COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148334 January 21, 2004
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and
SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005
dated 5 June 2001 ("Resolution No. 01-005") and Resolution No. NBC
01-006 dated 20 July 2001 ("Resolution No. 01-006") of respondent
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC"). Resolution No. 01-005
proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001
elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared "official and final" the
ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. ("Senator Guingona") as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the
nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on
9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingona’s confirmation, the Senate on 8 February
2001 passed Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the
existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on
Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election.1 Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial
candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for
the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which
ends on 30 June 2004.2
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results
from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the
elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first
twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the
thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years
of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-
President."3 Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan
("Honasan") ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-
005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica
("petitioners"), as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for
prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought
to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for
Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the
special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners
prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes
a proclamation to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005
without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No. 6645");4 (2) it failed to require senatorial
candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek
election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under
Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;5 and, consequently, (3) it failed
to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election
under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required
under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. No.
6646").6 Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELEC
canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May
2001 elections without distinction such that "there were no two separate
Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen
seats, irrespective of term."7
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special
and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well
as in the canvassing of their results. To support their claim, petitioners
cite the special elections simultaneously held with the regular elections of
13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by
Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who
became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in the Senate.8 Petitioners
point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the
votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under the regular
elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the special
elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of
those elections.9
Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during
the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to
Comment on the petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the
provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-006 declaring "official and final"
the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The
13 Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required
petitioners to file an amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as
additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition
in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition
and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a
special election to fill the seat vacated by Senator Guingona was validly
held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary
issues on the mootness of the petition and on petitioners’ standing to
litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of
his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the
Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto,
as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this
case because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of
the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally –
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo
warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the
sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-
year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Court’s Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right
of a public officer in the exercise of his office and to oust him from its
enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded.10 Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows,
however, that what petitioners are questioning is the validity of the
special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected.
Petitioners’ various prayers are, namely: (1) a "declaration" that no
special election was held simultaneously with the general elections on 14
May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as having won
in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-
006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the
special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on COMELEC’s alleged
failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of
that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine
Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners’
prayer for the annulment of Honasan’s proclamation and, ultimately,
election is merely incidental to petitioners’ cause of action. Consequently,
the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13
Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking
of the 13 Senators render the instant petition to set aside Resolutions
Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or
board to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.11 Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already
done.12 However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will
decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading
review.13 Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol,14 we took cognizance of a petition
to set aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang
Kabataan ("SK") on 4 December 1992 despite that at the time the petition
was filed, the SK election had already taken place. We noted
in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order sought to be
annulled "is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question may
not be decided before the date of such elections," the mootness of the
petition is no bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the
instant case. The question of the validity of a special election to fill a
vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELEC’s failure to comply with
requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to arise in
every such election. Such question, however, may not be decided before
the date of the election.
On Petitioners’ Standing
Honasan questions petitioners’ standing to bring the instant petition as
taxpayers and voters because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC
illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they
sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-
005 and 01-006.
"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury because of the challenged governmental act.15 The requirement of
standing, which necessarily "sharpens the presentation of
issues,"16 relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only
actual cases or controversies.17 Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to
litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.18
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the
instant petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of
the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified
as a "generalized grievance." This generalized grievance is shared in
substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the
voters, who voted in that election.19 Neither have petitioners alleged, in
their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the
petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 "tax money
[was] ‘x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protections against abuses of legislative power’ or that there [was]
misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was]
deflected to any improper purpose."20
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and
exercised our discretion to give due course to voters’ suits involving the
right of suffrage.21 Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora,22 we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition
filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP"). The IBP questioned
the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine
National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct
patrols even though the IBP presented "too general an interest." We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to
uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration,
however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi.
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry x x x.
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal
standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the
court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows
that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant
threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly
aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy
raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in
the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.23 (Emphasis
supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their
capacity as voters since they raise important issues involving their right of
suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise
again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be
called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives
"in the manner prescribed by law," thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a
special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner
prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
(Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A.
No. 6645, which provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen
(18) months or in the House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the
existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a
special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official
communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special
election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such
purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the
special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor
later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be
voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general
election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. – x x x In case
a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term,
the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy
not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the
occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the
Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the
expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires
COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special
election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than
ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy
in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of,
among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election
simultaneously with the 14 May 2001 regular elections, comply with the
requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
A survey of COMELEC’s resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May
2001 elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a
compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions24 or even
in its press releases25 did COMELEC state that it would hold a special
election for a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the
regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice
that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the
13th highest number of votes in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELEC’s failure, assuming it
did fail, to comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14
May 2001 and accordingly rendered Honasan’s proclamation as the
winner in that special election void. More precisely, the question is
whether the special election is invalid for lack of a "call" for such election
and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by which
the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons stated
below, the Court answers in the negative.
COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice
of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place
of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body
with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election’s
validity.26 In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the
election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to
administer the election.27
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that
expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the
next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be
held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election
held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the
body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do
so.28 This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from
the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority29 and
the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the
election.30
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a
special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place
after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on
the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will
render the election a nullity.31
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case
of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be
held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.
Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising
from Senator Guingona’s appointment as Vice-President in February
2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law
charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and
COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling
of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special
election to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives. In such a case,
the holding of the special election is subject to a condition precedent, that
is, the vacancy should take place at least one year before the expiration
of the term. The time of the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC
subject only to the limitation that it holds the special election within the
range of time provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This
makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, for COMELEC to "call x x x a special election x x x not earlier
than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the
vacancy" and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELEC’s failure
to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a special election
to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in
the congressional district involved to know the time and place of the
special election and the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so
notifies them.
No Proof that COMELEC’s
Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the
failure to give notice of the special election is whether the want of notice
has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change
the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a
substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no
special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters
would be void.32
The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial
election covers two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special
election to fill a vacant single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously
with the regular elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that
COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the
13th highest number of votes in the special election. Petitioners have
neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC’s failure to give this required
notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of
the special senatorial election or led them to believe that there was no
such special election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to
give such notice, no special election took place. This bare assertion
carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those
who voted in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the
vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona’s appointment as
Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding
regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence of formal notice
from COMELEC does not preclude the possibility that the voters had
actual notice of the special election, the office to be voted in that election,
and the manner by which COMELEC would determine the winner. Such
actual notice could come from many sources, such as media reports of
the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the
campaign.33
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party
who stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot
disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that
COMELEC’s omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of
suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this
Court is loathe to annul elections and will only do so when it is
"impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or
to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the great body of the
voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation, and threats from
exercising their franchise."34
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorate’s will
and let the results of the election stand, despite irregularities that may
have attended the conduct of the elections.35 This is but to acknowledge
the purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours,
which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government,
either in determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding
some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal
voters should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their
ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots
should be counted and the election should not be declared null. Innocent
voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their
government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for
which they are in no way responsible. A different rule would make the
manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance
than the duty itself.36 (Emphasis in the original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
Neither is there basis in petitioners’ claim that the manner by which
COMELEC conducted the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a
nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates
and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such
requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section
2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date of the election," if
necessary, and "state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for."
Similarly, petitioners’ reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing
of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the
printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is
misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way
require separate documentation of candidates or separate canvass of
votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the
special election on 14 May 2001 merely implemented the procedure
specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of
Resolution No. 84 as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad ("Senator
Tatad") made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by
former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion
of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate agreed to amend
Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the senatorial
candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr." Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and
the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further
inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider
Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 [later converted to Resolution No.
84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the motion is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order.
With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title and
text of the resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN
THE SENATE AND CALLING ON THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION TO
BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION ON
MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY
FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator
of the Philippines in 1998 for a term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by
a majority vote of all the members of both House of Congress, voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-
President of the Philippines on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve
(12) Senators, all elective Members of the House of Representatives, and
all elective provincial city and municipal officials shall be held on the
second Monday and every three years thereafter; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it
hereby certifies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through
election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14,
2001 and the Senator thus elected to serve only for the unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this
resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmeña is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the
distinguished Majority Leader, Chairman of the Committee on Rules,
author of this resolution, yield for a few questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]
S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]
Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a
special election for a vacant seat in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the
one who was elected in that special election was then Congressman,
later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other
words, the electorate had to cast a vote for a ninth senator – because at
that time there were only eight – to elect a member or rather, a candidate
to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA
revolution, twice there were 24 candidates and the first 12 were elected
to a six-year term and the next 12 were elected to a three-year term.
My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is
the candidate with the 13th largest number of votes going to be the one
to take a three-year term? Or is there going to be an election for a
position of senator for the unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the
mechanics to the Commission on Elections. But personally, I would like to
suggest that probably, the candidate obtaining the 13th largest number of
votes be declared as elected to fill up the unexpired term of Senator
Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec
to conduct such an election? Is it not the case that the vacancy is for a
specific office? I am really at a loss. I am rising here because I think it is
something that we should consider. I do not know if we can… No, this is
not a Concurrent Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate
President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic
Act No. 6645, what is needed is a resolution of this Chamber calling
attention to the need for the holding of a special election to fill up the
vacancy created, in this particular case, by the appointment of our
colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the
particular candidate to fill up would be that reserved for Mr. Guingona’s
unexpired term. In other words, it can be arranged in such a manner.
xxxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus,
wordings to the effect that in the simultaneous elections, the 13th placer
be therefore deemed to be the special election for this purpose. So we
just nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues. It is better for the
candidates. It is also less expensive because the ballot will be printed
and there will be less disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this
resolution to be such a special election, maybe, we satisfy the
requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the
Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. – to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the
forthcoming elections that will be held simultaneously as a special
election under this law as we understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator
Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later,
maybe it will be better, Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal
because I do not believe that there will be anyone running specifically –
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. – to fill up this position for three years and
campaigning nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th
candidate will be running with specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent
of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if
there will be no other amendment, I move for the adoption of this
resolution.
xxxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this
resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there
any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.37
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and
methods to conduct the special election within the confines of R.A. No.
6645, merely chose to adopt the Senate’s proposal, as embodied in
Resolution No. 84. This Court has consistently acknowledged and
affirmed COMELEC’s wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to
carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections
subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or
do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.38 COMELEC’s decision to
abandon the means it employed in the 13 November 1951 and 8
November 1955 special elections and adopt the method embodied in
Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate exercise of its discretion.
Conversely, this Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent
special senatorial elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in
the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 elections. That COMELEC
adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is no reason to
adjudge it liable for grave abuse of discretion. As we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to
play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the
1âw phi 1
discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that
would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization.
The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of
means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere.39
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to
the electorate of necessary information regarding a special election, are
central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the
circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that
COMELEC’s failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the
special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not
take chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC to comply strictly
with all the requirements under applicable laws relative to the conduct of
regular elections in general and special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Vitug, J., joins the dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins J. Puno’s dissent.
Tinga, J., joins Justice Puno’s dissent.
Footnotes
1
As provided under Section 2 of Republic Act. No. 7166, as
amended.
2
Resolution No. 84 reads:
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto Guingona, Jr. was
elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a term
which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated Senator
Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has
been conferred by a majority vote of all the members of
both Houses of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office
as Vice-President of the Philippines on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the
election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective Members of
the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial,
city and municipal officials shall be held on the second
Monday of May and every three years thereafter. Now,
 therefore be it Resolved by the Senate, as it is hereby
resolved to certify as it hereby certifies, the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to fill up said vacancy through
election to be held simultaneously with the regular
election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate
garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes
shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Emphasis supplied)
3
Resolution No. 01-005 reads:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting [E]n
[B]anc as the National Board of Canvassers for the
election of Senators of the Philippines, officially
canvassed in open and public proceedings the certificates
of canvass of votes cast nationwide for senators in the
national and local elections conducted on May 14, 2001.
Based on the canvass of the Certificates of Canvass
submitted by seventy-eight (78) out of seventy-nine (79)
Provincial Boards of Canvassers, twenty (20) City Boards
of Canvassers of cities comprising one (1) or more
legislative districts, two (2) District Boards of Canvassers
of Metro Manila, and one (1) Absentee Voting, and the
remaining uncanvassed certificate of canvass which will
not anymore affect the results, the Commission on
Elections sitting En Banc as the National Board of
Canvassers finds that the following candidates for
senators in said elections obtained as of June 04, 2001
the following number of votes as indicated opposite their
names:
Name Votes Garnered
(as of 4 June 2001)
NOLI DE CASTRO 16,157,811
JUAN M. FLAVIER 11,676,129
SERGIO R. OSMEÑA, III 11,531,427
FRANKLIN M. DRILON 11,223,020
RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR. 11,187,447
JOKER P. ARROYO 11,163,801
MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. 11,084,884
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN 10,877,989
EDGARDO J. ANGARA 10,746,843
PANFILO M. LACSON 10,481,755
LUISA P. EJERCITO ESTRADA 10,456,674
RALPH G. RECTO 10,387,108
GREGORIO G. HONASAN 10,364,272
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it
under the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and
other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting
En Banc as the National Board of Canvassers hereby
PROCLAIMS the above-named thirteen (13) candidates
as the duly elected Senators of the Philippines in the May
14, 2001 elections. Based on the certificates of canvass
finally tabulated, the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve
for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th)
Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years
of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed
Vice-President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 9,
Article VII of the Constitution, in relation to Section 9,
Article VI thereof, as implemented under Republic Act No.
6645. (Emphasis supplied)
4
This provision states: "The Commission on Elections shall fix the
date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-
five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of
such resolution or communication, stating among other things the
office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within
the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with such general
election."
5
This provision reads: "Certificate of candidacy. – No person shall
be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
 A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may,
prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to
the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be
filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of
candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be
eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of
the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the
person who has filed more than one certificate of
candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he
desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of
candidacy for the other office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall
not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."
6
This provision reads: "Certificates of Candidacy; Certified List of
Candidates. – x x x The names of all registered candidates
immediately followed by the nickname or stage name shall also
be printed in the election returns and tally sheets."
7
Rollo, pp. 5-7, 12-14.
8
Senator Roseller T. Lim was elected in the special election of 13
November 1951 while Senator Felisberto Verano was elected in
the special election of 8 November 1955.
9
Rollo, pp. 8-12.
Castro v. Del Rosario, 25 Phil. 611 (1967); Section 1(a), Rule
10
66, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
11
Sections 1-2, Rule 65, The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Gil v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 148179, 26 June 2001 (minute
12
resolution).
Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134856, 2 July 2002, 383 SCRA
13
577; Viola v. Hon. Alunan III, 343 Phil. 184 (1997); Alunan III v.
Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467 (1997).
14
342 Phil. 467 (1997).
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R.
15
No. 96541, 24 August 1993, 225 SCRA 568.
16
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652 (1995).
17
Const., art. VIII, secs. 1 and 5(2).
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
18
Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 352 Phil. 153
(1998).
19
See Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95
20
SCRA 392 (internal citations omitted).
De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, 6 May 1992, 208
21
SCRA 420; Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7 (1967). See also
Telecom & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC, 352
Phil. 153 (1998).
22
G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284,
23
15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
24
E.g. Resolution No. 3258, dated 28 September 2000 (providing
for the calendar of activities and periods of prohibited acts in
connection with the 14 May 2001 elections as amended by
Resolution Nos. 3322, dated 5 October 2000; 3284, dated 20
October 2000; 3306, dated 7 November 2000; 3426, dated 22
December 2000; and 3359, dated 6 February 2001); Resolution
No. 3632, dated 1 March 2001 (canceling the certificates of
candidacy of nuisance senatorial candidates); and Resolution No.
3743, dated 12 March 2001 (providing for the general instructions
to the Boards of Election Inspectors on the casting and counting
of votes).
E.g. undated COMELEC pamphlet entitled "Frequently Asked
25
Questions on the May 14, 2001 Elections."
 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections § 70
26
"SEC. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure,
(1965). violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election
in any polling place had not been held on the date fixed, or had
27
Ibid; ibid. been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
28
26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 282 (1996). transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of
such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
29
Ibid.
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by an interested party and after due notice and
30
McCoy v. Fisher, 67 S.E. 2d 543 (1951). hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections § 70
31
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended
(1965). or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
See 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 292 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections
32
suspension of the election or failure to elect".
§ 72 (1965).
Alcala v. Commission on Elections, 218 Phil. 322 (1984);
35

Indeed, the fact that 13 senators were due to be elected in the

33
Villareal v. Fornier, 84 Phil. 756 (1949); Lucero v. De Guzman, 45
14 May 2001 elections and that the senator elected to the 13th Phil. 852 (1924).
place will serve the remaining term of Senator Guingona was
published in news reports (see Philippine Star, 9 February 2001, 36
Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918).
pp. 1, 6 and Daily Tribune, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 8; Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 14 February 2001, Transcript of Session Proceedings of the Philippine Senate, 8
37

pp. 1, A20; Today, 8 February 2001, p. 10; Manila Bulletin, 9
February 2001, pp. 3, 8). Furthermore, the fact that the
administration and opposition coalitions each fielded 13 senatorial
candidates (and not only 12) was similarly given extensive
coverage by news publications (see Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12
February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001, pp. 1, A14; 14
February 2001, pp. 49-54. (Emphasis supplied)
38
E.g. Cauton v. COMELEC, 126 Phil. 291 (1967).
Puñgutan v. Abubakar, 150 Phil. 1 (1972) citing Sumulong v.
39

February 2001, pp. 1, A20; Philippine Star, 13 February 2001, pp. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 237 (1941).
1, 4; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; Today, 9 February 2001, pp. 1,
4; 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 10;
Manila Standard, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 2; Malaya, 13
February 2001, pp. 1, 6; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; Daily
Tribune 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; Manila Times, 14 February
2001, pp. 1, 2A; Philippine Star Ngayon, 13 February 2001, pp. 1,
4).

Florendo, Sr. vs. Buyser, 129 Phil. 353 (1967); Capalla v.

