G.R. No.

170298 June 26, 2007

MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275 entitled, "People of the Philippines v.
Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip" to the extent that it affirmed with modifications petitioner Manuel S. Isip’s conviction
for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its Amended
Decision2 dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City, under the
following information:

That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond (men’s ring),
valued at ₱200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused once in possession of the
above-described articles, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal use and benefit and
notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds
of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated
amount of ₱200,000.00, Philippine Currency.3

Petitioner’s wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for seven counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84,
148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 146-84
reads:

That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that her account with the bank is insufficient, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly issue Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 518672 in the amount
of ₱562,000.00, in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry, received from Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon
presentation with the drawee bank for payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated
demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said check, accused refused and still refuses to do so, to
the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the above-stated amount of ₱562,000.00, Philippine
Currency.4

The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date when the offense was committed, the number and
amount of the check. The pertinent data in the other informations are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Date of Commission No. of Check Amount of Check

147-84 17 March 1984 518644 ₱50,000.00

148-84 30 March 1984 518645 ₱50,000.00

149-84 12 March 1984 0300865 ₱150,000.00

155-84 25 March 1984 518674 ₱95,000.00

156-84 29 March 1984 518646 ₱90,000.00

157-84 1 April 1984 518669 ₱25,000.00

The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5) counts of Estafa. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The Estafa charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84 was
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
received from one Leonardo A. Jose the following pieces of jewelry, to wit: one (1) set dome shape ring and earrings
valued at ₱120,000.00, with the obligation of selling the same on commission basis and deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but the herein accused, once in possession of the said
jewelry by means of false pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert them to their own personal use and benefit and
paid the same with Check Nos. 518646 and 518669, dated March 29, 1984 and April 1, 1984, respectively, in the amount
of ₱90,000 and ₱25,000, respectively, which upon presentation with the bank was dishonored for insufficiency of funds
and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said check, failed to do so,
to his damage and prejudice in the abovestated amount of ₱120,000.00, Philippine Currency.6

Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date of receipt and agreed date of return, and the
number, date and amount of the checks issued in payment thereof, the four other informations are similarly worded. The
specifics thereof are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Value of Date of Agreed Date of Check No./Date Amount
Jewelry Receipt Return
257-84 030086/03-12-84 ₱150,000
₱150,000 03-07-84 03-30-84
260-84 518647/03-25-84 ₱95,000
₱95,000 03-20-84 03-27-84
261-84 518672/03-27-84 ₱562,000
₱562,000 03-20-84 03-27-84
378-84 518644/03-17-84 ₱50,000
₱200,000 02-03-84 -
518645/03-30-84 ₱50,000

When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not guilty. There being only one complainant in all
the cases, joint trial of the cases followed.

The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of Appeals in the parties’ respective briefs, are the
following:

i) Prosecution Version. –

Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced to complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose. The
introduction was made by complainant’s father, Nemesio, business associate of the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were
then engaged in the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitués (pp. 8-16, tsn, June
8, 1993).

Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips convinced complainant to be their capitalist, a
proposition to which complainant acceded to (p. 14, ibid).

Thus, the operation went smoothly – that was before February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn, ibid).

On February 3, 1984, at complainant’s residence in Caridad, Cavite City, appellant spouses received from complainant a
6 carat men’s ring valued at ₱200,000.00 with the condition that they are going to sell said jewelry x x x on commission
basis for ₱200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the same, they have to return the ring if sold on or before March 3,
1984 (p. 8, tsn, October 15, 1993).

On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds thereof. Instead, Marietta Isip issued two (2) personal
checks dated March 17 and 30, 1984, respectively, for ₱50,000.00 each as partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt of
the jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Manuel acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).

This particular men’s ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while Check Nos. 518644 and 518645
(Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30, respectively, are the subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.

In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainant’s residence in Caridad, Cavite City where
complainant delivered one (1) Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of south sea pearls with diamond worth ₱150,000.00. The
condition was that the proceeds be turned over to complainant on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March
30, 1984 came, but instead of turning over the proceeds or return the Choker Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March
12, 1984 for ₱150,000.00 (RCBC check No. 030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the spouses and Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation
of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainant’s residence in Cavite City and got from the latter a
men’s ring (7 carats) worth ₱200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with the condition that he return the ring or deliver the
proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March 15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an extension which fell due on
April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject matter
of Criminal Case No. 136-84 for Estafa against Manuel Isip.

On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from complainant one (1) Dome shaped ring with
matching earring with diamonds valued at ₱120,000.00. As with their previous agreement, the item was to be returned or
the proceeds of the sale be delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The following morning, however, Mrs. Isip
issued two (2) personal checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March 29, 1984 for ₱90,000.00 and ₱25,000.00,
respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the spouses Isip and Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and
and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of complainant and got from him one (1) collar
heart shaped necklace and one (1) baguette necklace worth ₱95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon, Marietta Isip
signed a receipt with the condition that the jewelry or the proceeds thereof be delivered to complainant on March 27,
1984. The Isips defaulted and instead, Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount
of ₱90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn, October 22, 1993).

The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa against the Isip couple and Criminal
Case No. 155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant informing him that Balikbayan doctors are
having a convention in Vigan, Ilocos Sur saying that, that was the most opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted pieces
of jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit ‘O’) acknowledging the value
thereof to the tune of ₱562,000.00.

Exhibit ‘O’ contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be delivered on March 27, 1984. Inspite of the
promise contained in Exhibit ‘O’, Mrs. Isip issued a postdated check (Check No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984 in the
amount of ₱562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993).

This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the couple and Criminal Case No. 146-84
against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP 22.

All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April 6, 1984 (p. 14, tsn, ibid), but all of them
bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds. Demand letters sent to the couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).

ii) Defense Version.

During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his residence at Room 411, 4th Floor,
Plaza Towers Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila, but claims he had his ancestral home at 506
P. Burgos Street, Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964 (Tr., 6/8/93,
7). Upon the other hand, appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M. Isip (Marietta hereafter) are
spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various
business undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13)
– appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and trucking business; while appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and
financing, as well as in PX goods, real estate and cars, which she started when she was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr.,
10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry from losing or
financially-strapped players which she repledged as security for financing she obtained from one Nemesio Jose, father of
complainant Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14). After about a year, when Nemesio Jose ran short of capital,
he referred appellants to his son, complainant Leonardo Jose, with address at the Plaza Towers Condominium aforesaid
for needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19). Beginning early 1983, at complainant’s residence at Plaza
Tower Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband who participated only as a witness,
started having transactions with complainant who, on different dates in February, March and April, 1984, extended various
amounts to her for which appellant Marietta pledged jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to
be sold on commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the
course of the transactions, appellant Marietta had issued several checks to complainant as guarantee for the payment of
the subject jewelry which have either been paid or redeemed, had returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and had
conveyed, by way of payment for other jewelry, some personal properties, like brass and antics, and real properties in
Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant who caused the same to be registered in the names of his
son, Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the
obligations of appellants to complainant have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 37-39;
Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that appellant Marietta issued which were initially dishonored have already been (sic)
(Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact, complainant caused the dismissal of some cases he filed against appellants.
Complainant however failed to return some of the redeemed and/or paid checks issued to him by appellant Marietta on
the pretext that he did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as appellant Marietta incurred some default in payment
and complainant suspected that she would not be able to redeem the checks or pay for the pledged jewelry, complainant
demanded that appellants sign certain documents to avoid any misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution before the
Cavite courts if they do not comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to maintain good relations with
complainant, appellant Marietta signed the document acknowledging obligations to him in one sitting, which appellant
Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later, appellants learned that, although all the transactions were entered into in
Manila, complainant filed the cases herein before the Cavite Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).7

On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion thereof reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is
hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of One (1) year of prision correctional (sic) in each case; and of Estafa in the
following Crim. Cases: No. 256-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱120,000.00 for the value of the articles misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where
she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱150,000.00;
Crim. Case No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱562,000.00;
Crim. Case No. 378-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱200,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. However, in
Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty of Estafa and he is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount of ₱200,000.00 value of the jewelry
misappropriated, and to pay the costs.8

In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases were sufficiently shown to have taken
place at complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose’s ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of absence from
the Bureau of Customs where he was connected. It said the defense failed to substantially prove its allegations that the
transactions occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that complainant is a resident of Bigasan,
Makati. It added that the testimony of Marietta Isip that the money with which the complainant initially agreed to finance
their transactions was withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite City further refuted the defense’s claim that the
transactions happened in Manila. The trial court likewise found the defense’s contention, that the obligations were already
paid and set-off with the turnover to complainant of personal and real properties, to be untenable for it is contrary to
human nature to demand payment when the same had already been made and the alleged set-offs were for other cases
which were settled amicably and subsequently dismissed upon motion of the City Prosecutor’s Office at the instance of
the complainant.

The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the pieces of jewelry involved in Criminal Cases
No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks
mentioned in Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to petitioner, the trial
court acquitted him in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding him to have acted as a
mere witness when he signed the receipts involved in said cases, but found him liable in Criminal Case No. 136-84 for
misappropriating a 7-carat diamond men’s ring which he secured from the complainant.

Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following as errors:

-I-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE CASES AGAINST APPELLANTS AND
IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE
OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN WAS COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

- II -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES BELOW, ERRD IN NOT HOLDING THAT
NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS MERE
GUARANTY FOR OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.

- III -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA HAD BEEN INCURRED BY
APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT LIABILITY HAD BEEN
EXTINGUISHED BY PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.
 - IV -

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP AND MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22
RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED UPON THEM AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND THAT THEIR
GUILT THEREOF, OR OF ANY CRIME FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY CIVIL.9

Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil
liability, if any.

In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch XVII) –

1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the sentence imposed on accused-appellant
Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and that the sum of ₱200,000.00 he was ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear interest at the legal
rate from filing of the information until fully paid;

2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is REVERSED and accused-
appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged; and

3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED and accused-appellants Manuel S.
Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged, but ordering them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly and
severally, the sums of ₱120,000.00, ₱150,000.00, ₱95,000.00, ₱562,000.00 and ₱200,000.00 representing the amounts
involved in said cases, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from filing of the information until fully paid.10

The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s finding that the venue was properly laid and that the checks were delivered
by the two accused and/or that the transactions transpired at complainant’s ancestral home in Cavite City, and that,
consequently, the offenses charged took place within its territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the seven counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of the charges on the ground that since
the checks involved were issued prior to 8 August 1984, the dishonor thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability
pursuant to Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.

As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84), the Court of Appeals ruled that
since the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry were dishonored, there was no payment to
speak of. It also found the defense’s claim of redemption/dacion en pago – that real and personal properties were
conveyed to complainant who executed affidavits of desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases – to be
unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that though novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent
the rise of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. In these five cases, it ruled
that there was novation because complainant accepted the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of
jewelry involved in said cases. Consequently, the Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and petitioner,11 but held them liable
to complainant for the value of the jewelry involved.

As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling of
conviction. It found petitioner’s claims that he did not receive the jewelry worth ₱200,000.00 mentioned in the information;
that the receipt he issued for said jewelry was among those documents which were forced upon him to sign under threat
of criminal prosecution; and that he signed the same to preserve his friendship with complainant, to be not persuasive.

On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his deceased wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial
Motion for Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly
liable, jointly and severally, with Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.12

On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of Marietta M. Isip prior to the promulgation of its
decision, rendered an Amended Decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in respect to par. 3 of the dispositive portion thereof
which shall now read as follows:

"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED, accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip
and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged and the civil aspect of those cases DISMISSED."13

Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84. He raises the following issues:

First – WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE IMPUTED TO
PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED;
Second – WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER RECEIVED THE SUBJECT OF
SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE CITY; and

Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY, WAS
EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.

On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 136-
84 and it is pure speculation and conjectural, if not altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose that any of the
essential elements of the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in Cavite City. First, he states that the
residence of the parties is immaterial and that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that it is non sequitur
that simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there and
had the transactions there with him when he and his late wife were actual residents of Manila. Mere convenience
suggests that their transaction was entered into in Manila. He adds that the source of the fund used to finance the
transactions is likewise inconsequential because it is where the subject item was delivered and received by petitioner
and/or where it was to be accounted for that determines venue where Estafa, if any, may be charged and tried. Second,
he further argues that it does not follow that because complainant may have been on leave from the Bureau of Customs,
the transactions were necessarily entered into during that leave and in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no competent
proof showing that during his leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City; and that the transactions involved, including the
subject of Criminal Case 136-84 covering roughly the period from February to April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional.14 The place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.15 It is a fundamental rule
that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein
by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.16

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the venue was properly laid in the RTC
of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took
place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence17 from the Bureau of Customs.
Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that
the transaction involved was entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.18

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the transaction happened in
Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests
that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila
does not necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any person from
going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case
at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite
City if that is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks
issued by petitioner’s late wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila
or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive
and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason
is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial
court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.19 It is to be pointed out that
the findings of fact of the trial court have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial court’s
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.20 In
the case at bar, we find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
and to apply the exception. We so hold that there is sufficient evidence to show that the particular transaction took place
in Cavite City.

On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’ holding that the ring subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84
was delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the receipt evidencing
delivery of the ring, not due to the threat of prosecution but merely to preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact
remains that there is no showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists there is no competent
evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was ever actually received by, or delivered to, him.

We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner received the ring subject of Criminal
Case No. 136-84 is supported by the evidence on record. The acknowledgment receipt21 executed by petitioner is very
clear evidence that he received the ring in question. Petitioner’s claim that he did not receive any ring and merely
executed said receipt in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import and obligation of what he executed and signed.
The following disputable presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act; (b) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private transactions
have been fair and regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has been followed 22Thus, it is presumed that
one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. We know that petitioner
understood fully well the ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It devolves upon him then to overcome
these presumptions. We, however, find that he failed to do so. Aside from his self-serving allegation that he signed the
receipt to preserve his friendship with complainant, there is no competent evidence that would rebut said presumptions. It
is clear from the evidence that petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant
in Cavite City.

Petitioner’s argument that he did not receive the subject ring23 is further belied by the testimony of his wife when the latter
testified that said ring was borrowed by him on 7 March 1984.24 In all, the delivery of the ring and the transaction regarding
the same occurred in Cavite City.

Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that any criminal liability was incurred by petitioner
respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was incipient, at best, and was effectively extinguished
by novation. The personal and real properties delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than sufficient to cover or
offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the fact that complainant executed Affidavits of
Desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals did not apply the
rule of novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected his denial of receipt of said
ring and his claim that he signed the receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of prosecution and merely to
preserve their good relations. He claims the Court should not have denied the application of the rule of novation on said
case because the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive the ring and that he signed the receipt to preserve their
good relations) was but an alternative defense and its rejection is not a reason to deny the application of the novation rule
in said case.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation25 cannot be applied in Criminal Case No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner
that the personal and real properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his family were more than sufficient to cover or
offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that the properties delivered to
complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of all, not some as in this instance, the cases
against petitioner and his late wife. This, complainant did not do for the simple reason that the properties conveyed to him
were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner and his deceased wife. Complainant testified that the
properties he received were in settlement of cases other than the cases being tried herein.26 In particular, he said that
petitioner and his spouse settled eight cases which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered properties as
payment.27 It follows then that the obligations incurred by petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the criminal
cases herein tried were filed.

His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it
rejected or did not believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is untenable. The main reason why the Court of Appeals did
not apply novation in said case was that not all the elements of novation are present. For novation to take place, four
essential requisites have to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a
new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No.
136-84, only the first element is extant. What distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84,
261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals applied the rule of novation, was that there were checks issued as
payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear
that neither petitioner nor his wife issued any check as payment for the subject ring that could have extinguished his old
obligation and brought to life a new obligation.

From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear that petitioner was charged with Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are: (1)
the offender receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the offender misappropriates or
converts such money or property or denies receiving such money or property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that the offender return the money or
property.28 All these are present in this case. Petitioner received from complainant a seven-carat diamond (men’s ring),
valued at ₱200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or converted said ring for his own benefit and even
denied receiving the same. Despite repeated demands from complainant, petitioner failed to return the ring or the
proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage and prejudice to complainant in the amount of ₱200,000.00.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to be in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004
dated 26 October 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164631 June 26, 2009

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RENE RALLA BELISTA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Land Bank of the
Philippines (petitioner), seeking to annul and set aside the May 26, 2004 Decision1 and the July 28, 2004 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096.

The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:

It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8) parcels of lot located in Ligao,
Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, the herein private respondent.

The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) under the coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228). Consequently,
private respondent claimed payment of just compensation over said agricultural lands.

It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was only ₱227,582.58, while petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP, for brevity) assessed the same at ₱317,259.31.

Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, private respondent, on 11 November 2002, filed a Petition for
Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against petitioning bank before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for
Region V (RARAD-V) docketed as DCN D-05-02-VC-005.

On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a Decision, in favor of herein private respondent, the fallo of which reads:

Wherefore, just compensation for the subject areas is hereby preliminarily fixed at TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
NINETY-SIX THOUSAND and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT & 91/100 (₱2,896,408.91) PESOS. Land Bank of the
Philippines, Legaspi City, is hereby ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to existing rules and guidelines,
minus the sum already remitted per Order dated January 2, 2003.

SO ORDERED.

As both parties interposed their respective motions for reconsideration, the RARAD-V eventually issued an Order dated 8
October 2003, the decretal portion of which reads:

Wherefore, the Decision dated July 7, 2003 is MODIFIED, fixing the valuation claim of petitioner herein with respect to her
due share in the above lots to the tune of Two Million Five Hundred Forty Thousand, Two Hundred Eleven and 58/100
(₱2,540,211.58) Pesos. Land Bank Legaspi City is hereby ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to
existing rules and guidelines, minus the sum already paid per Order dated January 2, 2003.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner Bank, on 28 October 2003, filed an original Petition for Determination of Just Compensation at the
same sala of the RTC, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 03-06.

The court a quo motu propio dismissed the case when it issued the herein first assailed Order dated 12 November 2003
"for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure.

Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for Reconsideration arguing, inter alia, "that the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure does
not apply to SAC nor its precursor DARAB Case and that the ground for dismissal of the case is not among the instances
when a court may dismiss a case on its motion."

As the court a quo denied its Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 28 November 2003, petitioner LBP elevated
the case before the Tribunal through the present Petition for Review, theorizing:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE MOTU PROPIO ON THE GROUND OF
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5, 6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE DARAB 2003 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLY TO
CASES FILED AND PENDING BEFORE THE DARAB OR ITS ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVITY AND TO
CASES FILED AND PENDING WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS.3
On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the petition.

The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, an appeal from the adjudicator's
resolution shall be filed before the DARAB and not before the RTC; that petitioner's filing of the case before the RTC
without first seeking the intervention of the DARAB is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The CA found that petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation was filed in the RTC on October
28, 2003 when the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure was already in effect, i.e., on February 8, 2003, and under its
transitory provision, it is provided that the 2003 Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity; and, since an
appeal from the adjudicator's resolution should first be filed with the DARAB, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court
(SAC), did not err in dismissing petitioner's petition.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004.

Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following arguments:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW CONSIDERING THAT
THE LBP DID NOT VIOLATE THE "DOCTRINE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES" WHEN IT
FILED THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO
WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING THE INTERVENTION OF THE DARAB.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPLICABLE RULE IS THE 2003 DARAB RULES
OF PROCEDURE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION) WAS FILED BEFORE THE RARAD ON NOVEMBER 11, 2002.4

Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just compensation was filed with the DARAB- Regional
Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long before the effectivity of the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that
under the transitory provision of the 2003 DARAB Rules, all cases pending with the Board and the adjudicators prior to
the date of the Rules' effectivity shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing; that clear from
the transitory provision that it is the proceeding of the DARAB which is governed by the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure,
thus, it is the date of filing of the petition with the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is the reckoning date of the
applicability of the 2003 DARAB Rules and not the date of filing with the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules
prevailing at the time of the filing of the respondent's claim for just compensation, the Rules provided that the decision of
the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board,
but shall be brought

directly to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB Rules that petitioner brought the adjudicator's
decision to the RTC sitting as SAC.

In his Comment, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with the RTC is an original action and, since the case was
filed at a time when appeal to the DARAB Central Office was already provided in the 2003 DARAB Rules before resorting
to judicial action, the RTC correctly dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed by the CA.

Petitioner filed a Reply reiterating its arguments in the petition.

The issue for resolution is whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation under Republic Act
(RA) No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB before a party can resort to the
RTC sitting as SAC.

The court rules in the negative.

Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:

Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this
Act. x x x

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from
submission of the case for decision.

Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction are all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA
No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.

In Republic v. CA,5 the Court explained:

Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two
categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The provisions of §50 must be construed in harmony with this
provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A.
No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The
DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings
under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that the
valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative
agencies, while in Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial
Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act.6

In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC, over all
petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,7 the Court upheld the RTC's jurisdiction over Wycoco's petition for
determination of just compensation even where no summary administrative proceedings was held before the DARAB
which has primary jurisdiction over the determination of land valuation. The Court held:

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of just compensation
without waiting for the completion of DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land. This, notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial
court properly acquired jurisdiction because of its exclusive and original jurisdiction over determination of just
compensation, thus –

… It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC
would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and
make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly
appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57
and, therefore, would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private respondent is valid.

In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco’s complaint for determination of just
compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP
was able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco's land pursuant to Executive Order No.
405, Series of 1990.8 x x x

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,9 wherein Land Bank questioned the alleged failure of private respondents to
seek reconsideration of the DAR's valuation, but instead filed a petition to fix just compensation with the RTC, the Court
said:

At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is nothing contradictory between the DAR’s primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.
The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. 1avvphi1

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination
is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian
reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function
addressed to the courts of justice.10

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,11 where the issue was whether the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over
respondent's petition for determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings
before the DARAB, the Court stated that:

It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC
properly took cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of just compensation.12
The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation relying on Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Article
XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the Adjudicator may bring the matter to the Board by filing
with the Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution. The filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved
party may file the appeal within the remaining period, but in no case shall it be less than five (5) days.

Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of the aggrieved party to contest the resolution of the
Adjudicator within the aforecited reglementary period provided shall be deemed a concurrence by such party with the land
valuation, hence said valuation shall become final and executory.

Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for Final Determination. The party who disagrees with
the decision of the Board may contest the same by filing an original action with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having
jurisdiction over the subject property within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the Board's decision.

Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure
which provides:

Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation – The decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to
the Board, but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.

where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA 6657 is a
power vested in the courts.13 Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land
valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import
of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC.
Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just
compensation.14 In accordance with the said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence,
the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.15 Only a statute can confer
jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies while rules of procedure cannot.16

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 and the Resolution
dated July 28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3, Legaspi City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is directed to hear without delay petitioner's petition
for the determination of just compensation.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 173935-38 December 23, 2008

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,

vs.
MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, LILY F. RAQUEÑO, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, MA. CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO, AND AURORA I.
MONTEMAYOR, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondents Ma. Erlinda Bildner and Lily Raqueño were charged by Erlinda K. Ilusorio (petitioner) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City with perjury arising from their filing, on behalf of Lakeridge Development
Corp.(LDC), of a petition in the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) for issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of
Certificate of Condominium Title (CCT) No. 21578 covering a condominium unit in Makati. The Information reads:

On or about November 4, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and falsely subscribe and swear to a Petition for Issuance of a New Owner’s Duplicate
Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 before Rafael Arsenio S. Dizon, a notary public in and
for Pasig City, duly appointed, qualified and acting as such, and in which Petition said accused subscribed and
swore to, among other things, facts known to them to be untrue, that is: That the Petitioners claim that the title was
lost, which fact was material matter and required by law to be stated in said Petition, when in truth and in fact as
the said accused very well knew at the time they swore to and signed the said petition for Issuance of a New
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578, that said statement appearing in
paragraph 4 of said Petition:

"4. Pending registration of the mortgage document with the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, the petitioners had
their respective offices, renovated and by reason thereof, documents were moved from their usual places and
 thereafter, sometime in the early part of the second quarter of this year, when petitioners were ready to have the
mortgage documents registered, the said owner’s duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 could no longer be
located at the places where they may and should likely be found despite earnest and diligent efforts of all
the petitioners to locate the same;"

was false and untrue because the said title was in the possession of the complainant, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, and the
above false statement was made in order to obtain a New Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21578, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

Contrary to law.1 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Three similarly worded Informations for perjury were also filed against respondents Sylvia Ilusorio, Ma. Cristina
Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor also before the Pasig City MeTC arising from their filing of three petitions, also on behalf
of LDC, before the Tagaytay City RTC for issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 17010,2 170113 and 170124 covering properties located in Tagaytay City.

As the purported corporate officers of LDC, respondents filed the above-mentioned petitions for issuance of new owner’s
duplicate copies of titles over properties located in Makati City and Tagaytay City after the owner’s copies thereof could no
longer be found "despite earnest and diligent efforts" to locate the same.

Petitioner, alleging that she, as bona fide chairman and president of LDC,5 has in her possession those titles, filed her
opposition to respondents’ petitions.6 Respondents forthwith amended their respective petitions,7 the amendments
reading, according to petitioner, as follows:

4. On November 4, 1999, in the belief that the aforesaid owner’s duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 had been lost
and can no longer be recovered, the petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a petition for
the cancellation and issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 in lieu of the lost copy;

5. However, after the jurisdictional facts and evidence had been presented before the said court, the above-
named respondents, through their counsel, filed their opposition to the petition on the ground that the said owner’s
duplicate copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 allegedly is not lost and is actually in their
possession and, thereafter, in a subsequent hearing held on February 10, 2000, said respondents, through
counsel, presented before this Honorable Court the duplicate copy of said CCT No. 21578;

6. The owner’s duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578, pursuant to law, should be in the actual possession of the
registered owner thereof and it is indubitable that LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION is the
registered owner entitled to the possession and control of the evidence of ownership of all corporate properties;

7. The respondents have no authority nor legal basis to take and continue to have possession of said CCT No.
21578, not one of them being a corporate officer of LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, the
registered owner of said property;

xxxx

9. The respondents, in the absence of any authority or right to take possession of CCT No. 21578, should be
ordered by this Honorable Court to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy thereof, which they continue to hold
without legal and/or justifiable reasons, not only for the purpose of causing the registration of the mortgage thereof
in favor of the mortgagee/petitioner, Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner, but also for the reason that it is the corporation, as
owner of the property, who [sic] is entitled to possession and control and therefore, said CCT must, pursuant to
law, be kept at the corporation’s principal place of business.

x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

Using as bases the contents of the original petitions filed in the Makati and Tagaytay RTCs,8 petitioner filed charges of
falsification of public documents and perjury against respondents before the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office.9

By Resolution of April 6, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Edgardo Bautista, with the imprimatur of the City Prosecutor,
dismissed the falsification charges but found probable cause to indict respondents for perjury.10 Four informations for
perjury were accordingly filed before the MeTC Pasig, one against respondents Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner and Lily F.
Raquero; another against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; still another
against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; and the last against
respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 121496,
121497, 121498 and 121499, respectively.

After the consolidation of the Informations, respondents moved for their quashal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction due
to improper venue, lack of bases of the charges as the original petitions had already been withdrawn, and privileged
character of the pleadings.11

Branch 72 of the Pasig City MeTC, by Order12 of June 13, 2001, ruled that venue was properly laid, viz:
 To determine the correct venue (territorial jurisdiction)[,] the vital point is the allegations [sic] in the complaint or
information of the situs of the offense charged. If the complaint or information alleges that the crime was
committed in the place where the court has jurisdiction, then that court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. (Colmenares vs. Villar, 33 SCRA 186). In other words, what is important is the allegation in the complaint
that the crime was committed in the place which is within the court’s jurisdiction (Mediante vs. Ortiz, 19 SCRA
832).

In the instant cases, the information [sic] allege that the offenses were committed in Pasig City. Hence, pursuant
to the aforecited doctrinal rulings, this court has the venue or territorial jurisdiction over these cases.
(Underscoring supplied)

Nonetheless, finding that respondents’ petitions are privileged, the MeTC, citing Flordelis v. Judge
Himalalaon13 and People v. Aquino, et al.,14 granted the Motions to Quash, viz:

However, the Court finds the third ground[-privileged character of the pleadings] meritorious. In the case of
Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, (84 SCRA 477) which is also a prosecution for Perjury, the Supreme Court held:

"x x x x

Moreover, it is likewise clear that any statement contained in an appropriate pleading filed in court that is
relevant to the issues in the case to which it relates is absolutely priveleged [sic] and it is the law that the
same may not be made the subject of a criminal prosecution. (People vs. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555.)"

Similarly, the alleged perjurious statements in the instant cases are contained in a Petition filed before the
Regional Trial Courts of Makati and Tagaytay Cities which are relevant to the case the same being for the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate of title alleged to be lost.

x x x x.

As the facts charged herein do not constitute an offense and/or the information contains averments which, if true,
would nonetheless constitute a legal excuse or jurisdiction [sic], quashal of the Information[s] is thus in order.

x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

Reconsideration of the quashal of the Informations having been denied,15 petitioner appealed to the Pasig City RTC
Branch 263 of which, by Decision16 of January 25, 2006, affirmed the ruling of the MeTC. After the denial of her motion for
reconsideration,17 petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for review on certiorari,18 contending that:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RELYING ON THE CASES OF FLORDELI[S] VS. HIMALALOAN (84 SCRA 477)
AND PEOPLE VS. AQUINO (18 SCRA 555) [IN HOLDING] THAT STATEMENTS MADE IN PLEADINGS, EVEN
IF PERJURIOUS OR FALSE, ARE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED AND NOT SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner is of the view that People v. Aquino19 cited by the RTC does not apply in the present controversy as that case
involved a libel case and "there is no authority which states that the rules on absolute privileged statements in pleadings
apply to both crimes of perjury and libel."20

Neither, petitioner posits, does the also cited case of Flordelis v. Himalaloan21 apply wherein the Court sustained the
quashal of the therein information for perjury as the answer to the complaint containing the alleged false allegations did
not have to be under oath.

In their Comment, respondents initially burrow into the petition’s alleged procedural crack by underscoring the apparent
disregard by petitioner of the established policy of judicial hierarchy of courts, pointing out that the petition should have
been first filed with the Court of Appeals.22

On the merits, respondents reiterate, in the main, the congruent rulings of the MeTC and RTC that allegations made by
the parties or their counsel in a pleading are privileged in nature. Moreover, they contend that since they had amended
the original petitions, there were no more bases for the charges of perjury."23

A word first on the procedural question raised by respondents. The present petition is one for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
(APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS), Section 2(c) provides that in all cases where only questions of law
are raised, the appeal "shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review in accordance with Rule 45."24 Indubitably, the
issue tendered in this case is a question of law, hence, there is no violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

On the merits, the Court denies the petition on the ground that, contrary to the lower courts’ ruling, venue of the
Informations was improperly laid in Pasig.
The allegations in each of the Informations indicate Pasig as the situs of the offense charged where respondents’ petitions
were notarized. Albeit the Informations referred to the "subscribed and sworn" petitions of respondents as bases of the
charges, there is no mention therein that those petitions were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The Complaint-
Affidavits,25 which initiated the criminal actions, reflect such jurisdictional details. Consider this allegation:

6. On November 4, 1999, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and LILY F. RAQUENO allegedly representing
LAKERIDGE filed a verified Petition for Issuance of a New Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21578 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City x x x x, (Emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)

as well as this:

06. On November 10, 1999, AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR, SYLVIA ILUSORIO, and MA. CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO
allegedly representing LAKERIDGE filed three (3) verified Petitions for Issuance of a New Owner’s Duplicate
Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 17010, 17011 and 17012 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
18, Tagaytay City x x x x. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The allegation in each of the four similarly-worded Informations that perjury was committed in Pasig is neither controlling
nor sufficient to show that the Pasig MeTC has jurisdiction over them. The purported perjurious petition quoted in each of
the Informations in fact indicates that, with respect to the CCT of the Registry of Deeds of Makati the TCTs of the Registry
of Deeds of Tagaytay, venue of the criminal action arising therefrom is in Makati and Tagaytay, respectively.

Perjury is committed as follows:

Article 183, Revised Penal Code.

False Testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmations. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making
untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under
oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires.

x x x x26 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

There are thus four elements to be taken into account "in determining whether there is a prima facie case" of perjury, viz:

(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the
statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in
the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) that the
sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.27(Citation
omitted)

It is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter, however, before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires,28 which is imperative in perjury29

Venue, in criminal cases, being jurisdictional,30 the action for perjury must be instituted and tried in the municipality or
territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any matter was made, in this case, in Makati and
Tagaytay.31

It was in Makati and Tagaytay where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owner’s duplicate copies of the
CCT and TCTs may issue.

Whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the
gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement. So United States v. Cañet 32teaches, viz:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information that the
defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at
issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the
offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit.33 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While the Court finds that, contrary to the MeTC and RTC ruling, venue of the Informations was improperly laid, and on
that score the Court denies the present petition as priorly stated, it is confronting the sole issue raised by petitioner –
whether the questioned petitions of respondents are, as the MeTC held and which the RTC affirmed, absolutely privileged
on the basis of Flordelis and Aquino.

The issue had already been addressed by the Court in Choa v. People,34 in this wise:
 Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court categorically stressed that the term "absolute
privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an "established technical meaning, in connection with civil actions for libel
and slander." x x x x.

x x x x.

The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with perjury for having alleged false
statements in his verified answer. This Court held that no perjury could be committed by Flordelis because
"an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent that one
element of the crime of perjury is absent x x x, namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be required
by law." 35 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

Verily, both the MeTC and the RTC misappreciated this Court’s rulings in Flordelis and Aquino as respondents’ petitions-
bases of the subject Informations for perjury are required by law to be under oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, on the ground that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig has no jurisdiction over the
Informations for perjury against respondents, DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015

ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, OR THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF MCTC JAGNA-
GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, DKT PHILS., INC., REPRESENTED BY ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1dated August 28, 2007 and the
Resolution2 dated May 7, 2008 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02353, which affirmed the Order dated
September 21, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, in SP Civil Action No. 0356.

The factual antecedents are as follows: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit3 filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty. Edgar
Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by
making it appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of P1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of P810.00, at Garden
Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it.

Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jagna-
Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904. The accusatory portion of the Information filed against her
reads:chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or
intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN
PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by
Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount of P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during trial. Acts committed contrary to the provision of Article 172, No.
2, in relation to Article 171, No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005.4

On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment5 on the ground that none of the essential elements of
the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case due to improper venue.

In the Order dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC denied the motion to quash and set the case for arraignment, the decretal portion
of the Order reads: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED, but considering however that accused has already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court by filing cash bond for their respective temporary liberty, set this case for ARRAIGNMENT on November 22, 2005, at
10:00 o'clock in the morning at the Session Hall, 10th MCTC, Jagna, Bohol.

The previous Court Order setting these cases for arraignment on November 09, 2005, is hereby set aside.

SO ORDERED.6
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005 Order, but the MCTC denied it in a Resolution7 dated January
24, 2006.

Navaja filed a petition for certiorari8 before the RTC, assailing the November 2, 2005 Order and January 24, 2006 Resolution of the
MCTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of legal basis or merit.9 On Navaja's
contention that the case for falsification of private document against her was filed with the MCTC which has no jurisdiction due to
wrong venue, hence, the RTC ruled: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
The contention of the petitioner is untenable. As correctly pointed out by the MCTC, the improper venue was already resolved
squarely by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that “there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification
took place in Jagna”.

This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated
that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said
receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an apparent scheme or pattern of
altering receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an
impression that the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself.”

In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in
Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.

If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in
Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said
contention would necessarily result in a “neither here no there” situation.10
Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.

In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed Navaja's appeal and affirmed in toto the September 21, 2006 RTC Order.

Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in the Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, she filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

I. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL[,] DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.
i. Not one of the essential elements of the alleged crime of falsification of a private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol.

ii. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be presumed or established from the alleged acts of the petitioner on a
totally different and unrelated time and occasion.

iii. The strict rules on venue in criminal cases were established for the protection of the rights of the accused and to prevent undue
harassment and oppression. chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

II. HEREIN PETITIONER PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN QUESTIONING IMPROPER
VENUE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

III. SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CLEARLY PERMITS THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE
DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH.11
The petition lacks merit.

On the substantive issue of whether the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has jurisdiction over her case for falsification of a private document,
Navaja argues that not one of the three (3) essential elements12 of such crime was shown to have been committed in Jagna, Bohol.
She insists that there is no showing in the Information, or even in the complaint-affidavit and the annexes thereto that the crime of
falsification of a private document was committed or consummated in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the allegation in the complaint-
affidavit that the subject receipt was issued by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol, cannot determine the venue because the place of
issuance of the receipt is not an element of the said crime. It was also impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna,
Bohol, because the alleged request for reimbursement under the Weekly Travel Expense Report for September 29 to October 4,
2003, was prepared and submitted on October 6, 2003 in Cebu City, while the subject receipt was issued on October 2, 2003 by
Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol. She further insists that at the time of the issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the
element of damage was absent, hence, there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of. She explains that any
damage that private respondent could have suffered would only occur when it pays the request for reimbursement in the Travel
Expense Report submitted on October 6, 2003, but not before that date, much less at time of the issuance of the said receipt.

Navaja's arguments are misplaced.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.13 This principle was explained by the Court in Foz, Jr. v.
People,14 thus: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases
is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that
the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.15
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a),
Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. cha nrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states: chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.
cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,16 the Court said that both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over
criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In
other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense
was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of or
with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for
which it was intended.17 chan robles law

Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no jurisdiction over the case because not one of the essential
elements of falsification of private document was committed within its jurisdiction, the allegations in the Information and the
complaint-affidavit make out a prima facie case that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the Information
clearly alleged that she committed such crime thereat, to wit: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an
alteration or intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc.
represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount of P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during trial. xxx18
Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit dated February 18, 2004 alleged that the she committed the said crime in Jagna, Bohol, viz: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

“4. Among the expenses she reimbursed from DKT is the amount of Php1,810.00 she supposedly incurred at Garden's
Cafe, Jagna branch. Photocopy of the receipt dated 02 October 2003 she sent to the DKT office in Metro Manila is hereto attached
as Annex “C”.

5. However, upon recent field investigation of Navaja's expenses in Bohol, it was found that the actual amount she incurred at
Garden's (sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy of the duplicate original official receipt (pink copy) certified true and correct by the
cashier of Garden's Cafe, Jagna is hereto attached as Annex “D”.

6. Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon receiving it with the intent of causing damage to DKT.”19
Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and not
by the result of proof20, the Court holds that Navaja's case for falsification of private document falls within the territorial jurisdiction
of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol.

Meanwhile, Navaja's defense that it was impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, cannot be sustained at
this point where the prosecution has yet to present evidence to prove the material allegations of the charge against her, which
include the place where the subject receipt was falsified. However, given that the defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper
venue may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, the Court stresses that if the evidence adduced during the trial would show
that the crime was indeed committed outside its territorial jurisdiction, the MCTC should dismiss the case based on such ground.

On Navaja's claim that there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of because at the time of the issuance of the
subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, the Court sustains the RTC ruling that such damage need
not be present, as Article 172 (2)21 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that mere intent to cause such damage is
sufficient.22
chan roble slaw

Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of the Regional State Prosecutor as to the sworn statement of a
certain Cheryl Labarro23 for purposes of determining venue was misplaced, as her sworn statement pertains to an incident in
Miravilla Resort in Tagbilaran City, which was entirely separate and distinct from the facts material to the case. She adds that the
CA's reliance on the said statement in upholding the venue of the case clearly runs afoul with the provisions of Section 34, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.24 She submits that nowhere in the Rules of Court is it allowed that the actions of the accused on a different
occasion maybe used to confer venue in another case, since venue must be determined solely and exclusively on the facts
obtaining in the instant case and cannot be inferred or presumed from other collateral allegations.

The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which boil down to the factual issue of whether the crime of falsification
of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, et al.,25 the Court held: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A
question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the
evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a
review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City, is a question of fact. Indeed,
in the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties during trial.26 In certain exceptional cases, however, the
Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues, viz: chanRo blesvi rtua lLawl ib rary

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.27
Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present.

It also bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when
said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.28 In this case, the CA, the RTC and the MCTC all
agree that the issue of improper venue was already resolved by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that “there are
sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna.”29 The Court perceives no compelling reason to disturb
such factual finding.

Anent Navaja's claim that the MCTC simply made reference to the findings of the Regional State Prosecutor without specifying the
factual and legal bases of its resolution, the Court finds that the RTC had squarely addressed such issue as follows: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated
that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said
receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an apparent scheme or pattern of
altering receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an
impression that the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself.”

In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in
Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.

If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in
Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said
contention would necessarily result in a “neither here no there” situation.30
On Navaja's argument that the CA's reliance on Labarro's31 aforesaid statement in upholding the venue of the case violates Section
34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,32 the Court holds that such evidentiary rule has no bearing in determining the place where the
crime was committed for purposes of filing a criminal information which merely requires the existence of probable cause.
In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,33 the Court expounded on the concept of probable cause in this wise: c hanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual
and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the
suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.34
Also, Navaja insists that the rule on venue should have been construed liberally in favor her favor as the accused, and strictly
against private respondent, given its purpose of preventing harassment and inconvenience by compelling the accused to appear in
a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed. Yet, private respondent willfully chose to prosecute
separately the other cases for falsification of private document against her in different jurisdictions, namely, Cebu City, Bacolod
City, Iloilo City and Tagbilaran, Bohol, to harass and drain her financial resources, when all these criminal cases, involving minimal
amounts of actual damages,35 should have been filed in one (1) criminal jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of actions.

The Court overrules Navaja's assertions, and upholds the RTC's sound ruling thereon: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

The petitioner's insistence that all the criminal complaints filed against her should be filed in one jurisdiction would be a blatant
violation of the law on jurisdiction as one cannot file a criminal case other than where the offense was allegedly committed.

In short, if it so happens that several offenses are alleged to have been committed in different venues, then it is just unfortunate
that whatever complaints have to be filed, will have to filed in those different venues. To do otherwise would be procedurally
fatal.36
To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction.37 Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element
of jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was
committed. Be that as it may, Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where there are serious and weighty reasons
present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and impartial trial, the Court has been
mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice.38 That private respondent filed several criminal
cases for falsification in different jurisdictions, which unduly forced Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend herself in faraway
places can hardly be considered as compelling reason which would prevent the MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial trial.

Besides, it is erroneous for Navaja to argue that the separate filing of the falsification cases she allegedly committed in different
jurisdictions would result in multiplicity of actions. Such separate filing of cases is only consistent with the principles that there are
as many acts of falsification as there are documents falsified39 and that the venue of such cases is where the document was
actually falsified40.

The Court now resolves the second and third procedural issues.

On the second issue, Navaja states that she did not commit a grave procedural error in filing a petition for certiorari from the denial
of her motion to quash. She posits that venue is an element of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a criminal
proceeding, and that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be interposed at any stage of the proceeding. Thus, even if a
party fails to file a motion to quash, the accused may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on, and such objection may be
raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal.

