diversity in Europe,
as we saw in the previous chapter (Khachani 2009a).
For a long time, migration and development have been two separate pol-
icy areas. In destination countries, migration authorities focus on control-
ling migration flows, while development agencies mainly work in the home
countries, with little coordination existing between the two (Van Hear and
Sørensen 2003: 6). In recent years, however, the Moroccan government has
explored ways to harness resources from the diaspora to promote develop-
ment. New institutions have been created to maintain ties with Moroccan
migrants, such as Morocco’s Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad,
Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad, the Ministry in
Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad, and a variety of policy measures, such
as investment facilities, have been adopted.
The capacity for entrepreneurship among Moroccan immigrants is
remarkable. According to official French statistics in 2012, there were over
60,000 Moroccan businessmen and entrepreneurs in Europe employing over
1 million workers.1 Money transfers made in 2012 by Moroccan immigrants
in Europe to their home country totaled approximately 3.5 billion dollars,
two-thirds of which originated in France.2 This explains why the Moroccan
government fosters migration, as we shall develop in the section on remit-
tances below.3
The low level of return of Moroccan migrants to their home country
(about 10 percent) can be ascribed to the considerable money transfers these
migrants make to Morocco, which are crucial for the well-being of their fami-
lies left behind. Another obstacle to return is Moroccan bureaucracy, which
146   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

reduces migrants’ investments in the home country (see chapter 2; El Manar


Laalami 2000; Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008: ch. 6).

Migrants’ Participation in Development


Moroccan migrants contribute actively to development and economic
growth, and participate in public life, which are good signs of their integra-
tion and constructive attitude. Their contributions militate for the protection
of their citizenship and political rights. However, immigration is generally
negatively pictured by the host society to the extent that the immigrants’ role
in development is ignored.
A more flexible and open vision of citizenship is needed, which calls for
a re-reading of the conditions of access to citizenship. This is what the new
generations of immigrants ask for. Although these immigrants do not all nec-
essarily ask for the citizenship of the host country, they demand their par-
ticipation in the public life of host countries. These demands have been met
by a few countries like Belgium and Germany, which have recognized the
immigrants’ right to vote in local elections (see previous chapter).4
Migrants’ contribution to the economic development of the host country
can be laid out as follows. First, migrants provide manpower to the host society,
especially during periods of shortage of labor. Second, highly qualified immi-
grants make a considerable contribution to development. Third, immigrants
participate in economic growth as both producers and consumers. While the
impact of migration on economic growth in the destination countries can be
positive, additional research is badly needed to tackle the issue of European
labor market data and the contributions of North African Muslim migrants.
As stated by Richard (1999), Muslim immigrants in France built one
out of two apartments, 90 percent of the highways, and one out of seven
machines. Businesses made more profit by recruiting illegal immigrants
whom they paid less. Illegal migrants are cheaper and more obedient than
legal ones, given their vulnerability (Khachani 2004). On the other hand,
unlike what anti-migration people claim, migrant workers are not responsible
for unemployment and in fact there is no cause-effect link. Unemployment
does not depend on the proportion of immigrants according to Khachani
(2001) and Richard (1999). On the contrary, immigrants suffer from unem-
ployment more than nationals, as we have already seen in previous chapters.5
Additionally, immigrant workers doing hard and dangerous jobs sometimes
pay a higher price in terms of on-the-job accidents.
Highly qualified immigrants are a great asset to the economy and soci-
ety as a whole. Their work has contributed to the evolution of science and
technology. In France, more than 10 percent of the North African migrant
Migrants’ Contributions to ­Development and Social Change   ●    147

population are professionals and experts (Wagner 1999). Some of them


hold key positions in research institutes. This is the case of the outstand-
ing Moroccan scientist, Malik Ghallab, director of scientific research at the
French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris. He
was awarded the Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur by the French state,
which is the highest award in France.6
The demand in Europe for experts and professionals is soaring. For instance,
in Germany the government has recently recruited over 15,000 computer sci-
entists from developing regions, especially India, Eastern Europe, and North
Africa.7 The German Institute for Labor Market Research assesses that as a
consequence of an aging population, the country will need about 6.5 million
specialists and skilled workers by 2025 if successful measures are not taken to
counterbalance the shortage through migration.8
In parallel, a good number of Moroccan migrants have invested in the host
country as entrepreneurs and businessmen, employing thousands of people,
thus contributing to economic growth in the host society. An example of a
migrant who has succeeded in their migration project, there is Marrakesh
Bakery in western Rotterdam, owned by Mahria. It employs 19 people, has
three locations in the city and expects to earn $640,000 annually. Mahria
was proud to announce that the Dutch Queen Beatrix bought a few pastries
in 2012 from his bakery. Mahria arrived in the Netherlands from Morocco
12 years ago and today he is a successful businessman and civic activist in
his neighborhood association. Mahria states: “Dutch people accept everyone
who does a good job, who works hard and who doesn’t cause problems.”
In 2000, Moroccan businessman, Menai, 37, established El Karama, a
cooperative business in Reggio Emilia, Italy; by assembling manufactured
goods the business soared from an initial investment of $450 to over $500,000
in 2008. “We learned to depend on ourselves,” says Menai. “In Reggio Emilia
no one gives you anything, but there is an entrepreneurial spirit. If you are
good, you can find a place. And that breeds respect.”
But the idea that migration has a good impact on the economy has not yet
been accepted in Europe. The entrance of migrants is blocked more than ever
before, leading to an underground world of lucrative smuggling and traffick-
ing (Ratnesar 2000).

Co-development, Remittances, Engagement, and Investment


The term “co-development” refers to the connection between immigration
and development. It is an approach in development studies that integrates
immigration in development, and which regards migrants as a developing
factor for both the host and home countries (Cortino and Ochoa-Reza 2013).
148   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

In 1995, the Barcelona process highlighted the role played by immigrants in


co-development and cooperation among the countries of the Mediterranean.
The Euromed Civil Forum proposed that the immigrant be considered the
agent of cooperation and development. Development projects and the move-
ment of persons within the Euro-Mediterranean region are the main areas
that deserve more attention in this effort of regional integration, despite much
resistance from the conservative European parties (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009).
In January 2010, Lamarkbi, a Franco-Moroccan journalist, led a move-
ment inciting immigrants and French people of migration origin to go on
strike on March 1 and avoid buying or selling anything. The aim of this
strike was to show the French government that France needs its immigrants
in order to progress economically, that migration is an advantage, and that
migrants deserve all due respect and dignity. The movement also protested the
waves of racism engendered by the campaign on national identity in France
(­chapter 8).9 “It is sad that after so many years, after so many migration waves,
one has to remind the authorities of these evident matters,” added Lamarkbi.10
There are many cases that show how Moroccan and other North African
immigrants could facilitate development in countries of origin. Alami, a
migrant developer in Amsterdam, runs a project of cooperation and develop-
ment between the Netherlands and Morocco to assist people in his home coun-
try in building a better future for themselves and their children. The goal of
the project is to develop the sector of agriculture, taking into consideration the
large labor force and availability of fertile lands and opportunities. It organizes
training workshops and sensitization sessions in favor of new graduates who are
interested in this domain. It also aims to introduce technology into agriculture,
provide machinery and farm tools, introduce efficient irrigation, and supply
adequate storage facilities in order to reduce waste during the harvest season.
The project would increase production, create jobs, increase income for farm-
ers, and help alleviate poverty. In implementing the project, Alami mentioned
the numerous hurdles encountered in both the Netherlands and Morocco,
such as complicated bureaucratic and administrative procedures, weak com-
munication and lack of access to credit. Alami recommends the creation of
a favorable environment to facilitate the investments of Moroccans abroad,
including financial incentives. Also, he strongly believes that the various dias-
poras could act as facilitators between Africa and host nations to advance devel-
opment efforts in the sending countries (Chamie and Dall’Oglio 2008).

Remittances
Like other less-developed emigration countries where remittances sent home
by migrants represent a significant source of income, Morocco receives
Migrants’ Contributions to ­Development and Social Change   ●    149

considerable inflows of remittances (Dalen, Groenewold and Fokkema 2005;


De Haas 2007c; Khachani 2009a). It is second only to Lebanon, which
receives the largest money transfers from abroad (Khachani 2005). In 2007,
Moroccan migrants abroad remitted approximately US $6.7 billion back
home (see Figure 9.1). This is due to both the growing numbers of Moroccan
migrants abroad and the diversification of the countries of destination; for
instance, recent destination countries like Spain, Italy, Germany and their
remarkable regularization schemes have intensified the rise of remittance
flows (Sasin 2008; Bilgili and Weyel 2009).
Because of the global financial and economic crisis, remittances by
Moroccans residing abroad decreased in 2012 by 4 percent compared with
2011, reaching a total of 58.63 billion Moroccan dirhams (6.9 billion US
dollars), according to figures released recently by the Moroccan Exchange
Office, cited by the Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad.11
In 2013, the transfers of the Moroccan community residing abroad rep-
resented 7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), covering 32 per-
cent of the trade deficit. The transfers, which amounted to over 63.5 billion
dirhams in 2011, with the rate of 5 billion dirhams per month, culminated
during July and August. These remittances constitute the equivalent of the
national tourism revenues, which underlines the great contribution of remit-
tances from Moroccans living abroad to the development of the national
economy.12
The remittances mentioned above do not take into account the money
transfers made by informal means, like those sent through family members

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Figure 9.1  Yearly transfers by Moroccans living abroad in billions of US dollars


Adapted from the World Bank Data and the Moroccan Exchange Office
150   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

or friends (Khachani 2005; Sasin 2008; Bilgili and Weyel, 2009). In addi-
tion, Moroccan migrants bring home a large number of goods and gifts,
spare parts, technological materials, clothes, furniture, etc. Many migrants
also invest in Morocco by building houses, buying apartments, or starting
businesses.
Moreover, ties between Moroccan migrants and their home country
seem to be undergoing a major transformation. Belahrach, who after years
in Europe moved back to Casablanca in 1998 to run a labor organization,
thinks that Moroccans in Europe are agents of change (Sørensen 2004).
He believes that they are progressively more connected with the Moroccan
business world and are, unlike their fathers, taking big risks in their invest-
ments. In a BBC documentary, in which Belahrach was interviewed, a young
Moroccan migrant stated that: “We are not like our parents’ generation. They
hadn’t studied and didn’t know their rights. They could write checks and send
money home and that was it.” (BBC News Nov. 9, 2002)
According to Khachani (2005), immigrants with a low level of education
send more money and invest more back home than those who are highly
educated. In recent years, housing stands out as the main investment in the
home country. By Moroccan standards, investment in housing is important
as it is viewed by the community back home as a sign of social prestige and
success. Moroccans also invest in their destination countries by owning busi-
nesses and homes, as we have already mentioned.
The motivations for these remittances reveal the migrants’ attachment
to their country of origin (Sasin 2008). Moreover, government publicity
campaigns and financial incentives, such as a fair exchange rate, are meant
to attract the maximum remittances to the country via foreign exchange
accounts and wire transfers, and create a stable macroeconomic environment
(Khachani 2005). The government, which has a positive attitude toward emi-
gration, creates a suitable context for remittances and encourages the formal
channels to transfer money—the Office of Exchange in Rabat mentions that
around 60 percent of remittances are sent through banking systems, 15 per-
cent by post, another 15 percent is done on a personal basis, and only 10 per-
cent is transferred through other mechanisms such as money transfer agents
(Sasin 2008; Bilgili and Weyel 2009).13
Morocco has opened several bank offices in Europe to facilitate money
transfers, such as Wafabank, Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur
(BMCE), Banque Populaire and others (De Haas 2005). In 1989 the Banque
Al Amal was opened with the goal of helping to finance emigrants’ projects
(Collyer et al. 2009). In the early 1990s, the bank helped create more than
a thousand new jobs a year, and today it carries on co-financing investment
projects with substantial loans and low interest rates (ibid.).
Migrants’ Contributions to ­Development and Social Change   ●    151

Additionally, national institutions like the Ministry in Charge of


Moroccans Living Abroad, the Council for the Moroccan Community
Abroad, and the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad
address migrants’ issues and provide solutions and support to encourage
investments in Morocco. These government strategies show to what degree
the Moroccan state is eager to encourage remittances.

Immigrants’ Organizations, Engagement, and Investment


The objective of this section is to focus on Moroccan migrants’ own organi-
zations (for example, professional associations, cultural organizations, and
social clubs) that seek to promote development, inter-cultural dialogue and
exchange. These NGOs often contribute to sustainable development in the
home country as well (Lloyd 2004). They mobilize their ethnic group mem-
bers to participate in the socioeconomic, cultural, and political domains of
European society and improve their living conditions and protect their rights.
I argue that NGOs created by migrants are an important way of facili-
tating their integration and self-development in the host country. I oppose
claims that social and cultural activities that consolidate migrants’ cultures
and minority identity are adverse to minority integration and a sign of the
rejection of the nation (Phaneuf 2012). Most Moroccan migrant NGOs
focus on the preservation of cultural identity through outreach activities that
celebrate cultural and culinary traditions, and present a selection of music
and dance at those events. Migrant NGOs are places where social debates can
take place and offer opportunity for participative action (Habermas 1981).
They are, in general, used as a means to gain authority vis-à-vis public pow-
ers and local community (Césari 1994). North African communities, for
example, have used them as interlocutors with government authorities or as
representatives of their ethnic groups. NGOs are also often treated as spokes-
persons for their communities.
As mentioned in chapter 4, the rise of Islam in Europe since the 1980s is
associated with the proliferation of immigrants’ NGOs that reflect the wide
variety of the Muslim communities. They have been created partly to sup-
port the public authorities and partly to defend the sociocultural interests of
migrants at the local and national levels. These organizations aim to satisfy
the needs of individuals who seek identification and to meet the expectations
of governments in order to gain their recognition.14
Most of these NGOs are involved in “community-building activities that
are a necessary component in their ability to organize outreach activities
designed to create dialogue and improve inter-communal relations” (Phaneuf
2012).
152   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Until recently, Moroccan migrants’ associations have been held in distrust


by the host societies; but, attitudes have recently become favorable to them
because they are now considered “to be stepping stones towards political
involvement” (Hamidi 2005: 219). These associations can be a means of inte-
gration for immigrants, and they are a way of understanding the problems
of migrants. Most of these associations are not affiliated with any political
party and present themselves as apolitical, for people prefer to stay away from
politics, enjoy the feeling of belonging to a community, participate actively in
community life, and thus give a meaning to their own lives.15
Cultural associations are usually secular and focused on social action and
outreach, whereas religious associations are concerned with questions of iden-
tity and ethnicity. For the Muslim immigrants, their associations are a means
of getting organized around their religion, which is viewed as culture and a
symbol of their cultural identity (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008, ch. 2). They con-
stitute a challenge to the secular democratic states that promote equality and
justice for all, including migrants and minorities.
In France, since the 1980s, associations have taken action on social issues
like racism, integration, immigrants’ economic and political roles, identity
crises, and minority rights. The 1981 law encouraging the creation of associa-
tions by foreigners was the turning point in the politicization of identities.
More than 500 associations were created between 1980 and 1990 according
to Hamidi (2005), as the French state needed interlocutors or intermediaries
between communities and the local authorities.
While some associations focus their activities mainly on the host coun-
try, others gear their activities exclusively to the home country, as we shall
see below. Thus, the Moroccan migrant is involved in a variety of activities,
ranging from political, developmental, scientific, and cultural activities to
charitable action.
A good model of Moroccan migrants’ proactive contribution is the work of
the NGO Migrations et Développement.16 It was founded in 1987 by a group
of expulsed Moroccan workers in France whose first project was to invest their
early retirement benefits and return allowance in the installation of electricity in
a village near Taroudant, southern Morocco (Lacroix 2009: 1671). This project
has been followed by numerous infrastructure projects, including agricultural
projects that improve production, income-generating programs for women and
youth, and the creation of associations and cooperatives for agricultural prod-
ucts. To upgrade the skills of fellow Moroccan farmers, technical and manage-
ment trainings are organized by members in Morocco, and visits to France are
conducted to teach methods for increasing production (Schüttler 2008: 6).
Migrations et Développement has overall been engaged in projects in over
200 villages in southern Morocco (Lacroix 2009), and has partnerships with
Migrants’ Contributions to ­Development and Social Change   ●    153