34

Tabiana, 63 Phil. 95 (1936); Kiamzon v. Pugeda, 54 Phil. 755

(1930); Cailles v. Gomez, 42 Phil. 852 (1924). Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as amended, (Omnibus Election Code), on failure of
elections (resulting to the annulment of elections), provides:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and
Lorenzo M. Tañada for respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro;
Felixberto M. Serrano and Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six
justices against four resolved to deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is
now written briefly to explain the principal grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M.
Tañadare quested that his right to speak on the next session day,
February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator
Tañada and Senator Tañada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with
the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the
then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at
the Senate session hall at the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the
petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his
appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally
ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but
instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted
by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he
read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and
conferred with his colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner
finally called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto who was
confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States,
all the Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the
roll call be dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion,
obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his
partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from
delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with
the reading of the minutes, but this motion was likewise opposed by
Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the
minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver
his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding,
continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes,
Senator Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would
speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while,
tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was
continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the
latter would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery,
as if by pre-arrangement. At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles
David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and
he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the
session and this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who
moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another
commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein
respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and again
moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair
hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by Senator David,
Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the
senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate
President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair
and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so
made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner,
made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to
paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be
designated to preside over the session which suggestion was carried
unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was
appointedActing Secretary, because the Assistance Secretary, who was
then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter
abandoned the session.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally
able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read
aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair,
after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced
Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of
the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano
Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said
resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent
as acting president of the Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the
Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines senate and
oust respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and
believes that these are the crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino
vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the
power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of
the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators
were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should
abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect
only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose
their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must
imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme
Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the
plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a
resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the
temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And
we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action
inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other
reasons, the situation is not where two sets of senators have constituted
themselves into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in said
Werts case), there being no question that there is presently
one Philippines Senate only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner
and his partisans have not erected themselves into another Senate. The
petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in
his place in the same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief
Executive to the respondent makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt
the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of similar
nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the
session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly
assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21,
1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor
and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these
questions once it is held, as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction
over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those four
on those sub-questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view
that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall,
prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the
resolution been approved only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it
validly constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the
Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice
Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the
minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there
were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez,
and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator
Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of
twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of
"each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all"
the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House".
(Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a
difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less
number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the
members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority
of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes
furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they
could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if
one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and
Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as
there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the
practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in
the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision,
twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will
side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the
latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially
one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators,
the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held
with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising
from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of
all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions
herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond
the shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to
dismiss the petition. Without costs.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C.J., concurring:
I believe that this Court has jurisdiction over the case.1 The present crisis
in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of the
Court.
Respondent Cuenco cannot invoke the doctrine of non-interference by
the courts with the Senate because the legal capacity of his group of
twelve senators to acts as a senate is being challenged by petitioner on
the groundof lack of quorum (Attorney General ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers
et al., Atl. 726; 23 L. R. A., 352). If this group is found sufficient to
constitute a quorum under the Constitution, then its proceedings should
be free from interference. But if it is not possessed of a valid quorum,
then its proceedings should be voided.
The issue as to the legal capacity of the Cuenco group to act as a senate
cannot be considered a political question the determination of which
devolves exclusively upon the Senate. That issue involves a
constitutional question which cannot be validly decided either by the
Cuenco group or by the Avelino group separately, for, if the Cuenco
group has no quorum, the Avelino has decidedly less. And for obvious
reasons, the two groups cannot act together inasmuch as the members
of the Avelino group, possibly to avoid trouble, do not attend the sessions
presided by the respondent believing as they do that the latter was
illegally elected. Upon the other hand, the Cuenco group believing itself
as possessing the constitutional quorum and not desiring to make any
semblance of admission to the contrary, does not find it convenient to
compel the attendance of any senator of the Avelino group. Then the
question arises--who will decide the conflict between the two groups?
This anomalous situation will continue while the conflict remains
unsettled, and the conflict will remain unsettled while this Court refuses to
intervene. In the meantime the validity of all the laws, resolutions and
other measures which may be passed by the Cuenco group will be open
to doubt because of an alleged lack of quorum in the body which
authored them. This doubt may extend, in diverse forms, to the House of
Representative and to the other agencies of the government such as the
Auditor General's Office. Thus, a general situation of uncertainty,
pregnant with grave dangers, is developing into confusion and chaos with
severe harm to the nation. This situation may, to a large extent, be
stopped and constitutional processes may be restored in the Senate if
only this Court, as the guardian of the Constitutional, were to pronounce
the final word on the constitutional mandate governing the existing
conflict between the two groups. And, in my opinion, under the present
circumstances, this Court has no other alternative but to meet challenge
of the situation which demands the utmost of judicial temper and judicial
statesmanship. As hereinbefore stated, the present crisis in the Senate is
one that imperatively calls for the intervention of this Court.
As to the legality of respondent's election as acting President of the
Senate,2I firmly believe that although petitioner's adjournment of the
session of February 21, 1949, was illegality cannot be countered with
another illegality. The session wherein respondent was elected as acting
President of the Senate was illegal because when Senator Mabanag
raised the question of a quorum and the roll was called, only twelve
senators were present. In the Philippines there are twenty-four senators,
and therefore, the quorum must be thirteen. The authorities on the matter
are clear.
The constitution of our state ordains that a majority of each house
shall constitute a quorum. the house of representative consist of
125 members; 63 is a majority and quorum. When a majority
or quorum are present, the house can do business; not otherwise.
A quorum possessed all the powers of the whole body, a majority
of which quorum must, of course, govern. (In re Gunn, 50 Kan.,
155; 32 P., 470, 476; 19 L.R.A., 519.)
Quorum as used in U. S. C. A. Const. Art. 4 sec. 8, providing that
a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do
business, is, for the purpose of the Assembly, not less than the
majority of the whole number of which the house may be
composed. Vacancies from death, resignation or failure to elect
cannot be deducted in ascertaining the quorum. (Opinion of
Justice, 12 Fla. 653.)
The general rule is that a quorum is a majority of all the members
and a majority of this majority may legislate and do the work of
the whole. (State vs. Ellington 117 N. C., 158; 23 S. E. 250-252,
30 L.R.A., 532; 53 Am. SR., 580.)
. . . a majority of each House is necessary to transact business,
and a minority cannot transact business, this view being in
keeping with the provision of the Constitution permitting a smaller
number than a quorum to adjourn from day to day merely.
(Earp vs. Riley, 40 OKL., 340; p. 164; Ralls vs. Wyand, 40 OKL.,
323; 138 P. 158.)
The Constitution provides that "a majority of each (house) shall
constitute a quorum to do business." In other words, when a
majority are present the House is in a position to do business. Its
capacity to transact business is then established, created by the
mere presence of a majority, and depend upon the disposition or
assent or action of any single member or faction of the majority
present. All that the Constitution required is the presence of a
majority, and when that majority are present, the power of the
House arises. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law ed. 321,
325.)
If all the members of the select body or committee, or if all the
agents are assembled, or if all have been duly notified, and the
minority refuse, or neglect to meet with the other, a majority of
those present may act, provided those present constitute a
majority of the whole number. In other words, in such case, a
major part of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum, and
a majority of the quorum may act. If the major part withdraw so as
to leave no quorum, the power of the minority to act is, in general,
considered to cease. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 4th ed., sec. 283.)3
Therefore, without prejudice to writing a more extensive opinion, if
necessary, I believe that respondent Mariano J. Cuenco has not been
legally elected as acting President of the Senate. It is true that
respondent Cuenco, in fact, must be the Senate President because he
represent the majority of the members now present in Manila, and, at any
new session with a quorum, upon the present senatorial alignment, he
will be elected to said office. But precisely he is now the master of the
situation, he must win his victory in accordance with the Constitution. It is
absolutely essential in the adolescent life of our Republic to insist, strictly
and uncompromisingly, on thedemocratic principles consecrated in our
Constitution. By such efforts alone can we insure the future of our
political life as a republican form of government under the sovereignty of
a Constitution from being a mockery.
The situation now in this Court is this — there are four members who
believe that there was no quorum in respondent's election as against four
other member who believe that there was such quorum. Two members
declined to render their opinion on the matter because of their refusal to
assume jurisdiction. And, one member is absent from the Philippines.
Thus, the question of whether or not respondent has been legally elected
is, to say the least, doubtful in this Court under the present conditions.
This doubt, which taint the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other
measures that the Cuenco group has passed and may pass in the future,
can easily be dispelled by them by convening a session wherein thirteen
senators are present and by reiterating therein all that has been
previously done by them. This is a suggestion coming from a humble
citizen who is watching with a happy heart the movement of this gallant
group of prominent leaders campaigning for a clean and honest
government in this dear country of ours.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
In these quo warranto proceedings the question as to who among the
parties is entitled to hold the position of President of the Senate is in
issue.
There is no question that up to Monday, February 21, 1949, at the time
the controversial incidents took place, petitioner Jose Avelino was rightful
occupant of the position. the litigation has arisen because of the opposing
contentions as to petitioner's outer and as to respondent's election as
acting President of the Senate, on February 21, 1949.
Petitioner contends that the proceedings in which a resolution was
passed declaring the position of President of the Senate vacant and
electing respondent Mariano J. Cuenco as acting President of the Senate
were illegal because, at the time, the session for said day has been
properly adjourned, and the twelve Senators who remained in the
session hall had no right to convene in a rump session, and said rump
session lacked quorum, while respondent contents that the session which
was opened by petitioner had not been legally adjournment, the Senators
who remained in the session hall had only continued the same session,
and there was quorum when the position of the President of the Senate
was declared vacant and when respondent was elected as acting
President of Senate, to fill the vacate position.
Petitioner's version of the facts, as alleged in his petition, is to the effect
that on Monday, February 21, 1949, at the time petitioner opened the
session in the Senate session hall, there were twenty two Senators
present who answered the roll call; Vicente J. Francisco. Fernando
Lopez, Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun,
Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio
Arranz, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Tañada, Vicente
Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon
Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag, and the petitioner Jose
Avelino. While the minutes of the preceding session was being read the
crowd of more than 1,000 people who entered the Senate hall to witness
the session, became unruly, the repeated efforts of petitioner as well as
the sergeant-at-arms and other peace officers to maintain peace and
order notwithstanding. Fights and commotions ensued and several shots
were fired among the audience. The Senator who spoke could not be
heard because the spectators would either shout to drown their voices or
would demeans that some other Senator should take the floor and be
recognized by petitioner. Pandemonium reigned and it was impossible for
the Senate to proceed with its deliberations free from undue pressure
and without grave danger to its integrity as a body and to the personal
safety of the members thereof. Senator Pablo Angeles David moved for
adjournment until Thursday, February 24, 1949. There being no
objection, petitioner adjourned the session until February 24, 1949.
Thereupon petitioner and nine other Senator namely, Vicente J.
Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David,
Sulipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enriquez Magalona, Carlos Tan, and
Olegario Clarin left the session hall. Senator Melencio Arranz, President
Pro-Tempore of Senate, went up the rostrum and, assuming the
presidency of the chamber, convinced the remaining twelve Senators into
a rump session, in which a resolution was passed declaring vacant the
position of the President of the Senate and electing respondent as
President of the Senate. Thereupon respondent pretended to assume the
office of president of the Senate and continues to pretend to assume said
office.
Petitioner alleged five grounds to claim that respondent is usurping or
illegally exercising the office of the President of the Senate: 1. Petitioner
had adjourned the session of the senate, the adjournment having been
properly moved and, without objection, favorably acted upon; 2.
Petitioner had full power to adjourn the session even without motion
under chapter II, Section 8, paragraph (e) of the Rules of the Senate; 3
The ordinary daily session having been adjourned, no other session
could be called in the Senate on the same day; 4 The President Pr-
tempore had no authority to assume the presidency except in the cases
specified in Chapter I, section 4 of the Rule of the Senate, and none of
the conditions therein mentioned obtained at the time in question; and 5.
The twelve Senators that convened in the rump session did not constitute
a quorum to do business under the Constitution and the rule of the
Senate, being less than one-half plus one of the twenty four members of
the Senate.
Respondent's version of the events as follows:
(a) Since Friday, February 18, 1949, when Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada
announced and reserved in open session of the Senate that on Monday,
February 21, 1949, he would make use of his one-hour privilege, it was
known that formal charges would be filed against the then Senate
President, petitioner in this case, on said date. Hours before the opening
of the session on Monday, February 21, 1949, Senators Lorenzo M.
Tañada and Prospero Sanidad registered in the Office of the secretary of
the Senates a resolution in which serious charges were preferred against
the herein petitioner. A certified copy of said resolution, marked as
Exhibit "1" is hereto attacked and made an integral part hereof:
(b) Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were
at the Senate session hall at and before 10:00 A.M., schedule time for
the session to begin, and in spite of the fact that the petitioner was
already in his office, said petitioner deliberately delayed his appearance
at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M.;
(c) When finally the petitioner ascended the rostrum, he did not
immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary
a copy of the resolution submitted by Senator Tañada and Sanidad and
in the presence of the public the petitioner read slowly and carefully said
resolution, after which he called and conferred with his followers,
Senators Francisco and Tirona;
(d) Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requested of Senators
Sanidad and Cuenco that the session be opened, the petitioner finally
called the meeting to order;
(e) Senator Sanidad, following a practice long established in the Senate,
moved that the roll call be dispensed with as it was evident that with the
presence of all the 22 senator who could discharges their functions, there
could be no question of a quorum, but Senator Tirona opposed said
motion, evidently in pursuance of a premeditated plan and conspiracy of
petitioner and his followers to make use of all sorts of dilatory tactics to
prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his privilege speech on the
charges filed against petitioner. The roll call affirmatively showed the
presence of the following 22 Senators; Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando
Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun,
Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio
Arranz, M. Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo M. Tañada,
Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia,
Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag and Jose
Avelino;
(f) Senator Sanidad next moved, as in the usual practice, to dispense
with the reading of the minute, but this motion was likewise opposed by
senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned conspiracy;
(g) Before and after the roll call before and after the reading of the
minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly took the floor to claim his right to
deliver his one-hour privilege speech in support of the charges against
petitioner, but the latter, then presiding, continually ignored him; and
when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being
recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would being
previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the antics of his
follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously and vociferously shouting
at Senator Sanidad "Out of order! Out of order! Out of order! . . .,"
everything the latter would ask the petitioner to recognized the right of
Senator Tañada to speak.
(h) At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate
gallery, as if by prearrangement, but the police officers present were able
to maintain order. No shots were fired among the audience, as alleged in
the petition. It was at about this same time that Senator Pablo Angeles
David, one of petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he
moved for adjournment of the session, evidently again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy to prevent Senator Tañada from
speaking;
(i) Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the
session and this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who
moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote;
(j) Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein
respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and again
moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote;
(k) Suddenly, the petitioner abandoned the Chair and hurriedly walked
out of the session hall.
(l) Without the session being adjournment, Senators David, Tirona,
Francisco,Torres, Magalona, and Clarin followed the petitioner out of the
session hall, while the rest of the senators, as afore-named in sub-
paragraph (e) hereof, remained to continue the session abandoned by
petitioner, whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, as Senate Pro-tempore,
took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
(m) Senator Cabili took the floor and delivered a speech, whereby he
asked that it be made of record — as it was in so made — that the
deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent
upon SenatePresident Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members
of the Senate to continue the session in order not to impede and paralyze
the functions of the Senate;
(n) Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that
respondent be designated to preside over the session, which suggestion
was carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the Chair.
(o) Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was carried unanimously,
Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary, as the Assistance
Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner
when the latter abandoned the session;
(p) Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally
able to deliver his privilege speech, Which took more than hours, on the
charges against the petitioner contained in the Resolution, attacked
hereto as Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration and
approval ofsaid Resolution. Senator Sanidad reiterated this motion, after
having firstread aloud the complete text of said Resolution, and thereafter
the same was unanimously approved;
(q) With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the
Chair, after the respondent had yield edit to him, Senator Sanidad
introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the
position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable
Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate," a copy of which
is herewith attacked and made an integral part hereof as Exhibit "2". Put
a vote, the said Resolutionwas unanimously approved, respondent
having abstained from voting;
(r) The respondent having been duly elected as Acting President of the
Senate, immediately took his oath of Office in open session, before
Senate President Pro-Tempore Melencio Arranz, and since then, has
been discharging the duties and exercising the rights and prerogatives
appertaining to said office;
(s) From the allegation of the petition, it clearly appears that the petitioner
had only nine senators in his favor and twelve, decidedly against him,
which fact negates the petitioner's assertion that there was no opposition
to the motion for adjournment submitted by Senator David;
(t) From the beginning of the session of February 21, 1949, to the
allegedadjournment, it was evidently and manifestly the purpose of the
petitioner to deprive Senator Tañada of his right to take the floor and to
speak on the charges filed against said petitioner; that said petitioner
resorted to all means to deprive the Senate of its right and prerogative to
deliberate on Senate Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and that when the
petitioner realized that a majority of the Senator who were present in the
said session was ready to approved said resolution, the petitioner
abandoned the session;
(u) The minute of the session held on February 21, Exhibit 1949, a copy
of which is hereto attacked and made an integral part hereof as Exhibit
"3", show that the petitioner illegally abandoned the Chair while the
Senate was in session and that the respondent has been duly elected
Acting Senate President in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
Respondent alleges further that Senator David's motion for adjournment
was objected to and not submitted to a vote and, therefore, could not
have been carried; that it is not true that petitioner had the power to
adjourn the session even without motion; that the session presided over,
first by petitioner and then by respondent, was orderly, no Senator having
been threatened or intimidated by anybody, and after petitioner
abandoned the session continued peacefully until its adjournment at 4:40
P.M.; that there was only one session held on said date; that petitioner's
abandonment of the Chair in the face of an impending ouster therefrom
constituted a temporaryincapacity entitling the Senate President Pro-
tempore to assume the Chair; that there was quorum as, with the
absence of Senator Tomas Confessor, whowas in the U. S. and of
Senator Vicente Sotto, who was seriously ill and confined in the Lourdes
Hospital, the presence of at least twelve senators constitutes a quorum;
that, despite petitioner's claim that he adjourned the session to February
24, 1949, convinced that he did not count with the majority of the
Senators and not wanting to be investigated by the specialinvestigation
committee regarding the grave charges preferred against him, the
petitioner deliberately did not appear at the session hall on said date.
Three special defenses are advanced by respondent: (a) Lack of
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; (b) No cause of action as there are
only nine Senators who had recognized petitioner's claim against twelve
Senators or who have madepatent their loss of confidence in him by
voting in favor of his out ouster; and (c) The object of the action is to
make the supreme Court a mere tool of a minority group of ten Senators
to impose petitioner's will over and above that of the twelve other
members of the Senate, to entrench petitionerin power.
In impugning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, respondent contends
that the present case is not justiciable, because it involves a purely
political question, the determination of which by the Senate is binding and
conclusiveupon the court (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 43 Phil., 83;
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192) respondent has been recognized as
acting President of the Senate by the President of the Philippines and
said recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts
(Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil., 87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil.,
366); the Senate is the only body that can determine from time to time
who shall be its President and petitioner's only recourse lies in said body;
and this Court's action in entertaining the petition would constitute an
invasion and an encroachment upon the powers, rights and prerogatives
solely and exclusively appertaining to Congress, of which the Senate is a
branch.
Upon the conflicting claims of the parties as to the real events, this Court
authorized the reception of evidence. Before passing to consider and to
weigh said evidence so as to determine the true events, it is only logical
that we should first pass upon the question of jurisdiction raised by
respondent.
In attacking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court respondent alleges, as
first ground, that the present controversy is not justiciable in nature,
involving, as it does, a purely political question, the determination of
which by the political agency concerned, the Senate, is binding and
conclusive on the courts.
The contention is untenable. In the first place, it begs question. It
assumes as premises that the question has been determined by the
Senate, when the two opposing parties claim that each one of them
represents the will of the Senate, and if the controversy should be
allowed to remainunsettled, it would be impossible to determine who is
right and who is wrong, and who really represent the Senate.
The question raised in the petition, although political in nature, are
justiciable because they involve the enforcement of legal precepts, such
as the provisions of the Constitution and of the rules of the Senate.
Thepower and authority to decided such questions of law form part of the
jurisdiction, not only expressly conferred on the Supreme Court, but of
which, by express prohibition of the Constitution, it cannot be divested.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various court, but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of
its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of the
court may provide, final judgment and decrees of inferior courts in
—
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
law, ordinance or regulations is in question.
(2) All case involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment,
or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
 (3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.
(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment.
(5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.
Because the legal questions raised in this case cannot be decided
without decided also what is the truth on the controversial facts, by the
very natureof things, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reached the
settlement of the conflict claims as to the real events.
Respondent alleges that he has been recognized by the President of the
Philippines as acting President of the Senate and that executive
recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts. The contention is
erroneous. The actions of the President of the Philippines cannot deprive
the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction vested in it by the Constitution. If
the Congress of the Philippines, in which the Legislature power is vested,
cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to decide questions
of law, much less canthe president of the Philippines, on whom is vested
the Executive power, which in the philosophical and political hierarchy is
of subordinate category to the of the Legislative power, do so. The power
to enact laws is higher than the power to execute them.
The third argument of argument of respondent, although based on truth,
has nothing to do with the legal questions raised in this case. It is true
that the Senate is the only body that can determine from time who is and
shall be its President, but when the legal questions are raised in a
litigation likein the present case, the proper court has the function, the
province and the responsibility to decide them. To shirk that responsibility
is to commit a dereliction of official duty.
Finally, it is alleged that for this Court to entertain the petition, is invade
and encroach upon the powers, rights and prerogatives solely and
exclusively appertaining to the Legislative Department, of which the
Senate is a branch. The contention is erroneous. The controversy as to
thelegality of the adjournment declared by petitioner, of petitioner's
ousters, as a result of the resolution declaring vacant the position of
President of the Senate, or respondent's election as acting President of
the Senate, and as to whether or not the twelve Senators who remained
in the session hall could continue holding session and if they
constitute quorum, are all legal question upon which courts of justice
have jurisdiction and the SupremeCourt is the final arbiter.
From the evidence, it appears that in the session of Friday, February 18,
1949, at the time the resolution of confidence in favor of petitioner,
introduced by the Senator Lopez, was being put to vote, Senator Tañada
voted,Senator Tañada voted in the negative, alleging as ground
damaging facts, supported by several checks, highly detrimental to the
personal and officialhonesty of petitioner. At the same time, Senator
Tañada announced his intention of filing in the next session, to be held
on Monday, February 21, 1949, formal charges against petitioner and of
delivering during the so-called privilege hour a speech in support of said
charges.
On said Monday morning, hour before the opening of the ordinary daily
session, Senator Tañada and Sanidad registered with the Secretary of
the Senate a resolution for the appointment of a Committee of three,
composed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David, and Mabanag, with
instructed to proceed immediately to investigate the serious charges
against petitioner embodiedin the document.
Said resolution, marked as Exhibit 1 of the respondent's answer, is as
follow:
RESOLUTION ORDERING THE INVESTIGATION OF
CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SENATE PRESIDENT, JOSE
AVELINO.
WHEREAS, Senate President Jose Avelino, in a caucus of high
government officials of the Philippines Government and leaders
of the Liberal Partyheld at Malacañang palace on January 15,
1949, delivered a speech,wherein he advocated the protection,
or, at least, tolerance, of graft and corruption in the government,
and placed the interest of grafters and corrupt officials as
supreme and above the welfare of the people, doctrine under
which it is impossible for an honest and clean governmentto exist;
WHEREAS, this speech of Senate President Jose Avelino was
given wide publicity by the press, especially the Chronicle
Publication in their issues of January 16 and 18, 1949, as follows:
The senate President defenses the abuses perpetrated by Liberal
Party men. He called the investigations of the surplus property
commission irregularities and the immigration quota scadal as
acts of injustice he describe the probe as "criminal" and "odious."
He flayed the National Bureau of Investigation agents for
persecuting Liberal party leaders.
"We are not angels", he said. "When we die we all go to hell. It is
better to be in hell because in that place are no investigations, no
secretary of justice, no secretary of interior to go after us."
Avelino, who is the present President of the Liberal party,
ensured the President for his actuations which, he claimed, were
mainly responsible for the division of the party into two hostile
camps.
Avelino asked the President to "tolerate" if he could not "permit",
the abuse of the party in power, because why should we be
saints when in reality we are not?
He stressed that the present investigation being conducted by
President Quirino on the surplus property scandal and the
immigration quota rackety has lowered the prestige of the Liberal
Party in the eyes of the people, and is a desecration to the
memory of the late President Manuel Roxas. "It is a crime against
the Liberal Party", Avelino said.
Defining his attitude regarding rights and privileges of those who
are in power in the government, Avelino maintained that the
Liberal Party men are entitled to more considerations and should
be given allowance to use the power and privilege. If they abuse
their power as all humans are prone to do, they will be given a
certain measure of tolerance, Avelino said, adding, "What are we
in power for?"
Avelino cited the surplus property investigations as an attempt to
besmear the memory of Presidential Roxas. As a result of these
investigations, the members of Congress are subjected to unjust
and embarrassing questioning by NBI, Avelino said. And what is
worse is the fact that these senators and representatives are
being pilloried in public without formal charges filed against them.
(Manila Chronicle issue of Jan. 16, 1949).
At last Saturday night's caucus Senate President Avelino
for two hours lectured to President Quirino on Liberal
Party discipline. At the same time he demanded
"tolerance" on the part of the Chief Executive by the party
in power.
The investigations were conducted on vague charges,
Avelino claimed. Nothing specific has teen filed against
atop Liberal Party man. And yet National Bureau of
Investigation agents have persecuted top leader of the
LiberalParty. That is not justice. That is injustice. . . . It
isodious. . . . It is criminal.
Why did you have to order an investigation Honorable Mr.
President? If you cannot permit abuses, you must at
leasttolerate them. What are we in power for? We are not
hypocrites. Why should we pretend to be saints when in
realitywe are not? We are not angels. And besides when
we die we all go to hell. Anyway, it is preferable to go to
hell wherethere are no investigations, no Secretary of
Justice, no Secretary of Interior to go after us.
When Jesus died on the Cross. He made a distinction
between a good crook and the bad crooks. We can
prepare to be good crooks.
Avelino related the story of St. Francis of Assisi. Athief
sought sanctuary in St. Francis' convent. When
thesoldiers came to the convent and ordered St. Francis
to produce the wanted thief, St. Francis told the soldiers
that thehunted man had gone the other way.
Avelino then pointed out that even a saint had condoned
the sins of a thief.
xxx xxx xxx
The investigation ordered by President Quirino, Avelino
said, was a desecration of the memory of the late
President Roxas. The probe has lowered, instead of
enhanced, the prestige of the Liberal Party and its leader
in the eyes of the public.
If the present administration fails, it is Roxas and not
Quirino that suffers by it, because Quirino's administration
is only a continuation of Roxas, Avelino said.
 Avelino compared all political parties to business
corporations, of which all members are stockholders.
Every year the Liberal Party makes an accounting of its
loss profit. The Liberal Party, he said, has practically no
dividends at all. It has lost even its original capital. Then
he mentionedthe appointments to the government of
Nacionalistas like: Lino Castillejo,as governor of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Nicanor Carag,
consulto Madrid; and Vicente Formoso, General Manager
of the National Tabacco Corporation."(Manila Chronicle
issue of January 18, 1949.).
WHEREAS, after the first publication of the said speech in the
Manila Chronicle issue of January 16, 1949, the Senate
President, in a letter to the said news report was a "maliciously
distorted presentation of my remarks at that caucus, under a
tendentious headlines", and threatened that "unless the proper
redness is given to me, therefore, I shall feel compelled to take
the necessary steps to protect my reputation and good name";
WHEREAS, the Chronicle Publication not only refuse to retract or
make the rectification demanded by the Senate President, but on
the contrary, in their issue of January 18, 1949, challenged him to
take his threatened action, stating that "in order to est abolished
the truth, we are inviting the Senate President to file a libel suit
against the Chronicle" and further repeated the publication of
their reports on the Senate President speech in the same issue of
January 18, 1949 as quoted above;
WHEREAS, notwithstanding in the considerable length of time
that has elapsed, the Senate President has not carried out his
threat of filing action against the Chronicle Publication, thereby
confirming, in effect, his doctrine of tolerance of graft and
corruption;
WHEREAS, in open and public session of the Senate on
February 18, 1949, there were exhibited photostatic copies of four
checks totalling P566,405.60, which appears to have come into
the possession and control of the Senate President, after he had
assumed his office;
WHEREAS, the first of the aforesaid check, which is Manager's
Check No. M5375 of the National City Bank of the National City
Bank of New York, drawn on September 24, 1946, in favor of the
Senate President in the amount of P312,500.00, was indorsed by
him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her
current account with the Philippine National Bank on October 26,
1946;
WHEREAS, the second of the aforesaid checks, which is
Manager's Check No. 49706 of the Nederlands Indische
Handelsbank, drawn on October 21, 1946, in favor of the Senate
President in the amount of P196,905.60, was indorsedby him to
his son, Mr. Jose Avelino, Jr., who cashed it October 22, 1946;
WHEREAS, the third of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No.
37262 of the Nederlandsch Indische Handelsbank, drawn on
October 23,1946 by Chung Liu Ching Long & Co., Ltd., a Chinese
concern, in favor of "cash", in the amount of P10,000.00, was
indorsed by the Senate President to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C.
Avelino, who deposited it in her Saving Account No. 63436 with
the Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, the fourth of the aforesaid checks, which is Check
No. 37268 of the Nederlandsch Indische Handelsbank, drawn by
the aforementioned Chinese concern, Chiung Liu Ching Long and
Co., Ltd., in the amount of P47,500.00 in favor of the Senate
President, was indorsed by him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C.
Avelino, who deposited it in her current account with the
Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, of the four checks aforementioned, the one for
P196,905.60 was cashed by the Senate President's son, Jose
Avelino, Jr., on October 22, 1946; while of the three other checks
totalling P370,000.00 which was deposited by the Senate
President's wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, in her saving and
current accounts with the Philippines National Bank on October
26, 1946, P325,000.00 were withdraw by her on same day;
WHEREAS, in the course of the speech delivered by the Senate
President on the floor of the Senate on February 18, 1946, in an
attempt to explain the foregoing checks, he refused to be
interpolated on the same, and his explanation lacked such details
and definiteness that it left many doubts unsettled;
WHEREAS, in the case of the check for P312,500.00 the Senate
President explanation that the same represented proceeds from
the sale of surplus beer to cover party obligation is directly
contradicted by the source of the same, Ching Ban Yek, who
declared under oath before the Horilleno Investigating Committee
that the said sum of P312,500.00 had been loaned byhim to the
Senate President, who repaid the same within ten days;
WHEREAS, it appears that during the period from December 29,
1945 to April 30, 1948, deposits totalling P803,865.45 were made
in the current account of the Senate President's wife Mrs.
Enriqueta C. Avelino, in the Philippine National Bank, of which
amount P6,204.86 were deposited before his election to office
and the sum of P797,660.59 was deposited after his election;
WHEREAS, the tax returns of the Senate President do not bear
explanation madein his speech of February 18, 1949 to the effect
that he and his wife had made substantial amounts in commercial
