2547463

Environmental and Ethical Aspects of International Migration
Author(s): Virginia Abernethy

Source: The International Migration Review, Vol. 30, No. 1, Special Issue: Ethics, Migration,
and Global Stewardship (Spring, 1996), pp. 132-150
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Center for Migration Studies of New
York, Inc.
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Environmental and Ethical Aspects of
International Migration
Virginia Abernethy
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine
U.S. immigration policy has a beneficent intent. However, recent work

suggests that the signal it sends internationally - that emigration can be
relied upon to relieve local (Third World) population pressure - tends to
maintain high fertility rates in the sending country. This effect is counter?
productive because high fertility is the primary driver of rapid population
growth. In addition, it appears that the relatively open U.S. immigration
Eolicy
oth thehas resultedofinAmerican
well-being a rate oflabor
domestic population
and cherished growth that threatens
environmental
values.
In recent years, Western industrialized countries have extended their traditions

of community responsibility to encompass much that is beyond their national
and even continental borders. Embracing an ideal of international beneficence
does not preclude giving weight to the national interest; nevertheless, benefi?
cence has sometimes guided U.S. policy in directions which appear inimical
to the nation.
Given so determinative an ideal of beneficence, one must be doubly confi?
dent that what is intended to do good indeed has that effect. Harm to intended
beneficiaries is unconscionable, the more so when policies serendipitously
entail sacrifice of the national interest, and in particular (as will be shown),
threats to the environment and the well-being of this country's more vulnerable
sectors.
One U.S. policy that is believed to be beneficent in both intent a

is the relative openness to international migration. Those who i
the United States expect to improve their own lives and, often, he
by sending home remittances. This article contends, nevertheless,
consequences of international migration are negative for:
? the countries which emigrants leave;
? vulnerable sectors of the host country's labor force with whi
grants compete;
? the host country's economy generally (addressed in Abern
and work in progress);
? the environmental goal of conservation and minimization of
These effects would suggest that a pause in international migra
deliberate consideration.
132 IMR Vol. XXX, No. 1
Environmental and Ethical Aspects of International Immigration 133
THE COUNTRIES WHICH EMIGRANTS LEAVE
Emigration can be counterproductive for immigrant-sending countries

ways at least. Emigration provides an escape for dissident and en
elements who might otherwise provide leadership and a critical
change. Where would Poland be, for example, if Lech Waless
electrician in Chicago? How long would Fidel Castro retain control
if the opposition there stayed put?
In addition, emigration appears to alter the incentive structure so th
fertility and large family size become more desirable. Only a very rapid
decline, however, offers even the semblance of hope that the ordinary
of most Third World countries will be able to enjoy a healthy and
existence.
Demographers usually attribute the rapid population growth wh
curred after World War II to a decline in mortality. Some experts also
small role to rising fertility due to cultural change, acknowledg
traditional behavior patterns which depress fertility are discarded as a si
of modernization. These real and true effects are not, however, the who
Unfortunately, well-meant policies intended to implement the d
"demographic transition" model seem also to have encouraged high fer
The idea of a demographic transition has been popularized to inc
certain causal assertions which are essentially unfounded but have misl
generations of policymakers. Scholars, including historian Paul Ken
Connelly and Kennedy, 1994), former editor-in-chief of the Scientific
can Gerald Piel, and politicians including Nafis Sadik of the United
and Vice-President of the United States Albert Gore, remain in thrall
demographic transition model. Its tenets - that prosperity, moder
declining infant mortality and socieconomic development produce a
ence for small family size, and thus will eventually correct population
- are based mainly on correlations. The postulated causality breaks dow
tested systematically with chronological data (historical and modern) o
trolled comparisons (Abernethy, 1979, 1993, 1994, 1995).
Some professional demographers have long doubted the causal po
of demographic transition theory (Teitelbaum, 1975), and others have
illuminate the motivational aspects of reproduction. Lant Pritchet
suggests that desired family size explains up to 90 percent of the varia
actual family size. Kingsley Davis (1963), Paul Demeny (1988),
Westoff (1988), and Sergio Diaz-Briquets and L. Perez (1981) have a
particular motives and incentives which determine completed family s
example, economist Richard Easterlin (1962) analyzed the U.S. baby
showing that the low fertility of the 1930s depression years gave way
and frequent childbearing, probably because of the bright economic pr
of the late 1940s and 1950s. Raymond Firths (1956, 1957, 1967) st
the Tikopia also support an economic opportunity explanation of fertil
134 International Migration Review
The analysis of Sergio Diaz-Briquets and L. Pe

