Saturn * * e o

Prepared by
GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
OF
N A T I O N A L AERONAUTICS A N D SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Steps t o Satuhcl . . . . .

At Cape Canaveral, on October 27, 1961, at about ten o’clock in the

morning, a white, three-stage rocket, one hundred and sixty-two feet tall,
lifted slowly from its pad on a roaring column of fire. T h e vehicle rose
with ceremonial dignity, four hundred and sixty tons of propellants and
piping, framework, instruments and engines, the whole encased in a smooth
aluminum skin and set free to lift itself into the air.

You could not tell exactly when the slow rise quickened. Suddenly,
the vehicle was rushing upward. Its speed increased and doubled, and in-
creased again, until the vehicle shrank to a brilliant orange dot in the south-
east sky.

But the sound of engines remained, a profound disturbance behind

the clouds.

This was the first flight test of the SATURN launch vehicle -- an
eight-engine booster capped with two inert stages and payload. T h e launch-.
ing will be followed by flights of nine other research and development
vehicles, some with a single live stage, some with two, and a few vehicles
with test versions of man-carrying spacecraft riding forward of the second
stage.

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 By the end of these tests, after the measurements have been made and
improvements completed, we will have developed a new space vehicle t o
meet the objectives and programs of the national space effort. In perfecting
such a vehicle, we move one step closer to realizing certain of the national
space objectives -- to carry instruments, equipment, supplies, and living
organisms through space; to expand human knowledge of space; and to
preserve the role of the United States as a leader in peaceful space explora-
tion.

T h e Government, in accepting its obligation to develop and extend

the nation’s capabilities in space, has begun a series of advanced scientific
programs. These include manned exploration of space, lunar circumnavi-
gation and landing, development of orbital communication networks, in-
vestigation of the space environment between the earth and the sun and,
of course, development of vehicles and spacecraft to carry out these pro-
grams.

Viewed in this context, the first S A T U R N flight takes on a partic-

ular importance. W e know rather precisely when the vehicle will become
operational. From this knowledge, we can construct a reasonably accurate
timetable of vehicle-oriented activities in space for the next several years.
W e may plan special missions in far more detail. And, during vehicle de-
velopment flights, we can provide a continuous flow of technical infor-
mation to the spacecraft designers.
 S l A G t S-IY, S-IY ti

\
APOLLO, SPACECRAFT
Douglas Aircraft

North American Aviation

DOWNEY, CALIFORNIA

OPERATIONS
WHITE BLOCKS.......PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL
 T h e launch of the first SATURN was a public demonstration of
that detailed and sustained effort, on a national scale, begun little more
than three years before, in August 1958. Between design and launch, the
skills and talents of thousands of people were com.bined into a single
program, as fibers are combined to form a cord. People in management,
people in science, people in Government and industry -- all joining in a
coordinated effort to develop a new vehicle.

W e can see that effort quite clearly from the viewpoint of the
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, manager of the S A T U R N program.
In mid-1960, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration gave the
Marshall Center responsibility for developing and launching NASA space
vehicles. SATURN was the largest and most demanding of these.

7
 e

K E D S T O N E MISSILE, d e v e l o p e d for t h e Army b y t h e

p r e s e n t MSPC team, is noui d e p l o y e d b y NATO

J U P I T E R MISSILE, d e t w l o p e d b y p r e s e n t M S F C t e n m ,
e x t e n d e d t e c h n o l o g y o/ RliDSTONE program.
JUI’I?’ER is presenfly d e p l o y e d b y N A T O
 Responsibility for major R&D programs has long been accepted
by members of Marshall. The Center is formed about a scientific and
management group that includes pioneers in rocketry and space research.
Supporting this group are engineers and technicians whose experience goes
back through JUPITER and REDSTONE to early United States' rocket
programs. T h e Center has also attracted many additional highly trained
people. Collectively, these individuals form an integrated organization of
widely diversified skills.

J U N O I!, a N A S A space probe vehicle, used J U P I -

T E R first stage and solid propellant upper
stages. established /irst U S satellite around
the s u n

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I
I
.

-
I
I
 I .

MER :URY S P A C E C R A F T , under deve Iopment by

the Manned Spacecraft Cenr!er, is first in‘ U
s e r i e s o f manned v e h i c l e s

Members of the Marshall Center have participated in some of the

nation’s most important space projects, ‘MERCURY-REDSTONE being
possibly the best known of these. Marshall also directs a number of major
development programs. One of these will provide the first high-energy
rocket engine to use liquid-hydrogen technology. In other programs,
boosters, upper stages, and engines are being developed for SATURN and
an advanced S A T U R N launch vehicle.

National recognition has frequently been given Marshall’s techni-

cal achievements. By contrast, Marshall’s program management -- the
work of organizing and directing these achievements -- is little known.
Essentially, management consolidates into a single program the in-
dividual stage and engine development efforts, the overall funding and
mission requirements, and the support equipment and facilities development.
 T h e magnitude of this effort, in which a variety of interrelated
R&D programs advance along a common front, has created a most com-
plex job for management. Marshall makes decisions which affect the
vehicle program from three to five years ahead. These necessary long
lead-time decisions are supported by Marshall’s coniprehensive technical
background.

In the past, development of missile systems by members of the

present Marshall group was concentrated at Huntsville, with industrial
support. T h e present SATIJRN program is on an altogether larger scale,
requiring greatly expanded industrial assistance. T h e development effort
has become national in scope, its success depending on tightly knit in-
dustry-Govcrnmcnt teamwork. In Marshall technical working groups, rep-
resentatives from industry and Government attack technical problems in
a spirit of close cooperation, working out solutions by a common effort.

T h e vehicle development program is composed of several clcarly

defined parts -- the in-house research and development work carried on in
Marshall’s laboratories, shops, and test areas; the research and develop-
ment performed b y industry under the Center’s direction; and special
study and test programs performed at private and Government facilities.
As a final part, there is Marshall’s work of overall program manage-
ment, during which in-house and out-of-house activities are integrated
along planned schedules into a unified project.
 - MSC SPACECRAFT
North American Aviation

S-IV STAGE
Aircraft

PROPELLANT CONTAINERS
Ling-Temco-Vought

s-I STAGE
Chrysler Corporatioi

- H-1 E N G I N E
Rocket dyne/
North American Aviation
 Management of earlier research and development programs was,
comparatively, less complicated. Present management, in contrast, is se-
verely taxed by rapidly advancing technology and ever-expanding fields
of investigation. In this atmosphere of change, management must remain
flexible and informed by first-hand experience with the new tools of
science. This is particularly true of research and development, where
programs are based on principles recently discovered and technology
still being defined.

