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REFERENCES
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Irish Studies in International Affairs
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Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia: a Realistic
Narrative
ABSTRACT
*The author wishes to thank the two anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful and i
comments, and the copy editor, Ms Helena King, for her thorough review, thoughtful sugg
and above all constructive editing.
Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal is Associate Professor at the School of Politics and Intern
Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, where he teaches various asp
Strategic Studies; International Security; Nuclear/Missile Proliferation; Arms Control/D
ment; and the Domestic and Foreign Policies of the country. He is also advisor o
proliferation to the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, London. He was previously a
coordinator at the Foreign Services Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad. D
has also been a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad a
Islamabad Policy Research Institute, and frequently a guest speaker at the distinguishe
School, Oberammergau, Germany; Center of Excellence: Defence against Terrorism, A
Turkey; Pakistan's National Defence University; Intelligence Bureau Academy, Comman
Staff Cöllege Quetta; and the Foreign Service Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Af
Pakistan.
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76 Irish Studies in International Affairs
INTRODUCTION
'Ellen O. Tauscher, 'Obama's commitment', eJournal 15 (2) (February 2010), 5. See also
'Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradčany Square, Prague, Czech Republic', available
at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-
Delivered (20 July 201 1); hereafter cited as Obama, 'Remarks in Hradcanv Square'.
Resolution 1887 (2009) on the maintenance of international peace and security and nuclear
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, was adopted by the Security Council at
its 6191st meeting, on 24 September 2009. The text of the resolution is available at: http://
daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/523/74/PDF/N0952374.pdf?OpenElement (13 May
2010).
3The New START treaty requires the US and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic
arsenals by 30% below earlier limits and establishes a new and more intrusive system of
monitoring and verification that will increase predictability and stability. It does nothing,
however, to prevent nuclear proliferation - or to take the Russians down the 'road to zero', a
world without nuclear weapons. The text of the treaty is available at: http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/1 40035.pdf (20 July 2011).
4The text of the final document that emerged following the review conference, which took
place in New York on 3-28 May 2010, is available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol = NPT/CONF.20 10/50 (VOL.1) (20 July 201 1).
5The CTBT was negotiated in Geneva between 1994 and 1996; to date it has been signed by
182 countries and ratified by 144 of those, but in order for it to enter into force it must be signed
and ratified by 44 specific nuclear technology holder countries, and nine such ratifications are
outstanding. Further information is available at: http://www.ctbto.org/specials/who-we-are/ (20
July 2011).
6A factsheet about the proposed FMCT is available from the Center for Arms Control
and Non-Proliferation; see http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/
07 1 509_factsheet_fmct/ (20 July 2011).
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 11
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78 Irish Studies in International Affairs
"United Nations, 'Establishment of a Commission to deal with the problem raised by the
discovery of Atomic Energy', Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee , 24
January 1946; see http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/52/IMG/NR
003252.pdf?OpenElement (15 April 2010).
'-Quoted in Zia Mian, 'Obama's nuclear postures', Middle East Report on line , 5 July 2010;
available at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070510 (5 August 2011).
"Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn, 'A world free of nuclear
weapons', Wall Street Journal , 4 January 2007.
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 79
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80 Irish Studies in International Affairs
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 81
"UN Security Council, SC/9746, 'Historic summit of Security Council pledges support for
progress on stalled efforts to end nuclear weapons proliferation', Security Council, 6191st
Meeting (AM), 24 September 2009; available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9746.
doc.htm (6 April 201 1).
2"Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, 'UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009): idealistic euphoria', Weekly Pulse, 1-6
October 2009, 6.
21 See Mian, 'Obama's nuclear postures'.
"The full text of the communiqué issued following the conclusion of the Washington Nuclear
Security Summit, on 13 April 2010, is available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofnce/
communiqu-washington-nuclear-security-summit (21 July 2011). Hereafter cited as Washington
Summit Communiqué.
"Washington Summit Communiqué.
24This report is required by Congress and is meant to establish US nuclear policy, strategy and
capabilities. The Obama review was the third such exercise: The first occurred under President
Bill Clinton in 1994 and the second under President George W. Bush in 2002. Only Obama's was
published in full; the earlier reports were summarised and excerpted. The full text of the 2010
Nuclear Posture Review Report is available at: http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%
20posture%20review%20report.pdf (21 July 201 1); hereafter cited as ÑPR Report.