in Cuba after the 1959 Fidel Castro revolution is
cases showing that perception of expanding econo
couples to raise their family size target. The auth
Cuban fertility has a "straightforward" explanati
The main factor was the real income rise among the
brought about by the redistribution measures of the re
fertility rises in almost every age group suggest that coupl
promising and felt they could now afford more childre
Linkages between economic/resource variables

mine family size are usually not so conveniendy
just beginning to ask the questions which wou
My work is synthesis, from which I propose
couples wanting either more or fewer children. A
summarizes the findings from controlled com
Eskimo societies, and various other historical a
For the most part, I have had to use separate s
variables with predicted demographic effects.
I continue to find that historical and crosscultu
consistency, to a causal relationship between p
and desired family size. It appears that people
opportunity want and have more children; co
contracting horizons promotes reproductive and
1979, 1993, 1994, 1995). I have litde hesitatio
increased worldwide after World War II as a resu
pating prosperity and therefore wanting more c
Perceived opportunities (postulated to raise f
new technology, widely distributed gains in inco
populist political changes, and migration. For
refer you to earlier publications. As a sample of o
of the day, I offer a new case.
Peru embarked on over a decade of unforesee
development of the anchoveta industry, an oppor
before World War II but which was taking o
increase in fertility was to be expected and, inde
1876 through at least 1940, Peru's total fertili
range of 5.6 to 5.82 ^lafecundidadpermanecio mas
rose, right on schedule, to 6.85 ("Hacia 1950...
(Montenegro and de Muente, 1990:70-71). Tha
ports a causal explanation; it is plausible that wid
anchoveta industry triggered the fertility increa
woman. For the record, I learned of the anchovet
the rise in fertility rate before seeking out the demographic study which,
happens, confirms my prediction.
Fertility remained at a historically high level for some fifteen years. A fe
decline was heralded by the plateau and then, in 1972, collapse of the anc
fishery and associated industries. The TFR was 6.85 in 1965, 6.56 by
6.00 by 1975, 5.38 by 1980, and 4.59 by 1985 (Ferrando y Ponce, 1983
z'ra Montenegro and de Muente, 1990). The 1995 Population Reference Bu
Data Sheet shows Peru with a 3.5 TFR. The predictably steep fall was no d
accelerated by the economically induced guerrilla activity that, befor
threatened to engulf Peru in anarchy.
Migration opportunity appears to be another powerful contributor to pe
tion of expanding economic horizons. The ethos of expansionism appears to
not only those who move toward relative prosperity, but also those who sta
and occupy niches which neighbors and relatives have vacated. Hebe Lutz
past president of the Foreign Nurses Association in Japan, recounts a conve
with a Nepalese elder who spontaneously observed that the new practice
young moving away from their birth village was creating the impression of li
space and opportunity and was a factor in rising fertility rates.
The insights of sophisticated native informants are meaningful, but th
more. Giving examples from late nineteenth century Ireland and early tw
tieth century Japan, Kingsley Davis (1963) suggests that emigration e
a country's ecological niche and, thus, allows high fertility rates to p
Similarly, John F. May (1995) suggests that mid-twentieth century polic
dispersing the Rwandan population to undeveloped agricultural lan
neighboring countries attenuated land hunger and, thus, encouraged
fertility rates than would otherwise have occurred. The fertility decline
in Rwanda in the late 1980s as the lands colonized 20 years earlier beg
lose productivity, the economy faltered, and further population dis
became impossible.
Some countries make export of labor a way of life and appear to d
significandy on the foreign exchange earnings and remittances sent hom
emigres. In 1990, global remittance credits reached $71 billion, nearly do
from 1980 (Teitelbaum and Russell, 1994). High fertility rates persist in
high emigration countries, e.g., the Philippines, India, Pakistan, El Sa
and Nicaragua. On the contrary, fertility rates have declined rapidly wh
emigration option closed, as it largely did in the CARICOM cou
(formerly the British West Indies) by the early 1980s (Guengant, 1985).
Systematic controlled comparisons within matched West Indian commu
ties show fertility remaining high during the 1970s and 1980s where the
a tradition of emigration, whereas a precipitous fertility decline occ
specifically in those communities where emigration was not seen as an es
valve (Brittain, 1990). Similarly, nineteenth century English and Wel
lages, from which many emigrated, had continuing high fertility. In con
fertility declined rapidly in similar communit