Specific problems and questions change. T h e final responsibility

of management remains constant. I n an R&D program, the objectives
are clear, but, at any given time, the details may be obscure. Yet, on
these details, management decisions must be made.

Thus, management of a space vehicle development program means

more than contract control and the monitoring of schedules and fund
requirements. N o r is it a matter of doing the LLTork in-house, building
a vehicle from off-the-shclf componcnts. More realistically, wc can des-
cribe vehiclc management as a constant balancing of the efforts of in-
d 11stria 1 con t r ;I c t o r s, tech n i ca I ad v isc r s, con t r i b 11ti n g agen c i es a n d av a i 1-
able resources along a schedule leading to launch.
 T o see more clearly how this balance is maintained, let us exam-
ine the SATURN research and development program. T h e problems
met and decisions made in carrying the system from design to launch
are typical of large vehicles. In the following section, we will view the
diverse panorama of the SATURN effort, and you will see how Marshall
formed and directed the program.

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 Three main elements run like nerves through the SATURN pro-
gram: the launch vehicle, the ground support equipment, and the test
and launch facilities.

Each element demands a sustained research and development effort.

N e w technical fields are explored. New techniques are devised. W o r k
progresses in many places at the same time. In Florida, machinists form
parts for a liquid hydrogen rocket engine. In a Tennessee wind tunnel,
air roars past a scale model of the SATURN vehicle. In California, the
dome of a fuel tank rotates in a welding fixture, while, in Alabama, a
full-size inert SATURN vibrates under applied forces in its test stand.

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 These many events, so diverse and seemingly unrelated, advance
the vehicle program along carefully wrought schedules. Results of re-
search and development flow into the project. N e w technical appli-
cations are combined with proven techniques for each step in develop-
ment. By management direction, the three elements -- vehicle, ground sup-
port equipment, and facilities -- support and define each other, as work
moves forward along a broad front.

During research and development, much new information is se-

cured. One can never be sure exactly what form this information will
take or how its use will affect program schedules. N e w problems con-
stantly arise, their solution requiring that old concepts be discarded and
new methods devised.

--
1 ) I V li I< S I : E V E N ' I ' S A 1) V A N C E '1'1 I I: V 13 111C I, E PI< O(;I< A A! I3 E LO IC': V P h i c la ra s p onse 1o
/ l i g h t c o n d i t i o n s is s i m u l n t c d in rlynnmir t p s t toirvr. F A C I N G P A G E . AI3OVE: Pro-
d u c t i o n o/ 11-1 e n g i n e s /or hoostcr; /jt?/,()\\'; Welding / u p 1 tank doma / o r S A T U R N
sacond stnge
27
A V A I L A B L E ENGINE DESIGNS W E R E A D A P T E D F O R T H E B O O S T E R -- A B O V E : T H O R /
J U P I T E R ENGINE. Designs o/ this engine were used to accelerate development O /
S A T U R N booster H-1 engine, shown BELOW
 To each problem, management responds with clear decisions: W e
will do this. W e will forego that. W e will go this way. Each decision
drives the program forward. Each decision leads to a more exact defi-
nition of vehicle performance.

T h e S-I booster stage, the keystone of the SATURN vehicle,

takes its present design from decisions made early in development. A
booster producing about 1,500,000 pounds of thrust was needed to orbit
the heavy payloads planned. But time was short. T h e need to support
the national space mission was immediate.

Design studies showed that a booster could be built around a

single, high-thrust engine. While technically practical, however, that en-
gine could not be developed and tested in time to meet flight schedules.
And, almost certainly, development of an entirely new engine would be
complicated by unpredictable technical problems, a condition common t o
any unproven design.

As development of a single-engine stage was not the answer, man-

agement took another approach. The needed thrust was secured by group-
ing eight engines of the THOR/JUPITER type. The engine design,
thoroughly tested and of proven reliability, was quickly up-rated in thrust
and adapted to SATURN. (After simplification, the engine, identified as
H-1, has become more reliable than the parent engine.)

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 T A N K C L U S T E R I N G BEGINS -- D e s i g n s of RED.TTONE t a n k s (Foreground) a n d JU~'1'l'E'K
t a n k s (Background) were a d a p t e d /or the c l u s t e r e d booster

To speed booster development still more, it was decided to use pro-

pellant tanks and components designed for the REDSTONE and JLJPITER
programs. Most o € the hardware could be built with existing tools, using
established fabrication and inspection procedures. Weight, size, and reli-
ability of the components were suitable for the new application. And ex-
perienced personnel were ready to begin work.

In pressing vigorously toward launch, responsibility for each phase

of booster development is assigned to the technical divisions o € the Center.
Preliminary designs are completed. Test schedules are worked out and
a wide range of investigations begins to Secure design information nccded
later in the program.
A V A I L A B L E T O O L I N G WAS A D A P T E D F O R B O O S T E R FABRICATION -- A B O V E : LOX
tank d o m e is s p u n formed i n J U P I T E R - d e v e l o p e d fixture. BELOW: 105-inch tank
s e g m e n t i s j o i n e d in horizontal w e l d fixture

r(

c
INS'I'ALLATION O F H - 1 ENGINE -- D e s i g n a n a l y s i s a s s u r e s p r e c i s e mounting of e n g i n e s
on thrust structure

T h e work is accelerated by parallel design of the booster stage

a n d H-1 engine. There is a free interchange of information between the
Center's design group and the engine contractor. Through this mutual
activity, the engine design is matched precisely with the design of the
booster tail section. Propellant line routing is adjusted. T h e attachment
of engine controls and the location of flame shields and insulation is
worked out. During this development phase, the design groups combine
their technical skills to define details of the final structure.
 By using available engine and equipment designs, we speed develop-
ment of a booster for the present vehicle. Looking to the future, however,
we foresaw a clear need to develop a vehicle of increased performance.
Thus, as fabrication of the first clustered booster proceeded, Marshall
began a series of design studies to improve vehicle capability. T h e guidance
equipment was analyzed to make sure that, through natural growth, it
would be satisfactory for missions of the future. Simultaneously, studies
began to determine the possible effect of manned guidance on the vehicle
system.