around 250 associations (Schüttler 2008). It receives a wide support from dif-
ferent institutions and from retired French professionals (Schüttler 2008) and
has also accepted financial aid from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the EU. The work of Migrations et Développement provides an interest-
ing instance of the efficient use of migrant capital in sustainable development
in the home country. The organization has a rich experience in running local
development projects in coordination with public administration and inter-
national donors (Lacroix 2009; Bilgili and Weyel 2009).
Some NGOs are engaged in charitable activities that may occur irregu-
larly. They may at times respond to a request from an association, a village,
or an individual. Their activities often consist of donating goods or equip-
ment to a school or hospital (for example, an ambulance, a wheelchair, a
school bus, or computers) or paying hospitalization costs for deprived indi-
viduals. As has been noticed about the Moroccan community in France and
Germany, charitable work is generally organized in rural areas more than in
towns or cities, since migrants have a stronger attachment to their region of
origin rather than to neighboring towns or cities (Schüttler 2007; Bilgili and
Weyel 2009).17
In recent years a growing number of highly skilled Moroccan emigrants
have created professional associations for special scientific interest groups.
Among the effective associations comprise L’Association des Informaticiens
en France, L’Association Marocaine des Biologistes en France, Réseau des
Intellectuels Marocains en Europe, and Savoir et Développement en France
(Khachani 2005). Savoir et Développement was founded in 1999 in France
by a group of scientists from various fields, including mathematics, computer
science, economics, and business administration. It has over 200 Moroccan
experts in Europe, the United States, and Canada. The association’s major
objective is to promote scientific and technological exchanges that will foster
development in Morocco (Bilgili and Weyel 2009).
The projects run by Savoir et Développement are development oriented.
They promote innovation in the scientific domains like the pharmaceutical
industry. They have implemented a Euro-Mediterranean proficiency team
in micro-technology, water purification and preservation, and a project on
urban waste treatment in Morocco (Khachani 2005; Bouoiyour 2006). The
association has also established agreements with Moroccan universities and
research institutes to foster multidisciplinary and multi-sector collaboration
involving experts and enterprises. In this regard, it established a cooperative
linkage with the Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique et Technique
in Morocco (Bouoiyour 2006).18
The Moroccan community in Europe equally invests in various entre-
preneurial activities. As previously mentioned, their major investment is in
154   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

housing, as migrants often purchase property either for themselves or their


families, or for rental. The second main investment is in trade and services,
and many small businesses have been created, such as restaurants, cafés, call
centers, clothing stores, or high-tech shops. Investment is similarly made in
industry, agriculture, and the tourist business, which is considered a promis-
ing sector.
Some of the obstacles impeding investments are slow bureaucracy, corrup-
tion, and high taxation (Schüttler 2007). Institutional bodies like Hassan II
Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad and the Ministry in Charge of
Moroccans Living Abroad do their best to encourage migrants by supplying
guidance and information; the Foundation has, for instance, 18 instructional
books on investment made available on its website.19
When looking at the different contributions of Moroccan migrants to
sustainable development, researchers have mainly focused on their eco-
nomic impacts. Migration effects go beyond pure financial terms, however.
The social and cultural context is also highly influenced by migration, and
the Moroccan case shows that the link between migration and development
encompasses not only the economic sector but also the social and cultural
domains (Khachani 2009a).
It is not only the financial and business capital (investments, remittances,
and savings) that is of paramount importance, but also the human capital
(education, skills and knowledge) of each migrant, the social capital (net-
works, and cooperation between groups), emotional capital (commitment
and goodwill) and finally, the local capital (investments made locally in areas
in need).
The productive use of human capital in all its dimensions is essential.
It allows the implementation of the development process, while helping to
further progress, such as the establishment of political stability and respect
for democratic norms. These aspects can lead to improved socioeconomic
conditions in both the hosting and sending countries.
Organizations of civil society and local authorities have a crucial role to
play. They can ensure that the capacity of migrants impacts positively on
development. Several stakeholders are involved, including diasporas, local
groups, the private sector, civil society (NGOs, including women’s associa-
tions, universities, professional organizations, and trade unions) and local
authorities. Attention is often rightly paid to areas that are essential to
development, such as health and education, and to maximizing the impact
of migration on development through the promotion of transfer of skills
(Belguendouz 1999).
While most researchers insist that remittances serve mainly to help
migrants and their families left behind, there is evidence that Moroccan
Migrants’ Contributions to ­Development and Social Change   ●    155

migrants increasingly invest directly in their home country (Khachani 2005;


Schramm 2006).
Remittances contribute to the reduction of vulnerability and severity of
poverty and the effects arising from economic shocks to the welfare of house-
holds. This allows families to make critical investments in aspects of human
and social development, such as education, health, and housing. However,
the impact that remittances currently have on human and social development
could be enhanced through targeted actions. This can be achieved through
the development of mechanisms to link remittances to productive invest-
ments and other financial services such as microcredit, health insurance,
retirement savings plans, and the creation of income-generating activities in
the country of origin.
Little attention has, however, been paid to the impact of migration
remittances on women and children in the sending and receiving countries,
particularly the relationship between remittances and the women’s activity
or inactivity, and children’s school achievements (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004;
Ennaji and Sadiqi 2008).

Conclusion
Moroccan migrants contribute to development and social change in both
the host and home countries. They use several channels to influence growth
and social development. In this chapter the focus has been placed on co-­
development, remittances, the contribution of skilled migrants, and the out-
put of migrants’ NGOs.
With the help of associations and civil society organization, immigrants
gradually integrate into the host country, especially the second and third
generations, and they endeavor to thwart the economic and social exclusion
suffered by the community as a whole. They have become independent indi-
viduals with a responsibility to contribute to the development of Europe and
Morocco, in addition to the well-being of their families. Entrepreneurship
has allowed many Moroccan migrants to free themselves of the old mentality
of the victimized migrant and has opened doors for men and women to be
creative, innovative, and productive.
As Sørensen (2004) suggests, to convince migrants to collaborate with the
state and foster investments it would be ideal to at least secure their political
participation at the local and national levels in both the host and home coun-
tries. Nevertheless, sending remittances back home can cause further stress
to the migrants who have to work harder than the average European worker
in order to save up. This may be at the expense of their health and their
children’s education. Additionally, the family left behind in Morocco may
156   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

become dependent on remittances and too lazy to work. Some such families
prefer to remain idle while waiting for the money transfer to arrive from
Europe. Thus, the general attitudes toward migrants as “cash cows” must be
changed. Migrants have their own lives to pursue in the settlement country
and, being a vulnerable group, the governments need to address their issues
and reduce their pain and frustrations back home and in the host country.
Policies need to be changed in order to guarantee larger investments while
protecting the rights of migrants to a decent life in the host country and the
country of origin, especially during periods of recession, such as the current
global financial crisis (see chapter 2; Ennaji 2010b; Killian 2006).
Chapter 10

Success Stories

T
here is a tendency in Europe to focus on the negative facets of migra-
tion and problems linked to migrants, such as unemployment,
exploitation, discrimination, and crime, although migration has
also advantages and bright sides. Regardless of this off-putting context, most
Moroccan migrants manage to earn a living in the host country, and on top
of that they actively participate in public life and contribute to sustainable
development and intercultural dialogue in Europe and Morocco, as discussed
in the previous chapter.
There are a myriad of success stories among the Moroccan diaspora in
Europe. This chapter, which will discuss some of these triumph cases, is
divided into two main sections; the first section focuses on prominent
Moroccan writers and artists, and the second highlights famous leaders in the
world of politics and civil society. Let us start with examples of well-known
successful Moroccan writers and artists.

Writers and Artists


Throughout the European territory, Moroccan writers and artists have pro-
duced, contributed, and innovated in ways that have advanced their own
societies and benefited European cultures. They have developed techniques
for resisting Islamophobia and xenophobia through their writings and
art, providing their communities with a sense of participation in a larger
European society. They have adapted their cultural traditions to the European
way of life and fostered positive attitudes and practices to impact Moroccans
and the larger Muslim communities in Europe.
158   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Tahar Ben Jelloun


Tahar Ben Jelloun is one of the greatest Francophone novelists and poets
of our time. According to the Paris Review, he is “one of France’s most cel-
ebrated writers.”1 In 1987, he won the highly prestigious Prix Goncourt for
his novel The Sacred Night, which was the first book by a Moroccan Muslim
writer to be so credited. During the past decade, he has been shortlisted sev-
eral times for the Nobel Prize in literature.
Tahar Ben Jelloun was born in1944 in Fès, Morocco. After attending
Qur’anic Medersa, he went to a bilingual Franco-Moroccan primary school
run by a French director. At the age of eleven, he obtained his primary-level
certificate in Tangier, where his parents had moved.
He went to a French high school (lycée Regnault) where he received his
baccalaureate (end of high school) certificate in 1963. That same year, he
went to Mohammed V University in Rabat and studied philosophy. But he
was forced to interrupt his philosophy studies, as he was sent to a disciplinary
military camp with other students suspected of having organized demonstra-
tions in March 1965.
When he was released three years later, he resumed his university studies
and published his first poem “L’Aube des dalles” in the magazine Souffles,
written in hiding during his imprisonment. In 1971, he published his first
book of poetry, Men under the shroud of silence, prefaced by the well-known
human rights activist, Abraham Serfaty.
After serving as a philosophy teacher at high schools in Tetuan and
Casablanca, Ben Jelloun obtained a grant to study in France. His doctorate in
social psychiatry was earned at the Faculty of Jussieu on the topic “Emotional
and sexual problems of North African workers in France.”
His first successful novel, Moha le fou, Moha le sage, which begins with a
description of a torture session in a Moroccan prison, was banned for a few
months in Morocco. His essay L’hospitalité française about racism in France
had lukewarm reception by the press and some booksellers because it was
believed to be provocative. His sincere and convincing cry for tolerance is a
solid argument that racism is nonsense in our multicultural world.
His novel Partir is about Moroccans torn between their love for Morocco
and their desire to leave it., Because of their determination to move from Tangier
to Spain, young Moroccans fall prey to smugglers or drown in the sea, often
for the sake of the dream of obtaining a visa or European passport. Setting
the story between Tangier and Spain, Ben Jelloun depicts how the dream to
leave by any means necessary becomes a forlorn dream.2
In his post-9/11 book, Islam Explained, aimed at European children and
adults, he sheds light on the main tenets of Islam in an accessible question-
and-answer format in which he discusses milestones in Islamic history and the
Success Stories   ●    159

present rise of political Islam and fundamentalism. He wrote that Islam is often
“grasped only as a caricature,” affirming that “the mistake we make is to attribute
to religions the errors and fanaticism of human beings.” Personally “incapable
of mysticism”—though he respects the Sufi mystics—Ben Jelloun is a secular
Muslim who believes “religion has to stay in the heart, not in politics. It is private.”
The book also clarifies the major concepts that have come to dominate the
media—Islamism, jihad, fundamentalism, fatwa (a religious opinion), ter-
rorism, and crusade—offering lucid and balanced explanations, not only for
youngsters but also for the general public. Islam Explained is also an appeal for
peace, tolerance, and mutual understanding in these deeply troubled times.
Regarding the conditions of immigrants, Ben Jelloun stated in an inter-
view that what pose problems for Europeans today are not immigrants but
their children, who are European citizens.3 To the question of how he saw the
situation of Moroccan immigrants today, he replied: “As a writer, as a testa-
ment to the modern times, it was for me difficult to get rid of the phenom-
enon of migration. I discovered this world earlier, that is, at the beginning of
the seventies. When I was a student in France, I used to go to Gennevilliers to
give literacy lessons for the benefit of migrant workers. So, I got to know the
facts known only to few people, not voluntarily but because migration at the
time was only a topic for the media. I have found, as a novelist, a lot of mate-
rial about migration for my novels and theatrical texts. Today, things have
changed so much: immigrants no longer constitute a problem for Europeans,
but their children who have become Europeans do. The whole issue lies in
knowing how to deal with them, for this young generation was not included
in the accounts of politicians. The fact that they are young Europeans means
that they have a dual culture. But, they need to be taken into account, and we
must stop putting them in one basket with their parents.”
In total, Ben Jelloun wrote dozens of novels and essays, most of which
have been translated into over 40 languages. In 2008, he was elected mem-
ber of the Goncourt Academy and made an officer of the French Légion
d’Honneur, the order established by Napoleon Bonaparte, which is the
­highest decoration in France.
A new generation of young Euro-Moroccan writers have also become so
well-known and successful in Europe that they have won several prestigious
prizes. We will discuss some of them below, namely: Fouad Laroui, Issa Ait
Belize, Maati Kabbal, and Abdelkader Benali.

Fouad Laroui
Fouad Laroui is one of the best Moroccan-Dutch writers who publishes in
both French and Dutch. In 2013, he was awarded the vastly exalted Prix
Goncourt de la nouvelle, one of France’s top literary prizes, for his short
160   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

story L’étrange affaire du pantalon de Dassoukine. The tale narrates how a


young Moroccan official came to Brussels to buy European wheat at the
best price for his country. His pants got stolen, but somehow he managed to
fulfill his duty, even dressed in rags. Laroui’s writings tend to mock Morocco,
particularly its corruption and bureaucracy. He has published many novels,
short stories, essays, and poems, but his work has yet to be translated into
English.
Laroui was born in 1958 in Oujda, eastern Morocco. He studied math-
ematics at the French lycée Décartes in Casablanca, and later studied engi-
neering at the École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées in Paris, ultimately
becoming an engineer. After working for the Office Chérifien des Phosphates,
the national phosphate mining company in Morocco, he migrated to England,
where he obtained a PhD in economics. He lived for a few years in Cambridge
and York before he moved to Amsterdam in 1989, where he has been teaching
econometrics, environmental science, and French literature since.
He is also a literary chronicler for the weekly magazines Jeune Afrique and
Economia, and, the Francophone Moroccan radio Médi 1. Among his most
outstanding works, the following novels and short stories stand out: Les dents
du topographe, the chronicle of a young Moroccan who revolts against the
established order and nurtures feelings of detachment for his homeland. It
won the Albert Camus Prize in 1996. De quel amour blessé tells the story of
an impossible love affair between a Maghrebi man living in Paris and a Jewish
girl. Winner of Mediterranean prize of Colleges, Radio-Beur Prize, Méfiez-
vous des parachutistes is a comic portrait of Moroccan society told through the
lives of two characters.
Laroui won many prizes, including the Eddy du Perron Prize 2001 for
contributing to intercultural dialogue in the Netherlands. Praising his literary
work, the American writer and translator, Lydia Beyoud, states:

There are many reasons to love Fouad Laroui’s stories, for they can be read
at many different levels and each reader can draw something different from
them. He has an ardent following among Moroccans and “maghrebophiles”
worldwide, and his books are often snatched up almost as soon as they appear
on shelves.4

His most recent nonfiction book, De l’Islamisme, was published simulta-


neously in French and Dutch.5 His essay, Le drame linguistique marocain,
is an extraordinary book that discusses in depth the questions of mother
tongues—colloquial Arabic (Amazigh) and standard Arabic in Morocco. The
author recommends the use of these languages in education. His analysis is
valid also for neighboring Algeria and other countries in the region.6
Success Stories   ●    161

I met Fouad Laroui occasionally in Amsterdam between 2007 and 2013,


and had the opportunity to interview him. To my question “What is your
experience of immigration, and what is your background?” he answered:

I went to school in Morocco, first to lycée Lyautey in Casablanca (I studied


advanced mathematics) where I rubbed shoulders with many young people
who have now successful careers. I joined the National School of Bridges and
Roads, where I was sitting next to Fouad Douiri in class (currently Minister
of Energy in Morocco)—yet another example of success . . . Then, I returned
to Morocco, where I spent five years in the Office Chérifien des Phosphates
(OCP), first as an engineer (I ran Merah el Ahrech mine) then as a commer-
cial director (I was selling Moroccan phosphate to China and India). At age
29, I decided to change my life for several reasons. And this is when I really
“migrated.” My tribulations took me everywhere in Belgium, where I worked
for Jacques Delors, then president of the European Commission; then, I moved
to England (I lived in Cambridge and York), and then went to France as visit-
ing professor at the University of St. Quentin-en-Yvelines). I ended up settling
down in Amsterdam, where I taught successively economics and the environ-
mental sciences, and French and Francophone literature. In parallel, I  have
pursued a career as a writer; I have published ten novels (mostly at J­ulliard,
Paris), collections of short stories, essays (on Islam, on the language issue in
Morocco) and two collections of poems in Dutch.