On the third issue, Navaja asserts that the Supreme Court has allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the denial of
a motion to quash in cases where grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or when the lower court acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction. She claims that not only did the lower court commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
quash, but there is likewise the issue of improper venue that need to be settled with finality and dispatch. In support of her
assertion, she cites a ruling41 that when the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court should
dismiss the case, instead of ordering its transfer.

Apropos to the second and third procedural issues is Querijero v. Palmes-Limitar42 where the Court reiterated the fundamental
principle that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari, thus:
chanRoble svirt ual Lawlib rary

In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that “a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial
of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the
remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is
handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.”
On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order in the following circumstances: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;

(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief;

(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;

(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and

(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.43

As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive issue of the case, Navaja failed to prove that any of the said
special circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the grave abuse of discretion she imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA did
not err in affirming the RTC ruling that the MCTC correctly denied her motion to quash.

Finally, the remaining factual issues raised by the parties need not be discussed further, as they are properly resolved in due
course of the proceedings in the instant case before the MCTC and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal
in the manner authorized by law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 28, 2007 and the Resolution dated May
7, 2008 in CA G.R. SP No. 02353 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012

HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing them to
take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.1

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul
and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 20102 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT
No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector
Treñas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the
transfer of the title in the latter’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt
Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:

P20,000.00- Attorney’s fees,

P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,

P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,

P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and
prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt
Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was
informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he
used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.

To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated
November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. When
the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was
closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa
was filed against him.3
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount
of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the
accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of
confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney’s fees and the said accused failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the
aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to
old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the
case.

On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1,
paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa
with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in
the manner described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is
sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4)
Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of
P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount
is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.6

We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and Trenas in the pleadings and court issuances, but
for consistency, we use the name "Treñas", under which he was accused in the Information.

On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2
July 2008.8

On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision10 affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11

On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari 12 before this
Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his motion in a
Resolution dated 9 February 2011.

On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the following assignment
of errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION
APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE
AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF
ESTAFA;13

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱
150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by
petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued.
Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City,
also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to
him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the
place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the
check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner
asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in
Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is
already indicated in the prosecution evidence.

As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was
misappropriation, it was actually she – not Elizabeth – who was the offended party. Thus, the latter’s demand does not
satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand
could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000.
Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return
Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioner’s.

On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latter’s
Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60
days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23
September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29
September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.

In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that
petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery of ₱150,000 to him, and that
there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint
should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any.
Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here.

With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was not raised in the lower
court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in the
Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner’s signature in
the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.

The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his advanced
age and failing health.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Review of Factual Findings

While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the factual findings of the
lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many
instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings
are contradicted by the evidence on record.14
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission of the offense are
conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and
conjectures.

The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to where it was committed:

Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is
convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he could
misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax.

As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from
her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling
her and making her believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private
complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.15

In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were
based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:

That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. Accused
Treñas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is
suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x

Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a reversal of the assailed
judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it
cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the
following day. His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for
paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay
the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his argumentation in this
regard is too specious to consider favorably.16

For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction in this wise:

It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that
Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecution’s evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to
substantiate his allegations that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hector’s allegations
cannot be given evidentiary weight.

Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if
considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made
by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on review.17

The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People,18 this
Court explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try
the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of
the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.

In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the
essential elements of the offense took place within the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Court ruled:
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to
Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises
of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. x x x

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was
charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are
as follows: x x x

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement
executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to
corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was
committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the
amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting
to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by
Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that
all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Parañaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the
house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended
that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of
Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00;
that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in
Parañaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his
money.

xxx

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in
Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial
court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however,
to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the
RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.

That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount
of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)20

Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of
Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. It provides in
part:

4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS the sum of
P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "B",

5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the latter failed to transfer the title of
aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary
stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS accomplished was only the preparation of the
Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C",

6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a check for refund of the
sum given to him less the attorney’s fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the
net sum of P120,000.00. x x x

7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the
same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x21

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the
offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.

Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.22

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23 that points to where the offense, or any of its
elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place where
the offense was allegedly committed:

Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what happened next?

A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to… and she will work for the Deed of
Sale.

Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?

A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q What was the amount quoted to you?

A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney’s fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR
THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.

Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did he issue a receipt?

A Yes, sir.

Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to
identify it?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial as exhibit "B". This
appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this court
what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty. Treñas issued to you?

A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.

Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treñas by you, what
happened next?

A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is
not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which even mentions
that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised
based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by
the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case
cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred

by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.26

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper
venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing
laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is
not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it
would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.28 This principle
echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health,
petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the
case.29

As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.

At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly militates against the
petitioner’s conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. 1âwphi1

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others kept by him.

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees,
transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent.30 If he does not
use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an
accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant
disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.31

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand.32 His failure to
return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.33 It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.34

In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action.

This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against
petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust,
the recommendation should include an order to immediately return the amount of ₱ 130,000 to his client, with the
appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011
issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This
case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349 July 12, 2001

BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN, MTCC, Tacloban City Branch 1, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

RESOLUTION

In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban,
MTCC, Tacloban City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave misconduct
relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-CR-133 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and Arlette
Mondejar" for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She alleged that respondent judge issued a "hold departure order"
against her on October 23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 which provides that "hold departure
orders" shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. She further
alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be heard before issuing the questioned order.

When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge admitted having issued said order because he was not aware
of the Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that he was not furnished a copy of the circular and managed to
secure a copy only after he instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997, he issued an order lifting and setting aside the hold departure order
dated October 23, 1998. As regards the issue of denial of due process, respondent judge averred that complainant and
her counsel were duly notified of the scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said date.

The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge erred in issuing the assailed "hold departure order,"
recommended that he be severely reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.

Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second
level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that "hold-departure orders shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts." Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent
judge to have issued one in the instant case.

Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence." The Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts, has not been remised in reminding
the members of the bench to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the development in law and jurisprudence.
Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was circularized in 1997 and violation of which has been accordingly
dealt with in numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be excused for his infraction. Judges
should always be vigilant in their quest for new developments in the law so they could discharge their duties and functions
with zeal and fervor.1âw phi1.nêt

In recent cases,1 involving similar violations, this Court imposed the penalty of reprimand on erring judges. Hence, the
same penalty should be imposed on respondent judge.

WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED with the warning that a repetition of the same and
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167764 October 9, 2009

VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA Resolution2dated April 8, 2005
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

In an Information3 dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G.
Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the
accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article
entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit:

MEET DR. PORTIGO,

COMPANY PHYSICIAN

PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of their patients. Especially if they are
employed by a company to serve its employees.

However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation office, SMC employees are fuming
mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after
the health problems of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.
One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale
to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19 last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for
consultation. The doctor put her under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and
must undergo an operation.

Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally,
where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a
surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod as he had one to recommend.

Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital two weeks after. Later, however,
she again complained of difficulty in urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital.

The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the family and the patient herself who
woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side.

This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.

Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to
whom he made the referral frankly turned it down because it would only be a waste of money since the disease was
already on the terminal state.

The company and the family spent some ₱150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of the company physician.

My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your side, May the Healer of all
healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians to remind them that their profession is no license for self-enrichment
at the expense of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.

Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their patients for profits. Where
physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent
drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable religious
institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices
which are cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.

The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk is many times cheaper and more
nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle. These hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days, conditioning
the former to milk formula while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to
death!

My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her body lies at the Payunan
residence located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.

wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected
of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and
without foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and
reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon being arraigned5 on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.

On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision6 finding petitioners guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding
both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel
defined in Article 353 and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor,
as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to
pay a fine of ₱1,000.00 each.7

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order8 dated February 20, 1998.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.

On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE "LIBELOUS" WITHIN THE
MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE AND IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO
HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE
OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.9

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz,
as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of
the poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and
her family and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the columnist criticizes the doctor's competence
or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was
written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the
existence of malice in the publication of the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution;
and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners
further contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was the columnist’s exclusive views; and that
petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views and should not be held
responsible for the crime of libel.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of malice
required in every indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the
evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are
accorded finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may alter the result of the case − a
situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not require the evaluation of evidence
submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a
petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel did
not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction
over the offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.

The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in
their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.

In Fukuzume v. People,10 the Court ruled:

It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction over the
offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction
over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on
appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized
the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. While an exception to this rule was
recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of
jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the
factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not
present in the instant criminal case.11

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People12 that:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)13
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue
in cases of written defamation, to wit:

Article 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed
and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila
at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or
of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold
office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case
one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first
published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Agbayani v. Sayo,14 the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.15

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the alleged
libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous article was printed and first
published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the Court quotes again, to wit:

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the
accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article
entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN...."

The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo
and throughout the region" only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but
did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,16 which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion
of the Information of which reads:

That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and
confederating with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one
another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule,
hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be published in "Smart File," a
magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....17

the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in
consonance with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition:

x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word "published" is utilized in the precise context of
noting that the defendants "cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila." The
Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila. The
place "Manila" is in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was
published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish that it
was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading national dailies such as the Philippine Daily
Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are published
and first printed in Cebu.1avv phi 1

Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the publication is in
general circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart
File is in general circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would allow a
resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are
in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid.18

In Agustin v. Pamintuan,19 which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the Acting General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the libelous article was
"published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire
Philippines," the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was the venue of the printing
and first publication of the alleged libelous article.

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case in the
RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information filed against
petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician
and medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in
Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place.

Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,20 where the Information for libel alleged that the "offended party was the Acting General
Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community," the Court did not find such
allegation sufficient to establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained its ruling
in this wise:

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the
residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the
place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a particular
place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised
intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager
of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state
that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private
complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and spends
considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may have or own a business does
not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of
residence there for purposes of venue.21

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.22 Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case
under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision
convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the
court of competent jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015

ARMILYN MORILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RICHARD NATIVIDAD, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution2 dated August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723
which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated February 23, 2009 and Order4 dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which, in turn, affirmed the Joint Decision5 dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.

The antecedent facts are as follows: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing themselves as contractors doing
business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their
project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction
Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery
and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall be via post-
dated checks.6

Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction site
where respondent and his partners were undertaking their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and
issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00.
Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City.
They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent
and his partners and demanded for payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured
petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the
checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were drawn was already a closed account.
Consequently, petitioner made several demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a
complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City.7 Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against
respondent and Milo Malong, the accusatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 337902

That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out,
draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN MORILLO to
apply on account or for value the check described below:

Check No. : 2960203217

Drawn
: Metrobank
Against

In the :
amount Php434,430.00

Postdated : October 20,

/ Dated 2003

Payable
: AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
to
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused failed lo pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 337903

That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out,
draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN MORILLO to
apply on account or for value the check described below:

Check No. : 2960203218

Drawn
: Metrobank
Against

In the :
amount Php13,032.00

Postdated : October 20,

/ Dated 2003

Payable
: AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
to
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days alter receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending that respondent and his partners be
charged in court with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as well as for Violation of
Batas Pambansa No. 22 (BP 22), which was later docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.

On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the prosecution had proven all the elements of violation
of BP 22 as against respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 337902-03 finding the accused, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is sentenced to pay a fine equivalent to Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), for Check No. 2960203217 and Thirteen Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos for Check No. 2960203218
or a total penalty of Two Hundred Thousand Thirteen Thousand Thirty Two Pesos (Php213,032.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. However, accused MILO MALONG, is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Both accused Malong and
Natividad are ordered to jointly pay the private complainant the total sum of Four Hundred Forty-Seven Thousand Four Hundred
Sixty-Two Pesos (Php447,462.00) which are the face value of the two (2) checks issued, subject of these cases, with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum and three percent (3%) penalty per month as stipulated in the invoices, reckoned from the date
of receipt of the demand on February 28, 2004, until the amount is fully paid, plus the costs of suit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.9 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing that the MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case.
He asserted that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was
improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense actually transpired in Makati City. Respondent also pointed out that during
the retaking of petitioner's testimony on March 14, 2008, the records of the case did not show that the public prosecutor
manifested his presence in court and that he delegated the prosecution of the case to the private prosecutor. Thus, since there was
no appearance for the public prosecutor, nor was there a proper delegation of authority, the proceedings should be declared null
and void.10

On February 23, 2009, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in the following wise:
Since accused Natividad failed to raise before the court [a quo] the issue of authority of the private prosecutor to present witness
Morillo in the absence of the public prosecutor during the March 14, 2008 proceeding, and only did so after obtaining an adverse
judgment, it would be an injustice if all the proceedings had in the case would be set aside.

The second issue raised on appeal also holds no ground. A violation of BP 22 is a continuing or transitory offense, which is oft-
repeated in our jurisprudence. Under this doctrine, jurisdiction may be had in several places where one of the acts material to the
crime occurred.

Accused Natividnd postulates that since the checks were presented suid dishonored in Makati City, which is not the
place where it was issued and delivered, the court [a quo] lacks jurisdiction. This argument is, at best, specious. The
fact remains that the bank where it was presented lor payment is in Makati City. These checks passed through this
bank for clearance, confirmation, and or validation processes. Moreover, the eventual dishonour indeed took place or
was completed at the end of the collecting bank in Makati City, where the private complainant maintains her account
over which the court [a quo] has jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, finding no merit on accused-appellant Natividad's appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the appealed
decision of the court [a quo] is hereby AFFIRMED in full.

SO ORDERED.11 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011 Decision, reversed the lower courts' rulings and dismissed the
case without prejudice to its refiling in the proper venue, the pertinent portions of said Decision state:
In this case, records will reveal that the first element of the offense happened in Pampanga. It was indisputably established that
the subject checks were issued to private complainant at petitioner's office in Pampanga. Said checks were drawn from petitioner's
account in Metrobank, Pampanga branch.

The second element of the offense or the knowledge of dishonor of the checks by the maker also transpired in Pampanga. After
private complainant was informed of the dishonor of the checks, she immediately proceeded to petitioner's office in Pampanga,
personally informed him and his companions of the dishonor of the checks and tendered a demand letter for the payment of the
construction materials.

Finally, the third element or dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank also happened in Pampanga. Upon maturity of
the subject checks, private complainant deposited the same in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati
Branch. Subsequently, she was informed by the latter bank that the subject checks were dishonored by the drawee
bank, Metrobank, Pampanga branch.

Clearly, all the essential elements of the offense happened in Pampanga. Consequently, the case can only be filed in
said place. Unfortunately, private complainant filed the case in Makati City, under the erroneous assumption that
since she deposited the subject checks in Equitable PCI Bank, Makati City, and was informed of lite dishonor of the
checks by the same bank, the case may be filed in Makati City. However, as correctly argued by the OSG, the act of
depositing the check is not an essential clement of BP 22. Likewise, the fact that private complainant was informed of
the dishonor of the checks at her bank in Makuti City did not vest the MeTC, Makati City with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case. To reiterate, a transitory crime can only be tiled in any of the places where its constitutive
elements actually transpired. And, knowledge of the payee of the dishonor of the checks is not an element of BP 22.
The law speaks only of the subsequent dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank and the knowledge of the fact of
dishonor by the maker. Consequently, none of the elements of the offense can be considered to have transpired in
Makati City. Thus, the venue of the instant case was improperly laid. 12 ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant action invoking the following argument:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY DID NOT
HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DESPITE A CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF SAID COURT.13 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
Petitioner maintains that the MeTC of Makati City, the place where the dishonored checks were deposited, had jurisdiction over the
instant case. In support of her contention, petitioner cites the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,14 wherein it was held that
since the check drawn in violation of BP 22 was deposited and presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank
of the Philippine Islands, the RTC of Pam.pa.nga clearly had jurisdiction over the crime of which accused therein was
charged.15 Thus, petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in ruling that the Makati MeTC did not have jurisdiction to try the
instant case. That none of the essential elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 occurred in the City of Makati is belied by
the Nieva doctrine recognizing the jurisdiction of the court of the place where the check was deposited and/or presented for
encashment.

Petitioner went on lo state that all the elements of violation of BP 22 were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. First, the
prosecution sufficiently established that the respondent issued the subject checks as shown by the documentary evidence
submitted. They were issued for value, as payment for the construction supplies and materials which petitioner delivered to the
accused.

As to the second and third elements, petitioner posits that it was clearly shown that respondent had knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds in or credit with the drawee bank, which subsequently dishonored the subject checks. Section 2 of BP 22 provides that
"the dishonor of a check when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee." In this case, petitioner states that the prosecution was able to sufficiently show that the
subject checks were presented within the time period required by law. In fact, written demand relaying the fact that the drawee
bank dishonored the subject checks was even personally delivered by petitioner to respondent as evidenced by the demand letter
signed by respondent. Thus, respondent cannot deny that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in his account with the
drawee bank and that the subject checks were subsequently dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were
drawn was already a closed account.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, is in line with the appellate court's and respondent's
stance that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the instant case. According to the OSG, the act of depositing the check is not an
essential element of the offense under the Bouncing Checks Law. Citing the ruling in Rigor v. People,16 the OSG posited that the
place of deposit and the place of dishonor are distinct from each other and that the place where the check was issued, delivered,
and dishonored is the proper venue, not the place where the check was deposited, viz.:
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila. x x x The
check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. x x x The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the
place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information. Although the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued
and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the
offense, was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in San Juan are triable by the RTC
stationed in Pasig.17 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

On the basis of the pronouncement in Rigor, the OSG thus claimed that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the
instant case for none of the essential elements of violation of BP 22 occurred therein.

The contention is untenable.

It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material
and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In
such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.18

The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the Supreme Court regarded the place of deposit and the place of
dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place where the check was issued, delivered and dishonored, and not
where the check was deposited, as the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case." The Court, however, cannot sustain such
conclusion.

In said case, She accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in payment thereof, he
issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural Bank deposited the check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the
same was returned for the reason that it had been dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand the
repayment of the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the accused for violation of BP 22 at the RTC of Pasig City,
wherein crimes committed in. San Juan are triable. The accused, however, contends that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction
thereon since no proof had been offered to show that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of hmrfficiency
of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan. The Court, however, disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by
the drawee. Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at
Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, positioner contends thai the Regional Trial Court of Pasig h;ui no jurisdiction over this case since no proofhas been offered
that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San
Juan, Metro Manila.

The contention is untenable.

x x x x.

The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on
November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited
with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places where
any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x

The information at bar effectively charges San Jisars as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored
by the drawee, Associated Baisk, sit its Tariac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan.
The place of issue airul delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of she offense, was also overtly
manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan arc triable by the
RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in
Pasig City.19ChanRob les Vi rtualawl ibrary
The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the prosecution had offered sufficient proof that the check drawn in
violation of BP 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that lcnowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San
Juan, thereby vesting jurisdiction upon the RTC of Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case, however, was it held, cither expressly or
impliedly, that the place where the check was deposited is not the proper venue for actions involving violations of BP 22, it is true
thai the Court, in Rigor, acknowledged the feet that the check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, while the
same was deposited wilts the PS Bank of San Juan. But such differentiation cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to conclude
that the court of the place of deposit cannot exercise jurisdiction over violations of BP 22. In the absence, thereiore, of any ground,
jurisprudential or otherwise, to sustain the OSG's arguments, the Court cannot take cognizance of a doctrine that is simply
inapplicable to the issue at hand.

In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals20 cited by petitioner is more squarely on point with the instant case.
In Nieva, the accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn against the Commercial Bank of Manila as payment for
Joven's dump truck. Said check was deposited in the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands, joven was advised,
however, that the Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the reason that the account against which the check was
drawn is a "closed account." Consequently, the accused was charged with violation of BP 22 before the RTC of Pampanga. On the
contention of the accused that said court had no jurisdiction to try the case, the Court categorically ruled:
As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged
herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no
basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City
Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga over the crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as
transitory or continuing crimes and so is the crime of estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.21 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People,22 wherein the modes of appeal and rules of procedure were the issues at hand, the
Court similarly inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong's appeal still remains dismissible on the ground that, inter
alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is welksedled that violation of BP 22 cases is
categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality
or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes
the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be tiled in
any of the places where any of its elements occurred - in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or
dishonored.

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal
that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its
dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as It had the
territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present petition remains
warranted.23 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the check was deposited
or presented for encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the
check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its
jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the
Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its
decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.

It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright due to certain procedural infirmities. Section 35
(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. Specifically, it shall represent the Government in all criminal proceedings before the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals.24 Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal,
the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State.25 cralaw red

There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of the
OSG, such as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court,26 when there is denial of due
process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private
offended party,27 when there is grave error committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so requires.28

Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that
the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and
void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting the aggrieved party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double
jeopardy,29 in violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered
in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. This is because a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the
prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.30

Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not under
Rule 65, and was not filed by the OSG representing the interest of the Republic, the same should be summarily dismissed. The
unique and special circumstances attendant in the instant petition, however, justify an adjudication by the Court on the merits and
not solely on technical grounds.

First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that
a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence
filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the
accused will not result in his acquittal.31 In the oft-cited People v. Salico,32 the Court explained:
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always
based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is
beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does tint decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not gniity.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence
does noi show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc.The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but
not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the
defendant moves for me dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence tails to show beyond a
reasonable doubt thai the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on
the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be
again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may
again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction. 33 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense
charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the
evidence proffered by the prosecution.34 The appellate court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that none of
the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower court's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed
to show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which, as
previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave
abuse of discretion.

Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a
trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which
does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.35 In De Vera v. Spouses
Santiago,36 the Court categorically ruled that the issue of whether the appellate court erred in annulling the RTC Decision for lack of
jurisdiction is a question of law, to wit:
Undeniably, the issue whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law.
The resolution of such issue rests solely on what the law [B.P. Blg. 129, as amended] provides on the given set of
circumstances as alleged in petitioners' complaint for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages. 37 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely "whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was committed
within the jurisdiction of said court." Evidently, therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our procedural rules for
the issue herein rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of
BP 22 is concerned. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information,
in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the
crime charged at the time of its commission.38 Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence
with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly
brought to this Court under Rule 45.39

More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case cannot be considered as an acquittal of respondent herein, he
cannot likewise claim that his constitutional right to protection against double jeopardy will be violated. In Paulin v. Hon.
Gimenez,40 the Court held:
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions thereto which finds application to the case at bar has been laid down by
this Court as follows:
. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall
not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the
defendant; (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the
case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal he
found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.41 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

A cursory review of the records would readily reveal the presence of the foregoing requisites. First, as early as the stage of
respondent's appeal of the MeTC's decision to the RTC, respondent had already been moving for the dismissal of the case alleging
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the CA's dismissal on said ground can rightly be considered to have been with
respondent's express consent. Second, as earlier mentioned, the dismissal herein is not an acquittal or based upon a consideration
of the merits. Third, the question raised in this case is based purely on a question of law. In view therefore of the presence of all
three requisites, the Court finds that petitioner's appeal of the appellate court's dismissal cannot be barred by double jeopardy.

As to the issue of petitioner's legal standing to file the instant petition in the absence of the OSG's participation, the circumstances
herein warrant the Court's consideration. In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,42 the Court gave due regard to the ends of substantial
justice by giving due course to a petition filed before it by the private offended party, viz.:
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo, however, provided an exception to the above doctrines in this manner:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals
(Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in
this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As
an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge
Adao's order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioner's) father.
xxxx

The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation of the appellate court's ruling on this point. Clearly, the
assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order
is no order at all. It cannot confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a
court of justice.

To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the public injustice brought
about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the
law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in
law.43ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

In a similar manner, the Court finds that in the interest of substantial justice, it must give due course to the instant petition and
consequently rule on the merits of the same. The circumstances surrounding this case left petitioner with no other suitable recourse
but to appeal the case herself. Not only was there an absence of support from the OSG, said government office also took a position
in contrast to the rights and interests of petitioner. Moreover, as discussed above, the arguments which ran counter to petitioner's
interest as well as the grounds used to support them were simply inapplicable to the issue at hand. In fact, these erroneous
contentions were adopted by the appellate court in their entirety, dismissing the instant case in a manner not in accord with law
and applicable jurisprudence. For the Court, now, to apply procedural rules in their strict and literal sense by similarly dismissing,
as the CA had, petitioner's action poses serious consequences tantamount to a miscarriage of justice. To rule that the accused can
postpone criminal prosecution and delay the administration of justice at petitioner's expense on the erroneous ground of lack of
jurisdiction would create a hazardous precedent and open loopholes in our criminal justice system.44

Indeed, the unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant case demand that the Court forego a rigid application of the
technicalities under
the law so as to prevent petitioner from suffering a grave injustice. As disclosed by the records, petitioner had already fulfilled her
end of the agreement in giving respondent, as early as in the year 2003, construction materials amounting to half a million pesos
and yet up until now, she has not been paid therefor. In feet, after having sufficiently proven to the satisfaction of both the MeTC
and the RTC her right allegedly violated by respondent, the CA simply dismissed, albeit without prejudice to the re-filing of the case
with the appropriate court, her action for the incorrect ground of wrong venue. On the mistaken reasoning that the MeTC of Makati
City did not have jurisdiction over the instant case, the CA, without providing any legal or jurisprudential basis, would have
petitioner start from the very beginning and refile her complaint before the same court which already had jurisdiction in the first
place.

Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural matters, the Court cannot turn a blind eye thereto lest
the administration of justice be derailed by an overly stringent application of the rules.45 Rules of procedure are meant to be tools
to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial
justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be
liberally construed.46 Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage
hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases
while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.47

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution dated
August 9, 2011 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23,
2009 and Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which affirmed the Joint
Decision dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03 are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

G.R. No. 137237 September 17, 2002

ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONY ESQUIVEL, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
HERMINIGILDO EDUARDO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus1 with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order seeks to annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman resolution2 dated June 15, 1998 finding prima
facie case against herein petitioners, and (2) the order3 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Further, in their
supplemental petition,4 petitioners assail the Sandiganbayan for taking cognizance of cases without or beyond its
jurisdiction. They impleaded that court and the People of the Philippines as additional parties in this case. 1âw phi 1.nêt

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are both residents of Barangay Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva
Ecija, but assigned with the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (RIID), Police Regional Office 3, Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In their respective complaint-affidavits,5 filed before the Philippine National Police –
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Third Regional Office, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel,6 municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother,
Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention,
maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. Also included in the charges were SPO1 Reynaldo Espiritu, SPO2
Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp.
Bienvenido C. Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal Police Force of dereliction of duty.

The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30 p.m. of March 14, 1998, PO2 Eduardo
was about to eat lunch at his parents’ house at Sta. Monica Village, Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, when petitioners
arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda, LTO Officer Diaz, and several unidentified persons accompanied them. Without
further ado, petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service pistol, which was covered by a Memorandum
Receipt and COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They then forced him to board petitioners’ vehicle and brought him to the
Jaen Municipal Hall.

PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to the town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a
firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said, "Putang-ina mo, papatayin
kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban!" (You son of a bitch! I will kill you, I will create an accident for you.
Why are you against me?) Upon reaching the municipal hall, Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel shoved
PO2 Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, saying "Patayin mo na iyan
at gawan ng senaryo at report." (Kill him, then create a scenario and make a report.)
At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify what happened to his teammate, PO2 Eduardo, but Mayor
Esquivel likewise threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp. Bienvenido Padua of the Jaen Police Station to
file charges against PO2 Eduardo. Then, the mayor once again struck PO2 Eduardo in the nape with a handgun, while
Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel was holding the latter. PO2 Eduardo then fell and lost consciousness. When he regained
his consciousness, he was told that he would be released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced to sign a
statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical condition.

PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and threatened because
of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that
same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with connections to
the mayor.7

In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered and
other documentary evidence.8

After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.9

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary investigation and required petitioners and their
companions to file their respective counter-affidavits. In their joint counter-affidavit,10 petitioners and their companions
denied the charges against them. Instead, they alleged that PO2 Eduardo is a fugitive from justice with an outstanding
warrant of arrest for malversation. They further alleged that the gun confiscated from PO2 Eduardo was the subject of an
illegal possession of firearm complaint.

On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the impugned resolution11 recommending that both Mayor
Esquivel and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries,
and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. The charges against the other respondents below were dismissed, either
provisionally or with finality.

On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the aforesaid resolution.

Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No. 2477712 for less serious physical injuries against Mayor
Esquivel and Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 2477813 for grave threats against petitioner mayor,
were filed with the Sandiganbayan.

On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the August 14, 1998 resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon. As directed by the Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation14 with the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however, denied by the OSP in the assailed order15 dated
December 7, 1998. On December 11, 1998, the Ombudsman approved the OSP’s order of denial.

On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases, and they pleaded not guilty to the charges.

With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings previously granted by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of their
motion for reconsideration, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondents in rendering the resolution and the order.

On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners’ motion16 reiterating their plea for the issuance of a TRO directing
public respondents to refrain from prosecuting Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778.17

Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution:

1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN

DISREGARDING THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT THAT HE WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL
CONDITION WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN, NUEVA ECIJA;

2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FINDING

PROBABLE CAUSE FOR GRAVE THREATS WHEN PETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY EFFECTING THE
ARREST OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA UNDER CRIM. CASE NO. 4925 FOR MALVERSATION
OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; and

3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSES FILED
AGAINST PETITIONERS.

Petitioners’ formulation of the issues may be reduced to the following:

(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of the informations against petitioners?
(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777
and 24778?

Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to consider the exculpatory
evidence in their favor, namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo that he was in good physical condition when he left the
police station in Jaen, Nueva Ecija.18 With such admission, PO2 Eduardo is now estopped from claiming that he was
injured since it is conclusive evidence against him and need not be proven in any other proceeding.19

Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman through the OSP, counter that petitioners raise a
factual issue which is not a proper subject of a certiorari action. They further postulate that this is the very same defense
advanced by petitioners in the charges against them and being evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only be threshed
out in a full-blown trial.20

We find the present petition without merit.

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts.21 Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise
of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.22 Said exercise of
powers is based upon his constitutional mandate23 and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not
only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the
same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors
each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.24 Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan,25 we held that:

This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of the
Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such
discretion.

In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the disputed resolution and order.

There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, much less grave abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardo’s
admission that he was in good physical condition when he was released from the police headquarters.26Such admission
was never brought up during the preliminary investigation. The records show that no such averment was made in
petitioners’ counter-affidavit27 nor was there any document purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as
an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only raised this issue in their motion for reconsideration.28 In his opposition to said motion,
PO2 Eduardo did admit signing a document to the effect that he was in good physical condition when he left the police
station. However, the admission merely applied to the execution of said document and not to the truthfulness of its
contents. Consequently, the admission that petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but a matter of evidence best
addressed to the public respondents’ appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature and its probative value can be best passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy. As previously held, but now bears stressing:

. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the probative value of all
evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or
order.29

Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayan’s exercise of jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78.
Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act
No. 7975.30 As the positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim they are
not covered by said law under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.31

Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,32 Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,33 and Layus vs.
Sandiganbayan,34 we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is
outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,35 provides that it is only in cases
where "none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or
higher"36 that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended."37 Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a
salary grade of 27.38 Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel,
whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming
jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ of
certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.

For the same reason, petitioners’ prayer for a writ of prohibition must also be denied.
First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction
to which it has no legal claim.39 As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78
is clearly founded on law.

Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided
by law are adequate and available.40 Prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford
redress. That the petitioners have another and complete remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generally held
sufficient reason for denying the issuance of the writ.41 In this case, petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary
course of law. They could have filed a motion to quash the informations at the first instance but they did not. They have
only themselves to blame for this procedural lapse as they have not shown any adequate excuse for their failure to do so.
Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for time to file a motion to quash the informations, during their much delayed
arraignment,42 but its denial is not a proper subject for certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an interlocutory
order.43

Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the attention of the court whose proceedings
are sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.44 The foundation of this rule is the
respect and consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation;45 it cannot be
presumed that the lower court would not properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly presented to it.46 The
records show that petitioners only raised the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before this
Court.1âwphi1.nêt

Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty.47 The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.48 Hence, this Court cannot issue a
writ of mandamus to control or review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and judgment
that is to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision has been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ
of mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it may be.49 Moreover, as earlier discussed,
petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary
course of law, mandamus will not lie.50

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division, denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state
university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and
Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within
the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade
Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-
ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City,
while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and
fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student
Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION
PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and
believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check
No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check
was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their
personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid
amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over
crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a
public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the
Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties
to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the
money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she
hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a
public office, petitioner’s stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is
not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this
definition, petitioner was compensated.14

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution,
 Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court
has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.

Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a
public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no
moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the
primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents,
to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate
powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may
be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for
the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent
with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University,
professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of
service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of
absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of
trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body
of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a
member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this
Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position
classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former
President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly
ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution
dated February 4, 2004.18

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION
AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged
was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the
government.

Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that
when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to
trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason for
this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the
exceptions, thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal
until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case
is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.
The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is
entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash,
acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The
reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial
of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following
are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and
directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the
offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in
the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this
Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case
except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this
Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of
Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based
on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal
case except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside
on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law
yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25She repeats the
reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner
repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It
was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.29

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;

"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding
the rank of senior superintended or higher;

" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;

" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and

" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued
in 1986.

" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
 " The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.

" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the
criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the
filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the
civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal
case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts
of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.32

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals. We quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from
any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in
which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or
affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social
and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to
such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust
or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where
there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law
and every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to the
rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute
itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa
kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No.
1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that
(b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held
then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14,
1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It
was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69).
On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD
No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709,
dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the
Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC
(Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent
parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason
that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the
Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees separately charged
for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by
penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by
government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be
possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student
regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office
of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does
not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices
and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it
(Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute
right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
 "A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer."42

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held
that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as she is placed there by express provision of law.44

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer
as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is
not a corporation created for profit.50

The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no
Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not
ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation
to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P.,
"while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of
her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information
based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada’s private funds and not from the government coffers.
Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant,
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing
on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that
should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606
as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro
D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name
different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may
warrant suspension or disbarment.56

We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the court
should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act
with complete candor and honesty before the courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015

DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the August 18, 2009 Resolution1 and February 8, 2010
Order2 of respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of la9k of jurisdiction.

The facts are plain and undisputed.

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation
to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILODUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the
Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an
obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and
business interests, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in Documail
Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993
Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his
assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest7before
respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged, he admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary
Grade 26. Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,9 he asserted that under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try
and hear the case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with
a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.

In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly show that
the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive branch other than the Regional
Director and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term "Regional Director" and "higher" are separated by
the conjunction "and," which signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined
together "relating one to the other" to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director
was specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials
occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the
motion to dismiss is premature considering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan12 and Organo v. Sandiganbayan13 in
his rejoinder.

On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution, disposing: WHEREFORE, in the
light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of
Arrest be therefore issued against the accused.

SO ORDERED.14

The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions where the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249
unequivocally provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch of the government
occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No.
6758, including those officials who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this
Court’s pronouncements in Indingand Binay v. Sandiganbayan15 were cited.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied;16 Hence, this petition.

Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court required respondents to file a
comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course thereto.17 Upon compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder
(supposedly a Reply) was filed by petitioner.

At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A)
(1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not included among the public officials
specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying as well on Cuyco, petitioner insists that
respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the
OSP maintains that a Regional Director, irrespective of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. We find merit in the petition.

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.18 By virtue of the
powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606,20Section 20 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI
thereof.24 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A. 7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this year, R.A. No.
10660.30

For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the
same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
 "(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.

x x x"

Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the
executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades.31 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the executive branch with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.32

That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional director and higher" is apparent from
the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos. 1353and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos.
7975 and 8249, respectively:

As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over the cases assigned to it only in
instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher
or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to
a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)

To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the "larger
fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-
pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or lower,
devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public
officials whose salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding important
positions in government regardless of salary grade; x

G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution2of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to
this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of ₱71,095.00 under a
disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection,
which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no
liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to
respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the
same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further
investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999,
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent
Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001,
prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.

On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89
of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-
ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in
relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-
ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (₱71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received by reason of her office,
for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to
gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of ₱71,095.00, Philippine
Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION
TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION4 dated November 18, 2004 stating that the
Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete
proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash
advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still in the process of
evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said
criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26,
whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in
cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.

The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the cash
advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial of the case and not in a motion
for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has
jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the
OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of
city local officials/heads.

The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal,
however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.

The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner raises this lone issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT
FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE
VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's appreciation
of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly
constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed
in relation to public office.

Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in Section
4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the
several exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph
and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling
that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and
higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the
enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses
or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with
salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same
respondent proceeded to cite a decision9 of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or
waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. 1avvphi 1

In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to
(g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their commission of
other offenses in relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case of Esteban v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions.

The petition is meritorious.

The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had thoroughly
discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June
11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees,
based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
xxx

Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under
Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect
on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the
offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21,
2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at
the time of the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it
expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present
case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening
sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in
relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of
the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the
provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249
are the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office
of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,

state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly
and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the
diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and
their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.

However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:

x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically including the public
officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary
grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases involving violation of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only because they are the specific
cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they are committed even by public officials
below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When
the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized
that the general qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan
could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.

In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her office is
included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a
case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the principle
declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve a violation of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if
the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being
prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that accused must be a public
official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could exercise jurisdiction over her.
And since the accused occupied a public office with salary grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. 1avv phi 1

Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is
the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of
P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade.
According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense
charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling
that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the
provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically
enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public
officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to
their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in
relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime
and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted
for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.17Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,18 where the crime
involved was murder, this Court held that:

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave
threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal
councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi
during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s administration. Clearly,
based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner’s official functions.
This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was
performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accused’s violent act was
precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the
latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he
would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech."
Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her office,
making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the application
of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been
no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to
their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved
in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in
those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in
relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been
committed in relation to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused’s office
if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x." In People
v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an element of the crime of
murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated while
they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no
personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x20

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public
officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section.
Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a
well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.22 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.23

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 212014-15, December 06, 2016

RICHARD A. CAMBE, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D.
BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212427-28

SENATOR RAMON "BONG" REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THROUGH ITS SPECIAL PANEL OF
INVESTIGATORS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212694-95

SENATOR RAMON "BONG" REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, AND THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212794-95

RICHARD A. CAMBE, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D.
BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213477-78

JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213532-33

 RONALD JOHN LIM, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213536-37

JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 218744-59

MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, ROSARIO SALAMIDA NUÑEZ, LALAINE NARAG PAULE, AND MARILOU DIALINO
BARE, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, (FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before this Court are consolidated petitions1 filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe
(Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which
commonly assail the Joint Resolution2 dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint Order3 dated June 4, 2014 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along with several
others, for the crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 (d) (1), (2), and (6) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7080,4 as amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 30195 (sixteen [16] counts).

Further assailed are: (1) by Cambe,6 the Ombudsman's Joint Order7 dated March 14, 2014, which denied Cambe's Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit with Second Motion to Suspend Proceedings;8 (2) by Sen. Revilla,9 the Ombudsman's Order10 dated May 15, 2014
which denied Sen. Revilla's Omnibus Motion11 to re-conduct the preliminary investigation, among others; and (3) by petitioners
Mario L. Relampagos (Relampagos), Rosario Salamida Nuñez (Nuñez), Lalaine Narag Paule (Paule), and Marilou Dialino Bare
(Bare),12 the Resolutions dated November 13, 201413 and May 13, 201514 of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed the finding of
probable cause against them in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280.

The Facts

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010,15 in the total amount of
P517,000,000.00.16 The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder17 filed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Atty. Levito D. Baligod on September 16, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0316; and (2) a
Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 301918 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on
November 18, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0395, both before the Ombudsman. Briefly stated, petitioners were implicated for
the following acts:

(a) Sen. Revilla, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for authorizing the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of
his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of fraudulent Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) created and controlled by
Napoles's JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation19 in relation to "ghost" PDAF-funded projects,20 and for receiving significant portions
of the diverted PDAF funds as his "commission" or "kickback";21

(b) Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla during the times material to this case, for processing the utilization, diversion, and
disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF,22 and for personally receiving his own "commission" or "kickback" from the diverted funds;23

(c) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen.
Revilla's PDAF through: (1) the commencement via "business propositions" with the legislator regarding his allocated PDAF; (2) the
creation and operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to serve as "conduits" for "ghost" PDAF-funded projects; (3) the use of spurious
receipts and liquidation documents to make it appear that the projects were implemented by her NGOs; (4) the falsification and
machinations used in securing funds from the various implementing agencies (IAs) and in liquidating disbursements; and (5) the
remittance of Sen. Revilla's PDAF for misappropriation;24

(d) Lim and De Asis, as staff employees of Napoles, for assisting in the fraudulent processing and releasing of the PDAF funds to
the JLN-controlled NGOs25 through, among others, their designation as Presidents/Incorporators26 of JLN-controlled NGOs,
cra lawred

namely, Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. (KPMFI)27 and Ginintuang Alay sa Magsasaka Foundation,
Inc. (GAMFI),28 respectively, and for eventually remitting the PDAF funds to Napoles's control;29 and

(e) Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare (Relampagos, et al.), as employees of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), for participating in the misuse or diversion of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, by acting as "contacts" of Napoles within the DBM, and
thereby, assisting in the release of the Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) covering
Sen. Revilla's PDAF.30

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator - in this case, Sen. Revilla - with the former giving
an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the
PDAF.31 Upon their agreement on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the PDAF will be utilized,
the corresponding IA tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either
the project cost or the amount stated in the SARO,32 the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for
the immediate release of his PDAF, who in turn, will endorse such request to the DBM for the release of the SARO.33 By this time,
the initial advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator.34 Upon release of the SARO, Napoles
would then direct her staff - including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) to prepare
PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be used as a "conduit" for the implementation of
the project, the project proposals of the identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff,
all for the approval of the legislator;35 and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of the legislator,
which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.36 Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the
IA which would handle the preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA,
and the chosen NGO.37 Thereafter, the DBM would release the NCA38 to the IA concerned, the head/official of which, in turn, would
expedite the transaction and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten
percent (10%) share in the project cost.39 Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank
accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis.40 Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO,
Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal thereof.41 Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the
latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for accounting.42 Napoles would then decide how much will be left in
the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to
deliver the money to Napoles's residence.43 Finally, to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture
fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that would
make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were not since they were actually inexistent
or, in other words, "ghost" projects.44 Under this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the help of petitioners, among others,
allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.0045 to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, received
"commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P224,512,500.0046

In the Orders dated November 19, 201347 and November 29, 2013,48 the Ombudsman directed petitioners, along with several
others, to submit their respective counter-affidavits, to which petitioners complied with, except for Napoles and Lim.49

In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his and Cambe's signatures in the
PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had "always been regular and above-board"; (c) his involvement in
the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts and that
conspiracy exists between him and all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.50

Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental Counter-Affidavit dated March 12,
2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from
Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.51

For his part, De Asis filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, admitting that: (a) he was an employee of the JLN
Corporation; (b) he did pick up checks for JLN-controlled NGOs; and (c) he was an incorporator in one of the JLN-controlled NGOs;
but denying that he personally benefited from the supposed misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF.52

Meanwhile, Relampagos, et al., in their separate Counter-Affidavits dated December 13, 2013, contended that: (a) there is no
probable cause and factual or legal basis to indict them for the offenses charged; and (b) the criminal complaints did not
specifically mention their names as among those who allegedly participated in the misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF.53

Pending resolution of the Ombudsman cases, Sen. Revilla and Cambe separately moved for the suspension of the preliminary
investigation54 on the criminal complaints, which were, however, denied by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order55 dated January 28,
2014, holding that no prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the preliminary investigation proceedings.56

Cambe filed another motion57 to suspend proceedings of the preliminary investigation, claiming that the filing of the criminal
complaints was premature since the Commission on Audit (COA) had yet to issue an Order of Execution in relation to the Notices of
Disallowance58 (NDs) against Sen. Revilla's Office, docketed as Special Audits Office (SAO) ND Nos. NLDC-2014-013-PDAF(07-09)
to 020-PDAF(07-09). The said motion was, again, denied by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order59 dated March 14, 2014 (March 14,
2014 Joint Order). Thus, Cambe elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 212014-15.