MANUFACTURING METHODS D E V E L O P E D A T MARSHALL PROVIDE T H E T E C H N I C A L

BASIS F O R MANAGING INDUSTRIAL ROOSTER PRODUCTION --Forward spider
beam, central LOX tank, and tail section have been joined to form the basic struc-
ture of the booster
B O O S T E R ASSEMBLY -- FACING P A G E , ABOVE: Eight outer fuel and LOX t a n k s are
c l u s t e r e d about the central tank; BELOW: After tank c l u s t e r i n g is c o m p l e t e , e n g i n e s
w i l l be i n s t a l l e d on thrust structure. ABOVE: Instrument c o n t a i n e r s are i n s t a l l e d ;
BELOW: C o m p l e t e d b o o s t e r is m o v e d t o checkout. then t o s t a t i c firing t e s t s

L
 All of this activity was paralleled by a program to develop the very
large I;-1 engine, intended for use in a future high-performance stage.
Design of this stage, however, began only after engine R&D was sub-
stantially complete, in order to secure maximum design experience. This
experience, in turn, served to shorten final stage development time.

T h e engine and stage development programs share the common

factor of reliability. As part of the reliability effort, emphasized from de-
sign through launch, the booster has an “engine-out” capability: that is,
if one engine fails, the mission can be completed with the remaining seven
engines. While technically demanding, this feature is a kind of flight
insurance, bought because of the importance. of the data to be secured
from instrumented payloads and, also, to give an extra margin of safety
in the coming manned space flights.

S P E C l A L DESIGNS S O L V E T A l L A R E A P R O B L E M S -- BELOW: T a i l shroud (shown in-

v e r t e d during j a b r i c a t i o n ) p r o t e c t s e n g i n e s / r o m a e r o d y n a m i c p r e s s u r e s . FACING
P A G E : Engine c o n n e c t i o n s are s h i e l d e d by s p e c i a l i n s u l a t i o n s
 - .
1
,
1 i
V

To develop a reliable space vehicle booster, the Marshall Center

and its contractors have solved many design problems. To use the max-
imum amount of propellants, a special propellant utilization system has
been devised. To compensate for shrinkage of the tanks when filled with
liquid oxygen, special sliding joints have been designed for the booster
structure.

Eight engines, with exhaust gases of 5,000°F, are clustered at the

base of the booster: to protect sensitive connections above the engines,
special insulation materials have been developed. To relieve in-flight aero-
dynamic pressures on the engines, a newly-designed tail shroud encloses
the rear of the booster. T h e shroud also includes air scoops to flush the
tail area free of explosive gas concentrations.

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 Every research and development program meets its share of un-
knowns, and SATURN is no exception to this rule. T h e very number of
problems encountered, as we extend technological and scientific frontiers,
requires the assistance of many participating organizations. Often the equip-
ment needed to study unusual technical problems is available at only
a few facilities. Or, perhaps, only a few individuals possess the specialized
skills and techniques required for certain investigations. Thus, in ad-
vancing development as efficiently and rapidly as possible, Marshall en-
lists the aid of many private and Government facilities. T h e work per-
formed by these facilities supplements research and development work
carried on by hlarshall’s operating divisions.
V E H I C L E D E V E L O P J l E N T P R O C E E D S ACROSS A BROAD F R O N T A T A V A R I E T Y O F
S P E C I A L I Z E D F A C I L I T I E S -- FAC1,VG P A G E : F a c i l i t y /or d e v e l o p m e n t o/ l i q u i d
hydrogen t e c h n o l o g y . AnOl’E: F - 1 e n g i n e turbopump t e s t s t a n d

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 ..

NEW F A C I L I T I E S R E F L E C T 7 E C I I N O L O G I C A L GROU’Tll -- L i q u i d hydrogen s t o r a g e

t a n k s at S-IV Stage t e s t area

These divisions have numerous responsibilities. They design, build, and

test the booster. They originate design criteria for the entire vehicle and
develop the guidance and control system. They also perform applied
research in a multitude of fields, developing materials suitable for space,
o r new fabrication methods, or advanced propulsion systems.

The out-of-house investigations, performed on specific assignment,

clarify sclcctcd dctails of the larger R&D eflort performed by the Marshall
divisions. In turn, the work of each division is phased, step by step,
into the overall vehicle program.
B U L K O F F - I E N G I N E LOOMS O V E R H - 1 -- O n e F - 1 engine p r o d u c e s 1,500,000 pounds of
thrust, the s a m e amount as eight of the H - 1 e n g i n e s , in foreground

35
 Into the vehicle program comes a tidal surge of information: wind
tunnel investigations to determine aerodynamic responses. Studies of flame
pattern and heating in the booster tail section. New methods of sup-
pressing propellant slosh. Recovery of flight stages. Performance of low-
temperature propellants. Each research activity is reviewed and directed
by Marshall, for loss of tempo in a single study may be the cause o f a
slip in overall program schedules.

C t f E C K O U T EQUIPMENT P R O R E S V E I f l C L E S Y S T E M S --
N e w c h e c k o u t t e c h n i q u e s must b e d e v e l o p e d to m e e t
d e m a n d s of n e w v e h i c l e s y s t e m s
 V A R I E D INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES S U P P O R T SATURN R C D -- A B O V E : T e s t mea for
c r y o g e n i c c o m p o n e n t s of l i q u i d hydrogen engines. BELOW: P r e s s u r e t e s t of s e a l e d
components

37
 r

From the results o f in-house and out-of-house research efforts,

spring the first Marshall designs o f vehicle systems and hardware. T o
prove these designs, thousands of' development tests are performed. There
is a bewildering variety o f these tests, in all degrees of complexity; yet
each plays a planned role in the project.
 Typical of Marshall’s approach to development testing are the test
programs for the H-1 engine and the booster stage. O n receipt of engines
from the contractor, Marshall begins a further series of static tests. T h e
engines are fired, first singly, then grouped on the booster. As a result,
a great amount of performance data are collected for each engine within
a short time. Working groups (representing Marshall and the contractors)
study the test data and initiate design revision, if need be, before additional
tests are conducted.