transaction in shoes and liquor;
WHEREAS, in his said speech of February 18, 1949, the Senate
President said that "en politica todo vale", and that inasmuch as
the Nacionalistas were prone to commit frauds, it was right for the
Liberals to commit frauds in the electionsto even up with frauds
committed by the opposition;
WHEREAS, the said speech of February 18, 1949 delivered by
the SEnate President justified the commission of electoral frauds,
which justification is a direct attack on the sovereignty of the
people and may be a cause of unrest or resolution;
WHEREAS, the senate President, as ex-officio Chairman of the
Commission on Appointments which passes upon all Presidential
appointment, including thoseto the judiciary, has abused the
prerogatives of his office by seeking in several instances to
interfere with and influence some judge in decidingcase pending
before, thereby imperilling the independence of the judiciaryand
jeopardizing the impartial administration of justice;
WHEREAS, the honor, dignity and prestige of the people and of
the membersof the Senate demand a through, impartial and
immediate investigation of allforegoing; Now, therefore,
1 Be it resolved, To appoint, as they are hereby appointed
2 Committee of three (3) members of this Senate, to be
com
3 posed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David and
Mabanag, who
4 shall immediately proceed to investigate the charges
mentioned
5 above, with full powers to compel the attendance of
witnesses
6 and the production of books of account, documents,
and other
7 evidence, and to utilized the facilities and the services
of such
8 personnel of this Senate as it may deem necessary,
with in
9 structions to render its report and recommendations to
the
10 Senate on or before Friday, February 25, 1949.
Adopted, February 21, 1949.
Although a sufficient number of Senators to constitute quorum were
already present in said morning at and before 10:00 o'clock, the schedule
time for the daily session to begin, the session was not then opened,
because petitioner failed to appear in the hall until about 11:35, the time
petitioner ascended the rostrum where, instead of calling the meeting to
order, he asked for a copy of the resolution introduced by the Senators
Tañada and Sanidad and, after reading it slowly, he called to his side
Senators Angeles David and Tirona and conferred with them.
Only after the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that
thesession be opened, that petitioner called the meeting to order shortly
before 12:00 o'clock noon.
Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with. Senator
Tirona opposed the motion and the roll call showed the presence of the
following twenty two Senators: Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez,
Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon
Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz,
Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Tañada, Vicente
Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon
Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Manag and Jose Avelino.
Senator Sanidad again moved that the reading of the minutes be
dispersed with, but the motion was again opposed by Senator Tirona
whose opposition was joined by Senator Angeles David, and the reading
of the minutes proceeded.
Senator Tañada repeated took the floor to floor to claim his right to
deliver his one-hour privilege speech in support of the charges against
petitioner,pursuant to the announcement he made in the session of
February 18, 1949; he did it before and after the roll call and the reading
of the minutes. he wasignored by the Chair and petitioner announced that
he would order the arrestof any Senator who speak without having been
previously recognized by him.Senator Sanidad requested the Chair to
recognized the right of Senator Tañada to speak, and every time he
would make the request, Senator Tirona would oppose him upon the
ground that the requests were out of order.
Meanwhile, commotion and disorder took place in the Senate gallery.
Shout were heard from individuals of the audience, where two fist fight
took place. The detonation of a gun shot was heard from outside.
Senator Angeles David, after being recognized by the Chair, moved for
adjournment of the session. The motion was objected by Senator Cuenco
who, at the same time, moved thatthe motion be submitted to vote.
Petitioner, instead of submitting to vote the motion to adjourn, banged the
gavel and declared the session adjourned until next Thursday, February
24, 1949, and, thereupon, left the session hall followed by the nine
Senators (Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona,
Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique
Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin), supporting him. Twelve
SEnator, respondent and his eleven supporters, remained in the session
hall. Senator Arranz, President Pro-tempore of the SEnate, ascended the
rostrum,and called those Senators present to order. Senator Mabanag
raised the question of quorum and the question of quorum and the
President Pro-tempore ordered a roll call, to which all the twelve Senators
remaining in the sessionhall answered.
The President Pro-tempore declared the presence of quorum and those
presentproceeded to continue transacting business. Senator Cabili took
an made it of record that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by
petitioner made it incumbent upon the Senate President Pro-tempore and
those remainingmembers of the Senate to continue the session in order
not to impede and paralyze the functions of the Senate. Senator Arranz
suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session
and the suggestion was carried unanimously and respondent took the
Chair.
Senator Tañada delivered his privilege speech, which took two hours on
the charge against petitioner contained in Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1",
and moved for the immediate consideration and approval of said
resolution, thecomplete text of which was read. The motion was
seconded by Senator Sanidad, and the resolution was unanimously
approved. Respondent yielded the Chair to the President Pro-tempore
and Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.67, Exhibit "2", which
read as follows:
RESOLUTION DECLARING VACANT THE POSITION OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND DESIGNATING THE HONORABLE
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO ACTING PRESIDENT OFTHE SENATE.
Resolved by the Senate in session assembled, That
a quorum exists; that the Honorable Jose Avelino, President of
the Senate having abandoned the chair, his position is hereby
declared vacant; and that, the Honorable Mariano JesusCuenco
of Cebu, designated Acting President of the SEnate, until further
orders from this Body.
Adopted, February 21, 1949.
The resolutions unanimously approved, with respondent abstaining from
voting. Pursuant to said resolution, respondent took his oath of office
inopen session before President Pro-Tempore Arranz and has started,
since then,to discharge the duties, rights and privileges of acting
President of theSenate.
The above recital of facts is based on our findings on the evidence on
record. From the said facts we believe the following conclusions are
unavoidable.
1. The adjournment declared by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.
2. After petitioner and the 9 Senators supporting him had walked out from
the session hall, the Senate could not continue holding session and
transact business for lack of quorum.
In the following discussion we will express the reasons in support of the
above conclusions.
ILLEGAL ADJOURNMENT
A motion to adjourn has the highest precedence when a question is
under debate and, with certain restriction, it has the highest privilege
under all other conditions. Under parliamentary practice, even questions
of privilege and the motion to reconsider yield to it. The motion to adjourn
may be made after the "yeas'' and "nays" are ordered and before the roll
call has begun, before reading of the journal. The motion is not debatable
and, after the motion is made, neither another motion nor an appeal may
intervene before the taking of the vote.
The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative
chamber. It cannot be exercised by any single individual, without
usurpation of the collective prerogatives. It is too tremendous a power to
be wieldedby a single individual. The functions of the Senate and its
opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of
a single individual without jeopardizing the high purposes for which a
legislative deliberative body is established in a democratic social order.
Single-handedindividual discretion on the matter may not mean anything
other than placing the legislative chamber under a unipersonal tyranny.
There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly
or impliedly authorizes an adjournment without the consent of the body or
one which authorizes the presiding officer to decree motu proprio said
adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in
thiscountry and in the United States of America, upon which ours is
patterned, would not authorize the existence of such a provision.
Petitioner alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of
Senator Angeles David to said effect was properly made and met with no
objection. If this version of the facts is true, then it was right for petitioner
to declare the adjournment, because the absence of anyobjection,
provided the motion was properly made and the other Senators after
having been properly apprised of the motion, did not object to it, was an
evidence of an implied consent of all the members. The evidence,
however, fails to support petitioner's claim.
We are inclined to consider respondent's version to be more in
consonance with truth. We are of opinion that the motion to adjourn was
actually objected to. Senator Tañada was bent on delivering a speech he
had ready onthe charges embodied in a resolution fathered by himself
and by Senator Sanidad, which both filed early in the morning, long
before the session was opened. The formulation of said charges had
been announced days before,since the session of Friday, February 18,
1949, when he showed photostatic copies of some checks as basis of a
part of the charges to be filed. In said Friday session respondent's group
suffered defeat on the approval of the resolution of confidence fathered
by Senator Lopez. And it is understandable that respondent's group of
Senators, believing themselves to constitute the majority, did not want to
waste any time to give a showing of said majority and must have decided
to depose petitioner as soon as possible to wrestfrom him the Senate
leadership that upon democratic principles rightly belongs to them.
As a showing of eagerness to hurry up the unfolding events that would
give them the control of the Senate, Senator Sanidad moved to dispense
with the roll call and the reading of the minutes, and had been requesting
that Senator Tañada be recognized to take the floor. Senator Tañada
himself made attempts to deliver his speech.
Evidently, petitioner and his supported decided to adopt a blocking
strategyto obstruct the process that would give due course to the
investigationof the serious charges made in resolution No. 68, Exhibit 1,
and wouldeffect petitioner's ouster as President of the Senate.
This strategy is evidence by the belated appearance of petitioner and his
supporters at the session hall and petitioner's procrastination in opening
the session, by taking all his time in reading first the Tañada and Sanidad
resolution, formulating charges against him, and conferring with Senators
Angeles David and Tirona and in not calling to order the members of the
Senate before Senator's Cuenco and Sanidad began urging that the
session beopened.
Petitioner's allegation that, even without motion from any member, he
could adjourn the session under the rules of the Senate, is not well taken.
There is nothing in the rules of the Senate giving petitioner such
authority. Theprovisions quoted in the petition authorizes the Senate
President to take measures to stop disorder, but that power does not
include the one to adjourn.
The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and
the walk out of the petitioner and his supporters from the session hall had
the purpose of defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed
investigation of the charges against petitioner and of his impedingouster,
by the decisive votes of respondent's group of Senators.
The adjournment decreed by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.
QUORUM
There is no controversy that at the session in question there were
present in the session hall only twelve Senators, those composing
respondent's group, and this fact had been ascertained by the roll call
ordered by President Pro-tempore Arranz, after Senator Mabanag had
raised the question of quorum.
The Constitution provides:
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner
and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10,
Sub-sec. 2 Article VI.)
The majority mentioned in the above provision cannot be other than the
majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words "each House" in
the above provision refer to the full membership of each chamber of
Congress.
The Senate was and actually is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority
of them cannot be less than thirteen. Twelve is only half of twenty-four.
Nowhere and at no time has one-half even been the majority. Majority
necessarily has to be more than one-half.
We have heard with interest the arguments advanced by respondent's
counsel, premised on the fact that the above constitutional provision does
not use the words "of the members" and the theory of the amicus
curiae that themajority mentioned in the Constitution refers only to the
majority of the members who can be reached by coercive processes.
There is, however, nothing in said arguments that can validly change the
natural interpretation of theunmistakable wordings of the Constitution.
"Majority of each House" can mean only majority of the members of each
House, and the number of said members cannot be reduced upon any
artificial or imaginary basis not authorized by the context of the
Constitution itself or by the sound processes of reason.
For all the foregoing, we conclude that:
1. The legal and constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in this case,
notwithstanding their political nature and implications, are justiciable and
within the jurisdiction expressly conferred to the Supreme Court, which
cannot be divested from it by express prohibition of the Constitution.
Should there be analogous controversy between two claimants to the
position of the President of the Philippines, according to the Solicitor
General, one of the attorneys for respondent, the Supreme Court would
have jurisdiction to decide the controversy, because it would raise a
constitutional question. Whether there was a quorum or not in the
meeting of twelve Senators in whichrespondent was elected acting
President of the Senate, is a question that call for the interpretation,
application and enforcement of an express and specific provision of the
Constitution. Should the two absent Senators comeand attend the
session and side with the petitioner's group, it is agreed that the Senate
will be kept at a stand still, because of the deadlock resulting from twelve
Senators, each group supporting petitioner's and respondent's opposing
claims to the position of President of the Senate. Admitting that pressure
of public opinion may not break the impasse, it hasbeen suggested from
respondent's side that it may invite revolution. Between the two
alternatives, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and revolution, there is
only one choice possible, and that is the one in consonance with the
Constitution, which is complete enough to offer orderly remedies for any
wrong committed within the framework of democracy it established in this
country. Should this Supreme Court refuse to exercise jurisdiction in this
case,such refusal can only be branded as judicial abdication, and such
shirking of official responsibility cannot expect acquittal in the judgment of
history. The gravity of the issues involved in this case, affecting not only
the upper branch of Congress, but also the presidential succession as
provided by Republic Act No. 181, is a challenge to our sense of duty
which we should not fail to meet.
2. The adjournment decreed by petitioner of the Monday session, without
the authority of the Senate, was illegal and, therefore, null and void.
3. The rump session held by twelve Senators, the respondent and his
supporters, after petitioner and his nine supporters had walked out from
the session hall, had no constitutional quorum to transact business.
4. The resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the
Senate and choosing respondent as acting President of the Senate, has
been adopted in contravention of the Constitution for lack of quorum. The
fact that respondent has been designated only as acting President of the
Senate, a position not contemplated by the Constitution or by Republic
Act No. 181 on presidential succession, so much so that his position in
acting capacity, according to his own counsel, would not entitle
respondent to Succeedto the position of the President of the Philippines,
emphasizes the invalidity of respondent's election.
Notwithstanding the importance of this case, the legal issues involved are
very simple, and it would not be hard to reach a prompt conclusion if we
could view the controversies with the attitude of a mathematician
tacklingan algebraic equation. Many considerations which, from the point
of view of laymen, of the press, of public opinion in general and the
people at large, may appear of great importance, such as who will wield
the power to control the Senate and whether or not petitioner is guilty of
the serious charges filed against him, are completely alien to the
questions that this Court must answer. The motives and motivations of
petitioner and respondent of their respective supporters in the Senate in
taking the moves upon which this case has arisen are their exclusive
business and should not be minded for the purposes of our decision.
The members of the Senate were and are free to depose petitioner and
to elect another Senator as president of the Senate, and their freedom to
make such change is subject only to the dictates of their own conscience
and to anyverdict that the people, through the electorate, may render at
the polls, and to the judgment of historians and posterity. But in making
such changes of leadership, the Senate and the Senators are bound to
follow the orderlyprocesses set and outlined by the Constitution and by
the rules adopted by the Senate as authorized by the fundamental law.
Any step beyond said legal bounds may create a legal issue which, once
submitted to the proper courts of justice, the latter cannot simply wash
their hands and ignore the issue upon the pretext of lack of jurisdiction,
adopting the indifferent attitude of a passerby who does not care whether
the lashing of the wind may causea live wire to ignite a neighboring
house.
When a Senator or a number of Senators come to the Supreme Court,
complaining that the President of the Senate has adjourned or is
adjourning the daily session of the Senate over and above objections
voiced from thefloor and without obtaining first the approval or consent of
the majority, we cannot close our eyes to the complaint or bury our heads
in the sand in ostrich fashion: Otherwise, we would be disregarding ours
sworn duty and,with our abstention or inaction, we would be printing the
stamp of our approval to the existence and continuation of a unipersonal
tyranny imposed upon the upper chamber of Congress, a tyranny that
may obstruct and defeat the functioning and actuations of the Senate
and, consequently, of the whole Congress, thus depriving the country of
the benefits of legislation.
When a member of the Senate comes to us complaining that he is being
deprived of the powers and prerogative of the position of President of the
Senate, to which he has been duly elected because twelve Senators,
without constituting a quorum, have illegally convened and voted to
depose him and to elect another Senator in his place, he raises a
constitutional question of momentous importance which we should not
fail to answer without betraying the official trust reposed on us. Such
complaint constitutes, in effect, an accusation of usurpation of authority
by the twelve Senators, in utter violation of the fundamental law. The
situation would demand ready and noother agency of government can
offer that remedy than the Supreme Court itself with whom the complaint
has been filed.
The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an indispensable
condition for effective collective action. Because a society or collective
body is composed of separate and independent individual units, it cannot
exist without the moral annectent of proper of organization and can
onlyact in organized form. Every time it has to act, it has to an organic
whole, and quorum here is the organizing element without which the
personality of the body cannot exist or be recognized. The importance of
such organizing element has been recognize by the members of our
Constitutional Convention, and that is the reason why they inserted in the
Constitution the provision requiring the existence of quorum for the
former National Assembly to transact official business and that
requirement was also imposed by the National Assembly when,
amending the Constitution, it voted itself out ofexistence, to be replaced
by a bicameral Congress. The requirement, both in the original text of the
Constitution and in the amendment, had been ratified by the sovereign
will of the people.
When we required a majority of a legislative chamber to constitute
a quorum we did it for mighty reasons, such as that democracy is based
on the rule of the majority and, to allow a quorum of less than the majority
of the members, one-half of them for example, as in the present
controversy, is to allow the anomalous and anarchic existence of two
independent bodies where the Constitution provides for only one. If the
twelve Senators of respondent's group constitute quorum to transact
official business, what willpreclude the twelve remaining Senators from
constituting themselves into a quorum to transact official business? This
is not impossible, should Senator Sotto decide to attend the session,
even if carried in a stretcher, and Senator Confesor returns from abroad
and sides with petitioner's group. Then there will be, in effect, two Senate
and, according to respondent's theory the Supreme Court will have no
jurisdiction to decide the conflict, and noone decide it except public
opinion or, in its failure, revolution. Such absurd situation and
catastrophic result should be avoided:
Lack of jurisdiction is sometimes a refuge behind which weak courts may
take shelter when afraid to displease the powerful.
Instead of disputing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this case,
everybody must congratulate himself because petitioner, instead of
resorting to any high-handed mean to enforce his right to continue
holding the positionof the President of the Senate, has come to us for
proper redress by the orderly by the orderly processes of judicial
settlement. Notwithstanding the fact that three year ago, he impugned the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and won his case on that ground — the
injustice then committedagainst the suspended Senators Vera, Diokno
and Romero now being more generally recognized — petitioner came to
this Court to submit his case to our jurisdiction.
The action taken by petitioner in filing his complaint with this Supreme
Court is premised on this sharing the conviction that said Tribunal is the
last bulwark of the rights and liberties of the people, the final arbiter on all
constitutional conflicts, and the ultimate redoubt of the majesty of the law.
That conviction and faith should not be betrayed, but rather strengthened,
and more imperatively nowadays when the majesty of the law, the basic
tenets of the Constitution, the principles of humanity springing fromthe
golden rule, which is the law of laws, are being the subject of bold
onslaughts from many elements of society, bent on taking justice in their
own hands or on imposing their will through fraud or violence. The
malady is widespread enough to imperatively and urgently demand a
more complete respect and faith in the effectiveness of our system of
administration of justice.
For the Supreme Court to renounce its jurisdiction in this case is to
disappoint the believers in a philosophy and social order based on
constitutional processes and on legal juridical settlement of all conflicts
that may beset a democracy. It has been said in the hearing of this case
that for this Court to refuse cognizance of it may not have other
alternative,if the pressure of public opinion may fail — and by experience
we know that it had suffered many failures — than revolution. This
immeasurable responsibilityof this Supreme Court if it should falter in the
performance of its plain duty and should dispose of this case with the
indifference with which a beach vacationist would dismiss a gust of wind.
The principle of separation of powers, so often invoked, to bind the hands
of justice into futility, should not be understood as absolute. It is an apt
rule of the tri-partite division of government as enunciated by Aristotle
and further developed by Montequieu, as the best scheme to put in
practice the system of check and balance considered necessary for a
workable democracy. To make absolute that principle is to open the
doors irretrievable absurdity and to create three separate governments
within a government and three independent states within a state. Indeed,
it is to avoid such a teratologiccreature that the Constitutional Convention
had not inserted among the principles embodied in the fundamental law.
Judicial determination of all constitutional or legal controversies is the
inherent function of courts. The Constitution of the United States of
America, unlike our own Constitution, is silent a to the power of courts of
justice to nullify an unconstitutional act of Congress. Notwithstanding the
silence, when the proper case arose, the United States Supreme Court,
under the wise leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, had not hesitated in
declaring null and void a law enacted in contravention of constitutional
provisions. The Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines should
not fail to match such and outstanding evidence of evidence of judicial
statesmanship.
To bolster the stand against our assumption of jurisdiction in this case the
theory has been advanced that, the President of the Philippines having
recognized respondent as a duly elected acting President of the Senate,
that recognition is final and should bind this Court. The theory sprouts
from the same ideology under which a former king of England tried to
order Lord Coke how the latter should dispose of a pending litigation. Our
answer is to paraphrase the great English judge by saying that nothing
should guide us except what in conscience we believe is becoming of our
official functions, disregarding completely what the President of the
Philippines may say or feel about it.
As a matter of fact, two pretenders may dispute the office. As in the
present case, Congress may split into two groups after a presidential
election and each group may proclaim a different candidate as the duly
elected Presidentof the Philippines. Because of a mistaken ideas to the
scope of the principle of separation of powers, if the case is brought to us
for decision, shall we, as Pontious Pilate, wash our hands and let the
people bleed and be crucifiedin the Calvary of revolution?
There is absolutely no merit in invoking the unfortunate decision in the
case of Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 1.92). No one now would regret more
that such a decision had been rendered than petitioner himself, the very
one whowon it upon the pusillanimous judicial theory of lack of
jurisdiction. The more said decision is forgotten, the better, it being one of
the blemishes without which the escutcheon of the post-liberation
Supreme Court would be spotless.
We vote to render judgment granting the petition and ordering
respondent to relinquish the powers, prerogative and privileges of the
position of the President of the Senate in favor of petitioner who, on the
other side, should be restrained from putting any obstacle or obstruction
by illegal adjournments or otherwise, in the holding of the, regular daily
session of the Senate. Said body should be allowed to continue
transacting official business unhampered by any procedure intended to
impede the free expressionof the will of the majority.
BRIONES, M., dissente:
Sin perjuicio de redactar una opinion mas extensa sobre mi voto en ese
asunto, me permito adelantar las siguientes observaciones:
(1) Esta Corte Suprema tiene jurisdiccion sobre el asunto. — Reafirmo la
posicion tomada por mi en los asuntos de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil.,
192) y Mabanag contra Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1). La cuestion constitutional
y legal aqui debatida no es de caracter puramente politico en el sentido
de que esta Corte deba inhibirse de enjuiciarla, sino que es
perfectamente justiciable. Se plantea la cuestion de si el grupo de
senadores que eligio al recurrido como presidente interino del Senado
tenia facultad para hacerlo. Se alega y se sostiene que no existia dicha
facultad, puesto que cuando dicho grupo se reunio no habia
un quorum presente de conformidad con los terminos de la Constitucion
y de los reglamentos del Senado. Esta cuestion es justiciable y puede y
debe ser enjuiciada, determinada y resuelta por esta Corte, ya que la
parte agraviada ha venido a nosotros en demanda de remedio. Esta
Corte no puede lavarse las manos en un ademan de inhibicion pilatista;
no puede continuar con la politica de esconde-cabeza-en la arena-del-
desierto estilo aveztruz. El issue constitucional y legal discutido es
importante, muy importante. Tiene repercusiones directas y vitalisimas
en la vida, libertad y hacienda de los ciudadanos. Es el negocio supremo
de legislar lo que esta en debate. Es, por tanto, una de las esencias de la
misma republica el tema de la controversia. La escaramuza politica es lo
de menos; el meollo juridico-constitucional es lo esencial e importante.
Es tanto mas urgente que esta Corte asuma jurisdiccion sobre el caso
cuanto que el conflicto surgido en el Senado entre los dos grupos
politicos en guerra ha cobrado las proporciones de una tremenda crisis
nacional, preñada de graves peligros para la estabilidad de nuestras
instituciones politicas, para el orden publico y para la integridad de la
existencia de la nacion.
Tenemos un precedente tipico en la jurisprudencia del Estado de New
Jersey, Estados Unidos de America. Es el caso de Werts vs. Rogers, del
año 1894, Atlantic Reporter, Vol. 28, p. 728, N. J. La analogia es
completa. Tambien se disputaban la presidencia del Senado dos
Senadores, cada cual pretendiendo ser al legitimo. Tambien hubo dos
facciones, cada cual reclamando ostentar la genuina representacion
popular. Un grupo se llamo "Adrian Senate" y el otro grupo "Rogers
Senate", por los nombres de los presidentes en disputa. Se arguyo
igualmente que la Corte Suprema de New Jersey no podia asumir
jurisdiccion sobre el caso por tratarse de una cuestion eminentemente
politica, por tanto no justiciable. La Corte, sin embargo, conocio del caso
y, por boca de su Presidente el eminente jurisconsulto Mr. Beasley, hizo
el siguiente categorico pronunciamiento:
. . . . That this court has the legal right to entertain jurisdiction in
this case, displayed by this record, we have no doubt; and we are
further of opinion that it is scarcely possible to conceive of any
crisis in public affairs that would more imperatively than the
present one call for the intervention of such judicial authority.
(supra, p. 758.)
Ademas de la justiciabilidad de la materia en controversia, una de las
principales razones invocadas por la Corte Suprema de New Jersey para
asumir jurisdiccion sobre el caso fue la extrema necesidad de resolver un
dead lock que paralizaba la maquinaria legislativa, afectaba a la
estabilidad del gobierno y ponia en grave peligro los intereses publicos.
Pregunto: no existe la misma razon de extrema necesidad en el presunto
caso? que duda cabe de que el conflicto entre las dos facciones en
nuestro Senado esta afectando seriamente a los intereses publicos? que
duda cabe de que la normalidad constitucional esta rota, con grave
preocupacion de todo el mundo y con grave daño de la tranquilidad
publica?
(2) El levantamiento de la sesion ordenado por el presidente Avelino fue
ilegal y arbitrario. — Estimo que el presidente Avelino obro ilegal y
arbitrariamente al ordenar el levantamiento de la sesion frente a la
oposicion firme, energica y tenaz de algunos senadores adversos a el.
En vista de esta oposicion, el deber de la Mesa era someter a votacion la
mocion de levantamiento de la sesion presentada por el Senador
Angeles David. Avelino no tenia el derecho, por si y ante si, de declarar
levantada la sesion. Solamente cuando no se formula ninguna objection
es cuando rutinariamente el presiding officer puede dar por aprobada
una mocion de levantamiento de la sesion. Si la facultad de levantar la
sesion no estuviera sujeta a la expresa voluntad de la mayoria, seria un
arma sumamente peligrosa en manos de un presidente despotico y
arbitrario.
La pretension de que el Senador Avelino ordeno el levantamiento de la
sesion en uso de sus facultades inherentes, en vista de que el mismo
creia que habia un peligro inminente de desorden y tumulto en la sala de
sesiones, es completamente insostenible. Las circunstancias del caso no
justifican semejante pretension, a tenor de las pruebas obrantes en
autos. Lo que debia haber hecho el Senador Avelino era tratar de
apaciguar al publico y prevenir todo conato de desorden. Tenia medios
para hacerlo. No lo hizo. En cambio, dejo la silla presidencial juntamente
con los senadores de su grupo. Esto equivalia a una desercion y los
senadores del otro grupo tenian perfecto derecho a proceder como
procedieron, quedandose en el salo para continuar celebrando la sesion.
Esta sesion venia a ser una tacita reconduccion — una simple
prolongacion de la sesion que habia sido declarada abierta por el
presidente Avelino con un quorum presente de 22 miembros.
(3) Sin embargo, la sesion prolongada se convirtio en ilegal por falta de
quorum. — Es cosa establecida y admitida por ambas partes que al
reanudarse la sesion estaban presentes los 12 miembros del grupo
llamado "Senado de Cuenco" mas tres senadores del grupo llamado
"Senado de Avelino". En esta coyuntura el Senador Mabanag, del grupo
de Cuenco, suscito la cuestion del quorum, de cuyas resultas se ordeno
por el Senador Arranz, que entonces presidia la sesion, la lectura de la
lista. Tambien es cosa establecida en autos y admitida por ambas partes
que al comenzar el roll call o lectura de la lista, lot tres senadores del
grupo de Avelino salieron del salon y solamente respondieron al roll
call los 12 senadores del grupo de Cuenco.
Resulta evidente de estos hechos que no habia quorum, por cuanto que
componiendose el Senado de 24 miembros debidamente elegidos y
cualificados, el quorum para celebrar sesion valida debe ser de 13
miembros. Tanto la jurisprudencia federal como la de los estados de la
Union americana esta repleta de decisiones en las que se ha sentado
firmemente la doctrina de que la base para determinar
el quorum legislativo es el numero total de miembros elegidos y
debidamente cualificados de cada camara.1 En el presente caso, como
se ha dicho, ese numero total es 24. Por tanto, el grupo Cuenco no podia
seguir celebrando validamente sesion, en vista de la falta de quorum. De
acuerdo con la Constitucion y los reglamentos, el grupo Cuenco tenia
ante si dos caminos para actuar: (a) suspender la sesion de dia en dia
hasta obtener el necesario quorum; (b) o compeler la asistencia de
suficientes senadores del otro grupo para constituir dicho quorum,
pudiendo a dicho efecto ordenar inclusive el arresto de los huelguistas.
(Constitucion de Filipinas, art. VI, sec. 10, ap. 2;2 Reglamento del
Senado, Cap. VI, arts. 23 y 24.3) Asi que todos los procedimientos
efectuados por el grupo Cuenco en dicha sesion eran nulos e ilegales.
Se ha insinuado que el cambio de fraseologia en el precepto
constitucional sobre quorum es significativo. Efectivamente en el texto
original de 1935 se decia lo siguiente: "A majority of all the
Members shall constitute a quorum to do business" . . . , mientras que en
el texto enmendado de 1940 se dice: "A majority of each House shall
constitute a qurrum to do business" . . . . De esto se quiere deducir la
consecuencia de que esta reforma habra sido por algo, y este algo acaso
sea la posibilidad de una base menor de la totalidad de miembros para
determinar la existencia de un quorum. El argumento, a mi juicio, es
insostenible, por no llamarlo futil. Los autores de la enmienda no han
hecho mas que copiar literalmente la fraseologia de la Constitucion
federal americana; y ya hemos visto que esta se ha interpretado en el
sentido de que señala, como base para determinar el quorum, la
totalidad de los miembros electos y cualificados de cada camara. Por
tanto, el cambio fraseologico, en vez de denotar cambio en el significado,
refuerza el sentido tradicional de que la base para la determinacion
del quorum la totalidad de los miembros electos y cualificados de cada
camara. Aparte de que es elemental en hermeneutica legal que una
misma cosa puede expresarse en terminos diferentes.
Tambien se ha insinuado, con bastante ingenio, que en el caso que nos
ocupa, la base mas racional para el quorum es 23, excluyendo al
Senador Confesor que se halla en America, pero incluyendo al Senador
Sotto, que si bien no pudo estar presente en la sesion de autos por estar
gravemente enfermo, hallabase, sin embargo, en Manila susceptible en
cualquier momento de ser llamado por el Senado. El fundamento de esta
opinion es que para la determinacion del quorum no debe ser contado un
miembro que esta fuera de la accion coercitiva de la camara. La
proposicion es igualmente inaceptable. No solo no tiene ningun
precedente en la jurisprudencia, sino que es convencional, arbitraria,
sometiendo el quorum, que debe ser algo permanente, a ciertas
eventualidades y contingencias. Hay que tener en cuenta que el
precepto constitucional y la regla pertinente no establecen ninguna
salvedad. Donde la ley no distingue, no debemos distinguir.
(4) Cual es el remedio. — No cabe duda de que una mayoria de
Senadores tiene derecho a reorganizar el Senado en la forma que les
plazca, siempre que ello se sujete a las normas prescritas por la
Constitucion, las leyes y los reglamentos. En el presente caso el grupo
Cuenco que al parecer forma la mayoria, por lo menos hasta la fecha,
tiene en sus manos los instrumentos constitucionales y legales para
efectuar una reorganizacion. Puede convocar una sesion y compeler la
asistencia de un numero suficiente de Senadores para formar quorum,
ordenando el arresto si fuese necesario de dichos senadores. Esto en el
supuesto de que el Senador Avelino y su grupo sigan boicoteando las
sesiones del Senado para impedir la existencia de un quorum. Pero si el
grupo Avelino acude voluntariamente al Senado, entonces los dos
grupos pueden buenamente restaurar la normalidad constitucional,
procediendo a efectuar la reorganizacion que desee y dicte la mayoria.
Hasta que esto se haga, el Senador Avelino es tecnicamente presidente
del Senado. Es verdad que Avelino cometio una grave arbitrariedad
ordenando el levantamiento de la sesion sin derecho y facultad para ello;
pero una arbitrariedad no justifica otra arbitrariedad; la de destituirle por
medios anticonstitucionales, ilegales y antireglamentarios. Los motivos
de la accion de Avelino y de la de sus adversarios no nos interesan para
nada ni caen dentro de nuestra provincia; lo unico que nos concierne son
sus repercusiones juridicas.
Es de suma importancia, sobre todo en estos momentos incipientes de la
republica, el que mantengamos rigida e implacablemente la integridad de
la Constitucion y de los procedimientos que prescribe. Solo de esta
manera podremos evitar el ciego desbordamiento de las pasiones
politicas y personales, con todas sus funestas consecuencias. A toda
costa hay que impedir la formacion de un clima politico, social o moral
que facilite las cuarteladas, los pronunciamientos, los golpes de mano y
de estado (coup d'main, coup d'etat) — eso que caracteriza la historia
azarosa de las llamadas "banana republicas". Un 19 Brumario solamente
se puede prevenir imponiendo con todo rigor, sin blandas transigencias,
la observancia de la Constitucion y de las leyes y reglamentos que la
implementan.
Voto, por tanto, en favor de la concesion del recurso interpuesto.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I agree with Mr. Justice Briones' dissenting opinion, that the twelve
senators who elected Senator Cuenco Acting President of the Senate did
not constitute a quorum and, consequently, that his election was illegal.
It appears tome that the basis for computing a quorum of the Senate is
thenumber of senators who have been elected and duly qualified and
who have not ceased to be senators by death or legal disqualification. If
this were not so, what is the standard of computation? No satisfactory,
reasonable alternative has been or can be offered.
Absence abroad cannot be a disqualification unless by such absence,
under the Constitution, a member of the Senate loses his office,
emoluments, and other prerogatives, temporarily or permanently. There
is no claim that this happens when a senators' presence at the session
be the criterion, then serious illness or being in a remote island with
which Manila has no regular means of communication should operate to
eliminate the sick or absent members from the counting for the purpose
of determining the presence of a majority.
The distinction made between absentees form legislative sessions who
are in the Philippines and absentees who are in a foreign country is, to
my arbitrary and unreasonable. From both the theoretical and the
practical by members of Congress are sometimes found necessary to
fulfill their missions. If we test the interpretation by its consequences, its
unsoundness and dangers become more apparent. The interpretation
would allow any number of legislators, no matter how small, to transact
business so long as it is a majority of the legislators present in the
country. Nothing in my opinion could have been farther from the minds of
the authors of the Constitution than to permit, under circumstances, less
than a majority of the chosen and qualified representatives of the people
to approve measures that might vitally affect their lives, their liberty,
happiness and property. The necessity of arresting absent members to
complete a quorum is too insignificant, compared with the necessity of
the attendance of an absolute majority, to make unamenability to arrest a
factor for ruling out absentees who are beyond the legislature's process.
The Congress is eminently a law-making body and is little concerned with
jurisdiction over its members. The power to order arrest is an emergency
measure and is rarely resorted to. Viewed in this light, it is doubtful if the
authority to arrest could always afford a satisfactory remedy even in the
cases of members who were inside the Philippines territory. This is
especially true in the United States of America, after whose form of
government ours is patterned and whose territorial possession extend to
the other side of the globe.
This case is easily distinguishable from Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192),
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, (78 Phil., 1).
In those cases the petitions were directed against an action of a
recognized Senate exercising authority within it own domain. Here the
process sought is to be issued against an appointee of a senate that, it is
alleged was not validly constituted to do business because, among other
reasons alleged, there was not quorum. The Court is not asked to
interfere with an action of a coordinate branch of the government so
much as to test the legality of the appointment of the respondent.
Section 1, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court provides:
An action for usurpation of office of franchise may be brought in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercise a public office, or a franchise, or an office in a
corporation created by authority of law;
xxx xxx xxx
This provision by its terms extends to every office. Its scope does not
exclude officers appointed by the legislative branch of the government.
Although this Court has no control over either branch of the Congress, it
does have the power to ascertain whether or not one who pretends to be
its officer is holding his office according to law or the Constitution.
Political questions as a bar to jurisdiction can only be raised by the
supreme power, by the legislature, and not by one of its creatures.
(Luther vs. Border, 48 U.S. 7 How. 1, 12 Law ed., 581.) If there were two
lesser officers of the Senate appointed by different faction thereof and
contesting each other's right to the office, it would not be the Senate by
the Court which would be called upon to decide the controversy. There is
more reason for the Court to intervene when the office of the President of
the Senate is at stake. The interest of the public are being greatly
imperiled by the conflicting claims, and a speedy determination of the
same is imperatively demanded, in the interest of good government and
public order.
Fundamentally this case is analogous to Attorney General, ex
rel. Werts vs. Rogers, 23 Lawyers' Reports, annotated, 354, to which I
am indebted for much of the reasoning adduced in this dissent on the
question of this Court's jurisdiction.
March 14, 1949
RESOLUTION
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in case G.R.
L-2821, Jose Avelino vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, the court, without prejudice
towriting later an extended opinion, has resolved, by a majority of
seven,to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent
events whichjustify its intervention; and, partly for the reasons stated in
the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Mr.
JusticeFeria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and Mr. Justice Briones in their
separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session
where respondent Mariano J. Cuenco was elected acting Senate
President.
The Chief agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement of
the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of
the case,the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere
formalism,it appearing from the evidence that any new session with
a quorum wouldresult in the respondent's election as Senate President,
and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has
been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes
against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the
latter's persistent effortsto block all avenues to constitutional processes.
For this reason, he believethat the group has done enough to satisfy the
requirements of the Constitutionand that the majority's ruling is in
conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public
interest.
The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that respondent Mariano J.
Cuencohas been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is
petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
Mr. Justice Paras concurs in the result, Mr. Justice Bengzon dissents on
the question of jurisdiction but concurs on the question of quorum.
Mr. Justice Tuason concurs on the question of jurisdiction but dissents on
that on that of quorum.
Mr. Justice Montemayor dissent s of the question of jurisdiction and
reserves his vote on the question of quorum.
Mr. Justice Reyes reserves the right to express the reasons for his vote.