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82 Irish Studies in International Affairs
nuclear weapon states that it would not use nuclear arms against t
provided those nations remain 'in compliance with their nuclear nonpro
tion obligations'.25
CONTRADICTORY FACTORS
-'Scott Sagan, 'After the Nuclear Posture Review: Obama's disarming influence'. B
the Atomic Scientists , 19 April 201 1; available at: http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/
after-the-nuclear-posture-review-obamas-disarmine-influence (23 April 2011).
26 NPR Report. 41.
"The Obama administration has proposed additional spending of 'well over $100 bi
nuclear weapon delivery systems, including new land-based missiles, new submarine
missiles, new submarines and bombers. See, Washington Post, 14 May 2010.
:8Mian. 'Obama's nuclear postures'.
^Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has suggested, for example, that if Iran proceeds to acquire
nuclear weapon capabilities, then the US may use nuclear weapons to defend its 'partners' in the
Gulf.
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 83
In the aftermath of the Cold War, New Delhi realistically readjusted its fo
and strategic policy and has begun to work closely with the governm
Washington, Tel Aviv and other countries advanced in the field of nuc
space technologies. It altered its previous international outlook
adopted policies that were suitable to Washington's post-Cold Wa
agenda. This shift in New Delhi's policies has had a constructive impa
India's political, economic and strategic stature in global politics. The
W. Bush administration committed practically to support New Delhi's d
'Great Power' status in the twenty-first century. Numerous bilateral agree
were approved and implemented. For example, Washington finalised th
US nuclear-deal for a far-reaching strategic partnership in October 2
'"NATO Public Diplomacy Division. "NATO 2020: Assured security; dynamic engagem
Analysis and recommendations of the Group of Experts on a new strategic concept f
(NATO Brussels, 17 May 2010), 11.
"Shyam Saran, 'Nuclear zero: the shining city on the hill', in V.R. Raghavan (ed.), India and
global nuclear disarmament (Delhi, 2009), 6-11: 10.
12Saran, 'Nuclear zero'.
"This is officially called a '123 Agreement' (named after Section 123 of the United States
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which deals with cooperation with other nations and establishes an
agreement for cooperation as a prerequisite for nuclear deals between the US and any other
nation), but it is generally referred to as the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation or Indo-US
nuclear deal. For the details of the deal, see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, 'Indo-US nuclear deal: altering
global nuclear order'. Strategic Studies 27 (2 and 3 ) (Summer and Autumn 2008), 18-38: 26-32.
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84 Irish Studies in International Affairs
Since then, the United States and India have been gradually cementing
strategic partnership. The partnership has been destined to bring a
revolution in Indian military affairs and make India's military muscle stron
Indeed, India is acquiring conventional military power more than suffici
defeat Pakistan's conventional military force.34
Importantly, political and military competition with India remains
centrepiece of Pakistan's foreign and strategic policy since the time of
founding of the state of Pakistan in 1947 to date. In over 60 year
independence, Pakistan has fought three (and a half) wars with India.35
wars and unlimited border skirmishes, the perennial Kashmir dispute, a
involvement in each other's intra-state conflicts, the contesting regiona
global outlook and, above all, power asymmetry, oblige Islamabad t
remain oblivious to India's increasing military strength. The Pakistani d
planners seem convinced that through nuclear weapons capability, they
be able to accomplish various strategic objectives, such as, deter the adv
from contemplating aggression; increase bargaining leverage; reduce d
dence on allies; and acquire military independence by reducing dependen
external sources of military hardware. Therefore, the nuclear deter
capability vis-à-vis India's nuclear and superior conventional capability
been the prime mover of the Pakistani nuclear weapon program since th
1970s.
Pakistan's defence posture remains Indo-centric despite the dramatic
in the global and regional politics in the last two decades. The United Sta
been contributing constructively in New Delhi's drive for great power, a
engaging in strategic partnership with Pakistan. Nevertheless, Washin
strategic partnership with both New Delhi and Islamabad has fail
transform the belligerent neighbours' bilateral relations. Both sides trea
other as strategic competitors in South Asia.