V E H I C L E D E V E L O P M E N T IS A D V A N C E D BY TIIOUSANDS O F T E S T S - - F A C I N G P A G E :
Static t e s t o/ H - 1 e n g i n e ut contractor’s / n c i l i t y . RELOW’: C o l d / l o w t e s t i n g a t in-
dustrial l i q u i d hydrogen f a c i l i t y

39
 The same general method is used in formalizing booster design.
Marshall instruments and static fires a special test booster. Necessary
design changes and modifications are incorporated on the first flight
booster, which is then qualified for flight by its own short series of static
tests.

While the flight booster I S being fired, the special test booster is
modified to include further design improvements. T h e test sequence is
now repeated. T h e modified test booster is again static fired, and results
of these tests are used to improve the design of the second flight booster.
In this way, the latest findings of research and development are quickly
applied to flight hardwarc. The total numbcr of static firings is mini-
mized a n d devclopment time is correspondingly shortened.

For the greatest economy, many separate tests are made during
each booster firing. Name shield materials are evaluated at the same time
that techniques of engine ignition and shut-down are explored. Performance
of the propellant utilization system and control of engine movements are
stud i ed si m u I t a n eo ii s1y .
S T A T I C T E S T I N G BEGINS -- A SATURN booster i s p o s i -
tioned in Marshall’s static test stand for live firing
tests

47
 A s \\.e Ii;ivc seen, the myriad details o f appIied research and de-
v e l o 17m e n t t cs t i 11g a r e m o n it o red by hf a r sh a I 1' s tcc-li n i ca I d i v is i o n s. h 1a n ag e -
ment, howcver. clearly distinguishes M n r e e n responsibilities o f the di-
visions in their spccific areas, and the interdivisional work accomplished
by the technical working groups.
 These groups directly link the Marshall Cei Ler with its contractors.
Fcr examp!e, at the beginning of the program to develop the SATURN
second stage, the S-IV Stage, Marshall formed working groups and in-
vited the contractor’s participation. These groups reviewed the s-IV design,
defining the proposed mating method, assuring that second stage systems
were compatible with those of the booster, and determining interface and
interstage requirements.

M O C K U P O F S-l\J S T A G E -- T h e S A T U K N s e c o n d sfage u s e s s i x liquid hydrogen e n g i n e s

p r o d u c i n g 90,000 pounds O/ tlwust

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 The booster and S-IV Stage are joined by an interstage segment.
I n this area, the working groups resolve technical problems concerning
hoth the S-1 a n d S-IV design groups, Major rlcments invcstiptccj include
ae rod y namic 1oads, e I ec t rical connections, ph y s ica I mating , d i s po s i t io 11
of hydrogen gases prior to separation, and placement of ullage rockcts
(Lvhich give the stage sufficient forward motion, after separation, to
settle the propellant). As urork progresses on the stage, parallel studies
d e f i n e the designs o f r eq u i red ground SLIp po r t c1' u i p m e 11t a 11d I a LI n c 11
facilities.
 T h e fuel for the S-IV Stage is liquid hydrogen. (Earlier decisions
have established that all SATURN upper stages will be powered with
liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen engines.) Liquid hydrogen propulsion is
a relatively new field, thus far applied only to the ATLAS-CENTAUR
vehicle, and, in many areas, the technology is still being defined.

C E N T A U R V E H I C L E -- L i q u i d hydrogen t e c h n o l o g y e v o l v e d during C E N T A O R program

s p e e d s d e v e l o p m e n t o/ SATURN propulsion s y s t e m s

45
I N T E G R A T E D T E S T PROGRAAIS D E F l N E PERFOK,\IANCE O F Ll Q U l l ) HYDROGEN - -
A B O V E : New i n s u l a t i o n s are f r s t d in s c a l r S-IV f n n k filled will) liquid hydrogen.
[?ELOW: C o n s t r u c t i o n of r l o u ~ ~ l e - u ~ n l lliquid
crl Iiydrogr?n s t o r a g e t a n k

1.
 T o speed development of liquid-hydrogen propulsion, management
assures a maximum exchange of technical information between the CEN-
TAUR and the S-IV programs. Such information includes results of
cryogenic materials testing, special welding techniques, and design ap-
proaches to propellant utilization. Similar close-knit cooperation will exist
between the S-IV and the still more advanced S-I1 Stage, which is planned
for an advanced launch vehicle.

To accelerate the S-IV program, Marshall recommended to NASA

Headquarters that the stage be powered with the same engines used in
the CENTAUR vehicle. This dual application eliminated the need for
another engine development program. Thus, in the same way that the de-
cision to use available engine designs speeded booster development, use of
the CENTAUR engines measurably reduces the time required to develop
the S-IV Stage. Later, it was decided to use six engines in the S-IV, rather
than the four engines first considered. Without affecting the basic stage
concept, the increased number of engines provides additional payload ca-
pability and better in-flight control.

I
 Basic Marshall policy is to speed vehicle development by parallel
development of the stages. In keeping with this policy, engines for the
several SATURN stages are also developed simultaneously by contractors
who have demonstrated outstanding ability in the propulsion field. Through
this approach, development of the booster and its H-1 engines proceeds at
the same time. While the S-IV is under development, its RLlOA-3 engines
a x undergoing design 2nd test. -4s design planning continues for the S-11
Stage, its 1-2 engines are being developed. And, conciirrently with these
programs, the F-1 engine enters development testing, \vliile preliminary
design begins of an advanced booster stage which will use these engines.

I
S-IV S T A G E T A N K A G E I S POSITIONED FOR P R O P E L L A N T LOADING T E S T S - S-IV
d e v e l o p m e n t t e s t i n g p a r a l l e l s e n g i n e and b o o s t e r d e v e l o p m e n t

t
i 49
e
8-
 Characteristic of the approach used in coordinating these parallel
programs are the methods devised to integrate engines with the S-IV Stage.
Initially, inert engines are installed in a full-scale stage mockup to verify pro-
per fit and arrangement. Then prototype engines (the first fully functional
engines) are forwarded to the stage contractor; these engines are instaiied
to check control systems, mounting structures, the propellant flow system,
and for static firing tests. Finally, fully-developed engines are assembled
into the new stage for flight testing.

Similar methods are employed to integrate the S-IV Stage with the
S-I booster. A mockup of the S-IV is used to check functional and mechan-
ical mating with the interstage segment. In turn, the segment is fitted pre-
cisely to the s - I Stage. After development and tests of the s-IV are com-
pleted, the stage will be checked out, using equipment which electronically
simulates the booster stage and vehicle instrumentation. (After movement
of stages and payload to Cape Canaveral, the vehicle will be erected on the
launch pedestal and given a final exhaustive checkout before being com-
mitted to launch.)