young (Friedlander, 1983). The common theme
opportunity (niches opening up where some le
psychological effect of having the option to move
Thus, the prospect of immigration to richer ter
the large number who consider it will actually m
one factor supporting large family size. Psycholog
a sense of limits (being bottled up; crowding and
First Do No Harm
Advocates for beneficence as a guide to foreign policy should be concerne

that inappropriate international aid and generous immigration policies bot
signal that some regions have wealth which they are willing to share. Such
misinformation fosters the belief that it is unnecessary for recipients to adjust
to the limited resources of their own environment, and thus it undercut
incentives to restrict family size. The consequent slow or no decline in fertilit
rates leaves countries vulnerable to a very uncertain, probably dismal future.
The almost inevitable rapid population growth tends to divert income int
consumption, impedes capital accumulation, dooms societies to deepening
poverty, and becomes an insurmountable barrier to environmental protection.
Misleading signals about the long-term prospects of immigration into the
United States can only add to the eventual chaos,
THE HOST COUNTRY
Immigration also harms Americans. Working Americans and es

immigrants compete with new waves of immigrants for jobs, e
housing, and other essentials. As the American dream recedes bey
many become alienated from society and others search for redress or
Every poll now shows a base of 65 percent or more of all Americans
of Mexicans in the United States (LNPS, 1992)) believing that the
many immigrants (CCN, 1995; Espenshade and Hempstead, 19
disaffection as well as violent expressions of genuine anger reflec
economic, fiscal and carrying capacity woes.
Labor Market Effects
Most studies which show net negative or mixed effects on American

are relatively recent.
Economist Steve H. Murdock (1995) suggests that immigration
aggregate income (because of the larger labor force) but harms
families individually. Murdock concludes that, by the year 2050
per-household annual income (in 1990 dollars) would be approxima

lower because of immigration. Murdock assumes continuation of
numbers and labor force characteristics of immigrants.
Economist George Borjas (1995), who originally saw no negative im
workers, now concludes that the increased labor supply resulting from
into the United States costs working Americans over $ 133 billion ann
job opportunities, depressed wages, and deteriorating conditions o
Symmetrically, these effects put $140 billion into the pockets of emp
The net $7 billion added to the economy comes at the cost of inc
polarization between rich and poor. This easily translates into a highly
and perhaps dangerous trend.
Labor economist Vernon Briggs, Jr. (1990, 1992) and political s
Frank Morris (1990, 1995) contend that immigration harms first a
Americas own poor and unskilled workers, many of whom are mi
Briggs (1990) testified before the Congressional Judiciary Subcomm
Immigration, Refugees, and International Law that the lower end of t
labor pool is victimized by immigration. It is disruptive for both citiz
established, earlier immigrants whose labor force characteristics resem
of newcomers. Frank Morris (1990), Dean of Graduate Studies an
Research at Morgan State University, Baltimore, testified in the same
My first concern is that the black community, in looking at the slow rate of growth
our numbers in the labor force and our increasing need for higher skills, may find t
any encouraging assumptions we had about opportunities for young black workers
prospective workers have been sidetracked by hasty immigration policies. . . .
It is clear that America's black population is bearing a disproportionate shar

immigrants' competition for jobs, housing and social services.
Indeed, Booker T. Washington pleaded for an end to immigratio