To the question “What is the secret of your success?” Laroui replied:

I do not know whether to speak of success or not, but . . . there is no secret


because since the dawn of time, we know that it is hard work that ensures suc-
cess in all areas. One could add talent, luck, (good) fortuitous encounters, and
chance; however, success can also be triggered by patient and painstaking work.
Personally, I would like to add this: the constant investment in yourself. I mean
intellectual, cultural investment . . . the constant search for knowledge (true,
that is to say scientific knowledge, no nonsense kind of astrology or dogma
of any kind or Byzantine nitpicky). When I see people spend hours on the
train doing nothing, looking ahead when they could read a book, a magazine,
learn, and get informed, I am appalled. When I meet people who have spent
twenty years in the Netherlands and who have never bothered to learn Dutch,
I do not understand. And they wonder why they have not achieved anything.
Finally, one must develop what I call a technicality, that is to say, a very sharp
knowledge in a given field, in order to distinguish oneself, eventually, among
a hundred candidates for the same position. For me, it was econometrics, spe-
cifically econometric modeling. I also defended a thesis on it. This has been
very helpful to me when I returned to Europe, not knowing anyone, with
the handicap of being a foreigner. I could still find interesting jobs in France,
Belgium, England, and the Netherlands.
162   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Then, I asked him if immigration had contributed to his success. He answered:

Let’s say that being a foreigner is another handicap that forces you to be better.
As Nietzsche said, “Anything that does not kill me makes me stronger” . . .
More seriously, there is also an undeniable fact that Europe offers more chances
and opportunities, possibilities to develop or improve than the rest of the
world. And then, the social system is very generous so you can get up after a
fall, you can take its course even if you get lost on the wrong track for a while.
Finally, immigration gives you a more varied world, as it forces you to look
with new eyes at your conduct, your beliefs, your habits, and this can be very
beneficial. A total questioning is sometimes the best way to reinvent oneself
and move forward in life.

Asked whether he could have succeeded had he stayed in Morocco, he


responded:

Again, it depends on what you mean by success. The fact is that when I had
decided to go and settle abroad, to try my luck there, I had already “succeeded”
in some way since I was a professional engineer at OCP and I was promised a
great career. But it was not the OCP today and it was not Morocco today . . .
I would probably have succeeded but there were years of personal frustration
with the feeling of living in a cultural desert, with a sword of Damocles over the
head: the arbitrary decisions taken over oneself. That’s a lot . . . It can tarnish
the shine of what could have been considered a success.

Then, I asked him what the impact of his success on Morocco and
Moroccans was. He answered:

I do not know . . . You’d have to ask those who know me. Having said that,
I often receive letters from young Moroccans who claim that they are inspired
by my journey or recognize themselves in some characters of my novels, for
example, in the narrator of Beware Paratroopers. What I say in a few words is:
be yourself. And then, I repeat what I stated above: invest in yourself in terms
of (true) knowledge and technicality.

About the impact of Moroccans in Europe, he replied:

Frankly, they are too varied to provide a single answer. To begin with, we
should not idealize: some contribute nothing, judging by the sterile debates
on some sites, ad hominem attacks and totally demagogic proposals. As for
those, often the second generation, who speak of Morocco without knowing
anything about it, without taking the trouble to delve into its history, without
the slightest notion of sociology, political science, and anthropology, it is better
Success Stories   ●    163

for them to begin to read and be silent in the meantime. Fortunately, there are
those who bring something valuable: a democratic culture, an ethical debate
that we are sometimes lacking. And then, and this is most important, there
are those that demonstrate the freedom of conscience, who really think for
themselves instead of rehashing old dogmas, who accept and even defend a
world where everyone thinks truly plural and practice what they want. Those
are unfortunately a minority.

My last question to him went like this: “Why is it that the European media
do not focus on Moroccan immigrants who have succeeded?” He replied:

This is the law of nature. We talk about the train that arrives late and not about
the one which has arrived on time. In the Netherlands, for example, newspa-
pers report about negative things. But, this is not always the case, fortunately.
The mayor of Rotterdam, Ahmed Aboutaleb, is a celebrity here7. I think he
is one of the most popular personalities in the country. The media have also
contributed to his fame. But his success is largely due to his work . . . which
takes us back to your second question!

In another interview, he stated: “I write to report situations that shock me,


to uncover stupidity in all its forms, wickedness, cruelty, fanaticism; stupidity
revolts me.”8
Fouad Laroui occasionally says that he has wasted his life by becoming a
writer, because all his Moroccan classmates who studied at the French lycée
Lyautey in Casablanca are now governors, ministers, and successful businessmen
in Morocco. He obviously does not truly think so, since he talks about books
with such greed and passion, and is so “obviously happy to be a free man.”9

Issa Aït Belize


Issa Ait Belize is a prolific Moroccan-Belgian writer, considered by Salim Jay
in his Dictionnaire des écrivains marocains (Dictionary of Moroccan writers),
as one of the most ambitious Francophone Moroccan novelists in Europe.
He was born in 1954 in a small village in northern Morocco where books
were scarce. After obtaining his end-of-high school certificate in Rabat, he
moved to Belgium to further his studies. He decided to settle down there
and start a writing career and a family. He was seduced by the diversity of the
Belgian society, the freedom of expression, and the love of life. On the cul-
tural and artistic levels, he discovered men and women producing masterful
creations, a profusion of colors, shapes, fantasy, and humor.
Among his most well-known novels, the following stand out: La Chronique
du pou vert is a satirical novel about poverty, life, and death in a small
164   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Moroccan town.10 Nounja à la folie is about madness and recklessness as seen


by two children during an early 1970s summer vacation in a small town in the
Rif, northern Morocco—the events, characters, and places are real.11
His novel Le fils du péché is about a poor young Berber man who had a
difficult childhood given the early death of his father.12 He later migrated to
Belgium only to discover his identity through reconnecting with his Islamic
culture, its values, and the cultural and spiritual specificities of Morocco.
Appelez-moi Sam, which he published in 2008, is the story of a young
daughter remembering how her Moroccan father had to go through so much
red tape to get his citizenship after years of work and residence in Belgium.
But her father dies before he can tell her about her roots and religion.
I interviewed Issa Ait Belize about his background, writing, and contribu-
tions. Here is what he had to say:

I arrived in Belgium when I was 18 years old to pursue my studies, and as


was expected at this age and especially at that time—the early‘ 70s—I met on
the banks of the university the girl that would later become my wife. She was
herself a descendant of Hispanic immigration, for her parents had migrated
to Belgium after the Spanish Civil War. At the end of my studies, against the
advice of my relatives who wanted me to return home, I stayed in Belgium. It
is already forty years, a lifetime. Migration in my case was facilitated by this
union: I have not had much trouble to love Belgium, its history and its diverse
and pragmatic people. At my young age, marrying a local girl was an asset
provided we could get rid of our own prejudices; mine were and are still legion.
This is the most difficult task in the life of a migrant. Even after these efforts,
it does not mean we were welcomed with open arms by the natives of the host
country. The oil crisis, the beginning of the economic crisis pushed the West to
put more barriers and increase prices; we had to fight like everyone else, a little
more even for daily bread, raising our children the best possible way we could
while trying to be happy anyway.

The secret of his success:

I do not like to use the word “success”, mainly because of its subjectivity. Has
Christ (controversy aside), for example, succeeded by ending his life on the
cross at the age of thirty odd years? According to today’s standards, one would
not hesitate to say no: it is a failure, and an idiocy! By contrast, I can speak of
the desire I have always had to talk about my cultural roots, fabulous history,
and civilization that is more than a millennium old to dispel some misconcep-
tions that ran and still run in the West; false received ideas, half-truths have
been circulating and still circulate about the civilization that I was born in. As
for the secret of my success, if secret there is, it is my constant yearning for the
truth and its universal relativity that I love above all.
Success Stories   ●    165

The role of immigration in his literary adventure:

Immigration has played in my case an important, if not essential role. Being


away from my nest, my feeder roots where my relatives had raised me patiently,
with a potential social role in a country that aspired to modernity and well-
being, I am deeply affected by migration at the psychological, spiritual and
intellectual levels, of course, which forced me to ask myself a series of existen-
tial questions: Who am I? But in every sense of the word “to be.” This was the
beginning of writing and the theme of my novel La chronique du pou vert pub-
lished by Luce Wilquin in 2001. It was written with the hope of finding peace
and harmony. Multiplicity is unified; uniqueness is viewed as a benchmark. It
is then that in the horizon, mine, fragility, substantiality, words are born in an
unknown ocean, then evaporate, and fall like dew on a recomposed being: this
is the case of the emigrant who takes possession of an immaterial homeland.
Literature and the word will now be my land and my sky. It is a timeless ocean
that comes from nowhere but that the migrant takes with him or her forever.
Farewell all homelands. Hello my sister, hello my brother, humans to the bone,
until death. I think I managed to undress everything that you gave me. Fare-
well ornaments, hello nakedness of the soul.

Would he have written had he stayed in Morocco?

I do not know, because for me Morocco is a country first dreamed, loved


through people I both adore and abhor. In short, a millennium passion unites
me with my homeland, unconditionally, without pay or reward. That said, I’m
pretty much a prisoner of its future and not of its past, since the Maghreb,
as does Belgium, runs through my veins night and day, and any time I see
Carthage and Fez, I breathe the scent of desert sands, the fragrances off Cape
Bon . . . Algeria, my beloved, my Libya! Berber culture of my country feeds its
amber, and its Arabism saddens me sometimes when it becomes exclusive in
the inexpert mouth of some of our leaders without memory . . . Because of this
and many other things, it seems to me that if I had stayed in Morocco, I would
have benefited from Morocco to the dregs, until the final fade. No, I would
not have written, I would probably have read the Moroccan authors more than
what I’ve done so far, as the literature of those who remained in the country
fascinates me. They write the way they live, soberly.

Concerning the impact of the literature of Moroccan authors on Morocco


and Moroccans, he affirmed:

Suffice it to say that my writings, as those of a lot of Francophone Moroc-


can authors, are not even available in Morocco. Why? Whose fault is it? This
is probably the fault of Voltaire or Rousseau . . . this type of dirty Rousseau
166   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

would have said Gavroche. But, I personally do not know why; I leave that to
the sociologists and other analysts of the literary phenomenon of the Moroc-
can diaspora. I can only cry out for translators and publishers of my country
who let die promising literary magazines, unite, wake up as the sun has risen
for ages! As to our influence on Western Europe, by contrast, it is clear. We
participate individually and collectively in the development of a literature able
to respond to multiculturalism which is increasingly criticized in these times
of crisis but which is able to participate in the making of a culture of peace
throughout the world, in the future.

Maati Kabbal
Maati Kabbal was born in Khouribga, Morocco. He is a Franco-Moroccan
writer, essayist, and specialist in Moroccan literature. He is frequently invited
to talk shows on Radio “Médi 1” and contributes to French and Moroccan
television programs and newspapers like Libération, Le Monde Diplomatique,
and the Magazine Littéraire. He has been responsible for the cultural activities
at the Arab World Institute in France since 1997.
He writes with a good sense of humor and emotion about his hometown,
Khouribga. In his novel, Je t’ai à l’oeil, he describes the Moroccan society and
people with a lot of criticism and affection. He depicts people’s everyday life
and socioeconomic challenges.13
In 2007, Kabbal published a collection of short stories titled Maroc, éclats
instantanés, in which he recounts rural characters torn between the deep
“bled” (countryside), the phosphate mines, and France, where the characters
came to live but remain without roots and ultimately without branches, as in
the case of Hoummad Baghli in the novella Farewell Ravel.14
In his novel, One Way to Bouya Omar, the author writes about his own
experience as a migrant torn between two identities and two cultures. It
describes the descent of the main character into the darkness of insanity,
while in search of her mother. By taking snapshots, the author describes
how madness is ready to “seize” the whole world. As Fouad Laroui states in
the preface, Kabbal knows where he comes from, where he is, but wonders
whether this displacement was really necessary. He personifies the Maghrebi
migrant who often suffers from nostalgia and identity crisis.15
Concerning his experience of migration and his background, he stated:

I voluntarily left Morocco after teaching at high school and at university in


Marrakesh. It must be said that at the time, it was the late 1980s, there was a lit-
tle damper on the psychological and moral levels for a generation that had dared
to go into politics. I arrived in France for studies and I found myself doing odd,
Success Stories   ●    167

painful, and underpaid jobs: distributing flyers, doing translations of obscure


texts or acting as a writer for immigrant illiterate workers! This was a laboratory
that allowed me to experience, live, and write about immigration and its silent
pain. This course is the common lot of many students and postgraduates.

Regarding the secret of his success:

I do not know if I have succeeded, but I gained visibility in the media and
culture, working hard at Courrier International, Liberation, Politis, Al Hayat,
the European University Research and finally at the Institut du Monde Arabe.
In the past, intellectuals and writers, were more generous and attentive to the
demand of people of the global South. There emerged a humanism that is
lacking today to the entire West. But the only secret is serious and hard work.

The role of migration in his success:

I owe a lot to immigrants, especially my uncles, who allowed me to become


familiar with the political and sociological realities of immigration. Through
their stories about Peugeot and Renault plants, I could understand what Ben
Jelloun called the highest solitudes.

Could he have succeeded had he stayed in Morocco?

Had I stayed in Morocco, I would have been dead and buried.

Concerning the impact of his success on Morocco and the Moroccans:

I am in no position to judge the impact of this success over Morocco and


Moroccans. One thing is certain though: writing on Morocco from France,
I take and convey something more distanced and subtle. My contributions lack
the immediacy aspect, but they are distanced and substantial.