I I O l < I % O N T A I - ,+lA?'ING 0 1 : ' l ' / l / ~ TA7'UKN L A U N C l l VEHICLE -- The f i r s t S A T U R N i s a

t h r e e - s f a g e v e h i c l e . 162 l e e t t a l l . Initial flight t e s f s w i l l u s e a l i v e booster, Plus
tu'o inert upper s t a g e s ana' payload body
E A R L Y M O C K U P OF S-IV A F T SECTION -- Engine-stage
inlerconnections c a n b e s t u d i e d in d e t a i l b y use of
lull-scale mockups
PREPARATION FOR LAUNCll OF
FIRST FLIGHT VElllCLE --
A B O V E : R o o s t e r is moved t o MSFC
dock. RIGHT: P a l a e m o n begins
2OOO-mik trib to C a n e Canaueral.
A S S E M B L Y O F SATURN BEGINS -- LEFT: Booster
stage is lifted to position on launch pedestal.
BELOW: Inert S-IV Stage i s hoisted into service
structure.
I ‘ I N A L ASS1:’MIILY IS COMl’Lli7’Iil) - - AI?OVI:‘: Inert S-V Sfage is m a t e d with S - I V .
IIE120M‘: l n r r t p a ylo a d b o d y is positioned on S-V. F A C I N G P A G E : F i r s t S A T U R N
launch vehicle stands u n s u p p o r te d on Launch pedestal
 I K A C K l N G FAL’ILII 11-7 7UI’I’OR I’ R C I ~F L I G I I T Y -- \’e-
h i c k trajectory is p L o t t ~ dacross projecttoti oj down-
range ureu

Inimediately after completion of the first mating checks, an addi-

tional element is iiitroduced into the SATURN program. L J p to this time,
effort has been concentrated on stage development. W i t h the availability
o f mockups and inert stages, however, we begin a later development phase,
focused 011 the veliicle, itsell.

For months previous, theoretical studies have been conducted o f the

vehicle’s expected flight responses. N o w it is time to prove out results of
these studies.

An inert vehicle is assembled in Marshall’s dynamic test tower. In

this device, built to simulate actual flight conditions, problems affecting
thc \vholc vehicle are investigated. Determinations are made of bending
inoclc\ and frequencies, as well as torsional and longitudinal vibrations.
r .

I hcse results are used to verify vehicle design a n d to determine i f re-

sponses are within acceptable limits. In this way, a thoroughly integrated,
extensively tested vchicle evolves, with a decreased number o f flight
tests needed before operational status is reached.
 T h e ten-vehicle research and development flight program is the
reai proof-test of the entire SATURN system. To hasten the vehicle to-
ward operational readiness, the Center plans a cumulative series of stage
flight tests. During the first launches, the flight performance of the
booster and the vehicle configuration will be clearly established. T h e
control system will be proven out and the operation of launch facilities
and tracking networks verified.

C A R E F U L L Y ORGANIZED R A D A R NETWORK S U P P O R T S
SATURN PROGRAM -- V e h i c l e !light i s t r a c k e d by
interlocking radar i n s t a l l a t i o n s
 By the time that booster flight tests are completed, the liquid-
hydrogen engines will be available for the s-IV Stage. T h e engines will
have been flight tested on the CENTAUR vehicle, and the great majority
of improvements made. Flight testing of the S-IV Stage will now begin.
During these tests, we will secure information concerning S-!V flight
operation, control, and in-flight separation. Additional checks will be
made of the tracking networks and launch facilities. At the same time,
the booster receives further flight trials, steadily increasing its reliability.

In this way, one stage at a time is cleanly tested. Each advance

in development is based on proven hardware. While holding the normal
risks of an R&D flight program to minimum, we reap all the ad-
vantages of quick development.

SEPARATION O F S-IV S T A G E FROM S O O S T E R -- F l i g h t t e s t i n g of s-IV b e g i n s a f t e r

booster in-flight performance i s c l e a r l y d e f i n c d
 "'

PROCESSING T E L E M E T E R E D FLIGHT D A T A -- T e l e m e t r y r e c o r d s of SATURN flight

are a n a l y z e d to determine additional v e h i c l e d e s i g n i m p r o v e m e n t s

T h e process of research and development continues after launch

at an even more accelerated pace. During flight, more than 500 channels
of telemetry poured a torrent of signals from the vehicle to the re-
cording instruments of the launch complex. Having been processed to
an easily usable form, the information is subjected to a searching analysis
and evaluation at Marshall. Results are used by the appropriate technical
divisions and responsible contractors to improve the performance and
reliability of later vehicles.

Representative of other actions taken by management in planning

and directing the SATURN program are the decisions leading to support
of the APOLLO mission.

59
 The original launch schedules called for fliSht tests of another
upper stage, called the S-V, rather than the APOLLO spacecraft. T h e S-V
Stage? a slightly modified CENTAUR vehicle, was to be €light tested
immeclintely after tests of the live S-IV were completed.

With the shift in emphasis toward APOLLO orbital missions for

the first SATllRN configuration, Marshall reevaluated the C-1 vehicle
progwn. The SATURN vehicle had been conieivccl as a carrier of both
hcavy payloads and men; the vehicle had been designed to accommodate
possiblc manned missions. Consequently, the design could be adjusted
very rapidly to support the specific requirements of the APOLLO mission.
 As a result of the reevaluation, Marshall recommended to NASA
Headquarters that program effort be redirected toward support of the
APOLLO project. A two-stage SATURN could provide the required
performance. For this reason, the NASA decided to postpone development
of the S-V Stage.

Present SATURN flight test schedules permit APOLLO develop-

ment tests to be substituted for the originally planned s-V Stage flights.
Advantages to the national space effort are immediate. SATURN-APOLLO
interface problems and reentry heat shielding requirements can be studied
in flight even before launch vehicle development is completed. Information
secured during these tests will markedly shorten spacecraft development
time, for much of the design information can be secured only during
actual flight and reentry.