FERIA, J., concurring:
In the case of Vera et al. vs. Avelino et al., (77 Phil., 192), the principal
question raised was whether this Supreme Court had jurisdiction to set
aside the Pendatun resolution ordering that petitioners Vera, Diokno and
Romero shall not be sworn to nor seated as members of the Senate, and
compel the respondents had no power to pass said resolution, because it
was contraryto the provisions of Sec. 11, Article VI, of the Constitution,
which createdthe Electoral Tribunal for the Senate as well as for the
House of Representative, and provided that said Tribunal shall be judge
of all contestsrelating to the election returns and qualifications of their
respective members. Respondent Avelino et al., who were represented
by Senator Vicente Francisco and the Solicitor General, impugned the
jurisdiction of this Court to take this Court to take cognizance of said case
on the ground that the question therein involved was a political question,
and petitioners Veraet al., who were represented by Attorney Jose W.
Diokno, who is now oneof the attorneys for respondents, who now
contends that this Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the present
case, then maintained that this Court had jurisdiction.
And in the case of Mabanag et al. vs. Jose Lopez Vito et al., 78 Phil., 1,
the question involved was whether it was within the jurisdiction of this
Court to take cognizance of the case and prohibit the respondents from
enforcing the "Congressional Resolution of both Houses proposing an
amendment to the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance there",
grantingcertain rights to the citizens of the United states of American in
the Philippines, on the ground that it was null and void because it was not
passedby the vote of three-fourths of the members of the Senate and
House of Representatives, voting separately, as required by Sec. 1, Art.
XV, of the Constitution, since if the Members of Congress who were not
allowed to take part had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of
the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-
fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners Mabanag et al.
contended that the Court had jurisdiction and the respondents maintained
the contrary on the ground that the question involved was apolitical one
and within the exclusive province of the Legislature.
The theory of Separation of Powers as evolved by the Courts of last
resortfrom the State Constitution of the United States of American, after
which our owns is patterned, has given rise to the distinction between
justiceable question which fall within the province of the judiciary, and
politicalquestions which are not within the jurisdiction of the judiciary and
are to be decided, under the Constitution, by the People in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government,
except to the extent that the power to deal with such question has been
conferred upon the court byexpress or statutory provision. Although it is
difficult to define a politicalquestion as contradistinguished from a
justiceable one, it has been generally held that the first involves political
rights which consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or managementof the government of the government,
while justiceable questions are those which affect civil, personal or
property rights accorded to every member of the community or nation.
Under such theory of Separation of Power, the judicial Supremacy is the
power of judicial review in actual and appropriate case and controversies
that present justiceable issues, which fall within the jurisdiction or power
allocated to the judiciary; but when the issue is a political one which
comeswithin the exclusive sphere of the legislative or executive
department of the Government to decide, the judicial department or
Supreme Court has no powerto determine whether or not the act of the
Legislative or Chief Executiveis against the Constitution. What
determines the jurisdiction of thecourts is the issue involved, and not the
law or constitutional provisionwhich may be applied. Divorced from the
remedy sought, the declaration of this Court on the matter of
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of alegislative or executive act,
would be a mere advisory opinion, without a coercive force.
Relying on the ruling laid down in Severino vs. Governor General, 16
Phil.,336; Abueno vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612; and Alejandrino vs. Quezon,
46 Phil., 83, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of said respondent
in both casesthat the question involved was a political question and
therefore this Court had no jurisdiction. I was one of the three Justice
who held that this Courthad jurisdiction, and dissented from the decision
of the majority.
When the present case was first submitted to us, I concurred with the
majority, in view of the ruling of the Court in said two cases, which
constitutes a precedent which is applicable a fortiori to the present case
and must, therefore, be followed by the virtue of the doctrine or maxim
of stare decisis, and in order to escape the criticism voiced by Lord Bryce
inAmerican Commonwealth when he said that "The Supreme Court has
changed its color i.e., its temper and tendencies, from time to time
according to the political proclivities of the men who composed it. . . .
Their action flowed naturally from the habits of though they had formed
before their accession to the bench and from the sympathy they could not
but feel for the doctrineon whose behalf they had contended." (The
ANNALS of the American Academyof Political and Social Science, May,
1936, p. 50).
Now that the petitioner, who obtained a ruling favorable to his contention
in the Vera-Avelino case, supra, insist in his motion for reconsideration
that this Court assume jurisdiction and decide whether or not there
was quorum in session of the Senate of February 21, 1949, and is willing
to abide by the decision of this Court (notwithstanding the
aforementioned precedent),and several of the Justices, who have held
before that this Supreme Courthad no jurisdiction, now uphold the
jurisdiction of this Court, I gladly change my vote and concur with the
majority in that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present in
accordance with my stand inthe above mentioned cases, so as to
establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but
political questions as well.
But I maintain my opinion and vote in the resolution sought to be
reconsidered,that there was a quorum in the session of the Senate of
Senate of February 21,1949, for the following reasons:
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority
of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do
business" and the fact that said provision was amended in the
Constitution of 1939,so as to read "a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of
the Constitution to basethe majority, not on the number fixed or provided
for the Constitution,but on actual members or incumbents, and this must
be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their
duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of
the house or forother causes which make attendance of the member
concerned impossible, eventhrough coercive process which each house
is empowered to issue to compel itsmembers to attend the session in
order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or
made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight,or for considering the
use of the words "of all the members" as unnecessary, is evidenced by
the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required
"concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to
expel a member" was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present
Constitutional, so as to require "the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House". Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the
United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual
members of the SEnate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-
three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.
This conclusion is in consonance with the legislative and judicial
precedent. In the Resolution of both Houses proposing an amendment of
the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended to the Constitution,
granting parity rightto American citizen in the Philippines out of which the
case of Mabanag vs. Lopez, supra arose, both Houses of Congress in
computing the three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and the
House of Representative votingseparately, required by Sec. 1, Article XV
of the Constitution, the three-fourths of all the members was based, not
on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on the actual
members who have qualifiedor were not disqualified. And in the case
of People vs. Fuentes, 46 Phil., 22the provision of Sec. 1, subsection 2,
of Act No. 3104, which requiredunanimity of vote of the Supreme Court in
imposing death excepted from the court those members of the Court who
were legally disqualified from the case, this Court held that the absence
of the Chief Justice Avanceña, authorized by resolution of the Court, was
a legal disqualification, and his vote was not necessary in the
determination of the unanimity of the decision imposing death penalty.
PABLO, J., concurrente:
Aungue los Sres. Magistrados Paras, Feria, Bengzon y yo, sosteniamos
que este Tribunal no tenia jurisdiccion sobre el asunto porque era de
naturaleza eminentemente politico, emitimos, sin embargo, nuestra
opinion de que los doce senadores constituian quorum legal para tomar
resoluciones. Desde luego, la opinion no surtio el efecto deseado. La
huelga en el Senado continua. Los recientes acontecimientos pueden
trascender a peores, con sus inevitables repercusiones dentro y fuera del
pais. Cuando las pasiones politicas no van por el cauce de la prudencia
pueden desbordase y causar fatales consecuencias. Es un sano
estadismo judicial evirtarlo y, si es necesario, impedirlo.
El recurrente pide que se reconsideresa nuestra dividida opinion.
alegando que las divisiones civiles en varias naciones han producido
sangrientes luchas fratricidas. Si no tuviera en cuenta mas que la solitud
original y los hechos probados, la mocion de reconsideracion debe ser
denegada en cuanto a mi voto sobre la falta de jurisdiccion. La
jurisdiccion no se confiere por la simple solicitud de una parte, ni por la
anuencia de amas, sino por la ley o por la Constitucion.
La apelacion del recurrente de que este Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para
evitar derramamiento de sangre llega al corazon. Como magistrado, no
deben importante las consecuencias; pero como ciudadano, me duele
ver una lucha enconada entre dos grupos en el Senado sin fin practico.
Al pueblo interesa que la Legislatura reanude su funcionamiento normal.
Fuerza es transigir, pues, para que haya seis votos que sostengan que
este Tribunal tiene jurisdiccion. Si insisto en mi opinion anterior,
fracasara todo esfuerzo de reajustre de nuestras opiniones para dar fin a
la crisis en el Senado.
El Sr. Presidente del Tribunal y los Sres. Magistrados Perfecto y briones
opinian hoy que hubo quorum en la continuacion de la sesion despues
de la marcha del Senador Avelino y compañeros. Con ellos, ya hay siete
votos que sostienen que las resoluciones votadas por los doce
senadores son legales y validas. pero para dar fuerza legal a esta
conclusion, es indispensable que el tribunal la declare con jurisdiccion.
Contribuyo mi grando de arena a la feliz conclusion de un conflicto que
esta minando el interes publico: voto hoy por que el Tribunal asuma
jurisdiccion para dar fuerza a mi opinion anterior de que los doce
senadores formaban quorum.
De be denegarse la mocion de reconsideracion.
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
The problem of democracy must be faced not in the abstract but as
practical question, as part of the infinitely motley aspects of human life.
They cannot be considered as scientific propositions or hypothesis
independently from the actual workings of the unpredictable flights of the
spirit which seen to elude the known laws of the external world.
Experience appears to be the only reliable guide in judging human
conduct. Birth and death rates and incidence of illness are complied in
statistics for the study and determination of human behavior, and
statistics are one of the means by which the teaching may render their
quota of contribution in finding the courses leading to the individual well-
being and collective happiness.
The way this case has been disposed of by the Supreme Court, upon the
evidence coming from many quarters and sectors, is provenly far from
being conducive to democratic eudaemonia. We intended to settle the
controversy between petitioner and respondent, but actually we left
hanging in the air the important and, indeed, vital questions. They posed
before us in quest of enlightenment and reasonable and just in a
quandary.
We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill;
the normal and ordinary functioning of the Senate has been hampered by
the non-attendance to sessions of about one-half of the members;
warrants of arrest have been issued, openly defied, and remained
unexecuted like mere scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the
persons to be arrested are prominent persons with well-known addresses
and residences and have been in daily contact with news reporters and
photographers. Farce and mockery have been interspersed with actions
and movements provoking conflicts which invite bloodshed.
It is highly complimentary to our Republic and to our people that,
notwithstanding the overflow of political passions and the irreconcilable
attitude of warring factions, enough self-restraint has been shown to
avoid any clash of forces. Indeed there is no denying that the situation,
as abstaining in the upper chamber of congress, is highly explosive. It
had echoed in the House of the Representatives. It has already involved
in the House of the Representatives. It has already involved the
President of the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable
national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from
any quarter other then this Supreme Court, upon which the quarter other
than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an
effective settlement are pinned.
The Avelino group, composed of eleven senators almost one-half of the
entire body, are unanimous in belief that this Court should take
jurisdiction of the matter and decide the merits of the case one way or
another, and they are committed to abide by the decision regardless of
whether they believe it to be right or mistaken. Among the members of
the so-called Cuenco group, there are several Senators who in not
remote past (see Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192 and Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, 78 Phil., 1) have shown their conviction that in cases analogous to
the present the Supreme Court has and should exercise jurisdiction. If we
include the former attitude of the senator who is at present abroad, we
will find out that they are in all eighteen (18) senators who at one time or
another recognized the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the
settlement of such momentous controversies as the one now challenging
our judicial statesmanship, our patriotism, our faith in democracy, the role
of this Court as the last bulwark of the Constitution.
In the House of Representatives unmistakable statements have been
made supporting the stand of the eighteen (18) senators, or of three-
fourths (3/4) of the entire Upper Chamber, in support of the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and of the contention that we should decide this case
on the merits.
Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority
complex. Consequently like its parallel in the psychological field, it is
premised on notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an upshot of
distorted past experience, warping the mind so as to become unable to
have a healthy appraisal of reality in its true form.
It is futile to invoke precedents in support of such an abnormal judicial
abdication. The decision in the Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, is
absolutely devoid of any authority. It was rendered by a colonial Supreme
Court to suit the imperialistic policies of the masters. That explains its
glaring inconsistencies.
Also frivolous is to invoke the decision in Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192),
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, (78 Phil., 1), both patterned after the
colonial philosophy pervading the decision in Alejandrino vs. Quezon, (46
Phil., 83.) Judicial emancipation must not lag behind the political
emancipation of our Republic. The judiciary ought to ripen into maturityif
it has to be true to its role as spokesman of the collective conscience, of
the conscience of humanity.
For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction in the case is
toviolate the Constitution. Refusal to exercise the judicial power vested in
it is to transgress the fundamental law. This case raises vital
constitutionalquestions which no one can settle or decide if this Court
should refuse to decide them. It would be the saddest commentary to the
wisdom, foresight and statesmanship of our Constitutional Convention to
have drafted a document leaving such a glaring hiatus in the organization
of Philippine democracy ifit failed to entrusted to the Supreme Court the
authority to decide such constitutional questions.
Our refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case is as unjustifiable as the
refusal of senators on strike to attend the sessions of the Senate and
toperform their duties. A senatorial walkout defeats the legislative
powervested by the Constitution in Congress. Judicial walkouts are even
more harmful than a laborers' strike or a legislative impasse. Society may
go on normally while laborers temporarily stop to work. Society may not
be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery. But society is
menaced with dissolution in the absence of an effective administration of
justice. Anarchy and chaos are its alternatives.
There is nothing so subversive as official abdication or walkout by the
highest organs and officers of government. If they should fail to perform
their functions and duties, what is the use for minor officials and
employeesto perform theirs? The constitutional question
of quorum should not be leftunanswered.
Respondent's theory that twelve (12) senators constitute the majority
requiredfor the Senate quorum is absolutely unacceptable. The verbal
changes made in the constitutional amendment, upon the creation of
Congress to replace the National Assembly, have not affected the
substance of the constitutional concept of quorum in both the original and
amended contexts. The words "all the members" used in the original, for
the determination of the quorum of the National Assembly, have been
eliminated in the amendment, as regards the house of Congress,
because they were a mere surplusage. The writer of this opinion, as
Member of the Second National Assembly and in his capacity as
Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who
proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each
House" can mean only the majority of the members thereof, without
excluding anyone, that is, of all the members.
The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and
exactmathematical meaning. A majority means more than one-half (½). It
can neverbe identified with one-half (½) or less than one-half (½). It
involved acomparative idea in which the antithesis between more and
less is etched in the background of reality as a metaphysical absolute as
much as the antithesis of all opposites, and in the same way that the
affirmative cannot be confused with the negative, the creation with
nothingness, existence withnon-existence, truth with falsehood.
The Senate is composed of twelve four (24) senators. The majority of
said senators cannot be less than thirteen (13). Twelve (12) do not
constitute the majority in a group composed of twelve four (24) units. This
is so evident that is not necessary to have the mathematical genius of
Pythagoras, Euclid, Newton and Pascal to see it. Any elementary school
student may immediately perceive it.
No amount of mental gymnastic or juristic logodaedaly will convince
anyone that one of the two equal number constitute a majority part of the
two numbers combined. The five (5) fingers of one hand cannot be the
majorityof the combined ten (10) fingers of the two hands. Majority is
incompatiblewith equality. It implies the idea of superiority.
Majority is a derivative of major which, in its turn, is a derivative of the
Latin "magnus," meaning great. Majority means the greater of two
numbers that are regarded as part of a total: the number greater than
half. It implies a whole of which constitute the greater part or portion. It
presupposes the existence of a total and, in the present case, the total
number of twelve four (24) senators composing the Senate.
The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to
conclude that for the purpose of choosing respondent merely as Acting of
the Senate, asan emergency measure to fill the vacuum created by
petitioner's desertion of the office of presiding officer by his walked in the
session of February 21, 1949, the presence of the twelve (12) senators
was enough quorum.
The Constitution provides:
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner
and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10,
Article VI.)
The "smaller number" referred to in the above provision has to act
collectively and cannot act as collective body to perform the function
specially vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among
theirnumber. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number"
has to take measure to "compel the attendance of absent member in
such manner and underpenalties as such House may provide," so as to
avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber.
Said "smaller number" maybe twelve or even less than twelve senators to
constitute a quorum for the election of a temporary or acting president,
who will have to act until normalcy is restored.
As events have developed after the decision in this case has been
rendered on March 4, 1949, the picture of the petitioner's attitude has
acquired clearerand more definite form, and that picture brings us to the
conclusion that thiscase turned into a moot one.
At the hearing of this case for the reception of evidence before Mr.
Justice Bengzon, Senator Mariano J. Cuenco, the respondent, on cross-
examination bySenator Vicente J. Francisco, counsel for petitioner,
manifested that he waslooking for an opportunity to renounce the position
of Acting President of the Senate, and that if Senator Jose Avelino, the
petitioner, should attend the sessions. He would only make of record his
protest, and never resort to force or violence to stop petitioner from
presiding over said sessions.
The last statement as to allowing petitioner to preside over the sessions
was made by respondent under oath twice, and petitioner, although he
refused to attend the hearing of this case, so much so that, instead of
testifying, he just signed an affidavit which, under the rules of procedure,
is inadmissible as incompetent and is as valueless as an empty gesture,
could not fail to learn about respondent's testimony, because it was given
publicity, it is recorded in the transcript, and petitioner's counsel, Senator
Francisco, would certainly not have failed to inform him about it.
Notwithstanding respondent's testimony, petitioner failed to take
advantage of it and continues to refuse to attend the sessions of the
Senate since he and his group of senators have walked out from the
historic Monday session of February 21, 1949.
If petitioner is sincere in his desire of presiding over the sessions of the
Senate, for which reason he has sought the help of the Supreme Court,
why has he failed to take advantage of the commitment made under oath
by respondent since February 26, 1949? Why has he, since then, been
not only failing but refusing to attend the sessions and preside over
them? Why is it that petitioner and his group of Senators have given
occasion, in fact, compelled the senators of the Cuenco group to issue
warrants of arrest to remedy the lack of quorum that has been hampering
the sessions of the Senate? Why is it that the Senate sergeant-at-arms,
his subordinates and the peace officers helping him, have to be hunting
for the senators of the Avelino group in a, so far, fruitless if not farcical
endeavor to compel them to attend the sessions?
The events that have been unfolding before our eyes, played up
everyday in screaming headlines in all newspapers and of which, by their
very nature, we cannot fail to take judicial notice, considered, weighed
and analyzed in relation with the happenings in the Friday and Monday
sessions, February 18 and 21, 1949, have driven into our mind the
conviction that, powers and prestige which command the position of
President of the Senate, he actually has no earnest desire to preside
over the sessions of the Senate, the most characteristic and important
function of President of the Senate.
His refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding respondent's
commitment to allow him to preside over them, can and should logically
be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.
(Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil., 14; Ortiz vs. De Guzman, 49 Phil., 371;
46 Corpus Juris p. 980-981; Wilkinson vs. City of Birmingham, 68 So.
999; 43 American Jurisprudence p. 27).
What are petitioner's reasons for refusing to attend the Senate sessions?
What are his group's reason? They say that they want a square decision
on the merits of this case, for which reason the motion for reconsideration
has been filed. Although we believe that the Supreme majority vote, to
exercise jurisdiction in this case, and the inconsistency in the position
taken by some Members of the majority has only increased public
bewilderment, stronger reasons for petitioner and his group to sabotage
the sessions of the Senate.
If this Court had decided this case as the four dissenters would have it,
there cannot be any doubt that the Senate impasse would have been
settled many days ago and, with it, the present national crisis hampering
and armstringing the legislative machinery. .
The gravity of the situation cannot be gainsaid. The showings of open
defiance to warrants of arrest are highly demoralizing. People are asking
and wondering if senators are placed above the law that they can simply
ignore warrants of arrest and despite the authority of the officers
entrusted with the execution. Threats of violence pervade the air.
Congress is neglecting the public interests that demand remedial
legislation. The present state of confusion, of alarm, of bewilderment, of
strife would have ended if, for the reasons we have stated in our
dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court would have ordered petitioner's
reposition.
Once petitioner had been recognized to continue to be the President of
the Senate, he would certainly have attended the Senate sessions to
preside over them. Then the sessions with senators of the Avelino group
attending, would have been held with the constitutional quorum. The
twelve senators of the Cuenco group would have the opportunity of
voting solidly to ratify or to reenact all the disputed actuations of the rump
session of February 21, 1949, and there is no doubt that they would have
succeeded in ousting petitioner and electing respondent to the position of
President of the Senate.
Everything then would have followed the normal course. With the
presence of a clear and unquestionable quorum, petitioner and his
followers would have no ground for any complaint, and respondent could
have assumed the Senate's presidency without any hitch.
Of course, petitioner and the senators of his group might have resorted
again to the same strategy, by quorum the rump session of February 21,
1949, but it is not probable that they would have taken the same course
of action after this Court, almost unanimously declared that petitioner's
action in adjourning the session of February 21, 1949, was arbitrary and
illegal. At any rate, the Senators of the Cuenco group would have been
by then well prepared to have orders of arrest ready for immediate
execution before the striking senators could leave the building housing
the session hall.
The abnormal situation in the Senate must be stopped at once.
Legislation must go on. The serious charges filed or may be filed against
petitioner, respondent and other senators demand imperatively
investigation and action to acquit the innocent and to punish the guilty
ones. Public interest cannot demand less.
Under such circumstances, petitioner has lost all title to claim the position
in controversy. This result will not legally or practically close any door for
him to again seek the position by attending the sessions of the Senate
and by securing a majority that would support him in his bid.
The motion for reconsideration should be denied.
Footnotes
1 On this matter, the vote is 6 to 4 in favor of lack of jurisdiction.
2 On this matter, the vote is 4 to 4.
3Quoted with approval in U.S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law
ed., 321, 325.
BRIONES, M., disidente: Vacancies from death, resignation or failure to elect cannot be
deducted in ascertaining the quorum." (Opinion of Justices, 12
1". . . . Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution of the United States Fla. 653)
provides:
2A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do
"Each House shall be the judge of the elections. . . . and a business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner
business." and under such penalties as such House may provide.

"Interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court of that
country held in U.S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 L. Ed.
321, 325:
"The Constitution provides that 'a majority of each (house)
shall constitute a quorum to do business.' In other words,
when a majority are present, the House is in a position to
do business. Its capacity to transact business is then
established, created by the mere presence of a majority,
and does not depend upon the disposition or assent or
action of any single member or fraction of the majority
present. All that the Constitution requires is the presence
of a majority, and when that majority are present, the
power of the House arises."
"The same decision quoted with approval from Dillon, Mun. Corp.,
the following rule:
3CHAPTER VI — The house — Sec. 23. A majority of the
Senators shall constitute a quorum to do business.
"SEC. 24. Whenever the question of quorum is raised by
any Senator in any session, the Chair shall immediately
order a roll call and announce forthwith the result.
"This shall be done without debate. If after the roll call it
appears that there is no quorum, a majority of the
Senators present may other the Sergeant-at-arms to
summon the attendance of absent Senators, and, if
necessary, to compel their attendance, in which case the
order that that effect shall not be subject to debate.
"SEC. 25. Only for a just cause may a Senator be
excused from atttending the session."

". . . If all the members of the select body or committee, or

if all tha agents are assembled, or if all have been duly
notified, and the minority refuse or neglect to meet with
the others, a majority of those present may act, provided
those present constitute a majority of the whole number.
In other words, in such case, a major part of the whole is
necessary to constitute a quorum, and a majority of
the quorum may act. If the major part withdraw so as to
leave no quorum, the power of the minority to act is, in
general, considered to cease."

"Quorum as used in U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, Sec. 8, providing that

a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do
business, is, of the purposes of the Assembly, not less than the
majority of the whole number of which the house may be
composed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S.
TATAD, petitioners,
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B.
FERNAN, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for she sovereign acts, of a
coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings
of the Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws or even
the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed
to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain
steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S.
Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66,
Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of
Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the
respondents and the solicitor general "to file COMMENT thereon within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice." On August 25,
1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted their
respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court
dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply on
September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to
the petition and deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without
need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have
concurrent jurisdiction1 to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as
well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to
the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower
tribunals. 2 However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional
and compelling circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has
allowed exceptions to this doctrine.3 In fact, original petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative
officers like the Senate President4 and the Speaker of the House 5 have
been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña as
presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session
of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the
composition of the Senate was as follows: 6
10 members — Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members — Lakas-National Union of Christian
Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP)
1 member — Liberal Party (LP)
1 member — Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member — People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member — Gabay Bayan
 2 members — Independent
——
23 — total number of senators 7 (The last six members
are all classified by petitioners as "independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by
Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo
B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same
position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to
2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the
Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro
tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was
assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who
had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those
who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority,"
Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a
minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the
debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad
delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met
in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in
receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
senators,9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority
leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized
Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court
the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for
resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of
discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the
arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal
infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the
assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority
leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this
Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate
minority leader. They submit that the definitions of "majority" and
"minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section
16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its President
and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments,
contend in common that the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority
leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the
legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no
constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law does not provide
for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has
the full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to
determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there
exists no question involving an interpretation or application of the
Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate; neither are there
"peculiar circumstances" impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over
the petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not even any
legislative practice to support the petitioners' theory that a senator who
votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the
minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and
deliberated on the various important cases involving this very important
and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the
Court's power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an
interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law,
including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the
jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or
executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the
question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a
political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately
assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its
intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum
to hold a session 13 and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the
majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present . . . so
as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but
political questions as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining
in the upper chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It
had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has
already involved the President of the Philippines. The
situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is
apparent that solution cannot be expected from any
quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the
hopes of the people for an effective settlement are
pinned. 15
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which
no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to
decide them. 16
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be
left unanswered. 17
In Tañada v. Cueno, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question.
And we said that "it refers to 'those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular
measure." 19
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question.
The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full
discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional
limitations. 20 Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it
was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion wrote that the Court "had authority to and should inquire into
the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]." This ruling was
made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v.
Baker 22 and Montenegro v. Castañeda 23 that "the authority to decide
whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege . .
.) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon
the courts and upon all other persons." But the Chief Justice cautioned:
"the function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in
him or to determine the wisdom of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary: 24
The reason why the issue under consideration and other
issues of similar character are justiciable, not political, is
plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-
justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle
of separation of powers — characteristic of the
presidential system of government — the functions of
which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature,
into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the
making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative
department; 2) those concerning mainly with the
enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions
applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the
executive department; and 3) those dealing with the
settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving
rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable
and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of
justice. Within its own sphere — but only within such
sphere — each department is supreme and independent
of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to
encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to
any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or
pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts
performed, measures taken or decisions made by the
other departments — provided that such acts, measures
or decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the
Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether
or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have
been met, or the limitations respected is justiciable or
non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality
or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise,
said qualifications, conditions or limitations — particularly
those prescribed by the Constitution — would be set at
naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue
and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the
courts of justice under the presidential form of
government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the
system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the
authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said
issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation — made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to support and
defend the Constitution — to settle it. This explains why,
in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was
held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power," to
determine whether another branch of the government has
"kept within constitutional limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in
defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now
fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action
the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial
prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute
pronouncements of the Court. Daza v. Singson, 26 Coseteng v. Mitra,
Jr. 27 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 28 similarly resolved issues assailing
the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning among
political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in the
Commission on Appointments. The Court held that the issue was
justiciable, "even if the question were political in nature," since it involved
"the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the
Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Tañada v.
Angara, 29 wherein the petitioners sought to nullify the Senate's
concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute." The
Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over
petitions questioning, an act of the political departments of government, it
will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will
strike it down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or
illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives 30 (HRET), the Court refused to reverse a decision of the
HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court
ruled that full authority had been conferred upon the electoral tribunals of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their
respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 31 The
Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only if
such "decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion" 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine
the enrolled bill doctrine and to look beyond the certification of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill, which was later
enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the legislative
body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the House had
been breached in the passage of the bill. They averred further that a
violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation of
the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter
complained of concerned the internal procedures of the House, with
which the Court had no concern. It enucleated: 34
It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of
a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not
been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. . . . In
the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must
assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its
rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the
judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners — one of whom is Senator
Santiago, a well-known constitutionalist — try to hew closely to these
jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of
the constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate
minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power
"to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court
has no jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however,
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff
or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid
allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over
the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next
crucial question: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate
minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate
President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend
that the constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate
President "by majority vote of all members" carries with it a judicial duty
to determine the concepts of "majority" and "minority," as well as who
may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted
constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for
the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and
accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right
to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert,
Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he
voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the
members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader,
because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and
accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds
no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate
or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When
referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means
the number greater than half or more than half of any total."36 The plain
and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean
that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half
of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby
delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in the
said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution
had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of
all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will
not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that
the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant
precedents, which were not contested in petitioners' Reply. During the
eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R Salonga as
Senate President was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen.
Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the ninth regular session, when Sen.
Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all
senators, including those belonging to the minority. 39 This practice
continued during the tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was
allowed to chair a committee. 40 History would also show that the
"majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to
which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority"
normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority."
Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger
number of votes," 41 not necessarily more than one half. This is
sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party,
or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority." 42 Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or
totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while the
lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select
the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-
party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners
themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to
be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for
purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the
present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of
the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof
has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate
itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the
power "to determine the rules of its proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the
Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal
affairs. 45 Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which
provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter
provided, a President, a President Pro Tempore, a
Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
 These officers shall take their oath of office before
entering into the discharge of their duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the
majority vote of all its Members. Should there be more
than one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote
shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva
voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing
specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them
or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid
of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the
Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of
the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress
how to do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be
given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well
as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. 47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact,
they "are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them." 48 Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a
majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative
to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its
own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the
exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of
constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold — the very
duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this
Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this
Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast
and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically
amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would
easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even
the practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without
power to decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether
an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of
discretion. 50 This is the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and
the duty not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable," but likewise "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion,
who was a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part: 51
. . . the powers of government are generally considered
divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a given law
is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is
the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not
 only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the
actions, first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent
Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and
exercise of power 52 by one without color of title or who is not entitled by
law thereto. 53 A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment. 54 The action may be brought by the solicitor
general or a public prosecutor 55 or any person claiming to be entitled to
the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another. 56 The action shall be brought against the person who allegedly
usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding of exercising such office. 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing
must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to
use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully
held by the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present no sufficient
proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate
minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been
laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which
the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way
can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's
assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority
leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government" is restricted only by the definition and confines of the
term "grave abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely
abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to
one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority
leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate
sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to
articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot
be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where
no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate
has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate
officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Martinez, Quisumbing and Pardo,
JJ., concur.
Romero, J., Please see separate opinion.
Bellosillo, J., No part. Did not take part in deliberation.
Vitug, J., Pls. see separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., I concur with Justice Mendoza's concurring and dissenting
opinion.
Mendoza, J., Please see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Purisima, J., Join concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Mendoza.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part;
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I disagree that "[it] has
jurisdiction over the petition [in this case] to determine whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives."1
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute
the minority in the Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of that
chamber is political. It respects the internal affairs of a coequal
department of the government and is thus addressed solely to that
august body.
Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization and
business of a house of Congress except as the question affects the rights
of third parties or a specific constitutional limitation is involved.
For this reason this Court has declined to take cognizance of cases
involving the discipline of members2 of the legislature and the application
and interpretation of the rules of procedure of a house.3 For indeed, these
matters pertain to the internal government of Congress and are within its
exclusive jurisdiction.
Dean Sinco has pointed out that the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate are not state officers.
They do not attain these positions by popular vote but only by the vote of
their respective chambers. They receive their mandate as such not from
the voters but from their peers in the house. While their offices are a
constitutional creation, nevertheless they are only legislative officers. It is
their position as members of Congress which gives them the status of
state officers. As presiding officers of their respective chambers, their
election as well as removal is determined by the vote of the majority of
the members of the house to which they belong.4 Thus, Art VI, §16(1) of
the Constitution provides:
The Senate shall elect its President and the of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.
This is likewise true of the "other officers" of each house whose
election and removal rest solely within the prerogative of the
members and is no concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took cognizance of matters
pertaining to the internal government of each house, infringements of
specific constitutional limitations were alleged.
In Avelino v. Cuenco,5 the question was whether with only 12 senators
present there was a quorum for the election of the Senate President,
considering that, of the 24 members, one was in the hospital while
another one was abroad. The case called for an interpretation of Art. VI,
§10(2) of the 1935 Constitution which provided that "A majority of each
House shall constitute a quorum to do business. . . ." While initially
declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally took cognizance of the
matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate opinion in support of the
assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which persuaded the
Court to intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there was a
quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that
calls for the interpretation, application and enforcement of an express
and specific provision of the Constitution."6 In his view, "The word quorum
is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact
mathematical meaning. A majority means more than one-half (1/2)." 7
In Tañada v. Cuenco,8 the question was whether the majority could fill the
seats intended for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
when there are not enough minority members in the Senate. Again, the
question was governed by a specific provision (Art. VI, §11) of the 1935
charter which provided that the Electoral Tribunals of each house should
be composed of "nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court . . . I and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the
second largest number of votes therein." There was, therefore, a specific
constitutional provision to be applied.
The cases9 concerning the composition of the Commission on
Appointments likewise involved the mere application of a constitutional
provision, specifically Art. VI, §18 of the present Constitution which
provides that the Commission shall be composed of "twelve Senators
and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein." Undoubtedly, the Court had jurisdiction over the
cases.
On the other hand, as long as the proportional representation of political
parties and organizations is observed the Court has held itself to be
without jurisdiction over the choice of nominees. In Cabili v.
Francisco, 10 it declined to take cognizance of a quo warranto suit seeking
to annul the recomposition of the Senate representation in the
Commission and to reinstate a particular senator after satisfying itself that
such recomposition of the Senate representation was not a "departure
from the constitution mandate requiring proportional representation of the
political organizations in the Commission on Appointments."
It is true that in Cunanan v. Tan 11 this Court took cognizance of the case
which involved the reorganization of the Commission as a result of the
realignment of political forces in the House of Representatives and the
formation of a temporary alliance. But the Court's decision was justified
because the case actually involved the right of a third party whose
nomination by the President had been rejected by the reorganized
Commission. As held in Pacete v. The Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments. 12 where the construction to be given to a rule affects
persons other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is judicial in character.
In contrast to the specific constitutional limitations involved in the
foregoing cases, beyond providing that the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall elect a President and Speaker, respectively, and
such other officers as each house shall determine "by a majority vote of
all [their] respective Members," the Constitution leaves everything else to
each house of Congress. Such matters are political and are left solely to
the judgment of the legislative department of the government.
This case involves neither an infringement of specific constitutional
limitations nor a violation of the rights of a party not a member of
Congress. This Court has jurisdiction over this case only in the sense that
determining whether the question involved is reserved to Congress is
itself an exercise of jurisdiction in the same way that a court which
dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction must in a narrow sense have
jurisdiction since it cannot dismiss the case if it were otherwise. The
determination of whether the question involved is justiciable or not is in
itself a process of constitutional interpretation. This is the great lesson
of Marbury v. Madison 13 in which the U.S. Supreme Court, while affirming
its power of review, in the end held itself to be without jurisdiction
because the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting it jurisdiction over that case
was unconstitutional. In other words, a court doing a Marbury v.
Madison has no jurisdiction except to declare itself without jurisdiction
over the case.
I vote to dismiss the petition in this case for lack of jurisdiction.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion;
"Loyalty to petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a human
soul."
These words vividly inscribed just beneath Mark Twain's bust at the Hall
of Fame veritably speaks about the creativity and dynamism which ought
to characterize our perspective of things. It instructs us to broaden our
horizon that we may not be held captive by ignorance. Free and robust
thinking is the imperative.
But there are times when one has to render fealty to certain fundamental
precepts and I believe that this occasion presents an opportunity to do
so. Thus, as I join the majority and cast my vote today for the denial of
the instant petition, may I just be allowed to reiterate jurisprudential
postulates which I have long embraced, not for the sake of "loyalty to
petrified opinion" but to stress consistency in doctrine in the hope that all
future disputes of this nature may be similarly resolved in this manner.
This is not actually the first time that the Court has been invited to resolve
a matter originating from the internal processes undertaken by a co-equal
branch of government, more particularly the Senate in this case. Earlier,
in the landmark case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al.,1 we were
confronted, among other things, by the issue of whether a significant tax
measure namely, Republic Act. No. 7716 (Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law), went through the legislative mill in keeping with the constitutionally-
mandated procedure for the passage of bills. Speaking through Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, the majority upheld the tax measure's validity,
relying on the enrolled bill theory and the view that the Court is not the
appropriate forum to enforce internal legislative rules supposedly violated
when the bill was being passed by Congress. I took a different view,
however, from the majority because of what I felt was a sweeping
reliance on said doctrines without giving due regard to the peculiar facts
of the case. I underscored that these principles may not be applied where
the internal legislative rules would breach the Constitution which this
Court has a solemn duty to uphold. It was my position then that the
introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Committee Report
violated the constitutional proscription against any amendment to a bill
upon the last reading thereof and which this Court, in the exercise of its
judicial power, can properly inquire into without running afoul of the
principle of separation of powers.
Last year,2 Arroyo, et al. v. de Venecia, et al.3 presented an opportunity
for me to clarify my position further. In that case, Congressman Joker
Arroyo filed a petition before the Court complaining that during a session
by the House of Representatives, he was effectively prevented from
raising the question of quorum which to him tainted the validity of
Republic Act No. 8240, or the so-called "sin taxes" law. The Court,
speaking again through Justice Mendoza, dismissed Mr. Arroyo's
petition, arguing in the main that courts are denied the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
Concurring with the majority opinion, I discerned a need to explain my
position then because of possible misinterpretation. I was very emphatic
that I did not abandon my position in Tolentino, the facts as presented
in Arroyo being radically different from the former. In keeping with my
view that judicial review is permissible only to uphold the Constitution, I
pointed out that the legislative rules allegedly violated were purely
internal and had no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and
proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a bill which would
otherwise warrant the Court's intervention.
In the instant case, at the risk of being repetitious, I again take a similar
stand as the ones I made in the two cited cases.
Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of
a Senate "office" and does not deal with the passage of a bill or the
observance of internal rules for the Senate's conduct of its business, the
same ground as I previously invoked may justify the Court's refusal to pry
into the procedures of the Senate. There is to me no constitutional
breach which has been made and, ergo, there is nothing for this Court to
uphold. The interpretation placed by petitioners on Section 16 (1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution clearly does not find support in the text
thereof. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end
to that which is implied. The majority vote required for the election of a
Senate President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives speaks
only of such number or quantity of votes for an aspirant to be lawfully
elected as such. There is here no declaration that by so electing, each of
the two Houses of Congress is thereby divided into camps called the
"majority" and the "minority." In fact, the "offices" of Majority Floor Leader
and Minority Floor Leader are not explicitly provided for as constitutional
offices. As pointed out by my esteemed colleague, Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, who penned the herein majority opinion, even on the theory
that under paragraph 2, Section 16 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution,
each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary,
still "the method of choosing who will be such officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision." With the prerogative being, therefore, bestowed
upon the Senate, whatever differences the parties may have against
each other must be settled in their own turf and the Court, conscious as it
is of its constitutionally-delineated powers, will not take a perilous move
to overstep the same.
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
The 1987 Constitution, like the counterpart 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
has continued to be implicit in its recognition of the time-honored precept
of separation of powers which enjoins upon each of the three co-equal
and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — proper acknowledgment
and respect for each other. The Supreme Court, said to be holding
neither the "purse" (held by Congress) nor the "sword" (held by the
Executive) but serving as the balance wheel in the State governance,
functions both as the tribunal of last resort and as the Constitutional
Court of the nation.1 Peculiar, however, to the present Constitution,
specifically under Article VII, Section 1, thereof, is the extended
jurisdiction of judicial power that now explicitly allows the determination of
"whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government."2 This expanded concept of judicial power seems to
have been dictated by the martial law experience and to be an immediate
reaction to the abuse in the frequent recourse to the political question
doctrine that in no small measure has emasculated the Court. The term
"political question," in this context, refers to matters which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity
or in regard to which discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, should not be thought of as having
been tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire
bureaucracy. I find it here opportune to reiterate what I have stated
in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,3 viz:
I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly
provocative as it might be, that under the 1987
Constitution the Court may now at good liberty intrude, in
the guise of the people's imprimatur, into every affair of
government. What significance can still then remain, I
ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed principle of
separation of powers if, at every turn, the Court allows
itself to pass upon at will the disposition of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch in our system of
government. I dread to think of the so varied uncertainties
that such an undue interference can lead to. The respect
for long standing doctrines in our jurisprudence,
nourished through time, is one of maturity, not timidity, of
stability rather than quiescence.
Pervasive and limitless, such as it, may seem to be, judicial
power still succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation of
powers. Congress is the branch of government, composed of the
representatives of the people, that lays down the policies of
government and provides the direction that the nation must take.
The Executive carries out that mandate. Certainly, the Court will
not negate that which is done by these, co-equal and co-ordinate
branches merely because of a perceived case of grave abuse of
discretion on their part, clearly too relative a phrase to be its own
sentinel against misuse, even as it will not hesitate to wield the
power if that abuse becomes all too clear. The exercise of judicial
statesmanship, not judicial tyranny, is what has been envisioned
by and institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution.
There is no harnbook rule by which grave abuse of discretion may be
determined. The provision was evidently couched in general terms to
make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any
contemporary or emerging millieu. In its normal concept, the term has
been said to imply capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
amounting, to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or at the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner such as by reason of passion or
personal hostility. When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, I would subscribe to
the dictum, somewhat made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs. De
Venecia,4 that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional
proscription thereby inheres the Court will not deign substitute its own
judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government.
Verily, in this situation, it is an impairment or a clear disregard of a
specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door
for judicial intervention.
In the instant settings, I find insufficient indication to have the case hew to
the above rule.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part;
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I disagree that "[it] has
jurisdiction over the petition [in this case] to determine whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives."1
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute
the minority in the Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of that
chamber is political. It respects the internal affairs of a coequal
department of the government and is thus addressed solely to that
august body.
Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization and
business of a house of Congress except as the question affects the rights
of third parties or a specific constitutional limitation is involved.
For this reason this Court has declined to take cognizance of cases
involving the discipline of members2 of the legislature and the application
and interpretation of the rules of procedure of a house.3 For indeed, these
matters pertain to the internal government of Congress and are within its
exclusive jurisdiction.
Dean Sinco has pointed out that the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate are not state officers.
They do not attain these positions by popular vote but only by the vote of
their respective chambers. They receive their mandate as such not from
the voters but from their peers in the house. While their offices are a
constitutional creation, nevertheless they are only legislative officers. It is
their position as members of Congress which gives them the status of
state officers. As presiding officers of their respective chambers, their
election as well as removal is determined by the vote of the majority of
the members of the house to which they belong.4 Thus, Art VI, §16(1) of
the Constitution provides:
The Senate shall elect its President and the of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.
This is likewise true of the "other officers" of each house whose
election and removal rest solely within the prerogative of the
members and is no concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took cognizance of matters
pertaining to the internal government of each house, infringements of
specific constitutional limitations were alleged.
In Avelino v. Cuenco,5 the question was whether with only 12 senators
present there was a quorum for the election of the Senate President,
considering that, of the 24 members, one was in the hospital while
another one was abroad. The case called for an interpretation of Art. VI,
§10(2) of the 1935 Constitution which provided that "A majority of each
House shall constitute a quorum to do business. . . ." While initially
declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally took cognizance of the
matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate opinion in support of the
assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which persuaded the
Court to intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there was a
quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that
calls for the interpretation, application and enforcement of an express
and specific provision of the Constitution."6 In his view, "The word quorum
is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact
mathematical meaning. A majority means more than one-half (1/2)." 7
In Tañada v. Cuenco,8 the question was whether the majority could fill the
seats intended for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
when there are not enough minority members in the Senate. Again, the
question was governed by a specific provision (Art. VI, §11) of the 1935
charter which provided that the Electoral Tribunals of each house should
be composed of "nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court . . . I and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the
second largest number of votes therein." There was, therefore, a specific
constitutional provision to be applied.
The cases9 concerning the composition of the Commission on
Appointments likewise involved the mere application of a constitutional
provision, specifically Art. VI, §18 of the present Constitution which
provides that the Commission shall be composed of "twelve Senators
and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein." Undoubtedly, the Court had jurisdiction over the
cases.
On the other hand, as long as the proportional representation of political
parties and organizations is observed the Court has held itself to be
without jurisdiction over the choice of nominees. In Cabili v.
Francisco, 10 it declined to take cognizance of a quo warranto suit seeking
to annul the recomposition of the Senate representation in the
Commission and to reinstate a particular senator after satisfying itself that
such recomposition of the Senate representation was not a "departure
from the constitution mandate requiring proportional representation of the
political organizations in the Commission on Appointments."
It is true that in Cunanan v. Tan 11 this Court took cognizance of the case
which involved the reorganization of the Commission as a result of the
realignment of political forces in the House of Representatives and the
formation of a temporary alliance. But the Court's decision was justified
because the case actually involved the right of a third party whose
nomination by the President had been rejected by the reorganized
Commission. As held in Pacete v. The Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments. 12 where the construction to be given to a rule affects
persons other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is judicial in character.
In contrast to the specific constitutional limitations involved in the
foregoing cases, beyond providing that the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall elect a President and Speaker, respectively, and
such other officers as each house shall determine "by a majority vote of
all [their] respective Members," the Constitution leaves everything else to
each house of Congress. Such matters are political and are left solely to
the judgment of the legislative department of the government.
This case involves neither an infringement of specific constitutional
limitations nor a violation of the rights of a party not a member of
Congress. This Court has jurisdiction over this case only in the sense that
determining whether the question involved is reserved to Congress is
itself an exercise of jurisdiction in the same way that a court which
dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction must in a narrow sense have
jurisdiction since it cannot dismiss the case if it were otherwise. The
determination of whether the question involved is justiciable or not is in
itself a process of constitutional interpretation. This is the great lesson
of Marbury v. Madison 13 in which the U.S. Supreme Court, while affirming
its power of review, in the end held itself to be without jurisdiction
because the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting it jurisdiction over that case
was unconstitutional. In other words, a court doing a Marbury v.
Madison has no jurisdiction except to declare itself without jurisdiction
over the case.
I vote to dismiss the petition in this case for lack of jurisdiction.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion;
"Loyalty to petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a human
soul."
These words vividly inscribed just beneath Mark Twain's bust at the Hall
of Fame veritably speaks about the creativity and dynamism which ought
to characterize our perspective of things. It instructs us to broaden our
horizon that we may not be held captive by ignorance. Free and robust
thinking is the imperative.
But there are times when one has to render fealty to certain fundamental
precepts and I believe that this occasion presents an opportunity to do
so. Thus, as I join the majority and cast my vote today for the denial of
the instant petition, may I just be allowed to reiterate jurisprudential
postulates which I have long embraced, not for the sake of "loyalty to
petrified opinion" but to stress consistency in doctrine in the hope that all
future disputes of this nature may be similarly resolved in this manner.
This is not actually the first time that the Court has been invited to resolve
a matter originating from the internal processes undertaken by a co-equal
branch of government, more particularly the Senate in this case. Earlier,
in the landmark case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al.,1 we were
confronted, among other things, by the issue of whether a significant tax
measure namely, Republic Act. No. 7716 (Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law), went through the legislative mill in keeping with the constitutionally-
mandated procedure for the passage of bills. Speaking through Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, the majority upheld the tax measure's validity,
relying on the enrolled bill theory and the view that the Court is not the
appropriate forum to enforce internal legislative rules supposedly violated
when the bill was being passed by Congress. I took a different view,
however, from the majority because of what I felt was a sweeping
reliance on said doctrines without giving due regard to the peculiar facts
of the case. I underscored that these principles may not be applied where
the internal legislative rules would breach the Constitution which this
Court has a solemn duty to uphold. It was my position then that the
introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Committee Report
violated the constitutional proscription against any amendment to a bill
upon the last reading thereof and which this Court, in the exercise of its
judicial power, can properly inquire into without running afoul of the
principle of separation of powers.
Last year,2 Arroyo, et al. v. de Venecia, et al.3 presented an opportunity
for me to clarify my position further. In that case, Congressman Joker
Arroyo filed a petition before the Court complaining that during a session
by the House of Representatives, he was effectively prevented from
raising the question of quorum which to him tainted the validity of
Republic Act No. 8240, or the so-called "sin taxes" law. The Court,
speaking again through Justice Mendoza, dismissed Mr. Arroyo's
petition, arguing in the main that courts are denied the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
Concurring with the majority opinion, I discerned a need to explain my
position then because of possible misinterpretation. I was very emphatic
that I did not abandon my position in Tolentino, the facts as presented
in Arroyo being radically different from the former. In keeping with my
view that judicial review is permissible only to uphold the Constitution, I
pointed out that the legislative rules allegedly violated were purely
internal and had no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and
proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a bill which would
otherwise warrant the Court's intervention.
In the instant case, at the risk of being repetitious, I again take a similar
stand as the ones I made in the two cited cases.
Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of
a Senate "office" and does not deal with the passage of a bill or the
observance of internal rules for the Senate's conduct of its business, the
same ground as I previously invoked may justify the Court's refusal to pry
into the procedures of the Senate. There is to me no constitutional
breach which has been made and, ergo, there is nothing for this Court to
uphold. The interpretation placed by petitioners on Section 16 (1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution clearly does not find support in the text
thereof. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end
to that which is implied. The majority vote required for the election of a
Senate President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives speaks
only of such number or quantity of votes for an aspirant to be lawfully
elected as such. There is here no declaration that by so electing, each of
the two Houses of Congress is thereby divided into camps called the
"majority" and the "minority." In fact, the "offices" of Majority Floor Leader
and Minority Floor Leader are not explicitly provided for as constitutional
offices. As pointed out by my esteemed colleague, Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, who penned the herein majority opinion, even on the theory
that under paragraph 2, Section 16 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution,
each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary,
still "the method of choosing who will be such officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision." With the prerogative being, therefore, bestowed
upon the Senate, whatever differences the parties may have against
each other must be settled in their own turf and the Court, conscious as it
is of its constitutionally-delineated powers, will not take a perilous move
to overstep the same.
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
The 1987 Constitution, like the counterpart 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
has continued to be implicit in its recognition of the time-honored precept
of separation of powers which enjoins upon each of the three co-equal
and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — proper acknowledgment
and respect for each other. The Supreme Court, said to be holding
neither the "purse" (held by Congress) nor the "sword" (held by the
Executive) but serving as the balance wheel in the State governance,
functions both as the tribunal of last resort and as the Constitutional
Court of the nation.1 Peculiar, however, to the present Constitution,
specifically under Article VII, Section 1, thereof, is the extended
jurisdiction of judicial power that now explicitly allows the determination of
"whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government."2 This expanded concept of judicial power seems to
have been dictated by the martial law experience and to be an immediate
reaction to the abuse in the frequent recourse to the political question
doctrine that in no small measure has emasculated the Court. The term
"political question," in this context, refers to matters which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity
or in regard to which discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, should not be thought of as having
been tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire
bureaucracy. I find it here opportune to reiterate what I have stated
in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,3 viz:
I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly
provocative as it might be, that under the 1987
Constitution the Court may now at good liberty intrude, in
the guise of the people's imprimatur, into every affair of
government. What significance can still then remain, I
ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed principle of
separation of powers if, at every turn, the Court allows
 itself to pass upon at will the disposition of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch in our system of
government. I dread to think of the so varied uncertainties
that such an undue interference can lead to. The respect
for long standing doctrines in our jurisprudence,
nourished through time, is one of maturity, not timidity, of
stability rather than quiescence.