well-remembered "Put Down Your Buckets Where You Are" speech at t
Adanta Exposition. Only after immigration was effectively ended in th
1920s did African Americans begin to take advantage of industrial job
tunities in the North.
Lind (1995:111) notes that Frederick Douglass, a prominent black
in the nineteenth century, also saw "that European immigrants we
entry-level jobs away from black American workers. No one who lives
where taxi service and many other trades are almost monopolized
immigrants can doubt that the same phenomenon is occurring again."
Estrada (1991), editorial writer for the Dallas Morning News, concurs:
Apologists for massive immigration appear to blame the large-scale replacemen

black workers by Hispanic immigrants in the hotel-cleaning industry of Los An
on the blacks themselves, instead of acknowledging the obvious explanation that
immigrants depressed prevailing wages and systematically squeezed thousand
citizens out of the industry, (p. 25)
Earlier immigrants also lose, even when an inf

Estrada (1990) attributes unemployment amon
arrivals who compete down wages and benefi
In sum, the evidence shows that Hispanic Americans
victims of U.S. immigration policy since 1965, instea
The notion that Hispanics in this country favor more
America favors less, is a false one that has poisoned
distortion must be corrected, especially by those wh
Hispanic Americans.
Economists George Borjas and Richard Free

sword falling on labor: competition from immi
manufactured by unskilled labor outside of the
direct and indirect - of the deterioration in
school educated U.S. workers. High-school dr
tion; in this sector, immigration and the trade
1988 effective supply of labor by 28 percen
women. The large labor supply, these economist
of the 10 percentage point decline in the wa
1970 and the late 1980s.
Demographer William Frey (1995) reinforces economic findings by show?
ing that low-skilled black and white Americans flee states that are heavily
impacted by immigration. Thus, local unemployment figures often do not
reveal the extent to which Americans are displaced by foreign workers. The
rapidly increasing supply of labor competes down wages and conditions of
work so that whole industries - construction, meat-packing, and hotelery, for
example - devolve toward jobs which it is said, "Americans won't do." But
various sources suggest that Americans often do want those jobs and are
excluded by immigrant networks which capture access (Huddle, 1992, 1993).
American skilled labor is also under pressure, particularly in fields where
fluent English is not required. Immigration is viewed by the 250,000-member
Institute for Electronic and Electrical Engineers as the cause of significant
increases in unemployment and underemployment among engineers. Similar
labor surpluses exist in mathematics {Science, 1991) and other specialties
(CCN, 1994). Thus, parts of the skilled sector of the labor market appear to
be approaching saturation.
The national security implications of these economic trends are a concern
(Wiarda and Wiarda, 1986). Displacement of specialized professionals by immi?
grants who often will work for much lower wages threatens the viability of science
education and engineering schools. Undergraduates often reject mathematics, for
example, when teaching assistants are difficult to understand because of poor
English language skills. And at advanced levels, students begin to doubt the
economic value of a technical degree. The United States cannot afford to cede
preeminence in mathematics, physical sciences, and engineering education.
Among these labor force trends, perhaps the polarization of society in

and poor (Rattner, 1995) should alarm one most. Historical demog
shows that such polarization is an inexorable result of a rapidly growin
force (Lee, 1980, 1987). Underemployment and competing down th
and conditions of work - as occurs when the demand for new jobs exce
capacity of the economy to create good (i.e., well-capitalized) net ne
endangers the very fabric of a society. Not only despair of ever joi
mainstream, but also crime, riots, vigilantism, scapegoating and other
disappointment and anger erode civil society, tolerance, and respect fo
racy. To knowingly impoverish a large proportion of one s country
betrayal of the highest magnitude.
Economic Effects
Lester Thurow, Dean of the MIT Sloane School of Business Admini