I N - F l ICIITT F P A R A T I O N 0 1 ’ A P O L L O PPACECRAFT -- ‘<r.sciwduhd /lights permit

early development t e s t s of spacecrnlt

61
 TO support APOLLO most effectively, Marshall is adding several
design improvements to the booster. Tanks are being lengthened to ac-
commodate a greater volume of propellants. Fins will be added to provide
increased vehicle stability. For an extra measure of control, the booster
engine swivel angle has been increased, and a more sensitive guidance
control system is being readied for thc manned mission.
F U L L - S C A L E MOCKUPS OF B L O C K I 1 V E H I C L E S T R U C T U R E S - - A B O V E : Instru-
ment unit will h o u s e g u i d a n c e and instrumentation equipment. BELOW: lnter-
stage connection and retrorockets
 As this work progresses, scale models of the improved vehicle
undergo air flow and aerodynamic heating tests. Modified launch faciiity
designs allow for the booster’s tail fins and increased propellant require-
ments. While these activities proceed along a coordinated schedule, an
instrument unit is being developed for later Block I1 vehicles. Nerve
center of the entire vehicle, the instrument unit contains all guidance and
instrumentation required during flight. T h e unit, located just behind
the payload, will significantly improve the vehicle in-flight performance
and provide a test bed for guidance and other instrumentation being
developed for an advanced vehicle.

W I N D T U N N E L MODEL O F B L O C K I 1 V E H I C L E -- Many
s t u d i e s are performed t o de/ine v e h i c l e per/ormance
L A U N C H P E D E S T A L F O R B L O C K I1 VEHICLES - - D e s i g n s of ground support a n d launch
equipment reflect evolving vehicle design

65
 The SATURN program demands maximum flexibility and decisive-
ness by management. Rapid response to new needs is esse.ntial. T h e im-
mediate adjustment of the S A T U R N program to the APOLLO mission is
representative of Marshall’s swift technical reaction in an already complex
program. T h e capacity for immediate management response is now, as
in the past, based on the capabilities of Marshall’s operating divisions and
technical working groups.

In the preceding paragraphs, we have dwelt on some of the pro-

blems and decisions directly affecting the vehicle. As we have stated,
however, the vehicle is but one of the three elements comprising the
SATURN system.
 Taken by itself, the vehicle is a romantic object -- splendid, eye-catch-
ing, of immense potential. Taken by itself, however, the vehicle will not
fly.

SATURN is totally dependent upon its unromantic ground support

equipment -- the electrical power sources, the hydraulic pressure units,
the checkout equipment that probes the vehicle’s well-being after as-
sembly and during the countdown. Development of ground support equip.
ment is intimately associated with development of the vehicle. Schedules
established for the design, fabrication, and test of this equipment parallel,
in detail, vehicle development schedules. At the same time, test and
launch facilities are developed to support the evolving program.

V E H I C L E , S U P P O R T EQUIPMENT, A N D FACILITIES A R E
D E V E L O P E D ALONG INTEGRATED SCHEDULES --
FACING P A G E : LOX fill mast is tested at Marshall.
BELOW: Instrumentation developed for booster check-
out

67
L A U N C l l FACILITIES A R F I I E S I G N E I ) T O AIEE?' TPEC1I:IC VBIIICIdP NEEDY --
AI3OVE: Aerial uierr, of S A T U R N L a u n c h C o m p l e x 34, C a p e Cannrrcral. I3FLOM':
IliRh-pressure pneurnatzc l i n e i n s t a l l a t i o n b r n c a t h u m b i l i c a l torrwr of the launch
complex
 f A C I L I T l F S A 1 L A U N L l i L U l l P L F Y 34 -- 4 O O V E . Service structure ann' LOY storage
funk at LC-34. UELOll: F l a m e deflector nioues on r a d s to position heneoth launch
pedestal. seen in background

1
 I
a
I
S A T U R N LAU,VCII P E D E S 7 ' 4 L -- F o u r o / t I v Pighi arms support the iichicle prior to
li/to//; rpmnining nrrns rcstrnin iiehiclc n/ter ignition until n l f e n g i n e x r p n c b l u l l
s t a b l e burning, then drlrrm hock to r ~ f ~ nthe
s e vehicfe

71
 ..

Launch facilities are particularly sensitive to vehicle design. De-

cause o f the long lead times involved, these facilities must be specified
early i n the program. They must be big enough and flesible enough to
handle possible vehicle design changes after the facility has been completed.
Each structure at the launch site has been devised to satisfy a particular
vehicle need. Systems f o r loadins propellants, placement of flame de-
f l e c t o r s be n eat li t li e l au n ch ped e s t a l, b lock li o u s e i n s t r 11 i i i e n tat i o n, size a n d
design details o f the service structure -- the physical characteristics of all
these are defined by specific requirements of the launch veliiclc and its
stages.

73
 While construction o f the first SATLJRN launch complex \vas
under\vay, hiarsliall began studies o f a second launch complex to support
operational firing rates. Designs o f the complex, including liquid-hydrogen
facilities, are based on the configuration o f the operational launch vehicle.
While this work progresses, planning begins for a launch cornplex which
will support advanced vehicles.
 In the preceding pages, we have examined some of the major de-
cisions giving impetus and direction to the SATURN program. Marshall
has constantly balanced and coordinated program elements -- vehicle,
ground support equipment, facilities, and manned spacecraft effects --
along rigorously compressed development schedules. Each element requires
an intensive research and development effort, with a constant, sensitive
interplay maintained between the separate programs.

In coordinating and directing this activity, Marshall blends old

knowledge and new, in-house and out-of-house activities, within the boun-
daries of time and funds, toward a clearly defined goal. Management
decisions are based on Marshall’s technical capabilities, gained by long
experience in active project participation. T h e Center’s interweaving of
design, test, and related research and development work results in a flexi-
ble, rapid development of a launch vehicle to satisfy assigned missions.

So far, our emphasis has been on the initial SATURN launch

vehicle, the C-1. From the present SATURN, however, other vehicles
naturally evolve. In the following pages, we will examine some of the
ways in which program continuity is maintained. W e will see how manage-
ment prepares, in advance, for development of later members of the
heavy launch vehicle family.

75
 .. +i

$."

('" - 3
g h e g c r h Side . . . . .

T h e coming launch vehicles will evolve directly from the present

S A T U R N program. These vehicles will be physically larger, their per-
formance enormously greater. Their missions will transcend the limits o €
the first launch vehicle program. Yet, for all their increased size and
capability, these vehicles are directly related to SATURN. They will be
developed by a logical extension of techniques and principles secured dur-
ing the SATURN program.

In managing advanced vehicle R & D programs, Marshall draws upon .

the mature products of past plans. Two roads are to be followed con-
currently -- production of the present SATURN, and development of the
advanced S A T U R N configuration, called the C-5. Planning for this dual
effort has long been underway.

To phase smoothly from the last research and development vehicle

to the first operational vehicle, Marshall had laid the necessary program
framework even before the first SATURN flight. For our production
needs, we turn to industry. The production contractor is selected in the
same way that contractors are selected to support the development pro-
gram. Invitations for bid are extended to industry. Resulting proposals
are subjected to intensive analysis, based on predetermined evaluation
criteria. After this detailed and objective study, a new member is selected
for the SATURN System team.

79
 T o carry out the booster production program, t\vo prime contractors
havc b e e n chosen. One \vi11 build and test thc operational first stage o f
the C-1 vehicle. T h e other contractor will develop and manufacture, in
production quantities, the F-I-powered booster for the advanced C-5
SATLJRN.

A booster production site \\.as selected after detailed operational

and I og ist ica I p I an 11i ng . Such pI an 11i ng incI u ded av a i I ab i I it y o E f aci I i t ies
and labor, location of the required test site, appropriate transport methods
for moving the completed stages to the test and launch sites. T h e Govcrn-
mc 11 t - ow 11cd M i c h o i i d PI a 11t , ne a r New 0 r I c ;11~s, s ;I t i s f I c d a 11 r eq ii i r e m e 11t S
and \\;is sclected for the production program. As prepar;ltions begall to
activate that plant, plans were also initiated to dcvelop a new booster
static test facility a few miles from the plant.
 ;.:
\\

I N D U S T R Y WlLL P R O D U C E A N D TEST V E l i l C L E B O O S T E R S -- Al3OVE: Proposed layout

of booster production areas, .Ilichoud Plant. LIELOI!’: A r t i s t ’ s concepi o / Jfisszssippi
T e s t F a c i l i t y where ~11zchoud-producedb o o s t e r s 1 1 , 1 1 1 be t e s t fired

81
t
 ~ h e s cnmJrrrtinn rn!2fis fcrrr: - - * c n C 2 !aigci paiteiii. Eevelopment
r - - --------
y L L L Vl.

of the F-1 has been so scheduled that a thoroughly tested engine, of

known performance, will be ready for integration into the C-5 booster
stage. Development of that booster is paralleled by development of the
advanced S-I1 upper stage. While this work progresses, the liquid-hydro-
gen J-2 engine, now under development, will undergo live firing tests.
As a result, the schedules of these programs, as delicately interwoven
as the components of a guidance system, mesh smoothly, engine to stage,
along strict development schedules.

83
 During the same period of time, research and development of the
advanced S-IVR Stage begins. To this program are brought the latest find-
ings of liquid-hydrogen technology. In this way. Marshall’s development
planning bears fruit -- each stage using liquid-hydrogen propulsion bene-
fits from the experience of its predecessors.

I3ehind this complex of engine and stage developn1ent programs

stands the unifying framework of MarshaII’s flight test philosophy. Each
program is so timed in relation to the others that, 011 successful flight
testing of the advanced booster, the S-I1 begins live flights. Following s-11
flights, C-5 vehicle tests will continue, using a live S-IVB Stage.
 With this general structure of the C-5 SATURN program in mind,
let us see how some of the intermediate steps are carried out. As work
proceeds on stages and engines, Marshall’s operating divisions and tech-
nical working groups continue design development of the new vehicle
configuration. This work evolves directly from the technology of the
present SATURN project. There is n o definite cut-off point, no clearly
defined technical area at which one program stops and the next program
begins. The two efforts merge inseparably, a continuity of research and
development, based on and extending present knowledge.

A D V A N C E D S-IVB STAGE IN F L I G H T - - A n S-IV Stage, modified lo use one J - 2 engine

and re-identified as S - f V f i , will become third stage of the S A T U R N C-5 vehicle

85
ARTIST'S C O N C E P T OF T H E SATURN C-S LAUNCH V E H I C L E -- T h e v e h i c l e , measuring
? S O f e e t i n height, will lift o v e r 100 t o n s of p a y l o a d t o low earth orbit or e s c a p e
e a r t h ' s g r a v i t y w i t h 40-50 t o n s
 -- The s i z e and
C O N C E P T O F RAIL-MOUNTED, V E H I C L E T R A N S P O R T E R - L A U N C H E R
weight o/ advanced launch vehicles place increased demands on designers of s u p p o r t
and launch equipment

Studies of advanced vehicle design extend those studies which

began with the C-1 vehicle. Research continues with metals and insulations
presently used, defining how these can be improved to meet conditions of
increased heat and vibration. Design of advanced ground support equip-
ment begins, stepping off from the experience gained during the first
launch vehicle program. In the same way, new designs of handling and
launch support equipment extend proven design concepts to meet the
increased needs of coming vehicles.

87
 Tooling is adapted to meet the larger size and weight of the new
stages. Fabrication methods proven during the C-1 program are used to
develop improved methods of handling the thicker metals of the advanced
stages. Altered methods of assembly are devised -- assembly in the vertical
position, for instance, to prevent the stages from deforming through
their own \\eight. Checkout procedures are revised to suit new needs.
Automated checkout, at the factory, the test site, and the launch area, is
elaborated, step by step, from the findings of the present program.
I . 7

S A T U R N B L O C K I f O U S E INSTRUNELVTATIOiV -- K n o w l e d g e g a i n e d during p r e s e n t program

a l l o w s d e f i n i t i o n of launch c o m p l e x instrumentation / o r a d v a n c e d v e h i c l e s

To assure that development progresses quickly and precisely, fa-

cility design, construction, and instrumentation are correlated with the
vehicle and ground support equipment programs. As firm requirements
are set for static and dynamic test stands, studies -- drawing on experi-
ence gained with the initial SATURN vehicle -- determine how the advanced
stages will be handled, transported, and assembled at the launch site.
In this area, too, progress is based on the technical knowledge secured
during the present program. Because of their bulk, the new vehicles
present numerous problems: additional safety procedures must be develop-
ed, telemetry stations must be expanded, improved ways must be found to
protect and service the vehicle after assembly.

As in the C-1 program, these representative problems are solved

under time pressure. Launch facilities and procedures are developed along
schedules precisely matched with the development schedules of vehicle
and ground support equipment. In this way, maximum compatibility and
parallel development are assured as the program progresses.

89
 T h e sum of all this activity -- the experiments and tests and plans
driving forward in every section of the country -- is only a part o f the
program. There is more. T h e tempo of the program must be maintained.
Today is not soon enough to lay out plans for the still more advanced
vehicles of tomorrow.

So, as metal is shaped to form the advanced C-5 launch vehicle,

planning begins for the vehicles which will follow. T h e first ideas of a
nuclear-powered upper stage are laid out. Using an engine developed
jointly by the NASA and the Atomic Energy Commission, this stage will
propel massive payloads deep into space. T h e engine, burning for ex-
tended periods of time, will accelerate the stage to the immense speeds
needed to cross between the planets.

N E W MODES OF PROPULSION A R E U N D E R D E V E L O P M E N T -- BELOW: N u c l e a r - p o w e r e d

upper s t a g e . FACING P A G E : Model 01 p r o p o s e d SATURN nuclear v e h i c l e
I

91
 SOLID P R O P E L L A N T I3OOSTEK.T M A Y I3E C O M H I N E I ) lVlTll L I Q U I D P K O P E L I ~ A N ' I '
U P P E R S T A G E S -- Combination v e h i c l c s of t h i s t y p c c o u l d l i l t up t o 70 t o n s of
p a y l o a d on e s c a p e m i s s i o n s

The application of nuclear energy to space tlight is but one of the

new methods of propulsion under investigation. Solid propellants have
been proposed for use in boosters to lift vehicles on escape missions, and
studies are being conducted to define the siLe and capability O E these
vehicles and the requirements o f their systems. At the same time, research
at the Lewis Research Center is defining the techniques of plasma pro-
pulsion. In this form of propulsion, ionized gases, accelerated by electrical-
magnetic forces, are ejected from an engine. T h e resulting thrust, while
low, can be continued , f o r long periods. Thus, these ensines would
be useful for driving instrumented payloads o n explorations deep in space.
93
 Research and development probes continuously in other directions.
At the facilities of Marshall and its allied contractors, new insulations
are developed to reduce fuel evaporation in space and to protect circuitry
from the environment encountered outside the atmosphere. Instrumentation
is devised to meet the new conditions of space. N e w methods of tracking
are worked out. New materials are developed to withstand months of
exposure to space. Techniques of engine start and shutdown outside the
atmosphere are studied. Methods of orbital rendezvous and refueiing are
investigated.

We must develop new techniques to meet problems never before

stated. W e require new materials. W e require a great extension of our
experience. Each o f these requirements must be secured along severely
circumscribed schedules for application to the coming vehicle programs.
W e make our plans now so that we can maintain a smooth continuity of
development, building always from the known to the unkown. As w e
manage programs to satisfy present missions, we also define and prepare
for the missions to come.

ORRITAL R E F U E L I N G - - E n t i r r l y n c u opernfionnl techniques m u s t bQ iieurloped d u r i n g

the n e x t p h a s e o/ s p a r p r x p l o r n t i o n s
 -- .-
--
I

C O N C E P T O F F U T U R E H E A V Y LAUNCH V E H I C L E
V e h i c l e s of t h i s t y p e , l a u n c h e d /I--- ---*L - - - I J
Inn,? d ~ n I r n c h a r o r r o l f o n mnnn a?

95
I

As the Marshall Center manages its assigned vehicle programs,

so the NASA manages a number of larger programs, in which the vehicle
is but one of several important elements. In turn, each of the NASA
programs contributes to the completion of national missions. In the
final analysis, the Government stands as the central organizing point for
this complex of missions and projects. In discharging its obligation to
direct and control the national space effort, the Government provides
guidance for plans, funds, missions, vehicles, and expanding technical
capabilities.

T h e Government’s role in furthering the national space effort has

been illustrated by Marshall’s management of the SATURN research and
development program. In these pages, we have seen much of the effort
which culminated in the launch of the first high-performance vehicle.
We have seen, as well, some of the planning leading to later members of
the heavy launch vehicle family, those vehicles which will support ex-
pansion of the national space effort toward the moon and beyond.

I 97
 This expansion has been planned as an orderly progression into
the regions beyond our planct. Each tcst contributes its share to the general
progress. 1’:ach stage increases vehicle capability. Each vehicle furthers per.
formancc of a mission, and each mission advances, one step further, the
national space effort.

Our sp;icc effort has steadily evolved towards ends \vhich can, at
prcscnt, be barely defined. This is to be expected. The f u l l impact o f
exploration lxyond natural boundaries cannot be determined all at once.
We met the same problem in the American expansion \vest. Then, the
cxplorcrs cnmc first to test out the ne\\‘ territory, to make direct contact
n i t h the country \ \ f a t , the land behind the river.

At this point in time, we are approaching our present equivalent of

thc land hehind the river. Except that our exploration is to be in areas
stranger than 11n mapped te r r a i n an d ii n reco r d ed mou n ta i n s . We a re m ov-
in8 out to explore the spaces beyond the air, d i e r e maps are differential
equations and the apparent route not thc shortest. O u r transportation 110
longer has a familiar shape. \We cross tlic bounclry of air i n a many-ccllcd
Inc ta I t 11bc, heavy with ins t r ii m e n ts and the pro pel I i ng ma ter ial s.
 Yet some things have not changed. Although the areas we seek to
explore have been penetrated only by the human imagination, although
our vehicles and maps are o € kinds never before visualized, what we seek
to d o now approximates what was done when the American expansion
\vest began. For as we then sought to map the un€amiliar contours of our
continent, so now \ve seek to map the outer boiindries of the sky.
Once exploration reached toward the Pacific mountains. It reaches now
toward the surface of the moon and to the possible mountains and
plains of the outer worlds.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

Illustrative material cited below has been reproduced through courtesy

of CHRYSLER MISSILE DIVISION (pages 25, bottom 37, 80, top 81);
DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CORPORATION (pages: bottom 21, 32, 34, 43,
44, 46, 49, top 51, 88, 101); GENERAL DYNAMICS ASTRONAUTICS
(pages 36, 39, 45); MCDONNELL AIRCRAFT CORPORATION (page
11); PRATT & W H I T N E Y CORPORATION (page 37) ; ROCKETDYNE
DIVISION OF N O R T H AMERICAN A V I A T I O N (pages: top 21, bottom
22, 33, 35, 38, 82); and US ARMY (pages 4, 8, 9).

105