For him the contributions of Moroccans to Europe are varied:

A supply of skills and expertise. Rationality that must be the basis of everyday
life. They are mediators between the two sides of the Mediterranean.

The European media do not focus on the Moroccans who are successful
because:

The media are obsessed with the bling-bling: it is Debbouze and company who
enjoy preferential treatment, whereas engineers, computer scientists, scientists,
168   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

who succeed and advance society, are reduced. These are potential victims of a
narrow Eurocentrism.

Abdelkader Benali
Abdelkader Benali was born in1975 in Ighazzazen, Morocco, but went with
his father to the Netherlands when Benali was just four years old. He is
now a prominent Moroccan-Dutch writer and journalist, described by the
Dutch media as one of the Netherlands’ leading writers. He wrote his first
novel, Bruloft aan zee (Wedding by the sea), when he was only 21. The novel
won the Geertjan Lubberhuizen-prize for Best First Novel and was trans-
lated into several languages. He received the Libris Prize for his second novel
Langverwachte (The long-awaited), published in 2002. Benali also writes
plays, reviews, and articles. As a Dutch-Moroccan writer, he is frequently
labeled as a multicultural author though he would rather prefer the public
to focus on his writings rather than being interested in his background and
assume that he is a voice for the Moroccan immigrants. He told me:

When I arrived with my mother in Rotterdam in the late 1970s, we thought


we had found a safe haven. Coming from the sharp-edged mountains of north
Morocco, the streets of the Low Countries felt like a place where everything
could be done better. It did not seem possible that, 30 years later, the likes
of Geert Wilders would wield influence, pushing his ban on the burqa, but
then there were no burqas to be seen in the street . . . I know that the Nether-
lands of my childhood will never come back. We are entering a dark period.
A generation is growing up with xenophobia and the fear of Islam has become
mainstream.
It’s time to come up with a new idea of what Europe is, drawing on the
humane Europe, as defended and described by writers such as Thomas Mann
and Bertolt Brecht. A Europe that newcomers consider a refuge, not a hell. If
not, Europe will not die for lack of immigrants, it will die for lack of light.16

In 2010, he was awarded the E. Prize of Perronprijs for his book From stem
mijn moeder van (The voice of my mother), qualified as “literature without
borders” by the jury. Organized annually by the city of Tilburg, the E. Prize
of Perronprijs distinguishes authors and artists who bring a plus to the muti-
cultural Dutch life.
I interviewed him in 2013 about the role of migration in his work and life.
Here is what he said:

Migration is an essential part of my lifestory, entwined with personal and uni-


versal histories and myths. In the first place, I do see myself as part of a long
Success Stories   ●    169

history of migration into Europe. And I see my history very much in connec-
tion with universal histories of displacement, exodus, shatat, hijra (diaspora),
and persecution. A central theme in my work is how people adjust to new,
sometimes surrealistic, situations. Not out of need, but necessity. Here my
inspirations are the stories of Odysseus, the wandering man in Kafka’s stories
and Sindbad the Sailor. Migration ultimately is an absurd act, and one of the
best worked out conclusions of this standpoint can be seen in the cinematic
work of the Ghanese-British filmmaker John Akomfrah.

When I asked him about the secret of his success, he said:

Hard work and raising to the occasion. But I have to say that society has offered
me many, many possibilities to put my individual talent into a myriad forms of
expression. I am fortunate to be living in a society that values the individualis-
tic expression for itself, and not for a political, nationalistic or ethnic agenda.
Though this creates tension between what is an artist and why is one an artist,
it still provides the space that creates an immense liberty.

I asked, “What is the role of immigration in your success?” He answered:

Everything I do in the professional field is strongly connected to my own expe-


riences and insights that flow out of the migration-story: going from A to B
and the change it encompasses. Another theme is the urge to get out of the
“ghetto,” to be part of mainstream culture instead of rejecting or being igno-
rant of mainstream culture. So a lot of what I have done was really trying to
formulate experiences and myths outside the ghetto, in this case the strongly
inward looking Moroccan community in the Netherlands.

I asked him if he could have been successful had he stayed in Morocco, and
he replied: “No, never that successful.” When I asked, “What is the impact of
your success on Morocco and the Moroccans?” he replied:

I don’t know, actually. There is a sense of nationalistic pride which I consider


shallow. And there is coming from Moroccan individuals a deep understand-
ing and appreciation of what I am trying to do. The getting out of the ghetto
project is being more and more followed and I am proud to have been of the
contributors.

Then, I asked: “In your opinion, what is the contribution of Moroccans


in Europe?” He responded:

When you look at sports, immense. When you look at various fields of art, very
strong and stimulating. It’s very exciting to see how this group is developing.
170   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Regarding why the European media do not highlight the successful Moroccan-
Europeans, his answer was:

They do that on a regular basis. But slowly Europe is becoming an immi-


grant-continent instead of an emigration-continent (remember the Irish who
migrated to the US in the nineteenth century), so a better understanding
of integration issues is becoming more and more urgent. The integration of
Moroccans in Dutch society can be used as a template, a starting point.

Many Moroccans in Europe have also excelled in other fields like sport, art,
theatre, and cinema. We shall then focus in the following sub-section on one
of the most prolific and successful artists in France: Jamel Debbouze.

Jamel Debbouze
Jamel Debbouze is an extraordinarily popular Franco-Moroccan actor, come-
dian, and producer. He is one of the most well-known and heavily mediatized
Francophone comedians in modern times. He was born in1975 in Paris. His
family, originally from Taza, Morocco, had settled in Trappes, in the Paris
area, where Debbouze spent the rest of his childhood.
At the age of 15, he was struck by a passing train travelling at 150 km/h at
the Trappes station. He lost the use of his right arm, while another young man,
Jean-Paul Admette, the son of the singer Michel Admette from Reunion, died.
Debbouze was sued by the victim’s family for manslaughter but the case was
dismissed by lack of proof, as most of the witnesses withdrew their accusations.
He took part in the French championship of theatre improvisation in 1991
and toured Quebec and Morocco. In 1992, he played his first role in a film
by Nabil Ayouch titled Les Pierres Bleues du Désert. After this film, Debbouze
wanted to work as an actor and create his own show. This happened in 1995
with the show C’est Tout Neuf, which was a success. He ran several shows on
French Radio Nova and on French television channels, which achieved him
national fame.
In March 1999, Debbouze started his new show Jamel en Scène, in which
he talked about his beginnings, childhood, and show business. At the end
of his 2000 tour through France, he returned to Paris with his show at the
Olympia for three weeks. He received his first huge role in a feature comic
film called Le Ciel les oiseaux et ta . . . mère! (Boys on the beach), which was
successful, with more than 1 million tickets sold. Over the next two years he
continued his stage shows, before returning to film with the highly successful
Le fabuleux destin d’Amélie Poulain. He was nominated for the César Award
for Best Supporting Actor in 2002.
Success Stories   ●    171

For three years in a row, Debbouze’s new show, 100% Debbouze, played in
the top Parisian theaters—the Casino de Paris, the Bataclan, the Zenith, and
the Olympia. He then toured France, Morocco, Tunisia, Switzerland, and
Belgium. The DVD of the show went on sale in 2004 and sold more than a
million copies.
In 2006, he acted in the historical movie Indigènes (he also co-produced),
which paid tribute to the North African soldiers who fought for France dur-
ing World War II. For this movie, he received the prize for best male actor at
the 59th Cannes Film Festival. Two years later, Debbouze opened a comedy
club in Paris, aimed at launching newcomers on the stand-up scene. He was
the chairman of the 2013 César Awards.
Analysts state that Jamel Debbouze is confined to the culture of the Paris
suburbs (banlieues), and that most of his comedy is drawn from his personal
life, his family’s experience, and the problems of the banlieues (Mogniss 2003).
In fact, he symbolizes Arab-Muslim oppressed youth in France. But he
responds that his characters have nothing to do with reality. In an interview
with the French magazine Télérama on April 7,1999, he confides that his
characters are one hundred percent “constructed.” He states that he under-
stands the problems and frustrations of the migrant youth, especially when
their parents earn little money or just enough to pay the electricity and rent
bills. This would indicate that he does get his characters from migrant youth
experience.
He financially supports Trappes’ football club, as well as schools, charities,
and deprived groups of the population. He created the Marrakesh interna-
tional film festival in 2010, to which prestigious actors and comedians are
invited. He is well respected and loved in Morocco and has developed friend-
ships with the royal family (Le Figaro of Feb. 4, 2003).
Debbouze is a good example of the cultural integration of young educated
Moroccans in France who cast aside their own communautarism and the
colonial legacy. He admits that it is very hard to integrate in France. In his
interview with Le Figaro of Feb. 4, 2003, he states “one does not realize how
difficult it is to integrate. Even the bowl vendors are racists.”17
Today, Debbouze is recognized in France and beyond as a Franco-Moroccan
actor and comedian, and is celebrated as one of the top 50 great French per-
sonalities of all time, along with Christian Clavier, Gérard Depardieu, and
Zinedine Zidane.18 He has many fans, not only among Moroccan youth, but
also among older generations and French nationals, who often ask him for
an autograph.
In addition to artists, intellectuals, and writers, many Moroccans in
Europe have succeeded and risen to stardom in politics and civil society, as
we shall see below.
172   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Politicians and Activists


This section will focus on Moroccans who have become celebrities in the
world of politics, activism, and diplomacy, particularly in France, the
Netherlands, and Belgium. First, let us consider the great work and achieve-
ments of the Moroccan-French spokesperson of the first François Hollande
government in France, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem.

Najat Vallaud-Belkacem
Second in a family of seven children, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem was born in
1977 near Nador, in the Rif, northern Morocco. In 1982, she traveled with
her mother and older sister to Amiens, where they joined her father, a con-
struction worker who had migrated previously, and it was there that she spent
her childhood.
As a lawyer and active member of the Socialist Party, she has led actions to
strengthen local democracy, fight against discrimination, and promote citi-
zens’ rights and access to employment and housing. When she was appointed
to President François Hollande’s cabinet in 2012, as Minister of Women’s
Rights and spokesperson for the government, she was the youngest minis-
ter in the government. She was the spokesperson for Ségolène Royal dur-
ing the 2007 presidential elections and for François Hollande in 2011 for
his presidential campaign.19 In addition to her role as spokesperson for the
presidential candidate, she ran in the 2012 parliamentary elections and won a
seat in the fourth district of the Rhone, and has since been elected its general
councilor.
Under her leadership, the Ministry of Women’s Rights has become a
vibrant and active ministry for the first time. Vallaud-Belkacem is determined
to initiate a “third generation of women’s rights,” after the first generation of
political rights and the second generation of economic equality. She is par-
ticularly engaged in achieving parity in many sectors and eradicating gender-
stereotyping in school textbooks and curricula.
Vallaud-Belkacem emphasizes her concept of “visible plurality” in French
society, because for her, diversity and equality are not incompatible and offer
a third way to “resolve difficulties related to integration.”20 She insists on an
equality of opportunity that is sorely lacking in French society. This lack of
opportunity has led to the impoverishment of the population, further exacer-
bated by the economic crisis.
Very involved in issues of her generation, she believes in the digital revolu-
tion, free Internet, and social media networks. She took a stand against the
Hadopi law that sought to limit the freedom of Internet surfers.
Success Stories   ●    173

In her 2012 book Raison d’Etre, she emphasizes the values of dialogue and
diversity that are very dear to her. She argues that progress is still possible
through political action and only through it. It is this conviction that she
wishes to champion in her book, where she provides good reasons of hope for
the future and uses harsh words to criticize supporters of pessimism, defeat,
and renunciation in the face of market forces. She brings a new tone to poli-
tics, that of a young woman who embodies the new generation of French
socialists. For many observers, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, one of two Franco-
Moroccans in government, has replaced the outstanding French female poli-
tician of Moroccan origin, Rachida Dati, who will be considered below:

Rachida Dati
Rachida Dati is an exceptional French politician and member of the European
Parliament, representing Île-de-France. Before her election, she held the cabi-
net post of keeper of the seals, minister of justice, during Nicolas Sarkozy’s
presidency.
She was born in1965 in Saint-Rémy, Saône-et-Loire, to a Moroccan
father, a bricklayer, and an Algerian mother. She graduated from the École
Nationale de la Magistrature and became a prominent judge in Paris and a
member of the Union for Popular Movement party (UMP). In 2007, she was
named spokesperson for Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential campaign. Thanks to
her hard work, she rose from poverty to sublime power against all the odds
of French discrimination.
She was appointed minister of justice under President Sarkozy’s govern-
ment and was the first Muslim woman to hold a major government post.
According to Sarkozy, her appointment was meant to send a message “to all
the children of France that with merit and effort, everything becomes pos-
sible.” Her position in the French cabinet was certainly a memorable period
in the political life of France, which is still shaken by racial discrimination.21
Her first reforms were received coldly by professionals, with public dem-
onstrations. She was attacked by feminists after giving birth to her daughter,
because she did not take maternity leave. She took only five days’ rest, and she
replied to the critics that she was free to go back to work. “The most impor-
tant right for women is freedom,” she said.22
In 2009, she was elected member of the European Parliament. Asked if
she would campaign for the top job, the 47-year-old single mother replied:
“Why not, if I can do something for my country?”23
Like France, the Netherlands showcases many Moroccan success stories
at the political level. The personality that comes to mind first is Ahmed
Aboutaleb, mayor of Rotterdam since 2009. He has had brilliant political
174   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

career in the Labor party, and between 2007 and 2008 he was secretary of
state for employment and training, as we shall see below.

Ahmed Aboutaleb
Ahmed Aboutaleb was born in 1961 in Beni Sidel, a small village in northern
Morocco, and was 15 when he arrived in the Netherlands. He graduated
from the Hogere Technische School, where he studied telecommunications.
His political career began in 2004, when he became alderman (council mem-
ber next in status to mayor) in the city of Amsterdam, in charge of work and
income, education, youth, diversity and urban policy.
He is the first Muslim mayor of Rotterdam, Europe’s largest port and one
of the busiest in the world. Ahmed Aboutaleb embodies the incongruity of
many successful Moroccan immigrants in a country where anti-Islam feelings
have become a hot political debate.
During my stay in the Netherlands in June 2012, I had the opportunity to
ask him why and how he achieved this powerful position, while the majority
of immigrants suffered from marginalization and discrimination. His answer
was:

I have struggled extremely hard for many years There is a large Muslim and
non-Muslim population which welcomes a Muslim-born and elected mayor
of Rotterdam . . . I must work hard and succeed; however, if I don’t, it will be
a big disappointment for this population, and it will be harder for people to
participate in public life.

Aboutaleb compares his battle to that of Dutch women in the 1960s. “Fifty
years ago there was only one female university professor in the Netherlands,
today there are so many,” he added. I asked him about his proudest moment,
and he answered:

It was during one of the elections in my pre-mayor era, I received the highest
number of votes, 50,000, and amongst those who voted for me were Jewish
people, Muslims, and Christians.

His aim is to develop his city, encourage business with the rest of the
world, and focus on human development. Aboutaleb states that economic
development and “physical appearance of success, in reference to bridges,
dams and infrastructure, are important but insufficient, for investing in
people is of paramount importance.”24 He stated in a December 16, 2011,
interview for Gulf News25:
Success Stories   ●    175

As a Muslim and a son of an immigrant from Morocco, I am glad to take part


in governing this country. I cherish this moment. I am proud that this is pos-
sible in the Netherlands. And I am proud of the Dutch people who have given
me their confidence.