postulates that "No country can become rich without a century
economic performance and a century of very slow population grow
in Lind, 1995). Indeed, current U.S. data confirm that rapid growt
labor force negatively affects both wages, the conditions of work (see ab
Bernstein, 1994), and the wealth of the nation. Real wages stagnated fo
80 percent of the population beginning in the early 1970s, a period coi
with women and the baby-boom generation bursting simultaneously on
labor market. That one-time surge from women and baby boomers is p
but continuing growth in the supply of workers is driven by imm
About three-quarters of immigrants enter the labor force, and their n
nearly doubles the annual need for net new jobs. This aggravates u
ployment (the unemployed plus involuntarily part-time workers), whi
from 9.8 percent of the labor force in 1989 to 12.6 percent in 1993
1995) and is an obstacle to the absorption of a probable 10 million disco
workers, the many welfare recipients whose government benefits may e
the 900^000 more young Americans entering than older workers lea
labor force each year.
By 1990, immigrants were 10 percent of the total U.S. labor fo
one-quarter of all workers without a high school diploma. The U.S.
does not need low-skilled workers.
Immigration accounts for nearly half of the annual growth in the U
force. In addition, immigration imposes public costs in excess of taxes
the immigrant sector which are variously estimated to range from
billions up to $51 billion annually (CIS, 1994; Huddle, 1995; Ve
McCarthy, 1995). Such costs are ultimately born by all sectors of the e
making it more difficult to accumulate savings for investment in any
tive enterprise.
Population Growth: The Ultimate Environm
The United States has the fastest population gr

world. At 1.1 percent per year (and rising), th
that of some Third World countries and puts t
in 50 or 60 years. A population size of one-half
likely" variant projected by demographers
number might now be higher in contemplation
legal immigrants, including refugees and asyle
net 400,000 illegal immigrants, and the many
Demography explains much of the environme
et al, 1995). The insatiable thirst for oil an
annual erosion or paving-over of 3 million a
and Giampietro, 1994; Pimentel etal, 1995), t
purposes of rural habitats with an attendant lo
buildup of carbon dioxide loads (Rosa and D
the human load factor: too many people living
Population growth, particularly as reflecte
agricultural to residential and other more i
connected to loss of habitat for wild species an
the 1780s and 1980s the United States lost 5
acres, of its wedands. The loss has been pr
wedands lost) in California (Balance Data, 19
the population growth rate is higher than
Population growth and environmental qualit
(Balance Data, 1994) and in the Chesapeake Ba
urbanizing areas of Maryland and Virginia
Depletion of nonrenewable and very slowly r
underground water (aquifers), the topsoil, and
U.S. population may already have exceeded
environment. Worldwide, per capita use of o
about 1980 (Duncan, 1993) and a parallel pea
predicted for the United States by 2005 (Gever
per capita use of energy has already nearly
a 25 percent increase in total energy use be
by population growth. That is, consumptio
increased efficiency and conservation efforts
whelmed by growing population numbers (H
suggests that carbon dioxide loads, a correlate
ately large for the largest nations "across t
incomes" (Rosa and Dietz, 1995).
Rapid population growth magnifies the d
headway or even holding past environmental g
has led to foundation support for a coalition for population stabilizat

United States. The rationale is:
... as a funder entertaining proposals from conservation groups around the cou
the Foundation had seen population growth, as manifested in extensive land
opment and widespread environmental degradation, emerge as the primary, ne
ending scourge counteracting the good work these groups were doing o
homefront every day. This was true whether a group's purpose was to clean up
bays and estuaries, protect fisheries, save our rivers, improve habitats for bird,
and plant species, preserve important ecosystems, or defend our forests from fu
unwise exploitation.
At times the Foundation asked these organizations why they had not attemp
communicate their concerns overgrowth, specifically population growth, to Con
and the Administration. The replies, of course, varied considerably, ranging fro
wanting to urge fertility reduction lest they be drawn into the abortion confl
fear of being called racist by pro-immigration interests. However, by far the m
of answers spoke to the fact that they were small or specialized organizations wo
toward a specific goal and not staffed to engage in advocacy of that nature.
believe that, even if raised, their voices would be lost in the labyrinths of Washing
Well-meaning citizens have decreasing options for addressing