Meantime, Sen. Revilla filed a Motion to be Furnished Copies of Motions, Pleadings, and Other Submissions (Motion to be
Furnished),60 praying that he be furnished with copies of all the counter-affidavits filed by the parties in this case, which was denied
by the Ombudsman in an Order61 dated March 11, 2014. His motion for reconsideration62 thereof was likewise denied by the
Ombudsman in an Order63 dated March 27, 2014.

Sen. Revilla likewise filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition (Of the Special Panel of Investigators),64which was also denied by the
Ombudsman in an Order65 dated March 7, 2014. His motion for reconsideration66 thereof was further denied in an Order67 dated
May 9, 2014.

In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict,
among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder,69 and all the petitioners
(along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section3 (e) of RA 3019.70

The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF was coursed through a complex scheme involving
various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office, the DBM, the IAs, and the JLN-controlled NGOs. The Ombudsman then went on to
conclude that through the said scheme, they were able to siphon out government funds in the aggregate amount of
P517,000,000.00, with at least P224,512,500.00 received by Sen. Revilla.71

Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder,
considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges; (b) with the help of his co-accused, who
are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth through their
intricate modus operandi as described above; and (c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00,72 way more
than the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder.73

In the same manner, the Ombudsman established probable cause to indict all the petitioners (along with several others), except
Lim, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in light of the following: (a) Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and Relampagos, et al. are all public
officers, while private individuals Napoles and De Asis all conspired with these public officers; (b) said public officers exhibited
manifest partiality to Napoles and her cohorts by favoring her controlled NGOs without the benefit of public bidding and without
having been authorized by an appropriation law or ordinance, as legally mandated; (c) said public officers likewise exhibited their
bad faith by unduly benefiting from the "ghost" PDAF-funded projects through the receipt of "commissions," "kickbacks," and the
like; and (d) their collective acts caused undue injury to the government in the aggregate amount of P517,000,000.00.74

Aggrieved, all the petitioners separately moved for the reconsideration75 of the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution. Specifically, Sen.
Revilla, in his motion for reconsideration,76 pointed out that the Ombudsman's use of the counter-affidavits, which documents he
prayed to be furnished with in his denied Motion to be Furnished, was a grave violation of his constitutionally guaranteed right to
due process.

Pending resolution of the aforesaid motions for reconsideration, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order77dated May 7, 2014 granting
Sen. Revilla's Motion to be Furnished, but only with respect to the counter-affidavits of his six (6) co-respondents.78 He was also
directed to file his comment thereon. Dissatisfied, Sen. Revilla then filed an Omnibus Motion79 dated May 13,2014 praying for the:
(a) partial reconsideration of the May 7, 2014 Joint Order; (b) recall of the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution; and (c) re-conduct of
the preliminary investigation and reconstitution of another special panel of investigators.80The said Omnibus Motion having been
denied by the Ombudsman in an Order81 dated May 15, 2014, Sen. Revilla elevated the matter to this Court via a petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 212427-28.

On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order82 (June 4, 2014 Joint Order) denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration for lack of merit and, thereby, affirming the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution with minor modifications to correct
clerical errors.83 These Ombudsman's issuances led to the filing of certiorari petitions before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos.
212694-95, G.R. Nos. 212794-95, G.R. Nos. 213477-78, G.R. Nos. 213532-33, and G.R. Nos. 213536-37.

Consequently, on June 6 and 9, 2014, Informations were filed by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan, charging: (a) Sen.
Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0240;84 and (b)
all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267 to 0282.85

To forestall the service of the warrant of arrest against him, Sen. Revilla filed on June 13, 2014, a Motion for Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause and Deferment and/or Suspension of Proceedings.86Likewise, Relampagos, et al. moved that
the Sandiganbayan declare lack of probable cause against them and suspend proceedings.87

On June 19, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, finding probable cause against petitioners and their co-accused and,
thereby, issued the corresponding warrants of arrest against them.88

Thereafter, Relampagos, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution Dated 19 June 2014 with Motion to
Recall Warrants of Arrest and to Defer Arraignment.89

In a Resolution90 dated August 28, 2014, the Sandiganbayan partially granted the said motion, and dismissed Criminal Case Nos.
SB-14-CRM-0267, 0270, 0271, 0274, 0277, 0278, 0281, and 0282 in so far as Relampagos, et al. were concerned for the reason
that the SAROs pertinent to these criminal cases were not issued or signed by Relampagos, et al., but by then DBM Secretary
Rolando Andaya. However, the Sandiganbayan ordered the prosecution to present additional evidence to establish the existence of
probable cause against them in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280.

The dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267, 0270, 0271, 0274, 0277, 0278, 0281, and 0282 against Relampagos, et al.
was appealed91 by the prosecution, but was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution92 dated November 13, 2014. In the same
Resolution, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of probable cause against Relampagos, et al. in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-
0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280 on the ground that the defenses they raised were evidentiary in
character.93 In particular, the Sandiganbayan held that the issue of whether the IA's endorsement was indispensable before the
SARO can be issued is a matter of evidence to be threshed out during trial.94

Hence, Relampagos, et al. filed a motion for partial reconsideration95 citing DBM Circular Letter No. 2015-1, s. of 2015,96 which
supposedly clarified that the IAs' endorsements are no longer required before the issuance of the corresponding SARO. The said
motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution97 dated May 13, 2015, pointing out that said DBM Circular was issued
only after the Ombudsman's issuance of the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution.98 Thus, Relampagos, et al. elevated the issue before
the Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 218744-59.

The Issue Before This Court

The core issue in this case is whether or not the findings of probable cause against all petitioners should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

All petitions are bereft of merit.

I. Cambe's Motion to Suspend Proceedings.

At the outset, the Court traverses the procedural issue raised by Cambe in his petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15. In particular,
Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion to suspend
proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal
complaints against him. This relates to the twelve (12) NDs received by the Office of Sen. Revilla on January 14, 2014 and
February 4, 2014 pertaining to expenditures charged against his PDAF during the period 2007 to 2009, docketed as SAO ND Nos.
TRC-2013-016-PDAF(07-09) to 019-PDAF(07-09)99 and NLDC-2014-013-PDAF(07-09) to 020-PDAF(07-09),100 respectively, which
Cambe claims should first attain finality; otherwise, the filing of the criminal complaints would be premature pursuant to the COA's
2009 Revised Rules of Procedure.101

The Court disagrees.

The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's audit is clearly separate and distinct
from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the
incidents related to it should have no effect on the filing of the latter. In Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan,102 this Court explained that:
[T]here are three kinds of remedies that are available against a public officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and
the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative [and that] [t]hese remedies may be invoked
separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of
remedies.

xxxx

It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases
are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the first two will not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice
versa. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings. 103
In Reyna v. COA (Reyna),104 this Court particularly declared that "[t]he criminal case filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is
distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the COA."105

Cambe's reliance on Section 6, Rule XIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA is misplaced. As worded, the provision
only accounts for the possibility of the filing of criminal charges upon referral of the audit findings to the Ombudsman:
Section 6. Referral to the Ombudsman. - The Auditor shall report to his Director all instances of failure or refusal to comply with the
decisions or orders of the Commission contemplated in the preceding sections. The COA Director shall see to it that the report is
supported by the sworn statement of the Auditor concerned, identifying among others, the persons liable and describing the
participation of each. He shall then refer the matter to the Legal Services Sector who shall refer the matter to the Office of the
Ombudsman or other appropriate office for the possible filing of appropriate administrative or criminal action.
Nowhere does the provision state any delimitation or precondition to the filing of such criminal charges. As correctly pointed out by
the Ombudsman, "an audit disallowance may not necessarily result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions or criminal
prosecution of the responsible persons. Conversely, therefore, an administrative or criminal case may prosper even without an
audit disallowance. Verily, Rule XIII, Section 6 is consistent with the ruling in [Reyna] that a proceeding involving an audit
disallowance is distinct and separate from a preliminary investigation or a disciplinary complaint."106

In fine, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in promulgating its March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied Cambe's
motion to suspend proceedings. Perforce, Cambe's petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 is dismissed. That being said, the Court now
proceeds to resolve the main substantive issue anent the presence of probable cause against all petitioners.

II. Parameters of Review.

Time and again, this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the Ombudsman's determination of the
existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not
only in respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the 1987 Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
upon practicality as well.107

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.108

Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief."109 "[T]hus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but
less than evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice."110

In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty."111 In this case, the petitioners
were charged with the crimes of Plunder and/or violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Plunder, defined and penalized under
Section 2112 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
(b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described
in Section 1 (d)113 thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).114 On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e)115of RA
3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private
individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.116 In determining probable cause therefor, only a
showing of the ostensible presence of these elements is required.

It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a preliminary investigation which is "merely
an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it."117 It "is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence."118 Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well
as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation
level."119 Accordingly, "owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not
be applied in the course of its proceedings."120 In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled that
"probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay,"121 and
that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of the proceedings is improper.122

Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause
to indict Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners, except Lim, of sixteen
(16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

III. Probable Cause Against Sen. Revilla.

First, in G.R. Nos. 212694-95, Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order
of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes charged, Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman
for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, the
Ombudsman cannot consider the whistleblowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant
to the res inter alios acta rule.

The petition holds no water.

The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At the forefront are the PDAF
documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla123himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds
to the identified JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs
executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these documents - even those not actually signed by Sen.
Revilla - directly implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica),124this Court observed that "the defining feature of all
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project
implementation."125 "At its core, legislators may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus - have been
consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional
Pork Barrel allocations."126 It is through this mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically
dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.

In particular, the Ombudsman details that "the NGO endorsed by the legislator would be among those organized and controlled by
Napoles. In fact, these NGOs were specifically set by Napoles for the x x x purpose [of having the PDAF funds
released]."127 Napoles's staff would then "prepare the PDAF documents for the approval of the legislator and reflecting the
preferred NGO to implement the undertaking."128 These documents "are transmitted to the IA which, in turn, handles the
preparation of the MOA relating to the project, to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA[,] and the NGO concerned." "The
projects are authorized as eligible under the DBM's menu for pork barrel allocations. [However,] [i]t bears noting that the NGO
is directly endorsed by the legislator [and that] [n]o public bidding or negotiated procurement [took] place."129 As
such, there was a defiance of Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) Resolution No. 012-2007 which states that:
4.1 When an appropriation law or ordinance specifically earmarks an amount for projects to be specifically contracted out to
NGOs, the procuring entity may select an NGO through competitive bidding or negotiated procurement under Section
53[(j)] of the [IRR-A]. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it must be emphasized that "the
findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery] should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted
by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its
similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the
judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity. [As such], Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself,
to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine."130 Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his
purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores)131 and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui,
(Pagui)132 cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed that Azores and Pagui admittedly used mere photocopies of the PDAF documents in their
handwriting analyses.133 In Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,134 this Court ruled that "[w]ithout the original document
containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery," and that "[a]
comparison based on a mere [photo] copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable
results."135Furthermore, it may not be amiss to state that the credibility of Azores and Pagui as handwriting experts has yet to be
tested. They still have to authenticate their findings and be subjected to cross-examination. Without a doubt, the prosecution
should also be given a chance to properly contest Azores and Pagui's findings with evidence of its own. It could all too well present
its own handwriting experts during trial to rebut such findings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla's signatures on the
PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all events, the Special Panel members, after
a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and
the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of
signatures, which bear the same style and flourish, were written by one and the same hands."136 Verily, the
Ombudsman's own factual finding on the absence of forgery, at least for the purpose of determining probable cause, should be
regarded with utmost respect. "[F]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence,"137 as in this case.

The Ombudsman's finding on the absence of forgery furthr gains credence in light of the July 20, 2011 Letter138signed by Sen.
Revilla submitted to the COA (Confirmation Letter). The letter evinces on its face that Sen. Revilla had confirmed the
authenticity of his and Cambe's signatures appearing on the PDAF documents:
After going through these documents and initial examination, it appears that the signatures and/or initials on these
documents are my signatures or that of my authorized representative.139
The Ombudsman further noted that the Confirmation Letter appeared to have originated from Sen. Revilla's Office because it was
issued Bar code/Reference No. 0-2011-13079.140

At this juncture, it deserves mentioning that while Luy indeed admitted that there were times that the whistleblowers would forge
the signatures of the legislators in the PDAF documents, he, however, explicitly qualified that such forgeries were made "[w]ith
the approval of Ms. Napoles kasi sila po ang nag-uusap":
Sen. Escudero: Ang tanong ko, finorge or may finorge na ba kayong pirma ng senador o congressman dahil pinepeke
nga 'yong beneficiary, 'di ba, galing sa listahan ng kung sino. x x x.

Mr. Luy: With the approval of Ms. Napoles kasi sila po ang nag-uusap, mav pagkakataon po na fino-forge po.

Sen. Escudero: May pagkakataong fino-forge [ninyo] ang pirma ng mambabatas?

Mr. Luy: Opo.141

Luy's testimony therefore explicates that although the whistleblowers would sometimes forge the legislators' signatures, such were
made with the approval of Napoles based on her prior agreement with the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern that
this authorization allows for a more expedient processing of PDAF funds since the documents required for their release need not
pass through the legislator's respective offices. It is also apparent that this grant of authority gives the legislators room for
plausible deniability: the forging of signatures may serve as a security measure for legislators to disclaim their participation in the
event of discovery. Therefore, Luy's testimony completely makes sense as to why the legislators would agree to authorize Napoles
and her staff to forge their signatures. As such, even if it is assumed that the signatures were forged, it does not mean that the
legislators did not authorize such forgery.

The testimonies of the whistleblowers which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman - are, in fact, the most integral
evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla
was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile
(Sen. Enrile), and Sen. Jinggoy, Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated142 to have dealt with Napols in the plunder of
their PDAF. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they were
employees of JLN Corporation - the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation and in their respective capacities, were individually
tasked by N&poles to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with
the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.143

Among others, it is interesting to note that, as per Luy's testimony, Sen. Revilla was given his own codename, same as the other
involved legislators with whom Napoles transacted with:

58. T: Maaari mo bang linawin itong sinasabi mong "codename"?

S: Ang pangalan pong taong [tumanggap] ng pera ang nilalagay ko sa voucher pero
minsan po ay codename ang nilalagay ko.
59. T: Sino ang nagbigay ng "codename"?

S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES po ang nagbigay ng codename kasi daw po ay sa

gobyerno kami nagta-transact.

60. T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung anu-ano ang mga "codenames" ng mga ka-
transact ni JANET LIM NAPOLES na pulitiko o kanilang [Chief of Staff]?

S: Opo. "TANDA" kay Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, "SEXY/ANAK/KUYA" kay Senator
Jinggoy Estrada, "POGI" kay Senator Bong Revilla, "GUERERA" kayCongressman
Rizalina Seachon-Lanete, "BONJING" kay Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA,
"BULAKLAK" kay Congressman SAMUEL DANGWA, "SUHA" kayCongressman ARTHUR
PINGOY, at "KURYENTE" kay Congressman EDGAR VALDEZ. Mayroon pa po
ibang codename nasa records ko. Sa ngayon po ay sila lang po ang aking naalala.144
As observed by this Court in the Reyes case, "the names of the legislators to whom the PDAF shares were disbursed x x x were
identified by the use of 'codenames.' These 'codenames,' which were obviously devised to hide the identities of the legislators
involved in the scheme, were known by a select few in the JLN Corporation,"145 such as the whistleblowers. The level of detail of
the whistleblowers' narration of facts would surely impress upon a reasonable and prudent mind that their statements were not
merely contrived. In addition, the fact that they had no apparent motive as to why Sen. Revilla, among all others, would be drawn
by the whistleblowers, into such a high-profile case of plundet should likewise be taken into account. Further, in Reyes, this Court
observed that:
[W]histleblower testimonies - especially in corruption cases, such as this - should not be condemned, but rather, be welcomed as
these whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves in order to expose the perpetrators and bring them to justice. In Re: Letter of
Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, et al.) [590 Phil. 8, 49-50 (2008)], the Court gave recognition and appreciation to whistleblowers in corruption cases,
considering that corruption is often done in secrecy and it is almost inevitable to resort to their testimonies in order to pin down the
crooked public officers.146
Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the whistleblowers' testimonies based on the res inter alios actarule. However, in Reyes,
citing Estrada v. Ombudsman,147 this Court had unanimously ruled that the testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo
Christine and John Christopher Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also charged with the embezzlement of the PDAF, are
admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of evidence are not binding on the fiscal during preliminary investigation.
This Court was unequivocal in declaring that the objection on res inter alios acta should falter:
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their invocation of the res inter alios
acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the same
Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the
course of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay
evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation "as long as
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies substantial
basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the
evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not
binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as in this case.148(Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Absent any countervailing reason, the rule on stare decisis149 mandates a similar application of the foregoing ruling to this case.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during preliminary investigation, the treatment
of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the
doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is
relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to
the existence of such a fact."150 Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the
involvement of Sen. Revilla and his coaccused in the present controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire
PDAF scam. Therefore, the statements made by whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy, who were employees of JLN Corporation and
privy to the financial transactions of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla's PDAF, should be given consideration as they
are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand.

To add, the prosecution also presented Luy's ledger entries which corroborate his testimony that Sen. Revilla dealt with Napoles
and received PDAF kickbacks. Luy's records disclose that the kickbacks amountpd to "at least P224,512,500.00: P10,000,000.00
for 2006; P61,000,000.00 for 2007; P80,000,000.00 for 2008; P40,000,000.00 for 2009; and P33,512,500.00 for 2010."151

Relatedly, it should be clarified that the fact that Luy did not personally know Sen. Revilla or that none of the
whistleblowers personally saw anyone handing/delivering money to Sen. Revilla does not mean that they did not
personally know of his involvement. Because of their functions in JLN Corporation as above-stated, it is evident that they had
personal knowledge of the fact that Napoles named Sen. Revilla as one of the select-legislators she transacted with. More
significantly, they personally processed the PDAF funds and documents connected with Sen. Revilla's Office, which lasted for a
considerable amount of time, i.e., four (4) years [2006-2010 as charged]. As such, their testimonies should not be completely
disregarded as hearsay.

In any case, this Court has resolved that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."152 The substantial basis for crediting the whistleblowers' testimonies, even if so
regarded as hearsay, rests on their key functions in JLN Corporation as above-mentioned, as well as the collective evidence
gathered by the prosecution tending to support the same conclusion that Sen. Revilla and his alleged co-conspirators acted in
concert to pillage his PDAF funds.
The prosecution further submitted the affidavits of Sen. Revilla's corespondents which constitute direct evidence that provide
an account of Sen. Revilla's involvement, this time from the perspective of certain IA officials.

Among others, National Livelihood Development Corporation Director IV Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, echoed the Ombudsman's
finding that "[Sen.] Revilla, through Cambe, [was] responsible for 'identifying the projects, determining the project costs and
choosing the NGOs' which was manifested in the letters of [Sen.] Revilla[.]"153

For his part, Technology Resource Center (TRC) Deputy, Director General Dennis L. Cunanan (Cunanan) narrated that he met Janet
Napoles sometime in 2006 or 2007. According to him, Napoles introduced herself as "the representative of certain legislators who
supposedly picked TRC as a conduit for PDAF-funded projects"; at the same occasion, Napoles told him that "her principals were
then Senate President [Enrile], [Sen. Revilla], [and] [Sen. Estrada.]" Cunanan further averred that he "often ended up
taking and/or making telephone verifications and follow-ups and receiving legislators or their staff members," all in connection with
PDAF projects. In addition, Cunanan even conveyed that Luy would occasionally go to his office to pressure him to expedite the
release of the PDAF funds by calling the offices of the legislators concerned.154

Cunanan's statements were furthr corroborated by TRC Department Manager III Francisco B. Figura (Figura), wno averred that
legislators would "highly recommend" NGOs/foundations as conduit implementors and that if TRC disagreed with their
recommendations, said legislators wquld feel insulted and take away their PDAF from TRC, resulting in the latter losing the chance
to earn service fees.155According to Figura, this set up rendered TRC officials powerless to disregard the wishes of Sen. Revilla
especially on the matter of public bidding for the PDAF projects.156

At this juncture, this Court would like to dispel the notion. that due process rights were violated when Sen. Revilla was denied
copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings before the Ombudsman as he
argues in G.R. Nos. 212427-28. This matter was already resolved in the similar case of Estrada, where this Court said:
Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating
officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither
of these Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his [co-respondents]. The
right of the respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant," as expressly stated in Section 3
(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-
affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory
questions to the parties. or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-
examine." Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c), of Rule II of the Ombudsman's Rule of Procedure, read together, only require the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. There
is no law or rule requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-
respondents.157
In any event, the Ombudsman in this case went beyond its legal duty and eventually granted Sen. Revilla's requests to be
furnished with said counter-affidavits, and even afforded him the opportunity to comment thereto.158 Thus, there is more reason to
decline his flawed claims of denial of due process. Case law statethat the touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be
heard,159 which was undeniably afforded to Sen. Revilla in this case.

The findings of the COA in its SAO Report No. 2012-2013 (COA report)160 also buttress the finding of probable cause against
Sen.Revilla. This report presents'in detail the various irregularities in the disbursement of the PDAF allocations of several legislators
in the years 2007 to 2009, such as: (a) the IAs not actually implementing the purported projects, and instead, directly releasing
the funds to the NGOs after deducting a "management fee," which were done at the behest of the sponsoring legislator,
including Sen. Revilla; (b) the involved NGOs did not have any track record in the implementation of government projects,
provided fictitious addresses, submitted false documents, and were selected without any public bidding and complying with COA
Circular No. 2607-001 and GPPB Resolution No. 12-2007; and (c) the suppliers who purportedly provided supplies to the NGOs
denied ever dealing with the latter. Resultantly, the COA Report concluded that the PDAF-funded projects of Sen. Revilla were
"ghost" or inexistent.161

The findings in the COA report were further corroborated by the field verifications conducted by the Field Investigation Office -
Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) to determine whether or not Sen. Revilla's PDAF was indeed utilized for its intended livelihood
projects. In the course of investigation, it was revealed that the mayors and municipal agriculturists, who had reportedly received
livelihood assistance kits/packages, purportedly procured through Sen. Revilla's PDAF, actually denied receiving the same and
worse, were not even aware of any PDAF-funded projects intended for their benefit. Moreover, the signatures on the certificates of
acceptance and delivery reports were forged, and in fact, the supposed beneficiaries listed therein were neither residents of the
place where they were named as such; had jumbled surnames; deceased; or even downright fictitious. The foregoing led the FIO to
similarly conclude that the purported livelihood projects were "ghost" projects, and that its proceeds amounting to
P517,000,000.00 were never used for the same.162

Taking together all of the above-stated pieces of evidence, the COA and FIO reports tend to prima facieestablish that irregularities
had indeed attended the disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF and that he had a hand in such anomalous releases, being the head
of Office which unquestionably exercised operational control thereof. As the Ombudsman correctly observed, "[t]he PDAF was
allocated to him by virtue of his position as a Senator, and therefore he exercise[d] control in the selection of his priority projects
and programs. He indorsed [Napoles's] NGOs in consideration for the remittance of kickbacks and commissions from Napoles.
Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be 'ghost projects', and that the rest of the PDAF allocation
went into the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts, [there is probable cause to show that] Revilla thus unjustly enriched himself at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines."163 Hence, he should stand
trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. For the same reasons, it is apparent that ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at least
P50,000,000.00 (i.e., P224,512,500.00) were amassed, accumulated or acquired through a combination or series of overt acts
stated in Section 1 of the Plunder Law. Therefore, Sen. Revilla should likewise stand trial for Plunder.

Besides, case law holds164 that once the trial court finds probable cause, which results in the issuance of a warrant of arrest (as
the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to Sen. Revilla and his copetitioners165), any question on the prosecution's conduct of
preliminary investigation becomes moot.

In fine, Sen. Revilla's petitions in G.R. Nos. 212427-28 and G.R. Nos. 212694-95 are dismissed for lack of merit.

IV. Probable Cause Against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause against him, as well as its failure to furnish him copies of his corespondents' counter-affidavits.

The above-discussed pieces of evidence are all equally significant to establish probable cause against Cambe. There is no dispute
that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational control over
the affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe's signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF
documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-
controlled NGOs.166

Moreover, Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla. As
recounted by Luy, Cambe was the one who would go to Napoles's office and receive cash from the latter in the aggregate amount
of P224,512,500.00 representing Sen. Revilla's "commissions" or "kickbacks" coming from the PDAF scam. The cash would come
either from Luy's vault or from Napoles herself.167 In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and
Napoles.

For the same reasons above-discussed, there should be no valid objection against the appreciation of the PDAF documents and
whistleblowers' testimonies as evidence to establish probable cause against Cam be at this stage of the proceedings. He also has
no right to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits ,of his co-respondents. Thus, this Court holds that Cambe should likewise
stand trial for the crimes charged, and his petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 be dismissed.

V. Probable Cause Against Napoles.

In G.R. Nos. 213536-37, Janet Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4,
2014 Joint Order finding probable cause against her for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she
argues that the complaints did not establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She likewise contends that
since she is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan.

Napoles's arguments are untenable.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal utilization, diversion, and
disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam. As outlined by the
Ombudsman, Napoles would approach legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, and "offer to 'acquire' his x x x PDAF allocation in exchange
for a 'commission' or kickback amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF."168 Once Napoles was informed of the availability of
Sen Revilla's PDAF, she and/or her staff would prepare listings of the available projects specifically indicating the IAs which would
carry out the same. After the listings are released by Sen. Revilla's Office, Napoles would then give a down payment from her own
pockets for delivery to Sen. Revilla, or in case of his unavailability, to Cambe who would receive the same on Sen. Revilla's behalf.
Once the SARO and/or the NCA regarding said project is released, Napoles would then deliver the promised "kickbacks" to Sen.
Revilla. Thereafter, Sen. Revilla and/or Cambe would endorse Napoles's NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects, all of which
turned out to be "ghost" or "inexistent;" thus, allowing Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation.169

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers' testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials,
and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause
against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla,
Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF
amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for violations of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to illegally divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects caused undue
prejudice to the government.

That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 because the
offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in
the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have
conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.170 In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in
the systematic pillaging of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned
crimes.

Thus, Napoles's petition in G.R. Nos. 213536-37 is dismissed.

VI. Probable Cause Against De Asis.

In G.R. Nos. 213477-78, De Asis accuses the Ombudsman of gravely abusing its discretion in finding probable cause against him
for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, contending, inter alia, that the performance of his functions as driver and
messenger of Napoles hardly constitutes overt acts of the aforesaid crimes or a willful participation thereof. In this regard, he
asserts that as a mere high school graduate and former security guard, it is highly unimaginable for him to conspire with his
employer and other high-ranking government officials to commit the aforesaid crimes.

The petition has no merit.

Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator171 of KPMFI which was one of the many NGOs controlled
by Napoles that was used in the embezzlement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF allocations.172 Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas
explicitly n,amed De Asis as one of those who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker.173 Said whistleblowers even declared
that De Asis, among others, rec ived the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank; and that, after
the money is withdrawn from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles's house.174 Indeed,
the foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe that, in all probability, De Asis conspired with the other co-accused to
commit the crimes charged.

To refute the foregoing allegations, De Asis presented defenses which heavily centered on his perceived want of criminal intent, as
well as the alleged absence of the elements of the crimes charged. However, such defenses are evidentiary in nature, and thus, are
better ventilated during trial and not during preliminary investigation. To stress, a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits.175

In sum, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict De Asis for the crimes charged.
Consequently, his petition in G.R. Nos. 213477-78 is dismissed.
 VII. Probable Cause Against Lim.

In G.R. Nos. 213532-33, Lim argues that the Ombudsman. gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause against him for
Plunder. According to him, the criminal complaints do not allege a specific action he committed that would demonstrate his
involvement for the crime charged.

Lim's contention is without merit.

As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas narrated that over the course of the perpetuation of the
PDAF scam, they, along with the other staff of Napoles - which includes Lim - would prepare, and thereafter deliver, the kickbacks
intended for Sen. Revilla.176 The preparation and delivery of kickbacks to the legislator and/or his trusted staff are indeed overt acts
that relate to his involvement in the PDAF scheme. To note, even if it is assumed that Lim only prepared the money and did not
deliver the same as he claims,177 the act of preparation is still connected to the common objective of the conspiracy. Accordingly,
this establishes the existence of probable cause against him for thb crime charged. Hence, his petition in G.R. Nos. 213532-33 is
likewise dismissed.

VIII. Probable Cause Against Relampagos, et al.

Meanwhile, in G.R. Nos. 218744-59, DBM employees Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions
dated November 13, 2014178 and May 13, 2015179 which judicially found probable cause against them for eight (8) counts of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, thereby affirming the Ombudsman's earlier finding of probable cause against them (at least
for the said eight [8] counts that were affirmed). In particular, they argue that: (a) they cannot be faulted for issuing the SAROs
without prior IA endorsement as it was authorized under the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) for the years 2007 to 2009; and
(b) there was no "undue haste" in the issuance of the said SAROs as the DBM itself prescribes shorter periods in the processing of
the same.180

Relampagos, et al.'s arguments fail to persuade.

As pointed out by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs issued in the perpetuation of the PDAF
scam were issued by the Office of Relampagos as DBM Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare are all working - a finding
that they themselves did not dispute.181 More significantly: (a) whistleblower Luy positively identified Relampagos, et al. as
Napoles's "contact persons" in the DBM; and (b) the COA Report found irregularities in their issuances of the aforesaid SAROs
and NCAs.182 Ostensibly, these circumstances show Relampagos et al.'s manifest partiality and bad faith in favor of Napoles and her
cohorts that evidently caused undue prejudice to the Government. Thus, they must stand trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019.

As to their contentions that there was no "undue haste" in the issuance of the said SAROs as the GAAs for the years 2007 to 2009
authorized such issuances even without prior IA endorsement and that the DBM itself prescribes a shorter processing time for the
same, suffice it to say that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated in a full-blown trial. The timing of the SARO
releases by these DBM officials, as well as any deviations from legal procedure are but part of a multitude of factors to be threshed
out during trial in order to determine their exact culpability. Verily, the confines of a preliminary investigation do not yet allow a full
exposition of the parties' claims. Relampagos, et al.'s petition in G.R. Nos. 218744-59 is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

Case law states that "the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
It is not the function of the Office of the Ombudsman to rule on such issue. All that the Office of the Ombudsman did was to weigh
the evidence presented together with the counter-allegations of the accused and determine if there was enough reason to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof."183 In the review of the Ombudsman's
determination of probable cause, we are guided by this Court's pronouncement in Vergara v. Ombudsman,184 where it was ruled
that:
[C]ourts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining probable cause unless there are compelling
reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of
discretion. Besides, to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on the ground of abuse of discretion, the abuse must be grave,
as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.185
Meanwhile, with respect to the Sandiganbayan's judicial determination of probable cause, this Court, in Delos-Santos Dio v. Court
of Appeals,186 enlightens that:
[A] judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of the information in court is appropriate only when the failure
to establish probable cause can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented and not when its existence is simply doubtful. After
all, it call)lot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would have already presented all the
evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being
merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.187
In this case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al.) did not err in finding probable cause against all
the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the evidence on record and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same.
Moreover, this Court cannot tag key documentary evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the
proceedings; otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms followed during preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence
teaches us that "[i]n dealing with probable cause[,] athe very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.
The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved."188 Overall, based on the foregoing disquisitions, the
standard of probable cause was adequately hurdled by the prosecution in this case. As such, no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan in the proceedings a quo. All the petitioners should therefore stand trial for
the crimes they were charged.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of erit. The findings of probable cause against all petitioners are
hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court, is DIRECTED to commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in
these cases with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

G.R. No. 149311 February 11, 2005

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO, STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III, MISAEL
M. LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
PANFILO M. LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated June 25, 2001 issued by the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
Civil Case No. 01-100934.

The facts are as follows:

Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the
Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of
the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses
imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-
00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in
form and substance and thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February
28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.

Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging the
same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman.1 NBI Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended
the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes:

a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;

b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and

c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2

In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this recommendation was made after taking the sworn
statements of Mary Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet. The
sworn statements of these witnesses were attached to the letter.3

On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the other persons named
in the witnesses’ sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the subpoena on May 8, 2001. The subpoena directed
them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the
complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their
counsel, manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed
therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against
the same respondents. Furthermore, they claimed that according to the Court’s ruling in gr_ Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such as private respondents.5

The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on May 28, 2001, denied the dismissal of the cases
before it through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:

It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure[;]

It appearing further that respondent’s rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the determination of
jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully
Acquired Property [or] Bribery, nor are they related to respondents’ discharge of their official duties;

It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice
No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular
courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with
finality;6
On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the Solicitor General received a copy of a petition for
prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the said petition for prohibition,
Lacson and Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on the complaints
submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was
violating the Ombudsman’s mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster their claim.

On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting the Department of Justice from conducting
the preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby GRANTED, and accordingly a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their subordinates, agents[,] and other persons
acting in their behalf, individually and collectively, from conducting a preliminary investigation in IS No. 2001-402, insofar
as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the petitioners to file their counter-affidavits in said case until such time
that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses subject matter of the investigations
before it, or until such Office shall have categorized the said offenses as being committed by the petitioners not in relation
to their respective offices.

Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue without bond, as there is no showing whatsoever in
the pleadings of the parties that the respondents will suffer any injury by reason of the issuance of the writ prayed for, in
accordance with Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED. 7

Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then Secretary Hernando Perez, the NBI, through
Director Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation
of I.S. No. 2001-402. In their petition, they raise the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR
AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF 1990 OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING
OF A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING THE NBI COMPLAINT
FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME OFFENSES, RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.

IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDENT

MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO DESPITE THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH SEPARATE AND DISTINCT
OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE DOJ.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR
PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE ONLY HELD
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.8

A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth one central question to be resolved: whether or
not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a
complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the second proceedings
does not alter the nature thereof as being principally directed against the respondents herein in connection with
substantially the same set of facts alleged.

First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.

Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain
that it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration of justice and that this is all the more
compelling, in this case, considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged
have already attracted nationwide attention.

Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be the safety of witnesses who
risked life and limb to give their statements to the authorities, but also the rights of the respondents, who may need to
clear their names and reputations of the accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted not as ends in
themselves but as means conducive to the realization of justice. The rules of procedure are not to be applied when such
application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence.9

Now, to the merits.

The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code
under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a principal law
agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance
with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and
administration of the correctional system; . . .

Section 3. Powers and Functions. – To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following powers and
functions:

...

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system;

...

Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978, provides:

Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice. – There is
hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of
Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional
State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal’s Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.

Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases filed against them, to
the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of Government pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on
the doctrine in Uy v. Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of the said
primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials. They likewise claim that it should be deemed that the
Ombudsman has already taken over the investigation of these cases, considering that there are already pending
complaints filed therewith involving the same accused, facts and circumstances.

Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; ….10

The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the case or cases in question
to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In granting the petition for prohibition, RTC Judge
Liwag gave the following rationale:

Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the
matter, it is the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the
same matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the matter by
the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative
agencies of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the Ombudsman’s investigation. Only in matters
where the other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may
such agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. That is the situation. It is not
otherwise. To allow the respondents to meddle with the investigation of similar cases being investigated by the
Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source of their powers with respect to such cases. This is, of
course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to ordinary common sense. It would certainly be
presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous, for the Department of Justice to be making recommendation as to its preliminary
investigation to the Ombudsman in matters being handled by such Office itself. Such recommendation would be pre-
emptive of the actions of the said Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.

The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage, from any investigative
agency of the Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such
as the petitioners. It is the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the law. That
situation presupposes the conduct by other Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials in
cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already
taken hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the investigation being
conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for power and
authority would thus require the respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled by the Ombudsman.
Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the
truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and
authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency must be recalled.11

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the plenary power to
investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or employees.12 To discharge its duty
effectively, the Constitution endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special features which puts it a notch
above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies. First and foremost, it extended independence to the
Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the Constitution provided for stringent
qualification requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born citizens,
of recognized probity and independence and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election.13 The Ombudsman and his deputies were given the rank and salary equal to that of the Chairman and
Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their
term of office.14 They were given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment.15 Upon their cessation from office,
they are prohibited from running for any elective office in the immediately succeeding election.16 Finally, unlike other
investigative bodies, the Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy.17 Clearly, all these measures
are intended to enhance the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the principal and
primarycomplaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this
purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate
complaints against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged before it.18 It can
inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants based on reports in the media and those which come to his
attention through sources other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is direct,
informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing the illegal
or improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put
to minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the Ombudsman. Vis-à-vis other
prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate public officials is given preference over other
bodies.

As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the Office of Ombudsman when it
enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency,
the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other investigative bodies. All
this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is notco-
equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate
cannot claim equal power.

Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving
violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and
employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the
executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the Ombudsman.

Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter,19 the settled rule is that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.20 Thus,
assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both
bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present
case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the
preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.

None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual situation similar to that of the present case.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),21 the Court upheld the special authority of the
PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, issued by
then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court emphasized in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman
to conduct a preliminary investigation over said cases is not exclusive but a shared authority, the complaints for the
alleged misuse of coconut levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that the Court recognized the primary, albeit
shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered the PCGG to
desist from proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the
investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders against petitioner’s assets.

In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with the DOJ against petitioner
Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the
preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were filed in court by the
DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only the Ombudsman who has the power to conduct investigation of cases
involving public officers like him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling that the authority to investigate and prosecute
illegal acts of public officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman but a shared authority. However, it will be
noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation in that case was filed solely with the DOJ.

In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of prosecutors, the corresponding Information
was filed in court. The pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said Information
without previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the
shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case. Again, it should be noted that the complaint in that case was
addressed solely to the provincial prosecutor.

The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix25 and Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
of the DOJ26 where the letter-complaint against petitioners public officers were brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for
investigation.

In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies
and no risk of conflicting findings or orders. In stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a complaint
against respondents initially with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was immediately
acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records, she thereafter refiled substantially the same
complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.

Not only this.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed
against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation
is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.27 When one is hailed before an investigative body on
specific charges, the very act of filing said complaint for preliminary investigation immediately exposes the respondent and
his family to anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or
more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to
the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense.

There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising
jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.

Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable
and limited resources of Government, inaduplication of proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.

From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Annex D-1 of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 83-91.

2 Annex D of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 80-82.

3 Annexes D-2 to D-4 of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 92-107.

4 354 SCRA 651 (2001).

5 Annex G of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 133-144.

6 Annex H of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 145-147.

7 Rollo, pp. 54-55 (Emphasis in the original).

8 Petition, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 13-14.

9 gr_ Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187 (1997).

10 Emphasis supplied.

11 RTC Order, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 53-54 (Emphasis in the original).

12 Uy v. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 4.

13 Section 8, Article XI, Constitution.

14 Section 10, id.

15 Section 11, id.

16 Id.

17 Section 4, id.

18 Section 13 (1), id.

19 Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition, p. 363.

20
gr_ Carlos v. Angeles, 346 SCRA 572 (2000); Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324 (1984).

21 190 SCRA 226 (1990).

22 Id., at 242.

23 227 SCRA 627 (1993).

24 G.R. No. 98452, En Banc Resolution dated September 26, 1991.

25 229 SCRA 680 (1994).

26 G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004.

27 Section 1, Rule 112, Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 149311 February 11, 2005

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO, STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III,
MISAEL M. LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Manila, PANFILO M. LACSON,
MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued by the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 01-100934.

The facts are as follows:

Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit
on January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael
Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-
affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and
Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-
00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and
substance and thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On
February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges
against them be dismissed.

Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the
NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the
Ombudsman.1 NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of
Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and
private individuals for the following alleged crimes:

a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong
Kam Chong;

b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and

c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2

In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this recommendation was made after taking
the sworn statements of Mary Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and
Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these witnesses were attached to the letter.3

On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the other
persons named in the witnesses’ sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the subpoena on May 8,
2001. The subpoena directed them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the
scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-
Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a letter dated May 18,
2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since
there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same
respondents. Furthermore, they claimed that according to the Court’s ruling in gr_ Uy v.
Sandiganbayan,4 the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials, including
police and military officials such as private respondents.5

The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on May 28, 2001, denied the dismissal
of the cases before it through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:

It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]

It appearing further that respondent’s rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the
determination of jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or] Bribery, nor are they related to respondents’
discharge of their official duties;

It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Department of Justice No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not in relation
to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the
Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with finality;6

On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the Solicitor General received a copy of a
petition for prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the
said petition for prohibition, Lacson and Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They argued
that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the Ombudsman’s mandate of
having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster their claim.

On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting the Department of Justice
from conducting the preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby GRANTED, and accordingly a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their subordinates,
agents[,] and other persons acting in their behalf, individually and collectively, from conducting a
preliminary investigation in IS No. 2001-402, insofar as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the
petitioners to file their counter-affidavits in said case until such time that the Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses subject matter of the investigations before it, or until
such Office shall have categorized the said offenses as being committed by the petitioners not in relation
to their respective offices.

Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue without bond, as there is no
showing whatsoever in the pleadings of the parties that the respondents will suffer any injury by reason
of the issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance with Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.

SO ORDERED. 7

Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then Secretary Hernando Perez, the
NBI, through Director Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct
the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 2001-402. In their petition, they raise the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL

CLEAR AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF 1990 OF
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING
THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING THE NBI

COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME OFFENSES, RESPONDENTS
AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.

IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING RELIEF TO

RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO DESPITE THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE DOJ.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE
FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE
ONLY HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.8
A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth one central question to be
resolved: whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the
pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances.
The addition of other names in the second proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being
principally directed against the respondents herein in connection with substantially the same set of facts
alleged.

First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.

Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to reconsider the assailed
Order. They maintain that it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration of
justice and that this is all the more compelling, in this case, considering that this involves the high-
ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged have already attracted nationwide attention.

Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be the safety of
witnesses who risked life and limb to give their statements to the authorities, but also the rights of the
respondents, who may need to clear their names and reputations of the accusations against them.
Procedural laws are adopted not as ends in themselves but as means conducive to the realization of
justice. The rules of procedure are not to be applied when such application would clearly defeat the very
rationale for their conception and existence.9

Now, to the merits.

The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the provisions of the 1987
Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a
principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the
crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system; . . .

Section 3. Powers and Functions. – To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following
powers and functions:

...

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and
correction system;

...

Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978, provides:

Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of
Justice. – There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision
and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the
Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City
Fiscal’s Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.

Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases filed
against them, to the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of Government pursuant to law and
existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine in Uy v. Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend
that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of the said primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including
police and military officials. They likewise claim that it should be deemed that the Ombudsman has
already taken over the investigation of these cases, considering that there are already pending complaints
filed therewith involving the same accused, facts and circumstances.

Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases; ….10
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the case or
cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In granting the
petition for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag gave the following rationale:

Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction over the matter, it is the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on conducting
a preliminary investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In
the final analysis, the resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no power
and right to add an input into the Ombudsman’s investigation. Only in matters where the other
investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may
such agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. That is the
situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the respondents to meddle with the investigation of similar cases
being investigated by the Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source of their powers
with respect to such cases. This is, of course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to
ordinary common sense. It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous, for the Department of
Justice to be making recommendation as to its preliminary investigation to the Ombudsman in matters
being handled by such Office itself. Such recommendation would be pre-emptive of the actions of the said
Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.

The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage, from any
investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including
police and military officials such as the petitioners. It is the feeling of this Court that the respondents
cannot find comfort in that provision of the law. That situation presupposes the conduct by other
Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore
being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken hold
of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the investigation being
conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and becoming
respect for power and authority would thus require the respondents to desist from interfering with the
case already handled by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized
prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the
powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The hierarchy
of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency must be recalled.11

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the plenary
power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or employees.12 To
discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special
features which puts it a notch above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies. First and foremost, it
extended independence to the Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus,
the Constitution provided for stringent qualification requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman and
his deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born citizens, of recognized probity and independence and must
not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election.13 The Ombudsman
and his deputies were given the rank and salary equal to that of the Chairman and Members, respectively,
of the Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their term of
office.14 They were given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment.15 Upon their cessation from
office, they are prohibited from running for any elective office in the immediately succeeding
election.16 Finally, unlike other investigative bodies, the Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman
fiscal autonomy.17 Clearly, all these measures are intended to enhance the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the principal and
primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of
procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers given to prosecutors. It was
vested with the power to investigate complaints against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even
without a formal complaint lodged before it.18 It can inquire into acts of government agencies and public
servants based on reports in the media and those which come to his attention through sources other than
a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and
inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing the illegal or
improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public
agencies, is put to minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Vis-à-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate
public officials is given preference over other bodies.

As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the Office of Ombudsman
when it enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time
is not given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ.
The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.
Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases
involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary
power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against
public officers and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast,
the DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to
the Ombudsman.

Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of
concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter,19 the settled rule is
that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.20 Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and
the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained
freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to
which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the
complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the
exclusion of the DOJ.

None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual situation similar to that of the
present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),21 the Court
upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth
cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, issued by then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the
Court emphasized in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation
over said cases is not exclusive but a shared authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut
levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that the Court recognized the primary,
albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered
the PCGG to desist from proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the
PCGG to conduct the investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders
against petitioner’s assets.

In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with the DOJagainst
petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After the DOJ panel
prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued and the
corresponding Informations were filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only
the Ombudsman who has the power to conduct investigation of cases involving public officers like him.
The Court reiterated its previous ruling that the authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of
public officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman but a shared authority. However, it will be
noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation in that case was filed solely with the DOJ.

In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of prosecutors, the
corresponding Information was filed in court. The pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the
prosecutors can file the said Information without previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court
ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate
the case. Again, it should be noted that the complaint in that case was addressed solely to the provincial
prosecutor.

The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix25 and Honasan v. Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ26 where the letter-complaint against petitioners public officers were
brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.

In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power between two
coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or orders. In stark contrast with the present case,
Mary Ong filed a complaint against respondents initially with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation which was immediately acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the
records, she thereafter refiled substantially the same complaintwith the NBI and the DOJ.

Not only this.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over
the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although
a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.27 When one is hailed before an investigative body on specific charges, the very act
of filing said complaint for preliminary investigation immediately exposes the respondent and his family
to anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or
more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue
difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or
 body where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to
appear and plead their cause or defense.

There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies
exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of
the respondents.

Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of
valuable and limited resources of Government, inaduplication of proceedings already started with the
Ombudsman.

From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147097 June 5, 2009

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID and ANGELITO A. PELAYO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Ombudsman's disapproval of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution1 dated September 18, 2000, recommending dismissal of the
criminal cases filed against herein petitioners, be reversed and set aside.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit
docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
as amended.

The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of the
projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing
Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to ₱4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the
help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF
into cash.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB)
issued a Resolution2 dated May 29, 2000 recommending the filing against herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each
of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said Resolution was approved by the
Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were filed against
herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which
motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-
evaluate the cases against petitioners.

Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution3 dated September 18, 2000. It recommended the
dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of evidence.

The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a
Memorandum4 dated October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be
directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA
Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive
prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
proceedings.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Petitioners allege that:

I.

THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION.

II.

THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES

AND CONJECTURES.5

Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's
Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases against erring
officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute
belongs to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct entity
from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate
and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that
R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component of the Office of the
Ombudsman, should be struck down for being unconstitutional.

Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability because the checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin
allegedly as reimbursement for the advances he made from his personal funds for expenses incurred to ensure the
immediate implementation of projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo victims.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A.
No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no
constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully
dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.6

Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall "exercise such other functions or duties as may be
provided by law." Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:

x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was indeed present, the Commission
[referring to the Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature could, through
statute, prescribe such other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved by the
Commission after several amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of
Public Officers) of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

xxxx

Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law.

Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman, we quote
Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo:

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the Ombudsman is: "to exercise such
powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law." So, the legislature may vest him with
powers taken away from the Tanodbayan, may it not?

MR. COLAYCO:

Yes.

MR. MONSOD:
 Yes.

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
provided by law."

MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.

MR. RODRIGO:

So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.

MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct.

MR. RODRIGO:

And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be performed by the Ombudsman are "such
functions or duties as may be provided by law." The sponsors admitted that the legislature later on might remove
some powers from the Tanodbayan and transfer these to the Ombudsman.

MR. COLAYCO:

Madam President, that is correct.

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body which has neither punitive nor
prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too much and then
disappoint them.

MR. MONSOD:

I agree with the Commissioner.

MR. RODRIGO:

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the legislature, why
not leave this to the legislature?

xxxx

MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):

xxxx

With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the concept in its
form at the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by law in
accordance with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time we should
prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the
Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
1awphi1

So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.7

The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was
likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor as among the offices under the
Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization
of the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.

The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x

xxxx

x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law,
except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase
evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then
that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other
powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article
XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be
provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under
the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan
by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers
and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.8

The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.9 More recently, in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Valera,10 the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is
"merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon
authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with
the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.11 The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute
based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v.
Sandiganbayan,12 where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of
informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution,
Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under
the Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited
and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again, this contention deserves scant consideration.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are
established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.

It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as follows:

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.14 1avvphi1

In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation,15 the Court
expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial
decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by
the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is
a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.16

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that "[a]bandonment thereof must
be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected
from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements
diminished."17 Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits
derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.

In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the Court that the doctrine of stare
decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse
of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervision over
the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.

The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the OSP Resolution recommending
dismissal of the cases is based on misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and conjectures. The question is
really whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct
only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been emphasized in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division
of the Court of Appeals,18 to wit:

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go
as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not
include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of
evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued
by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the
said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.19

Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding of probable cause would necessitate an
examination and re-evaluation of the evidence upon which the Ombudsman based its disapproval of the OSP Resolution.
Hence, the Petition for Certiorari should not be given due course.

Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto,20 imparting the value of the Ombudsman's independence, stating thus:

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court not
to interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings
are supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of
public service, he has wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the three branches
of government. This is to ensure that his Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence.21

Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it is imperative for petitioners to clearly
prove that said public official acted with grave abuse of discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Desierto,22 the Court elaborated on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. x x x23

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner described above. Clearly, the
Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its power of control and supervision
over the OSP when it disapproved the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.

It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or action of the Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence,
it should not have been included as a respondent in this petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163586 January 27, 2009

SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Guimaras; the COA-Region VI,
represented by its Director; and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
 DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail
the July 22, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 69350; and the March 26,
2004 CA Resolution2 which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts are of record.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65,
Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Buenavista, Province
of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, a public officer,
being the Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such, was in the custody
and possession of public funds in the amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the value of her
collections and other accountabilities, for which she is accountable by reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position, with deliberate intent, and with
intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and
convert to her own personal use and benefit said amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made upon
her account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.

On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the
Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed
to allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v.
Sandiganbayan,4 petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against
her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the
Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.5

The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order6 dated September 7, 2001. It held that the jurisdiction of the RTC over
the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense
charged.7 Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman in the case, pointing out that in Uy, upon
motion for clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and issued a March 20,
2001 Resolution expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases
cognizable by the RTC.

The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded
not guilty under the Information.8

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which the RTC denied in its December 18, 2001 Order.10

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari11 with the CA, but the latter dismissed the petition in the Decision under review.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration12 was also denied.

Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following:

1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information for Malvesation of Public Funds
was instituted against the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light of this Supreme Court’s ruling in the
First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme Court dated February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without violating the constitutional
provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process.13

Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August 9, 1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the
time of issuance on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the same case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that
the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the investigation and prosecution
against petitioner was conducted by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy
was applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said
case. Hence, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no
investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.
The petition lacks merit.

The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,14 wherein accused Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9,
1999 Decision of the Court in Uy15 in a motion to dismiss the 11 counts of malversation that were filed against them by the
Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon petition filed by the Ombudsman, the Court reversed
the RTC and held:

In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same resolution promulgated on March 20, 2001 in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extended only to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It held:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any
act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by
regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special
Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law
defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the
exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by
the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it
must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds
of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special
Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these
types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the
government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To
carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or
lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution
of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise
allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance
with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.

We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to
385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not exclusive and is
shared by him with the regular prosecutors.

WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET
ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED
to try and decide the same. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva,16 in which, citing the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy,
the RTC dismissed a criminal complaint that was filed before it by the Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for,
"given the Court’s Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial court’s assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight,
without legal support and must, therefore, be set aside."

It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases
cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision
was the operative ruling on the issue.

Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for otherwise it
would amount to "an ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally proscribed."17

Petitioner is grasping at straws.

A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original
passage. Such interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts light upon the
contemporaneous legislative intent of that law.18 Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the
Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.

Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the
Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under the impression of the constitutionality of the law or the
validity of its interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application.19 But
where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at
the moment of its legislation.20

In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it
vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent
interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect has
therefore been held by the Court to reach back to validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted by the
Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against petitioner.

With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 229781

SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioner

vs.
HON. JUANITA GUERRERO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
204, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, P/DIR. GEN. RONALD M. DELA ROSA, in his capacity as Chief of the
Philippine National Police, PSUPT. PHILIP GIL M. PHILIPPS, in his capacity as Director, Headquarters Support
Service, SUPT. ARNEL JAMANDRON APUD, in his capacity as Chief, PNP Custodial Service Unit, and ALL
PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, INSTRUCTION OR DIRECTION IN RELATION TO
THE ORDERS THAT MAY BE ISSUED BY THE COURT, Respondents

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

For consideration is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and
Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Status Quo Ante Order1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Senator Leila De Lima. In it, petitioner assails the following orders and warrant issued by respondent judge Hon.
Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, in Criminal Case No. 17-165,
entitled "People vs. Leila De Lima, et al.:" (1) the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable cause for the issuance
of warrant of arrest against petitioner De Lima; (2) the Warrant of Arrest against De Lima also dated February 23, 2017;
(3) the Order dated February 24, 2017 committing the petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center; and finally,
(4) the supposed omission of the respondent judge to act on petitioner's Motion to Quash, through which she questioned
the jurisdiction of the RTC.2

Antecedents

The facts are undisputed. The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the proliferation
of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their
testimonies.3 These legislative inquiries led to the filing of the following complaints with the Department of Justice:

a) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00313, entitled "Volunteers against Crime and Corruption (VACC), represented by Dante
Jimenez vs. Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al.;"

b) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315, entitled "Reynaldo Esmeralda and Ruel Lasala vs. Senator Leila De Lima, et al.;"

c) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00331, entitled "Jaybee Nifio Sebastian, represented by his wife Roxanne Sebastian, vs.
Senator Leila M De Lima, et al.;" and

d) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00336, entitled "National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) vs. Senator Leila M. De Lima, et
al. "4
Pursuant to DOJ Department Order No. 790, the four cases were consolidated and the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors (DOJ
Panel),5 headed by Senior Assistant State Prosecutor Peter Ong, was directed to conduct the requisite preliminary
investigation.6

The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016,7 wherein the petitioner, through her counsel, filed
an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel
of Prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice ("Omnibus Motion").8 In the main, the petitioner argued that the Office of the
Ombudsman has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her. Further, alleging evident
partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and
refer the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.

A hearing on the Omnibus Motion was conducted on December 9, 2016,9 wherein the complainants, YACC, Reynaldo
Esmeralda (Esmeralda) and Ruel Lasala (Lasala), filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to the Omnibus Motion. 10

On December 12, 2016, petitioner, in turn, interposed a Reply to the Joint Comment/Opposition filed by complainants
VACC, Esmeralda and Lasala. In addition, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Motion to First Resolve Pending
Incident and to Defer Further Proceedings. 11

During the hearing conducted on December 21, 2016, petitioner manifested that she has decided not to submit her
counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two motions.12 The DOJ Panel, however, ruled that it will not entertain belatedly
filed counter-affidavits, and declared all pending incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution. Petitioner moved for
but was denied reconsideration by the DOJ Panel.13

On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari14assailing the
jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints against her. The petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 149097 and CA-
G.R. No. SP No. 149385, are currently pending with the Special 6th Division of the appellate court.15Meanwhile, in the
absence of a restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the
preliminary investigation16 and, in its Joint Resolution dated February 14, 2017,17 recommended the filing of Informations
against petitioner De Lima. Accordingly, on February 17, 2017, three Informations were filed against petitioner De Lima
and several co-accused before the RTC ofMuntinlupa City. One of the Infonnations was docketed as Criminal Case No.
17-16518 and raffled off to Branch 204, presided by respondent judge. This Information charging petitioner for violation of
Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, contained the following
averments:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and
accused Rafael Marcos Z. Rages, being then the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of
their public office, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then an employee of the
Department of Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over inmates in the New
Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug trading, in the following manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of
their power, position, and authority, demand, solicit and extort money from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid
Prison to support the senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being
lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and Dayan,
the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million
(₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each
from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.19

On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash,20mainly raising the following: the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the
offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the Information; the Information charges more
than one offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is
based on testimonies of witnesses who are not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these
witnesses are hearsay.21

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order 22finding probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused. The Order stated, viz.:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of
Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE P ALISOC
DAYAN.

WHEREFORE, let Warrants of Arrest be issued against the abovementioned accused.

SO ORDERED.23

Accordingly, the questioned Warrant of Arrest dated February 23, 2017 ,24 which contained no recommendation for bail,
was issued against petitioner.
On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of Arrest on petitioner and the
respondent judge issued the assailed February 24, 2017 Order,25 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP
Custodial Center.

On February 27, 2017, petitioner repaired to this court via the present petition, praying for the following reliefs:

a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated 23 February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated
the same date, and the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional Trial Court - Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, in
Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the Philippines versus Leila M De Lima, et al.;

b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from conducting further proceedings until and
unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality;

c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction to the proceedings; and

d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior to the issuance of the Order and Warrant of
Arrest, both dated February 23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her liberty and
freedom.26

On March 9, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the respondents, interposed its Comment to the
petition.27 The OSG argued that the petition should be dismissed as De Lima failed to show that she has no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy. Further, the OSG posited that the petitioner did not observe the hierarchy of courts and
violated the rule against forum shopping. On substantive grounds, the OSG asserted inter alia that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the offense charged against the petitioner, that the respondent judge observed the constitutional and
procedural rules, and so did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in the issuance of the assailed orders and warrant.28

On petitioner's motion, the Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues raised. The Court then
heard the parties in oral arguments on March 14, 21, and 28, 2017.29

In the meantime, the OSG filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 2017,30 claiming that petitioner falsified
the juratsappearing in the: (1) Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping page of her petition; and (2) Affidavit
of Merit in support of her prayer for injunctive relief. The OSG alleged that while the advertedjurats appeared to be
notarized by a certain Atty. Maria Cecille C. Tresvalles-Cabalo on February 24, 2017, the guest logbook31 in the PNP
Custodial Center Unit in Camp Crame for February 24, 2017 does not bear the name of Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo. Thus, so
the OSG maintained, petitioner De Lima did not actually appear and swear before the notary public on such date in
Quezon City, contrary to the allegations in the jurats. For the OSG, the petition should therefore be dismissed outright for
the falsity committed by petitioner De Lima.

In compliance with an Order of this Court, petitioner filed the Affidavit of Atty. Maria Cecille C. Tresvalles-Cabalo dated
March 20, 201732 to shed light on the allegations of falsity in petitioner'sjurats.

The parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda on April 17, 2017.33

The Issues

From the pleadings and as delineated in this Court's Advisory dated March 10, 201734 and discussed by the parties during
the oral arguments, the issues for resolution by this Court are:

Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on hierarchy of courts considering that the
petition should first be filed with the Court of Appeals.

B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the trial court renders the instant petition
premature.

C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule against forum shopping given the pendency of
the Motion to Quash the Information before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 17-165 and
the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165
averred in the assailed Information.

B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding probable cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest
against petitioner.
C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order in the interim until
the instant petition is resolved or until the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash.

OUR RULING

Before proceeding to a discussion on the outlined issues, We shall first confront the issue of the alleged falsification
committed by petitioner in the jurats of her Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in
support of her prayer for injunctive relief.

In her Affidavit, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo disproves the OSG's allegation that she did not notarize the petitioner's
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in this wise:

4. On February 24, 2017 at or around nine in the morning (9:00 AM), I went to PNP, CIDG, Camp Crame, Quezon City to
notarize the Petition as discussed the previous night.

5. I met Senator De Lima when she was brought to the CIDG at Camp Crame and I was informed that the Petition was
already signed and ready for notarization.

6. I was then provided the Petition by her staff. I examined the signature of Senator De Lima and confirmed that it was
signed by her. I have known the signature of the senator given our personal relationship. Nonetheless, I still requested
from her staff a photocopy of any of her government-issued valid Identification Cards (ID) bearing her signature. A
photocopy of her passport was presented to me. I compared the signatures on the Petition and the Passport and I was
able to verify that the Petition was in fact signed by her. Afterwards, I attached the photocopy of her Passport to the
Petition which I appended to my Notarial Report/Record.

7. Since I already know that Sen. De Lima caused the preparation of the Petition and that it was her who signed the same,
I stamped and signed the same.

8. To confirm with Senator De Lima that I have already notarized the Petition, I sought entry to the detention facility at or
around three in the afternoon (3:00 PM). x x x

xxxx

11. Since I was never cleared after hours of waiting, I was not able to talk again to Senator De Lima to confirm the
notarization of the Petition. I then decided to leave Camp Crame.35

At first glance, it is curious that Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo who claims to have "stamped and signed the [Verification and
Certification and Affidavit of Merit]" inside Camp Crame, presumably in De Lima's presence, still found it necessary to,
hours later, "confirm with Senator De Lima that [she had] already notarized the Petition." Nonetheless, assuming the
veracity of the allegations narrated in the Affidavit, it is immediately clear that petitioner De Lima did not sign the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in front of the notary public. This is contrary to
the jurats (i.e., the certifications of the notary public at the end of the instruments) signed by Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo that
the documents were "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me."

Such clear breach of notarial protocol is highly censurable36 as Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima in this case, to sign the instrument or document in the presence of the notary, viz.:

SECTION 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules;

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular notarization merely reduces the evidentiary value of a
document to that of a private document, which requires /roof of its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as
evidence,"37 the same cannot be considered controlling in determining compliance with the requirements of Sections 1 and
2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 6538 require that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition
must be verified and accompanied by a "sworn certificate of non-forum shopping."

In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] pleading is verified by an affidavit that the
affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records." "A pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading." Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of
the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed." "Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided x x x."

In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping in the
presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to properly swear under oath the contents thereof, thereby rendering false
and null the jurat and invalidating the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping. The significance of a
proper jurat and the effect of its invalidity was elucidated in William Go Que Construction v. Court of Appeals,39where this
Court held that:

In .this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against Forum Shopping attached to the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 was not accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified under oath. This was
because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did not indicate the pertinent details regarding the affiants' (i.e., private
respondents) competent evidence of identities.

Under Section 6, Rule II of AM. No. 02-8-13-SC 63 dated July 6, 2004, entitled the "2004 Rules on Notarial Practice"
(2004 Rules on Notarial Practice), ajurat refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

xxxx

In Fernandez v. Villegas (Fernandez), the Court pronounced that noncompliance with the verification requirement or a
defect therein "does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction
or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with
in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby." "Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one
who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct." Here, there was no substantial
compliance with the verification requirement as it cannot be ascertained that any of the private respondents actually swore
to the truth of the allegations in the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 given the lack of competent evidence
of any of their identities. Because of this, the fact that even one of the private respondents swore that the allegations in
the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt.

For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement.
In Fernandez, the Court explained that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
'substantial compliance' or presence of 'special circumstances or compelling reasons."' Here, the CA did not mention - nor
does there exist - any perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which justifies the rules' relaxation. At all
events, it is uncertain if any of the private respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been filed or is
pending in another forum.

xxxx

Case law states that "[v]erification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made
in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative." On the other hand, "[t]he certification against forum
shopping is required based on the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different fora." The important purposes behind these requirements cannot be simply brushed aside absent any
sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper justification is especially called for in light of the
serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the remaining private respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus,
by simply treating the insufficient submissions before it as compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring
anew the submission of a proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored
settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. All things considered, the proper course of action was
for it to dismiss the petition.40 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping, there is
no assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct, and not merely speculative. It must be noted that verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless
formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice,41as what apparently
happened in the present case. Similarly, the absence of the notary public when petitioner allegedly affixed her signature
also negates a proper attestation that forum shopping has not been committed by the filing of the petition. Thus, the
petition is, for all intents and purposes, an unsigned pleading that does not deserve the cognizance of this
Court.42 In Salum bides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,43the Court held thus:

The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with the requirement of verification and that of certification
against forum shopping. A defective verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading and thus produces no legal
effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied, while the failure to certifv against forum
shopping shall be cause for dismissal without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, and is not curable by amendment of
the initiatory pleading. (Emphasis and italicization from the original.)

Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the Verification and Certification Against
Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary. There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and excuse the
petitioner's non-compliance therewith. This Court had reminded parties seeking the ultimate relief of certiorari to observe
the rules, since nonobservance thereof cannot be brushed aside as a "mere technicality."44 Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or simply disregarded, for these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.45 Thus, as in William Go Que Construction, the proper course of action is to dismiss outright the present petition.

Even if We set aside this procedural infirmity, the petition just the same merits denial on several other grounds.

PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS

Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by this Court.46 It will not entertain direct resort to it
when relief can be obtained in the lower courts.47 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of
courts is an important component of the orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical and
arbitrary reasons.48 In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,49the Court explained the reason for the
doctrine thusly:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with
causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the
more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.

xxxx

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts
from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which
may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To
effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs
generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the
facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their
territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the "actual case" that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of
such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to
courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts,
such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by
the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court.
But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can
have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not
necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating - in the light of new
circumstances or in the light of some confusion of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance
or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly
performs that role.50 (Emphasis supplied.)

Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this Court were allowed in some instances.
These exceptions were summarized in a case of recent vintage, Aala v. Uy, as follows:

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate
resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of
constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance;
(3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of
the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain,
speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public
welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent
nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.51

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present petition so as to convince this court to
brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is obviously not covered by the
exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The notoriety of a case, without more, is not and will not be a reason for this
Court's decisions. Neither will this Court be swayed to relax its rules on the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to the
minority party in the present administration. A primary hallmark of an independent judiciary is its political neutrality. This
Court is thus loath to perceive and consider the issues before it through the warped prisms of political partisanships.

That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of her case. The right to equal
treatment before the law accorded to every Filipino also forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her
position and status in the government.

Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first impression. Petitioner is not the first
public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is she the first defendant to question the finding of probable cause for her
arrest. In fact, stripped of all political complexions, the controversy involves run-of-the mill matters that could have been
resolved with ease by the lower court had it been given a chance to do so in the first place.

In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should be disregarded as her case involves
pure questions of law does not obtain. One of the grounds upon which petitioner anchors her case is that the respondent
judge erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to issue her arrest. By itself, this ground
removes the case from the ambit of cases involving pure questions of law. It is established that the issue of whether or not
probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact, determinable as it is
from a review of the allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other
documents and/ or evidence appended to the Information.52 This matter, therefore, should have first been brought before
the appellate court, which is in the better position to review and determine factual matters.

Yet, petitioner harps on the supposed judicial efficiency and economy of abandoning the rule on the hierarchy of courts in
the present case. Indeed, the Court has considered the practical aspects of the administration of justice in deciding to
apply the exceptions rather than the rule. However, it is all the more for these practical considerations that the Court must
insist on the application of the rule and not the exceptions in this case. As petitioner herself alleges, with the President
having declared the fight against illegal drugs and corruption as central to his platform of government, there will be a spike
of cases brought before the courts involving drugs and public officers.53 As it now stands, there are 232,557 criminal cases
involving drugs, and around 260,796 criminal cases involving other offenses pending before the R TCs.54 This Court
cannot thus allow a precedent allowing public officers assailing the finding of probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants to be brought directly to this Court, bypassing the appellate court, without any compelling reason.

THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE

The prematurity of the present petition is at once betrayed in the reliefs sought by petitioner's Prayer, which to restate for
added emphasis, provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the interest of substantial justice and fair play, Petitioner respectfully prays
the Honorable Court that judgment be rendered:

a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated 23 February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated
the same date, and the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional Trial CourtBranch 204, Muntinlupa City, in Criminal
Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the Philippines versus Leila M De Lima et al.;

b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from conducting further proceedings until and
unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality;

c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction to the proceedings; and

d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior to the issuance of the Order and Warrant of
Arrest, both dated February 23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her liberty and
freedom.55 (Emphasis supplied)

Under paragraph (a), petitioner asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable
cause, the warrant of arrest and the Order dated February 24, 2017 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP
Custodial Center. Clearly petitioner seeks the recall of said orders to effectuate her release from detention and restore her
liberty. She did not ask for the dismissal of the subject criminal case.

More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition under paragraph (b) of the prayer "until and unless
the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality," is an unmistakable admission that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion to
Quash and the existence of the RTC's authority to rule on the said motion. This admission against interest binds the
petitioner; an admission against interest being the best evidence that affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute.56 It is based on the presumption that "no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is
true. "57 It can be presumed then that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is her fault if it does not.58
Moreover, petitioner under paragraphs (c) and (d) prayed for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction and a status quo
ante order which easily reveal her real motive in filing the instant petition-to restore to "petitioner her liberty and freedom."

Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 17-165. What is clear is she
merely asked the respondent judge to rule on her Motion to Quash before issuing the warrant of arrest.

In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to dismiss the petition on the ground of prematurity
and allow respondent Judge to rule on the Motion to Quash according to the desire of petitioner.

This Court, in Solid Builders Inc. v. China Banking Corp., explained why a party should not pre-empt the action of a trial
court:

Even Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which SBI and MFII invoke, works against them. Under that provision, the equitable
reduction of the penalty stipulated by the parties in their contract will be based on a finding by the court that such penalty
is iniquitous or unconscionable. Here, the trial court has not yet made a ruling as to whether the penalty agreed upon by
CBC with SBI and MFII is unconscionable. Such finding will be made by the trial court only after it has heard both parties
and weighed their respective evidence in light of all relevant circumstances. Hence, for SBI and MFII to claim any right or
benefit under that provision at this point is premature.59 (Emphasis supplied)

In State of Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60the Court likewise held that a petition for certiorari can be resorted
to only after the court a quo has already and actually rendered its decision. It held, viz.:

We note, however, that the appellate court never actually ruled on whether or not petitioner's right had prescribed. It
merely declared that it was in a position to so rule and thereafter required the parties to submit memoranda. In making
such a declaration, did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? It did not.

xxxx

All things considered, this petition is premature. The CA has decided nothing and whatever petitioner's vehement
objections may be (to any eventual ruling on the issue of prescription) should be raised only after such ruling shall have
actually been promulgated.

The situation evidently does not yet call for a recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.61(Italicization from the
original. Emphasis supplied.)

An analogous ruling was made by this Court in Diaz v. Nora, where it ruled in this wise:

x x x In the case of the respondent labor arbiter, he has not denied the motion for execution filed by the petitioner. He
merely did not act on the same. Neither had petitioner urged the immediate resolution of his motion for execution by said
arbiter. In the case of the respondent NLRC, it was not even given the opportunity to pass upon the question raised by
petitioner as to whether or not it has jurisdiction over the appeal, so the records of the case can be remanded to the
respondent labor arbiter for execution of the decision.

Obviously, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to seek relief from public respondents but he failed to
avail himself of the same before coming to this Court. To say the least, the petition is premature and must be struck
down.62 (Emphasis supplied.)

The dissents would deny the applicability of the foregoing on the ground that these were not criminal cases that involved a
pending motion to quash. However, it should be obvious from the afore-quoted excerpts that the nature of the cases had
nothing to do with this Court's finding of prematurity in those cases. Instead, what was stressed therein was that the lower
courts had not yet made, nor was not given the opportunity to make, a ruling before the parties came before this forum.

Indeed, the prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-emphasized considering that petitioner is actually asking
the Court to rule on some of the grounds subject of her Motion to Quash. The Court, if it rules positively in favor of
petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion to Quash, will be preempting the respondent Judge from doing her duty to
resolve the said motion and even prejudge the case. This is clearly outside of the ambit of orderly and expeditious rules of
procedure. This, without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the proceedings in the trial court, as the latter abstains
from resolving the incidents until this Court rules with finality on the instant petition.

Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements set before this Court can exercise its review
powers. Section 5 (2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires the existence of "final judgments and
orders of lower courts" before the Court can exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari" in "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue," viz.:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which puts the jurisdiction of the lower court in issue -- there
is no controversy for this Court to resolve; there is simply no final judgment or order of the lower court to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm. As per the block letter provision of the Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in
a vacuum nor issue a definitive ruling on mere suppositions.

Succinctly, the present petition is immediately dismissible for this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a non-existent court
action. It can only act to protect a party from a real and actual ruling by a lower tribunal. Surely, it is not for this Court to
negate "uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all," as the lower
court's feared denial of the subject Motion to Quash.63

The established rule is that courts of justice will take cognizance only of controversies "wherein actual and not merely
hypothetical issues are involved."64 The reason underlying the rule is "to prevent the courts through avoidance of
premature adjudication from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements, and for us to be satisfied that the case
does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never
transpire."65

Even granting arguendo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction of this Court under Section 5 (1) of Article VIII, the
petition nonetheless falls short of the Constitutional requirements and of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of a
final judgment, order, or ruling on the Motion to Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court, there is no occasion
for this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Without a judgment or ruling, there is nothing for this Court to
declare as having been issued without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, it is a basic requirement under Rule 65 that there be "[no] other plain, speedy and adequate remedy found in
law."66 Thus, the failure to exhaust all other remedies, as will be later discussed, before a premature resort to this Court is
fatal to the petitioner's cause of action.

Petitioner even failed to move for the reconsideration of the February 23 and 24, 2017 Orders she is currently assailing in
this Petition. As this Court held in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, "[a] motion for reconsideration allows the public
respondent an opportunity to correct its factual and legal errors x x x [it] is mandatory before the filing of a petition
for certiorari."67The reasons proffered by petitioner fail to justify her present premature recourse.

Various policies and rules have been issued to curb the tendencies of litigants to disregard, nay violate, the rule
enunciated in Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution to allow the Court to devote its time and attention to matters
within its jurisdiction and prevent the overcrowding of its docket. There is no reason to consider the proceedings at bar as
an exception.

PETITIONER VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

It is settled that forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some
other court. It is considered an act of malpractice as it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes.68 Thus, as
elucidated in Luzon Iron Development Group Corporation v. Bridgestone Mining and Development Corporation,69forum
shopping warrants the immediate dismissal of the suits filed:

Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in different fora,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another.
The rationale against forum-shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two
different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court processes which tends to degrade the administration of
justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the
courts.

xxxx
What is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused the courts and litigants by a party
who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on similar or related causes and/or grant the same or
substantially similar reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered upon the same
issues.

xxxx

We emphasize that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-shopping is the rendition by two
competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. To avoid any confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the
rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case. The acts committed and
described herein can possibly constitute direct contempt.70

This policy echoes the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which states that "[i]f the acts of the party
or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions."

The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia, or whether a final
judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Forum shopping therefore exists when the following elements
are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.71

Anent the first requisite, there is an identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity
between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.72

Meanwhile, the second and third requisites obtain where the same evidence necessary to sustain the second cause of
action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or the nature of the two (2) actions are different
from each other. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are considered the same within the
rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not.73

All these requisites are present in this case.

The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in the criminal case below, while the
respondents in this case, all represented by the Solicitor General, have substantial identity with the complainant in the
criminal case still pending before the trial court.

As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the Motion to Quash will reveal that the arguments
and the reliefs prayed for are essentially the same. In both, petitioner advances the RTC's supposed lack of jurisdiction
over the offense, the alleged multiplicity of offenses included in the Information; the purported lack of the corpus delicti of
the charge, and, basically, the non-existence of probable cause to indict her. And, removed of all non-essentials, she
essentially prays for the same thing in both the present petition and the Motion to Quash: the nullification of the
Information and her restoration to liberty and freedom. Thus, our ruling in Jent v. Tullet Prebon (Philippines), Inc. 74 does
not apply in the present case as the petition at bar and the motion to quash pending before the court a quo involve similar
if not the same reliefs. What is more, while Justice Caguioa highlights our pronouncement in Jent excepting an "appeal or
special civil action for certiorari" from the rule against the violation of forum shopping, the good justice overlooks that the
phrase had been used with respect to forum shopping committed through successive actions by a "party, against whom
an adverse judgment or order has [already] been rendered in one forum."75 The exception with respect to an "appeal or
special civil action for certiorari" does not apply where the forum shopping is committed by simultaneous actions where no
judgment or order has yet been rendered by either forum. To restate for emphasis, the RTC has yet to rule on the Motion
to Quash. Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash before the R TC are simultaneous actions that do not
exempt petitions for certiorari from the rule against forum shopping.

With the presence of the first two requisites, the third one necessarily obtains in the present case. Should we grant the
petition and declare the RTC without jurisdiction over the offense, the RTC is bound to grant De Lima's Motion to Quash in
deference to this Court's authority. In the alternative, if the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash in the interim, the
instant petition will be rendered moot and academic.

In situations like the factual milieu of this instant petition, while nobody can restrain a party to a case before the trial court
to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, still such petition must be rejected outright because
petitions that cover simultaneous actions are anathema to the orderly and expeditious processing and adjudication of
cases.

On the ground of forum shopping alone, the petition merits immediate dismissal.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Even discounting the petitioner's procedural lapses, this Court is still wont to deny the instant petition on substantive
grounds.

Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in Criminal Case No. 17-165, the Sandiganbayan has
the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the Information charges her not with violation of RA
9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former
Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the Information is
a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts
described in the Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some justices of this Court
would even adopt the petitioner's view, declaring that the Information charged against the petitioner is Direct Bribery.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the R TC has exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of RA 9165,
including the acts described in the Information against the petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend,
was specifically created as an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the power to try drug-related cases even those
committed by public officials. In fact, respondents point out that the history of the laws enabling and governing the
Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was streamlined to address specific cases of graft and corruption, plunder,
and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

Before discussing the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is necessary to clarify the crime with which the
petitioner is being charged. For ease of reference, the Information filed with the R TC is restated below:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

Versus Criminal Case No. 17-165

LEILA M. DE LIMA (NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315 and NPS No.

XVl-INV-16K-00336) For: Violation of the
(66 Laguna de Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
South Bay Village, Paraiiaque City and/or 2002,Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj),
Room 502, GSIS Building, Financial Center, Section 26 (b), and Section 28, Republic Act
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City), RAFAEL No. 9165 (lllegal Drug Trading)
MARCOS Z. RAGOS (c/o National Bureau of
Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila) and
RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, (Barangay
Galarin, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan), Accused

x-------------------------------------x

INFORMATION

The undersigned Prosecutors, constituted as a Panel pursuant to Department Orders 706 and 790 dated October 14,
2016 and November 11, 2016, respectively, accuse LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE P
ALISOC DAY AN, for violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 3 (jj), Section 26 (b) and Section 28, Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002, committed as follows:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and
accused Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, being then the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of
their public office, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then the employee of the
Department of Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over inmates in the New
Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug trading, in the following manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of
their power, position, and authority demand, solicit and extort money from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid
Prison to support the Senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being
lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and Dayan,
the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million
(₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One Hundred Thousand (₱l00,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from
the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.

CONTRARY TO LAW.76

Notably, the designation, the prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of the Information repeatedly provide that
the petitioner is charged with "Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to
Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165." From the very designation of the crime in the
Information itself, it should be plain that the crime with which the petitioner is charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this
Court clarified in Quimvel v. People, 77 the designation of the offense in the Information is a critical element required under
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the accused of the offense being charged, viz.:
The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation of the offense as appearing in the Information.
The designation of the offense is a critical element required under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists in
apprising the accused of the offense being charged. Its inclusion in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise on the
accused and to afford him of the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. Its import is underscored in this case
where the preamble states that the crime charged is of "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of
R.A. No.7610."78(Emphasis supplied.)

Further, a reading of the provisions of RA 9165 under which the petitioner is prosecuted would convey that De Lima is
being charged as a conspirator in the crime of Illegal Drug Trading. The pertinent provisions of RA 9165 read:

SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxxx

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios,
internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any
other consideration in violation of this Act.

xxxx

SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

xxxx

SECTION 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. - Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized
by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:

xxxx

(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical;

xxxx

SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. - The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts
provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those
found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees.

While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of Direct Bribery under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the other allegations in the Information portray a much bigger
picture, Illegal Drug Trading. The latter crime, described by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as "a
global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances,"79necessarily involves various
component crimes, not the least of which is the bribery and corruption of government officials. An example would be
reports of recent vintage regarding billions of pesos' worth of illegal drugs allowed to enter Philippine ports without the
scrutiny of Customs officials. Any money and bribery that may have changed hands to allow the importation of the
confiscated drugs are certainly but trivial contributions in the furtherance of the transnational illegal drug trading - the
offense for which the persons involved should be penalized.

Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately, the Information against De Lima
goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the RPC.80 As Justice Martires articulately explained, the
averments on solicitation of money in the Information, which may be taken as constitutive of bribery, form "part of the
description on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP." The averments on how petitioner asked for and received
money from the NBP inmates simply complete the links of conspiracy between her, Ragos, Dayan and the NBP inmates
in willfully and unlawfully trading dangerous drugs through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices under
Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, of RA 9165.

On this score, that it has not been alleged that petitioner actually participated in the actual trafficking of dangerous drugs
and had simply allowed the NBP inmates to do so is non sequitur given that the allegation of conspiracymakes her liable
for the acts of her co-conspirators. As this Court elucidated, it is not indispensable for a co-conspirator to take a direct part
in every act of the crime. A conspirator need not even know of all the parts which the others have to perform,81 as
conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of the
crime. 82 As long as the accused, in one way or another, helped and cooperated in the consummation of a felony, she is
liable as a co-principal.83 As the Information provides, De Lima's participation and cooperation was instrumental in the
trading of dangerous drugs by the NBP inmates. The minute details of this participation and cooperation are matters of
evidence that need not be specified in the Information but presented and threshed out during trial.

Yet, some justices remain adamant in their position that the Information fails to allege the necessary elements of Illegal
Drug Trading. Justice Carpio, in particular, would cite cases supposedly enumerating the elements necessary for a valid
Information for Illegal Drug Trading. However, it should be noted that the subject of these cases was "Illegal Sale" of
dangerous drugs -- a crime separate and distinct from "Illegal Trading" averred in the Information against De Lima. The
elements of "Illegal Sale" will necessary differ from the elements of Illegal Trading under Section 5, in relation to Section
3(jj), of RA 9165. The definitions of these two separate acts are reproduced below for easy reference:

SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxxx

(ii) Sell. - Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical whether for
money or any other consideration.

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios,
internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any
other consideration in violation of this Act.

It is obvious from the foregoing that the crime of illegal trading has been written in strokes much broader than that
for illegal sale. In fact, an illegal sale of drugs may be considered as only one of the possible component acts of illegal
trading which may be committed through two modes: (1) illegal trafficking using electronic devices; or (2) acting as a
broker in any transactions involved in the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs.

On this score, the crime of "illegal trafficking" embraces various other offenses punishable by RA 9165. Section 3(r) of RA
9165 provides:

(r) Illegal Trafficking. - The illegal cultivation, culture, delivery, administration, dispensation, manufacture, sale, trading,
transportation, distribution, importation, exportation and possession of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor
and essential chemical.