He has distinguished himself as the most active politician of Moroccan


descent in Dutch political and social fields. He contributed to appeasing the
ethnic and race relations in the Netherlands, after the murder of filmmaker
Theo van Gogh in November 2004 by Ahmed Bouyeri, a radical Islamist
of Moroccan origin. After the murder, Aboutaleb himself began receiving
death threats because of his integration policies in the capital. For some time,
he lived in a secret location and could not go out without security. But he
continued to fiercely defend his integration policies and gradually became
known at the national level. He took action in favor of a policy called “school
map”  inspired by the French model, which requires parents to place their
children in the neighborhood schools.26 He also helped develop education
programs for youth and put into effect the Dutch coalition for peace in the
Middle East.
When it comes to Rotterdam’s young people, Aboutaleb emphasizes the
role of education as a means to tackle crime. As someone who began life as a
poor Moroccan boy but became a Dutch citizen with an impressive career, he
is especially qualified to inspire young people from immigrant backgrounds
to succeed. In a recent interview with the Moroccan electronic news agency
Hespress on January 14, 2014, he stated that he was made in Morocco and
programmed in the Netherlands to become mayor of Rotterdam.27
Initially, Aboutaleb faced fierce opposition from politicians associated
with the anti-Islam Party for Freedom (PVV). Geert Wilders, party leader,
stated publicly that “appointing a Moroccan as mayor of the second largest
Dutch city is just as ridiculous as appointing a Dutchman as mayor of Mecca.
Instead, he should become mayor of Rabat in Morocco . . . Soon we may
even have an imam serving as archbishop. This is madness.” Aboutaleb was
also criticized by the followers of Rotterdam-based Pim Fortuyn, a populist
anti-immigration politician, who was murdered in 2002. But in the end,
even Aboutaleb’s critics came to accept the appointment.28
Aboutaleb was elected first and foremost for his leadership qualities and
hard work, but this position had a much more in-depth impact because the
integration of migrants in Dutch society enriches the national debate about
the role of migration.
In the Netherlands, many Muslim immigrants rose in politics, business,
art, or sport, at a time of crisis and ethnic doubt of the ability of the Muslim
minority to integrate into European societies. But at the same time, their
176   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

rarity at the top of the hierarchy demonstrates the difficulty of integrating


and becoming part of the elite.
“This is the new Europe; the Netherlands and Belgium show the exam-
ple to follow,” states Sadik Harchaoui, a Moroccan who heads the National
Institute for Multicultural Development at Utrecht. “This is the moment for
Dutch citizens from immigrant origin to take this type of work, not only in
government but also in business. Fifteen to twenty years from now, it will
become a normal thing,”29 he added. Ahmed Aboutaleb will indeed have
paved the way.

Fatiha Saidi
Fatiha Saidi has been a member of the senate in Belgium (Socialist party)
and member of the Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe since
2004. She was born in 1961 to a family of Moroccan origin and has lived in
Belgium since she was five years old. She struggles for the respect of human
rights, doing volunteer work. She is best known for the founding of Radio El
Wafa, a free community radio station, in 1986. As a psychologist, she oper-
ates in the field of youth welfare, helping troubled youth and their families
(because of abuse, school dropout, drugs, delinquency, etc.). Then, she moved
to journalism, and continued struggling for the promotion of migrants rights
and equal opportunities.
To better defend the values of justice, equity, and respect for human rights
and women, Fatiha Saidi entered politics and in 1999 became a member of
Parliament (MP). Along with her parliamentary mandate, Fatiha Saidi has
been alderwoman at Evere since 2007, in charge of urban planning, the envi-
ronment, sustainable development, solidarity among peoples, and equality
of opportunity.
Her work focuses on access to the fundamental rights of health, housing,
and employment; and equal opportunities for all citizens, regardless of their
national origin, gender, religious or philosophical beliefs, or sexual orien-
tation. To achieve this, her favorite method is to listen to citizens, to hear
and relay their needs, suggestions, and concerns. “Attention is crucial, for
it feeds my political action and it helps me take concrete action, tailored to
individual needs,” she stated in an email conversation. This essential bond
allows her to take the pulse of the living conditions of people, especially the
most vulnerable groups (unemployed, single parents, people of foreign ori-
gin, undocumented migrants, disabled persons, etc.) and gives her a more
informed perspective, leading to helpful resources or solutions.
Being an MP never meant she should live in an ivory tower, and she con-
tinues to be active in associations that have invited her to participate. She
Success Stories   ●    177

facilitates informal gatherings for them, and sometimes more formal work-
shops or conferences aimed at sharing realities, tools, and strategies.

Nadia Sminate
Nadia Sminate was born in Bonheiden (central Belgium), to a Moroccan
father and a Belgian mother. She earned a degree in Roman philology from
the Flemish University of Brussels (VUB) and taught languages to adults
in the teaching center Lethas de Ganshoren, before she became MP, in the
House of Representatives of Belgium in 2010.
As a candidate of the independentist New Flemish Alliance Party (N-VA),
Nadia Sminate was elected mayor of the town of Londerzeel in 2012 at the
age of 31, during the Belgian municipal elections. As member of the New
Flemish Alliance, the separatist party in the Flemish region, Nadia Sminate
will be the first mayor of Moroccan origin in Belgium. At her side, 129 other
Belgians from Morocco were elected on the same day. This figure symbolizes
the successful integration of these immigrants in the host society.
Ninety-five Moroccans were elected in the capital, Brussels. Overall, it is in
French-speaking Wallonia that Moroccans are most successful. In the Flanders
regions, which are Dutch- or German-speaking, there is a general reluctance
to elect immigrants or their descendants to decision-making positions.
This unfavorable attitude did not prevent Moroccans from developing
brilliant political careers. The leader of the separatist Flemish party said he
was proud to present the first mayor of Moroccan origin, who has a high
sense of independence. The independentist Flemish party is against anti-
immigrant policies, unlike the extreme right. The appointment of Nadia
Sminate has created surprise, according to the newspaper La Libre Belgique,
since the nationalist party N-VA is not known for its soft attitude toward
foreigners and immigrants.30
The Belgian information site “7 sur 7” of the party claims that it is open
to debate about immigrants political participation. However, the party holds
ambivalent positions toward immigration, as it wavers between the rein-
forcing of border controls and denouncing the reintroduction of border
controls.31

Fadila Laânan
In Wallonia, the example that comes to mind is Fadila Laânan, currently
the minister of culture, audiovisual, health, and equal opportunities of the
Federation of Wallonia-Brussels. She held several other prestigious positions
as member of the Socialist Party.
178   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Fadila Laânan was born in1967 in Schaerbeek (Brussels) of Moroccan


parents. She holds a degree in public and administrative law from the Free
University of Brussels.
Her parents, who are from the Rif (Nador area), emigrated to Algeria
before settling in Belgium in 1964. Laânan has been active in the club
Maghreb Youth since age 18, and later became its president.
For her, women’s greatest achievement is “without hesitation, the right to
dispose of their body, without the threat of an unwanted pregnancy, without
the heaviness of a public morality which confines women to the roles of wife
and mother.”32 However, she thinks that there are still many challenges facing
women, especially gender equality in the workplace. Women’s career paths
are still marked by multiple obstacles, or pure and simple discrimination,
whether at the level of income, employment opportunities, working condi-
tions, or employment security.
To overcome these obstacles, a genuine mobilization of the public authori-
ties is necessary, but also the social partners and civil society must intervene in
all relevant fields—education, training, family policies, and the labor market.
When asked by French TV5 what motivates her commitment she
answered: “Sincerely, outrage at the injustice and the belief that we need to
live and advance the rights and freedoms for which others have fought before
us.”33 In 2014, the minister for the Francophony, Yamina Benguigui, gave
Laânan the insignia of officer of the French Légion d’Honneur and praised
her cultural diversity policy and personal journey. Fadila Laânan is the “model
of an exceptional career that transcends borders,” the minister stated in the
Belgian newspaper Le Soir.34
Laânan is not the only success story in Belgium. There are other impor-
tant public figures like Sfia Bouarfa, who has been promoted to the rank of
Knight of the Order of Leopold. Bouarfa, who has had a long parliamentary
career, is considered a leading figure of the Belgian left (El Bouzdaini, 2012).
Thus, Moroccans in Europe are not passive in the political arena. They
contribute to the sustainable development of their host country, in addition
to their involvement in civil society and intercultural dialogue. Their active
participation has been recognized by native Europeans, who elected many of
them to lead and run their communities. A vote of confidence which will, in
the long run, be productive at a time of isolationism and xenophobia.

Conclusion
Across Europe, Moroccan immigrants have contributed to various fields,
which has helped advance their host countries and their own society. At home
and in Europe, they have developed strategies for resisting social injustice,
Success Stories   ●    179

discrimination, and other forms of oppression. Through their hard work,


they have created a broad North African identity, providing their communi-
ties with a sense of participation in European public life. They have learned
skills and adapted their customs and beliefs to European lifestyle. They have
equally established positive attitudes and practices to impact their communi-
ties, even though hegemonic European powers could interfere at will. These
kinds of sociocultural and political contributions by Moroccan Muslim
immigrants have evolved in unique ways.
Conclusion

I
n Europe, Muslim Moroccan migration is often wrongly associated
with undocumented migration, integration issues, violence, terrorism,
theft, drugs, delinquency, prostitution, etc. It is also widely thought that
migrants take advantage of host countries and take more than they give. This
kind of discourse is dangerous because it fosters xenophobia, Islamophobia,
and prejudice against migrants.
The book has shown that Moroccan migrants function as facilitators of
exchange at the economic, socio-cultural, and political levels. Economically,
migrants contribute to development of trade, partnerships, and financial
exchanges. Socially, they are involved in networks and other links that main-
tain their attachment to their home countries. Culturally, migrants are good
mediators between Europe and the Muslim world, and can play a prominent
role in cultural exchanges and intercultural dialogue.
Moroccan migrants in Europe have changed over the last decades both
qualitatively and quantitatively. They have become diverse, multicultural,
and multilingual. They are diverse at the levels of gender, age, socio-cultural
background, status, integration, education, employment, etc. Their encoun-
ter with democratic life in Europe has made them more disciplined, law-
abiding, and keener on progress and modernity in their country of origin.
This book has highlighted the considerable contributions of Moroccan
immigrants to development and socio-cultural change in Europe. They
actively participate in economic growth by building infrastructures, indus-
tries, and manufactures; increasing production in all domains; creating
businesses and new jobs; and filling those occupations European people are
reluctant to take. Moroccan immigrants also contribute substantially to the
economic and social development of their home country through remittances
and investments.
The remittances sent back to Morocco are substantial, as they constitute
the second source of foreign currency for the country after tourism, and are
an important vector of development. They support thousands of families and
182   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

nourish hundreds of businesses and enterprises back home. Without these


remittances, Morocco would suffer a big economic and social loss.
The Moroccan state shows a positive attitude toward its citizens abroad.
The size of remittance flows is recognized as indispensable by the Moroccan
government, which now endeavors to foster the relationship between
Moroccans abroad and their home country through several inspiring socio-
economic measures and facilities like loans and administrative leeway.

Major Findings
One of the central findings of this study is the plurality and heterogeneity of
the Moroccan community. Regardless of their age, education, gender, class,
and status, all Moroccan migrants and their descendants are undergoing
change and moving toward greater diversity, giving rise to new family models,
including bachelorhood, cohabitation, divorced, nuclear, and large families.
The reasons for immigration, which were originally economic or for family
reunification, are also evolving, with new strategies being adopted, especially
in relation to marriage. For example, the majority are married to Moroccans:
86.4 percent of Belgian-Moroccans have spouses of Moroccan origin, com-
pared with only 8.5 percent who are married to Belgians. Even as a third of
the Belgian-Moroccans interviewed own their own homes in Belgium, nearly
two thirds of them have property in Morocco (Saaf et al. 2009). These are just
a few factors that illustrate the Moroccan community’s attachment to both
Morocco and the host country.
The book also reveals the insecure socioeconomic situation of many
Moroccans. Large cross-country and regional differences were found in the
scale of poverty, showing the Belgian-Moroccans in Wallonia as the worst off
among the diaspora. Women and young people remain marginalized in the
labor market because not only of segregation but also lack of training and
patriarchal restrictions on women to stay home.
Another interesting finding of the study is that Moroccans in Europe felt
usually more integrated in Francophone countries like France and Belgium than
in other European countries like Spain, Germany, or England, for linguistic,
cultural, and historical reasons (see introduction). Hence, their artistic and cul-
tural production is visibly richer in the Francophone countries (see chapter 10).
Migrants’ attitudes to the home country were complex. The majority of
respondents felt rather optimistic about Morocco, although they mentioned
problems such as poverty, corruption, issues of freedom, and human rights.
With regard to their host country, despite advantages like education, health-
care, and social security, the majority were less optimistic, especially because
of problems like Islamophobia, racism, and unemployment.
Conclusion   ●    183

Moroccans’ interest in politics (which is low regarding Morocco because


of the lack of democracy and the chaotic situation of political parties) is much
stronger in Europe. Political participation, which bears witness to active citi-
zenship, is characterized by a relatively strong adherence to socialist parties.
Nevertheless, more than a third of respondents mentioned that they had no
attraction to any European political party. Respondents had a prudent and
reserved attitude toward political questions, entailing a lack of visibility of the
EU policies and institutions (Saaf et al 2009).
Concerning their degree of religiosity, the book confirms that most
Moroccan migrants are moderate Sunni Muslims, and reveals the emergence
in Europe of a more secularized and individualized form of Islam that is toler-
ant, moderate, and progressive (Ramadan 2005).
As to interpersonal and cultural integration, the book shows that the
majority of Moroccans in Europe felt socially integrated and sustained good
relationships with Europeans in the host country.
In spite of their active contribution to economic and social development
in Europe, Moroccan migrants are looked upon by the European Right as the
most difficult community to integrate, as a result of their religious and cul-
tural differences. However, the second generation is increasingly participating
in public life and political power.
As far as religion is concerned, second- and third-generation Moroccans
have developed a more liberal and humanistic version of Islam, which is dif-
ferent from that of their parents, and acclimatize it to the realities in Europe
and to modernity. However, it is likely that Moroccan descendants of migra-
tion will adopt a different process of integration based on socioeconomic
integration and loyalty to their cultural roots and religious beliefs. Thus,
from the cultural identity point of view, children of Moroccan migrants have
adopted a gendered and generationally different path that combines both
social and cultural integration, and which will eventually succeed over time,
making them steadily more similar to the natives.
Although Moroccan migrants face many challenges, some grapple and
make progress faster than others. Having different levels of education and a
relatively good command of the host country’s language help many of them
to adapt to the European culture and work system, eventually integrating
into the society and protecting their rights. Those who have learned how to
struggle have a more positive attitude than those who perceive themselves
sensitive and vulnerable.
This book thus reveals a multilayered picture of Moroccans in Europe that
should not be taken as a stereotyped image, but should be appreciated for its
great richness and diversity, allowing better integration while respecting the
mixed identity that characterizes this community.
184   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Moroccans living in Europe contribute to intercultural dialogue and


understanding between European and Muslim societies. They bridge the gap
between Morocco and the host countries and contribute to developing part-
nerships and joint-venture projects and exchanges. Cultural contacts, work
connections, and friendly networks have created a rapprochement between
Europe and Morocco.
As a result of these relations, the traditional view of Morocco has changed,
and a lot of Europeans (French, German, Spanish, British, etc.) spend their
holidays in Morocco or own homes there. This has affected language and cul-
ture as well; many Arabic words have entered French and German lexicons,
such as rai (Moroccan modern music), couscous, and tagine (popular meals in
Morocco). Where the Moroccan community is large, Moroccans have gained
seats in government and parliament, allowing them to promote exchange
programs and partnerships between their own and Moroccan cities.
The book has given testimony to how contact with different civiliza-
tions, religions, and languages has brought about a distinctive space between
European cultures and multicultural facets, where policy, identity, and inte-
gration are intertwined (Martin 2010).
It has presented perspectives other than official governmental reports that
are often replete with bigoted discourse. It is based on migration narratives
focusing on the challenges and contributions of Moroccan migrants as agents
of change, and on migration as a complex phenomenon. This complexity
entails “partnership and identification with the Other” (Epps 1995).