mental quality. Deteriorating systems are everywhere apparent. Many
(deforestation, pollutants, infrastructure, traffic congestion) could b
tuted for habitat, oil, water, and topsoil loss to illustrate stress
population growth places upon the environment. Resources are being
even at the present rate of use. More people demand more resources;
them, people create more pollution. Some systems have no substitute
used up or degraded, the loss is irretrievable. Other systems are rem
at a cost - for example, $25 billion is the estimated annual cost of impl
the Clean Air Act.
In the Third World and Russia, the linkage between wealth, po
growth, and environmental devastation has long been evident. Protec
conservation take real money, lots of it, and such efforts are low on
priorities in poor countries. In the United States, the linkages betwee
lation growth and the environment have been masked by affluence. (
lets one afford environmental protection and restoration - as w
much-reviled overconsumption.)
Until recendy, environmentalists relied on government regulation
of private and public (taxpayer) funds for environmental protection.
cost of such programs has provoked a political backlash, recision
environmental legislation, and possible retrenchment of Environmen
tection Agency (EPA) activities. The cost of mitigating the envir
damage done by large populations grows along with population si
seems likely that less money, rather than more, will be available in t
JFor information regarding the coalition, contact Population-Environment Bal

Street NW, Suite 210, Washington, DC 20036 or telephone (202) 955-5700.
Thus, environmentalists may have little cho

between population growth and environmen
the gist of questioning by Senator Harry R
hearings on the Endangered Species Act. Senato
an immigration moratorium (bills in 1994 an
between human appropriation of wildlife habit
As natural wealth diminishes and population
out other values. Do people need jobs? Is hou
Forget the spotted owl! Rescind the Clean W
vote; other species are no one's constituency.
Environmental batdes are perennially refoug
and intrusion into wildlands habitat grow i
people. Environmental values are overwhelmed
wants trump the environment.
CONSERVATION ETHIC
These few examples suggest that a conservation ethic in America sh

with the goal of maintaining this country at as small a popula
possible. This goal is incompatible with a relatively open door im
policy. Therefore, the United States should not undertake to re
countries of their excess population even if such a policy were neut
immigrant-sending country. However, the U.S. open door policy
not neutral but actually, because of the misleading signals it sends,
Whereas equalizing opportunity within every nation remains a
and ethically valid goal, cross-national transfers of wealth and carryi
jeopardize the incentive to make adjustments which only local so
families can undertake. Americans have voluntarily limited fertility
replacement levels. Others cannot expect to raise their standard
without doing the same.
Even at present population size, the U.S. environment is contin
promised despite the considerable sums spent to improve quality and
harm - and present levels of expenditure may not be sustainabl
mental and conservation programs compete with other economic
uses for resources and money.
In fact, environmental protection is probably a luxury availab
relatively rich nations with stable populations. Nations, institutions
and individuals can afford and are likely to conserve only if income i
to support the expected quality of life. At the extreme of pove
consumption hovers near subsistence level, individuals are compe
sume their wealth, including natural capital, as a last-ditch survival
tragic testament to today's destitution and overpopulation is tha
believe they can afford to conserve may be in the minority.
Wealth facilitates but does not guarantee conservation. Control ov