In turn, the crimes included in the definition of Illegal Trafficking of drugs are defined as follows:

(a) Administer. - Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body of any person, with or without his/her
knowledge, by injection, inhalation, ingestion or other means, or of committing any act of indispensable assistance to a
person in administering a dangerous drug to himself/herself unless administered by a duly licensed practitioner for
purposes of medication.

xxxx

(d) Chemical Diversion. - The sale, distribution, supply or transport of legitimately imported, in-transit, manufactured or
procured controlled precursors and essential chemicals, in diluted, mixtures or in concentrated form, to any person or
entity engaged in the manufacture of any dangerous drug, and shall include packaging, repackaging, labeling, relabeling
or concealment of such transaction through fraud, destruction of documents, fraudulent use of permits, misdeclaration,
use of front companies or mail fraud.

xxxx

(i) Cultivate or Culture. - Any act of knowingly planting, growing, raising, or permitting the planting, growing or raising of
any plant which is the source of a dangerous drug.

xxxx

(k) Deliver. - Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with
or without consideration.

xxxx

(m) Dispense. - Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or any dangerous drug with or without the use of
prescription.

xxxx

(u) Manufacture. - The production, preparation, compounding or processing of any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical, either directly or indirectly or by extraction from substances of natural origin, or
independently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and shall include
any packaging or repackaging of such substances, design or configuration of its form, or labeling or relabeling of its
container; except that such terms do not include the preparation, compounding, packaging or labeling of a drug or other
substances by a duly authorized practitioner as an incident to his/her administration or dispensation of such drug or
substance in the course of his/her professional practice including research, teaching and chemical analysis of dangerous
drugs or such substances that are not intended for sale or for any other purpose.

xxxx

(kk) Use. - Any act of injecting, intravenously or intramuscularly, of consuming, either by chewing, smoking, sniffing,
eating, swallowing, drinking or otherwise introducing into the physiological system of the body, any of the dangerous
drugs.

With the complexity of the operations involved in Illegal Trading of drugs, as recognized and defined in RA 9165, it will be
quite myopic and restrictive to require the elements of Illegal Sale-a mere component act-in the prosecution for Illegal
Trading.

More so, that which qualifies the crime of Illegal Trafficking to Illegal Trading may make it impossible to provide the details
of the elements of Illegal Sale. By "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, email, mobile or
landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms," the Illegal Trading can be remotely perpetrated
away from where the drugs are actually being sold; away from the subject of the illegal sale. With the proliferation of
digital technology coupled with ride sharing and delivery services, Illegal Trading under RA 9165 can be committed
without getting one's hand on the substances or knowing and meeting the seller or buyer. To require the elements of
Illegal Sale (the identities of the buyer, seller, the object and consideration, in Illegal Trade) would be impractical.

The same may be said of the second mode for committing Illegal Trading, or trading by "acting as a broker" in
transactions involved in Illegal Trafficking. In this instance, the accused may neither have physical possession of the
drugs nor meet the buyer and seller and yet violate RA 9165. As pointed out by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, as early as 1916,
jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who is simply a middleman, negotiating contracts relative to property with
which he has no custody, viz.:

A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative to
property with the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own name,
but in the name of those who employed him; he is strictly a middleman and for some purposes the agent of both
parties.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In some cases, this Court even acknowledged persons as brokers even "where they actually took no part in the
negotiations, never saw the customer."85 For the Court, the primary occupation of a broker is simply bringing "the buyer
and the seller together, even if no sale is eventually made. "86 Hence, in indictments for Illegal Trading, it is illogical to
require the elements of Illegal Sale of drugs, such as the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration.87 For the prosecution of Illegal Trading of drugs to prosper, proof that the accused "act[ed] as a broker" or
brought together the buyer and seller of illegal drugs "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages,
e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms" is sufficient.

The DOJ' s designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus holds sway. After all, the prosecution is vested
with a wide range of discretion-including the discretion of whether, what, and whom to charge.88 The exercise of this
discretion depends on a smorgasboard of factors, which are best appreciated by the prosecutors.89

As such, with the designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information, there can be no other conclusion than
that petitioner is being charged not with Direct Bribery but with violation of RA 9165.

Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the elements of Direct Bribery or that
more than one offence is charged or as ill this case, possibly bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the
authority to amend the information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been arraigned, then the
information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court which reads:

SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the Sandiganbayan or the RTC that has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 17-165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.

It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law.90 It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.91 Indeed,
Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that
Congress may also, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one
court. Such would be a special law that is construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts.92
The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules provided in RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that
jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of
the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the following provisions where it
was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to hear drug-related cases:

Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or
Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - x x x x

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a
hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties of the
accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out
of proportion to his/her lawful income:

xxxx

During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which may be
confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond
shall be admitted for the release of the same.

xxxx

Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses to Apply Under the Voluntary Submission
Program. - x x x

A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be dependent on dangerous drugs to a Center may be filed by any
person authorized by the Board with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where such person is found.

xxxx

Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with an Offense to Treatment and Rehabilitation. - If a
person charged with an offense where the imposable penalty is imprisonment of less than six (6) years and one (1) day,
and is found by the prosecutor or by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, to be a drug dependent, the prosecutor or
the court as the case may be, shall suspend all further proceedings and transmit copies of the record of the case to the
Board.

In the event the Board determines, after medical examination, that public interest requires that such drug dependent be
committed to a center for treatment and rehabilitation, it shall file a petition for his/her commitment with the regional trial
court of the province or city where he/she is being investigated or tried: x x x

xxxx

Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional Trial
Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number of courts
designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective
jurisdiction.

The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving violations of this Act.

Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-related cases.
Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals,93this Court categorically named the RTC as the court with jurisdiction over drug
related-cases, as follows:

Applying by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon, People v. De Lara, People v. Santos, and Ordonez v. Vinarao, the
imposable penalty in this case which involves 0.4587 grams of shabu should not exceed prision correccional. We say by
analogy because these cases involved marijuana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). In Section 20 of RA. No.
6425, as amended by Section 17 of RA No. 7659, the maximum quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine
hydrochloride for purposes of imposing the maximum penalties are not the same. For the latter, if the quantity involved is
200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000 to PIO million shall be
imposed. Accordingly, if the quantity involved is below 200 grams, the imposable penalties should be as follows:

xxxx

Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 would at most be
only prision correccional duration is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Does it follow then that, as the
petitioner insists, the RTC has no jurisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of Section 32 of B.P. Big. 129 by R.A. No.
7691, which vested upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount
of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties? This Section 32 as thus amended now reads:
 xxxx

The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. x xx The aforementioned
exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal
cases, but also to other laws which specifically lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal
cases, e. g., (a) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. Nos. 1289 and 4363 on written defamation or
libel; (b) Decree on Intellectual Property (P. D. No. 49, as amended), which vests upon Courts of First Instance exclusive
jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned regardless of the imposable penalty; and (c) more appropriately for the case
at bar, Section 39 of RA No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44, which vests on Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal
Courts, and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving
violations of said Act.

xxxx

That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Regional Trial Courts
over certain cases is clearly evident from the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended by RA No. 7691. These special laws are not, therefore, covered by the repealing clause (Section 6) of
RA No. 7691.

Neither can it be successfully argued that Section 39 of RA. No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44, is no longer operative
because Section 44 of B.P. Big. 129 abolished the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts. While, indeed, Section 44 provides that these courts were to be "deemed automatically
abolished" upon the declaration by the President that the reorganization provided in B.P. Blg. 129 had been completed,
this Court should not lose sight of the fact that the Regional Trial Courts merely replaced the Courts of First Instance as
clearly borne out by the last two sentences of Section 44, to wit:

xxxx

Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the "abolition" of the Courts of First Instance carried with it the abolition of
their exclusive original jurisdiction in drug cases vested by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P. D. No. 44. If
that were so, then so must it be with respect to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 57 of the Decree on
Intellectual Property. On the contrary, in the resolution of 19 June 1996 in Caro v. Court of Appeals and in the resolution
of 26 February 1997 in Villalon v. Ba/dado, this Court expressly ruled that Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive
original jurisdiction over libel cases pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. In Administrative Order No. 104-96
this Court mandates that:

xxxx

The same Administrative Order recognizes that violations of RA. No. 6425, as amended, regardless of the quantity
involved, are to be tried and decided by the Regional Trial Courts therein designated as special courts.94 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Yet, much has been made of the terminology used in Section 90 of RA 9165. The dissents would highlight the provision's
departure from Section 39 of RA 6425 - the erstwhile drugs law, which provides:

SECTION 39. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court. - The Circuit Criminal Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act.

For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" is a clear indication that no
court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with such "exclusive original jurisdiction" so that even the Sandiganbayan can
take cognizance and resolve a criminal prosecution for violation of RA 9165.

As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, such deduction is unwarranted given the clear
intent of the legislature not only to retain the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the RTCs over violations of the drugs law
but to segregate from among the several RTCs of each judicial region some RTCs that will "exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of [RA 9165)." If at all, the change introduced by the new phraseology of Section 90, RA 9165 is not
the deprivation of the RTCs' "exclusive original jurisdiction" but the further restriction of this "exclusive original jurisdiction"
to select RTCs of each judicial region. This intent can be clearly gleaned from the interpellation on House Bill No. 4433,
entitled "An Act Instituting the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing Republic Act No. 6425, as amended:"

Initially, Rep. Dilangalen referred to the fact sheet attached to the Bill which states that the measure will undertake a
comprehensive amendment to the existing law on dangerous drugs -- RA No. 6425, as amended. Adverting to Section 64
of the Bill on the repealing clause, he then asked whether the Committee is in effect amending or repealing the aforecited
law. Rep. Cuenco replied that any provision of law which is in conflict with the provisions of the Bill is repealed and/or
modified accordingly.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen suggested that if the Committee's intention was only to amend RA No. 6425, then the
wording used should be "to amend" and not "to repeal" with regard to the provisions that are contrary to the provisions of
the Bill.
Adverting to Article VIII, Section 60, on Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs Case, which provides that "the Supreme Court
shall designate regional trial courts to have original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable by this Act," Rep. Dilangalen
inquired whether it is the Committee's intention that certain RTC salas will be designated by the Supreme Court to try
drug-related offenses, although all RTCs have original jurisdiction over those offenses.

Rep. Cuenco replied in the affirmative. He pointed that at present, the Supreme Court's assignment of drug cases to
certain judges is not exclusive because the latter can still handle cases other than drug-related cases. He added that the
Committee's intention is to assign drug-related cases to judges who will handle exclusively these cases assigned to them.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen stated that, at the appropriate time, he would like to propose the following amendment;
"The Supreme Court shall designate specific salas of the RTC to try exclusively offenses related to drugs."

Rep. Cuenca agreed therewith, adding that the Body is proposing the creation of exclusive drug courts because at
present, almost all of the judges are besieged by a lot of drug cases some of which have been pending for almost 20
years.95 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Per the "Records of the Bilateral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1858 and House
Bill No. 4433," the term "designation" of R TCs that will exclusively handle drug-related offenses was used to skirt the
budgetary requirements that might accrue by the "creation" of exclusive drugs courts. It was never intended to divest the
R TCs of their exclusive original jurisdiction over drug-related cases. The Records are clear:

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). x x x [W]e would like to propose the creation of drug courts to handle exclusively drug
cases; the imposition of a 60-day deadline on courts within which to decide drug cases; and No. 3, provide penalties on
officers of the law and government prosecutors for mishandling and delaying drugs cases.

We will address these concerns one by one.

1. The possible creation of drugs courts to handle exclusively drug cases. Any comments?

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). We have no objection to this proposal, Mr. Chairman. As a matter of fact, this is one
of the areas where we come into an agreement when we were in Japan. However, I just would like to add a paragraph
after the word "Act" in Section 86 of the Senate versions, Mr. Chairman. And this is in connection with the designation of
special courts by "The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in
each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number of court designated in
each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of pending cases in their respective jurisdiction."
That is my proposal, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). We adopt the same proposal.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). I have no problem with that, Mr. Chairman, but I'd like to call your attention to the
fact that my proposal is only for designation because if it is for a creation that would entail another budget, Mr. Chairman.
And almost always, the Department of Budget would tell us at the budget hearing that we lack funds, we do not have
money. So that might delay the very purpose why we want the RTC or the municipal courts to handle exclusively the drug
cases. That's why my proposal is designation not creation.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). Areglado. No problem, designation. Approved.96

The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the Sandiganbayan whenever the
accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed
in relation to office. The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials is not
omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and prescribed
by RA 10660,97 which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.98 As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the following:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
'27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
 xxxx

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986. Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not
allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the
same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One Million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).

The foregoing immediately betrays that the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a special anti-graft court pursuant to a
specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution.99 Its characterization and continuation as such was expressly given a
constitutional fiat under Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear drug-related cases. Even
Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted by the petitioner and the dissents as a catchall provision, does
not operate to strip the R TCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165. As pointed out by Justices
Tijam and Martires, a perusal of the drugs law will reveal that public officials were never considered excluded from its
scope. Hence, Section 27 of RA 9165 punishes government officials found to have benefited from the trafficking of
dangerous drugs, while Section 28 of the law imposes the maximum penalty on such government officials and employees.
The adverted sections read:

SECTION 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation, Misapplication or Failure to Account
for the Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laborat01y Equipment Including the Proceeds or
Properties Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (Pl0,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual
disqualification from any public office, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates,
misapplies or fails to account for confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the
proceeds or properties obtained from the unlawful acts as provided for in this Act.

Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the trafficking of dangerous drugs as
prescribed in this Act, or have received any financial or material contributions or donations from natural or juridical
persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually
disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the government, its divisions, subdivisions, and
intermediaries, including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. - The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts
provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those
found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, provides but the general rule, couched in a "broad and general
phraseology. "100 Exceptions abound. Besides the jurisdiction on written defamations and libel, as illustrated
in Morales 101and People v. Benipayo, 102 the RTC is likewise given "exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,"103 regardless of whether such violation was
committed by public officers occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher in relation to their offices. In fact,
offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces in relation to their office, i.e., in the words of RA 7055,104"service-
connected crimes or offenses," are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan but by court-martial.

Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not determined solely by the pay scale or
by the fact that they were committed "in relation to their office." In determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try
and decide criminal actions, the laws governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must likewise be
considered.
In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to "exclusively try and hear cases involving
violations of [RA 9165)." This is an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule
under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law
prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered as an exception to the general.105

Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section 90 of RA 9165. However, a closer look at the
repealing clause of RA 10660 will show that there is no express repeal of Section 90 of RA 9165 and well-entrenched is
the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. It is only accepted upon the clearest proof of inconsistency so repugnant that
the two laws cannot be enforced.106 The presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two laws involved one is
special and the other general.107 The mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law
applies regardless of the laws' respective dates of passage. Thus, this Court ruled:

x x x [I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law - regardless of their dates of
passage - and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general.

So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If reasonable construction is possible, the laws
must be reconciled in that manner.

Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very
clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.108

To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general law on jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their office; Section 90,
RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such
public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court,
regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public officials' office.

The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive jurisdiction to RTCs specially
designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the technical aspect of drug-related cases. With the proliferation
of cases involving violation of RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and untechnical. However, narcotic
substances possess unique characteristics that render them not readily identifiable.109 In fact, they must first be subjected
to scientific analysis by forensic chemists to determine their composition and nature.110Thus, judges presiding over
designated drugs courts are specially trained by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given scientific instructions
to equip them with the proper tools to appreciate pharmacological evidence and give analytical insight upon this esoteric
subject. After all, the primary consideration of RA 9165 is the fact that the substances involved are, in fact, dangerous
drugs, their plant sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals. Without a doubt, not one of the
Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and technical expertise on matters relating to prohibited
substances.

Hard figures likewise support the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs over violations of RA 9165. As previously
stated, as of June 30, 2017, there are 232,557 drugs cases pending before the RTCs. On the other hand, not even a
single case filed before the Sandiganbayan from February 1979 to June 30, 2017 dealt with violations of the drugs law.
Instead, true to its designation as an anti-graft court, the bulk of the cases filed before the Sandiganbayan involve
violations of RA 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and malversation.111 With these, it would not only
be unwise but reckless to allow the tribunal uninstructed and inexperienced with the intricacies of drugs cases to hear and
decide violations of RA 9165 solely on account of the pay scale of the accused.

Likewise of special significance is the proviso introduced by RA 10660 which, to reiterate for emphasis, states:

Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not allege
any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the same
or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).

The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by RA 10660 is to streamline the cases handled by the Sandiganbayan
by delegating to the RTCs some cases involving high-ranking public officials. With the dissents' proposition, opening the
Sandiganbayan to the influx of drug-related cases, RA 10660 which was intended to unclog the dockets of the
Sandiganbayan would all be for naught. Hence, sustaining the RTC's jurisdiction over drug-related cases despite the
accused's high-ranking position, as in this case, is all the more proper.

Even granting arguendo that the Court declares the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the information subject of
Criminal Case No. 17-165, still it will not automatically result in the release from detention and restore the liberty and
freedom of petitioner. The R TC has several options if it dismisses the criminal case based on the grounds raised by
petitioner in her Motion to Quash.

Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has three (3) possible alternative actions when confronted with a
Motion to Quash:

1. Order the amendment of the Infonnation;

 2. Sustain the Motion to Quash; or

3. Deny the Motion to Quash.

The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion to quash is meritorious. Specifically, as to the first
option, this court had held that should the Information be deficient or lacking in any material allegation, the trial court can
order the amendment of the Information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which states:

SECTION 4. Amendment of Complaint or Information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court
an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

The failure of the trial court to order the correction of a defect in the Information curable by an amendment amounts to an
arbitrary exercise of power. So, this Court held in Dio v. People:

This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power.
In People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division): When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of
an Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the
prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts
constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to
automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an
amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple
amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings, are
avoided.

More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court
in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the
prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and
affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.112

Notably, the defect involved in Dio was the Information's failure to establish the venue - a matter of jurisdiction in criminal
cases. Thus, in the case at bar where petitioner has not yet been arraigned, the court a quo has the power to order the
amendment of the February 17, 2017 Information filed against the petitioner. This power to order the amendment is not
reposed with this Court in the exercise of its certiorari powers.

Nevertheless, should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the quashal of the Infonnation, the prosecution
is not precluded from filing another information. An order sustaining the motion to quash the information would neither bar
another prosecution113 or require the release of the accused from custody. Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court, the trial court can simply order that another complaint or information be filed without discharging the accused
from custody. Section 5, Rule 117 states, thus:

Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another
complaint or information be filed except as provided in Section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in
custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no new information is
filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if
in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another charge.

Section 6, Rule 117, adverted to in the foregoing provision, prevents the re-filing of an information on only two grounds:
that the criminal action or liability has already been extinguished, and that of double jeopardy. Neither was invoked in
petitioner's Motion to Quash filed before the court a quo.

The third option available to the trial court is the denial of the motion to quash. Even granting, for the nonce, the
petitioner's position that the trial court's issuance of the warrant for her arrest is an implied denial of her Motion to Quash,
the proper remedy against this court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present petition for certiorari. This Court
in Galzote v. Briones reiterated this established doctrine:

A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed of by the petitioner in
the lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to
quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court's decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can
then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to
overturn the latter's ruling.

In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory
order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition
for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The
plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.114 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

At this juncture, it must be stressed yet again that the trial court has been denied the opportunity to act and rule on
petitioner's motion when the latter jumped the gun and prematurely repaired posthaste to this Court, thereby immobilizing
the trial court in its tracks. Verily, De Lima should have waited for the decision on her motion to quash instead of
prematurely filing the instant recourse.

In the light of the foregoing, the best course of action for the Court to take is to dismiss the petition and direct the trial
court to rule on the Motion to Quash and undertake all the necessary proceedings to expedite the adjudication of the
subject criminal case.

RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE TO ORDER THE
PETITIONER'S ARREST

The basis for petitioner's contention that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the February
23, 2017 Order115 finding probable cause to arrest the petitioner is two-pronged: respondent judge should have first
resolved the pending Motion to Quash before ordering the petitioner's arrest; and there is no probable cause to justify the
petitioner's arrest.

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law.116

In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before issuing a
warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim. Rather,
Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court117 required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its
supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days, viz.:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of
doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
(5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.

It is not far-fetched to conclude, therefore, that had the respondent judge waited longer and first attended to the
petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to a possible administrative liability for failure to observe
Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Her exercise of discretion was sound and in conformity with the provisions of
the Rules of Court considering that a Motion to Quash may be filed and, thus resolved by a trial court judge, at any time
before the accused petitioner enters her plea.118 What is more, it is in accord with this Court's ruling in Marcos v. Cabrera-
Faller119that "[a]s the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused."

This Court's ruling in Miranda v. Tuliao 120does not support the petitioner's position. Miranda does not prevent a trial court
from ordering the arrest of an accused even pending a motion to quash the infonnation. At most, it simply explains that an
accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken in the custody of law.

Undoubtedly, contrary to petitioner's postulation, there is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a
motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest. As such, respondent
judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed February 23, 2017 Order even before resolving
petitioner's Motion to Quash. There is certainly no indication that respondent judge deviated from the usual procedure in
finding probable cause to issue the petitioner's arrest.

And yet, petitioner further contends that the language of the February 23, 2017 Order violated her constitutional rights and
is contrary to the doctrine in Soliven v. Makasiar. 121Petitioner maintains that respondent judge failed to personally
determine the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest since, as stated in the assailed Order, respondent
judge based her findings on the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation and not on the report and
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.122 This hardly deserves serious consideration.

Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the judge is required before a warrant of arrest may issue.
The Constitution123 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure124 command the judge "to refrain from making a mindless
acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented
by both parties. "125 This much is clear from this Court's n1ling in Soliven cited by the petitioner, viz.:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof
he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.126

It must be emphasized, however, that in determining the probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the
petitioner, respondent judge evaluated the Information and "all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
conducted in this case." The assailed February 23, 2017 Order is here restated for easy reference and provides, thusly:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of
Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA x x x.127 (Emphasis supplied.)

As the prosecutor's report/resolution precisely finds support from the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation, this Court cannot consider the respondent judge to have evaded her duty or refused to perform her
obligation to satisfy herself that substantial basis exists for the petitioner's arrest. "All the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation" encompasses a broader category than the "supporting evidence" required to be evaluated
in Soliven. It may perhaps even be stated that respondent judge performed her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is
required of her by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence, not just the supporting documents. At the very least, she
certainly discharged a judge's duty in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, as described in Ho v. People:

The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v. Diokno, where we explained again what
probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, 'must satisfy himself that based
on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof' At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence
submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining
probable cause. In Webb v. De Leon we stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of
guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the
prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence."

xxxx

x x x [T]he judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion
that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally
sustain his own findings on the existence (or non-existence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility
of determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less
than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the
litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but
also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial
finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to
and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete
records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn
statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at
the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he
cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the
prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn
gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine
probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden
duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.128 (Emphasis supplied.)

Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is tasked to merely
determine the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the accused.129 She is given wide latitude of discretion in the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.130 A finding of probable cause to order the
accused's arrest does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.131 It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.132

Again, per the February 23, 2017 Order, respondent judge evaluated all the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation and on the basis thereof found probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. This is
not surprising given that the only evidence available on record are those provided by the complainants and the petitioner,
in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this. Thus, there is nothing to disprove the following
preliminary findings of the DOJ prosecutors relative to the allegations in the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 17-165:

Thus, from November 2012 to March 2013, De Lima[,] Ragos and Dayan should be indicted for violation of Section 5, in
relation to Section 3Gj), Section 26(b) and Section 28, of R.A. 9165, owing to the delivery of PS million in two (2)
occasions, on 24 November 2012 and 15 December 2012, to Dayan and De Lima. The monies came inmate Peter Co
[were] proceeds from illicit drug trade, which were given to support the senatorial bid of De Lima.

Also in the same period, Dayan demanded from Ragos money to support the senatorial bid of De Lima. Ragos demanded
and received ₱100,000 tara from each of the high-profile inmates in exchange for privileges, including their illicit drug
trade. Ablen collected the money for Ragos who, in turn, delivered them to Dayan at De Lima's residence.133

The foregoing findings of the DOJ find support in the affidavits and testimonies of several persons. For instance, in his
Affidavit dated September 3, 2016, NBI agent Jovencio P. Ablen, Jr. narrated, viz.:

21. On the morning of 24 November 2012, I received a call from Dep. Dir. Ragos asking where I was. I told him I was at
home. He replied that he will fetch me to accompany him on a very important task.

22. Approximately an hour later, he arrived at my house. I boarded his vehicle, a Hyundai Tucson, with plate no. RGU910.
He then told me that he will deliver something to the then Secretary of Justice, Sen. Leila De Lima. He continued and
said "Nior confidential 'to. Tayong dalawa lang ang nakakaalam nito. Dadalhin natin yung quota kay Lola. SM 'yang nasa
bag. Tingnan mo."

23. The black bag he was referring to was in front of my feet. It [was a] black handbag. When I opened the bag, I saw
bundles of One Thousand Peso bills. 1âwphi1

24. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, we arrived at the house located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay
Village, Paranaque City.

25. Dep. Dir. Ragos parked his vehicle in front of the house. We both alighted the vehicle but he told me to stay. He then
proceeded to the house.

26. From our parked vehicle, I saw Mr. Ronnie Dayan open the gate. Dep. Dir. Ragos then handed the black handbag
containing bundles of one thousand peso bills to Mr. Dayan.

27. At that time, I also saw the then DOJ Sec. De Lima at the main door of the house. She was wearing plain clothes
which is commonly known referred to as "duster."

28. The house was elevated from the road and the fence was not high that is why I was able to clearly see the person at
the main door, that is, Sen. De Lima.

29. When Dep. Dir. Ragos and Mr. Dayan reached the main door, I saw Mr. Dayan hand the black handbag to Sen. De
Lima, which she received. The three of them then entered the house.

30. After about thirty (30) minutes, Dep. Dir. Ragos went out of the house. He no longer has the black handbag with him.

31. We then drove to the BuCor Director's Quarters in Muntinlupa City. While cruising, Dep. Dir. Ragos told me "Nior 'wag
kang maingay kahit kanino at wala kang nakita ha," to which I replied "Sabi mo e. e di wala akong nakita."

32. On the morning of 15 December 2012, Dep. Dir. Ragos again fetched me from my house and we proceeded to the
same house located at Laguna Bay comer Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.

33. That time, I saw a plastic bag in front of my feet. I asked Dep. Dir. Ragos "Quota na naman Sir?"Dep. Dir. Ragos
replied "Ano pa nga ba, 'tang ina sila lang meron. "134

Petitioner's co-accused, Rafael Ragos, recounted in his own Affidavit dated September 26, 2016 a similar scenario:

8. One morning on the latter part of November 2012, I saw a black handbag containing a huge sum of money on my bed
inside the Director's Quarters of the BuCor. I looked inside the black handbag and saw that it contains bundles of one
thousand peso bills.

9. I then received a call asking me to deliver the black handbag to Mr. Ronnie Dayan. The caller said the black handbag
came from Peter Co and it contains "Limang Manoi<' which means Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00) as
a "manoR' refers to One Million Pesos (Php 1,000,000.00) in the vernacular inside the New Bilibid Prison.

10. As I personally know Mr. Dayan and knows that he stays in the house of the then DOJ Sec. Leila M. De Lima located
at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, I knew I had to deliver the black handbag to
Sen. De Lima at the said address.
11. Before proceeding to the house of Sen. De Lima at the above[-]mentioned address, I called Mr. Ablen to accompany
me in delivering the money. I told him we were going to do an important task.

12. Mr. Ablen agreed to accompany me so I fetched him from his house and we proceeded to the house of Sen. De Lima
at the above-mentioned address.

13. While we were in the car, I told Mr. Ablen that the important task we will do is deliver Five Million Pesos
(Php5,000,000.00) "Quota" to Sen. De Lima. I also told him that the money was in the black handbag that was on the floor
of the passenger seat (in front of him) and he could check it, to which Mr. Ablen complied.

14. Before noon, we arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay
Village, Paranaque City.

15. I parked my vehicle in front of the house. Both Mr. Ablen and I alighted from the vehicle but I went to the gate alone
carrying the black handbag containing the Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00).

16. At the gate, Mr. Ronnie Dayan greeted me and opened the gate for me. I then handed the handbag containing the
money to Mr. Dayan.

17. We then proceeded to the main door of the house where Sen. De Lima was waiting for us. At the main door, Mr.
Dayan handed the black handbag to Sen. De Lima, who received the same. We then entered the house.

18. About thirty minutes after, I went out of the house and proceeded to my quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa City.

19. One morning in the middle part of December 2012, I received a call to again deliver the plastic bag containing money
from Peter Co to Mr. Ronnie Dayan. This time the money was packed in a plastic bag left on my bed inside my quarters at
the BuCor, Muntinlupa City. From the outside of the bag, I could easily perceive that it contains money because the bag is
translucent.

20. Just like before, I fetched Mr. Ablen from his house before proceeding to the house of Sen. De Lima located at Laguna
Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, where I know I could find Mr. Dayan.

21. In the car, Mr. Ablen asked me if we are going to deliver "quota." I answered yes.

22. We arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima at the above[-]mentioned address at noontime. I again parked in front of the
house.

23. I carried the plastic bag containing money to the house. At the gate, I was greeted by Mr. Ronnie Dayan. At that point,
I handed the bag to Mr. Dayan. He received the bag and we proceeded inside the house.135

The source of the monies delivered to petitioner De Lima was expressly bared by several felons incarcerated inside the
NBP. Among them is Peter Co, who testified in the following manner:

6. Noong huling bahagi ng 2012, sinabi sa akin ni Hans Tanna nanghihingi ng kontribusyon sa mgaChinese sa Maximum
Security Compound ng NBP si dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang planong pagtakbo sa senado sa 2013
Elections. Dalawang beses akong nagbigay ng tig-P5 Million para tugunan ang hiling ni Sen. De Lima, na dating DOJ
Secretary;

7. Binigay ko ang mga halagang ito kay Hans Tan para maibigay kay Sen. Leila De Lima na datingDOJ Secretary. Sa
parehong pagkakataon, sinabihan na lang ako ni Hans Tan na naibigay na ang pera kay Ronnie Dayan na siyang
tumatanggap ng pera para kay dating DOJ Sec. De Lima Sinabi rin niHans Tanna ang nagdeliver ng pera ay si
dating OIC ng BuCor na si Rafael Ragos.

8. Sa kabuuan, nakapagbigay ang mga Chinese sa loob ng Maximum ng PIO Million sa mga huling bahagi ng
taong 2012 kay dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang planong pagtakbo sa senado sa2013 Elections. Ang mga
perang ito ay mula sa pinagbentahan ng illegal na droga.136

All these, at least preliminarily, outline a case for illegal drug trading committed in conspiracy by the petitioner and her co-
accused. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the allegation that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed Order for petitioner's arrest.

Petitioner would later confine herself to the contention that the prosecution's evidence is inadmissible, provided as they
were by petitioner's co-accused who are convicted felons and whose testimonies are but hearsay evidence.

Nowhere in Ramos v. Sandiganbayan 137 - the case relied upon by petitioner - did this Court rule that testimonies given by
a co-accused are of no value. The Court simply held that said testimonies should be received with great caution, but not
that they would not be considered. The testimony of Ramos' co-accused was, in fact, admitted in the cited case.
Furthermore, this Court explicitly ruled in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman138that hearsay evidence is admissible during
preliminary investigation. The Court held thusly:

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.139 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, the admissibility of evidence,140 their evidentiary weight, probative value, and the credibility of the witness are
matters that are best left to be resolved in a full-blown trial,141 not during a preliminary investigation where the technical
rules of evidence are not applied142 nor at the stage of the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Thus, the better alternative is to proceed to the conduct of trial on the merits for the petitioner and the prosecution
to present their respective evidence in support of their allegations.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the provisional reliefs prayed for, as a consequence, have to be rejected.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with dispatch with Criminal Case N6.17-165.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124295 October 23, 2001

JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II, MARIVIC A. TRABAJO-DARAY,
ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in his capacity as the Director for Fact Finding and Intelligence of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman
for Mindanao, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The case is a petition1 for certiorari assailing the propriety of the Ombudsman's action investigating petitioner for violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e).2

On August 23, 1995, we promulgated a decision in Administrative Matter No. RTJ-94-1270.3 The antecedent facts are as
follows:

"x x x [P]ursuant to the government's plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the Republic of the
Philippines (represented by DPWH) filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties affected by
the project, namely, defendants Tessie Amadeo, Reynaldo Lao and Rev. Alfonso Galo. The case was docketed
as Special Civil Case No. 22,052-93 and presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes.

"The government won the expropriation case. x x x

"As of May 19, 1994, the DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners, the total sum of P15,510,415.00 broken
down as follows:

Dr. Reynaldo Lao – P 489,000.00

Tessie P. – P 1,094,200.00
Amadeo
Rev. Alfonso - P
Galo 13,927,215.00

"In an order dated April 5, 1994, the lower court granted Tessie Amadeo's motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. The Order was received by DPWH (Regional XI) through
its Legal Officer, Atty. Warelito Cartagena. DPWH's counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, received its copy
of the order only on May 10, 1994.

"On April 6, 1994, Clerk of Court Rogelio Fabro issued the corresponding Writ of Execution. On April 15, 1994, the
writ was served by respondent Sheriff Paralisan to the DPWH-Region XI (Legal Services) through William Nagar.

"On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed to the Regional Director of the
DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties subject of the levy as 'All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of
the Department of Public Works and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City'x x x.
 "The auction sale pushed through on May 18, 1994 at the DPWH depot in Panacan, Davao City. Alex Bacquial
emerged as the highest bidder. x x x Sheriff Paralisan issued the corresponding certificate of sale in favor of Alex
Bacquial. x x x

"Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the auctioned
properties on May 19, 1994. They were, however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH
properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, Regional Equipment Engineer, Regional Equipment Services, DPWH
depot in Panacan, Davao City. Engr. Alejo claimed that his office was totally unaware of the auction sale, and
informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot were still serviceable and were
due for repair and rehabilitation.

"On May 20, 1994, Alex Bacquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance of a 'break through' order to
enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned properties. The motion was granted by Judge Fuentes on the
same date.

"On May 21, 1994, Alex Bacquial and Sheriff Paralisan returned to the depot, armed with the lower court's order."4

Thus, Bacquial succeeded in hauling off the scrap iron/junk equipment in the depot, including the repairable equipment
within the DPWH depot. He hauled equipment from the depot for five successive days until the lower court issued another
order temporarily suspending the writ of execution it earlier issued in the expropriation case and directing Bacquial not to
implement the writ.5

However, on June 21, 1994, the lower court issued another order upholding the validity of the writ of execution issued in
favor of the defendants in Special Civil Case No. 22, 052-93.6

On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of Davao City and Engineer Ramon A.
Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to
comment on the report recommending the filing of an administrative case against the sheriff and other persons
responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. Also, on September 21, 1994, the Department of
Public Works and Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto
Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation of Article IX, Section 36 (b) of P. D. No.
807.7

After considering the foregoing facts, on August 23, 1995, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent NORBERTO PARALISAN, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court (Branch XVII),
Davao City, is declared guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation of Section 36 (b),
Article IX of PD 807. Accordingly, respondent sheriff is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The office of the Court Administrator
is directed to conduct an investigation on Judge Renato Fuentes and to charge him if the result of the investigation
so warrants. The Office of the Solicitor General is likewise ordered to take appropriate action to recover the value
of the serviceable or repairable equipment which were unlawfully hauled by Alex Bacquial."8 (italics ours)

On January 15, 1996, Director Antonio E. Valenzuela (hereafter, Valenzuela) of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
recommended that petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic
Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a
judge.9

On January 22, 1996, Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal
complaint10 charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e).

On February 6, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through Graft Investigation Officer II Marivic A. Trabajo-
Daray issued an order directing petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit within ten days.11

On February 22, 1996, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or
manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.12

On March 15, 1996, Graft Investigation Officer Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray denied the motion of petitioner.13

Hence, this petition.14

The issue is whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his official
functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge
for the same acts before the Supreme Court.

Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e].
And he conducted an investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the
Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.

The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation because the Supreme Court is not in
possession of any record which would verify the propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the
Court Administrator has not filed any administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the
present inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

We grant the petition.

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

"Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,
the investigation of such cases."15

xxx xxx xxx

"Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions.- The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or
over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary."16 (underscoring ours)

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against
petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the
Supreme Court, for appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.17

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of
powers.18

Petitioner's questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution were done in
relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the
course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. "No other entity or official of
the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as
to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative
belongs to the courts alone."19

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the case and refer the complaint
against petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475 May 30, 2011

THERON V. LACSON, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY, and TEODORICO C. TAGUINOD, in his capacity as General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of
the Public Estates Authority, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489

JAIME R. MILLAN and BERNARDO T. VIRAY, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, and the PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the June 8, 2004 Decision
and the September 20, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78749 and CA-G.R. SP
No.78290.1

The Facts

Petitioners Theron V. Lacson (Lacson), Jaime R. Millan (Millan) and Bernardo T. Viray (Viray) were non-presidential
appointees and career service officials of respondent Philippine Estates Authority (PEA), holding the positions of Deputy
General Manager for Finance, Legal and Administration; Assistant General Manager; and Department General Manager,
respectively.2

On October 3, 2002, Sulficio O. Tagud (Tagud) filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) accusing petitioners Lacson, Millan and Viray for overpricing, by ₱600,000,000.00, the contract for the
construction of the Central Boulevard Project (the Project), otherwise known as the President Diosdado Macapagal
Boulevard.3

Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman proceeded with the investigation of both the criminal and the administrative
aspects of the case.4 The criminal case, docketed as OMB-C-C-02-0667-J and entitled "Sulficio O. Tagud Jr., et al. v.
Ernesto Villareal, et al.," charged petitioners for committing an act in violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080. The
administrative case, docketed as OMB-C-A-02-0523-K, on the other hand, charged them with Dishonesty, Serious
Misconduct and Acts Inimical to the Interest of the Public Service in violation of Section 52A (1), (3) and (20) of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.5

Meanwhile, on October 14, 2002, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) requested the Ombudsman for authority
to conduct administrative disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners and other individuals involved in the Project.6

In its Letter-Reply dated October 17, 2002,7 the Ombudsman responded in the following manner:

This has reference to your letter dated 14 October 2002 requesting for authority to conduct administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the presidential appointees at the Public Estates Authority (PEA) named respondents in the case
involving the construction of the President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard (PDMB). It is our humble view that the
authority is not necessary.

The Office takes the opportunity to confirm the fact that the case filed with this Office on 3 October 2002, involving the
subject controversy, is criminal in nature. It now bears the docket number OMB-C-C-02-0667-J, entitled "Sulficio Tagud,
Jr., et al. versus Ernest Villareal, et al." The basic complaint has not been further docketed as an administrative case.
Thus, the same did not preclude the subsequent filing with the PAGC of an administrative complaint against the
concerned PEA officials. [Emphasis supplied]

Subsequently, on November 12, 2002, a formal complaint was filed by the Investigation Office of PAGC charging several
employees of PEA, including petitioners, with acts and/or omissions contrary to: (1) Item 1B2 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1594, as amended; (2) Section 3(i), (g) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended; (3) Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. No. 3019, as amended; (4) Articles 8.1 and 8.2
of the Construction Agreement signed on April 10, 2000 between PEA and J.D. Legaspi Construction; and (5) Section 46
(a) and (b) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, as amended, in particular Item (B), Nos. 3, 4 and 27, in relation to R.A. No.
3019, as amended.8

On the same date, PAGC issued an order requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavit/verified answer (not a motion
to dismiss or motion for bill of particulars) within a non-extendible period of 10 days from receipt of the order. Preliminary
conference was set on November 22, 2002.9

During the preliminary conference, petitioners raised several jurisdictional issues, particularly the following: the absence of
certification of non-forum shopping in the complaint; the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate them; the
lack of jurisdiction of PAGC over the complaint against them considering that they were not presidential appointees and
there was no allegation that they had conspired with the presidential appointees who were charged with them; the futility
of any investigation by PAGC as the same would have no bearing on the case filed with the Ombudsman; and the fatally
defective complaint which was not based on personal knowledge of the complainant who, as an officer of PAGC, was
merely a nominal party and was never privy to the project subject of the investigation.10

PAGC directed petitioners to file their memoranda to formalize their arguments.11

On November 28, 2002, PAGC issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of petitioners from PEA with the
imposition of the corresponding accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from
employment in the government.12

In a letter dated December 16, 2002, the Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary, informed the PEA
Chairman and Members of the Board that the President approved the recommendation of PAGC in its November 28,
2002 Resolution dismissing the petitioners from PEA and imposing upon them the accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits and disqualification from employment in the government service, and directed them to take the
necessary actions to effect the instructions of the President. 13

On December 18, 2002, petitioners received a notice dated December 4, 2002 informing them that PAGC had resolved
their case and that the records therein had been forwarded to the Office of the President. It also advised the petitioners
that any inquiry relative thereto should be addressed to the said office.14

After securing a copy of the PAGC Resolution, petitioners Millan and Viray, together with Manuel R. Beriña,
Jr. (Beriña) filed a motion for reconsideration15 dated January 2, 2003 with the Office of the President assailing the
November 28, 2002 Resolution and Recommendation of the PAGC.

This motion was not acted upon.16

On July 25, 2003, PEA dismissed the petitioners. They received their copies of the notice of dismissal on July 28, 2003.17

Aggrieved, Beriña, Millan and Viray filed their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 with the CA on July 30,
2003, which was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 78290.18

Lacson, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order19 in a letter dated August 11, 2003
addressed to Teodorico C. Taguinod (Taguinod), PEA General Manager and Chief Executive Officer. This motion,
however, was denied on August 20, 2003.20

On August 25, 2003, Ernesto L. Enriquez (Enriquez) and Lacson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 with the CA, which was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 78749.21 Said petition, however, was later consolidated with CA
G.R. SP No. 78290 upon motion of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). But, before the consolidation of the
mentioned petitions, writs of preliminary injunction were issued.22 The writs, dated August 6, 2003 in CA G.R. SP No.
78290 and September 16, 2003 in CA G.R. SP No. 78749, temporarily enjoined the respondents from implementing the
dismissal orders.23

Finally, in a consolidated decision dated June 29, 2004, the CA dismissed the consolidated petitions.24

On July 5, 2004 and July 22, 2004, Lacson in CA-G.R. SP No. 78749 and Beriña, Millan and Viray in CA-G.R. SP No.
78290, filed their respective motions for reconsideration.25 Unfortunately for petitioners, both motions were denied in a
resolution dated September 20, 2004.26

Hence, these petitions.

Upon motion of the OSG, on behalf of respondents Executive Secretary and PAGC, the Court issued a resolution ordering
the consolidation of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489 with the petitions in G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475.27

ISSUES

In their respective petitions for review, petitioners assigned the following errors, to wit:

I.

Respondents erred when they issued the questioned memoranda and ordered the dismissal of Petitioners
allegedly on the basis of the recommendation of the respondent PAGC, in that:

A. Under the constitution and the laws applicable, it is the ombudsman which has the jurisdiction to investigate
and recommend the dismissal of career service officers such as petitioners herein.

B. it is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the investigation and removal of Petitioners and not
Respondent PAGC.

C. Executive Order No. 12, series of 2002, which grants Respondent PAGC the authority to investigate and
recommend the dismissal of public officers and employees within the civil service who are non-presidential
appointees as petitioners herein is unconstitutional and invalid for being contrary to law.

D. The direct action of Respondents in dismissing the PetitionerS from the service without the head of respondent
PEA having conducted any investigation at all is contrary to law.
 II.