Women’s Resistance to Oppression


For many Moroccan women, immigration is an irrevocable stride, a lasting
partition from their home country, family, and past. Visibly rejecting the
patriarchal system that relegates them to a debasing role of subordination,
women have become agents of change who focus on the future and their des-
tiny in the host country. To guard themselves from a custom that insists on
keeping them in their diminished status, many women snatch their indepen-
dence while running the risks of drowning in the straits of Gibraltar, being
held as hostages by human trafficking organizations, and suffering countless
forms of segregation and exclusion.
Migration for Moroccan women is related to plans of resistance, social
mobility, freedom, and survival. To integrate into the host society, many
women set up alliances and negotiate strategies that favor coexistence and
a sense of identity and citizenship. Making an income never dreamed of in
Morocco, many women try to alleviate the gloomy socioeconomic situation
of their families in the home country by sending remittances home. They
Conclusion   ●    185

contribute to a new type of feminism whose impact shapes the second gen-
eration of immigrants that participate in the construction of a contemporary
Europe with multiple identities. The book claims that women’s contributions
foster a pledge to the construction of an integrated plural European society.
Second- and third-generation girls and women do slightly better than
their male counterparts in education and employment, despite the conserva-
tive family culture restricting women’s ambitions more than men’s. Arranged
marriages are decreasing, as more and more Moroccan women choose to
marry someone they love from their ethnic group, country of origin, or
another community.
Stigma and discrimination have at times forced Moroccan women to work
in the informal or unregulated sector, which exposes them to low pay and lack
of benefits and protection. Host countries cannot continue to ignore the plight
of these migrant women while they are increasingly needed in the job mar-
ket, where their work is recognized and appreciated. In many cases, Moroccan
women are respected for their positive thinking, honesty, and hard work.

Muslim Migrants Agents of Change, Not a Threat


While avoiding the danger of making sweeping generalizations, the book has
attempted to provide a balanced view of Muslim Moroccan migrants taking
into account their challenges, problems, and contributions as agents of change
in both European society and their home country. It has provided arguments
against assumptions shared by many conservative European politicians who
consider migrants a threat to security and development; it has similarly ques-
tioned claims made by right-wing intellectuals and multiculturalists who think
that the assimilation of migrants will be extremely difficult if not impossible.
Muslim Moroccan migrants, like Algerians and Turks, have for the most
part kept national allegiance to the home country institutions. Today, many
European observers and researchers claim that these migrants do not want to
integrate because they prefer to remain loyal to their ethnic group and coun-
try of origin. Such cultural and nationalist factors have impacted migrants
throughout history. However, this book has revealed that second- and third-
generation Moroccans express less attachment and allegiance to the political
and cultural forces in their country of origin than their parents did, and that
they are rather influenced by the European culture, despite their socioeco-
nomic exclusion. They even show signs of their preference for the Western
society they live in. Thus, immigrants in general and Moroccans in particu-
lar do not represent a social threat to the host country. Paradoxically, today
Europeans feel threatened by the second generation, whereas in the past the
migrant parents themselves were subject to racism and disdain.
186   ●    Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe

Second- and third-generation Moroccans in Europe have not experienced


much social mobility and have remained for the most part in the same social
class as their parents, and often married inside the Moroccan ethnic group.
When the financial crisis hit Europe, they were among the first to be laid off.
However, Moroccan young people in Europe have started to make progress
at the educational and socioeconomic levels, and most of them take the great
opportunities offered to them by their host country mainly through an inclu-
sive system of education, respect of human rights, gender equity, and diversity.
Going back to where we began, it is plausible to state that, notwithstand-
ing European bureaucrats’ and media’s attitudes to migration and diversity,
this book has shown that migration and multiculturalism have more advan-
tages than disadvantages. In Europe and other parts of the world, immigra-
tion has led to social and cultural change, and to an increase of diversity.
These changes transform European societies by opening up to different
cultures, civilizations, religions, and ways of life. It is unlikely, though, that
over the decades, this interchange between European cultures and migrants’
Muslim customs will lead to the perseverance of dissimilar ethnic cultures
that are distinct from the cultures of the predominant European society.
Evidence from North America shows that most ethnic groups end up inte-
grating into the culture and civilization of the host country as the cultures of
migrants fade over two or three generations. Children of old migrants begin
to detach from the country of origin, witnessing loss of language and failure
of political and cultural loyalty to the country of origin. The integration of
Jewish, Irish, and Polish migrants and their children led to the disappear-
ance of their different cultural status and their conformity with the religious,
social, and cultural environment of America.
The findings in this study confirm previous research on the slow but sure
assimilation of migrants and their offspring into the host society (Lucassen
2005; Manning 2009). Thus, the xenophobic and racist attitude of many
Europeans who fear that Muslim immigrants will never integrate or assimi-
late and will always constitute a threat to the security of their country, is base-
less and unjustified. For example, the fact that second-generation Moroccans
have problematic behaviors is not due to ethnicity, cultural background, or
Islam, but to their marginalization and exclusion. They will certainly inte-
grate once they have access to proper education, training, and jobs.

Future Perspectives
There is a consensus among researchers that Moroccan migration will con-
tinue to play an important role, and there will not be a decrease in numbers
in the near future (Fargues 2008; de Haas 2007). The Moroccan community
Conclusion   ●    187

is expected to become the largest non-European diaspora group in Europe in


the next two decades. The tendency to migrate for labor in Europe is likely
to remain high, due to soaring unemployment and lack of opportunities in
Morocco.
The consequences of the world financial and economic crisis on Moroccan
migration are still tentative; however, one possible implication is that the
number of employment opportunities offered to migrants will decrease, gen-
erating a growth in return migration and a reduction of emigration. The
growing unemployment in Europe may support the trend of natives tak-
ing the jobs previously occupied by migrant workers. This has already been
observed in Spain in the agriculture and service sectors (Fargues 2009).
However, the number of highly skilled migrants of Moroccan origin is
on the rise—after finishing their studies, a good number of students stay
in destination countries to look for jobs or continue their university careers
(Khachani 2005). The increasing number of highly skilled migrant organi-
zations with scientific backgrounds also testifies to the rising trend of brain
drain from Morocco. The destination countries are no longer only European,
but increasingly on the North American continent.
The book has portrayed Moroccan Muslim immigrants in particular as
ordinary hard working people whose main concern is to improve their living
conditions in the host countries. They are neither criminals nor terrorists nor
drug-dealers nor a threat to security. The book has shown that migrants are
agents of change, given their various immense contributions and accomplish-
ment at many levels. They fight every day for a better future for themselves
and their children, and deserve our recognition and respect. For the most
part, their Islam is both modern and moderate, and thus does not constitute
a menace to Europe.
I have argued, along the lines of Carens (1995), that borders ought to be
open and people free to migrate, live, and work in another country, subject
only to the restrictions that connect them to citizens in the host country.
I also believe that international migration should become a human right.
It is also my belief that, following Kymlicka (2009), European countries
and Western societies in general, would be better off if they accepted the cul-
tural traditions of immigrants and protected their civic and political rights.
Likewise, immigrants and their descendants ought to recognize the culture
of the adoptive country and be more tolerant and respectful of the laws and
rules of the host land.
Notes

Introduction
  1. For example, five bodies were found and about 15 more people were missing
after a boat carrying illegal immigrants sank in August 2006 off the Italian island
of Lampedusa, The New York Times reported on August 20, 2006. On Octo-
ber 3, 2013, at least 82 African people (including several children and a preg-
nant woman) were killed after a boat carrying some 500 illegal migrants caught
fire and capsized near Lampedusa island. Others die by the dozens each year
in the Strait of Gibraltar, or Tarifa, Spain. For more on this sad story see this
link: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/20/world/europe/20iht-italy.2543408.
html?_r=0 (accessed on August 6, 2013). And for more on the circumstances
of this tragedy, see this electronic newspaper: http://www.nationalturk.com/en/
italy-illegal-immigration82-migrant-dead-boats-sinks-near-lampedusa-breaking-
news-43466 (accessed on Jan. 20, 2014).
  2. The 5+5 Dialogue, convened for the first time in Rome on December 10, 1990,
was one of the first meetings on dialogue in the region. The forum’s purpose was
to strengthen political dialogue and socioeconomic and cultural ties between all
countries of the Mediterranean.
  3. Researchers use this method if the sample for the study is very rare or is limited to
a very small subgroup of the population. This type of sampling technique works
like chain referral. After observing the initial subject, the researcher asks for assis-
tance from the subject to help identify people with a similar trait of interest.

Chapter 1
  1. For more details, see Bidwell (1973) and de Haas, H. (2005).
 2. France created l’Office National d’Immigration Français, which operated in
Casablanca until 1974. Belgium had representatives of la Fédération des Char-
bonnages Belges, and the Netherlands had offices of recruitment of immigrants
until 1973.
 3. See de Haas (2009). Morocco. Focus Migration. Country Profile No. 16. See
http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/CP_16_Morocco.pdf
(accessed on Oct. 12, 2012).
  4. See note 3.
190   ●    Notes

  5. Cf. de Haas (2009) and the references therein.


  6. See de Haas (2005).
  7. See de Haas, “Morocco: From emigration country to Africa’s migration passage to
Europe,” Migration Information Source, http://www.migrationinformation.org/
Profiles/display.cfm?ID=339 (accessed on Sept. 19, 2007).
 8. The Schenguen Agreement was signed in 1985, but not implemented until
1995. The agreement abolishes border controls within Europe. Ten countries had
acceded by 1995; the UK is not a signatory country.
  9. It used to be the case that Spanish young people would emigrate to Germany
for employment. Today, Spain hosts immigrant workers of its own from North
Africa, namely Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.
10. See report of the Institut National des Statistiques et de l’Economie, cited in
Le Figaro Jan. 10, 2012.
11. For more details, see Phalet and Swyngedouw (2003).
12. Reliable demographic data on Belgian Muslim immigrants are difficult to find.
The government no longer conducts a national census, and even when it existed,
no questions were asked about the issues of migrants.
13. See note 11.
14. For more details see “The impact of immigration on Italy’s society” edited by
Italian National Contact Point, 2004.
15. This information was released by BBC news: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/4570714.stm (accessed on Oct. 16, 2012).
16. See The Economist of Apr. 14, 2011.
17. Read O. Bilgili and S. Weyel (2009). “Migration in Morocco: History, Current
Trends and Future Prospects.” http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu/ISacademie/docs/
CR_morocco.pdf (accessed on Oct. 13, 2012).
18. See Myriam Cherti (2009). “British Moroccans. A Runnymede Country Study.”
http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/BritishMoroc-
cans-2009.pdf (accessed on Oct. 18, 2012).
19. Today, all European countries have restricted family reufinication; for example,
in Italy the Bossi-Fini law enacted in 2002; likewise, the German law of 2003
stipulates the maximum age of 12 years for family reunion of minors living in the
country of origin.
20. Brain drain began to develop in the 1980s. This trend, which is a real threat to
development in Morocco, is encouraged by the economies in Europe and other
Western countries, which are more and more based on knowledge and skills
(knowledge economy). See Khachani (2001).
21. Moreover, due to restrictive immigration policies adopted since 1990, illegal
migration worsened (see Ennaji 2012c).
22. Interview realized by The Christian Science Monitor of Sept. 29, 2005. http://www.
csmonitor.com/2005/0929/p07s01-woeu.html (accessed on Oct. 11, 2012).
23. See note 21.
24. See Moroccan electronic newspaper Hespress, Mohamed Raji Oct. 13, 2012.
25. One US dollar equals about 8.5 Moroccan dirhams.
Notes   ●    191

Chapter 2
 1. See the Arabic link that published the figures: http://hespress.com/marocains-
du-monde/86390.html (accessed on Aug. 10, 2013). See also the website of the
Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad: http://www.marocainsdumonde.
gov.ma/le-minist%C3%A8re/mre-en-chiffres.aspx (accessed on May 2, 2014).
  2. See the French newspaper Le Figaro of Oct. 10, 2012.
  3. See note 2.
  4. See the website of the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad: http://
www.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma/le-minist%C3%A8re/mre-en-chiffres.aspx
(accessed on May 2, 2014).
  5. The same source notes that there are 178,914 Moroccans in North America, and
281,772 in the Arab countries.
 6. See official website of the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad:
http://www.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma/ministère-des-mre/mre-en-chiffres.aspx
(accessed on Oct. 11 2012).
  7. If one counts illegal immigrants, approximately 4 million Moroccans live abroad
today. This is according to The Christian Science Monitor of Sept. 29, 2005.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0929/p07s01-woeu.html (accessed on Oct.
11, 2012).
  8. See this link: http://focusmigration.hwwi.de/Morocco.5987.0.html?&L=1
(accessed on Oct. 11, 2012).
  9. The Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad expressed its indignation
about this decision. Read more at this link: http://www.aujourdhui.ma/maroc-
actualite/societe/reduction-des-allocations-familiales-maazouz-reagit-a-la-deci-
sion-des-autorites-neerlandaises-100468.html (accessed on Mar. 9, 2013).
10. See this link: http://www.aujourdhui.ma/une/special-mre-2013/communaute-
marocaine-a-l-etranger-les-mre-rattrapes-par-la-crise-96937#.U0xzoVU0G1s
(accessed on Dec. 23, 2012).
11. For more information, see the electronic Dutch newspaper nrc.nl of Sept. 27,
2009: http://vorige.nrc.nl/international/article2305201.ece/Dutch-Moroccans_
least_happy_in_Europe (accessed on Oct. 22, 2012).
12. ibid.
13. A separate study makes a direct link between criminality in the Netherlands
and Muslim immigration. Entitled “Criminality, Migration and Ethnicity,” it
was published in June 2010 by the Amsterdam-based Journal of Criminology.
For more on this point, see this link: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2624/
moroccan-crime-netherlands (accessed on Oct. 25, 2012).
14. More than 130 African migrants died on October 2, 2013, after the boat carrying
them to Europe sank off the southern Italian island of Lampedusa. For more, see
the BBC site: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24380247 (accessed on
Oct. 6, 2013).
15. Derose, K. P., Escarce, J. J., and Lurie, N. (2007). “Immigrants and Health Care:
Sources of Vulnerability.” In Health Affairs: http://content.healthaffairs.org/con-
tent/26/5/1258.full (accessed on Oct. 21, 2012).
192   ●    Notes

16. The available statistics in Spain concern mainly legal migrants and do not take
into account undocumented ones.
17. For more details about this sad story, see this link: http://www.eurofound.europa.
eu/eiro/2000/04/feature/es0004184f.htm (accessed on May 2, 2014).
18. This survey was carried out by Tomas Calvo Buzas, and published by the newspa-
per El Pais on Nov. 7, 2001.
19. See this relevant information: http://usefoundation.org/view/989 (accessed on
Apr. 14, 2014).
20. For more information, read how Spanish authorities compel Moroccans to vol-
untarily return home: http://eliesmith.blogspot.com/2008/08/spain-wants-to-
compel-moroccan.html (accessed on Apr. 14, 2014).
21. On October 18, 2012, the second Moroccan TV channel, 2M, broadcast a docu-
mentary on the situation of Moroccan migrants in Spain, where it was shown that
most Moroccans had lost their jobs and were running the risk of being deported.
22. See this link: http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/research-projects/mirem/ (accessed on May
3, 2014).
23. See note 22.

Chapter 3
  1. See Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu (2011). http://www.project-syndicate.org/commen-
tary/islam-and-in-the-west (accessed on Oct. 22, 2013).
 2. Here is the report in question: http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/Xref
ViewHTML.asp?FileID=12479&Language=en (accessed on Oct. 23, 2014).
 3. Read this article: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/islam-and-in-
the-west (accessed on Oct. 23, 2013).
  4. See Dounia Bouzar’s interview published in the French newspaper L’Humanité
of Jan. 24, 2014: http://www.humanite.fr/societe/dounia-bouzar-combattre-les-
derives-sectaires-c-es-557875 (accessed on Mar. 21, 2014).
  5. There are many hate websites that even campaign for stopping “Muslim immigra-
tion.” See http://www.barenakedislam.com/2013/04/22/help-stoplimit-muslim-
immigration-into-your-country/ (accessed on Oct. 22, 2013).
  6. See www.brusselsjournal.com/node/616 (accessed on Oct. 22. 2013).
 7. See The Copenhagen Post, Dec. 23, 2005. www.jp.dk/uknews/article190147.ece
(accessed on Oct. 22. 2013).
  8. See article “Demonstrating for Dialogue”, The Copenhagen Post, Feb. 5, 2006.
www.jp.dk/uknews/article176947.ece (accessed on Oct. 22. 2013).
  9. Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is the second-largest political party in Ger-
many by total membership.
10. Bashir Ebrahim-Khan (2006). “Is Islamophobia in Europe leading to another
holocaust?” The Muslim News, Jan. 27, 2006. See http://www.muslimnews.
co.uk/paper/index.php?article=2274. (accessed on Oct. 22, 2013). Bashir
Ebrahim-Khan is the former head of community relations at the London Cen-
tral Mosque, Regent Park and former deputy director of the Muslim Cultural
­Heritage Center.
Notes   ●    193

11. See the Moroccan daily Attajdid, Feb. 10, 2007.


12. See article “De l’antisémitisme au terrorisme,” by Dominique Vidal, Le Monde
diplomatique, (Oct. 2005)
13. See this link: http://lobservateurdumaroc.info/2013/10/16/islamophobie-man-
uel-valls-devant-juge/ (accessed on Oct. 20, 2013).
14. The killer detonated a car bomb in Oslo that killed eight, and then perpetrated
the massacre of 69 adolescents at a summer youth camp organized by the Norwe-
gian Labor Party. See The New York Times’ report on this sad event: http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/07/23/world/europe/23oslo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(accessed on Apr. 29, 2014).
15. See this source: http://www.ifop.com/?option=com_publication&type=poll&
id=1053 (accessed on May 2, 2014).
16. This Survey was based on a questionnaire self-administered online among a sam-
ple of 1,736 people representative of the French population aged 18 years and
older, between October 15 and 18, 2012. See http://news.fr.msn.com/m6-actu-
alite/france/limage-de-lislam-trop-importante-pour-la-majorit%C3%A9-des-
fran%C3%A7ais (accessed on Oct. 25, 2012).
17. See type of discourse on Islamic societies: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eliz-
abeth-nicholas/fear-and-loathing-in-la-f_b_4196580.html (accessed on Apr. 17,
2014).
18. Read Iftikhar Haider Malik’s 2004 book Islam and modernity: Muslims in Europe
and the United States.
19. Read this article about his difficult situation in France: http://www.atlantico.
fr/decryptage/non-dieudonne-est-pas-probleme-mais-public-oui-benoit-ray-
ski-949942.html (accessed on Apr. 17, 2014)
20. Bashir Ebrahim-Khan (2006). “Is Islamophobia in Europe leading to another
holocaust?” The Muslim News, Jan. 27, 2006. See http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/
paper/index.php?article=2274 (accessed on Jan. 21, 2013).
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. In the 1930s, militant Italian communists suffered the same fate. Mussolini and
Hitler stripped the Jews of their nationalities.
24. See http://pennyforyourthoughts2.blogspot.com/2008_04_01_archive.html
(accessed on Oct. 22, 2013).
25. See the article by Pierre Savary and Sophie Louet online: http://islamophobie.
net/art_read.php?ai=53 (accessed on Oct. 22, 2013).
26. See Mustapha Kharmoudi’s entire letter addressed to President Nicolas Sarkozy
in this link: http://bellaciao.org/fr/spip.php?article96097 (accessed on Oct. 22,
2013).
27. See http://www.pourlasuppressionduministeredelidentitenationale.org/ (accessed
on Oct. 22, 2013).
28. See the National Archives of Feb. 5, 2008, also the URL: http://collections
.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front%
3 F p a g e n a m e = O p e n M a r k e t / X c e l e r a t e / S h o w Pa g e & c = Pa g e & c i d =
1134650559096 (accessed on Oct. 22, 2013).
194   ●    Notes

29. See http://www.compas.ca/data/050718-TerrorAfterLondon-PB.pdf (accessed


on Apr. 22, 2014).
30. Matthew Randall, “Asylum and Immigration; Comparing the Daily Telegraph, The
Guardian and The Independent”, Media Lens, Dec. 8, 2003. URL: http://www.
globalissues.org/article/537/immigration (accessed on Oct.22, 2013.
31. See the article by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu (2011). URL: http://www.project-syn-
dicate.org/commentary/islam-and-in-the-west (accessed on Apr. 22, 2014).
32. See the text of the report: http://www.religionspourlapaix.org/img/Declaration_
de_Sarajevo2012.pdf (accessed on May 3, 2014).
33. For more, see http://www.migpolgroup.com/projects_detail.php?id=24 (accessed
on Oct. 22, 2013).

Chapter 4
  1. Here is the full speech of President Jacques Chirac on Dec. 17, 2003: http://
www.lemonde.fr/societe/article_interactif/2007/05/15/les-discours-de-jacques-
chirac_910136_3224_8.html (accessed on Apr. 18, 2014).
 2. Halal meat is killed by hand and blessed by a Muslim slaughterman.
  3. See this interview reproduced in The Huffington Post of Aug. 29, 2010: http://
archives-lepost.huffingtonpost.fr/article/2010/08/29/2198991_elisabeth-bad-
inter-en-2003-sur-le-voile-islamique-si-on-accepte-cette-symbolique-fini-
l-egalite-des-sexes.html (accessed on Apr. 17, 2014).
 4. Niqab is the term used to refer to the piece of cloth that covers the woman’s face,
except the eyes, whereas burqa is a garment that covers women’s bodies from head
to toe with a tiny aperture for the eyes.
 5. See the entire interview in Le Monde of Dec. 19, 2009, published online:
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2009/12/19/francois-baroin-le-
debat-sur-l-identite-nationale-ne-peut-que-servir-le-fn_1283102_823448.
html#ens_id=1258775
 6. See The Guardian of Mar. 30, 2014: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
mar/30/anne-hidalgo-socialist-first-paris-mayor-front-national (accessed on May
4, 2014).
  7. See Edward Cody, Washington Post Foreign Service, Jan. 16, 2010. http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010011503775.
html?waporef=obinsite (accessed on Apr. 4, 2014).
  8. See Edward Cody, Washington Post Foreign Service, Jan. 16, 2010. http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010011503775.
html?waporef=obinsite (accessed on Apr. 4, 2014).
 9. See the article here: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/09/11/muslim-
students-banned-wearing-veil-college-protest-_n_3906438.html (accessed on
October 18, 2013).
10. See note 11.
Notes   ●    195

11. This news report: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/09/us-swiss-vote-


immigration-idUSBREA180H220140209 (accessed on May 8, 2014).

Chapter 5
  1. Freedman (2000: 15) demonstrates that many North African women in France
feel uprooted, being far away from their extended families back home, and lack
mastery of French.
  2. Interview with Mahmood Jamal, We are Here Project: http://www.weareherepro-
ject.co.uk/transcripts/ms-souad-talsi.pdf (accessed on Aug. 18, 2013).
  3. See ISTAT, 2012. http://www.istat.it/en/archive/110551 (accessed on Aug. 12, 2014).
  4. See Khachani, M. (2009b): http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/11613/
CARIM_AS&N_2009_26.pdf?sequence=1 accessed on Aug. 18, 2013).
  5. For more statistics and figures about employment, see http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/
docs_ffc/ref/IMMFRA12_j_Flot4_mar.pdf (accessed on May 5, 2014).
  6. In fact, domestic work is the second-most increased industry throughout the
world for migrant women. The need for domestic workers has increased greatly
over the last two decades (Gregson and Lowe 1994). Macklin (1999) and
Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) both draw attention to the demand for undocu-
mented domestic migrant work in the United States as well.
  7. According to the declaration of IOM on Women’s day in Geneva on March 8,
2010, migration labor policies applied by destination countries do not seem to
distinguish between the sexes, they are still characterized by sexism and focused
on skilled jobs, mostly male jobs.
  8. The work undertaken by migrant women, especially in the fields of care and domes-
tic work, is of fundamental importance for the economy of the host country. How-
ever, it is often undervalued and poorly integrated in admission policies. See also
note 9.
  9. The historical evolution of the migrant domestic workforce in Italy is marked by
restriction and regularization. In 1986, the Italian government stopped the issu-
ing of labor permits for domestic workers, and in turn started a legalization of
undocumented immigrants.
10. The absence of legal migration channels often forces women to seek the services
of traffickers and other intermediaries, which greatly increases the risk of abuse
and violence against them.
11. The number of Moroccans living in the UK amounted to nearly 60,000, includ-
ing 70 percent having the British nationality. Most of them are concentrated in
the London area. Nearly 65 percent of these Moroccans are women. For more on
this, see Cherti (2008) and Alaoui (2008). www.ccme.org.ma/.../Rachid_Alaoui_
Chafai_espa (accessed on Mar 21, 2013).
12. See the entire interview on this link: http://www.kcsc.org.uk/spotlight-on-souad-
talsi (accessed on 16 August 2013).
13. MBE is a Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire.
196   ●    Notes

14. Interview with Ms. Talsi by Mahmood Jamal, We Are Here Project: http://www.
wearehereproject.co.uk/transcripts/ms-souad-talsi.pdf (accessed on Aug. 18,
2013).
15. For further information, see this article by Alaoui (2008): http://www.docstoc.
com/docs/136958365/Economic-Contribution-of-the-Moroccan-Women-Liv
ing--CCME (accessed on Aug. 17, 2013).
16. See this link about UNITAR’s role in Europe : http://www.unitar.org/featured/
unitar-and-barcelona-provide-critical-space-city-leadership-strategize-migration-
policy (accessed on Aug. 8, 2014).
17. Cf. Khachani (2004: 51) and “l’Annuaire de l’Emigration” (1991: 228).
18. See A. Lebon (1983: 55).
19. Fatema Mernissi (1995). “Pour une dynamique de l’entrepreneuriat féminin au
Maroc.” Presentation in a conference in Casablanca on May 14, 1995.

Chapter 6
  1. See this article for details: http://etn.sagepub.com/content/7/3/416.full.pdf+html
(accessed on Dec. 3, 2013).
  2. See note 1.
  3. See details in this article: http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=u3kX
jCnWfRAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA61&dq=Wolff,+R.+2003+moroccan+immigrants+
in+the+netherlands&ots=qgTbBYoK26&sig=G5DCBPCKV4Kb8KeZq-
50lFb8OK4#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed on Dec. 3, 2013).
  4. In Belgium, Migration History and Social Mobility (MHSM) surveys were con-
ducted some years ago among Turkish and Moroccan communities to measure
the extent of their integration.
  5. For more, see this article about the case of Spain: http://migrationeducation.org/
48.1.html?&rid=163&cHash=9d6f60e57eb65e106fdd8b0e5ae6d3ee (accessed
on Nov. 6, 2013).
 6. For more about the linguistic skills of Moroccans in Belgium, see Saaf et al.
(2009). See also Arango and Pastrana (2011). Overcoming School Failure: Policies
that Work. Madrid: Publication of the Ministry of Education. http://www.oecd.
org/spain/48631820.pdf (accessed on June 12, 2013).
 7. The Tifinagh alphabet has been re-shaped and modernized by the Royal Institute
of Amazigh Culture, created by royal decree in 2001.
  8. For more information, consult this link: http://www.e-madrassa.ma/ (accessed on
Jan. 21, 2014).
  9. See this important article: http://www.oecd.org/spain/48631820.pdf.
10. For example, see this article: http://www.cirdi.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/
01/Raxen-Migranti-minoranze-ed-educazione-2004.pdf (accessed on Dec. 3,
2013).
11. Only 23 percent of immigrant students in the Madrid region reach university
(Aramburu 2005).
Notes   ●    197

12. See this link: http://vladtepesblog.com/2012/06/29/moroccan-government-


demands-arabic-become-standard-part-of-european-school-curriculum/
(accessed on Nov. 8, 2013).
13. See the British newspaper Mirror of January 30, 2013, where these figures
appeared: Mirror.co.uk http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/2011-census-
top-20-languages-1563629#ixzz2mZo76mRC (accessed on Dec. 4, 2013).
14. See this article by Habib Toumi, bureau chief of Gulf News: http://gulfnews.
com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-to-cooperate-in-teaching-arabic-in-uk-1.1230796
(accessed on Dec. 4, 2013).
15. Linguists distinguish between Classical and Standard Arabic. The latter variety is
less formal or rigid than Classical Arabic because it is the modernized and simpli-
fied form of Classical Arabic. Its domains of use are: education, media, political
discourse, modern literature, etc. I use here the term “Classical” Arabic because it is
the most commonly used term for written literary Arabic, which is extremely dif-
ferent from Colloquial Arabic at the levels of pronunciation, word formation, and
grammar.
16. See this link for more details: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics (accessed
on Dec. 3, 2013).