critical minimum of resources as well as secure rights to benefit from
the future - in order to avoid the mentality of the commons (Hard
? are necessary conditions for conservation, but alone they may
sufficient (Abernethy, 1993). For most people, privatizing wealth to ge
future income takes priority over conservation of the commons and w
to overexploitation of resources whenever rights to future benefits are
V. S. Naipaul (1989), a widely read commentator on the Third World,
that the element of society most upsetting to him is "cynicism." He ex
cynicism as
fouling one's own nest at home and feathering another abroad. The cynicism,
perhaps by this availability of emigration abroad ... is very demoralizing. People
able to create a mess at home, build dreadful skyscrapers in cities like Bombay, yet b
nice apartments for themselves in foreign countries that are better organized, (p.
The very rich have global mobility, and increasingly neither peo
corporations appear to have the loyalty to country that economist
David Ricardo and John Maynard Keynes took for granted. Citizen
world may be patriots of nowhere.
For example, virgin timber is a core element of national wealth and
represent depletion of barely-renewable natural capital, but until recend
regarded as intrusive offers of international assistance in protecting t
forest. Tax policy rewarded those who exploited the trees because expo
foreign exchange; wealthy Brazilian nationals and foreigners joindy lum
off the rain forest, shipped whole logs to countries which import
capacity (e.g., Singapore and Japan), sold the denuded land, and d
untaxed profits in offshore banks. This treatment of forest lands as "
to be exploited and as space for its fast-growing population" was osten
public response to populist demand, writes an appropriately skept
Street Journalstaffer (Cohen, 1989).
In part, as well, the deforestation and earnings repay internation
Excusing the debt as lenders often are urged to do would, neverth
wrong. The great, original harm of the loans (besides their misappropr
was that government leaders used funds for consumption subsidie
probably mislead ordinary people into believing that larger family
affordable (Abernethy, 1993, 1994, 1995). Excusing the loans would
perverse effect of, again, suggesting an abundance of international res
be tapped, ad lib, for consumption.
Certain industrialized countries' business interests and multinational
rations also espouse globalism at the expense, it sometimes appears, of th
country. The export of high-value-added jobs and especially the import
labor to compete with ones own show a disregard of country. Such
practices amount to letting the few ruin one niche before moving on to
Not only does this happen, but globalism is held before us as an ideal.
In my view, the incentive system and ethics

opinionmakers, the intellectual elite, and the g
sibility. Critical, liberal or conservative voices a
counternote (^Lind, 1995).
Economists John Culbertson (1989), as we
with ethicist John B. Cobb (Cobb and Daly
consensus is growing that the neoclassical myt
underlies the business community's addiction
Cobb, and many others challenge the possibilit
not only upon ecology's concept of "carryin
Ricardo, the father of classical economics. Rica
(land). He also assumed that virtually all invest
Maynard Keynes concurs with the desirability
inevitability) of primarily national investmen
Cobb and Daly (1990) follow classical - not
this paradigm, free trade and an open arms im
a betrayal of both the environment and th
countries with a relatively higher standard of
exporting jobs, and immigration brings sur
tion. Cobb and Daly write that either strategy
"the national community that embraces both l
has the more lasting negative impact because p
Both strategies, however, irresponsibly under
vation ethic, the confidence that one can be
saves today.
Behaviors are subdy shaped, I think, by the mosdy subliminal sense that the
United States has become a commons. Waste and degradation of natural
resources become normal practice when the private, local incentive to conserve
the carrying capacity disappears. If everyone owns or uses a resource, if so many
can enter and claim a share, who will conserve? Overconsumption and loss of
natural capital are inevitable when ownership is ambiguous. The key to
conservation appears to be accountability and appropriate incentives. Without
control, without secure rights to long-term benefits, with the possibility of
moving on, or with gain unrelated to risk,3 conservation is a sometime thing.
2Carrying capacity refers to the number of individuals who can be supported without degrading
the physical, ecological, cultural and social environment, i.e., without reducing the ability of the
environment to sustain the desired quality of life over the long term.
3lt should be noted that U.S. domestic policies often support unwise exploitation of natural
capital. For example, sale of cheap (below market price) crop insurance encourages planting
grain in the fragile, drought-prone prairie grasslands of Oklahoma and other dry states. When
the crop fails, the U.S. taxpayer pays for it. Meanwhile, the soil erodes and irrigation drains
underground aquifers at unsustainable rates. Similarly, water subsidies throughout the U.S. west
encourage agriculture in areas that are naturally desert. Given the price incentives, flood
irrigation - which wastes water - will continue.
The mobility of monetized capital makes it difficult to envision a suffi

