CHAPTERISATION:

INTRODUCTION: ........................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined.

MEANING AND CONCEPT OF LIFE…………………………………………………………..3

RIGHT TO LIFE………………………………………………………………………………….5
EXTENDED VIEW OF ARTICLE 21…..……………………………………………………….5
RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD……………………………………………………………………….6
SLUM DWELLERS………………………………………………………………………………9
HAWKERS………………………………………………………………………………………11
OTHER RELATED CASES…………………………………………………………………….13

RIGHT TO WORK………………………………………………………………………………15
RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS……………………………………………………………….15
RETIREMENT AND TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT…………………………………16
REGULATION OF TRADE……………………………………………………………………18
MISCELLANEOUS……………………………………………………………………………..18
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………..19

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INTRODUCTION

Article 21 of the Constitution deals with Protection of Life and Personal Liberty which as that no
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established
by law. “Life”, in article 21 is not merely the physical act of breathing. Article 21, if read
literally, is a colourless article and would be satisfied, the moment it is established by the state
that there is law which provides a procedure which has been followed by impugned action. But
the expression ‘procedure established by law’ in article 21 has been judicially constructed as
meaning a procedure which is a reasonable, fair and just. Article 21 of the constitution which
guarantees protection of life and personal liberty can be said to be ‘heart and soul’ of the
fundamental rights.

Article 21 can only be claimed when a person is deprived of his “life” or “personal liberty” by
the “State” as defined in Article 12. Violation of the right by private individuals is not within the
preview of Article 21. Article 21 secures two rights: Right to life &Right to personal liberty. The
Article prohibits the deprivation of the above rights except according to a procedure established
by law.Article 21 corresponds to the Magna Carta of 1215, the Fifth Amendment to the
American Constitution, Article 40(4) of the Constitution of Eire 1937, and Article XXXI of the
Constitution of Japan, 1946.

Article 21 applies to natural persons. The right is available to every person, citizen or alien.
Thus, even a foreigner can claim this right. It, however, does not entitle a foreigner the right to
reside and settle in India, as mentioned in Article 19 (1) (e).

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 MEANING AND CONCEPT OF RIGHT TO LIFE

‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.’ The right to life is undoubtedly
the most fundamental of all rights. Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 provides that,
“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law.” ‘Life’ in Article 21 of the Constitution is not merely the physical act of
breathing. It does not connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a
much wider meaning which includes right to live with human dignity, right to livelihood, right to
health, right to pollution free air, etc. Right to life is fundamental to our very existence without
which we cannot live as human being and includes all those aspects of life, which go to make a
man’s life meaningful, complete, and worth living. It is the only article in the Constitution that
has received the widest possible interpretation. Under the canopy of Article 21 so many rights
have found shelter, growth and nourishment. Thus, the bare necessities, minimum and basic
requirements that is essential and unavoidable for a person is the core concept of right to life.

In the case of Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1, the Supreme Court quoted and held
that: By the term “life” as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The
inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed.
The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by amputation of an armour leg or the
pulling out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul
communicates with the outer world.

In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration2, the Supreme Court reiterated with the approval the
above observations and held that the “right to life” included the right to lead a healthy life so as
to enjoy all faculties of the human body in their prime conditions. It would even include the right
to protection of a person’s tradition, culture, heritage and all that gives meaning to a man’s life. It
includes the right to live in peace, to sleep in peace and the right to repose and health.

1
AIR 1963 SC 1295
2
AIR 1978 SC 1675

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Article 21 of the constitution says that:

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure of
law”.

Prior to Maneka Gandhi decision, Article 21 guaranteed the right to life and personal liberty to
citizens only against the arbitrary action of the executive and not from the legislative action. The
state could interfere with the liberty of citizens if it could support its action by a valid law. But
after the Maneka Gandhi’s case Article 21 now protects the right to life and personal liberty of
citizen not only from the executive action but also from Legislative action also. A person can be
deprived of his life and personal liberty if two conditions are complied with

 There must be a law

 There must be a procedure described by that law, provided that procedure is just, fair
and reasonable3

In any organized society, right to live as a human being is not ensured by meeting only the
animal needs of man. It is secured only when he is assured of all facilities to develop
himself and is freed from restrictions which inhibit his growth. All human rights are
designed to achieve this object. Right to live guaranteed in any civilized society implies the
right to food, water, decent environment, education, medical care and shelter. The word
‘life’ as employed by Article 21 takes in its sweep not only the concept of mere physical
existence by also all finer values of life including the right to work and right to livelihood.
This right is a fundamental right guaranteed to all persons residing in India, citizens and
non-citizens alike. right to life including right to livelihood and work as guaranteed by
Article 21 is not reduced to a mere paper platitude but is kept alive, vibrant and pulsating so
that the country can effectively march towards the avowed goal of establishment of an
egalitarian society as envisaged by the founding fathers while enacting the Constitution of
India along with its Preamble.

3
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597

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RIGHT TO LIFE:

The expression of Right to Life in Art 21 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court rather
liberally and broadly after Maneka Gandhi decision. Over time, the court has been giving an
expansive interpretation to ‘life’. The court has often quoted the following observation of
FIELD, J., in Munn v. Illinois4, an American case: “By the term ‘life’ as here used something
more is meant than a mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all
limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the
body by the amputation of arm or leg.”

The right to life guaranteed under Article 21 embraces within its sweep not only physical
existence but the quality of life. If any statutory provisions run counter to such a right, it must be
held unconstitutional. The court referred to the explanation of the concepts life and liberty in the
5th and 14th amendment to the US constitution in these words:

BHAGWATI, J., has observed in the Fracis Coralie5, “We think that the right to life includes
the Right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries
of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading,
writing and expressing ourselves in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and
commingling with fellow human beings.”

EXTENDED VIEW OF ARTICLE 21:

A very fascinating development in the Indian Constitutional Jurisprudence is the extended

dimensions given to Article 21 by the Supreme Court in the post Maneka1 era. The Supreme
Court has asserted that in order to treat as a Fundamental Right it is not necessary that it should
be expressly stated in the Constitution as a Fundamental Right. Political, social and economic
changes in the country entail the recognition of new rights. The law in its eternal youth grows to
meet the demands of the society.

4
94 U.S. 113 (1877)
5
Francis Coralie v. Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746

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Moreover, it has now become a judicial strategy to read Fundamental Rights along with
Directive Principles with a view to define scope and the ambit of the former. Mostly Directive
Principles have been used to broaden and to give depth to some Fundamental Rights and to
imply some more rights there from for the people over and above what are expressly stated in the
Fundamental Rights. The biggest beneficiary of this approach has been Article 21. By reading
with Directive principles, the Supreme Court has derived there from a bundle of rights.

Since Maneka Gandhi, Article 21 has proved to be multi-dimensional. This aspect of Article 21
is brought out by the following judicial pronouncements. This extension in the dimensions of
Article 21 has been made possible by giving an extended meaning to word 'life' and ‘liberty’ in
Article 21. These two words in Article 21 are not to be read narrowly. These are organic terms
which are to be construed meaningfully.

RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD:

The Right to live and Right to livelihood are inseparable the person cannot live a decent life
without means to life. According William Shakespeare in Merchant of Venice says 'you take my
life when you take the means whereby I live'.

To begin with, the Supreme Court took the view that the Right to life in Art. 21 would not
include livelihood. In re Sant Ram6, a case which arose before Maneka Gandhi, the Supreme
Court ruled that Right to Livelihood would not fall within the expression of life in Art.21. The
court said curtly: “The argument that the word “life” in Art 21 of the Constitution includes
‘livelihood’ has only be stated to be rejected. The question of livelihood has not in terms been
dealt with by in Art. 21.” The right to livelihood would be included in the freedoms enumerated
in Art.19 or even in Art.16, in a limited sense. But the language of Art 21 “cannot be pressed into
aid of the argument that the word ‘life’ in Art.21 includes ‘livelihood’ also.”

But then the view of the court underwent a change. With the defining of the word ‘life’ in Art 21
in a broad and expansive manner, the court came to hold that ‘the Right life’ to guaranteed
‘Right to livelihood’.

6
AIR 1960 SC 932

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In case of Olga Tellis v. Union of India7 which has put life and vigour to this requirement,
because in that case the right to dwell on pavements or in slums was expected as a part of the
right conferred by Article 21. In this case, portraying the plight of nearly half of the population
of Bombay city who live on pavements and slums emits filth and squalor, the validity of the
provisions of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, which provided for their eviction from their
squat shelters without being offered alternative accommodations and without the opportunities of
hearing, was challenged as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. Although they did not
contend that they have the right to live on pavements but they contended that they have a right to
live, a right which cannot be exercised without the means of livelihood. It was contended that
they have no option but to flock to big cities like Bombay, which provided the means of bare
subsistence. In short, their plea was that the right to life is illusory without a right to the
protection of the means by which alone life could be lived. The eviction of pavement and slum
dwellers would lead in a vicious circle to the deprivation of their employments, their livelihood
and therefore to the right to life.

However, if a person is deprived of such a right according to procedure established by law which
must be fair, just and reasonable and which is in the larger interest of people, the plea of
deprivation of the right to livelihood under Art. 21 is unsustainable.

In, Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that
when the land of a landowner was acquired by state in accordance with the procedure laid down
in the relevant law of acquisition the right to livelihood of such a landowner even though
adversely affected, his right to livelihood is not violated.

The Court opined that the state acquires land in exercise of its power of eminent domain for a
public purpose. The landowner is paid compensation in lieu of land, and therefore, the plea of
deprivation of the right to livelihood under Art. 21 is unsustainable.

In M. J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka & Ors, the Supreme Court held that right to life under
Article 21 does protect livelihood but added a rider that its deprivation cannot be extended too
far or projected or stretched to the avocation, business or trade injurious to public interest or has

7
AIR 1986 SC 180

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insidious effect on public moral or public order. It was, therefore, held that regulation of video
games or prohibition of some video games of pure chance or mixed chance and skill are not
violative of Article 21 nor is the procedure unreasonable, unfair, or unjust.

In Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, it was held that right to carry on any trade
or business is not included in Article 21. The petitioners, hawkers doing business on the
pavements of roads in Delhi, had claimed that their rights were being violated under Article 21.
However, the Court has held that Olga Telli's case is not applicable in this case.

As what Douglas J. in Baksey v. Board of Reagentes8, has said, the right to work I have
assumed was a most precious liberty that a man possess. ‘Man has indeed as much right to work
as he has to live to be free and to own property. To work means eat and it also means to means of
living.

In a landmark judgment, in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi

Administration9, the supreme court held that The country has so far not found it feasibleto
incorporate the right to livelihood as a fundamental right in the Constitution. This is because the
country has so far not attained the capacity to guarantee it, and not because it considers it any the
less fundamental to life. Advisedly, therefore, it has been placed in the Chapter on Directive
Principles, Article 41 of which enjoins upon the State to make effective provision for securing
the same "within the limits of its economic capacity and development".

In D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A Industries10, the court held that right to life includes right to livelihood
also related to the termination of services of an employee without giving an opportunity was held
to be arbitrary.

The state may not by affirmative action, be compelled to provide adequate means of livelihood
or work to the citizens. But, any person who is deprived of his right to livelihood except
according to just and fair procedure established by law can challenge the deprivation as
offending the right to life conferred in Article 21.

8
(1954) 347 MD 442
9
AIR 1992 SC 789
10
(1993) 3 SCC 258

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The right to live and the right to work are integrated and interdependent. If a person is deprived
of his job as a result of his eviction from slum or a pavement his very right to life is put in
jeopardy. The economic compulsions under which these persons are forced to live in slums or on
pavements impart to their occupation the character of their fundamental rights. They did not
claim fundamental rights to live on pavements, but they claimed right to live, at least to exist and
asked whether right to life includes the right to livelihood. The Court replied in affirmative and
observed:

The right to life conferred in Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that
life cannot be extinguished or taken away as imposition and execution of the death sentence
except according to the procedure established by law. This is but one of the facet of right to life.
An equally important facet of this right is a right to livelihood because no person can live
without the means of living i.e. the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as
a part of the Constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life is
to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not
only denude the life of his effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life
impossible to live. That which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life
livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life.

SLUM DWELLERS:

In Olga Tellis11, the Supreme Court has made a significant pronouncement on the impact of
Art.21 on urbanization. Pavement dwellers were sought to be evicted by the municipality. The
problem of pavement dwellers arises because thousands of people migrate from villages to the
metropolitan towns and they squat everywhere, even on pavements, and live in a very pitiable
condition. The Municipality’s case was that no person has any legal right to encroach on a foot
path over which the public has a right of way. The pavement dwellers took recourse to Art.21 to
stall their eviction from the pavements. They argued that their eviction would adversely affect
their means of livelihood which is included within Art.21 and it can only be taken away or
abridged by following a fair and reasonable procedure.

11
AIR 1986 SC 180

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As has already been noted, the Court accepted the plea that the right to life guaranteed by Art.21
includes the right to livelihood. The Supreme Court ruled that the eviction of persons from
pavement or a slum not only results in deprivation of shelter but would also inevitably lead to
deprivation of their means of livelihood which means deprivation of life in as much as the
pavement dwellers were employed in the vicinity of their dwellings. “The conclusion, therefore,
in terms of the constitutional phraseology is that the eviction of the petitioners will lead to
deprivation of their livelihood and consequently to the deprivation of life.”

However, ever if removal of pavement dwellers would lead to deprivation of their ‘livelihood’,
and hence ‘life’ for purposes of Art.21, Art.21 does not place an absolute embargo on the
deprivation of life or personal liberty. What Art.21 insists is that such deprivation ought to be
according to the procedure established which should be “fair, just and reasonable”. Therefore,
anyone who is deprived of his right to livelihood without just and fair procedure established by
law can challenge deprivation as being against Art.21. This means that anyone who is sought to
be evicted by the municipality must be given notice and hearing.

The court accepted the right of the municipality to remove the pavement dwellers from the
footpaths over which the public has right of passage. The court rejected the contention of the
squatters that their claim to construct hutments on pavements and that of the pedestrians to use
pavements are “competing claims” and so the former ought to be preferred to the latter. But,
before eviction, the municipality must follow a ‘reasonable procedure’ and give notice and
hearing to the squatters except in urgent cases where eviction brooks no delay

The question of removal of huts constructed by pavement dwellers over municipal land again
arose in Ahmedabad municipal corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan12 The Supreme
court has ruled that the municipality can remove the huts by following a reasonable procedure.
Under Art.21, a person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty by following a reasonable
procedure. “It is for the court to decide in exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review
whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given case is by procedure which is
reasonable, fair and just or it is otherwise.”

12
AIR 1997 SC 152

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The Court has emphasized that the constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the
deprivation of life or personal liberty but such a deprivation must be according to the procedure,
in the given circumstances, fair and reasonable. “To become fair, just and reasonable, it would
not be enough that the procedure prescribed in law is a formality.”

HAWKERS:
While the hawkers have a Fundamental Right under Art. 19(1)(g) to carry on trade or business of
their choice, they have a right to do so at a particular place. They cannot be permitted to carry on
their business on every road in the city. If the road is not wide enough to conveniently
accommodate the traffic on it, no hawking may be permitted at all, or may be permitted once a
week, say on Sunday, when the rush considerably thins out. Footpaths, streets or roads are public
property and are intended to several general public and are not meant for private use.

Sodan Singh Vs. NDMC and ors

Another landmark case, the Supreme Court was to expand further on the principles laid down in
the Bombay Hawkers Union case. The following additional views may be culled out.

1. Though streets are primarily meant for passing and re-passing of the public it cannot be
contented that they cannot be used for other ancillary purposes. 2. Hawkers can only demand
their fundamental right under Art.19 (1) (g) which would be subject to reasonable restrictions
imposed by the State. They could not claim that if they are prevented from hawking, it would be
a deprivation of their right to livelihood under Art. 21. 3. There is no law regulating street trading
in Delhi. 4. Since the citizens do not have the right to choose a particular place for trading, it is
for the state, through suitable enactment, to designate streets and earmark places from where
street trading can be done. 5. Inaction on the part of the state would result in deprivation of
fundamental rights of citizens.

6. The NDMC was to come up with a scheme for relating hawking in Delhi. Pursuant to the
framing of a scheme, a committee was to be constituted in order to address grievances of
hawkers with respect to implementation of the scheme.

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Saudan Singh Vs. NDMC and ors ( Sodan Singh – 2)

This case is more of a corollary to the earlier decision. The court reiterated the stand taken in the
first case; that is, Art 21 could not be made applicable in the case of street vendors. It also said
that vendors moving from place to place could take the benefit of Art 19 (1) (g) but they could
not ask as a matter of right to sell their commodities at a particular place. This could be regulated
by the state. Further, the writ petitioners challenged the strict standard of proof adopted by the
Thareja Committee constituted as per the earlier decision. Subsequently, the court laid down
certain guidelines for regularizing and regulating hawking on Delhi roads with directions to the
committee.

Sodan Singh Vs. NDMC and Ors [Sodan Singh 3]

This case finally laid to rest the series of litigations in the same matter interspersed with IAs and
other applications. The court approved the report of the Thareja Committee and added a few
clarifications. It then appointed the Registrar of the High Court of Delhi to enforce the committee
directives along with its own suggestions.

OTHER RELATED CASES :

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Vs. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan and ors

The respondents in this case were pavement dwellers on a busy road in Ahmedabad. It is to be
remembered that, here, most of them had permanent dwelling places on the road and some were
running full fledged business units. Some of these dwellings had been sold/transferred and
subsequent transferees were dwelling in them. The respondents approached the court when the
Municipal Corporation threatened to evict them. The High Court stayed the eviction process,
asking the Municipal Corporation to follow fair procedure for eviction and also to provide
alternate accommodation to the dwellers.

When the matter came in appeal before the apex court, the issues framed were: 1. whether the
principles of natural justice had to be followed for eviction of pavement dwellers? and 2.
Whether they were to be provided with alternate accommodation? In this case the court was firm
on the eviction issue since the dwellers had made permanent structures on the road and were

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obstructing public life. But the court observed that principles of natural justice, more specifically
that of audi alteram partem had to be followed. This implied that they had to be served adequate
notice-the adequacy of the notice being a subjective concern. If the encroachments are immediate
and have been in existence only for a short period the no notice is required. But as the duration of
existence increases, the requirement of notice becomes increasingly mandatory. In the instant
case the Municipal Corporation was giving a notice of 21 days, which was considered to be
adequate.

Answering the second question, the court observed that a right to alternate accommodation was
well within the ambit of Art. 21 of the Constitution which was expanded in the Olga Tellis case
to include right to livelihood. Since the dwellers were being deprived of their livelihood, the state
was under an obligation to provide adequate alternate accommodation. On the other hand this
cannot be concluded to be a universal rule and the satisfaction of this requirement has to be
measured subjectively. Otherwise it would lead to an abuse of judicial process. In this case the
Municipal Corporation had devised a scheme for rehabilitation by which only some of the writ
petitioners, classified on the basis of the duration of their dwelling and income limits, were
entitled to alternate accommodation. The court accepted this contention of the Municipal
Council.

Sanjay Aggarwal and anr vs. Allahabad Nagar Palika

In this case the petitioner filed a writ for removal of a vegetable market on the public road in
front of his property. The court held that such street vending or Tehbazari was absolutely
prohibited on public roads after the rulings of the Supreme Court discussed earlier. The court
seems to have forgotten the decision in Sodan Singh-I wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
right to trade on street pavements could not be denied solely on the grounds that the streets are
exclusively meant for pedestrian use and cannot be put to any other use. But it goes to the credit
of the court that it identified the soul of the said decisions and directed the authorities to shift the
Tehbazari market to a suitable location.

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RIGHT TO WORK:
Right to work has not yet been recognized as a Fundamental Right. In State of Karnataka V
Umadevi (3)13 the argument of infringement of Article 21 relying on an expansive interpretation
of Art. 21 i.e., the right of employment was not accepted by the Supreme Court and the reason
for that was amongst others, that the employees accepted the employment on their own violation
and with eyes open as to the nature their employment. The Court also rejected the argument that
the right to life under Art.21 would include the right of employment at the present point of time.

In Delhi Development Horticulture Employee’s Union v. Delhi Administration14, the

Supreme Court has held that daily wages workmen employed under Jawahar Rozgar Yojna has
no right of automatic regularization even though they have right to work for 240 or more days.
The petitioners who were employed on daily wages in Jawahar Rozgar Yojna filed a petition for
their regular absorption as employee in the Development Department of Delhi Administration.
They contended that right to life included the right to livelihood and therefore right to work. The
Court held that although broadly interpreting and as a necessary logical corollary, the right to life
would include the right to livelihood and therefore right to work but this country has so far not
found feasible to incorporate the right to livelihood as a fundamental right in the Constitution.
This is because the country has so far not attained the capacity to guarantee it, and not because it
considers it any less fundamental to life. It has also been placed in the directive principles in
Article 41 which enjoins upon the State to make effective provisions for securing the same,
within the limits of its economic capacity and development. The Court observed that a good deal
of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and
frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchanges for years. Not all those who
gain such back door entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs.

RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS:
In All Indian Imam Organisation v. Union of India15, the Supreme Court directed the wakf
boards to pay remuneration to the whole time Imam. The Court ruled that the right to life
enshrined in Article 21 means the right to live with human dignity. Therefore, the Imams are

13
State of Karnataka v. Umadevi(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1
14
AIR 1992 SC 789.
15
AIR 1993 SC 2086

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entitled to get remuneration. The Court rejected the argument of the Wakf Board that their
financial position is not such that they could cope with the obligation of paying salary to the
Imams with the remark that financial difficulties of the Institution cannot be above fundamental
rights of a citizen.

Some other decisions which touched the question of livelihood are State of Maharashtra v.
Chandrabhan16 in which payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of Rs. 1 per month was
held to be violative of Article 21 and the Court also observed that this amount can never sustain a
civil servant for even a day, much less for a month. Suspension for a long period without
concluding the departmental proceedings within a reasonable period and with reasonable
diligence has been held to be violative of this Article.

RETIREMENT AND TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT:

In O.P. Gupta v. Union of India17, the Court pointed out that the expression life ‘does not
connote animal existence or a continued drudgery through life. In K. Nagraj v. State of Andhra
Pradesh18, the reduction of retirement age from 58 to 55 was not held to be violative of Article
21 by stating that the retirement age does not take away livelihood, it merely limits the right to
hold office to a stated number of years. The Court pointed out that if reduction in retirement age
was held to be violative of this article, it will become impermissible to fix the age of retirement
at all. In T. Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P.19, the abolition of part-time job was not regarded as
the deprivation of right to life. In State of Maharashtra v. Besanti Bai20, the validity of land
ceiling laws was also not regarded to have the effect of depriving a person of his life and also the
compulsory retirement as in State of Sikkim v. Sonam Lama21 but termination of service of a
permanent employee merely by giving notice was held to be violative of Article 21 in Delhi
Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress22.

16
AIR 1983 SC 803
17
AIR 1987 SC 2257.
18
AIR 1985 SC 551.
19
AIR 1985 SC 724
20
AIR 1986 SC 1446
21
AIR 1991 SC 534.
22
AIR 1991 SC 101

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In D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries23, the Supreme Court has held that right of life in Article
21 includes the right to livelihood and therefore termination of services of a worker without
giving him reasonable opportunity of hearing is unjust, arbitrary and illegal. The procedure
prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood must meet the challenge of Article 14 and so it
must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. In this case the applicant was
removed from service by the management of the J.M.A Industries Ltd. On the ground that he had
willfully absented from duty continuously for more than 8 days without leave or prior permission
from the management and therefore, deemed to have left the services of the company under
clause 12(2) of the certified standing order. The Labour Court upheld the termination of the
appellant from service as legal. The Supreme Court has held that the right to life enshrined under
Article 21 includes right to livelihood and therefore before terminating the services of an
employee or workman fair play requires that a reasonable opportunity should be given to explain
the case. Article 21 clubs life with liberty, dignity of a person with means of livelihood without
which the glorious content of dignity of person would be reduced to animal existence. The Court
set aside the Labour Court‘s decision and rejecting the termination of the worker, ordered his
reinstatement with 50% back wages.

A regulation conferring power on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent and
confirmed employee by issuing a notice without assigning any reasons and without giving him a
hearing has been held to be wholly arbitrary and violative of Article 21 in D.T.C. v. D.T.C.
Mazdoor Congress24. Sawant J. has explained the position thus:

The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood therefore cannot hang on to
the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its
survival beat their mercy. Income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work
is the sole source of income the right to work becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental rights
can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premixes and uncertain applications.
That will be a mockery of them.

23
(1993) 3 SSC 258.
24
AIR 1991 SC 101

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In Anthony‘s case25, the Supreme Court has insisted that when a Government servant or one in a
public undertaking is suspended pending the holding of a department disciplinary inquiry against
him, subsistence allowance must be paid to him. The Court has emphasized that a Government
servant does not surrender his right to life under Article 21 or the basic human rights. Non-
payment of subsistence allowance is an in-human act which has an unpropitious effect on the life
of an employee. Right to work has not yet been recognized as a Fundamental Right.

Right to livelihood is higher than a mere legal right. It is an integral part of right to life under
Article 21 although it has not been incorporated by specific language in Part III by the framers of
the Constitution. The legislative scheme of the 2005 Act clearly places the 'right to livelihood' at
a higher pedestal than a mere legal right. It was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Centre for
Environment & Food Security v. Union of India26.

REGULATION OF TRADE:
The Supreme Court has ruled in M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka27 that regulation of video
games does not violate Article 21. It is true that Article 21 protects livelihood but its deprivation
cannot be extended too far or projected or stretched to the avocation, business or trade injuries to
public interest or has invidious effect on public morale or public order. Therefore, regulation of
video games or prohibition of some video games or pure chance or mixed chance and skill are
not violative of Article 21 nor is the procedure of regulation unreasonable, unfair or unjust. It is
true that the owner of the video games earns his livelihood assured under Article 21 but no one
has the right to play with the credulity of the general public or the career of young and
impressive age school or college going children by operating unregulated video games.

MISCELLANEOUS:
In Budhadev Karmaskar (I) v. State of West Bengal28 the Supreme Court has dealt with the
right of a sex worker or prostitute to have means of livelihood. It has observed thus:

25
M. Pal Anthony v. Bihar Gold Mines Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 1416.
26
(2011) 5 SCC 676
27
AIR 1995 SC 1770.
28
2011 Criminal Law Journal 1684.

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A woman is compelled to indulge in prostitution not for pleasure but because of abject poverty.
If such a woman is granted opportunity to avail some technical or vocational training, she would
be able to earn her livelihood by such vocational training and skill instead of by selling her body.

Central and State Governments were directed to prepare schemes for giving
technical/vocational training to sex workers and sexually abused woman in all cities in India.

CONCLUSION:

Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a very familiar fundamental right, applicable to all
persons under Part III of the Constitution of India. Meaning of term “life” is defined in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 US 11, Field, J. spoke of the right to life in the following words:
“By the term “life” as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The
inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed.
The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or
the putting out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the
soul communicates with outer world.”
This article applies to even non-citizen of India. The Supreme Court has emphasized that even
those who come to India as tourists also –

“have right to live, so long as they are here, with human dignity, just as the State is under an
obligation to protect the life of every citizen in this country, so also the State is under an
obligation to protect the life of the persons who are not citizen.”(Chairman, Railway Board v.
Chandrima Das, AIR 2000 SC 988)

Deprivation of livelihood would not only denude the life of its effective content and
meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet such deprivation of life would
not be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not
regarded as a part of the right to life.

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Right to work has not yet been recognised as a Fundamental Right. In Secretary, State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), AIR 2006 SC 1806 the argument of infringement on an expansive
interpretation of Article 21 i.e., the right of employment was not accepted by the Supreme Court
and the reason for that was amongst others, that the employees accepted the employment on their
own violation and with eyes open as to the nature their employment. The Court also rejected the
argument that the right to life under Article 21 would include the right of employment at the
present point of time.

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