Pervasive and limitless, such as it, may seem to be, judicial

power still succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation of
powers. Congress is the branch of government, composed of the
representatives of the people, that lays down the policies of
government and provides the direction that the nation must take.
The Executive carries out that mandate. Certainly, the Court will
not negate that which is done by these, co-equal and co-ordinate
branches merely because of a perceived case of grave abuse of
discretion on their part, clearly too relative a phrase to be its own
sentinel against misuse, even as it will not hesitate to wield the
power if that abuse becomes all too clear. The exercise of judicial
statesmanship, not judicial tyranny, is what has been envisioned
by and institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution.

There is no harnbook rule by which grave abuse of discretion may be

determined. The provision was evidently couched in general terms to
make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any
contemporary or emerging millieu. In its normal concept, the term has
been said to imply capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
amounting, to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or at the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner such as by reason of passion or
personal hostility. When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, I would subscribe to
the dictum, somewhat made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs. De
Venecia,4 that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional
proscription thereby inheres the Court will not deign substitute its own
judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government.
Verily, in this situation, it is an impairment or a clear disregard of a
specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door
for judicial intervention.

In the instant settings, I find insufficient indication to have the case hew to
the above rule.

Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE
HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in
his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his
capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE
SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR
LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS
YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR.,
ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO,
MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO
VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE
BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in
their capacities as members of the Municipal Board, respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas
and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for
respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor
Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and
Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic
Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila,
Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred
Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was
filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third
reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was
sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed
by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended
approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that
instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the
Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the
latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second
reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 11 were
introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by
Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings
as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House
of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the
Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a
certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by
Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones
actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it,
and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were
then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the
Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the
President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of
approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No.
4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public
denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate
reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press
statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law
by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually
passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence
the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a
letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining
that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of
both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill
duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the
enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21,
1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate
President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature
appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact
that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a
valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view
of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House
Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July
3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert
into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued
circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic
Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-
Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor,
Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964
for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory
and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the
Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief
of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal
board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never
became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and
that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself
should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then
going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order,
without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from
exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred
upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065
and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law
until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded
by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and
Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici
curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on
the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities,
principally decisions of United States Federal and State Courts, have
been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or
the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar
question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the
case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil.
Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the
"enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been
laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of
Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be
appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision)
had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of
the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in
by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M.
Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not
within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of
powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon
merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning
being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also
binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice
Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the
question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of
the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us,"
specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No.
2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil
Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the
"enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals
of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk
or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the
case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy
signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by
both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding
officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill.2 It has
been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication,3 to
signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has
been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or
rejection.4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval,
because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses.
Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities
are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that
their absence would render the statute invalid.5 The affirmative view, it is
pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of
veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary6 There is less
reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where
the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should
sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required
the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed
mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as
conclusive proof of its due enactment.7 Another case however, under the
same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence.8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark,9 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not
required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The
authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case
of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation
by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through
their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus
attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives
his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should
be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary
of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by
the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon
that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in
conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the
respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires
the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in
other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required
for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent
as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the
presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due
enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to
the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its
proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may in its judgment require
secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House
unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its
final form furnished its Members at least three calendar
days prior to its passage, except when the President shall
have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment.
Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall
be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of
Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said,
by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, 11 is
neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his
signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification
that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had
never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it
did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the
certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the
validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In
other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that
"[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be
presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme
Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution,
said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final
passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not
attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed both
houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but
argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to
have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at
all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out,
Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument
begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or
absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the
validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no
enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or
not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the
journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary
record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors,
the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire
whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive
was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and
resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President
of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their
signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be
to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-
called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE
POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY
OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS
TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED
NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED
CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining
order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.
10 Gray vs. Taylor, 113 P 588, 591, affirmed in 227 U. S.
51, 57, 57 L. ed. 413, 416; Pelt vs. Payne, 30 SW 426,
427.
11 Field vs. Clark, supra at p. 303; Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 13; Morales vs. Subido, L-29658, Feb. 27,
1969, 27 SCRA 131, 134.
12 Article VI, Section 20(1). The 1973 Constitution
similarly provides in Article VIII, Section 20(1) that
"(E)very bill passed by the National Assembly shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the Prime
Minister ... "

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part. 13 See, for example, the decisions of this Court in Casco
Phil. Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez, L-17931, Feb. 28, 1963,
Makasiar, J., is on leave. 7 SCRA 347 and Morales vs. Subido, supra.

Footnotes

1 Amending Section 10 of R. A. No. 409 defining the

powers and duties of the Vice-Mayor.

2 See Rules of the House of Representatives, Rules II (d)

and IV(j) and Rules of the Senate; Sections 3(e) and 6(h).

3 Brown vs. Morris, 290 SW 2d 160, 164.

4 Taylor vs. Wilson, 22 NW 119, 120.

5 See Annotations in 95 ALR 273.

6 Brown vs. Morris supra, at pp. 164-165.

7 Hammond vs. Lynch, 151 NW 81, 88.

8 Lynch vs. Hutchinson 76 NE 370.

9 143 U. S. 294, 303; 36 L. ed. 294.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto
Lasarte with the crime of illegal importation of opium, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused,
conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did,
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring
from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the
steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court,
520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of
P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the said
accused, also conspiring together and plotting among
themselves, did receive and conceal the said quantity of opium
and aided each other in the transportation, receipt and
concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported,
knowing that said drug had been unlawfully brought, imported
and illegally introduced into the Philippine Islands from a foreign
country; an act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried
separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each were found
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be
confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of
P1,000, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same
penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to
pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and
the judgment as to him has become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of
error) and are greatly multiplied by their reiteration in a somewhat
changed form of statement under the many propositions embraced in the
elaborate printed brief, but their essence, when correctly understood, are
these: The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May
6, 1915, and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal
evidence of record establishes the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons,
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that
the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914
was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must
be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of
February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null
and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is
admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the
Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is
charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital
question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces
itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the
legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can
take judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be considered in
the reversed order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall
perform the duties which would properly be required of the Recorder of
the Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the
Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among
other things, "that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and
accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the
Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the
Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for
the ordinary and special sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the
following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved.
Adjournment sine die of the Commission as a Chamber of the
Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having arrived, on
 motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber
of the Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other
things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal of
its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this
mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of
1914 was duly published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the
Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28,
1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of
the "official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of
the United States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall be judicially
recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court
may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section states,
when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for
its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence." And section 313
[as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code also provides
that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislative body that may be provided for the Philippine Islands, or
of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their
order: Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature when there is in
existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact
question whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative
journals, it is well settled in the United States that such journals may be
noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill
became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348,
and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated
cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of
the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals
are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the
adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature
adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published
by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was
passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative
journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when
such journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this
investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which
embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one hand, it is
maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at
midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation
or alleged fact may be established by extraneous evidence; while, on the
other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are
conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to
understand these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the
nature and character of the evidence thus involved. Evidence is
understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question
or to influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that
which establishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive
presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel
for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily
depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the
legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself.
From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of
the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows
that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight
and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending
matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to
enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time
fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special
session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the
clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might
be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and
character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action
depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence,
and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long
centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of
the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that
character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for
all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation
less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts
between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters."
(Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same
point the court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348),
decided in 1886, said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various
cases upon this question; and, out of a multitude of citations, not
one is found in which any court has assumed to go beyond the
proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the journals
required to be kept in each of its branches, on the question
whether a law has been adopted. And if reasons for the limitation
upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not generally been
stated, in doubtless arises from the fact that they are apparent.
Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of
laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent
character. They should be public, because all are required to
conform to them; they should be permanent, that right acquired
to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall
not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by
facts resting only in the memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited
numerous decisions of the various states in the American Union in
support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a
single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed
or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the
Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the
Federal Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow
the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind
these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez
y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain, bringing, among other cargo,
twenty-five barrels which were manifested as "wine" and consigned to
Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this cargo,
engaged in the business of a wine merchant, with an office and
warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's
invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels were delivered to
Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were
indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto
Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident to the release of
the merchandise from the customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were
delivered in due course to the warehouse of Beliso at the aforementioned
street and number. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery.
Shortly thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments
of merchandise manifested as "wine" had been arriving in Manila from
Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not listed as merchants,
and having some doubt as to the nature of the merchandise so
consigned, instituted an investigation and traced on the 10th of April,
1915, the twenty-five barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the
customs registry number of the shipment, the entry number, and the
serial number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five barrels
began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11 o'clock on
the morning of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived at that place, the
appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso's warehouse and joined Beliso in
the latter's office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left
and shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in
Beliso's bodega. He called one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and
directed him to go out and get a bull cart. This Sese did and returned with
the vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment
of twenty-five and told Sese to load these five on the cart and to deliver
them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano. This order was
complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to Pons at the place
designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on the 10th, the
customs secret service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date
before the office was opened and awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was
found in the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents then proceeded
to separate the recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the
warehouse, identifying the barrels by the customs registry and entry
numbers. Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels could be found on
Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or interrogated, Sese informed
the customs agents that the five missing barrels had been delivered by
him to Pons at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The agents,
accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and here
found the five missing barrels, which were identified by the registry and
entry numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were
empty, the staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five
empty tins, each corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels,
were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed several
baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house and on further
search they found 77 tins of opium in one of these baskets. There was no
one in the house when this search was made, but some clothing was
discovered which bore the initials "J. P." It then became important to the But during the trial of this case in the court below Pons testified that
customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of house No. 144 Garcia was a wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had
on Calle General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia) and
owner was found, upon investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and from the retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to
latter's agent it was learned that the house was rented by one F. C. Pons this letter arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels
Garcia. When the lease of the house was produced by the agent of the of "wine," but that he had destroyed it because he feared that it would
owner, the agents saw that the same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan compromise him. On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in
Pons." After discovering these facts they returned to the house of Beliso purchasing wine from Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had
and selected three of the twenty barrels and ordered them returned to the just arrived on the Lopez y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C.
customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was found to Garcia told me in this letter that this opium was coming in barrels of wine
contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the
and securely nailed. Each large tin contained 75 small tins of opium. A reason I wanted to get these barrels of wine."
comparison of the large tins taken out of the three barrels with the empty
ones found at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these
they were in every way identical in size, form, etc." fats establish the guilt of the appellant beyond any question of a doubt,
notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the opium as shipped to
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso him from Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a
on the morning of April 10, Pons, apparently unaware that anything direct part in this huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The
unusual was going on, arrived there and was placed under arrest, and penalty imposed by the trial court is in accordance with la and the
taken to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret decisions of this court in similar cases.
service, and according to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his participation
in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained, however, that the 77 tins For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano represented the entire costs. So ordered.
importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the
three barrels were opened and the customs officers appearing to be no Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
doubt as to which end of the barrels contained the opium, Pons showed
the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the end of the
barrel, which had the impression of a bottle stamped in the wood,
contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of opium taken from the
three barrels, Pons further stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of
opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning of
April 10, following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further
questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several
opium transactions; that the house at No. 144 Calle General Solano had
been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for the purpose of
handling the prohibited drug; and that he and Beliso had shared the
profits of a previous importation of opium. Sese testified that he had
delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The customs
agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard several
large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those found at 144 Calle
General Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At
first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in
the between the Provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, and later he
retracted this statement and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person.
 Republic of the Philippines On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service
SUPREME COURT Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected
Manila his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil
service eligibility requirements for the said position." Instead, the
EN BANC respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post and called the
attention of the mayor to section 4 of the Decentralization Act of 1967
G.R. No. L-29658 November 29, 1968 which requires the filling of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming into
existence. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the metropolitan
newspapers that the position of chief of police of Manila was vacant and
ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner,
listed the qualifications which applicants should possess.
vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.
The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand that the
respondent include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from
Vicente Rodriguez, for appellant.
which the mayor might appoint one as chief of police of the city. He
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
contended that his service alone as captain for more than three years in
the Manila Police Department qualified him for appointment. The demand
CASTRO, J.: was contained in a letter which he wrote to the respondent on October 8,
1968. The mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent
The question for resolution in this case is whether a person who has refused to reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to
served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three compel the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five next
years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for ranking eligible and qualified persons."
appointment as chief of police. The question calls for an interpretation of
the following provisions of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic The petitioner's reading of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 is, per his
Act 4864): own phrasing, as follows:

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency
— No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE
unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution
of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served
learning AND has served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the
OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR
police department of any city with the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school
graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at (2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR
least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
(3) has served in the police department of any city with the rank
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; OR
the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel.
He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his (4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in the
present position. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain
March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated acting chief of police of and/or higher.
Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the
same position by the mayor of Manila. As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant colonel
in the MPD since 1954, the petitioner's insistence is that he falls under
the third class of persons qualified for appointment as chief of a city
police department.
In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act "to place
the local police service on a professional level,"1 and contends that a
bachelor's degree does not guarantee that one who possesses it will
make a good policeman, but that, on the other hand, one who, like the
petitioner, has risen from patrolman to lieutenant colonel "meets the test
of professionalism."
Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view still we do not
see how the requirement of a college degree as additional qualification
can run counter to the avowed policy of the Act. On the contrary, we
should think that the requirement of such additional qualification will best
carry out that policy. The fallacy of petitioner's argument lies in its
assumption that the choice is between one who has served long and
loyally in a city police agency and another who, not having so served, has
only a bachelor's degree. But that is not the issue in this case. The issue
rather is whether, within the meaning and intendment of the law, in
addition to service qualification, one should have educational qualification
as shown by the possession of a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of section 9 of the Act which
provides:
Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act have rendered
at least five years of satisfactory service in a provincial, city or
municipal police agency although they have not qualified in an
appropriate civil service examination are considered as civil
service eligibles for the purpose of this Act.
In effect, he contends that if a person who has rendered at least five
years of satisfactory service in a police agency is considered a civil
service eligible, so must a person be considered qualified even though he
does not possess a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to
distinguish between eligibility and qualification. For the statute may allow
the compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility but not
necessarily for his lack of educational qualification. Second, section 9
governs the appointment of members of a police agency only. On the
other hand, the appointment of chiefs of police is the precise gravamen of
section 10, the last paragraph of which states:
Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional
appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service Law
and rules: Provided, that the appointee possesses the above
educational qualification: Provided, further, That in no case shall
such appointment extend beyond six months, except for a valid
cause, and with the approval of the Civil Service Commission.
Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to compensate
for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a member of a police
agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case
of a chief of police. On the contrary, by providing that a person, who is
not a civil service eligible, may be provisionally appointed2 chief of police
"[ p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee possesses the above educational
qualification," the Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of a
college degree or a high school diploma (in addition to service) is an
indispensable requisite.
It is next contended that to read section 10 as requiring a bachelor's
degree, in addition to service either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or in the National Bureau of Investigation or as chief of police
with an exemplary record or as a captain in a city police department for at
least three years, would be to create an "absurd situation" in which a
person who has served for only one month in the AFP or the NBI is in law
considered the equal of another who has been a chief of police or has
been a captain in a city police agency for at least three years. From this it
is concluded that "the only logical equivalence of these two groups (Chief
of Police with exemplary record and Police Captain for at least 3 years in
a City Police Agency) is the bachelor's degree."
Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what capacity service
in the AFP or in the NBI must have been rendered, but an admission of
the existence of the ambiguity in the statute does not necessarily compel
acquiescence in the conclusion that it is only in cases where the
appointee's service has been in the AFP or in the NBI that he must be
required to have a bachelor's degree. The logical implication of the
petitioner's argument that a person who has served as captain in a city
police department for at least three years need not have a bachelor's
degree to qualify, is that such person need not even be a high school
graduate. If such be the case would there still be need for a person to be
at least a high school graduate provided he has had at least eight years
of service as captain in the AFP?
The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to (the meaning of
which is not in issue in this case), section 10 of the Act needs no
interpretation because its meaning is clear. That the purpose is to require
both educational and service qualifications of those seeking appointment
as chief of police is evidence from a reading of the original provision of
House Bill 6951 and the successive revision it underwent. Thus, section
12 of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the Police Act of 1966) read:
Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a Police
Agency. — No chief of a police agency of a province or chartered
city shall be appointed unless he is a member of the Philippine
Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's degree in police administration.
Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the
Philippine Constabulary or the police department of any city from
the rank of captain or inspector, second class, or its equivalent for
at least three years shall be eligible for appointment to the
position of chief of the police agency.
No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed unless he
is a holder of a four-year college degree course or a holder of a
Bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology.
Where no civil service eligible is available provisional
appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service Law
and rules, provided the appointee possesses the above
educational qualification but in no case shall such appointment
exceed beyond six months.
It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as requiring both
educational and service qualifications that the following exchanges of
view were made on the floor of the house of Representatives:
MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum Qualification for
Appointment of Chief of a Police Agency, provides that the chief
of a police agency of a province or a chartered city should be at
least a member of the Philippine Bar or a holder of a bachelor's
degree in Police Administration; and the chief of police of a
municipality should be at least a holder of a four years' college
degree or holder of a bachelor's degree in Police Administration
or Criminology.
At first blush, there is no reason why I should object to these
minimum requirements; but I find such requirement very rigid
because it would not allow a man to rise from the ranks. Take a
policeman who rose from the ranks. He became a corporal, a
sergeant, a police lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed to go
higher? If he merited it, he should also be appointed chief of
police of a city or municipality.
MR. AMANTE. During our committee discussions, I objected to
this provision of the bill because it is a very high qualification.
However, somebody insisted that in order to professionalize our
police system and also to attain a high standard of police
efficiency, we must have a chief of police who has a college
degree. The point which the gentleman is now raising was
brought up by one Member in the sense that a policeman who
rose from the ranks through serious hard work, even after serving
for fifteen or twenty years in the police force, cannot become chief
of police for lack of a college degree.
The gentleman's objection is a very good and reasonable one. I
assure him that if he brings it up during the period of
amendments, I will consider it.
MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the Committee will accept my
amendment. My only regret, however, is that because I made a
number of proposed amendments, I will not be ready to submit
them immediately. We should just limit ourselves to the
sponsorship this evening.3
Thus it appears that it was because of the educational requirement
contained in the bill that objections were expressed, but while it was
agreed to delete this requirement during the period of amendment, no
motion was ever presented to effect the change.4
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which
House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure.5 It is to this
substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and
substance.
Parenthetically, the substitute measure gives light on the meaning of the
ambiguous phrase "and who has served either in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation." The provision of
the substitute bill reads:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation
 or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain
or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city for at
least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the capacity of
captain for at least three years.
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as
officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to make the provision
read:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation
or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain
or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city or who
has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.6
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an
addition to the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city
for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher," under which
the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both parties
agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could
possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the
phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained.
Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made by
mistake, the writer of this opinion personally and painstakingly read and
examined the enrolled bill in the possession of the legislative secretary of
the Office of the President and found that the text of section 10 of the Act
is as set forth in the beginning of this opinion. The text of the Act bears
on page 15 thereof the signatures of President of the Senate Arturo M.
Tolentino and Speaker of the House of Representatives Cornelio T.
Villareal, and on page 16 thereof those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of
the Senate, and Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the House of
Representatives, and of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under the
enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito8 this text of the
Act must be deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding on the
courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in Marshall Field
& Co. v. Clark:9
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and,
by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled
bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one
that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus
attested, has received in the form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bill which pass
Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus
attested, receives his approval, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a
bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the house of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent
department requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.10
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that, when the two
chambers of the legislature met in conference committee, the phrase
"has served as chief of police with exemplary record" was added, thereby
accounting for its presence in section 10 of the Act.11
What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that — except
for that vagrant phrase "who has served the police department of a city
for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher" — a high
school graduate, no matter how long he has served in a city police
department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police.
Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who has served as
captain in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight years irrespective
of the branch of service where he served can be Chief of Police of
Manila, why not one who holds an A.A. degree, completed two years in
Law School, and served as Chief of the Detective Bureau for 14 years,
holding the successive ranks of Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel? Not to
mention the fact that he was awarded three Presidential Awards, and
was given the Congressional Commendation — the highest award ever
conferred in the history of the Manila Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to concede its
soundness, still we would be hard put reading it in the law because it is
not there. The inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute is
addressed to the judgment of Congress and unless such enlargements
are by it accepted courts are without power to make them. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity:
An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later
wisdom may recomment the inclusion.
The vital difference between initiating policy, often involving a
decided break with the past, and merely carrying out a formulated
policy, indicates the relatively narrow limits within which choice is
fairly open to courts and the extent to which interpreting law is
inescapably making law.12
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the
petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of police
of the city of Manila. Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding
legal duty — and therefore may not be compelled by mandamus to certify
the petitioner as qualified and eligible.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No
pronouncements as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., concurs in the result.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
DIZON, J., concurring:
As stated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
petitioner Enrique V. Morales began his career in the Manila Police
Department in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present
position — that of Chief of the Detective Bureau thereof — and holds the
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
In my opinion, a man bearing such credentials can be reasonably
expected to be a good Chief of the Manila Police Department. But the
issue before us is not whether or not his training and experience justify
that expectation, but whether or not, under and in accordance with the
pertinent law, he is qualified for appointment to such office to the extent
that he is entitled to the relief sought, namely, the issuance of a writ of
mandamus compelling the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to
include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from which the
mayor of the City of Manila might choose the appointee who will fill the
vacant position of Chief of Police of the City of Manila.
Section 10 of Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864) — which controls
the issue before us, reads as follows:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency.
— No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency
unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution
of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served
as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the
police department of any city with the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school
graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at
least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
The above legal provision may be construed as providing for two different
kinds of academic qualification, namely, (1) a bachelor's degree from a
recognized institution of learning, and (2) a high school degree, each of
which is coupled with separate and distinct service qualifications. Any
one of the latter, joined with either of the aforesaid academic
requirements, would qualify a person for appointment as Chief of a city
police agency. In other words, an applicant who is a holder of a
bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation would make the grade, in the same manner as
would another applicant with a similar bachelor's degree who has served
as chief of police with exemplary record, etc.
In the case of an applicant who is a mere high school graduate, the
service qualification is not only different but is higher and more exacting
— for obvious reasons.

Petitioner, however, would construe and read the law as follows:

NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency

unless HE

(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution

of learning AND has served in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR

(2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record,

OR

(3) has served in the police department of any city with

the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years; OR

(4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in

the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.

While, in my view, petitioner's interpretation is not unreasonable, it falls

short of showing that it is the true and correct meaning and intent of the
law aforesaid. This, in my opinion, must lead to the conclusion that
petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus for the
purpose stated in his petition because to be entitled thereto he must
show that, in relation to the matter at issue, he has a clear enforceable
right, on the one hand, and that the respondent has an imperative legal
duty to perform, on the other. Because of this I am constrained to concur
in the result.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor,
Congress of the Philippines, respondents.
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr. for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-General's decision that
petitioner as a Congressman whose term of office expired on December 30, 1969 and qualified for
retirement benefits by virtue of a minimum of twenty years of government service is entitled to a
retirement gratuity based on the salary actually received by him as a member of Congress of
P7,200.00 per annum. To grant petitioner's contention that the retirement gratuity of members of
Congress; such as himself whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 should be computed on the
basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum under Republic Act 4134 which could only by
operative with incoming members of Congress whose terms of office would commence on December
30, 1969, by virtue of the Constitutional mandate that such salary increases could take effect only upon
the expiration of the full term of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such
increased salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members of Congress were constitutionally
prohibited from receiving such salary increase during their term of office) would be a subtle way of
going around the constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their compensation during their term
of office and of doing indirectly what could not be done directly.
Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms
covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30,
1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134
"fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of
the national government" was enacted into law and under section 7
thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress
(senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from
P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that
said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution." (section 1)
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to
December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of
P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous
decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay1 "that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30,
1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the
constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
which provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections
and his term having expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for
retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by
Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or
employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of
service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein
provided "in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in
case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law."2
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant
in the sum of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity,
using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of
Congress which he never received during his incumbency and which
under this Court's above-quoted decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay could
become operative only on December 30, 1969 with the expiration of the
full terms of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964
such increased salary.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant,
however, pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim
filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as
Congressman likewise expired on December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested
petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting papers for a
recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing therewith copy of the
Auditor General's adverse decision on ex-Congressman Singson's claim
for retirement gratuity as computed on the basis of the salary increase of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act No.
4134.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course on
January 20, 1972, by the Auditor General through respondent Auditor
who further advised petitioner and furnished him with copy of the 2nd
indorsement of June 29, 1971, of the Office of the President, dismissing
the appeal of Congressman Singson from the Auditor General's adverse
decision disallowing the claim for retirement gratuity, computed on a
salary basis of P32,000.00 per annum.
Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from the adverse
decision of the Auditor General.
The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his
incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held
in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative
only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for
members of Congress "as provided by law" (under Republic Act 4134)
was already P32,000.00 per annum.
Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of
Congress under Republic Act 4134 could be operative
only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress when
the full term of all members of Congress (House and Senate) that
approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of
the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935
Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for
members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner
must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they
received "as provided by law" and the Constitution during their term of
office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the
Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond
that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the
similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch
a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same
prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what can not be done directly."3
The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape
notice that during his entire tenure as Congressman (Dec. 30, 1965 to
December 30, 1969) comprising the last four years of his government
service, the herein claimant-retiree was unable to receive the increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum for Members of Congress precisely
because of the ,constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such
amount in the guise of retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand
to reason that while he could not legally receive such rate as salary while
still in the service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue
of his retirement."4
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00
per annum was already operative when his retirement took effect on
December 30, 1969, his retirement gratuity should be based on such
increased salary cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of
Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30,
1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or
benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional
provision limiting their compensation and "other emoluments" to their
salary as provided by law.
This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez.5 In striking down
Republic Act No. 3836 as null and void insofar as it referred to the
retirement of members of Congress and the elected officials thereof for
being violative of the Constitution, this Court held that "it is evident that
retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it
is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office" and
that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in
the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was
on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately
available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in
Article VI, section 14 of the Constitution."6
It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow
petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per
annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his
term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain
directly."
4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his claim were
amply refuted by the Office of the President in dismissing the appeal in
the similar case of ex-Congressman Singson and therefore likewise serve
to show the untenability of petitioner's stand in this appeal, mutatis
mutandis, as follows:
It is evident, therefore, that the increased compensation
of P32,000 is the rate of pay prescribed by Republic Act
No. 4134 for Mr. Singson's successor in office, while Mr.
Singson and his colleagues of the same term are limited
to the annual compensation of P7,200 fixed in the
Constitution. To compute his retirement gratuity at the
rate of P32,000 per annum after the expiration of his term
of office would effectively give him the benefits of
increased compensation to which he was not entitled
during his term, thereby violating the constitutional
prohibition against increased compensation of legislators
during their term of office (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Const.) which
was presumably in the mind of Congress when it stated in
Republic Act No. 4134 that "the salary increases herein
fixed shall be in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Neither an argument of logic nor a judicial pronouncement
supports the proposition that, as Mr. Singson's retirement
legally started simultaneously with the beginning of the
term of his successor and the effective rate of pay of his
successor and all incoming members of Congress was
already the new rate of P32,000 per annum, it is this new
rate of pay that should be made the basis in computing
his retirement gratuity. Suffice it to say that P7,200 per
annum is Mr. Singson's authorized compensation during
his term of office and, therefore, the rate of pay
prescribed by law for him on his retirement, while P32,000
per annum is the allowable compensation of incoming
members of Congress during their term and, hence, the
rate of pay prescribed by law for them on their retirement.
There is, then, no basis for equating a constitutionally
prohibited compensation for Mr. Singson with a statutory
prescribed rate of pay for his successor in computing his
retirement gratuity.
It is likewise contended by Mr. Singson that the new rate
of pay (P32,000) authorized him Republic Act No. 4134
would be used in the instant case, not to compensate him
for services during the constitutionally prohibited period,
but would simply serve as basis for computing his
retirement gratuity for services rendered by him not only
as a member of Congress but in other branches of the
government as well. The foregoing contention carries its
own refutation. Retirement benefit is compensation for
services rendered (PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ, supra).
Since Mr. Singson applied for retirement as an "elected
official," it is evident that he seeks compensation not only
for services rendered in other branches of the
Government but also for his services as member of
Congress using P32,000, an amount prohibited for him
but allowed for his successor, in the computation of his
retirement gratuity."7
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 18 SCRA 300, 312 (Oct. 4, 1966); emphasis supplied.
2 The pertinent text of the cited retirement law reads: "(c)
Retirement is likewise allowed to any official or employee,
appointive, or elective, regardless of age and employment
status, who has rendered a total of at least twenty years
of service, the last three years of which are continuous.
The benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal
contributions with interest compounded monthly and the
payment of the corresponding employer's premiums,
described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof, without
interest, be only a gratuity equivalent to one month's
salary for every year of the first twenty years of service,
plus one and one-half month's salary for every year of
service over twenty but below thirty years and two
month's salary for every year over thirty years in case of
employees based on the highest rate received and in
case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by
law. ..."

3 Rollo, p. 21.

4 Idem.

5 15 SCRA 479, 490-491 (Dec. 18, 1965).

6 Emphasis supplied.

7 2nd Indorsement of June 29, 1971, Rollo, pp. 35-36.


EN BANC
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on
six counts1 is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In
answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and
conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the
context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate
As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
— may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular
will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any
right or interest — not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative
amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts
to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates
entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to
attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member
thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its
mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily
curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will."
He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made
possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending
criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In
the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity
of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected
applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of
Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty
of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that
election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the
official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the
higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of
the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative
Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-
appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could
not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same
general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions
were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and
in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was
no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and
intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the
concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member
involved the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the
obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the
custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions
or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor
offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to
attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution which states that —
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it
has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2, which
states, inter alia, that —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people
have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the
above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal
law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not
removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final
conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also
serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the
injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It
is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial
Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to
incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted
him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might
escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties
outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was
issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in
the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to
surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body
whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to
justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to
reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional
restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial
Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at
the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at
the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his
dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical
Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this
case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and
private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New
Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted
to leave the prison premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for
the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2)
planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this
purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his
place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist
in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for
his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a
member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make
him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following
observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and
fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
 responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of
their conscience of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost
latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes
to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation
of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in
going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any
transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that
crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might
unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to
answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an
accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary
would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is
treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter
urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also
claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily
curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always
complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
1âwphi 1.nêt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other
member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a
congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House
of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a
full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-
department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the
Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he
attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while
under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears
that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits.
Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate
as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the
restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee,
accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve
only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a
person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they
do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in
office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws."6 This simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed.7 The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism
or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that
allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from
the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the
highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on
the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most
compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the
duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types
of individuals.8
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed
by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate
even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes
of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.10
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-
appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other
right or interest, including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo Buena and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and also in separate opinion of Justice Reyes.
Bellosillo, J., I concur in the main and separate opinion.
Melo, J., I join the majority as well as the separate opinion.
Puno, J., I concur with the main and separate opinion.
Vitug, J., I concur in both the ponencia and the separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur in this as well as in the separate opinion of Justice
Gonzaga-Reyes.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., See separate concurring opinion.

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion

exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of Separate Opinions
locomotion.11
GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of
one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or
For resolution in this case is a motion filed by accused-appellant Romeo
lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.12 The term refers to the
G. Jalosjos, who has been convicted by the trial court of two counts of
restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his
statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, which judgment is
movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own
currently pending appeal before this Court. As a member of the House of
pleasure and will.13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his
Representatives, accused-appellant claims that his constituents are
will depriving him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more
deprived of representation by reason of his incarceration pending appeal
than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits
of the judgment of conviction and that he should therefore be allowed to
defined by wall or any exterior barrier."15
discharge his legislative functions, including attendance of legislative
sessions and committee meetings.
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature,
changes an individual's status in society.16 Prison officials have the
I concur in the ponencia of my colleague Madame Justice Consuelo
difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially
Ynares-Santiago in holding that accused-appellant's motion is bereft of
explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that
any legal merit.
prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily,
both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.17 The Bill of Rights provides —
 All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.1 (emphasis supplied)
This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong is
reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz —
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory
rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v. Divina2 we
held that the trial court's judgment of conviction imports that the evidence
of guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued
incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally
mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of
his conviction.
Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to
legislators provide legal justification for accused-appellant's motion. The
Constitution states that —
A Senator of Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.3
I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant to attend
legislative sessions would constitute an unjustified broadening of the
privilege from the arrest bestowed by the Constitution upon members of
Congress. Neither the legislative history of this provision nor the general
principles of official immunity support an expanded interpretation of such
privilege.
Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution4 limited the
privilege from arrests to "all cases except treason, felony, and breach of
the peace." This provision was taken from the Philippine Autonomy Act of
1916, which was in turn based upon the American Constitution. In
accordance with American precedents, the word "treason, felony and
breach of the peace" have been construed to include all indictable
offenses.5 Thus, under the 1935 Constitution the freedom from arrest only
encompassed civil arrest.
Under the 19736 and the 1987 Constitution, the privilege was broadened
to include arrests for crimes punishable by imprisonment of six years or
less. Despite the expansion of the privilege, the rationale for granting
members of Congress immunity from arrest remained the same — to
ensure that they are not prevented from performing their legislative
duties.7 In fact, the 1986 Constitutional Commission rejected the proposal
of one of its members to expand the scope of the parliamentary immunity
to include searches because, unlike arrest, it was not demonstrated that
the conduct of searches would prevent members of Congress from
discharging their legislative functions.8
It is a well-established principle that official immunity is a necessary
adjunct to the vigorous and effective performance of official functions.
Members of Congress in particular, who are called upon to exercise their
discretion and judgment in enacting laws responsive to the needs of the
people, would certainly be impeded in the exercise of their legislative
functions if every dissatisfied person could compel them to vindicate the
wisdom of their enactments in an action for damages or question their
official acts before the courts.9
It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions to shield a member of Congress from the consequences of
his wrongdoing. Thus, despite the widening of its scope to include
criminal offenses, the privilege from arrest is still circumscribed by the
nature or the gravity of the offenses of which the accused is charged.
Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by
afflictive penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall within the
scope of the constitutional privilege. A member of Congress could only
invoke the immunity from arrest for relatively minor offenses, punishable
at most by correctional penalties. As enunciated in Martinez v.
Morfe,10 "when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would amount to the
creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to
and returning from the same"

The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is

punishable by reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty, is obviously not
entitled to the privilege of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from
the above stated rationale for legislative immunity, a liberal construction
of the constitutional privilege is not in order.

It should also be mentioned that, under the factual circumstances of this

case, the applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-appellant is
already moot and academic. The constitutional provision contemplates
that stage of the criminal process at which personal jurisdiction is sought
to be acquired over the accused by means of his arrest. Accused-
appellant is no longer at the point of merely being arrested. As a matter
of fact, he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by the trial
court.

Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal

of his mandate and that such an expression of the popular will should not
be rendered inutile by even the police power of the State is hollow.
In Aguinaldo v. Comelec,11 Aguinaldo v. Santos12 and in Salalima v.
Guingona13 we laid down the doctrine that a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term,
since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove
therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to
criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed during his
previous term.14 The administrative liability of a public officer is separate
and distinct from his penal liability.
1âwphi1.nêt

Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine
territory. Since the Constitution itself provides for the immunities from the
general application of our criminal laws which a Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives may enjoy, it follows that any expansion of
such immunities must similarly be based upon an express constitutional
grant.