incentive, or workable enforcement mechanism, to tie wealthy individual
land or any particular natural resource so that they have a stake in conser
its long-term productivity, ^et this must eventually be part of a sol
Whereas conspicuous consumption has been a sign of wealth, conserv
would ideally be tomorrows status symbol.
When the condition of irrevocable linkage to country and rights to lan
not in place - and in the global economy and with ambiguity of na
borders they increasingly are not - ways to promote connectedness
conservation are not obvious. The essential element of conservation, nonet
less, is a climate in which citizens can trust that their own and their chil
rights to future use of assets will remain secure. Without this confidence, e
falter through a failure of will, and then collapse under the pressu
continuing population growth.
If and when adjustments in national migration policy are made, env
mental progress still depends upon the willingness of business to be a par
The wealth generated by business, large and small, is the source of in
which affords the United States the environmental protection undertaken
far and the possibility of continuing care. Possibly a renewal of federalism
a return of regulatory authority to state and local government is the tra
which business should expect from a country that values its capitalis
trepreneurial, wealth-generating sector.
Regardless of the means used to encourage conservation and discou
pollution, business justifiably fears that the costs of federally mandated
ronmental protection and labor standards jeopardize their competitiveness
the global economy - where globalism is a reality even if not an ideal.
unmanaged trade, capital investment and jobs do flow to countries that ac
environmental degradation, just as they flow to countries with low labor
Witness China, Korea, Thailand, and Mexico.
The answer cannot be to lower ones own standards for environmental
quality, no more than to undercut American workers' wages with cheap
immigrant labor or to accept unlimited goods from countries that produce at
any human cost. As an industrialized country, the United States can compete
through innovation, automation, and employment of a skilled labor force, plus
protection of its markets against industrialized countries that resort to exclu?
sionary trade practices. Bilateral trade agreements should aim for equal trade
in the sum of high value-added goods - in short, fair trade. From a paralle
perspective, permitting immigration from countries which have higher than
replacement level fertility imposes on the self-restraint of American citizens
who limit reproduction and is, therefore, unfair. And it should stop.
The American way is to let incentives work. Citizens, labor and business
alike will protect and conserve land, resources, and environmental quality
where they have a stake and secure rights in the

their effort, caution, low fertility rates, and fru
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Environmental and Ethical Aspects of International Migration

Author(s): Virginia Abernethy

U.S. immigration policy has a beneficent intent. However, recent work

In recent years, Western industrialized countries have extended their traditions

One U.S. policy that is believed to be beneficent in both intent a

132 IMR Vol. XXX, No. 1

THE COUNTRIES WHICH EMIGRANTS LEAVE

Emigration can be counterproductive for immigrant-sending countries

The analysis of Sergio Diaz-Briquets and L. Pe

Linkages between economic/resource variables

fertility declined rapidly in similar communit

Advocates for beneficence as a guide to foreign policy should be concerne

THE HOST COUNTRY

Immigration also harms Americans. Working Americans and es

Labor Market Effects

Most studies which show net negative or mixed effects on American

per-household annual income (in 1990 dollars) would be approxima

It is clear that America's black population is bearing a disproportionate shar

Indeed, Booker T. Washington pleaded for an end to immigratio

Apologists for massive immigration appear to blame the large-scale replacemen

Earlier immigrants also lose, even when an inf

Economists George Borjas and Richard Free

Among these labor force trends, perhaps the polarization of society in

Lester Thurow, Dean of the MIT Sloane School of Business Admini

Population Growth: The Ultimate Environm

The United States has the fastest population gr

has led to foundation support for a coalition for population stabilizat

Well-meaning citizens have decreasing options for addressing

JFor information regarding the coalition, contact Population-Environment Bal

Thus, environmentalists may have little cho

These few examples suggest that a conservation ethic in America sh

Wealth facilitates but does not guarantee conservation. Control ov

In my view, the incentive system and ethics

The mobility of monetized capital makes it difficult to envision a suffi

where they have a stake and secure rights in the

1990 Testimony before U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on

1994 "Sharp Increase in Science and Engineering Immigrants Results in Unemployed

Cobb, J. Jr. and H. Daly

1968 "Early Fertility Decline in Austria-Hungary: A Lesson in Demographic Transition,"

Diaz-Briquets, S. and L. Perez

Espenshade, T. J. and K. Hempstead

1956 Elements in Social Organization. London: W

Pimentel, D., C. Harvey, P. Resosudarmo, K. Sinclair, D. Kurz, M. McNair, S. Crist, L. Shopritz,

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