The implementation of the 2008 nuclear deal has cemented the Indo-
strategic partnership, opened India's gigantic economic market for Ame
investment and encouraged New Delhi to emerge as a balance in souther
against China. The United States policy to checkmate China and mould
Asian security architecture could have serious regional and interna
^The Indian Chief of Army Staff, General N.C. Vij unveiled the Cold Start doctrine d
the Army Commanders Conference on 28 April 2004. This doctrine visualised a tri-s
doctrine, which necessitates restructuring of the Indian Army and reorganising the Indian
offensive power away from three large strike corps into eight smaller division-sized 'inte
battle groups' (IBGs) that combine mechanised infantry, artillery and armour. These eight
groups would be prepared to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan along different axes of
to destroy its defensive and offensive corps. The ground operations of the IBGs req
integration with close air support from the Indian Air Force and Naval aviation assets to p
highly mobile fire support. In addition, the holding corps are redesignated as 'pivot cor
would be bolstered by additional armour and artillery. This would allow them concurre
man defensive positions and undertake limited offensive operations as necessary. The
emphasis of Cold Start is on the speed of both deployment and operations to multiply
war-fighting capability against Pakistan. Importantly, the execution of this doctrine r
massive Indian military buildup. See Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A cold start for hot wars? The I
Army's new limited war doctrine', International Security 32 (3) (Winter 2007/08), 158-9
164-5; see also Gurmeet Kanwal, 'Strike fast and hard: Army doctrine undergoes chang
nuclear era'. Tribune , 23 June 2006.
35India and Pakistan fought three wars in 1948, 1965, 1971, and a half war in 1999. The
1971 resulted in the division of Pakistan, a defeat that instilled a great sense of insecu
Pakistan and a greater determination to find a way to overcome India's military super
Christoph Bluth, 'India and Pakistan: a case of asymmetric nuclear deterrence', Korean Jou
Defense Analysis 22 (3) (September 2010), 387-406: 387.
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 85
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86 Irish Studies in International Affairs
38Cole Harvey, 'CD breaks deadlock on work plan', Arms Control Today , June 2009; available
at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/CD (26 April 2010).
'"Harvey, 'CD breaks deadlock on work plan', and see also Paul Meyer, 'A fìssile material (cut-
off) treaty: some observations on scope and verification', Disarmament Diplomacy 91 (Summer
2009); available at:http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd91/91pm.htm (20 April 2010).
"Jonathan Lynn, 'Pakistan blocks agenda at U.N. disarmament conference', Reuters, 19
January 2010; available at: www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60I26U201001 19 (24 April 2010).
41 Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the
United Nations, in the First Committee at the 65th United Nations General Assembly on 12
October 2010.
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 87
Pakistan is also increasing its fissile material. Its plutonium facility became
operative in 2010. In January 2011 it was reported in the international press
that Pakistan had doubled its nuclear arms stockpile to more than 100
warheads.45
India and Pakistan have failed to negotiate and execute a bilateral arms
control agreement or treaty, which would prevent a nuclear arms race and
decrease the mistrust between them. Arms control is based upon cooperative
approaches taken by national governments to strengthen national security, to
42Bruno Tertrais, The illogic of zero", Washington Quarterly 33 (2) (April 2010), 125-38: 132.
43Cortright and Väyrynen, Towards nuclear zero , 104.
"Zia Mian, 'India developing new centnfuges and increasing enrichment capacity , Interna-
tional Panel on Fissile Material , 4 June 2010; available at: http://www.fissilematerials.org/blog/
2010/06/india_developing_new_cent.html (14 April 2011). RMP stands for 'Rare Materials
Plant'. See 'BARC develops fourth generation uranium enrichment gas centrifuges', Press Trust
of India , 31 October 2008.
45Karen De Young, 'New estimates put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at more than 100 ,
Washington Post , 31 January 2011; available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2011/01/30/AR201 1013004136_pf.html (1 February 2011). See also 'Pakistan
has 110 N-weapons, edges ahead of India: US Report', Times of India , 31 January 2011;
available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/201 1-0 1-3 l/us/28377446_l_weapons-
fissile-material-nuclear-arms (1 February 2011).
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88 Irish Studies in International Affairs
^Li Bin and Liu Zhiwei, 'The contribution of arms control to fighting nuclear terrorism',
Disarmament Forum (No. 2, Geneva: 2003), 17.
47Pakistan has repeatedly offered a strategic restraint regime to India since 1998. The strategic
restraint regime proposal indicates Islamabad's willingness to negotiate bilateral arms control
agreements with India. The elements of the proposal were: One, not to deploy ballistic missiles;
two, not to operationally weaponise nuclear capable missile systems; three, formalise the
understanding to provide prior and adequate notification of flight-tests of missiles; and, four, to
declare a moratorium on the development, acquisition or deployment of anti-ballistic missile
systems, since these can destabilise 'minimum credible deterrence'. For more details about
bilateral arms control between India and Pakistan, see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Arms control: risk
reduction measures between India and Pakistan, S AS SU Research Paper no.l (June 2005), 8.