Respondents erred in dismissing the Petitioners from Respondent PEA and public office in that:

a. Petitioners’ dismissal was violative of their right to due process of law, petitioners having been deprived of a
formal investigation which they are entitled to under the rules of procedure of the ombudsman and the uniform
rules on administrative cases in the civil service.

b. The Petitioners’ dismissal was violative of their right to security of tenure as they were terminated from service
upon a mere presidential directive.

iii.

Respondents engaged in prohibited forum shopping by the filing of multiple administrative complaints against Petitioners
for the same cause; hence, the instant charge against petitioners should be dismissed.28

These alleged errors in G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475 and G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489 can be categorized into two
principal issues:

(1) Whether it is the Ombudsman who should conduct the investigation on the charge of overpricing of the Project
against petitioners; and

(2) Whether the Court can still review the dismissal ordered by PEA.

THE COURT’S RULING

The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with similarly authorized agencies

Petitioners argue that because they are not presidential appointees, it is only the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over
them.

In this regard, the petitioners are not correct. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of
the government in relation to the offense charged. 29 Therefore, with respect to petitioners, the Ombudsman may share its
authority to conduct an investigation concerning administrative charges against them with other agencies.

At any rate, this issue is already moot and academic as the Ombudsman has terminated its investigation of petitioners.
This can be gleaned from the certified true copies of the Ombudsman’s May 30, 2008 Decision as well as the July 3, 2008
Review and Recommendation which the petitioners submitted in compliance with the November 22, 2010 Resolution
requiring them to inform the Court of the status of their cases before the Ombudsman. It appears therefrom that the
Ombudsman dismissed the administrative case against the petitioners because the charges had already been passed
upon by PAGC.30

Having been dismissed by PEA, petitioners should have appealed to the Civil Service Commission

Despite the claim of petitioners that the decision to dismiss them was upon orders of the President or upon undue
pressure exerted by the Office of the President to implement the PAGC recommendations, still the undeniable fact is that
the dismissal of petitioners was actually made and effected by PEA.

Granting that PEA committed an error, whether substantial or procedural, petitioners should have appealed to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 (The Administrative Code
of 1987), to wit:

(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be
filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it
may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to
conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty
days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office
head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case
the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned."[Emphasis Supplied]
It is only after appealing the case to the CSC that it can be elevated to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. From there, said case can be appealed to the Court through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.

Unfortunately, petitioners chose the wrong remedy. Instead of appealing their dismissal by the PEA to the CSC, they
chose to question it before the CA.

For their failure to appeal to the proper forum, the decision of the PEA dismissing them has become final and executory. It
should be emphasized that "the right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail himself of the same
must comply with the requirements of the law. Failure to do so, the right to appeal is lost."31

As petitioners’ dismissal has become final and executory, the Court no longer has the power to review and act on the
matter.

There was no violation of petitioners’ right to due process and security of tenure

Even granting that this Court can still review the PEA action to terminate the petitioners, they have not shown that their
right to due process and security of tenure was violated.

Petitioners argue that they were denied due process because their order of dismissal was not accompanied by any
justification from the PEA Board of Directors who merely relied on the findings of PAGC.

This argument, however, deserves scant consideration.

As conversely pointed out by respondents, petitioners cannot claim that their dismissal was unattended by the requisite
due process because they were given the opportunity to be heard in the course of PAGC’s investigation.

Indeed, as career service officers, the petitioners enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution.32 This is further reiterated in Section 36(a) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines, which clearly provides that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed
except for cause as provided by law and after due process."

The tenurial protection accorded to a civil servant is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process.
Procedural due process requires that the dismissal, when warranted, be effected only after notice and hearing. On the
other hand, substantive due process requires, among others, that the dismissal be for legal cause, which must relate to
and effect the administration of the office of which the concerned employee is a member of and must be restricted to
something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.33

Nevertheless, the right to security of tenure is not tantamount to immunity from dismissal. Petitioners cannot seek
absolute protection from this constitutional provision. As long as their dismissal is for a legal cause and the requirements
of due process were met, the law will not prevent their removal from office.

Per records of the case, the exercise of disciplinary action against petitioners was justified because (1) they committed
acts punishable under the anti-graft laws; and (2) their conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service.34 Thus,
their removal from office was for a legal cause.

Anent the alleged failure of respondents to observe due process, well-established is the rule that the essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.35 The demands of due process
are sufficiently met when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.36In the landmark
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,37 this Court laid down the cardinal and primary rights to be observed
and respected in administrative proceedings:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have some evidence to support a finding or conclusion;

(4) The evidence must be substantial (that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accepts as adequate
to support a conclusion);

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the view of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
 (7) The tribunal should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decisions rendered.38

In this regard, petitioners actively participated in the proceedings before PAGC where they were afforded the opportunity
to explain their actions through their memoranda. The essence of due process is the right to be heard and this evidently
was afforded to them. Thus, petitioners’ assertion that their dismissal was unattended by the requisite due process cannot
be sustained. 1avv phi 1

In sum, the removal from office of petitioners was valid. PEA dismissed them for cause and in accordance with the
requisites of due process. Petitioners, as PEA officers and employees, are under the disciplining authority of the PEA
Board, pursuant to Section 11 of P.D. No. 1084, the Charter of the Public Estates Authority,39 which states that:

Section 11. Appointment, control and discipline of personnel. The Board, upon recommendation of the General Manager
of the Authority, shall appoint the officers and employees of the Authority and its subsidiaries; fix their compensation,
allowances and benefits, their working hours and such other conditions of employment as it may deem proper; grant them
leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate; discipline and/or remove them for cause; and establish
and maintain a recruitment and merit system for the Authority and its affiliates and subsidiaries. (Emphases supplied)

At any rate, as earlier stated, as the petitioners did not appeal the decision of the PEA to dismiss them to the CSC, it has
become final and executory and the Court can no longer review it.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 135687 July 24, 2007

(Re: OMB-0-96-2643)

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by: PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT(PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO, WENCESLAO PASCUAL, GAUDENCIO VIDUYA, JULIA M. MACUJA,
PLACIDO MAPA, JR., JOSE TEVES, ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, RECIO M. GARCIA, DBP BOARD OF DIRECTORS
LORENZA N. SALCEDO, JOSEPHINE S. GARCIA, STOCKHOLDERS OF P.R. GARCIA & SONS DEVELOPMENT
and INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

(Re: OMB-0-96-2644)

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by: PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
PLACIDO MAPA - Board of Director/Chairman DBP,
RECIO GARCIA - Member,
JOSE TENGCO, JR. - Member,
RAFAEL SISON - Chairman,
JOSE R. TENGCO - Member,
ALICE L. REYES - Member,
CESAR SALAMEA - Chairman,
DON PERRY - Vice Chairman,
ROLANDO M. SOZA - Member,RICARDO SILVERIO, SR.,RICARDO SILVERIO, JR. RICARDO S. TANGCO,
Stockholders/Directors of Golden River Mining Corp., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

(Re: OMB-0-96-2645)

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by: PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
PANFILO O. DOMINGO - Former PNB President,
CONRADO S. REYES - Former NIDC General
Manager,
CONRADO T. CALALANG, ANTONIO M. GONZALES, NORBERTO L. VILLARAMA, SENEN B. DE LA COSTA,
ANTONIO O. MENDOZA, JR., IGNACIO C. BERTUMEN, Stockholders/Officers of Filipino Carbon and Mining
Corporation, Respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Order1 of the Ombudsman dated
July 6, 1998 dismissing three complaints filed by petitioner docketed as OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-
2645, and its Order2 of August 31, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, which created herein petitioner
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee).

On March 6, 1996 and June 28, 1996, Orlando S. Salvador (Salvador), in his capacity as PCGG consultant, executed
three separate Sworn Statements stating that among the loan accounts referred by the Assets Privatization Trust to the
Committee for investigation, report and recommendation are those of the following corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons
Development and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation (Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon
and Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).

With respect to the loan account of PRGS, Salvador alleged that the said corporation obtained from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) an initial loan guarantee of ₱26,726,774.72 and a straight industrial loan amounting to
₱29,226,774.72 on October 26, 1967 for the purpose of redeeming mortgaged properties, rehabilitating buildings and
equipment and defraying its operational expenses.

Anent the loan account of Golden River, Salvador claimed that the corporation obtained loan accommodations from DBP
beginning from 1975 until 1982 and that as of October 31, 1986, it had a total obligation of ₱43,193,000.00; that out of its
five loan accounts, only the first two loans of Golden River obtained in 1975 and 1977 were sufficiently collateralized,
leaving three other loans without any sufficient collateral, to wit: refinancing loan obtained in 1980 for the amount of
₱14,724,430.00; refinancing loan obtained on March 13, 1982 for the amount of ₱5,551,000.00; and refinancing loan
obtained on December 1, 1982 for the amount of ₱7,118,656.52.

As to the loan account of Filcarbon, Salvador averred that the said corporation applied with the National Investment
Development Corporation (NIDC) a loan guarantee of P27.4 Million on January 17, 1977; that the loan application was
favorably recommended by the President of the Philippine National Bank (PNB); that the application was subsequently
approved by PNB's Board of Directors on August 17, 1977.

Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submitted to the Committee, these three corporations did not have sufficient
collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with respect to the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977.
Salvador also alleged that the above-mentioned corporations did not have adequate capital to ensure not only the viability
of their operations but also their ability to repay all their loans. Accordingly, the Committee found the loan accounts of the
above-mentioned three corporations as behest loans.

The Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who instructed then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo,
sitting as the Committee's ex-officio Chairman, to file the necessary charges against the DBP Chairman and members of
the Board of Directors, the former PNB President and former NIDC General Manager, together with the respective
stockholders/officers of the three corporations.

Subsequently, the Sworn Statements of Salvador were used by the Committee as its bases in filing separate complaints
with the Office of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents for alleged violation of the provisions of Sections 3
(e)3 and (g)4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The complaint against respondents Lorenzo N. Salcedo and Josephine S. Garcia, stockholders of PRGS; and Wenceslao
Pascual, Gaudencio Viduya, Julia D. Macuja, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Jose Teves, Alejandro Melchor, Recio Garcia, Rafael
Sison, Cesar Zalamea, Don M. Perry and Rolando Soza, then officers and members of the Board of Directors of DBP, is
docketed as OMB-0-96-2643.

The complaint against Ricardo Silverio, Sr., Ricardo Silverio, Jr., and Ricardo S. Tangco, stockholders of Golden River;
and Placido Mapa, Jose de Ocampo, Recio Garcia, Jose Tengco, Jr., Rafael Sison, Jose de Ocampo, Jose R. Tengco,
Alice L. Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Don Perry and Rolando M. Soza, then officers and members of the Board of Directors of
DBP, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2644.

The complaint against Panfilo O. Domingo, then PNB President; Conrado S. Reyes, then NIDC General Manager; and
Conrado Calalang, Antonio M. Gonzales, Norberto L. Villarama, Sene B. dela Costa, Antonio O. Mendoza, Jr. and Ignacio
C. Bertumen, officers and stockholders of Filcarbon, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2645.

Subsequently, the three aforementioned cases were consolidated by the Office of the Ombudsman.

In his assailed Order of July 6, 1998, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau, dismissed the complaints against herein respondents. The Ombudsman ruled that, except with
respect to the two loan transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the offenses alleged by the Committee as
having been committed by herein respondents had already prescribed under the provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No.
3019. As to the two 1982 transactions of Golden River, the Ombudsman found that, contrary to the claims of herein
petitioner, the loan accounts obtained by the said corporation have sufficient collaterals.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Ombudsman denied it in its Order dated August 31, 1998.

Hence, herein petition.

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing, motu proprio, the three complaints without first requiring
respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and petitioner to file its reply thereto. Such dismissal, petitioner avers, is
premature. Petitioner further argues that even granting that the Ombudsman feels that petitioner's evidence is insufficient,
the Ombudsman should have first required petitioner to clarify said evidence or to adduce additional evidence, in
accordance with due process.

Petitioner also asserts that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that
it was filed out of time as evidence shows that the said motion was timely filed.

Petitioner contends that the consolidation of the three complaints and the subsequent issuance of a single Order
dismissing them is erroneous. Petitioner argues that the three complaints cannot be lumped together and a single order
issued for their resolution as these complaints involve different sets of facts and are based on different loan transactions.

Petitioner further avers that the pieces of evidence submitted as part of the complaints were not considered by the
Ombudsman when it issued the assailed Orders; that the findings of the Committee that the subject loans are behest
loans prevail; and, that the right of the State to recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is not barred by prescription.

In his Comment, the Ombudsman, citing the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission as authority, contends
that the provisions of Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution, which provides for the imprescriptibility of the right of the
State to recover ill-gotten wealth, applies only to civil actions and not to criminal cases. The Ombudsman further avers
that prior to its amendment, Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 provided that the period for the prescription or extinguishment of
a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was ten years. Subsequently, the said provision was amended in
1982 increasing the prescriptive period to fifteen years. Applying the Constitution and the law to the present case, the
Ombudsman argues that, except with respect to the two loan transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the
other alleged criminal acts of herein private respondents in connection with the loan transactions they entered into in the
years 1967 until 1980 had already prescribed in 1995. Hence, private respondents can no longer be prosecuted with
respect to these transactions.

The Ombudsman also avers that under Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman), the Ombudsman is authorized to dismiss, motu proprio, a complaint even without requiring the
respondents to file their counter-affidavits and even without conducting a preliminary investigation.

As to the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982 and December 1, 1982, the Ombusman contends
that based on pieces of evidence presented by the complainant, the said loans had more than sufficient collateral.

The Ombudsman asserts that his findings of fact and his application of pertinent laws as well as rules of evidence deserve
great weight and respect and even accorded full faith and credit in the absence of any showing of any error or grave
abuse of discretion.

Respondents Panfilo O. Domingo, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Alicia Ll. Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Conrado T.
Calalang, Norberto Villarama and Ricardo C. Silverio filed their respective Comments. While the present petition is
pending in this Court, respondents Conrado Reyes and Jose Teves died.5 In a Resolution6 issued by this Court dated
February 22, 2006, respondents Wenceslao Pascual, Senen dela Costa, Lorenzo Salcedo and Antonio Mendoza were
dropped as respondents for an earlier resolution of the case after all efforts of petitioner to ascertain their correct and
present addresses proved to be in vain.

With respect to the other respondents who failed to file their respective comments, the Court dispenses with the
comments in order that the present petition may be resolved.

The Court shall first deal with the issue of prescription as this was the main basis of the Ombudsman in dismissing
petitioner's complaints.

Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto7 , the Court held that the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to
recover ill-gotten wealth applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases. In other
words, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in the
above-mentioned provision of the Constitution may be barred by prescription.8
Under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16,
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said Act was increased from ten to fifteen years.

As to whether or not the subject complaints filed against herein respondents had already prescribed, the Court's
disquisition on an identical issue in Salvador v. Desierto

G.R. No. 149311 February 11, 2005

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO, STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III, MISAEL
M. LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
PANFILO M. LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated June 25, 2001 issued by the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
Civil Case No. 01-100934.

The facts are as follows:

Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the
Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of
the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses
imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-
00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in
form and substance and thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February
28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.

Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging the
same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman.1 NBI Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended
the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes:

a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;

b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and

c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2

In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this recommendation was made after taking the sworn
statements of Mary Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet. The
sworn statements of these witnesses were attached to the letter.3

On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the other persons named
in the witnesses’ sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the subpoena on May 8, 2001. The subpoena directed
them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the
complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their
counsel, manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed
therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against
the same respondents. Furthermore, they claimed that according to the Court’s ruling in gr_ Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such as private respondents.5

The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on May 28, 2001, denied the dismissal of the cases
before it through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:

It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure[;]
It appearing further that respondent’s rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the determination of
jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully
Acquired Property [or] Bribery, nor are they related to respondents’ discharge of their official duties;

It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice
No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular
courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with
finality;6

On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the Solicitor General received a copy of a petition for
prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the said petition for prohibition,
Lacson and Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on the complaints
submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was
violating the Ombudsman’s mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster their claim.

On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting the Department of Justice from conducting
the preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby GRANTED, and accordingly a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their subordinates, agents[,] and other persons
acting in their behalf, individually and collectively, from conducting a preliminary investigation in IS No. 2001-402, insofar
as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the petitioners to file their counter-affidavits in said case until such time
that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses subject matter of the investigations
before it, or until such Office shall have categorized the said offenses as being committed by the petitioners not in relation
to their respective offices.

Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue without bond, as there is no showing whatsoever in
the pleadings of the parties that the respondents will suffer any injury by reason of the issuance of the writ prayed for, in
accordance with Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED. 7

Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then Secretary Hernando Perez, the NBI, through
Director Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation
of I.S. No. 2001-402. In their petition, they raise the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR
AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF 1990 OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING
OF A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING THE NBI COMPLAINT
FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME OFFENSES, RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.

IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDENT

MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO DESPITE THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH SEPARATE AND DISTINCT
OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE DOJ.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR
PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE ONLY HELD
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.8

A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth one central question to be resolved: whether or
not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a
complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the second proceedings
does not alter the nature thereof as being principally directed against the respondents herein in connection with
substantially the same set of facts alleged.

First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.

Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain
that it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration of justice and that this is all the more
compelling, in this case, considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged
have already attracted nationwide attention.

Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be the safety of witnesses who
risked life and limb to give their statements to the authorities, but also the rights of the respondents, who may need to
clear their names and reputations of the accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted not as ends in
themselves but as means conducive to the realization of justice. The rules of procedure are not to be applied when such
application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence.9

Now, to the merits.

The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code
under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a principal law
agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance
with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and
administration of the correctional system; . . .

Section 3. Powers and Functions. – To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following powers and
functions:

...

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system;

...

Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978, provides:

Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice. – There is
hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of
Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional
State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal’s Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.

Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases filed against them, to
the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of Government pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on
the doctrine in Uy v. Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of the said
primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials. They likewise claim that it should be deemed that the
Ombudsman has already taken over the investigation of these cases, considering that there are already pending
complaints filed therewith involving the same accused, facts and circumstances.

Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; ….10
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the case or cases in question
to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In granting the petition for prohibition, RTC Judge
Liwag gave the following rationale:

Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the
matter, it is the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the
same matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the matter by
the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative
agencies of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the Ombudsman’s investigation. Only in matters
where the other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may
such agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. That is the situation. It is not
otherwise. To allow the respondents to meddle with the investigation of similar cases being investigated by the
Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source of their powers with respect to such cases. This is, of
course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to ordinary common sense. It would certainly be
presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous, for the Department of Justice to be making recommendation as to its preliminary
investigation to the Ombudsman in matters being handled by such Office itself. Such recommendation would be pre-
emptive of the actions of the said Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.

The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage, from any investigative
agency of the Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such
as the petitioners. It is the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the law. That
situation presupposes the conduct by other Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials in
cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already
taken hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the investigation being
conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for power and
authority would thus require the respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled by the Ombudsman.
Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the
truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and
authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency must be recalled.11

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the plenary power to
investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or employees.12 To discharge its duty
effectively, the Constitution endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special features which puts it a notch
above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies. First and foremost, it extended independence to the
Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the Constitution provided for stringent
qualification requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born citizens,
of recognized probity and independence and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election.13 The Ombudsman and his deputies were given the rank and salary equal to that of the Chairman and
Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their
term of office.14 They were given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment.15 Upon their cessation from office,
they are prohibited from running for any elective office in the immediately succeeding election.16 Finally, unlike other
investigative bodies, the Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy.17 Clearly, all these measures
are intended to enhance the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the principal and
primarycomplaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this
purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate
complaints against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged before it.18 It can
inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants based on reports in the media and those which come to his
attention through sources other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is direct,
informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing the illegal
or improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put
to minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the Ombudsman. Vis-à-vis other
prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate public officials is given preference over other
bodies.

As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the Office of Ombudsman when it
enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency,
the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other investigative bodies. All
this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is notco-
equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate
cannot claim equal power.

Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving
violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and
employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the
executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the Ombudsman.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter,19 the settled rule is that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.20 Thus,
assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both
bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present
case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the
preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.

None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual situation similar to that of the present case.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),21 the Court upheld the special authority of the
PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, issued by
then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court emphasized in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman
to conduct a preliminary investigation over said cases is not exclusive but a shared authority, the complaints for the
alleged misuse of coconut levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that the Court recognized the primary, albeit
shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered the PCGG to
desist from proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the
investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders against petitioner’s assets.

In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with the DOJ against petitioner
Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the
preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were filed in court by the
DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only the Ombudsman who has the power to conduct investigation of cases
involving public officers like him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling that the authority to investigate and prosecute
illegal acts of public officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman but a shared authority. However, it will be
noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation in that case was filed solely with the DOJ.

In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of prosecutors, the corresponding Information
was filed in court. The pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said Information
without previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the
shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case. Again, it should be noted that the complaint in that case was
addressed solely to the provincial prosecutor.

The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix25 and Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
of the DOJ26 where the letter-complaint against petitioners public officers were brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for
investigation.

In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies
and no risk of conflicting findings or orders. In stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a complaint
against respondents initially with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was immediately
acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records, she thereafter refiled substantially the same
complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.

Not only this.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed
against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation
is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.27 When one is hailed before an investigative body on
specific charges, the very act of filing said complaint for preliminary investigation immediately exposes the respondent and
his family to anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or
more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to
the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense.

There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising
jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.

Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable
and limited resources of Government, inaduplication of proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.

From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Annex D-1 of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 83-91.

2 Annex D of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 80-82.

3 Annexes D-2 to D-4 of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 92-107.

4 354 SCRA 651 (2001).

5 Annex G of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 133-144.

6 Annex H of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 145-147.

7 Rollo, pp. 54-55 (Emphasis in the original).

8 Petition, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 13-14.

9 gr_ Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187 (1997).

10 Emphasis supplied.

11 RTC Order, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 53-54 (Emphasis in the original).

12 Uy v. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 4.

13 Section 8, Article XI, Constitution.

14
Section 10, id.

15 Section 11, id.

16 Id.

17 Section 4, id.

18 Section 13 (1), id.

19 Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition, p. 363.

20 gr_ Carlos v. Angeles, 346 SCRA 572 (2000); Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324 (1984).

21 190 SCRA 226 (1990).

22 Id., at 242.

23 227 SCRA 627 (1993).

24 G.R. No. 98452, En Banc Resolution dated September 26, 1991.

25 229 SCRA 680 (1994).

26 G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004.

27 Section 1, Rule 112, Rules on Criminal Procedure.

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 149311 February 11, 2005

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO, STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III,
MISAEL M. LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Manila, PANFILO M. LACSON,
MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued by the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 01-100934.

The facts are as follows:

Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit
on January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael
Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-
affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and
Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-
00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and
substance and thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On
February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges
against them be dismissed.

Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the
NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the
Ombudsman.1 NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of
Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and
private individuals for the following alleged crimes:

a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong
Kam Chong;

b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and

c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2

In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this recommendation was made after taking
the sworn statements of Mary Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and
Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these witnesses were attached to the letter.3

On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the other
persons named in the witnesses’ sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the subpoena on May 8,
2001. The subpoena directed them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the
scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-
Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a letter dated May 18,
2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since
there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same
respondents. Furthermore, they claimed that according to the Court’s ruling in gr_ Uy v.
Sandiganbayan,4 the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials, including
police and military officials such as private respondents.5
The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on May 28, 2001, denied the dismissal
of the cases before it through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:

It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]

It appearing further that respondent’s rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the
determination of jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or] Bribery, nor are they related to respondents’
discharge of their official duties;

It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Department of Justice No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not in relation
to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the
Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with finality;6

On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the Solicitor General received a copy of a
petition for prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the
said petition for prohibition, Lacson and Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They argued
that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the Ombudsman’s mandate of
having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster their claim.

On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting the Department of Justice
from conducting the preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby GRANTED, and accordingly a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their subordinates,
agents[,] and other persons acting in their behalf, individually and collectively, from conducting a
preliminary investigation in IS No. 2001-402, insofar as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the
petitioners to file their counter-affidavits in said case until such time that the Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses subject matter of the investigations before it, or until
such Office shall have categorized the said offenses as being committed by the petitioners not in relation
to their respective offices.

Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue without bond, as there is no
showing whatsoever in the pleadings of the parties that the respondents will suffer any injury by reason
of the issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance with Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.

SO ORDERED. 7

Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then Secretary Hernando Perez, the
NBI, through Director Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct
the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 2001-402. In their petition, they raise the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL

CLEAR AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF 1990 OF
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING
THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING THE NBI

COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME OFFENSES, RESPONDENTS
AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.
IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING RELIEF TO

RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO DESPITE THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE DOJ.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE
FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE
ONLY HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.8

A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth one central question to be
resolved: whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the
pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances.
The addition of other names in the second proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being
principally directed against the respondents herein in connection with substantially the same set of facts
alleged.

First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.

Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to reconsider the assailed
Order. They maintain that it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration of
justice and that this is all the more compelling, in this case, considering that this involves the high-
ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged have already attracted nationwide attention.

Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be the safety of
witnesses who risked life and limb to give their statements to the authorities, but also the rights of the
respondents, who may need to clear their names and reputations of the accusations against them.
Procedural laws are adopted not as ends in themselves but as means conducive to the realization of
justice. The rules of procedure are not to be applied when such application would clearly defeat the very
rationale for their conception and existence.9

Now, to the merits.

The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the provisions of the 1987
Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a
principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the
crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system; . . .

Section 3. Powers and Functions. – To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following
powers and functions:

...

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and
correction system;

...

Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978, provides:

Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of
Justice. – There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision
and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the
Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City
Fiscal’s Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.

Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases filed
against them, to the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of Government pursuant to law and
existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine in Uy v. Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend
that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of the said primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including
police and military officials. They likewise claim that it should be deemed that the Ombudsman has
already taken over the investigation of these cases, considering that there are already pending complaints
filed therewith involving the same accused, facts and circumstances.

Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases; ….10

The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the case or
cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In granting the
petition for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag gave the following rationale:

Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction over the matter, it is the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on conducting
a preliminary investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In
the final analysis, the resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no power
and right to add an input into the Ombudsman’s investigation. Only in matters where the other
investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may
such agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. That is the
situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the respondents to meddle with the investigation of similar cases
being investigated by the Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source of their powers
with respect to such cases. This is, of course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to
ordinary common sense. It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous, for the Department of
Justice to be making recommendation as to its preliminary investigation to the Ombudsman in matters
being handled by such Office itself. Such recommendation would be pre-emptive of the actions of the said
Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.

The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage, from any
investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including
police and military officials such as the petitioners. It is the feeling of this Court that the respondents
cannot find comfort in that provision of the law. That situation presupposes the conduct by other
Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore
being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken hold
of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the investigation being
conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and becoming
respect for power and authority would thus require the respondents to desist from interfering with the
case already handled by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized
prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the
powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The hierarchy
of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency must be recalled.11

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the plenary
power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or employees.12 To
discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special
features which puts it a notch above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies. First and foremost, it
extended independence to the Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus,
the Constitution provided for stringent qualification requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman and
his deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born citizens, of recognized probity and independence and must
not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election.13 The Ombudsman
and his deputies were given the rank and salary equal to that of the Chairman and Members, respectively,
of the Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their term of
office.14 They were given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment.15 Upon their cessation from
office, they are prohibited from running for any elective office in the immediately succeeding
election.16 Finally, unlike other investigative bodies, the Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman
fiscal autonomy.17 Clearly, all these measures are intended to enhance the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the principal and
primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of
procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers given to prosecutors. It was
vested with the power to investigate complaints against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even
without a formal complaint lodged before it.18 It can inquire into acts of government agencies and public
servants based on reports in the media and those which come to his attention through sources other than
a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and
inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing the illegal or
improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public
agencies, is put to minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Vis-à-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate
public officials is given preference over other bodies.

As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the Office of Ombudsman
when it enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time
is not given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ.
The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.

Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases
involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary
power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against
public officers and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast,
the DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to
the Ombudsman.

Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of
concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter,19 the settled rule is
that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.20 Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and
the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained
freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to
which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the
complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the
exclusion of the DOJ.

None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual situation similar to that of the
present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),21 the Court
upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth
cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, issued by then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the
Court emphasized in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation
over said cases is not exclusive but a shared authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut
levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that the Court recognized the primary,
albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered
the PCGG to desist from proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the
PCGG to conduct the investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders
against petitioner’s assets.

In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with the DOJagainst
petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After the DOJ panel
prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued and the
corresponding Informations were filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only
the Ombudsman who has the power to conduct investigation of cases involving public officers like him.
The Court reiterated its previous ruling that the authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of
public officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman but a shared authority. However, it will be
noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation in that case was filed solely with the DOJ.

In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of prosecutors, the
corresponding Information was filed in court. The pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the
prosecutors can file the said Information without previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court
ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate
the case. Again, it should be noted that the complaint in that case was addressed solely to the provincial
prosecutor.

The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix25 and Honasan v. Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ26 where the letter-complaint against petitioners public officers were
brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.

In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power between two
coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or orders. In stark contrast with the present case,
Mary Ong filed a complaint against respondents initially with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
 investigation which was immediately acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the
records, she thereafter refiled substantially the same complaintwith the NBI and the DOJ.

Not only this.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over
the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although
a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.27 When one is hailed before an investigative body on specific charges, the very act
of filing said complaint for preliminary investigation immediately exposes the respondent and his family
to anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or
more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue
difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or
body where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to
appear and plead their cause or defense.

There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies
exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of
the respondents.

Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of
valuable and limited resources of Government, inaduplication of proceedings already started with the
Ombudsman.

From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158543 July 21, 2004

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN and RAINIER PUNZALAN, petitioners,

vs.
DENCIO DELA PEÑA and ROBERT CAGARA, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the June 6, 2002 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals and its May 23, 2003 Resolution which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City. At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13,
1997, Dencio dela Peña, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier
Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others arrived. Ricky Eugenio
shouted at Dela Peña, "Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero mo?"2 Dela Peña replied, "Kalbo nga ako, ay
pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako."3 Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Peña while Rainier punched him in the
mouth. The group then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody shouted, "Yariin na ‘yan!"4 Thereafter,
Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The
group chased him.

While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas’ family driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the
gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby,
intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on
the thigh. Shocked, Dela Peña, Cagara and Plata ran towards the latter’s house and locked themselves in. The group ran
after them and when they got to the Platas’ house, shouted, "Lumabas kayo d’yan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin
kayo!"5 Dela Peña, Cagara, and Plata left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police station to seek
assistance.

As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide6 and
against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Peña filed several counter-
charges7 for grave oral defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries against the
Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Peña against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen
others (I.S. No. 97-11528); and one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Peña against Alex "Toto" Ofrin (I.S. No. 97-11520-21).

In their counter-affidavit,8 the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were fabricated in order to dissuade them
from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and
Cagara, respectively.

Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation, docketed as I.S. No. 97-11522, against
Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City, Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing distance of other people, told him, "Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay
ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho."9 In her defense, Rosalinda denied
having uttered the alleged defamatory statements.

On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral Defamation
against Rosalinda Punzalan,10 holding that Cagara failed to show that the alleged defamatory statements would cast
dishonor, discredit or contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were uttered by Rosalinda in a state of
distress and, hence, were not actionable.11 The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was
also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor because complainant Dela Peña’s claim that he accidentally shot Rainier
forms part of the defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier against the latter.12

Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of Justice. On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary
Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by
ordering, among others – (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded to
Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others be downgraded to
Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light
Threats. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to file
information for three (3) counts of slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan; information for two (2)
counts [of] other light threats against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin; information for attempted homicide against Alexander
"Toto" Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito dela Cruz, Emmanuel Nobida,
Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark
Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar and Raymond Poliquit; information for malicious mischief and theft against
Rainier Punzalan, Mark Catap, Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Herson Mendoza,
Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino "Bobby" Serrano, and John Does; and to report action taken within 10
days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.13

Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their co-respondents, filed separate motions for
reconsideration. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the
withdrawal of the Informations against the movants. He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation case should be
dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of
shock and anger. Anent the Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Peña against Rainier, the Secretary held that the
allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by Rainier
against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Peña failed to prove that Rainier, Randall and his companions intended to kill
him. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is REVERSED. The resolution dated March 23, 2000
is set aside and the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to withdraw the separate informations for
slight oral defamation, other light threats, attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft against all respondents
and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.14

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated October 11, 2000.15

On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying that the City Prosecutor
of Mandaluyong be directed to file one count of Slight Oral Defamation against Rosalinda; one count of Attempted
Homicide against Rainier, Randall and 14 others; and two counts of Other Light Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin.16

On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the questioned Resolutions of public respondent
dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 are set aside insofar as it directed the withdrawal of informations for
slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against the respondents Alexander
"Toto" Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito de la Cruz, Emmanuel Nobido,
Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente "Joven" Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark
Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit.

The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby affirmed insofar as it directed the withdrawal of
information for two (2) counts of other light threats against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin.

SO ORDERED.17

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.18 Hence, the instant petition raising the following assignment of errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
SETTING ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE 6, 2000
AND OCTOBER 11, 2000.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT, MORE LIKELY THAN NOT, SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION HAD BEEN
COMMITTED AND WAS COMMITTED BY HEREIN PETITIONER ROSALINDA PUNZALAN.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF
RESPONDENTS AND THEIR WITNESSES, WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN WEIGHT, ARE SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE INTENT TO KILL SUCH THAT PETITIONERS RANDALLL AND RAINIER PUNZALAN MUST BE
PROSECUTED FOR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE.19

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause
against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral Defamation and against petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for
Attempted Homicide.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The pertinent law in relation to this case is Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Where the error is in the judge’s
findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact, appeal is the remedy.20

Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not
have the legal power to determine the case; where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case,
oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of his jurisdiction.21 In the case of Meat
Packing Corp. v. Sandiganbayan,22 it was held that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its
discretion; such abuse must be grave.23

We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in his Resolutions dated June 6,
2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. "Supervision and control" includes the
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the
performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.24
In the case of People v. Peralta,25 we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range
of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors
which are best appreciated by prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals,26we declared that:

A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear
legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by
the petitioner.

We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is
under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at
hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to prosecute when after
investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a
prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who
is vested with discretion in the discharge of this function.

Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor and,
ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.

The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations for slight oral
defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide against the other respondents other than Rosalinda
Punzalan is determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.

First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the defamatory remarks were uttered within the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 6, 2002 stated the settled
rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its opportunity to observe the
demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the occurrence
of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine
probable cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within the hearing distance of third parties. The
investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the
decision of the City Prosecutor.

As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein petitioners other than Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of
Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a countercharge. The Department of Justice in a
Resolution dated June 18, 1998 had already directed that Dencio Dela Peña be likewise investigated for the charge of
attempted homicide in connection with the shooting incident that occurred on August 13, 1997 making him a party to the
case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of herein
respondent Dencio Dela Peña should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the shooting incident that resulted in
the serious injury of herein petitioner Rainier Punzalan.

In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of
the Court of Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et al. v. Guingona27 that the Court will not interfere in
the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the
filing of information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been made
with grave abuse.28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 6, 2002 and the Resolution
dated May 23, 2003 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice, directing the withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and attempted homicide
against the petitioners, is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581 February 28, 2005

PETER L. SESBREÑO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE GLORIA B. AGLUGUB, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 2, San Pedro, Laguna, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Peter L. Sesbreño filed a Verified Complaint1 dated March 2, 2004 against respondent judge, Hon. Gloria B. Aglugub,
charging the latter with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service relative to Criminal Case No. 39806 entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al.
It appears that complainant filed three (3) separate complaints against Enrique Marcelino (Marcelino), Susan Nuñez
(Nuñez), Edna Tabazon (Tabazon) and Fely Carunungan (Carunungan), all from the Traffic Management Unit of San
Pedro, Laguna, for Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three (3) cases were assigned to
respondent judge’s branch and subsequently consolidated for disposition.

After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent issued a Consolidated Resolution2 dated May 6, 2003, dismissing
the cases for Falsification and Grave Threats for lack of probable cause, and setting for arraignment the case for
Usurpation of Authority. Except for Marcelino who failed to appear during the arraignment, all of the accused were
arraigned. Respondent judge issued a warrant for Marcelino’s arrest.

Subsequently, complainant filed a Private Complainants’ Urgent Manifestation3 dated February 6, 2004 alleging that the
accused were also charged with violation of Republic Act No. 104 (R.A. 10) and praying that warrants of arrest be likewise
issued against all of the accused.

Acting upon this manifestation, respondent judge issued an Order5 dated February 12, 2004 stating that a charge for
violation of R.A. 10 was indeed alleged in the complaint for Usurpation of Authority but was not resolved due to oversight.
However, since the statute only applies to members of seditious organizations engaged in subversive activities pursuant
to People v. Lidres,6 and considering that the complaint failed to allege this element, respondent judge found no probable
cause and dismissed the charge for violation of R.A. 10. Further, citing Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Rules), respondent judge denied complainant’s prayer for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
the accused and ordered the records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) for review. 1a\^ /phi1.net

Thereafter, complainant’s counsel, Atty. Raul Sesbreño (Atty. Sesbreño), filed a Motion for Reconsideration andUrgent
Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Against Non-Appearing Accused. Respondent judge, however, did not
act on these motions allegedly because the court had already lost jurisdiction over the case by then.

The PPO affirmed respondent’s order and remanded the case to the court for further proceedings on the charge of
Usurpation of Authority.

During the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan and Nuñez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreño,
however, did not move for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Neither did he object to the cancellation of the
scheduled hearing.

The foregoing circumstances brought about the filing of the instant administrative complaint.

Complainant contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules when she refused to issue
warrants of arrest against the accused. Complainant also faults respondent judge for allegedly motu proprio reconsidering
her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003 and failing to order its transmittal to the Office of the Ombudsman within
ten (10) days.

In her Comment With Motion To Dismiss The Administrative Complaint7 dated March 26, 2004, respondent judge counters
that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary upon the judge. Since she found no indication that the accused
would abscond, she found it unnecessary to issue the warrant. Moreover, under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known
as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the PPO has been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor. The PPO can
take action on similar cases for review and appropriate action. Thus, she acted in accordance with law when she
forwarded the records of the case to the PPO for review and not to the Office of the Ombudsman as complainant insists.

Respondent judge further accuses complainant and Atty. Sesbreño of falsification, and the latter of violation of Rule 1.01
and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly, the affidavit which was attached to the instant
verified complaint was not notarized by Atty. Raul Corro as indicated therein. Further, Atty. Sesbreño was allegedly
convicted of Homicide and may have been suspended from the practice of law.

Complainant reiterates his allegations in his Complainant’s Reply To Respondent’s Comment Dated March 26,
20048 dated May 11, 2004. He further contends that there is no provision in the Ombudsman Act of 1989 specifically
deputizing the PPO to be the "Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor" as respondent judge contends. He adds that
respondent judge failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 8 since she has yet to forward her resolution to the
Deputy Ombudsman.

Moreover, complainant points out that the affidavit attached to his complaint was notarized by Atty. Corro as certified by a
member of the latter’s staff. Complainant also disproves respondent judge’s allegation that Atty. Sesbreño is in the habit
of filing administrative complaints against judges, explaining that the latter merely acted as counsel for litigants who filed
administrative complaints against certain judges.

In another Verified Complaint9 filed on March 18, 2004, complainant further charges respondent with violating Sec. 9(b),
Rule 112 of the Rules.

Respondent Judge filed a Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative Complaint10 dated May 7, 2004 clarifying that
contrary to complainant’s allegation, she did not conduct a preliminary investigation in the case for Usurpation of
Authority. What was submitted for preliminary investigation was the charge for violation of R.A. 10. It was her resolution
dismissing the charge for violation of R.A. 10 which was transmitted to the PPO for appropriate action. However, since the
charges for violation of R.A. 10 and Usurpation of Authority were contained in a single complaint, respondent judge
deemed it proper to forward the entire records to the PPO.

Complainant filed a Complainant’s Reply To Respondent’s Comment Dated May 7, 200411 dated May 20, 2004
substantially reiterating his allegations.

The Verified Complaint filed on March 18, 2004 was treated as a supplemental complaint per the notation in
the Memorandum12 dated June 25, 2004.

In sum, complainant asserts that respondent judge erred in conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge of
Usurpation of Authority; in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the accused to appear during trial; in issuing
her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10; and in transmitting the records of the
case to the PPO instead of the Office of the Ombudsman. 1awphi 1.nét

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of merit but that
respondent judge should be reminded to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties.13 It made the following
findings:

A careful consideration of the records as well as the pertinent rules reveals that there is nothing in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for the non-appearance of the accused during the trial.
Hence, its issuance rests on the sound discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this case, the private prosecutor did
not move for the issuance of such warrant.

As regards the next issue, Rep. Act No. 10 penalizes a person who, with or without pretense of official position, shall
perform any act pertaining to the Government, or to any person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled
to do so, shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10) years. Violation
thereof is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court but subject to preliminary investigation.

Respondent judge admitted that she overlooked the charge when she conducted the preliminary examination of the
complaints. Nonetheless, after reviewing the case, respondent Judge found no probable cause and ordered the dismissal
of the case. Therefore, when respondent Judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause,
she was acting in accordance with the procedure on preliminary investigation laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure.

Respondent Judge also directed that the records of the case be forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office on review.
Sec. 5 of Rule 112 provides that the resolution of the Investigating Judge is subject to review by the provincial or city
prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be.

It is respondent Judge’s contention that the resolution shall be reviewed by the Provincial Prosecutor. She explained that
pursuant to the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charge of
Violation of R.A. No. 10.

However, Sec. 31 of Rep. Act No. 6770 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989" provides that prosecutors can (be) deputized
by the Ombudsman to act as special investigator or prosecutor only on certain cases. Such provision is not applicable to
the issue at hand. Therefore, respondent Judge erred when she forwarded the case for review to the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office. Nonetheless, complainant failed to show that respondent Judge was motivated by bad faith when she
issued the assailed order. At most, she is guilty of judicial error for which she could not be held administratively
accountable absent any proof of fraud or other evil motive.14

A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.15 Thus, a preliminary
investigation is not required nor was one conducted for the charge of violation of Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code
which is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or from six (6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months.16

This being so, Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Rules is applicable. Said section provides:

Sec. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.—

(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court.—If the complaint or information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If
within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally
evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of
additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still
finds no probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its submission or expiration of
said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if
l^vvphi1.net
the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity
for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest.

Under the foregoing section, if a complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure laid
down in Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules shall be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent
for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order
if the accused had already been arrested, and hold the latter for trial. However, the judge is given the discretion to merely
issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest if he does not find it necessary to place the accused under custody.

It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions for
the determination of whether probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judge’s sound judgment.17

Moreover, the judge is not required to transmit the records of the case to the prosecutor for review.

In this case, respondent judge, following the foregoing procedure, found probable cause to hold the accused for trial for
the charge of Usurpation of Authority and forthwith set their arraignment and the pre-trial. There is nothing irregular in the
course of action taken by respondent judge.

Neither is there merit in complainant’s contention that respondent judge should have issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused for their failure to appear during the initial presentation of evidence for the prosecution for the charge of
Usurpation of Authority. The issuance of a warrant of arrest for non-appearance of the accused during trial is discretionary
upon the judge. Indeed, there is nothing in the Rules which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for non-
appearance of the accused during trial.

Respondent judge concedes, however, that due to oversight, she failed to rule on the charge of violation of R.A. 10 in
her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003. Nonetheless, she asserts in her Comment With Motion To Dismiss
Administrative Complaint18 dated May 7, 2004 that she conducted a preliminary investigation for the charge of violation of
R.A. 10 and dismissed the charge after taking into consideration the affidavits and evidence presented. Complainant does
not dispute the fact that indeed a preliminary investigation was conducted for this charge.19 Thus, when respondent judge
dismissed the complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she merely did so to correct an oversight.

Furthermore, as the Order dated February 12, 2004 confirms, it was the dismissal of the charge for violation of R.A. 10
that was elevated to the PPO for review. It was imprudent, however, for respondent judge to transmit the entire records of
the case to the PPO knowing that the charge for Usurpation of Authority was included in the records of the case.
Respondent judge should have ensured that at least one complete set of the records remained in her sala so that the
prosecution for Usurpation of Authority would not be held up. Injudicious though her actuation was, we do not agree with
complainant that respondent judge was motivated by an evil intent to delay the case.

This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have transmitted her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing
the charge of violation of R.A. 10 to the Office of the Ombudsman instead of the PPO. Complainant asserts that since the
charge of violation of R.A. 10 is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman has the primary
jurisdiction to review the resolution of dismissal.

This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 820 entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, which provides "that all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors." Moreover, "[R]esolutions
in Ombudsman cases21 against public officers and employees prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be
submitted to the Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the Deputy Ombudsman
of the area with his recommendation for the approval or disapproval thereof. The Deputy Ombudsman shall take
appropriate final action thereon, including the approval of its filing in the proper regular court or the dismissal of the
complaint, if the crime charged is punishable by prision correccional or lower, or fine of not more than ₱6,000.00 or both.
Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy
Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the Office of the Ombudsman."

Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance with law when she forwarded the case
for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the PPO remanded the case to the court for further proceedings instead
of forwarding the same to the Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is quite another matter. In
any event, respondent judge should have taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to preclude delay in the
disposition of the case.

In sum, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he
was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or some other like motive. Respondent judge’s actuations are hardly indicative of bad
faith or any motive to delay the case which characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the law.22

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondent Judge Gloria B.
Aglugub is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties in the future.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144492 December 18, 2008

LUWALHATI R. ANTONINO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, ROSALITA T. NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, JUDGE
ABEDNEGO O. ADRE, PEDRO G. NALANGAN, ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA, JULIO C. DIAZ and AGAPITO
BORINAGA, respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner, former
Congresswoman Luwalhati R. Antonino (petitioner) of the First Congressional District of South Cotabato which includes
General Santos City (city), assailing that portion of the Resolution2 dated January 20, 1999 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) dismissing the case against private respondents, former city Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez (Mayor
Nuñez), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director for Region XI Augustus
L. Momongan (Momongan), Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Abednego O. Adre (Judge Adre), former City Legal Officer
Pedro G. Nalangan III (Nalangan), Register of Deeds Asteria E. Cruzabra (Cruzabra), Land Management Officer III of the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of South Cotabato Julio C. Diaz (Diaz) and Regional
Technical Director of the DENR for Region XI Agapito Borinaga (Borinaga) (respondents).

The facts, as narrated by the Ombudsman, are as follows:

Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President Diosdado Macapagal on October 3, 1963
(Record, pp. 23-24). The pertinent provision of which states that:

do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and health resort site purposes, under the
administration of the municipality of General Santos, subject to private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of
land of the public domain situated in the said municipality and more particularly described as follows:

Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation

The Municipal Government of General Santos Magsaysay Park

A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D) situated in the barrio of Dadiangas, Municipality of General
Santos, province of Cotabato. x x x containing an area of 52,678 square meters.

On January 22, 1968, Republic Act No. 5412 (Record, pp. 25-26), known as the "Charter of the City of General
Santos" was enacted creating the City of General Santos where it is provided that "The National Government
hereby cedes to the City of General Santos the ownership and possession to all lands of the public domain within
the city." Later, said Act was amended by Republic Act No. 6386 on August 16, 1971 (Record, pp. 27-28) wherein
it read that "The disposition of all lands of the public domain within the city shall be in accordance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-one, as amended: Provided, That all incomes and
receipts derived from such disposition shall accrue exclusively to the city as provided in this Act."

On the other hand, the property subject of Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was thereafter subdivided into three
lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an area of 18,695 square meters, Lot X containing 15,020 square meters and Lot Y-2
with 18,963 square meters, or a total of 52,678 square meters which is still equivalent to the original area.

However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2273 amending
Proclamation No. 168 (Record, pp. 29-31), which provides that:

do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No. 168 dated October 3, 1963, which established
the recreational and health resort reservation situated in the Municipality of General Santos, now General
Santos City, Island of Mindanao, certain portions of the land embraced therein and declare the same open
to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which parcels of land are more particularly
described as follows:

Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D

(Magsaysay Park)

A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the Municipality of General
Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao. x x x containing an area of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE (18,695) SQUARE METERS. x x x
 Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D
(Magsaysay Park)

A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the Municipality of General
Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao. x x x containing an area of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (18,963) SQUARE METERS. x x x

Thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 168 and is therefore reserved for
recreational and health resort site purposes.

As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop applied for Free Patent with the District Land Office and
consequently Certificates of Title were issued sometime in 1983. In 1984, two cases were filed by the local
government of General Santos City against the said Heirs of Kusop for Declaration of Nullity of Titles and, on the
other hand, the Heirs of Kusop filed a case against the said local government for Injunction and Damages. The
said three cases were consolidated before the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22, presided
by respondent Judge Abednego Adre.

On May 23, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos City passed Resolution No. 87, Series of
1991, entitled "Resolution Approving the Compromise Agreement to be entered into by and between the City
Government of General Santos represented by the City Mayor and the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, re: Magsaysay
Park" (Record, pp. 1506-1507). Significant provisions of the said Compromise Agreement (Record, pp. 33-39)
state that:

1. The subject matter of this agreement are Lots Y-1, MR-1160-D and Y-2, MR-1160-D with combined
area of THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (37,658) SQUARE METERS, and
from this the HEIRS AND BENEFICIARIES shall receive a total net area of TWENTY THOUSAND
(20,000) SQUARE METERS and to the CITY shall pertain the remainder of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (17,658) SQUARE METERS which if added to Lot X, MR-1160-D,
previously donated to the CITY as stated in par. 7 of the WHEREAS clause, with an area of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND AND TWENTY (15,020) SQUARE METERS (located in between Lots Y-1 and Y-2), the CITY
shall retain a total area of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT (32,678)
SQUARE METERS.

Said Compromise Agreement was signed by respondent City Mayor Rosalita Nuñez, assisted by respondent
Pepito Nalangan III, and the heirs and beneficiaries of Cabalo Kusop.

As a consequence of the said Compromise Agreement, respondent Judge Abednego Adre issued an Order
(Record, pp. 40-52), covering the three pending cases, on May 6, 1992, the dispositive portion of which states:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the foregoing "Compromise Agreement" in conformity with Article 6 in correlation
with Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the same is hereby APPROVED and ADOPTED as
judgment in these cases. The parties are enjoined to faithfully comply therewith.

A Writ of Execution was accordingly issued on November 28, 1995.

However, on July 22, 1997, acting upon the "Motion for Exclusion of an Extraneous Subject from the Coverage of
the Judgment thereof" and the "Motion for Issuance of Clarificatory Order" submitted by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop
and jointly by CENR Officer and Regional Technical Director of DENR, respectively, respondent Judge issued
another Order [assailed RTC Order] (Record, pp. 53-59) in the above-cited three cases, stating that:

ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing facts, law and jurisprudence, the motion for exclusion of Lot X, MR-
1160-D comprising an area of 15,020 SQUARE METERS is GRANTED. The movants heirs of Kusop are,
however, enjoined to donate to the City of General Santos in keeping with the intent and spirit of the
compromise agreement.

On July 23, 1997, the following private respondents applied for Miscellaneous Sales Patent over portions of Lot X,
to be divided as follows (refer to affidavits, Record, pp. 60-75):

Applicants Area applied

1. Mad Guaybar
2. Oliver Guaybar
3. Jonathan Guaybar
4. Alex Guaybar
5. Jack Guiwan
6. Nicolas Ynot
7. Carlito Flaviano III
8. Jolito Poralan
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
 9. Miguela Cabi-ao
10. Jose Rommel Saludar
11. Joel Teves
12. Rico Altizo
13. Johnny Medillo
14. Martin Saycon
15. Arsenio delos Reyes, Jr.
16. Jose Bomez
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 510 sq. m.; and,
- 524 sq. m.

The following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent Cesar Jonillo, as Deputy Land Management Inspector,
recommended for the approval of the survey authority requested by the above-named private respondents for Lot
X (Record, p. 418).

Within the same day, the Survey Authority was issued to private respondents by public respondent CENR Officer
Renato Rivera (Record, p. 419). As a result of which, Lot X was subdivided into 16 lots (refer to subdivision plan,
Record, p. 32).

On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez, assisted by respondent City Legal Officer Pedro
Nalangan III issued 1st Indorsements (refer to application documents, Record, pp. 421-500) addressed to CENRO,
DENR for portions of Lot X applied by private respondents and stated therein that "this office interposes no
objection to whatever legal proceedings your office may pursue on application covering portions thereof after the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 excluded Lot X, MR-1160-D from the coverage of the
Compromise Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said court’s order dated July 22, 1997."

Thereupon, public respondents Cesar Jonillo and City Assessor Leonardo Dinopol, together with recommendation
for approval from respondent Rivera, submitted an appraisal of lots X-1 to X-16 stating therein the appraisal
amount of P100.00 per square meter and existing improvements of residential light house per lot with an
appraised value ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00 (refer to application papers, Record, pp. 421-500).

Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo prepared a letter-report addressed to the Regional
Executive Director of DENR for each of the sixteen (16) applicants recommending for the private sale of the
subject lots to the above-named applicants-respondents, without public auction (refer to sample letter-report of
recommendation in favor of Rico Altizo, Record, p. 77). Respondent CENR Officer, Renato Rivera, also issued
recommendation letters for each of the sixteen applicants addressed to the PENR Officer for the approval of the
appraisal of the subject lots and of the private sale (please refer to sample recommendation letter in favor of Rico
Altiz[o], Record, p. 78).

A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz also on the same date stating therein that on September 5,
1997 the subject lot/s will be sold (Record, p. 79).

On September 18, 1997, the following Certificates of Titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of General
Santos City, respondent Asteria Cruzabra, which titles were also signed by respondent Augustus Momongan, as
DENR Regional Executive Director, to wit:

Name of Owner OCT No. Lot No. Record Page No.

1. Mad Guaybar P-6393-A X-1 80-82;
2. Oliver Guaybar P-6392 X-2 83-85;
3. Jonathan Guaybar P-6389-A X-3 86-88;
4. Alex Guaybar P-6393 X-4 89-91;
5. Jack Guiwan P-6399 X-5 92-94;
6. Nicolas Ynot P-6388-A X-6 95-97;
7. Carlito Flaviano III P-6389 X-7 98-100;
8. Jolito Poralan P-6391 X-8 101-103;
9. Miguela Cabi-ao P-6392-A X-9 104-106;
10. Jose Rommel Saludar P-6388 X-10 107-109;
11. Joel Teves P-6396 X-11 110-112;
12. Rico Altizo P-6395 X-12 113-115;
13. Johnny Medillo P-6390 X-13 116-117;
14. Martin Saycon P-6394-A X-14 118-120;
15. Arsenio delos Reyes P-6395-A X-15 121-123;
16. Jose Bomez P-6394 X-16 124-127.

Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except for lots X-6, X-7, X-15 and X-16, the above-named registered
owners sold their lots, through their attorney-in-fact, respondent Atty. Nilo Flaviano, to the AFP-Retirement and
 Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) in the amount of Two Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Seven Thousand
Pesos (P2,997,000.00) per 999 sq. m. lot (Record, pp. 127-150). Then, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-81051
to 81062 were issued in the name of the vendee on September 25, 1997 (Record, pp. 151-173).

On the other hand, the registered owners of lot numbers X-6 and X-7 executed a Deed of Exchange with AFP-
RSBS, represented by respondent Jose Ramiscal, Jr., consenting to the exchange of lots X-6 and X-7 with lots Y-
1-A-1 and Y-1-A-2, respectively, the latter two lots being owned by AFP-RSBS (Record, pp. 175-178). While lots
X-15 and X-16 were exchanged with one office unit or condo unit to be given or ceded to respondent Nilo Flaviano
(Record, pp. 179-182).3

Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit4 before the Ombudsman against the respondents
together with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato Rivera (Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan Guaybar, Alex
Guaybar, Jack Guiwan, Carlito Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel Saludar, Joel
Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio de los Reyes, and Jose Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his
companions), Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal), Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty. Nilo Flaviano (Atty.
Flaviano) (indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,5 as amended,
and for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents.

The Ombudsman's Ruling

In the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1999, the Ombudsman held that Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan, among others,
entered into the Compromise Agreement on behalf of the city and pursuant to the authority granted to them by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the sole responsibility of Mayor Nuñez and
Nalangan but of the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod. Moreover, the Ombudsman opined that the validity of the
Compromise Agreement had been settled when the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the RTC found it to be in
order. The Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with the facts of the case, while
Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have regularly performed their official functions. Accordingly, the
charges against the respondents were dismissed. Thus, the case was disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the following crimes were
committed and that respondents, whose names appear below, are probably guilty thereof:

1. CESAR JONILLO – sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public document to the sixteen (16) recommendation
reports submitted;

2. RENATO RIVERA – sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public document relative to the sixteen (16) reports
submitted, all dated August 4, 1997;

3. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, CARLITO
FLAVIANO III, NICOLAS YNOT, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, JOEL
TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MED[I]LLO, MARTIN SAYCON, ARSENIO DE LOS REYES, and JOSE BOMEZ
in conspiracy with public respondents CESAR JONILLO and RENATO RIVERA– one (1) count each for private
respondents and sixteen (16) counts each for public respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019;

4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO – as conspirators for twelve (12) counts of
falsification of public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;

5. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO
PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY
MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON – one (1) count each as conspirator in the falsification of public document relative to
the corresponding unilateral Deed of Sale executed by their agent in their behalf;

6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN and NILO FLAVIANO – twelve (12) counts of violation of section
3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the government inn the correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot-X to
AFP-RSBS; and

7. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO
PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY
MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON – one (1) count each of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 as conspirator in short-
changing the government in the payment of taxes for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS.

Let the herein attached Informations against aforementioned respondents be filed with the proper courts.

Charges against respondents ROSALITA NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS MOMONGAN, ABEDNEGO ADRE, ASTERIA
CRUZABRA, PEDRO NALANGAN III, JULIO DIAZ and AGAPITO BORINAGA are hereby DISMISSED,
without prejudice to the filing of criminal cases against private respondents, for offenses committed not in
conspiracy with the herein public respondents, by the proper parties-in-interest.

SO RESOLVED.6
On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was, however, denied by the Ombudsman in his
Order7 dated April 26, 2000. The Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informations were already filed against the
aforementioned indicted and the cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of General
Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.

The Sole Issue

Hence, this Petition, on the sole ground that:

THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS

OF JURISDICTION IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS PROSECUTORY FUNCTIONS, BY DISMISSING THE
CHARGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT AND DEFRAUD THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY THROUGH THE ILLEGAL DISPOSITION OF LOT X OF THE
MAGSAYSAY PARK IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND ITS CHARTER.8

Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial evidence pointing to the existence of a conspiracy among all the
respondents and those indicted, which led to the illegal and fraudulent disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park. To
prove her claim of a grand conspiracy, petitioner outlines the individual participation, cooperation and involvement of each
respondent, as follows:

1. The assailed RTC Order issued by Judge Adre on July 22, 1997 was part of the grand scheme and was made
the basis for the filing of the miscellaneous sales applications of Mad Guaybar and his companions. The same
Order was likewise used by Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan as the reason for interposing no objection to the said
applications. The assailed RTC Order was issued by Judge Adre almost five (5) years after his Judgment based
on the Compromise Agreement had long become final; thus, it was issued with grave abuse of discretion and in
gross ignorance of the law. Judge Adre, therefore, violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

2. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan knew or ought to have known, by reason of their respective offices and as
administrators of the properties of the city, that Lot X of the Magsaysay Park is owned by the city and reserved as
health and recreation site. Yet, Nalangan's Comment, filed before Judge Adre issued the assailed RTC Order,
stated that per verification, there was no existing donation from the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop to the city. Likewise, in
their 1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997, instead of opposing the applications of Mad Guaybar and his
companions, Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan endorsed the same and interposed no objection thereto. Said
Indorsement was part of the grand conspiracy and was utilized as a front for the resale of the said property to
AFP-RSBS, to the injury of the city. Petitioner submits that Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan also violated Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019.

3. After Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan issued their 1st Indorsement on August 2, 1997 and after Jonillo submitted his
falsified report on August 4, 1997, Diaz, on the same date, scheduled the sale of Lot X to Mad Guaybar and his
companions on September 5, 1997. Thus, Diaz issued notices of sale of the subdivided lots of Lot X on
September 5, 1997 without public auction and at the disadvantageous price recommended by Rivera. Therefore,
Diaz, as a co-conspirator, should be similarly charged with Jonillo and Rivera for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 and for falsification of public documents.

4. Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9, 1997 the Motion for Issuance of a Clarificatory Order before
Judge Adre, which led to the issuance by the latter of the assailed RTC Order. Borinaga and Rivera likewise
represented to the RTC that upon verification, they did not find in the records any deed of donation executed by
the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop. Borinaga should be held liable as an active participant in a grand scheme to defraud
the city.

5. Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot X is not disposable and alienable and is, therefore, not a
proper subject of a sales patent application. Despite such knowledge and based on the falsified reports of Jonillo
and Rivera, Momongan allowed Lot X to be subdivided and sold to Mad Guaybar and his companions by
approving their miscellaneous sales application and issuing the Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) covering the
subdivided lots of Lot X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his own the false reports, and granted unwarranted
benefit and advantage to Mad Guaybar and his companions, to the injury of the city.

6. While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of documents and titles may be considered as ministerial, the
circumstances under which the titles were issued in the names of Mad Guaybar and his companions and
eventually, in the name of AFP-RSBS, indicate that Cruzabra was aware and was part of the grand conspiracy to
defraud the city. Each of the sixteen (16) OCTs was transcribed and signed by Cruzabra on September 22, 1997.
On the same date, Atty. Flaviano claimed and received the owners' copies of the OCTs; Mad Guaybar and his
companions executed a Joint Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Atty. Flaviano to be their attorney-in-
fact, for the purpose of selling their respective lots; and Cruzabra registered and annotated said SPA in their
respective titles. On September 25, 1997, Atty. Flaviano registered with Cruzabra twelve (12) Deeds of Absolute
Sale in favor of AFP-RSBS, after paying the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the same day the capital gains
tax and documentary stamp tax due thereon. On the same day, Cruzabra canceled the OCTs and issued, in lieu
thereof, twelve (12) Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) in favor of AFP-RSBS. The remaining four (4) lots were
transferred and registered in the name of AFP-RSBS on October 10, 1997 by virtue of deeds of exchange
 executed by the registered owners in favor of the former. Petitioner submits that Cruzabra could not have been
unaware of the restrictions; instead, she allowed the transfer and registration of the said lots to AFP-RSBS so
swiftly, that it could only be interpreted as part of the scheme to defraud the city.9

In sum, petitioner ascribes to the Ombudsman grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory functions, by completely ignoring and disregarding the pieces of substantial evidence which clearly establish
the existence of a common design among the respondents and those indicted in the fraudulent sale and disposition of Lot
X of the Magsaysay Park.

On the other hand, respondents separately raise their respective defenses against petitioner's claims, as follows:

1. The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), contends that, in effect, petitioner is
asking this Court to review the pieces of evidence gathered by the Ombudsman during the preliminary
investigation. This is not proper. In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman10 and Young v. Office of the
Ombudsman,11 this Court accorded highest respect for the factual findings of the Ombudsman, absent a clear
case of grave abuse of discretion. The OSP claims that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion
because the respondents, based on their counter-affidavits, have valid and legal justifications, sufficient for the
Ombudsman to exculpate them from the charges.12

2. Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy exists between her and other respondents charged
before the Ombudsman. Petitioner's allegations with respect to Cruzabra refer to recorded transactions which are
legal acts. Such allegations did not discuss how the alleged conspiracy was committed; they are merely
conjectures and bare allegations. Inasmuch as conspiracy cannot be presumed, and there is no convincing
evidence to support such allegations, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Lastly, Cruzabra
claims that the canceled OCTs do not contain any restriction to transfer the respective lots to AFP-RSBS. As
such, Cruzabra submits that it would be most unfair if she would be made a part of the alleged conspiracy simply
because she exercised her ministerial functions as Register of Deeds.13

3. Momongan alleges, among others, that as Regional Executive Director of the DENR, he is duly authorized to
sign patents and reconstituted patents. Since the standard procedure and processes were complied with,
Momongan simply relied on his subordinates and on their good faith. He argues that he acted in accordance with
law, department guidelines, rules and regulations, and that to require him to scrutinize every phase of a report of a
subordinate is a very tall order.14

4. Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint Resolution15 of the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and National Defense and Security, dated December 23, 1998, not one of
the respondents was recommended for prosecution in connection with the irregularity involving the Magsaysay
Park. Judge Adre claims that he acted properly, and even sought the opinion of the OSG before the Compromise
Agreement was approved. However, Judge Adre narrated that due to the vagaries of politics, the judgment lay
dormant, as no motion for execution was filed by then Mayor Adelbert Antonino, husband of petitioner, after Mayor
Nuñez lost in the elections. Subsequently, the writ was not issued as the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop did not execute
any deed of donation in favor of the city. He declared that the RTC did not lose jurisdiction over the case when the
Motions for Clarification and Exclusion were filed; thus, the issuance of the assailed RTC Order excluding Lot X
and enjoining the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop from donating the same to the city in keeping with the intent and spirit of
the compromise agreement, was proper.16

5. Borinaga posits that the Ombudsman's factual findings need not be disturbed, as they are not attended by
grave abuse of discretion. He maintains that he acted in accordance with law; that as the Regional Technical
Director is not required to go to the premises of the land subject of miscellaneous applications, and he may rely on
the data submitted by the CENRO and reviewed by the PENRO.17 Moreover, Borinaga argues that the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution was filed out of time.18The
Certification19 dated October 1, 2003, issued by Severo A. Sotto, Records Officer IV of the Office of the
Ombudsman, shows that petitioner was personally served with a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24,
1999 by Jose Ruel Bermejo, Process Server, and she filed her Motion for Reconsideration only on February 4,
2000.

6. Diaz opines that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he participated in a grand scheme to unlawfully
dispose of the lots covered by Lot X. He vouches that when he issued the notice of sale, he did so on the basis of
the requisite documents submitted to his office.20

7. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuñez did not violate the Charter of the City, because when
she entered into the Compromise Agreement with the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, she was authorized by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Resolution No. 87, series of 1991, after almost one (1) year of committee and
public hearings. The same was also referred to the OSG, which recommended its approval. When the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop filed a Motion for Exclusion of Lot X, Nalangan had no recourse but to tell the truth that, indeed, he
found no deed of donation made in favor of the city. While they admit to have issued Indorsements, they made it
clear that the DENR shall undertake only what is legally feasible. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan asseverate that
they had no intention of giving up the claim of the city over Lot X, as they even filed a case against Mad Guaybar
and his companions.21
 Our Ruling

The instant Petition lacks merit.

Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)22 provides:

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for
reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.

Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed that she received through counsel the assailed
Resolution of the Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she failed to establish that her Motion for Reconsideration was
indeed filed on time, and thus, failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the aforementioned Certification
that petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999. There are a number of
instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer
any explanation at all for the late filing of the motion for reconsideration. After the respondents made such allegation,
petitioner did not bother to respond and meet the issue head-on. We find no justification why the Ombudsman entertained
the motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed Resolution was
already final.

Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the instant Petition ought to be dismissed. And on the substantive
issue raised, the petition is likewise bereft of merit.

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the
power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.23 Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate
otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. A contrary rule would encourage innumerable
petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, which would grievously hamper
the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts would be swamped by a deluge of cases if
they have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.24

Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, as what the petitioner did in this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo,25 where we laid down
the following exceptions to the rule:

1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;

3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;

4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;

10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.26

The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court finds no
reason to deviate from the general rule. We concur with the disquisition of GIO I Rubillar-Arao in dismissing the charges
against respondents, as approved by Ombudsman Desierto, thus:

Hence, without ruling on the validity of the titles, this Office is constrained to limit its evaluation of the issue on the
participation of each respondent in the titling of Lot X, whether the same would constitute a violation of RA 3019
and/or other illegal acts.

1. Respondent Abednego Adre – His participation extends only to his issuance of an Order excluding Lot-X from
the coverage of the Compromise Agreement.

A review of the terms and conditions of the subject Compromise Agreement confirms the Order of the respondent
that indeed Lot X was excluded. The Order of respondent judge was made in accordance with the facts of the
case. It is even noteworthy that respondent judge assisted in preserving the claim of the government of General
Santos City over Lot X by enjoining the donation of said property by the private respondents.

2. Respondents Nuñez and Nalangan – Said respondents’ participation in the titling of Lot-X was when they
issued or caused the issuance of Indorsements stating therein that "this office (Office of the Mayor) interposes no
objection to whatever legal proceedings your (CENRO) office may pursue on the application covering portions
thereof (Lot-X)."

The contents of the Indorsements, as quoted above, cannot be construed as a waiver on the part of General
Santos City on its claim over Lot-X. On the contrary, it has given DENR the authority to take the necessary legal
proceedings relative to the titling of the property. Moreover, it should be taken into account that DENR has the
responsibility, authority and the power to grant alienable and disposable lands to deserving claimants.

Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence to prove that respondents Nuñez and Nalangan gave
unwarranted benefit to the claimants by issuing said Indorsements. In fact, they protected the interest of the
government over Lot-X by immediately filing a case for nullification of titles upon knowing of the issuances thereof.

xxxx

[5.] Public respondents Julio C. Diaz, Agapito Borinaga, Augustus L. Momongan, Asteria E. Cruzabra – Based on
the evidences on record, these respondents were in the regular performance of their official functions. Their
participation in the titling of Lot-X was due to the fact that the documents for titling were submitted to their
respective offices as a matter of course, and there is nothing that they can do but to follow the established
procedure upon finding that all the documents for titling were submitted.27

Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless,
petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's
findings by this Court. In this respect, petitioner fails.28

Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an accused under Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are
as follows:

(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;

(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties, or in
relation to his or her public functions;

(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;

(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and

(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect.29

Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, the act of the accused that caused undue injury
must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. Bad faith per se is not enough for one
to be held liable under the law; bad faith must be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or
negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest, or ill will for ulterior purposes. On the other hand,
gross negligence is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a willful or intentional manner
displaying a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons may be affected.30
As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no showing of evident bad faith and/or gross negligence
in the respective acts of the respondents. It must be stressed that it is good faith, not bad faith, which is presumed, as the
chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which springs from
the fountain of good conscience.31

Finally, petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and those indicted. However, as found by the
Ombudsman, such conspiracy alleged in the complaint was not supported by ample evidence. At best, the evidence
adduced was not clear as to respondents' participation in the acts in question. Actori incumbit onus probandi- the burden
of proof rests with the plaintiff or the prosecution. The inherent weakness of complainant's case is not a ground for the
Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation.32 For it is fundamental that conspiracy cannot be presumed. Conspiracy
must be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of
the crime charged indicative of a common design.33 This, the petitioner sadly failed to establish.

All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 171175 October 30, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ARTURO F. DUCA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside
and annul the Decision1 dated November 23, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312.

The CA decision reversed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Criminal Case
No. 2003-0194-D3 which affirmed an earlier decision4 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto,
Pangasinan, convicting respondent Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows:

It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were charged of the crime of Falsification of Official
Document defined and penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code in
an Information which reads:

"That on or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused confederating together and mutually abiding each other, with intent
to cause damage, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation of a Declaration of Real
Property over a bungalow type residential house covered by Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 of the Municipal
Assessor’s Office of San Fabian, Pangasinan by making it appear that the signature appearing on the sworn statement of
owner is that of Aldrin F. Duca when the truth of the matter is not because the latter was abroad at that time having
arrived in the Philippines only on December 12, 2001, and it was accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature
thereon to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned private complainant Pedro Calanayan."

Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded ‘not guilty’. Then trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan (hereinafter "Calanayan"), private
complainant herein, filed an action for ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca
and Vangie F. Duca before the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 960 (SF-99). The case was decided in favor of Calanayan. There being no appeal interposed
by the aforesaid defendants, the said decision became final and executory. On November 22, 1999, a writ of execution
was issued by the MCTC to enforce the decision. On February 29, 2000, the money judgment was likewise satisfied with
the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca covered by TCT No. 233647. On March 1, 2000, a certificate of sale
was issued in favor of Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder in the auction sale.

On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Execution and Damages with prayer for
Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining order against Sheriff IV Vinez Hortaleza and Police Officers Roberto Vical,
Alejandre Arevalo, Emilio Austria, Victor Quitales, Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2000-0304-D.
When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the house erected on the lot subject of the
ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca. In support of such claim she presented Property Index No. 013-32-027-
01-116131 (Exhibit "B"). At the back of the said exhibit is a sworn statement showing that the current and fair market
value of the property, which is a bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the signature affixed on top of the typewritten name Aldrin
F. Duca and subscribed and sworn to before Engr. Reynante Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of San Fabian,
Pangasinan, on December 10, 2001. The signature on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca is that of Arturo Duca.
According to the prosecution, Arturo made it appear that the signature is that of his brother Aldrin who was out of the
country at that time. Aldrin arrived in the Philippines only on December 12, 2001, as evidenced by a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration, Manila. Arturo even made it appear that his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 03841661
issued on December 10, 2001 is that of his brother Aldrin. That because of the misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were
able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them
to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the property in question.

Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she had no participation in the
execution as she was in Manila at that time.

On the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name Aldrin Duca was his. However, he intersposed the
defense that he was duly authorized by the latter to procure the said tax declaration.

On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto rendered a decision, dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification
defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon said accused a prison term
of two years, four months and one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00. Accused Cecilia is
acquitted for lack of evidence.

The accused Arturo F. Duca is hereby ordered to pay to the complaining witness actual damages in the amount of
P60,000.00 moral damages of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost.

SO ORDERED."

Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed. On March 24, 2004, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 44, rendered
a decision, disposing the case as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the decision dated April 3, 2003 of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Fabian-San Jacinto,
Pangasinan convicting accused Arturo F. Duca of the crime of Falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposing upon said accused an imprisonment of two years, four months and one day to six (6)
years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00, and ordering him to pay to the complaining witness actual damages
in the amount of P60,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 plus cost, is AFFIRMED.

x x x.

SO ORDERED."5

Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. On November 23, 2005,
the CA promulgated its assailed decision acquitting Duca of the crime charged and reversing the RTC decision. The CA
held:

However, the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly authorized by Aldrin in procuring the tax
declaration. On the contrary, the defense was able to establish that Arturo Duca was duly authorized by his brother Aldrin
to secure a tax declaration on the house erected on the land registered under their mother’s name.

xxx xxx xxx

From the foregoing testimony, it can be deduced that Arturo could not have falsified the Tax Declaration of Real Property
under Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116B1 (Exhibit "B") by making it appear that Aldrin Duca, his brother,
participated in the accomplishment of the said document since he was actually acting for and in behalf of the latter. It must
be noted that as early as June 2001, Arturo has already been authorized by Aldrin; albeit verbally, to register the house in
the latter’s name as he cannot do it personally as he was abroad. This authority of Arturo was confirmed by the latter’s
execution of an Affidavit dated January 19, 2002 confirming the procurement of the said tax declaration (Exhibit "6") as
well as a Special Power of attorney executed on June 17, 2002 (Exhibit "7"). Thus, what appeared to be defective from
the beginning had already been cured so much so that the said document became valid and binding as an official act of
Arturo.

If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration in what capacity he was signing, this deficiency was cured by Aldrin’s
subsequent execution of Exhibits "6" and "7".
The RTC’s conclusion that the special power of attorney executed by Aldrin was a mere afterthought designed to extricate
Arturo from any criminal liability has no basis since from the very start, it has been duly established by the defense that
Aldrin had verbally instructed Arturo to cause the execution of Exhibit "B" for the purpose of registering his house
constructed on his mother’s lot for taxation purposes.6

Hence, the instant petition anchored on this sole ground:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND HAD ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED PRIVATE RESPONDENT ARTURO F. DUCA’S APPEAL WITHOUT GIVING THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD THEREON.7

Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the respondent’s appeal without
notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same and without requiring
the Solicitor General to file his comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the CA or this Court, it is
only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it acted on respondent’s appeal without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard.
Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for being violative of due process.

In his Comment,8 respondent argues that there was no denial of due process because the prosecution was properly
represented by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and a private prosecutor who handled the presentation of evidence
under the control and supervision of the Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and supervision conferred on the private
prosecutor by the Provincial Prosecutor had not been withdrawn, the Solicitor General could not claim that the prosecution
was not afforded a chance to be heard in the CA. According to the respondent, he should not be prejudiced by the
Provincial Prosecutor’s failure to inform the Solicitor General of the pendency of the appeal.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
explicitly provides, viz.:

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines,
its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions
and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis
supplied)

Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case of Cariño v. De Castro,9 it was held:

In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People
is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of
the OSG was to "represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings."
This provision has been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12
thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.10

Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,11 the Court made the following pronouncement:

Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the
prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial
courts and the regional trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or this Court,
it is the Solicitor General who must represent the People of the Philippines not the fiscal.12

And in Labaro v. Panay,13 the Court held:

The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the Government or the People of the
Philippines before us and before the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body, or
commission in any matter, action, or proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the welfare of the
people as the ends of justice may require.14

Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People
of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records
show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Duca’s petition. A copy of the CA
Resolution15 dated May 26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel
for Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was
it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The failure of the CA to require
the Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.

Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.16 ruled as follows:

When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby
violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino vs. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971];
People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31,
1966]).

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction.
Thus, the violation of the State’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdiction issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, L-300026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where
the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack
of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA
416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a ‘lawless
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head’ (Aducayen vs. Flores,
supra).17

The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present
its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered
without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process
if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.18

The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his
comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said
petition filed before the CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,19 we held:

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests
of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is
not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and
the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one
hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.20

Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Court:

Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the
same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for
costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed
and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion
for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of
the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to extend fifteen (15) days.

Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Court. The respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for
review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent failed to serve a
copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City.21 The
service of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the
reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and
the Supreme Court. The respondent’s failure to have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. However, the CA, instead of dismissing
respondent’s petition, proceeded to resolve the petition and even acquitted respondent without the Solicitor General’s
comment. We, thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its assailed decision.

On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without filing a
motion for reconsideration with the CA. It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a general rule, must
be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought. Ordinarily, certiorari as a special
civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an
opportunity to correct its assigned errors.22 This rule, however, is not without exceptions. In National Housing v. Court of
Appeals,23 we held:

However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that while generally a motion for
reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to rectify its
errors, this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the circumstances of the case.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a condition sine qua non when the issue raised is purely one of law, or
where the error is patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already
squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.24 (emphasis supplied)

The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari without a motion for
reconsideration is justified.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312
is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the CA for further proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide the
case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168168 September 14, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2) counts of rape and one (1)
count of attempted rape in the complaints which read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 96-125

That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his
own daughter, a minor 10 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Criminal Case No. 96-150

That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria,
who is his own daughter, a minor 12 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Criminal Case No. 96-151

That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria,
thus commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts
of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is
due to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was first sexually abused in the morning of
September 1993. While inside their house in Sucat, Paraaque, appellant entered her room and laid down beside her. He
removed her clothes and asked her to lie face down then inserted his penis into her anus. Complainant cried and felt so
much pain, but she kept the incident to herself as her father might hurt her.5
A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he asked her to lie on her side facing him and
to place her thigh over his. While in that position, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina which caused tremendous
pain.6 As in the first incident, complainant kept the ordeal to herself. It was only in November 1995 that she confided the
sexual abuses to her mother.

On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While leaning on the kitchen sink, he raised her t-shirt,
fondled and kissed her breasts. He then removed their shorts, fondled her vagina and inserted his penis, but when her
brother Edwin went out of his room, appellant immediately asked her to dress up.7

The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant laid complainant down on the sofa then
placed himself on top of her and made pumping motion even with their shorts on. Appellant stopped only when he heard
the arrival of his wife.8

On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal, who upon learning of the abuses done
by the appellant, advised them to go to Camp Crame where they filed a complaint.9 The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP
Crime Laboratory examined complainant and found her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a
non-virgin state.10

Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married Maria Loreto V. Dimaano on December 25,
1976 and begot three children with her, namely, Edwin, Eric, and Maricar. He alleged that he worked in several
companies abroad11 but admitted that he was in the Philippines in September 1993. He contended though that he could
not have raped complainant because he was always in the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to
another assignment overseas.12

He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or January 1, 1996 because there were
other people in the house. He argued that had he raped complainant, then she would not have accompanied him to the
Paraaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of San Antonio to apply for police clearance and barangay I.D., and to
Uniwide Shopping Center at Sucat, Paraaque, where they applied for membership at the Video City Club.13 He also
maintained that the fact that his daughter was in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove that he was responsible for it
because it is also possible that his daughter had sexual intercourse with another man her age.14

The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible. She narrated the obscene details of
her harrowing experience which no girl of tender age would have known unless she herself had experienced it. It found
the delay in reporting the rape understandable due to the fear complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy
over her. Also, the quarrel between complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious charge
of rape against appellant. It disregarded the Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since
complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same. Besides, she testified in open court that she was
pursuing the case against her father. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape (2 counts)
and the crime of attempted rape. For the rape committed in September 1993, he is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion
perpetua. For the rape on December 29, 1995, he is imposed the supreme penalty of death. And for the crime of
attempted rape, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended), he is sentenced to a penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional medium to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayormaximum. He is
ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.15

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City,
Branch 257 convicting accused-appellant Edgardo Dimaano of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of rape under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR
DIMAANO Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,0000.00 as exemplary
damages.

In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as found guilty of qualified rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, and sentenced to death penalty, is also
ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and
Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of attempted rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day
to 10 years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO
Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php25,000.00 as moral damages, and Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-
03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), this case is CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court for review.

Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.16

In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION HAS OVERCOME THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.

II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE BY
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DULY CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH PUT TO
DOUBT THE REASONS BEHIND THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES OF RAPE AGAINST HEREIN
ACCUSED.17

Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she could have reported them to the authorities when
she accompanied him to Paraaque Police Station and the Barangay Hall of San Antonio or to their relatives when she had
the opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the trial court considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang
Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Sumbong, it would have known that complainant was only pressured by her mother into filing
the complaint.

We are not persuaded.

This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely
on because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude during
direct and cross-examination by counsel.18 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility
deserves the appellate court's highest respect.19

It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, more so if she is a
minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to
undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so
testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.20

In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of the complainant who was
only 12 years old when she narrated to the court the violations of her person as follows:

For rape committed in September 1993:

ATTY. AMBROSIO:

When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you?

A: September 1993.

COURT:

No specific date?

A: I cannot remember, Maam.

ATTY. AMBROSIO:

Can you remember how old were you at that time?

A: 10 years old, Maam.

Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what happened next, if anything happened?

A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako.

Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next?

RECORD: The witness is crying.

A: He inserted in my anus ' ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko.

Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you?

A: No, Maam.

Q: Why not?

A: Because I was afraid of my father.

Q: Why are you afraid of your father?

A: Because he might hurt me.

Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident that occurred?

A: There is, Maam.

Q: When was it?

A: After a few days after the first incident.

Q: After he entered your room, what happened next?

A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes.

Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing?

A: He removed his clothes.

Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any?

A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side ' pinatagilid niya ako.

Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any?

A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was then lying on his side.

Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what happened next, if any?

A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21

For rape committed on December 29, 1995:

Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened?

A: There was, Maam.

Q: What is that incident?

A: I was raped by my father on that day.

Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you?

A: I was then at the kitchen of our house.

Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time?

A: I was then sitting at our dining set.

Q: What about your father, what he doing?

A: He was cooking.

Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any?

A: He told me to approach him.

Q: After you approached him, what happened next?

A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him.

Q: What happened after you embraced him?

A: After that, he raised my T-shirt.

Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next?

A: He held my breast.

Q: After that, what happened next?

A: He kept kissing my breast.

Q: How many times did he kiss your breast?

A: Many times.

Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast?

A: He put my shorts down.

Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any?

A: He also put down my panty.

Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any?

A: He held my organ.

ATTY. MALLARES:

At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific with respect to organ.

ATTY. AMBROSIO:

When you say organ', what do you mean?

A: Pekpek.

COURT: Proceed.

ANSWER:

After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief.

Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next?

A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.22

For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996:

Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00 P.M.?

A: We were in our sala on the sofa.

Q: When you say 'we', who are those you are referring to?

A: Me and my father.

Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what happened?
A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and kissing my breast.

Q: What were you wearing at that time?

A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.

Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra?

A: He raised them.

Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time?

A: Shorts and T-shirt.

Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next?

A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he went on top of me.

Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any?

A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts.

Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time?

A: Yes, Maam.

Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your vagina?

A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23

The trial court believed the complainant and held that:

The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the indicia of truth. It is spontaneous, direct and clear.
It is vivid and complete with details. Her testimony is truthful and convincing. Her credibility is beyond question.

The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the offense, undergo the troubles and
humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she has not in fact been raped. The
Court believes that a girl who is only twelve (12) years old would not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody,
much less her own father, if it is not true.24

We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court and the appellate court.

Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not diminished by her failure to report the sexual abuses to
the authorities and her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting the rape incidents, especially in the face
of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim, more so when the lecherous attacker is her own father.
Strong apprehensions brought about by fear, stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended party to doubt or even distrust
what should otherwise be a positive attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The Court has thus considered justified the
filing of complaints for rape months, even years, after the commission of the offense.25

In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that the charges were fabricated for complainant's
reactions were consistent with reason. Her complete obedience to appellant, her lack of struggle and the studied silence
she kept about her ordeal were all brought about by genuine fear posed by her own father against her.

Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. A survey of our jurisprudence
reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The
unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the
trouble of having the appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the
humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her
anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.26

Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted her when she
affixed her signature27 and had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the cases.28 Besides, the trial court
is not bound to dismiss the cases, as it is still within its discretion whether or not to proceed with the
prosecution,29 considering that the compromise agreement and the affidavit of desistance were executed long after the
cases have been filed in court.
Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State belongs the power to prosecute and
punish crimes.30 By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been
instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should
proceed, because the case was already filed and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.31

In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that complainant never retracted her allegation that she
was raped by her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about the rape. All she stated in
the affidavit was that she had decided to withdraw the complaints after the appellant agreed not to disturb the
complainant; to consent to annul his marriage; allow his wife to solely manage the conjugal properties; and entrust the
custody of his children to his wife. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainant's testimony that appellant
raped her on several occasions.

The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent. If the woman is
1âw phi 1

under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an element of
statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is
proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and
also that it was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat.32

We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be employed where the
overpowering moral influence of appellant, who is private complainant's father, would suffice. The moral and physical
dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires.33 The instant case is no
exception. Appellant took advantage of his moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon his daughter.

Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for
the crimes of rape committed in September 1993 and on December 29, 1995. However, we acquit appellant in Criminal
Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of
attempted rape.

The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria,
thus commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts
of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is
due to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.

CONTRARY TO LAW.34

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.35What is controlling
is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited.36 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of
the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the
accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.37

Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege specific acts or omission
constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other
than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rapethe
complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the
one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction;
otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.

The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 96-125 as the rape was
committed in September 1993 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, on
December 31, 1993. Prior to R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the the crime of rape, when committed against a woman who is under 12 years old or is demented. Anent the
rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150 which was committed on December 29, 1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, thus applies. It provides:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.

In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as the special qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship were properly alleged in the information and proved during trial by the testimonies of the
complainant, her mother and the appellant himself; they were also supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate
and birth certificate, respectively.

In the case of People v. Cayabyab,38 this Court, in affirming the death penalty, held that a photocopy of the birth certificate
is admissible to prove the age of the victim, as the original thereof is a public record in the custody of a public officer. The
admission of this secondary evidence is one of the exceptions to the 'best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Further, we held that production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's
discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose
will be served by requiring its production.

Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public
officer. The presentation, therefore of their photocopies is admissible as secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is
also well to note that appellant did not dispute their contents when offered as evidence to prove relationship and minority.
Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a
primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby.39

Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil indemnity and exemplary
damages, which the trial court lumped together for all the crimes committed, by separately awarding the sums of
P50,000.0040 and P75,000.0041 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and
P25,000.0042 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence.

The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon a conviction
for rape.43 On the other hand, exemplary damages is awarded when the commission of the offense is attended by an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.44

Finally, the awards of P50,000.0045 and P75,000.0046 as moral damages in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150,
respectively, by the Court of Appeals are also sustained in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. The award of moral
damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 47

WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, finding appellant Edgardo
Dimaano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his own daughter, Maricar Dimaano,
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and DEATH, respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant in Criminal
Case No. 96-125 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and in Criminal Case No. 96-150 the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED. Appellant is however ACQUITTED for the crime of
attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for failure of the complaint to allege the specific acts or omissions
constituting the offense.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143193 June 29, 2005

MELBAROSE R. SASOT and ALLANDALE R. SASOT, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, The Honorable court of of appeals, and REBECCA G. SALVADOR, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 1, Manila, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The case subject of the present special civil action for certiorari is a criminal prosecution against petitioners for unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch
1), and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-166147.1

Some time in May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by
the NBA Properties, Inc., against petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair
competition. In its Report dated June 4, 1997, the NBI stated that NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of the United States of America, and is the registered owner of NBA trademarks and names of NBA
basketball teams such as "USA Basketball," "Chicago Bulls," "Orlando Magic," "Los Angeles Lakers," "Rockets," "Phoenix
Suns," "Bullets," "Pacers," "Charlotte Hornets," "Blazers," "Denver Nuggets," "Sacramento Kings," "Miami Heat," Utah
Jazz," "Detroit Pistons," "Milwaukee Bucks," "Seattle Sonics," "Toronto Raptors," "Atlanta Hawks," "Cavs," "Dallas
Mavericks," "Minnesota Timberwolves," and "Los Angeles Clippers." These names are used on hosiery, footwear, t-shirts,
sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport shirts, and other garment products, which are allegedly registered with the Bureau
of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer. The Report further stated that during the investigation, it was
discovered that petitioners are engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit "NBA" garment
products. Hence, it recommended petitioners’ prosecution for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code.2

In a Special Power of Attorney dated October 7, 1997, Rick Welts, as President of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the
law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the company’s attorney-in-fact, and to act for and
on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and administrative complaints, among others.3 The Special Power
of Attorney was notarized by Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County Clerk and
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Consul Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate General of the
Philippines, New York, authenticated the certification.4 Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February 12, 1998,
before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown of the State of New York.5

Thereafter, in a Resolution dated July 15, 1998, Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez recommended the filing of
an Information against petitioners for violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.6 The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about May 9, 1997 and on dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above named accused ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of Allandale Sportslines,
Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture and sell various garment products bearing the
appearance of "NBA" names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to believe that the goods offered by them are
those of "NBA" to the damage and prejudice of the NBA Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the "NBA".

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the following grounds:

I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE

II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF
THE ACCUSED8

In support of the foregoing, petitioners argue that the fiscal should have dismissed Welts’s complaint because under the
rules, the complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a fax
transmittal.9 They also contend that complainant is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, and cannot
be protected by Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they have been using the
business name "ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC." since 1972, and their designs are original and do not appear to be
similar to complainant’s, and they do not use complainant’s logo or design.10

The trial prosecutor of the RTC-Manila (Branch 1), Jaime M. Guray, filed his Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash,
stating that he has the original copy of the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent it.
Prosecutor Guray also contended that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even without the participation of the
private offended party, as the crime charged is a public crime.11

The trial court sustained the prosecution’s arguments and denied petitioners’ motion to quash in its Order dated March 5,
1999.12

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52151
which was dismissed per its Decision dated January 26, 2000.13 According to the CA, the petition is not the proper remedy
in assailing a denial of a motion to quash, and that the grounds raised therein should be raised during the trial of the case
on the merits.14 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent court is hereby ordered
to conduct further proceedings with dispatch in Criminal Case No. 98-166147.

SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but this was denied by the CA.16

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with issues raised as follows:

1. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED AND LICENSE (sic) TO DO BUSINESS IN THE
PHILIPPINES MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION.

2. WHETHER AN OFFICER OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION MAY ACT IN BEHALF OF A CORPORATION WITHOUT

AUTHORITY FROM ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS.

3. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS AND WHOSE EMBLEM IT SOUGHT TO
PROTECT IS NOT IN ACTUAL USE IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW.

4. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE AND THE PERSONS OF THE ACCUSED.

5. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION.17

Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by Rick Welts of the NBA Properties, Inc., is defective and
should have been dismissed by the fiscal because it should have been personally sworn to by the complainant before the
investigating prosecutor. They also reiterate the claim that Welts failed to show any board resolution showing his authority
to institute any action in behalf of the company, and that the NBA’s trademarks are not being actually used in the
Philippines, hence, they are of public dominion and cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws. Petitioners further
contend that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair competition.18

The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the People, and filed its Amended Comment to the petition,
praying for its dismissal, arguing that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for
reasons stated in its Decision dated January 26, 2000.19

The petition must be denied.

The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a
motion to quash an information.20 The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial
without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.21 Thus, petitioners should
not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and
reiterate the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances22 in
the present case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorarishould be permitted. Clearly, the CA did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.

Moreover, the Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners.

For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused,23 their arguments
focused on an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal, complainant’s capacity to sue and petitioners’
exculpatory defenses against the crime of unfair competition.

Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time the alleged criminal acts
were committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to wit:

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;

c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses;

f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense
charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the
complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.

For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it
states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant’s affidavit and his witnesses and
supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized
to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All these have been duly
satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the
absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid.24 Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which
does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.25

In this case, Welts’s Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole Brown of the State of New
York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before her on February 12, 1998,26 duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof,
Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez stated that complainant’s representative will present the authenticated notarized original in
court,27 and Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is already on hand.28 It is apt to state at this point that the
prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions, which in turn gives
his report the presumption of accuracy.29

Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from which the prosecutor based his recommendation,
to wit:

(1) The NBI Report dated June 4, 1997, containing an account of the investigation conducted from April 30, 1997
to May 9, 1997, and the subsequent search and seizure of several items from petitioners’ establishment;30

(2) The letter dated May 8, 1997 from the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell to
the NBI, seeking assistance in stopping the illegal manufacture, distribution and sale of "fake products bearing the
‘NBA’ trademark, and in prosecuting the proprietors of aforesaid factory;"31 and

(3) The Joint Affidavit executed by Rechie D. Malicse and Dalisay P. Bal-ot of the Pinkerton Consulting Services
(Phils.) Inc., which was certified to by Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez, attesting to their findings that petitioners
were found to be manufacturing, printing, selling, and distributing counterfeit "NBA" garment products.32

Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion
and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such determination.33

More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code34 is a public
crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured party. The
complainant’s capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.

In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,35 a case akin to the present dispute, as it involved the crime of Unfair
Competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, and the quashal of search warrants issued against
manufacturers of garments bearing the same trademark as that of the petitioner, the Court succinctly ruled that:

More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded this petition for certiorari was a letter-
complaint filed before the NBI charging Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the
Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no longer the
petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act against the State. It is the
latter which is principally the injured party although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue
would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We cannot allow a possible violator of our
criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no
standing to sue.

In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair competition or infringement
of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France are parties. We are simply
interpreting and enforcing a solemn international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which
we are a party and which we entered into because it is in our national interest to do so.36 (Emphasis supplied)

Lastly, with regard to petitioners’ arguments that the NBA Properties, Inc., is not entitled to protection under Philippine
patent laws since it is not a registered patentee, that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair competition for the
reason that their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to complainant’s, and they do not use complainant’s
logo or design, the Court finds that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated and resolved during trial on the
merits of the case.
WHERFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 24) where Criminal Case No. 98-166147 is presently assigned, for further proceedings with
reasonable dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 129472. April 12, 2005]

MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, Petitioners, v. HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 76,
QUEZON CITY, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned, pleaded guilty and were convicted and after they had
applied for probation, may the information be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the ground that the information was
allegedly altered/tampered with? chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero dated 03 July 1996,1accused Marcelo Lasoy and
Felix Banisa were charged as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.

The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 was assigned and raffled to Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.

Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced on 16 July 1996 in this wise:2

On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA with the assistance of [their] counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano
entered a plea of GUILTY to the crime charged against them in the information.

ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby find[s] accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, GUILTY of Violation of Section 4, Republic
Act 6425 and they are hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and the period during which said
accused are under detention is hereby deducted pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 5127.

The evidence in this case which is the 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. The Property Custodian is ordered to turn over said evidences to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.

On the same date, both accused applied for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.3

On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two separate
motions, first, to admit amended Information,4 and second, to set aside the arraignment of the accused, as well as the decision of
the trial court dated 16 July 1996.5 In plaintiff's motion to admit amended information, it alleged:

1. That for some unknown reason both accused herein were charged of (sic) Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, R.P. 6425.

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell, or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.

When in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for transportation and delivery, with intent to sell and to gain, of
Forty-Five (45) pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to Metro Manila.

2. That it is imperative to file an amended information in order to make it conformable to the evidence on hand.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed that the herewith attached Amended Information against both
accused be admitted and subsequently set for arraignment and trial.6(Emphasis supplied) ς rαl αωl ιb rαrÿ

Resolving the motions, the trial court, in its Order dated 03 September 1996,7 held:

The Motion to Admit Amended Information is hereby DENIED, as this court has already decided this case on the basis that the
accused was arrested in possession of 42.410 grams of marijuana and it is too late at this stage to amend the information.

Another Order8 of the same date issued by the trial court resolved the second motion in the following manner:

The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well as the Decision dated July 16, 1996, filed by the Public Prosecutor
is hereby GRANTED, it appearing from the published resolution of the Supreme Court dated October 18, 1995, in G.R. No. 119131
Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen Bobares v. Hon. FRANCISCO H. ESCANO, JR. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Leyte Branch 12, Ormoc City which was dismissed by this court on August 20, 1996, the jurisdiction over drug of small
quantity as in the case at bar should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court, although under the statute of R.A. 7659 which took
effect on December 31, 1993 the penalty for possession or use of prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision [correccional]
to reclusion temporal which indeterminate penalty and under the rule on jurisdiction the court which has jurisdiction over a criminal
case is dependent on the maximum penalty attached by the statute to the crime.

The amended Information reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 kilos of dried marijuana
fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.9

This second information was assigned to Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa,10 docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572.

Both accused filed a Motion to Quash11 which was opposed12 by the People in its Comment/Opposition filed before the trial court.
Subsequently, while the motion to quash before the RTC was as yet unresolved, both accused filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari13 which they later moved to withdraw "to pave the way for Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City to act
judiciously on their motion to quash. ''14 The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 15 November 199615 noted the motion and
considered the petition withdrawn.

In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997,16 the trial court denied accused's motion to quash, and scheduled the
arraignment of the accused under the amended information. Accused's Motion for Reconsideration,17 duly opposed by the
prosecution,18 was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 16 April 1997.19 Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for injunction and temporary restraining order20 based on the following grounds:21

A) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO VALID INFORMATION
AND, THEREFORE, THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; and cralawlibra ry

B) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE RTC, BRANCH 103, HAD
JURISDICTION OVER the case, docketed as Criminal CASE NO. Q-96-66799.22

In this Court's resolution dated 23 July 1997,23 respondents were required to comment on the Petition. They submitted their
Comment on 18 November 1998.24 Accused filed their Reply25 on 02 March 2000. In compliance with the Court's resolution dated
29 March 2000,26 accused and respondents submitted their memoranda, respectively, on 26 May 200027 and 26 July 2000.28

To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the
court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.29

The issues boil down to whether or not the first information is valid and whether or not the RTC, Branch 103, where the first
information was filed and under which Criminal Case No. Q-96-66788 was tried, had jurisdiction to try the case.

On the issue of validity of the information, accused and respondents submitted opposing views - - accused insisting on its validity,
whereas respondents asserted that the accused were arraigned under an invalid information. Alleging that there being an alteration
on the first information, hence it failed to reflect the true quantity of drugs caught in possession of the accused, the prosecution
insisted that the first information under which accused were arraigned is invalid.

In accord with the view of the prosecution, the trial court denied the accused's motion to quash, stating:30

. . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled that the earlier information filed against the accused appeared to be sufficient in form.
It was discovered, however, that an alteration was made as to the weight of the marijuana fruiting tops which was placed at only
42.410 grams when the correct amount should have been in kilos. This fraudulent alteration necessarily vitiated the integrity of the
proceedings such that despite the plea of guilt made by the accused it would not bar a subsequent prosecution for the correct
offense.

Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the prior proceedings must have been valid, and the lack of
any fundamental requisite which would render void the judgment would also make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such
proceedings.

Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal procured by accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put
him in jeopardy; and consequently it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense.

Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or by collusion of the offender, for the purpose of protecting
himself from further prosecution and adequate punishment, is no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, either on
the ground that the conviction is void because of the fraud practiced, or that the state is not in any sense a party to it and
therefore not bound by it. (22 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 244-245)

It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of the deceitful maneuvering which led to the erasure of the true weight
of the marijuana fruiting tops as alleged in the information.

They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of prohibited stuff for which they were charged before the information was
tampered with.

They could not feign innocence when they participated in that charade when they pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the decreased weight in the now altered information which merited a
much lighter penalty was irregularly obtained. Hence, they cannot be considered as put in jeopardy by the proceedings in court
which was tainted with fraud.

The accused should not be allowed to make a mockery of justice or to trifle with the courts by participating in a grand deception of
pleading guilty to a lesser offense knowing that they participated/acquiesced to such tampering and then tell the court that they
would be placed in jeopardy for the second time.

We do not agree with the trial court.

FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest proceedings dated 03 July 1996 addressed to the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and received by Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the accused were apprehended "for conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with each other in facilitating and effecting the transportation and delivery . . . of forty five
pieces of dried marijuana leaves (already in bricks) and weighing approximately forty-five kilos. ''31

In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Ernesto Jimenez Viray, Jr., and arresting officer SPOI Inadio U. Ibay, Jr., it is stated
that the accused were caught with approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops.32 For some unknown reasons, however,
the Information filed against the accused reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams.

The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first Information under which the accused were arraigned invalid.

Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court under Rule 110 are hereunder quoted:

Section 4. Information defined. - An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the
fiscal and filed with the court.

In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,33 this Court citing People v. Marquez affirmed:34

It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 defines an information as nothing more than "an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court."

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof.35

In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant,
and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary
to follow the language of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.36

Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the
manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the
charge against them, is reasonably complied with.

Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110,37 Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid.

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial court's point of view that the accused cannot claim their right against double
jeopardy because they "participated/acquiesced to the tampering," we hold that while this may not be far-fetched, there is actually
no hard evidence thereof.38 Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted
under the first information. Granting that alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the
setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well
be the subject of another inquiry.

In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People,39 the Court affirming the finality of a decision in a criminal case, citing Section 7, Rule 120
of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, stated:

A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed a judgment [of conviction] becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.

Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information amended defies procedural rules, the decision
having attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.

Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:

Sec. 14. Amendment. 'The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court,
when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11,
provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
In Sanvicente v. People,40 this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an accused's right against double jeopardy, even an
appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when
the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. Respondent People of the Philippines argues, citing the
case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan41 that the trial was a sham. We do not agree with the respondent as the trial in the Galman case
was considered a mock trial owing to the act of a then authoritarian president who ordered the therein respondents Sandiganbayan
and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure a predetermined final outcome of
acquittal and total absolution of the respondents-accused therein of all the charges.42

The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. In this case, it bears repeating that the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already in
the stage where they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the
information and seek to try again accused for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by motion of the prosecution and at the time when the
accused had already been convicted is contrary to procedural rules and violative of the rights of the accused.

FINALLY, on the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and Bobares v. Escano, Jr.,43 upon which both trial courts justified their
claim of jurisdiction, was actually based on this Court's resolution dated 18 October 1995 where this Court held:

The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under Section 32
(2) of B. P. 129, as amended by Rep. Act 7691 has been increased to cover offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of the fine (Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June 14, 1994). It appears that the imposable
penalties applicable to the subject cases are within the range of prision correccional, a penalty not exceeding six years, thus falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC. It follows that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charges
against petitioners.

If we apply the resolution of this Court quoted above, it would seem that the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case
under the first Information. Following that argument, the decision dated 16 July 1996 of the RTC Branch 103 was rendered without
jurisdiction, thus, accused may not invoke the right against double jeopardy.

Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this view owing to the fact that a later resolution superseding the resolution cited by the trial
courts, specifically Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC with jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. Q-
96-67572. The resolution provides:

RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, DANGEROUS DRUGS, CARNAPPING AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES UNDER R.A.
NO. 7659

Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the interest of speedy and efficient administration of justice and subject to the
guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively try and decide
cases of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, AND VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-CARNAPPING
ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES defined and penalized under Rep. Act No. 7659, committed within their
respective territorial jurisdictions:

...

11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR.

Subsequently, A.M. No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August 1996, Re: Clarification on the applicability of Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 51-96 in relation to Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, declared:

. . . [T]he Court Resolved to AMEND the prefatory paragraph in Administrative Order No. 5-96, to read:

Pursuant to Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in the interest of speedy administration of justice and subject to the guidelines
hereinafter set forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively try and decide cases of
KIDNAPPING AND/OR KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, regardless of the quantity of the drugs
involved.

This issue is further settled by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in People v. Velasco:44

. . . [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as
applied/interpreted in People v. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994; 234 SCRA 555), and of the provisions of R.A. No. 7691
expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, still fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). R.A. No. 7659 and
R.A. No. 7691 have neither amended nor modified this Section.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Granted. The Orders dated 14 February 1997 and 16 April 1997 issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, are set aside. Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 is ordered Dismissed. Accused
Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith ordered released from detention45 unless there may be valid reasons for their further
detention.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 184537 April 23, 2010

QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, Petitioners,
vs.
The HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th DIVISION and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008
Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, denying the Motion for Preliminary
Investigation filed by the petitioners who were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the
denial of their Motion for Reconsideration done in open court on August 13, 2008.

An Information2 dated September 13, 2000 charging both petitioners with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, by causing undue injury to the government, reads:

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA
and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-
GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:

That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, public officials, being the
Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern Samar in such capacity and committing the offense in relation
to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and with the late Limpio Legua, a private
individual, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter into a Pakyaw Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur
and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(₱48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount of NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱97,000.00), Philippine
Currency, without conducting a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the government the chance to obtain the best, if
not, the most reasonable price, and thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-
accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) and COA Circular No.
91-368, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

This case was initially raffled to the Third Division of Sandiganbayan and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 26319.

In a Resolution3 promulgated on June 14, 2002, the Third Division granted petitioners’ Motion to Quash and dismissed the
information "for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, an
essential element of the crime charged."

In a Memorandum4 dated July 1, 2003, the Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to study the
possibility of having the information amended and re-filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information5 dated August 17, 2007, this time, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM
0263, with the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government.

The information, subject of the petition, now reads:

The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses, MAYOR
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:

That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking
public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while in the
discharge of his official administrative function, conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member
of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-
license contractor and non-

accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there entering into a Pakyaw Contract with
the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares,
Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of
NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the benefit of a competitive public
bidding to the prejudice of the Government and public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation6 dated June 4, 2008 which was strongly opposed by the prosecution
in its Opposition7 dated June 18, 2008.

Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary investigation before the filing of the
second Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter charged a different offense–that is, violation of
Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first Information. They
argue that assuming that no substitution took place, at the very least, there was a substantial amendment in the new
information and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. Further, they claim
that newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.

On July 14, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the assailed Resolution denying the petitioners’ motion for
preliminary investigation. The graft court found that there is no substituted information or substantial amendment that
would warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. It gave the following ratiocination:

The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged, but merely modified the mode by which
accused committed the offense. The substance of such modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of another
preliminary investigation.

Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of the accused upgraded in the re-filed information.
Thus, new preliminary investigation is not in order.

The dispositive portion of the Resolution states:

Finding the arguments of accused-movants indefensible, the sufficiency of the information must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, having established the sufficiency of the Information, the motion under consideration is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the arraignment of both accused shall proceed as scheduled.8

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 dated August 6, 2008, submitting that the two Informations substantially
charged different offenses, such that the present information constituted a substitution that should have been preceded by
a new preliminary investigation.

On August 13, 2008, in a hearing for the arraignment of petitioners, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion10 in open court.

Hence, petitioners interpose the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court anchored on the
following grounds:

The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
refused to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, when the second Information in the instant case
constituted substituted Information whose submission required the conduct of preliminary investigation.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
refused to order the conduct of a preliminary investigation of the case a quo, since the second Information therein
contained substantial amendments whose submission required the conduct of preliminary investigation.

III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
refused to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, although the newly discovered evidence mandates due
re-examination of the finding that prima facie cause existed to file the case a quo.11

From the arguments raised by petitioners, the core issue is whether or not the two (2) ways of violating section 3(e) of
Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference constitute two distinct and separate offenses that would
warrant a new or another preliminary investigation.

In its Comment12 dated January 12, 2009, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, counters that there is no substituted information in contemplation of law and jurisprudence that would require
the conduct of another preliminary investigation. There is no newly-discovered evidence that would lead to a different
determination should there be another preliminary investigation conducted.
In their Reply,13 dated April 24, 2009, petitioners insist that the offenses charged in the first and second Information are
not the same, and what transpired was a substitution of Information that required prior conduct of preliminary
investigation. Even assuming there was no substitution, substantial amendments were made in the second Information,
and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.

We find no merit in this petition.

Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
which reads:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be 0unlawful:

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The essential elements of the offense are as follows:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.14

In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled:

R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public officer should have
acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that
either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of
committing the offense. This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an
accused may be charged under either mode or under both.15

The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of statutory construction that "The word or is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word."16

Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in
Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Only the mode of commission was modified. While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan,17 provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue
injury to any party, including the government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged under
either mode18 or under both should both modes concur.19

Petitioners’ reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag,20 ruling that, "in substitution of information another preliminary
investigation is entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new information" is not applicable to the present
case because, as already stated, there is no substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the offense
charged.

Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor v. Vivar,21 that failure to conduct a new
preliminary investigation is tantamount to a violation of their rights. While it is true that preliminary investigation is a
statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, the denial of petitioners’ claim for a new investigation,
however, did not deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of the case discloses that there
was a full-blown preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated.

Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained substantial amendments warranting a new preliminary
investigation, the same must likewise fail.1avvphi1

Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first Information, and conferring unwarranted
benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue injury to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the
very least, a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded on the same transaction as the
first Information, that of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day care centers for barangays
Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and
defense remain the same.

To bolster their claim for a reinvestigation of the offense, petitioners cited the case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan.22The
same is inapplicable to petitioners’ case. In Matalam, there was indeed a substantial amendment which entitled the
accused to another preliminary investigation. The recital of facts constituting the offense charged therein was definitely
altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by the petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable
refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, whereas in the amended information, it is the illegal
dismissal from the service of the private complainants. In the case at bar, there is no substantial amendment to speak of.
As discussed previously, the Information in Criminal Case No. 26319 was already dismissed by the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan in view of the petitioners’ Motion to Quash. As such, there is nothing more to be amended.

The Court is not unaware of the case of People v. Lacson,23 where it was written:

The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new
Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and
new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is
refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused,
other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if
under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal
liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the
right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence.

No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no modification in the nature of the charged
offense. Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners.
1avv phi 1

Finally, the third assigned error, that newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding of prima facie
cause to file the case, deserves scant consideration. For petitioners, it is necessary that a new investigation be conducted
to consider newly discovered evidence, in particular, the Affidavit of COA Auditor Carlos G. Pornelos, author of the audit
report. We are not convinced.

Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at
the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of
such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.24

The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed by affiant way back in November 29,
2000, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was
already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered
during the preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners’ Supplement to Motion for
Reinvestigation,25 offered to dispute the charge that no public bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject
project.

More important is the prosecution’s statement in its Memorandum that, "after a careful re-evaluation of the documentary
evidence available to the prosecution at the time of the filing of the initial Information, and at the time of the re-filing of the
Information, the prosecution insists on the finding of probable cause, an exercise within the exclusive province of the
Office of the Ombudsman."26

Worthy of note is the case of Soriano v. Marcelo,27 viz:

Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary investigation is
a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a
criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call.

Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its
investigatory and prosecutory powers.28 The only ground upon which it may entertain a review of the Office of the
Ombudsman’s action is grave abuse of discretion.29

Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and
despotism.30

The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to
act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.31

The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with arbitrariness, whim or
caprice. It committed no error in refusing to order the conduct of another preliminary investigation. As sufficiently
explained by the prosecution, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary as there was neither a modification of the
nature of the offense charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary investigation anew will only delay the
resolution of the case and would be an exercise in futility in as much as there was a complete preliminary investigation
actively participated by both petitioners.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
Resolution of July 14, 2008, denying petitioners’ motion for preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM
0263.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010

WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR.,Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) – Order1 of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to
quash the Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution2 of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration
of the first issuance.

Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family ("in
particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.
(Malayan),4 a criminal complaint,5 before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article
355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella
Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn
Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez
Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a
member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the
website www.pepcoalition.com.

PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly
owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC)
- who had previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the
benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of
payments before the Makati RTC.

Decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a
forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website
on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.

Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot6 under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These
websites are easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.

Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to
October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be
published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the
Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan."8 He cited an article which was posted/published
on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:

Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng
negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that
Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga
Yuchengcos.
LET’S MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER.
Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng
YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat
and again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially
those who joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.

FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD
SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x 9 (emphasis in the original)

By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed
thirteen (13) separate Informations11 charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads:

That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as
such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication
to the public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and
integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt
published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the
said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory article as follows:

Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng
negotiation. x x x x x x x x x

For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next
time they will try to kill us na. x x x

A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex "F" of the
complaint.

That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to the
accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones responsible for the
posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with the object of
the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public.

CONTRARY TO LAW.12

Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutor’s Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of
Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,13 reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the
withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was
non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14

Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash16the
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts
complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC;
and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense of libel.

Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial
court’s jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at
the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.

By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information,
citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.19 It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually
residing in Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit
at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.

The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,20 insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred
jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban21 which held that the Information need not allege
verbatim that the libelous publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that
Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that
the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.

Petitioners opposed the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in
criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be
cured by amendment.22
By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration and accordingly
ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue."

The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007,24 the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as
such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication
to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts
are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and
reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco
and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article
imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first
published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)

Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information25 which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public
respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati;
and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-
published article.

By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be
sufficient in form.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12,
2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:

1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;

2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE

DEFICIENT; and

3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27

With the filing of Gimenez’s Comment28 to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on
hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public
respondent’s admission of the Amended Information.

The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,29 as a rule, requires that recourse must first
be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.30 A regard for judicial hierarchy
clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC
and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.31 The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of
certain exceptions.

Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual
but purely legal questions.32

In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception,
in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal
complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC –whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for
written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363,
reading:

Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila
at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or
of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold
office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case
one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first
published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires even greater import in libel
cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal
and civil aspects of such cases.

In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo35 which laid out the rules on venue in
libel cases, viz:

For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier
pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:

In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information
should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or
a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written
defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the
circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the
action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two
places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the
alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the
venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing
and first publication.

The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon
an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals36 explained
the nature of these changes:

Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the
amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:

"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the
province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written,
printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the
preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.

Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618).
Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.

Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the
venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.

Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V.
Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan
(Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).

To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the
criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by
means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which
became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the
venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an
accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of
sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the
venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed
and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the
case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the
internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise
of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with "printing and first publication"
would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly
requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger
or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant
may have allegedly accessed the offending website.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because
the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations
where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed. 1avv phi 1

Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the
Court’s pronouncements in Chavez37 are instructive:

For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person
must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainant’s place of
residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such
as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations
imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the
civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest
to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to quash the Amended
Information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12,
2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the
Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 172476-99 September 15, 2010

BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to annul the 5 April 2006 Resolution2 of the SandiganbayanFourth
Division in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45. The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment
on 26 February 2006 pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause
against him.

The Facts

Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of
Brigadier General, when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)
from 5 April 1994 to 27 July 1998.3

During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of
15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as housing projects.4

On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12
individual vendors,5 executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of
₱10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of
₱10,500.00 per square meter of the property.

Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral deeds of sale
reflected a purchase price of only ₱3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of ₱10,500.00 per
square meter. On 24 September 1997, Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral
deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City
to AFP-RSBS.6

On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato,
which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit7 against petitioner, along with 27 other
respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and
(2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. The case was docketed as Case No.
OMB-3-98-0020.

After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999 Resolution,8 found petitioner probably guilty of
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents, thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the following crimes were committed and
that respondents, whose names appear below, are probably guilty thereof:

xxxx

4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO, conspirators for twelve (12) counts of falsification of
public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;

xxxx

6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. WILFREDO PABALAN, and NILO FLAVIANO twelve (12) counts of violation of section 3(e) of
RA 3019 for short-changing the government in the correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot X to AFP-RSBS;9

On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations10 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 and 12 informations11 for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.

Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999,12 with a supplemental motion dated 28 May
1999,13 of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. In its 11 June 1999 Order,14 the Sandiganbayan
disposed of petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration, thus:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to evaluate its evidence and to do whatever is
appropriate on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28,
1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal and to inform this Court within the said period as to its findings and recommendations
together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman.

In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that
petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated
18 December 2001, recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the
contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject
property.15

The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of the Ombudsman for Military
(OMB-Military). In a memorandum dated 21 August 2002, the OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP
recommending the dropping of petitioner’s name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved
the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before
the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration.

A panel of prosecutors16 was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough review, the panel of prosecutors
found that petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and
various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter.
The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale,
which indicated the false purchase price of ₱3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that
probable cause existed for petitioner’s continued prosecution. In its 19 December 2005 memorandum,17 the panel of
prosecutors recommended the following:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following:

1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside and the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal (petitioner) be DENIED;
 2. Another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 be filed against Ramiscal and all the other accused
for causing damage to the government when it caused the payment of the amount of Php 10,500.00 per square
meter for the subject lots when the actual amount should only be Php 3,000.00 per square meter.18 (Emphasis
supplied)

Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of prosecutors. Upon receipt of the
final findings of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner.

Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration19 of the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause against him.

On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a
plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment20 pending resolution of his
second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.

The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence
petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.21

The Issue

Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment
pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him?

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from the informations. He claims lack of probable
cause to indict him considering the prior findings of the Ombudsman recommending the dropping of the cases against
him. Petitioner claims that heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and that there should
be grounds other than the mere signature appearing on a questioned document to sustain a conspiracy charge.

Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment. Respondent
court argues that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, filed on 26 January 2006 and pending with the Ombudsman at
the time of his arraignment, violated Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended. Respondent court maintains that the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against
petitioner was the final decision of the Ombudsman.

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of
2001,22 sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –

a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the
same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy
Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already
been filed in court;

b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding
information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion.(Emphasis
supplied)

If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the
corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal
procedure logically follows the filing of the information.

An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is
granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges
against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.23
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493,24 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed
with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has
appeared before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later, thus:

Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. - The
arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date
the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last
occurs. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493, provides:

Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –

(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx (Emphasis
supplied)

Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493 mean the same thing, that the
30-day period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when
the accused appears before the court.

The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies
suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the
following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable
to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the
Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.25

Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in
this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by
Section 7 of RA 8493.

Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
filed on 26 January 2006 was already his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable
cause against him. The Ombudsman, in its 19 December 2005 memorandum, has already denied petitioner’s first motion
for reconsideration,26 impugning for the first time the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. Under Section
7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion for
reconsideration questioning yet again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.

We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner’s defenses are evidentiary in nature and are best threshed out in the trial
of the case on the merits. Petitioner’s claim that the Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the existence of
probable cause against him is baseless. The memorandum of the OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of the cases
against petitioner, has been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following:

1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside and the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal be DENIED;27 (Emphasis supplied)

As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against petitioner prevails.
This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause.28 The Ombudsman is endowed
with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal
complaints.29 As this Court succinctly stated in Alba v. Hon. Nitorreda:30

Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally
mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the
exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and
independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and
preserver of the integrity of the public service.31
In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman,32 the Court explained the rationale behind this policy, thus:

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered
by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could
be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide
to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.33

Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the
Ombudsman, which has full control of the case.34 1avvphi1

In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion
when power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law.35

Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction and
control over a case properly filed before it. The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the
manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case.36 There being no
showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all deliberate
dispatch.

We remind respondent to abide by this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,37 where we stated that the mere filing
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the Sandiganbayan. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides:

Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition [for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall
not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis
supplied)

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 25122-45, which denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment. This Decision is immediately
executory.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R.
SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.2

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January
1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment
for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June
1995, but to no avail.3

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson 4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his
counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent
money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in
appreciation of his services, he was

offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had
filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks
and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly
the same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson
himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and
dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the
case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible
for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during
the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against
Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, 11 ACP Sampaga
held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, 12 which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were
dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24
August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative
proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as
yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed. 13 Moreover, ACP
Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the
investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner. 15

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that
the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ
resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and
declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was
directed to file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 19 On 8 July 2003, the City
Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson,
ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of
special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does
not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised
Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. 23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v.
Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial
proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The
petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of
non-forum

shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere
photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27 Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent
compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of
Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.28

In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical
grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the
Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which
does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim
that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30

The petition is meritorious.

First on the technical issues.

Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules,
the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a
deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31

Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true
and correct–the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with
the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the
pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.

Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a
certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before
the

Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, 33 a certified true copy of which
was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.

Now, on the substantive aspects.

Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring
that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this
case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the
violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner
notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him
since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control. 38

There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which
do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but
less than two years; (c) x x x

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court
can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses
was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. 40

The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926
at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the
peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the
prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch
as the filing of the complaint signifies the

institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. 44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao
and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding
which suspends the prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in
the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the
case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, 48and hence, the prescriptive period
should be interrupted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled
that the

prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more
recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature
and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities
Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus
effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation
and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now
be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial
when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted
against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription. 54

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under
his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within
the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of
the charges against

Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution,
an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already
initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-
flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights
and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond
their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there
is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the
filing of the information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE,

Petitioner ,
-versus-

JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO,

Respondent .

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944

[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2189-RTJ]

Present:

PANGANIBAN, Chairman,

SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES, and

GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:

December 13, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the
defense in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, 'People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al., for violation of Section 3 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State
Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case.

State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in
Quezon City, hence, his absence during the proceedings on the said dates.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27, October 1, 15 and 29, 2004, State Prosecutor Pinote
refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he maintaining that the
proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence were void.

State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November 12, 2004 before the trial court, he restating why he
was not present on August 13 and 20, 2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Ayco's act of allowing the defense to
present evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be 'coerced to cross-
examine those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off the record.

By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over the Manifestation, considered the prosecution to have
waived its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses.

Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State Prosecutor Pinote (complainant) against Judge Ayco
(respondent), for 'Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.

By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent proffers that complainant filed the complaint 'to save his face and cover up
for his incompetence and lackadaisical handling of the prosecution of the criminal case as in fact complainant was, on the
request of the Provincial Governor of South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the case by the Secretary of Justice.

And respondent informs that even after complainant was already relieved as the prosecutor in the case, he filed a motion for
his inhibition without setting it for hearing.

On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant before the trial court on November 12, 2004, respondent brands the
same as 'misleading and 'highly questionable, complainant's having undergone medical treatment at the Philippine Heart
Center on August 13 and 20, 2004 having been relayed to the trial court only on said date.
On his Order considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the same on complainant's
failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose.

Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainant was permitted to
cross examine the two defense witnesses but he refused to do so.

By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with 'Contempt of Court and 'Grave Misconduct and/or
'Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Bar and as an Officer of the Court.

On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure, finds respondent to have breached said rule and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded
therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of lack of public
prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal
action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.

If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private
prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to
prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to
prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked
or otherwise withdrawn.

Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly
prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. [1] It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the
trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law,
the bedrock of peace of the people. [2]

Respondent's act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a
private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by
subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.

Respondent's intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be,
cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

Respondent's lament about complainant's failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the August 13 and 20, 2004
hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders
allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve respondent of his utter
disregard of the Rules.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Respecting the counter-complaint against complainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote, respondent is advised that the
same should be lodged before the Secretary of Justice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158177 January 28, 2008

SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE BALBOA, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng (petitioners) charge Vicente Balboa (respondent) with
forum shopping.

On February 24, 1997, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 34), Civil Case No. 97-
82225 for Collection of Sum of Money against petitioners. The amount sought covers three post-dated checks issued by
petitioner Caroline Siok Ching Teng (Caroline), as follows: Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57546 dated December 30, 1996
for P2,000,000.00; Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57547 dated January 15, 1997 for P1,200,000.00; and Asia Trust Check
No. BNDO57548 dated January 31, 1997 for P1,975,250.00 - or a total of P5,175,250.00.1

On July 21, 1997, separate criminal complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. No. 22) were filed against
Caroline before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manila (Branch 10), covering the said three checks. These cases were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 277576 to 78.2

On August 11, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. 97-82225 finding petitioners liable, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter:

1. To play the plaintiff the sum of P5,175,250.00 plus 6% interest per annum until full payment;

2. To pay the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.

3. To pay the cost of suit.

The counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.3

Thereafter, in a Decision dated December 5, 2001 rendered in Criminal Case Nos. 277576 to 78, the MTC acquitted
Caroline of the offenses charged for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The MTC,
however, found Caroline civilly liable in favor of respondent for the amounts covered by these checks, to wit:

WHEREFORE, accused Caroline Siok Ching Teng is acquitted of the charge for violation of BP Blg. 22 for failure
of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is ordered civilly liable to the offended
party for the amounts of the checks subject of the three informations herein, i.e., P1,200,000.00, P1,975,250.00
and P2,000,000.00.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the MTC Decision praying for the deletion of the award of civil indemnity, but it
was denied by the MTC per Order dated April 12, 2002. Thus, Caroline appealed to the RTC, which docketed the case as
Criminal Case Nos. 02-204544-46.
In the meantime, petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on appeal the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 97-
82225, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61457. In the assailed Decision dated November 20, 2002, the CA5 dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding no reversible error in the appealed Decision dated August 11,
1998 of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 97-82225, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit, and said Decision is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but this was denied per Resolution dated April 21, 2003.7

On May 8, 2003, the RTC as an appellate court, rendered its Decision in Criminal Case No. 02-204544-46, modifying the
MTC Decision by deleting the award of civil damages.8

Now before the Court for resolution is the Amended Petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the CA
Decision dated November 20, 2002 and Resolution dated April 21, 2003, on the lone ground that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ALLOWING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO RECOVER TWICE FOR THE SAME
OBLIGATION ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S DELIBERATE FAILURE AND
REFUSAL TO INFORM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THE CIVIL OBLIGATION BEING SUED UPON IS
THE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS WITH THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, AND FOR WHICH
THE CIVIL OBLIGATION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ADJUDGED.9

Petitioners contend that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution should be reconsidered and the RTC Decision dated
August 11, 1998 dismissed as respondent's act of filing Civil Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78
constitutes forum shopping.

Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the supposition
that one or the other court would render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party against whom an
adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.10

There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who
represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded
on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.11

In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.,12 the Court ruled that there is identity of parties and
causes of action between a civil case for the recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of bouncing
checks, and a criminal case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of the civil action
so as to prevent double payment of the claim. The Court stated:

x x x The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender to deter him and others from committing
the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform or rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order. The purpose, meanwhile, of the civil action is for the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.
Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 is the same as that
sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is, the recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to
petitioner, represents the amount to be paid by respondent for its purchases. x x x

This was reiterated in Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corp. v. Demetria,13 where the civil case for the recovery of the
amount covered by the bouncing checks was also ordered dismissed.

In Hyatt and Silangan, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 effective September 16, 1997, which provides:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized.

This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based
on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged
 but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial
of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions.

The foregoing, however, are not applicable to the present case. It is worth noting that Civil Case No. 97-82225 was filed
on February 24, 1997, and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78 on July 21, 1997, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court
Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997. Thus, at the time of filing of Civil Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos.
277576 to 78, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is necessarily included
in the criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or (2) there is a reservation to institute
a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.14 Since respondent instituted the civil action
prior to the criminal action, then Civil Case No. 97-82225 may proceed independently of Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to
78, and there is no forum shopping to speak of.

Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22
is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case. Thus, in the Hyatt case, the Court noted, viz.:

x x x This rule [Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure ] was enacted to help declog court
dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no
filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal
charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The
inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before
the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these
cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be
filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of
the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no
longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil
action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners' rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before
the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the RTC, in its Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-204544-46, already deleted the award of civil damages.
Records do not disclose that appeal had been taken therefrom. There is, therefore, no double recovery of the amounts
covered by the checks or unjust enrichment on the part of respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 20, 2002 and Resolution dated
April 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.