REDANTE SARTO Y MISALUCHA v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018
Justice Samuel Martires
Third Division

Nature of the action:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 31 July 2012
Decision and the 6 March 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 32635,
which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City, in
Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 finding petitioner Redante Sarto y Misalucha (Redante) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy.

Facts:
On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly contracting two
(2) marriages: the first, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro), and the second, without
having the first one legally terminated, with private complainant Fe R. Aguila (Fe). The charge
stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe against Redante on 4 June 2007. During his
arraignment, he entered a not guilty plea. During the pre-trial, Redante admitted that he contracted
two marriages, but interposed the defense that his first marriage had been legally dissolved by
divorce obtained in a foreign country. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigay. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree that was validly obtained from foreign country will allow the
petitioner to have the capacity to contract a subsequent marriage and thus absolving him of the
crime of bigamy.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following
elements must concur: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the provisions of the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however, put
forth the defense of the termination of his first marriage as a result of the divorce obtained abroad
by his alien spouse. It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof lies
with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense
of an action. Since the divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is incumbent upon him to show
that it was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro's country's national law. Stated
differently, Redante has the burden of proving the termination of the first marriage prior to the
celebration of the second. Redante failed to prove his capacity to contract a subsequent marriage.
A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an automatic effect
in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts may be required before the
effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction. Recognition of the divorce decree,
however, need not be obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that purpose. Philippine courts
may recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect
of his claim or defense.

Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Proving the foreign law under
which the divorce was secured is mandatory considering that Philippine courts cannot and could
not be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws. For the purpose of establishing divorce as
a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence. This is in
consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only
after it is presented and admitted in evidence.
In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them must
present copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be proven through (1) an
official publication or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer having legal custody of said
documents. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of said documents
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the
divorce as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage
to Fe.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO
G.R. No. 218630, January 11, 2018
Justice Noel Gimenez Tijam
First Division

Nature of the action:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision rendered by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage
of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.

Facts:
Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Parties met sometime in 1997 and after the brief courtship they got
married on July 22, 2000. During the early stage of their marriage they have a constant bickering
and quarrels. Lawrence kept himself distant and failed to take care of their child, spent almost
every night for parties and drinking sprees. He was alarmingly dependent in his mother and
suffered from a very high degree of immaturity. In 2003, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave their
house and live with her parents and never come back. They have been separated in fact since then.
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Arellano, who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's
psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence
with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened sense of self-
importance and grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way. Dr. Arellano determined that
this personality disorder is permanent, incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche; and that
it was present but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the onset was in early
adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide
mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and support to his wife. The trial court granted the
petition and declared the marriage void ab initio. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue:
Whether or not Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to do his marital obligations based on
the evidence presented by Katrina through the findings of Dr. Arellano which is the basis of the
RTC and CA to declared such marriage as void ab initio.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Time and again, it has been held that "psychological
incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it
must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved. The Supreme Court has set out the guidelines that has
been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of
psychological incapacity cases that We have decided:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. xxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. xxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. xxx
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

Using these standards, SC find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a husband. The Supreme Court
have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of their proceedings. Here, the SC find the totality of evidence clearly
wanting. Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were based solely
on Katrina's statements. It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the
proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.
 ABIGAEL AN EPINA-DAN v. MARCO DAN
G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018
Justice Mariano Del Castillo
First Division

Nature of the action:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the December 14, 2012 Decision and
August 29, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition in CA-G.R. CV
No.95112 and herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, respectively, thus affirming the
January 4, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, in
Civil Case No. LP07-0155.

Facts:
Abigael An Espina-Dan and Marco Dan - an Italian national - met "in a chatroom [o]n the internet"
sometime in May, 2005. They soon became "chatmates" and "began exchanging letters which
further drew them emotionally closer to each other" even though petitioner was in the Philippines
while respondent lived in Italy. In November 2005, Marco proposed marriage. The following year,
their marriage was held in Italy. After the wedding, Marco returned to Italy and Abigael followed
him thereafter on Feb. 23, 2006. They live together in Italy. After a few days, respondent started
displaying traits, character and attitude different from that of Marco whom she had known thru the
internet. He was immature, childish, irresponsible and dependent. He depended on his mother to
do or to decide things for him. It was even his mother who decided where they lived and how the
house should be arranged. When they transferred to a separate house. it was respondent's mother
who managed the household. Marco was addicted to video games and drugs that he is too
dependent to his mother. On 18 April 2007. she flew back to the Philippines and filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Las Piñas City. Petitioner presented Nedy
Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who subjected Marco to a series of psychological tests and testified
she found no sign or symptom of major psychological incapacity to Abigael, while Marco is
suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder with underlying Anti-Social Trait. Dr. Tayag was
able to arrive at this conclusion based on respondent clinical assessments and information supplied
by his wife and the description of his mother-in-law. The RTC dismissed the petition and the CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented by petitioner established Marco’s psychological
incapacity to do his marital obligation to declared their marriage null.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial
affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of her mother and Dr. Tayag; and
Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the psychological condition of both petitioner and
respondent. The deterınination of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was based solely
on petitioner's account and that of her mother, since respondent was presumably in Italy and did
not participate in the proceedings. At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before
and during their marriage, respondent was working and giving money to her; that respondent was
romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and respondent enjoyed a
harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that petitioner was psychologically unfit for
marriage. As correctly observed by the trial and appellate courts, the couple simply drifted apart
as a result of irreconcilable differences and basic incompatibility owing to differences in culture
and upbringing, and the very short period that they spent together prior to their tying the knot. As
for respondent's claimed addiction to video games and cannabis, the trial and appellate courts are
correct in their ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and petitioner has not shown that
she helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation to render support and
aid to respondent. "What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage"
such that "[i]f the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental -- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 38 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her witness, the weight of
proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag's expert findings. However, her
determinations were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted on respondent himself - but
on personal accounts of petitioner alone. To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability, "The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage, and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved." Finally, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GINA P. TECAG
G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018
Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
Second Division