^Sanjoy Majumder, 'India nuclear test "did not work'", BBC News , Delhi, 27 August 2009,
available at: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/8225540.stm (7 August 2011).
49Prime Minster Manmohan Singh contradicted the declaration of K. Santhanam. On 29
August 2009 he stated that the Pokhran II nuclear tests were successful and that there was no
need to indulge in needless controversies. Importantly, while negating the scientist's claim, Prime
Minister Singh did not rule out the possibility of nuclear weapon tests in the near future.
^Pokhran II refers to India s three nuclear weapon tests on 1 1 May 1998 and two on 13 May
1998. These tests were conducted at the Pokhran testing site built in the Rajasthan Desert in
India.
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 89
"In August 2007, New Delhi gave the impression that it might opt for testing a new generation
of nuclear weapons. On 20 August that year Pakistan also hinted that it would renounce its
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing if India were to resume nuclear trials.
52'The bottom line is that it is very difficult to explain the absence of war among major powers
in the past 65 years without taking into account the existence of nuclear weapons. Nuclear
weapons have also limited the risk of chemical and biological weapons use: no nuclear-capable
country has ever been the victim of such an attack. The history of the Middle East provides a
good case study. Egypt used chemical weapons against Yemen between 1962 and 1967, but not
against Israel in the 1973 war. Iraq used them against Iran from 1983 to 1988, but did not fire its
Scud missiles loaded with chemical and biological weapons against Israel or the U.S. -led coalition
in 199Г, see Tertrais, 'The illogic of zero', 128.
" India developing advanced fighter jets , Dawn , 24 April 2010.
"■"China bieger threat than Pakistan: India', Dawn, 24 May 2009.
55The Cold Start strategy, which was officially announced in April 2004, is a proactive war
strategy to mobilise fast army strike-formations and strike hard to crush the enemy. This strategy
has, supposedly, been formulated on the basis of the strategic philosophy that India would be able
to control the escalation of conventional war. In addition, fast Indian army strike formations
would minimise Pakistan's time to shore up its defenses and would give insufficient time to the
international community to intervene.
56In January 2010, India s Defense Ministry announced plans to spend more than $10 billion
that year on acquiring new weapons. This was made possible by a 34 percent increase in India's
military budget for 2009-10, to more than $35 billion; in Pakistan, the military budget went up 15
percent, to just more than $4 billion. See Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar, 'Playing the nuclear game:
Pakistan and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty', Arms Control Today , April 2010; available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_04/Mian (16 April 2010).
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90 Irish Studies in International Affairs
S7The Bahawalpur Corps is one part of Pakistan's defence corps. In summer 2010, the
Army conducted a gigantic defensive exercise - AZMA NAU- in the Cholustan desert
the nation that it is vigilant in regard to India's Cold Start doctrine.
^Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), 'Press release,', 19 April 2011.
5'ISPR, 'Press release', 19 April 2011. See also, Anita Joshua, 'Pakistan tests shor
ballistic missile', The Hindu, 19 April 2011. http://www.thehindu.com/news/inte
article 1709352.ece (24 April 2011).
"Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, NASR (Hatf IX) counteracts India s Cold Start Doctnne , Weekly P
28 April 2011; available at: http://www.weeklypulse.org/detaikaspx7contentID = 482&story
April 2011).
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 91
61 Duncan Smith 'Perspectives on the revival of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime in
the wake of President Barack Obama's Prague speech', Irish Studies in International Affairs 21
(2010) 179-96: 193.
"United Nations, Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons', Article VI. The text of
the treaty, which was agreed in July 1968, is available at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/
npttreaty.html (25 July 201 1).
63 M ark Hibbs, 'The Breach', nuclear energy brief Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 4 June 2010; available at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?
fa = view&id = 40942 (9 June 2010).
MUN Security Council, 'Resolution 1 172', adopted on 6 June 1998; the text of the resolution is
available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html (24 April 2010).
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92 Irish Studies in International Affairs
This confirms that Islamabad could not underplay the regional strategic
environment in its nuclear non-proliferation outlook.