Chapter 7
1. Van Kessel (2004). See http://www.eclac.org/celade/proyectos/migracion/Van
Kessel.doc.
2. When we speak of globalization, we must not keep in mind only the economic
factor. In addition to economic, financial, and cultural exchanges, free circulation
of people and flow of ideas must also be fostered.
3. See the website of the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford
of May 18, 2012. http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/characteristics-
and-outcomes-migrants-uk-labour-market (accessed on Oct. 28, 2012).
4. For more information about this campaign, see the article by Ruben Navarrette
in this link: http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/opinion/navarrette-anti-immigra-
tion-uk/ (accessed on Dec. 5, 2013).
5. The Conservative Party of Prime Minister David Cameron has decided to reduce
illegal immigration from annual 200,000 to 10,000. For the British, the problem
is Eastern Europeans. See note 6.
6. See debate on this event in The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2013/oct/22/go-home-vans-scrapped-failure (accessed on Dec. 5, 2013).
7. See the report by United Nations Population Division, Replacement Migration:
Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, March 2000, on website:
http://www.u-n.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration.htm
(accessed Oct. 28, 2012).
8. On January 29, 2004, Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan,
stated in a formal speech at the European Parliament in Brussels that “immigrants
198   ●    Notes

needed Europe and Europe needed immigrants.” He emphasized that European


population totaled around 452 million, but with the low birth and death rates,
by 2050 the population would decrease to 400 million people. For this reason,
he would encourage the European Union to foster legal migration, underscor-
ing that integration must go in both directions. See http://www.un.org/sg/
statements/?nid=757 (accessed on Dec. 29, 2013).
 9. On the difference between assimilation, integration, and acculturation, see
Killian (2006).
10. For more details on this issue, see Soeren Kern’s article titled “Moroccan Crime
in the Netherlands and the Myths of Multiculturalism,” published online by the
Gatestone Institute of International Policy Council. http://www.gatestoneinsti-
tute.org/2624/moroccan-crime-netherlands (accessed on Oct. 25, 2012).
11. This survey was based on a questionnaire self-administered online among
a sample of 1,736 people representative of the French population age 18
years and older, between October 15 and 18, 2012. See http://www.lepoint.
fr/societe/l-image-de-l-islam-trop-importante-pour-la-majorite-des-fran-
cais-25-10-2012-1520785_23.php (accessed on Oct. 25, 2012).
12. For details, see this link: http://www.20minutes.fr/article/1029654/islam-trop-
visible-majorite-voient-menace (accessed on Dec. 6, 2013).
13. For the full report on Belgium, see this link: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/
irf/2002/13924.htm (accessed on Aug. 9, 2013).
14. See this link for more information: http://www.rfi.fr/france/20121031-imam-
radical-tunisien-expulse-france-apres-avoir-prone-jihad-violent-mohamed-ham-
mami (accessed on Nov. 1, 2012).
15. The Annual Report on Integration 2007 focuses mainly on ethnic minority chil-
dren in education, the situation of ethnic minorities in the job market and in
housing, their sociocultural integration and the role of religion.
The conclusion concerning the integration of non-Western ethnic minorities is
revealing: some ethnic groups suffer from socioeconomic deprivation and are
socioculturally at a disadvantage. Similarly, the difference between and within
groups is so considerable that there is some progress occurring in education,
employment, and housing.

Chapter 8
  1. It is, however, well known that there are several practices and forms of Islam in
Europe represented by the various Muslim immigrants from different countries,
according to their sects and rites.
  2. Report read by Mohammed Amaziane, Radio Netherlands International, Tues-
day, Sept. 23, 2008.
 3. See this link: http://www.rug.nl/news-and-events/news/archief2008/114_008
(accessed on Dec. 11, 2013).
  4. See more figures by country in this report: http://www.west-info.eu/moroccans-
are-the-new-eu-citizens/stat-13-177_en/ (accessed on Apr. 24, 2014).
Notes   ●    199

 5. Ibid.
 6. See this link for more on this event: http://fr.lakome.com/index.php/
international/1240-france-la-justice-invente-la-nationalite-arabe-d-un-marocain
(accessed on Aug. 20, 2013).

Chapter 9
  1. For more information, see this Eurostat Report: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-31-10-539/EN/KS-31-10-539-EN.PDF (accessed on
Apr. 21, 2014).
  2. I refer the reader to the website of the Council for the Moroccan Community
Abroad for more statistics and figures: http://www.ccme.org.ma/fr/medias-et-
migration/13880 (accessed on Apr. 30, 2014).
  3. Every summer, hundreds of thousands of Moroccans return home for vacation
with their families. For instance, in 2004, the port of Tangier received over 2
million Moroccan migrants (El Madmad 2004, p. 110).
  4. In France, the Socialist Party has discussed extending the right to vote to immi-
grants since the early 1980s, but it needs a Constitutional change or a referen-
dum. On May 3, 2000, a bill was voted on by the National Assembly, yet it was
blocked by the Senate. In 2012, polls indicated that a majority of the French
public opinion was still opposed to it. For the different policies adopted by the
EU member states, see this article: http://migrationeducation.de/50.1.html?&
rid=128&cHash=8203ee3d83c92126ccf5db4c44550c6d (accessed on Apr. 21,
2014).
  5. In 1999, unemployment of workers was 14 percent for the nationals, while it
reached 21 percent for immigrant workers and employees (Khachani 2001).
 6. See his biography online: http://homepages.laas.fr/malik/Home/Bio.html
(accessed on Apr. 30, 2014).
  7. This brain drain inevitably leads to a widening gap between developed and devel-
oping countries (Khachani 2001).
  8. For more information on this problem, see this link: http://articles.economic-
times.indiatimes.com/2011-06-23/news/29694713_1_skilled-workers-special-
ists-eu (accessed on Apr. 29, 2014).
  9. See also the Moroccan daily Le Matin of Jan. 11, 2010.
10. Resistance at times implies deportation. On January 11, 2010, more than 1100
undocumented immigrants, mostly Moroccans, were deported from southern
Italy, notably from the cities of Rosarno and Bari (Devitt 2013). As a conse-
quence of the economic crisis, the political Right in Italy pushed for a bill on
immigration that would allow vessels to patrol for illegal migrants, and use vio-
lence in case of resistance to being arrested. However, these violent tactics against
immigrants have not and will not put an end to the migration influx, as hundreds
of thousands are ready to pay for that hazardous journey with their lives (Ennaji
2012c).
200   ●    Notes

11. See this link, which published the statistics: http://www.ccme.org.ma/fr/medias-


et-migration/13880 (accessed on Aug. 12, 2013).
12. Ibid.
13. See note 6.
14. In this chapter, I use the terms “association” and “organization” interchangeably.
15. Here are a few examples of associations: Union des Organisations Islamiques en
France, Fédération des Organisations Islamiques en Europe, Union de la Commu-
nautée Algérienne de Paris, Association Culturelle Islamique Al-Ghadir, Associa-
tion des Amis du Maghreb, and Association Action Espoir. For more, consult this
link: http://www.annuaire-musulman.com/index.php?cat=72&lpage=3&page=
1&PHPSESSID=acdd999ad27335a59ca645ae99c0b8 (accessed on May 29,
2012).
16. See their website: www.migdev.org (accessed on Mar. 21, 2012).
17. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ): German Techni-
cal Cooperation.
18. For more discussion of the role of migrant associations, see Ennaji forthcoming.
19. See this interesting link: www.alwatan.ma (accessed on Apr. 29, 2014).

Chapter 10
 1. Paris Review (1999, Issue 152). See the source online:http://www.thepa-
risreview.org/interviews/893/the-art-of-fiction-no-159-tahar-ben-jelloun
(accessed on Apr. 30, 2014).
  2. In 2000, he published This Blinding Absence of Light about Moroccan soldiers
who organized the military coup against King Hassan II in 1971, and who had to
spend most of their lives in the odious prison called Tazmamart.
  3. From his Feb. 7, 2012, interview with the Moroccan News Agency (MAP).
 4. Read more: http://wordswithoutborders.org/dispatches/article/from-the-trans-
lator-lydia-beyoud-on-fouad-larouis-my-fathers-antenna (accessed on May 1,
2014).
  5. In English: About Islamism (published by Robert Laffontin 2006)
 6. For more comments on this book, read http://www.algerie-focus.com/
blog/2012/08/22/revue-litteraire-le-drame-linguistique-marocain-de-fouad-
laroui/ (accessed on Mar. 8, 2013).
  7. Ahmed Aboutaleb, of Moroccan origin, is the current mayor of Rotterdam, as we
will discuss in the section on political and civil society leaders.
  8. See this blog about Fouad Laroui’s work: http://arablit.wordpress.
com/2013/05/07/moroccan-author-fouad-laroui-wins-prix-goncourt-dln/
(accessed on May 1, 2014).
  9. See this interesting interview that Georgia Makhlouf had with Laroui in October
2011, published online in L’Orient Littéraire: http://www.lorientlitteraire.com/
article_details.php?cid=6&nid=3589 (accessed on May 1, 2014).
10. It was published in 2001 in Belgium by Luce Wilquin publishers.
11. Published in 2003 by Luce Wilquin publishers, Avin–Belgium.
Notes   ●    201

12. This novel was published in three volumes by Luce Wilquin, Avin, between 2005
and 2008).
13. His book Le Maroc en mouvement: Créations contemporaines was published in Paris
by Maisonneuve & Larose (2000). Je t’ai à l’œil was published by Paris-Méditer-
ranée (2002). Lune solitaire (translation) was published by Non Lieu (2006).
14. This book, published by Le Grand Souffle in Paris, is a collection of 90 pages
containing 13 stories.
15. Read more: http://lafouaditude.blogspot.com/2007/04/quelques-fragments-
dun-maroc-disparu.html (accessed on Mar. 6, 2013).
16. Quoted from his article published by The Guardian. For more, read http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/oct/03/abdelkader-benali-immigration-
prejudice (accessed on Mar. 6, 2013).
17. “On ne se rend pas compte à quel point c’est dur de s’intégrer. Même les march-
ands de bols sont racistes.” Le Figaro, Feb. 4, 2003.
18. See note 17.
19. The Guardian called her “The New Face of France.” See this link: http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/22/najat-vallaud-belkacem-france (accessed on
May 2, 2014).
20. Information taken from her website: http://www.najat-vallaud-belkacem.com/
mon-parcours/ (accessed on May 2, 2014).
21. For more information see http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/20/
rachida-dati-france-sarkozy-pregnant (accessed on Dec. 28, 2012).
22. See note 21.
23. Read more: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/07/france.
24. See article by Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi, posted on Dec. 11, 2011 in The Huff-
ington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sultan-sooud-alqassemi/ahmed-
aboutaleb_b_1154760.html (accessed on Dec. 24, 2012).
25. See this link: http://gulfnews.com/news/world/other-world/on-a-mission-to-
regenerate-1.950331 (accessed on Mar. 9, 2013).
26. See the Moroccan Francophone magazine Marco-Hebdo: http://www.maroc-
hebdo.press.ma/Site-Maroc-hebdo/archive/Archives_734/html_734/success.
html (accessed on Dec. 27, 2012).
27. See the entire interview in this link: http://www.hespress.com/interviews/110141.
html (accessed on Jan. 20, 2014).
28. For more data on this, see this site: http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/
the-netherlands/ (accessed on Dec. 29, 2012).
29. See this interview cited here: http://fr.groups.yahoo.com/group/suffrage-univer-
sel/message/1592 (accessed on Mar. 9, 2013).
30. See this interesting link for more information: http://www.lalibre.be/actu/
politique-belge/la-premiere-bourgmestre-d-origine-marocaine-sera-n-va-
51b8f33ce4b0de6db9c8635e (accessed on May 2, 2014).
31. For more information on Sminate’s success, see the link to 7 sur 7: http://www.7sur7.
be/7s7/fr/1502/Belgique/article/detail/1522324/2012/10/23/La-premiere-bourg-
mestre-d-origine-marocaine-est-N-VA.dhtml (accessed on May 2, 2014).
202   ●    Notes

32. See the website of the French TV channel TV5, which published the interview:
http://www.tv5.org/cms/chaine-francophone/Terriennes/Comite/p-16289-
Fadila-Laanan.htm (accessed on Dec. 29, 2012).
33. Ibid.
34. See the full report on this event in this link: http://www.lesoir.be/413450/article/
culture/cinema/2014-01-28/fadila-laanan-recu-sa-legion-d-honneur (accessed on
Jan. 30, 2014).
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Magazines and Newspapers


Attajdid, Feb. 10, 2007
Le Figaro, Jan.10, 2012
Le Figaro, Feb. 4, 2003
Le Matin, Jan. 11, 2010
Le Matin, June 6, 2009
Le Monde, Jan. 12, 2009
Le Monde, Dec. 19, 2009
Le Monde, Dec. 7, 2003
Le Monde, Dec. 27, 2005
Le Monde Diplomatique No. 339, February 2005
Le Soir, Jan. 28, 2014
L’Humanité, Jan. 24, 2014
Libération, Apr. 23, 2003
Télérama, Apr. 7, 1999
The Copenhagen Post, Dec. 23, 2005
The Copenhagen Post, May 2, 2006
The Economist, Apr. 4, 2011
The Guardian, Mar. 30, 2014
The Huffington Post, Aug. 29, 2010
The Huffington Post, UK, Sept.11, 2013
The Muslim News, Jan. 27, 2006
The New York Times, Aug. 20, 2006
The New York Times, Jul. 23, 2011
The Washington Post, Dec. 19, 2009
The Washington Post, Jan. 16, 2010
Index

Acculturation 7 Education 95–102


Action against Islamophobia 63–5 Education and integration
Activists 172–9 100–5
Amazigh 105–6 Engagement 147–52
Arabic 108–9 Economic crisis 43–5
Artists 165, 170 European context 2–3, 6
Assimilation 102, 129
Associations 71, 73, 122 Family formation 28–30
Attachment to Morocco 130, 134 Family reunification 28–30, 77, 125
Attitudes 58–9, 131–2 Feminine migration 80–1
Feminism 72, 116
Banlieues 58, 69 France 18–21, 36, 67
Belgium 22–4, 38, 117–18
Berber 105–7, 108 Headscarf issue 67–9
Bilingual education 96–7 History 17–19, 20–35
Bilingualism 96–7 Human capital theory 3–4
Borders 5 Human rights 57
British Muslims 61–3
Burqa 74–6 Germany 26–27

Citizenship 121, 127–35, 137, Identity 103, 127–9, 137


139–43 Integration 115–18, 119–25
Classical Arabic 105–6, 110–11 Investment 151–5
Co-development 60, 147–9 Islam 2, 8–10, 53, 57–60, 133
Communautarism 71–3 Islam in the UK 60–3
Colloquial Arabic 105–6, 110–11 Islamic fundamentalism 72–4,
Cultural identity 127–9 133
Islamism 50–2
Danish cartoons 53–6 Islamists 162, 236–8
Demography 35–7 Islamophobia 8–10, 51–9
Discrimination 65, 83, 100, 117–19, Islamophobia causes 52–6
128 Islamophobia forms 52–6
Domestic services 82 Italy 24–5, 41–2, 84–6
222   ●  Index

Justice 5 Professionals 147


Push-pull theory 4
Language 95–100
Racism 117–19, 131
Marginalization 98, 100, 128 Remittances 149–51
Methodology 10–12 Return migration 45–6
Migration causes 17–20
Migration discourses 3 Satisfaction 119–21
Migration effects 55–7 School achievements 99
Migration origins 18–29 Sexism 72–4
Migration themes 3 Social identity theory 127
Migration to Belgium 22–3, 38 Sociability 120
Migration to France 18–1 Spain 21–2, 39–41, 43–5
Migration to Germany 26–7 Success stories 157–179
Migration to Italy 24–5, 41
Migration to Spain 21–2, 39 Transnationalism 132
Migration to the Netherlands 21–6
Migration to the UK 27–8 Unemployment 30, 58, 123
Moroccan children 107–8 United Kingdom 27–8, 86–8
Moroccan-Europeans 113–20, 130,
157–79 Women 77–89
Morocco 19, 8, 92–9, 102–11 Women and the veil 67–7
Mosque 123 Women associations 73
Mother tongue 105–7 Women integration 125
Mother tongue teaching 108–11 Women migrants 78–85
Multilingualism 96–79 Women migrants experience
Multiculturalism 5–6, 9, 79, 116–17 88–92
Multiple identities 132 Women migrants in Italy 85–6
Muslims in Europe 2, 50–2, 69, 135–57 Women migrants in the Netherlands
88–9
Niqab 74–6 Women migrants in the UK 86–8
North Africa 2, 18, 80 Writers 157–65

Participation in development 146–9 Xenophobia 65, 117


Political participation 137–9
Politicians 172–81 Youth 128–29

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