The Philippine New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950.

In this revision, the Code Commission

added a new chapter on Human Relations. The chapter on Human Relations governs several aspects of
private affairs not otherwise covered by the old Civil Code.

The chapter of the Philippine Civil Code on Human Relations starts with Articles 19, 20, and 21. These
articles provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage. These
articles apply either when first, one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or second, and
more relevantly, one commits an act that does not violate any positive law but nevertheless violates
rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. These are so-called catch-all provisions because they provide
the bases for actions for damages in the absence of any express provision.

Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith”.
This provision codifies the concepts of justice and fair play. This prevents a person from abusing the
rights that he may otherwise have, against another. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, although legal because recognized or granted by law, may nevertheless become a
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Article 19 abandoned the old theory that no person can be held liable for damages against another while
in the exercise of his or her right. And adopted instead the modern thinking, which is to grant indemnity
for damages in cases where there is an abuse of right, even when the act is legal. “Law cannot be given
an anti-social effect. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for injury caused
thereby (which can be a tortious act), with more reason, should abuse or bad faith make him liable.”

The next one, Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that “every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same”. Article 20 was enacted to
fill in any gaps in the law. It is a general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide their own sanction. It makes it now almost impossible to have a situation whereby a person who
suffers damage would be left without relief.

The third provision, Article 21, provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage”. This provision was enacted because of the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. It
provides for adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs, which it is impossible for
human foresight to capture in the statutes.

Because of this, Article 21 does not refer to any violation of any statute or positive law, but to a
transgression of “morals, good customs, or public policy.” This principle is taken from the German Civil
Code. It is based on the idea that inasmuch as the Legislative cannot foresee all wrongs that cause
damage to another person, there should be an all-embracing clause that will provide remedy in all such
unforeseen situations. When therefore combined with Articles 19 and 20, Article 21 broadens our law on
civil wrongs; making it more difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be
sanctioned; and, thus making it more adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.

One usual example when Article 21 applies is for a breach of promise to marry as long as one party has
paid for preparations when the marriage was called off. The damages due are to recompense a party for
such preparations, and not the breach of the promise to marry itself.

With these foundational principles of Human Relations in mind, we now raise a question: What is the
boundary between morality and law? Every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those
principles, which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. The rule is a bastion of justice
in the face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damage. This helps
maintain the social order, by preventing a person from causing damage to his fellow men with impunity,
just he does not break any law of the state, though he may be defying the most sacred postulates of
morality.

Article 21 may also be justified by the words of Eugen Huber, author of the Swiss Civil Code of 1907:

“Moral law has in law such a penetrating and valuable significance that we cannot speak of positive law
without referring to moral law. The moral law and the law of the State have the same object and
purpose, and together they govern human aims and conduct, which constitute human society itself.
Human community is the field in which morality and law act as immanent ideas in our rational
conscience. It is equally possible to consider law as included in morality.”
Question now: Will the person, for example, who fails to render assistance to a drowning man, or to a
victim of a hit-and-run vehicular accident, when he has the means to help, make him liable under these
three articles? Do these three articles require a person to be altruistic, or to perform charity, or sacrifice
if he has the means to do so? Will this act of omission constitute a charge of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Philippine Civil Code (which is the equivalent of the Anglo-American
concept of torts)?

The Supreme Court of the Philippines in Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals discusses the
distinction, and how the provisions on human relations fill in the gaps otherwise not captured by the
traditional concept of quasi-delicts:

“Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an
Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes
not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are
to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article
2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law
on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.”

The foregoing provisions of law are based upon justice, and were made suitable to Philippine conditions.
The Civil Code incorporated into the positive law of the Philippines very many claims that had remained
only within the sphere of natural law. It was intended by the Code Commission that the many grievances
not redressed and the many injustices committed in the relations among men be righted and given some
adequate legal remedy. It was opined by the Code Commission that the guides for human conduct
contained in these articles should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice.

Let me present a few examples of recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which
interpreted and applied these provisions on Human Relations.

In Joyce Ardiente v. Spouses Javier, a seller sold a housing unit to the buyer. Under the terms of their
agreement, the buyer would be responsible for all the utilities. However, the seller’s rights over the
utilities were never formalized with the water supplier. Hence, the seller was able to cut off the water
supply of the buyer. The Court held that such conduct amounted to a violation of Article 19 because
even if the seller still had the right to tell the water supplier to cut off the buyer’s water supply, such
right was exercised in bad faith to the prejudice of the buyer.

In California Clothing, Inc. v. Shirley Quiñones, a woman bought a pair of jeans at a store. Upon leaving
the store, the woman was chased by the store employees, claiming that she failed to pay for the item.
The woman showed the employees the receipt, but they were not convinced, so they accompanied her
to her office where her belongings were searched, her employer was informed of the supposed theft,
and she was humiliated in front of clients. The Court held that while the employees had the right to
ensure the item was paid for, that did not justify the excessive means employed by the employees
against the woman.

There are several other provisions on Human Relations that the Philippine Civil Code covers. The chapter
on Human Relations likewise contains provisions against unjust enrichment, violation of privacy, and
unfair competition.