New Delhi has softened its stance on the FMCT during recent years, as part
of the Indo-US nuclear deal announced in July 2005. It pledged to support
negotiations on an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva.66
Numerous security observers, however, believe that in real terms if India were
asked to sign an FMCT today, it would not be ready to do so.67 Ambassador
Hamid Rao of India warned at Geneva that '[w]e will not accept obligations not
in keeping with or prejudicial to our national security interests or which hinder
our strategic program, our R&D as well as three-stage nuclear program'.68 This
underscores that New Delhi would not consider any constraints on its
programme of fissile-material production. C. Rajaraman has pointed out that:
India's implicit view appears to be that it is a recent entrant to the group of
nuclear powers, that its nuclear forces are still at the growing stage and that it
needs more time before it can consider any constraints on its fissile-material
production. It is unlikely that India will accept any restriction on its
production till such time as it feels that it has an adequate nuclear arsenal to
deter all foreseeable nuclear threats to its security.69
New Delhi's non-confrontationist approach on FMCT in the CD creates an
impression that it would not block the FMCT. The nuclear history of India
reveals that India had always adopted diplomatic-multifaceted stances during
the preliminary negotiations of treaties. Once the negotiations have entered into
the final stage, however, India could change from a non-confrontational
position and adopt a bargaining tactic, and might finally abstain from the
process or oppose it. For example, it had adopted a similar stance during the
NPT negotiations in the mid-1960s and again in the case of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty negotiations during the early 1990s. The FMCT stake-holders,
therefore, are not very optimistic about the present stance of New Delhi on
FMCT. In addition, another important pessimistic variable is the 2008 NSG
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 93
70The 2008 nuclear accord allows India to access global nuclear technology and fuel supplies
after more than three decades of international boycott over a 1974 atomic test; see Rama
Lakshmi, 'India introduces controversial legislation on compensation for nuclear accidents',
Washington Post , 8 May 2010.
"Mian and Nayyar, 'Playing the nuclear game'. For a detailed discussion on the Indo-US
nuclear deal, see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal. 'Indo-US nuclear deal: altering global nuclear order',
Strategic Studies 27 (2-3) (Summer and Autumn 2008), 18-38.
"'Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akran, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the
Conference on Disarmament', Geneva. 18 February 2010, 1. The text of the statement is available
at: http://missions.itu.int/~pakistan/2005_Statements/CD/cd/20100218.html (25 July 2011).
7 Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akran .
74ISPS, 'NCA Meeting', Press release, no. 1 1/2010-ISPR, Rawalpindi, 14 December 2010. The
text of the press release is available at: http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp7o = t-press_
release&date = 2010/12/14 (25 July 201 1).
"'Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN
and other International Organizations at the Conference on Disarmament', Geneva, 25 January
2011, 1. The text of the statement is available at: http://missions.itu.int/~pakistan/2005_
Statements/CD/cd/20 1 10125.htm (25 July 201 1).
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94 Irish Studies in International Affairs
The demand for peaceful use of nuclear technology has been increasing i
India and Pakistan.76 International nuclear energy's renaissance, the In
nuclear deal, rising prices of oil and gas, the environmental hazard of h
power generation, and above all the advance of the nuclear programm
India and Pakistan make atomic power plants very attractive for both
Delhi and Islamabad The former currently has fourteen nuclear reactors
sites - Tarapur, Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam, Narora, Kakrapar and Kaiga -
a combined generating capacity of 2,720 megawatts of electricity (MWe),
percent of India's total electricity needs, lbe Nuclear Power Corporatio
India Ltd has ambitious plans to boost output to 20,000 MWe by 2020,
percent of India's total energy-generating capacity. Practically, for boost
nuclear energy-generating capacity, India requires external assistance.
Indo-US nuclear deal has multiplied New Delhi's options in relatio
receiving nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel-cycle buildup assistance. It
also receive nuclear fuel from the nuclear supplier states. It has been est
that with the help of American, French and Russian nuclear companies,
would be able to generate 63,000 megawatts of nuclear energy by
compared with the present 1,700 megawatts of nuclear energy.77
Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission's nuclear power stations curr
account for nearly three percent of the country's total installed gene
capacity, with Karachi Nuclear Power Plant generating 137 megawatts
Chashma-1 generating 325 megawatts, which is far below the nuclear
generating capacity of many other countries. In 2007 Islamabad announce
it would produce 8,800 megawatts of nuclear power in the next 25 yea
establishing more nuclear power plants. On 16 February 2010, the
Assembly unanimously passed a resolution for setting up nuclear power
in the country. On 20 February 2010, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza
visited Khusab Nuclear Complex, which houses some of Pakistan's impo
nuclear facilities, to reiterate the country's peaceful use of nuclear capa
While addressing the nuclear bureaucracy, he reiterated that his govern
would keep the country's nuclear programme on top of its priority li
claimed that the peaceful use of nuclear technology would help the coun
addressing the electricity crisis, and would help Pakistan to achieve gr
economic progress.