Nature of the action:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated June 29, 2016 and the
Resolution dated January 13, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104578, which
affirmed the Decision dated January 20, 2014 and the Resolution5 dated July 10, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Abatan, Buguias, Benguet, Branch 64 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 12-F-223,
which granted the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage between respondent Gina P.
Tecag (Gina) and Marjune B. Manaoat (Marjune) based on psychological incapacity.

Facts:
After living together as husband and wife for two (2) years, Gina and Marjune formalized their
marital union through civil rites on August 2, 2006 at La Trinidad, Benguet. As a means of
livelihood, they engaged in vegetable farming until Gina found employment in Macau, where she
likewise searched for job opportunities for Marjune. When she found one suited for him, she sent
money for his travel abroad, but Marjune refused to go, telling her that he would rather use the
money for their farming venture. As months passed, the communication between Gina and
Marjune became less frequent until it ceased altogether. During the rare times when Gina would
call, they would only end up arguing, as Marjune would be too drunk to talk. Eventually, news
reached Gina that Marjune was having an affair. To confirm the news, Gina returned to the
Philippines in 2009. However, Marjune told her that it was better for her to stay abroad. Gina
returned to Macau and she confirmed sometime in 2010 that her husband was already living with
someone else and bearing his child. On October 9, 2012, Gina filed a petition to declare her
marriage with Marjune null and void on the basis of the latter's psychological incapacity. During
trial, Gina presented the findings of Professor Emma Astudillo-Sanchez (Prof. Sanchez), the
psychologist who conducted a psychological examination of the parties. In this relation, Prof.
Sanchez interviewed Gina, her sister Sofia, and her brother-in-law Christian12 Tabadero.13 In her
Case Analysis Report, Prof. Sanchez stated that Gina was suffering from "Anxious and Fearful
Personality Disorder" where traces of "Dependent Personality Disorder" were observed, rendering
her psychologically incapacitated as a spouse to Marjune. With respect to Marjune, Prof. Sanchez
found that his behavior was suggestive of an "Avoidant Personality Disorder," even though she
was unable to interview him. She also concluded that Gina and Marjune's personality disorders
"affected their behaviors even before they contracted marriage and, in the presence of situational
factors, became more evident during the time they were together during the marriage." The RTC
found both of them psychologically incapacitated and declared their marriage null and void. The
CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid dissolution of the marriage which was granted by the trial court
and CA between the parties based on the findings of Dr. Sanchez, on her interview with Gina, her
sister, and brother-in-law to declared them both suffering from psychological incapacity.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The validity of marriage and the unity of the family are
enshrined in our Constitution and statutory laws. Thus, any doubts attending the same are to be
resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage and the burden of proving the
nullity of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner. The policy of the Constitution is to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended,
psychological incapacity is a valid ground to nullify a marriage. However, in deference to the
State's policy on marriage, psychological incapacity does not merely pertain to any psychological
condition; otherwise, it would be fairly easy to circumvent our laws on marriage so much so that
we would be practically condoning a legal subterfuge for divorce. Based on jurisprudence,
psychological incapacity has a specific and peculiar denotation. It ought to pertain to only the most
serious cases of personality disorders that clearly demonstrate the party's/parties' utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It should refer to no
less than a mental- not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage, which, as provided under Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and
support. The Supreme the Court emphasized "that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved)." According to
jurisprudence, the probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of
his or her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he or she can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as basis for his or her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic
of his or her conclusion are founded. Hence, it has been held that com1s should weigh and consider
the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis-a-vis the other evidence
available, and the root cause of the psychological incapacity must still be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature be fully explained. In this case, there is no other
evidence offered apart from Prof. Sanchez's report to substantiate Gina's allegation of
psychological incapacity. The said report leaves much to be desired since it does not adequately
demonstrate the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Gina's purported personality
disorder.
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr.
Third Division

Nature of the action:

This is an appeal assailing the Decision dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution dated March
20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 (petition for the declaration of
presumptive death).

Facts: