Quinto vs. Comelec case ⇒ Sec.
5: COC shall be filed on regular days,
⇒ Promulgated on December 1, 2009
⇒ Ponente: Justice Antonio Eduardo Nachura
⇒ Decision: vote of 8-6
⇒ Concurred: Corona, Chico-Nazario, Velasco,
Leonardo-Castro, Brion, Bersamin, del Castillo
⇒ Dissented: Peralta, Abad, Villarama, Puno,
Carpio, Carpio-Morales
⇒ Petitioners: Eleazar Quinto (Usec for Field
Operations, DENR/ intends to run as Rep. in
the 4th Congressional District of Pangasinan),
Gerino Tolentino Jr. (OIC-Director , LMB of the
DENR/ desires to run as city councillor in the
4th district of Manila)
⇒ Petition for prohibition and certiorari
⇒ December 22 , 1997: RA 8436 (An Act
Authorizing the Comelec to use an automated
election system in the May 11, 1998 National
or Local Elections and in subsequent national
and local electoral exercises)
⇒ January 23, 2007: RA 9369 (An Act Amending
RA 8436 entitled “title of RA 8436” to
encourage (tcfa) transparency, credibility,
fairness and accuracy of elections, amending
for the purpose BP Blg. 881, as amended, RA
7166 and other related election laws)
⇒ October 6, 2009: Resolution No. 8678
(Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy and Nomination of Official
Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
connection with the May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections)
⇒ Assailed provision: Res. No. 8678, Sec. 4a:
any person holding 1) a public appointive
position or office, 2) including active members
of the AFP and 3) other officers and
employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy
⇒ Sec. 4b: any person holding an elective office
or position shall not be considered resigned
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy
for the same or any other elective office or
position
Kai Sydiongco
from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office
hours, except on the last day, which shall be
until midnight
⇒ Petitioner’s contentions:
a. Comelec gravely abused its discretion when
it issued the resolution
b. they should not be deemed resigned from
their govt offices because at such time, they
are not yet treated by law as candidates
c. they should be considered resigned only at
the start of the campaign period when they
are, by law, considered as candidates
d. Sec. 13, RA 9369, contains two conflicting
provisions
e. the provision considering them resigned
upon filing of the COCs is discriminatory and
violates the equal protection clause of the
protection
⇒ Respondents’ arguments (OSG representing
the Comelec):
1. Procedural aspect
a. petitioners have no legal standing: pet.
have not filed their COCs, hence, they are not
yet affected by the assailed provision
b. petition is premature or unripe for judicial
interpretation
c. petitioners availed of the wrong remedy:
pet. questioning an issuance of the Comelec
made in the exercise of its rule-making power
2. Substantive aspect
July 31, 2010
a. Comelec did not abuse its discretion in
phrasing Sec4a, Resolution 8678 since it
merely copied what is in the law
b. agrees with pet. that there is conflict in RA
9369 that should be resolved: there seems to
be no basis to consider appointive officials as
ipso facto resigned and to require them to
 vacate their positions on the same day that
they file their COcs because they are not yet
considered as candidates at that time
c. the deemed-resigned provision existed in
BP 881 and no longer finds a place in our
present election laws with the innovations
brought about by the automated system
Ruling
I.
⇒ Petition suffers from an incipient procedural
defect:
a. certiorari cannot be availed of since it is a
remedy to question decisions, resolutions and
issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or
quasi-judicial function (pet. assailing a
resolution issued by the Comelec in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers)
b. prohibition also inappropriate remedy (pet.
seek a proper determination of the proper
construction of a statute and a declaration of
their rights thereunder)
c. petition is one for declaratory relief
⇒ Court resolves petition since pet. raises a
challenge on the constitutionality of the
questioned provisions of both the Comelec
resolution and the law
II.
⇒ History of the assailed provision
a. reproduction of the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369
b. lifted from Section 66 of OEC
c. Sec.. 29 of PD 1296, 1978 Election Code
d. Sec. 23 of RA 6388 or the Election Code of
1971
e. earliest recorded phil law on the subject:
Sec 29, Act 1582
Kai Sydiongco
 May be gleaned that assailed provision
traces its roots to the period of American
occupation
 Senator Richard Gordon, principal author
of Senate Bill 2231 (RA 9369), said the
proviso is an old provision copied from
earlier existing legislation
 Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of
the ff. during the period of amendments:
"ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE
OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD
SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A
CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE
CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED
HIS COC.”
 Section 67 of OEC and Sec. 11, RA 8436:
contained a similar provision on automatic
resignation of elective officials upon the
filing of their COCs for any office other
than that which they hold in a permanent
capacity or for President or VP
⇒ repealed by Sec 14 of RA 9006 (Fair
Election Act)
⇒ situation incidentally addressed in Farinas
vs. The Executive Secretary when it ruled that
Sec 14 of RA 9006 is not violative of the
equal protection clause
 repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code pertaining to elective
officials which gives undue benefit to such
officials as against the appointive ones
and violates the equal protection clause of
the constitution is tenuous (very weak)
 Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between elective and appointive officials
 EO – occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate, elected for a
July 31, 2010
definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions
 AO – hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing
authority, some hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure, others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority
  Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection
A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292): appointive officials are, as
officers and employees in the civil service,
strictly prohibited from engaging in any
partisan political activity or take part in
any election except to vote
⇒ However, in Farinas, the court’s declaration is
merely an obiter dictum: main issue in the
case was whether the repealing clause of the
Fair Election act was a constitutionally
proscribed rider, it failed to ascertain with
stricter scrutiny the impact of retaining Sec
66, OEC vis-a-vis the equal protection clause,
Fariñas et al. rather merely questioned, on
constitutional grounds, the repealing clause,
or Section 14 of the Fair Election Act.
III.
⇒ Petitioners have locus standi: they are
qualified voters
⇒ a restriction on candidacy affects the rights of
voters to choose their public officials
⇒ laws that affect candidates always have at
least some theoretical, correlative effect on
voters
⇒ the court has relaxed the stringent direct
injury test and has observed a liberal policy
⇒ court also finds that an actual case or
controversy exists between petitioners and
Comelec
IV.
⇒ Right to run for public office touches on two
fundamental freedoms: those of expression
and assembly
⇒ Mancuso vs. Taft: he may decide that the
most effective way to give expression to his
views and to get the attention of an
appropriate audience is to become a
candidate for public office-means generally
considered among the most appropriate for
those desiring to effect change in our
governmental systems
Kai Sydiongco
⇒ William vs. Rhodes: An individual may decide
to join or participate in an organization or
political party that shares his beliefs. He may
even form a new group to forward his ideas.
And at some juncture his supporters and
fellow party members may decide that he is
the ideal person to carry the group's standard
into the electoral fray. Party access to the
ballot becomes less meaningful if some of
those selected by party machinery to carry
the party's programs to the people are
precluded from doing so because those
nominees are civil servants.
⇒ Petitioners' interest in running for public
office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and
8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached
by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369.
It is now the opportune time for the Court to
strike down the said proviso for being
violative of the equal protection clause and
for being overbroad.
⇒ The law unduly discriminates against
appointive officials and favors elective
officials. The fact that there is substantial
distinction does not justify the differential
treatment between the two. Four requisites of
valid classification should be complied with:
a. it must be based upon substantial
distinctions
b. it must be germane to the purposes of the
law
c. it must not be limited to existing conditions
only
d. it must apply equally to all members of the
class
⇒ Applying the four requisites to the instant
case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive
July 31, 2010
offices as opposed to those holding elective
ones is not germane to the purposes of the
law.
 whether one holds an appointive office or
an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain.
  For example, the Vice-President running
this time, let us say, for President, retains
his position during the entire election ⇒ Promulgated February 22, 2010
period and can still use the resources of
⇒ motion for reconsideration (Comelec) and
his office to support his campaign.
movants-intervenors’ motions for
 Instead of the danger of neglect, reconsideration-in –intervention
inefficiency or partisanship in the
⇒ contentions of respondents:
discharge of the functions of the elective
office, the official who filed his COC might a. contrary to, and/or violative of, the
be driven by a greater impetus for constitutional proscription against the
excellent performance to show his fitness participation of public appointive officials and
for the position aspired for. members of the military in partisan political
activity
V.
b. do not violate the equal protection clause
⇒ The challenged provision suffers the infirmity
when they accord differential treatment to
of being overbroad.
elective and appointive officials because such
differential treatment rests on material and
⇒ 1) provision pertains to all civil servants
substantial distinctions and is germane to the
holding appointive posts without distinction as
purposes of the law
to whether they occupy high positions in
government or not (a utility worker in the govt c. do not suffer from the infirmity of
would be ipso facto resigned once he files his overbreadth
COC for the 2010 elections)
d. There is a compelling need to reverse the
⇒ 2) the provision is directed to the activity of assailed Decision, as public safety and
seeking any and all public offices, whether interest demand such reversal.
they be partisan or nonpartisan in character,
whether they be in the national, municipal or I.
barangay level
⇒ Procedural issues
 Congress has not shown a compelling
a. MR filed on December 14/15, 2009
state interest to restrict the fundamental
right involved on such a sweeping scale b. Timeliness of Comelec’s filing of MR

⇒ the Americans, from whom we copied the  Comelec had 15 days (till Dec 17) to file
provision in question, had already stricken an MR from receipt of decision of the
down a similar measure for being assailed decision which was received on
unconstitutional December 2, 2009

⇒ second proviso in the third paragraph of  corresponding Affidavit of Service (in

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section substitution of the one originally
66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section submitted on Dec 14) was filed on Dec. 17
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are – still within the reglementary period
July 31, 2010

declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL
c. Propriety of the Motions for reconsideration-
in- intervention

 Section 1, Rule 19, ROC: “A person who

has legal interest in the matter in litigation
or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or is so
Quinto vs. Comelec (MR)
situated as to be adversely affected by a
Kai Sydiongco
 distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof may, with leave of court,
be allowed to intervene in the action.
XXX”
 Requisites of motion for intervention:
a. the would-be intervenor shows that he
has a substantial interest or right in the
case
b. such right or interest cannot be
adequately pursued and protected in
another proceeding
 Section 2. Time to intervene – “The
motion for intervention may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment
by the trial court. xxx”
 rule above is not inflexible:
interventions have been allowed
beyond the period prescribed when
demanded by the higher interest of
justice
 the allowance or disallowance of a
motion for intervention rests in the
sound discretion of the court
⇒ movants-intervenors have each sufficiently
established a substantial right or interest in
the case
 Senator Manuel A. Roxas: 1) as a voter, he
has a right to intervene in a matter that
involves the electoral process; 2) as a
public officer, he has a personal interest in
maintaining the trust and confidence of
the public in its system of government
 Former Senator Franklin Drilon & Tom
Apacible: candidates in the May 2010
elections running against appointive
officials who have not yet resigned from
their posts and are not likely to resign
from their posts
 IBP-Cebu City Chapter: failed to present a
specific and substantial interest, its
invoked interest is in character too
indistinguishable to justify its intervention
("this case involves the constitutionality of
Kai Sydiongco
elections laws for this coming 2010
National Elections," and that "there is a
need for it to be allowed to intervene xxx
so that the voice of its members in the
legal profession would also be heard
before this Highest Tribunal as it resolves
issues of transcendental importance.")
II.
⇒ Substantive issues:
a. the assailed decision struck down section
4a of Res 8678, Sec 66 of OEC, second
proviso in the third paragraph of Sec 13 RA
9369 because of the ff. reasons:
 violate the equal protection clause
because of the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices and
those holding elective positions;
 overbroad insofar as they prohibit the
candidacy of all civil servants holding
appointive posts (a) without distinction as
to whether or not they occupy
high/influential positions in the
government and (b) they limit the civil
servants’ activity regardless of whether
they be partisan or nonpartisan in
character or whether they be national,
municipal or barangay level
 Congress has not shown a compelling
state interest to restrict the fundamental
right of these public appointive officials
b. Court grants MR and reverses December 1
decision.
III.
⇒ Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
8678 Compliant with Law
 faithful reflection of the present state of
July 31, 2010
law and jurisprudence
 implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits civil
service officers and employees from
engaging in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign
  intention to impose a strict limitation on
the participation of civil service officers
and employees in partisans is
unmistakable
 Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section
55, Chapter 8 – both of Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987:
Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions
(b) The following shall be grounds for
disciplinary action:
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in
partisan political activities by one
holding a non-political office
Section 55. Political Activity. — No officer
or employee in the Civil Service including
members of the Armed Forces, shall
engage directly or indirectly in any
partisan political activity or take part
in any election except to vote nor shall
he use his official authority or influence to
coerce the political activity of any other
person or body. Nothing herein provided
shall be understood to prevent any officer
or employee from expressing his views on
current political problems or issues, or
from mentioning the names of his
candidates for public office whom he
supports: Provided, That public officers
and employees holding political offices
may take part in political and electoral
activities but it shall be unlawful for them
to solicit contributions from their
subordinates or subject them to any of the
acts involving subordinates prohibited in
the Election Code.
 Section 261(i) of OEC:
SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. — The
following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(i) Intervention of public officers and
employees. — Any officer or employee in
the civil service, except those holding
political offices; any officer, employee, or
member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or any police force, special forces,
home defense forces, barangay self-defense
Kai Sydiongco
units and all other para-military units that now
exist or which may hereafter be organized
who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in
any election campaign or engages in any
partisan political activity, except to vote or
to preserve public order, if he is a peace
officer.
⇒ Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution and the implementing statutes
apply only to civil servants holding apolitical
offices
⇒ the constitutional ban does not cover elected
officials, notwithstanding the fact that "the
civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original
charters."
⇒ Reasons for such:
a. elected public officials, by the very nature
of their office, engage in partisan political
activities almost all year round, even outside
the campaign period (dissenting opinion of
Justice Antonio Carpio)
b. Political partisanship is the inevitable
essence of a political office, elective positions
included (dissenting opinion, Justice Conchita
Carpio-Morales)
⇒ Civil service officers and employees are still
allowed to 1) vote and 2) express their views
on political issues or 3) mention the names of
certain candidates for public office whom they
support
⇒ Clearly intended in the Constitutional
Commission deliberations: (“...The last phrase
or clause might have given the impression
that a government employee or worker has no
right whatsoever in an election campaign
July 31, 2010
except to vote, which is not the case. They
are still free to express their views although
the intention is not really to allow them to
take part actively in a political campaign.” Mr.
Foz in response to Ms. Aquino)
IV.
⇒ Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section
13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate
the Equal Protection Clause
⇒ i. Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary,
et al. is Controlling
 In the said case, the constitutionality of
Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation
to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, was assailed on the ground, among
others, that it unduly discriminates against
appointive officials.
 As Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the
deemed-resigned provision in respect of
elected officials) of the OEC, elected officials
are no longer considered ipso facto resigned
from their respective offices upon their filing
of certificates of candidacy.
 Since Section 66 was not repealed, the
limitation on appointive officials continues to
be operative – they are deemed resigned
when they file their certificates of candidacy.
 petitioners in Fariñas brought an equal
protection challenge against Section 14, with
the end in view of having the deemed-
resigned provisions "apply equally" to both
elected and appointive officials
 the legal dichotomy created by the
Legislature is a reasonable classification as
there are material and significant distinctions
between the two classes of officials
 ruling: constitutional as there are substantial
distinctions between elective and appointive
officials
 Court should be guided by the doctrine of
stare decisis (adherence to precedents) to
secure certainty and stability of judicial
decisions
 Fariñas ruling on the equal protection
implications of the deemed-resigned
provisions cannot be minimalized as mere
obiter dictum: an adjudication on any point
within the issues presented by the case
cannot be considered as obiter dictum
Kai Sydiongco
 As held in Villanueva vs. CA:
“… A decision which the case could have
turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum
merely because, owing to the disposal of the
contention, it was necessary to consider
another question, nor can an additional
reason in a decision, brought forward after
the case has been disposed of on one ground,
be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case
presents two (2) or more points, any one of
which is sufficient to determine the ultimate
issue, but the court actually decides all such
points, the case as an authoritative precedent
as to every point decided, and none of such
points can be regarded as having the status
of a dictum, and one point should not be
denied authority merely because another
point was more dwelt on and more fully
argued and considered, nor does a decision
on one proposition make statements of the
court regarding other propositions dicta.”
⇒ ii. Classification is germane to the
purpose of the law
⇒ To start with, the equal protection clause does
not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a
valid classification (note the 4 requisites).
⇒ assailed decision says: the differential
treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis
elected officials is not germane to the purpose
of the law, because "whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure
remain"
⇒ the fact that a legislative classification, by
itself, is underinclusive will not render it
unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. There
is no constitutional requirement that
July 31, 2010
regulation must reach each and every class to
which it might be applied; that the Legislature
must be held rigidly to the choice of
regulating all or none.
⇒ any person who poses an equal protection
challenge must convincingly show that the
 law creates a classification that is "palpably
arbitrary or capricious

⇒ the constitutionality of the law must be

sustained even if the reasonableness of the
classification is "fairly debatable”

July 31, 2010

Kai Sydiongco