Islamabad has been expressing its willingness to purchase nuclear re
from Western countries to boost its nuclear power generation capacity
NSG trade laws, however, prevent nuclear-reactor and nuclear-fuel trad
Pakistan. Despite this, Islamabad approached Washington and other nu
76The technological line between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons is permeable: th
uranium-enrichment process used to manufacture fuel for energy reactors can be reconfig
produce bomb fuel, and the plutonium that some countries extract while recycling reac
also can be used in nuclear weapons. See, Barry Blechman and Alex Bollfrass, '5 myths
getting rid of the bomb', Washington Post , 27 June 2010.
77The 2008 nuclear accord allows India to access global nuclear technology and fuel su
after more than three decades of international boycott over a 1974 atomic test. Rama L
'India introduces controversial legislation on compensation for nuclear accidents', Was
Post , 8 May 2010.
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 95
78'China firms join controversial Pakistan nuclear push', Reuters , 24 June 2010; available at:
http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFTOE65N02E20100624 (25 June 2010).
"Since 2004, Pakistan has sought China's help to supply it with two additional power reactors,
Chashma-3 and -4. Beijing hasn't obliged so far, but now that U.S., French, Japanese and Russian
firms are poised to sell nuclear equipment to India, China is finally prepared to press the issue;
see Mark Hibbs, 'The Breach', Foreign Policy , 4 June, 2010; available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2010/06/04/the_breach (9 June 2010).
""Kenneth N. Luongo, 'Securing vulnerable nuclear materials: meeting the global challenge',
Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, November 2009, 6; available at: http://www.
stanleyfounclation.org/publications/pab/Luongo_PAB 1109.pdf (25 July 2011).
""Radiation death exposes India's waste disposal failures'. Nuclear Power Daily, 1 1 May 2010;
available at: http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/Radiation_death_exposes_Indias_waste_
disposal_failures_999.html (12 May 2010).
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96 Irish Studies in International Affairs
CONCLUSION
Since the invention of nuclear weapons and their use in August 1945 ag
non-nuclear weapon state, nuclear disarmament has remained an aspir
rather than a reality. Article VI of the NPT makes nuclear disarm
obligatory for the parties to the Treaty. The nuclear weapon states party to
NPT have reiterated on numerous occasions their intention to imp
Article VI in its letter and spirit. In practice, however, they have opted for
opposite course of action. In the context of South Asia, the idealistic ap
is to minimise and eliminate the use of HEU and plutonium stockpiles i
and Pakistan. It seems, however, an impracticable strategy. In both st
nationalism is not only surviving, but is also overwhelmingly influenci
ruling elites' internal and external outlook. Furthermore, chronic conflicts
been hindering mutual cooperation and coordination; and traditional n
of state security have been intensifying a security dilemma that is sus
both a conventional and non-conventional arms race between str
competitors.
The signing of New START between Russia and the US on 8 April 2010 and
its entry into force in January 201 1, the Nuclear Security Summit communiqué,
and an agreed final document of the NPT all indicate that nuclear arms control
rather than nuclear disarmament is a practical approach, which is not contrary
to the defense requirements of the militarily insecure nuclear weapon states. In
addition, at present the primary focus of the nuclear weapon states is the safety
and security of their nuclear infrastructure, to prevent nuclear/radiological
terrorism. Hence, the drafting of nuclear and conventional bilateral arms
control agreements and the establishment of regional nuclear training centers in
South Asia to cultivate a local nuclear security culture and provide access to the
best nuclear security practices is imperative.
The history of the nuclear non-proliferation regime reveals that substantial
development took place only when the nuclear weapon states had a convergence
of interest on the nuclear non-proliferation agenda and they were able to create
82Lisa Daniel, 'Chairman cites importance of US-Pakistan ties', American Forces Press
Service, 1 July 2010; available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx7id = 59836 (1
July 2010).
83Luongo, 'Securing vulnerable nuclear materials', 6.
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Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 97
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