I vote to deny the motion.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and
appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez,
Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of
damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant
Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to
dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not
libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.
This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed
the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a
privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication,
defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman
of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the
Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace,
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions
of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech
or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same
is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is
in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time
of the performance of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President
of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress
presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines,
on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee
thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial
Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed
to the President, the communication began with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however
unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected
members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-
mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter
to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under
the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people
to expose. 1äw phï1.ñët
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in
the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a
massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus
Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be
prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the
"planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas
is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the
P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the
Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund"
— the letter says — are "available to adequately finance a political
campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the
following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose
Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col.
Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public
information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners"
purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to
study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col.
Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief
of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while
Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala.
The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief
of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing
link in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the
offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which
they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists,
under the heading "other operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for
Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on
civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters
— "typed in two (2) typewriters only" — to Editors of magazines
and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of
democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the
administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of
Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in several branches of
the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to
give the impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or
the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the
"planners" had gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan
"seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to
assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection
with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority
and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the
AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked
to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics;
(3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional
military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5)
that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs
of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the
chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned
elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most
probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military
personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except
those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division
of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion
strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the
country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves
from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support
plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are
under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as
"planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and
Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique",
it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course
possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may
have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon
which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might
be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they
may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this
statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to
recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces,
that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question
seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include
these two (2) high ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was
written by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to
impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt,
dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but
these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the
contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very
basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint
that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that
they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they
were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned
passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not
among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not
be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,

Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES,
ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and
REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of
the Securities & Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO,
R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO,
SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised
against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman
Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following
dates and allegations are being given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International
Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those
in charge ruled that the following were elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the
right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the
Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings, docketed as
Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14,
1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not
properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the
parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice
Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent
Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds.
Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided
that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any
administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally,
the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The
cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did
not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A.
Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten
(10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a
Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May
30, 1979 and was sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of
Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed
an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the
owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the
matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of
Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order
allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde
Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T.
C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to
respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman
Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we
ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a
case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the
Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner
from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of respondent
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC
Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner,
supports the stand of the latter in allowing intervention. The Court en
banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an
Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman
Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case
without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as
amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as
counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of
the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
any government-owned or controlled corporation, during
his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause
or matter where he may be called to act on account of his
office. (Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the
SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel,
albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the
Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is
not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of
the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the
matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor
respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere
P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843
outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30,
1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after
the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and
one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on
May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T.
C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of
legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the
case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as
counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that
there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an
administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote
and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of
the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel Footnotes
indirectly.
1 p. 23, Rollo.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional
provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to 2 p. 6, Ibid.
influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in
the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That 3 Am. Digest, 2d Dicennial Ed., Vol. 5, citing Atkinson vs.
which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or Board, etc., 108 P. 1046.
by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3

In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC.

No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11,
Article VIII of the Constitution.

Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the
question of the constitutional prohibition against members of the Batasan,
allowing any stockholder, or any number of stockholders, in a corporation
to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intra-corporate
matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty.

Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is
hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,

Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ.,
concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Barredo, J., I reserve my vote.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L.
PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY,
FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT,
PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA
SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S.
BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga
in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this
Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun
and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of
the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it,
particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his
charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do
so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent
portions of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives
from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of
this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech,
entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from
the Second District of Cebu stated the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that
under your unpopular administration the free things they used to
get from the government are now for sale at premium prices.
They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of
the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can
always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come
across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous
situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your
administration is dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second
District of Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without
basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon
the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which
is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people,
and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special
committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be,
and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President of the Philippines made by
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June
223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, jr., to appear before it to substantiate
his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena
duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the
production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why he
should not be punished by the House. The special committee
shall submit to the House a report of its findings and
recommendations before the adjournment of the present special
session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the
Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for
speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech
and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of
the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after
the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be
held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's
cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear
the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing
any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its
implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of
the legislative session, the special committee continued to perform its
talk, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself,
submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of
serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House
approved on the same day—before closing its session—House
Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of
Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and
Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its
members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then
invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on
July 18, 1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole
respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech
delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery
against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he
refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose,
evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that
for having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in
support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from
office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue
of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found
Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly
behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous,
malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the
President of the Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23,
1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they
affronted and degraded the dignity of the House of
Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That
Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared
guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the
Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for
words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20 that his
speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be
punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline
therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up
other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he
takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or
debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section
was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of
the United States. In that country, the provision has always been
understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress
may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they
shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked
(Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member
responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to
enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come
to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and
applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and application
remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming
a member thereof. In the United States Congress, Congressman
Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following
language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most
infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds'
Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were
censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds'
Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was
summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked
his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds'
Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress
have been, or could be censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by
the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attest
to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the
traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action
against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It
mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949,
suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives
provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United
States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take
action against me, he argues, because after my speech, and before
approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business.
Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved
by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the
House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may
done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the
operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its
rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws4 extending the period of
limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions that had
lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such laws as
against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states
hold divergent views. At any rate, court are subject to revocation
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them."5 And it
has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed
to a particular measure."6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of
Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is
uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies
to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted
for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty
action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433;
Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott,
104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany,
23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196
Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann.
Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632;
Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W.
Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of
Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p.
584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman
Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of
censure was presented, the House approved the resolution, despite the
argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable
remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief
Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be
discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We
believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not
be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by
the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine
whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution
never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government.
The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court,
demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within
its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle
is well established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in
any case amount to an interference by the judicial department
with the legislature since each department is equally independent
within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the
courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative
functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to
example a member, the court will not review its action or
revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur.,
Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark
case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators who had been
expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed
mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had
given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of
the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to
interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no
power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department
by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even
in the absence of an express provision conferring the power,
every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative
power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for
any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3
Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in
substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body;
that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high
functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a
power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must
necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify
and require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision authority
courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either
house of the power to expel a member. These powers are
functions of the legislative department and therefore, in the
exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme.
An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or
either house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an
attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly
forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our
opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although
referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other disciplinary
action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive
power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious
hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the
legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard
the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to
maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a
conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic illustrations,
we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the
position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the
Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of
orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against offenders, even
after other business had been considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is
the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by
resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he
had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the
latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this
Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the resolution.
Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had
no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless
went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because
suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law
(under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power
to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones
Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for
disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel
an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General
to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without restriction as to
residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth
District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that
"suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that
district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that
remark should be understood to refer particularly to
the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was by
the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth
District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of
the Governor-General, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only
those power which were granted to it by the Jones Law10; whereas now
the Congress has the full legislative powers and preprogatives of a
sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words,
in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones
Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercised—the power of
suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the
inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did
not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate
suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary,
subject only to such limitations are found in the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by
usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine
Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.
(Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's
representation can not be more weightly in the matter of suspension than
in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have
the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended
to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of House
Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued,
the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter
approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and
the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the
case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.13 Of
course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to
include all members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement
and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of
such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important
questions of political law, the Court thought it proper to express at this
time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and
decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So
ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:
I concur with the majority that the petition filed by Congressman Osmeña,
Jr. does not make out a case either for declaratory judgment or certiorari,
since this Court has no original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment
proceedings, and certiorari is available only against bodies exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The respondent committee, being merely
fact finding, was not properly subject to certiorari.
I submit, however, that Congressman Osmeña was entitled to invoke the
Court's jurisdiction on his petition for a writ of prohibition against the
committee, in so far as House Resolution No. 59 (and its sequel,
Resolution No. 175) constituted an unlawful attempt to divest him of an
immunity from censure or punishment, an immunity vested under the very
Rules of the House of Representatives.
House Rule XVII, on Decorum and Debates, in its section V, provides as
follows:
If it is requested that a Member be called to order for words
spoken in debate, the Member making such request shall indicate
the words excepted to, and they shall be taken down in writing by
the Secretary and read aloud to the House; but the Member who
uttered them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the
censure of the House therefor, if further debate or other business
has intervened.
Now, it is not disputed that after Congressman Osmeña had delivered his
speech and before the House adopted, fifteen days later, the resolution
(No. 59) creating the respondent Committee and empowering it to
investigate and recommend proper action in the case, the House had
acted on other matters and debated them. That being the case, the
Congressman, even before the resolution was adopted, had ceased to be
answerable for the words uttered by him in his privilege speech. By the
express wording of the Rules, he was no longer subject to censure or
disciplinary action by the House. Hence, the resolution, in so far as it
attempts to divest him of the immunity so acquired and subject him to
discipline and punishment, when he was previously not so subject,
violates the constitutional inhibition against ex post facto legislation, and
Resolution Nos. 59 and 175 are legally obnoxious and invalid on that
score. The rule is well established that a law which deprives an accused
person of any substantial right or immunity possessed by him before its
passage is ex post facto as to prior offenses (Cor. Jur. vol. 16-A, section
144, p. 153; People vs. Mc Donnell, 11 Fed. Supp. 1015;
People vs. Talklington, 47 Pac. 2d 368; U. S. vs. Garfinkel, 69 F. Supp.
849).
The foregoing also answer the contention that since the immunity was
but an effect of section 7 of House Rule XVII, the House could, at any
time, remove it by amending those Rules, and Resolutions Nos. 59 and
175 effected such an amendment by implication. the right of the House to
amend its Rules does not carry with it the right to retroactive divest the
petitioner of an immunity he had already acquired. The Bill of Rights is
against it.
It is contended that as the liability for his speech attached when the
Congressman delivered it, the subsequent action of the House only
affected the procedure for dealing with that liability. But whatever liability
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. then incurred was extinguished when
the House thereafter considered other business; and this extinction is a
substantive right that can not be subsequently torn away to his
disadvantage. On an analogous issue, this Court, in People vs. Parel, 44
Phil., 437 has ruled:
In regards to the point that the subject of prescription of penalties
and of penal actions pertains to remedial and not substantive law,
it is to be observed that in the Spanish legal system, provisions
for limitation or prescription of actions are invariably classified as
substantive and not as remedial law; we thus find the provisions
for the prescription of criminal actions in the Penal Code and not
in the 'Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal.' This is in reality a more
logical law. In criminal cases prescription is not, strictly speaking,
a matter of procedure; it bars or cuts off the right to punish the
crime and consequently, goes directly to the substance of the
action. . . . (Emphasis supplied.).
I see no substantial difference, from the standpoint of the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws, that the objectionable measures
happen to be House Resolutions and not statutes. In so far as the
position of petitioner Osmeña is concerned, the essential point is that he
is being subjected to a punishment to which he was formerly not
amenable. And while he was only meted out a suspension of privileges
that suspension is as much a penalty as imprisonment or a fine, which
the House could have inflicted upon him had it been so minded. Such
punitive action is violative of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the
constitutional provision against ex post facto legislation. Nor is it material
that the punishment was inflicted in the exercise of disciplinary power.
"The ex post facto effect of a law," the Federal Supreme Court has ruled,
"can not be evaded by giving civil form to that which is essentially
criminal" (Burgess vs. Salmon, 97 L. Ed. [U. S.] 1104, 1106;
Cummings vs. MIssouri, 18 L. Ed. 276).
The plain purpose of the immunity provided by the House rules is to
protect the freedom of action of its members and to relieve them from the
fear of disciplinary action taken upon second thought, as a result of
political convenience, vindictiveness, or pressures. it is unrealistic to
overlook that, without the immunity so provided, no member of Congress
can remain free from the haunting fear that his most innocuous
expressions may at any time afterwards place him in jeopardy of
punishment whenever a majority, however transient, should feel that the
shifting sands of political expediency so demand. A rule designed to
assure that members of the House of the House may freely act as their
conscience and sense of duty should dictate complements the
parliamentary immunity from outside pressure enshrined in our
Constitution, and is certainly deserving of liberal interpretation and
application.
The various precedents, cited in the majority opinion, as instances of
disciplinary taken notwithstanding intervening business, are not truly
applicable. Of the five instances cited by Deschkler (in his edition of
Jefferson's Manual), the case of Congressman Watson of Georgia
involved also printed disparaging remarks by the respondent (III Hinds'
Precedents, sec. 2637), so that the debate immunity rule afforded no
defense; that of Congressmen Weaver and Sparks was one of censure
for actual disorderly conduct (II Hinds, sec. 1657); while the cases of
Congressmen Stanbery of Ohio, Alex Long of Ohio, and of Lovell
Rousseau of Kentucky (II Hinds, sec. 1248, 1252 and 1655) were
decided under Rule 62 of the U. s. House of Representatives as it stood
before the 1880 amendments, and was differently worded. Thus, in the
Rousseau case, the ruling of Speaker Colfax was to the following effect
(II Hinds' Precedents, page 1131):
This sixty-second rule is divided in the middle a semicolon, and
the Chair asks the attention of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Wilson) top the language of that rule, as it settles the whole
question:
62. If a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate,
the person calling him to be order shall repeat the words
excerpted to —
That is, the "calling to order" is "excepting" to words spoken in
debate "and they shall be taken done in writing at the Clerk's
table; and no Member shall be held to answer, or be subject to
the censure of the House, for words spoken, or other business
has intervened, after the words spoken, and before exception to
them shall have been taken.
The first part of this rule declares that "calling to order" is
"excepting to words spoken in debate." the second part of the rule
declares that a Member shall not be held subject to censure for
words spoken in debate if other business has intervened after the
words have been spoken and before "exception" to them has
been taken. Exception to the words of the gentleman from Iowa
(Mr. Grinnell) was taken by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Harding), the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Banks), the
gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rosseau), and also by the
Speaker of the House, as the records of the Congressional Globe
will show. The distinction is obvious between the two parts of the
rule. In the first part it speaks of a Member excepting to language
of another and having the words taken down. In the last part of
the rule it says he shall not be censured thereafter unless
exception to his words were taken; but it omits to add as an
condition that words must also have been taken down. The
substantial point, indeed the only point, required in the latter part
of the rule is, that exception to the objectionable words must have
taken.
The difference between the Rules as invoked in these cases and the
Rules of our House of Representatives is easily apparent. As Rule 62 of
the United States House of Representatives stood before 1880, all that
was required to preserve the disciplinary power of the Hose was
that exception should have been taken to the remarks on the floor before
further debate or other business intervened. Under the rules of the
Philippines House of Representatives, however, the immunity becomes
absolute if other debate or business has taken place before the motion
for censure is made, whether or not exceptions or point of order have
been made to the remarks complained of at the time they were uttered.
While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity established in Article VI,
section 15 of our Constitution does not bar the members being
questioned and disciplined by Congress itself fro remarks made on the
floor, that disciplinary power does not, as I have noted, include the right
to retroactively amend the rules so as to divest a member of an immunity
already gained. And if Courts can shield an ordinary citizen from the
effects of ex post facto legislation, I see no reason why a member of
Congress should be deprived of the same protection. Surely membership
in the Legislature does not mean forfeiture of the liberties enjoyed by the
individual citizen.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. If may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraint
 or violate fundamental rights and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established
by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But
within these limitation all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule
to say that some other way would be better, more accurate or
even more just. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law Ed., 324-
325.)
Court will not interfere with the action of the state senate in
reconsideration its vote on a resolution submitting an amendment
to the Constitution, where its action was in compliance with its
own rules, and there was no constitutional provision to the
contrary. (Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963)
(Emphasis supplied.).
Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or compel the
Legislature to act in any specified manner, should not deter it from
recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and nullify of the
questioned resolutions and of all action that has been disbanded after the
case was filed, the basic issues remain so important as to require
adjudication by this Court.
LABRADOR, J., dissenting:
I fully concur in the above dissent Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, Reyes, and I
venture to add:
Within a constitutional government and in a regime which purports to be
one of law, where law is supreme, even the Congress in the exercise of
the power conferred upon it to discipline its members, must follow the
rules and regulation that it had itself promulgated for its guidance and for
that of its members. The rules in force at the time Congressman Osmeña
delivered the speech declared by the House to constitutes a disorderly
conduct provides:
. . . but the Member who uttered them shall not be held to answer,
nor be subject to the censure of the House therefor, if further
debate or other business has intervened. (Rule XVII, Sec. 7,
Rules, House of Representatives.)
Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech in question on June 23,
1960. It was only on July 8, or 15 days after June 23, 1060 when the
House created the committee that would investigated him. For fully 15
days the House took up other matters. All that was done, while the
speech was being delivered, was to have certains portions thereof
deleted. I hold that pursuant to its own Rules the House may no longer
punish Congressman Osmeña for the delivered fifteen days before.
The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish Congressman
Osmeña immediately after its delivery, except to have some part of the
speech deleted, show that the members of the House did not consider
Osmeña's speech a disorderly conduct. The idea to punish Congressman
Osmeña, which came 15 days after, was, therefore, an afterthought. It is,
therefore, clear that Congressman Osmeña is being made to answer for
an act, after the time during which he could be punished therefor had
lapsed.
The majority opinion holds that the House can amend its rules any time.
We do not dispute this principle, but we hold that the House may not do
so in utter disregard of the fundamental principle of law that an
amendment takes place only after its approval, or, as in this case, to the
extent of punishing an offense after the time to punishing an had elapsed.
Since the rule, that a member can be punished only before other
proceedings have intervened, was in force at the time Congressman
Osmeña delivered his speech, the House may not ignore said rule. It is
said in the majority opinion that the rule limiting the period for imposition
of a penalty for a speech to the day it was made, is merely one of
procedure. With due respect to the majority, we do not think that it is
merely a rule of procedure; we believe it actually is a limitation of the time
in which the House may take punitive action against an offending
member; it is alienation (in reference to time) on the liability to
punishment. As Mr. Justice J.B.L., Reyes points out, the rule is
substantive, not merely a procedural principle, and may not be ignored
when invoked.
If this Government of laws and not of men, then the House should
observe its own rule and not violate it by punishing a member after the
period for indictment and punishment had already passed. Not because
the subject of the Philippic is no less than the Chief Magistrate of the
nation should the rule of the House be ignored by itself. It is true that our
Government is based on the principle of separation of powers between
the three branches thereof. I also agree to the corollary proposition that
this Court should not interfere with the legislature in the manner it
performs its functions; but I also hold that the Court cannot abandon its
duty to pronounce what the law is when any of its (the House) members,
or any humble citizen, invokes the law.
Congressman Osmeña had invoked the protection of a rule of the House.
I believe it is our bounden duty to state what the rule being invoked by
him is, to point out the fact that the rule is being violated in meting out
punishment for his speech; we should not shirk our responsibility to
declare his rights under the rule simply on the board excuse of separation
of powers. Even the legislature may not ignore the rule it has
promulgated for the government of the conduct of its members, and the
fact that a coordinate branches of the Government is involved, should not
deter us from performing our duty. We may not possess the power to
enforce our opinion if the House chooses to disregard the same. In such
case the members thereof stand before the bar of public opinion to
answer for their act in ignoring what they themselves have approved as
their norm of conduct.
Let it be clearly understood that the writer of this dissent personally
believe that vitreous attacks against the Chief Executive, or any official or
citizen for that matter, should be condemned. But where the Rules,
promulgated by the House itself, fix the period during which punishment
may be meted out, said Rules should be enforced regardless of who may
be prejudicated thereby. Only in that way may the supermacy of the law
be maintained.
5 Corpus Juris Secumdum, p. 870.
6 South Georgia Power vs. Bauman, 169 Ga. 649; 151 s. w. 515.
7 146 Cal. 604; 69 L. R. A. 556.
8Canno's Precedents (1936) par. 2497) William Willet, Jr. of New
York); par. 2498 (Louis v. Mc Fadden of Pensylvania).
9Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and the House of
Representative by Louis Deschler (1955) p. 382.
10the Jones Law placed "in the hands of the people of the
Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be
given them, without in the meantime impairing the rights of
sovereignty by the people of the United States." (Preamble)
11Apart from the view that power to remove includes the power to
suspend asan incident. (Burnap vs. U. s. 252, U. S. 512, 64 L.
Ed. 693, 695.) This view is distinguishable from
Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil., 175.(See Gregory vs. Mayor, 21 N.
E. 120) But we need not explain this now. Enough to rely on
congressional inherent power.

12 See appendix par. VII, Cushing.

13This, apart from doubts on (a) our jurisdiction to entertain

original petitions for declaratory judgments, and (b) availability of
Footnotes
certiorari or prohibition against respondents who are not
exercising judicial or ministerial functions (Rule 67, sec. 1 and 2).
1These, except Congressman Abeleda, share the views of
petitioner. 14 See supra.
2 Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367. 15 Phil., 83.
3Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 189; Hiss. vs. Barlett & Gray.
468, 63 Am. Dec. 768, 770.

4 Rules of the House not the force of law, but they are merely in
the nature of by-laws prescribed for the orderly and convenient
conduct of their own proceedings. (67 Corpus Juris Secundum, p.
870)
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S.
BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING
JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and
how far it can go, in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner,
Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in
criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner,
then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case
from investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up
with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum,
dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the
appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP
submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved,
forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner
was indicted thusly:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization
for the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra,
Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui
Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui
Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go,
Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua
Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se
Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang
Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping,
Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan,
Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen
Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified
aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby
giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused." 1
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and
No. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of
petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos.
Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as
she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or
until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in
court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner
was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan
issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and
prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition
for Certiorari with prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before the Court,
docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the
Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court taking
cognizance of the petition issued a temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's
arraignment and the consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond
until further advice from the Court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the
petition and lifting the temporary restraining order. The subsequent
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's
intention to accept a fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan
Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and to defer her
arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November
1992, her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The following day,
she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At
the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the
Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose
applications she purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended
undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the
Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner's arraignment not later than five days
from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two amended informations.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The court, in its
11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said
informations and directed her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed
Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition
for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993
resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its
Presiding Justice, as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the
32 Amended Informations, and seeking the nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding
Justice Garchitorena to cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well
as from enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to
post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceedings
with her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his
disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed
the OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations.
Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were consolidated into one
information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine
Probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash said information. Pending the
resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony
of one Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled
on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition
to the 31st July 1995 motion of the prosecution within fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion
for reconsideration of its 03rd August 1995 order which would allow the
testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan,
was elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled
"Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No.
123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the
prosecution to suspend her. On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan
resolved:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the
motion under consideration and hereby suspends the accused
Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines and from any other government
position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her
suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect
immediately upon notice.
 "Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto
Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the Philippines, Executive
House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the
Senate, for the implementation of the suspension herein ordered.
The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this Court of the action
taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date
of implementation of the suspension order as well as the expiry of
the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at that
time." 2
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines,
from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the
Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension
of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section
13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as
a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode
of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless
in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already
been separated from the service, has already received such
benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 the Court
reiterated:
"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended — treating of
the suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer — may
no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this
Court.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons
indicted upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be
appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary
employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service." 4
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an
order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information
filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter
of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it." 5 Explaining
the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot
vs. Sandiganbayan 6 observed:
"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension." 7
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan
merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well
as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials
and employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to
have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has
been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to
any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused. 8
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-
operative as the validity of the information must be determined in a pre-
suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct
thereof. It has been said that —
"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-
suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be
given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY
OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has
not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that
the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation
of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of
the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory
suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds
provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x .'
"xxx xxx xxx
"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of
his prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is
charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the
provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to
present a motion to quash the information on any other grounds
provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.
"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings
on the ground that the acts for which the accused is charged do
not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of
the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be
treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal
proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided
in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other
words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal
proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry
whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under
Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal
Code." 9
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be
established in a presuspension proceeding before trial on the merits
proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the
strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the
offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in
decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity
or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not
been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts
imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds
set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. 10
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to
petitioner's case before the Sandiganbayan has been brought to this
Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon to resolve
several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs.
Vasquez, 11 petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez, 12 petitioner sought the nullification
of the hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to
Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order
with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing;
(3) in Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 13 petitioner sought the nullification of the
resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice
Garchitorena disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the
resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32
amended informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago
vs. Sandiganbayan, 14 petitioner assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan
of her motion for reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order
allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases, 15 the Court
declared:
"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before
us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290;
G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to
raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and
the filing of the information against her in those petitions. A piece-
meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action,
is self-defeating.
 "Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not
charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No.
3019 because the official acts complained therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy
of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they
had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her
motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits
hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People vs.
Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the
stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January
1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality
in the execution of her official functions.'
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the
offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019." 16
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against
petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to
forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution which provides that each —
"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days." 17
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the Court affirmed the order of suspension of
Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations
on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of Congress. The
Court ruled:
"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution — which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly
behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the
penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from
the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to
have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No.
3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the
three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has
exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence
and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII,
of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in the
settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible
grave abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality
has evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it
malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In
its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic,
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an affair internal
to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the
view 19 that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional
proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own
judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is
an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or
provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any
part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly
react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members
of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has
been decided by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06
December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless,
deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the
significant issue raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.