ERRATA SHEET

“CLEARER THAN TRUTH:”

Determining and Preserving Grand Strategy
The Evolution of American Policy
Toward the People’s Republic of China

Monica Elizabeth Crowley

In 2017, concerns were raised about potential plagiarism in this dissertation. Columbia
University conducted a formal research misconduct investigation into the allegations, in
accordance with its Institutional Policy on Misconduct in Research. The investigation was
completed in 2019. The investigation identified localized instances of plagiarism, but concluded
that the preponderance of the evidence did not support a finding that Dr. Crowley committed
research misconduct. For the dissertation to stand, the University required certain corrections,
which Dr. Crowley has provided. Those corrections follow.

December 2019
______________________________________________________________________________

#1: Dissertation at p. 24

As written:
The numbers issue in international relations consists of the debate over the relative stability
of bipolar and multipolar systems (which is really a debate about the impact of the number of
significant players on international conflict and cooperation) and of the debate over the
impact of hegemonic stability and international regimes on cooperation. 15
Numbers affect the potential for and success of cooperation in several ways. First,
cooperation requires the recognition of opportunities for the promotion of mutual interests, as
well as policy coordination once they have been identified. According to Keohane and
others, as the number of players increases, transactions and transaction costs rise; as Oye
states, “the complexity of N-person situations militates against identification and realization
of common interests.” 16

Revision:
The numbers issue in international relations consists of the debate over the relative stability
of bipolar and multipolar systems (which is really a debate about the impact of the number of
significant players on international conflict and cooperation) and of the debate over the
impact of hegemonic stability and international regimes on cooperation. 15
Numbers affect the potential for and success of cooperation in several ways. First, as Oye
points out, cooperation requires a number of elements, including a sense of mutual
opportunities and interests and a general agreement on policy prescriptions to achieve it. 15.1
According to Keohane and others, as the number of players increases, transactions and
transaction costs rise; as Oye states, “the complexity of N-person situations militates against
identification and realization of common interests.” 16

1
 [Fn. 15: Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy,” Cooperation Under
Anarchy, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 18. Fn. 15.1: Oye, Ibid, p.
19.]

#2: Dissertation at p. 69

As written:
Public support is a fluid dynamic: given information and analysis by leaders and elites,
the public constantly weighs the benefits and prospects of success against the likely and
actual costs and then reaches a determination as to whether the likely outcome is worth
the sacrifice. As new events occur or objective conditions change, they are interpreted by
political leaders and experts, and the ends and means are reevaluated.

Revision:
Public support is a fluid dynamic. As Larson has indicated, given information and
analysis, the public constantly performs a cost-benefit analysis and then decides whether
a likely outcome is worth the sacrifice. “As new events occur or objective conditions
change,” notes Larson, “they are interpreted by political leaders and experts, and the ends
and means are reevaluated.” 42

As Larson and others have noted, “U.S. military operations are typically explained and
justified both in normative terms---stressing the importance of the principles and interests
that are at stake---and pragmatic terms---stressing the good prospects and reasonable
costs of the intervention.” 42.1 Further, “a focus on the particular objectives of the
operation and the perceptions of the principles and interests that are engaged establishes a
connection between the objectives of a given operation and the larger purposes it is
promoting.” 42.2

[Fn. 42: Larson, Ibid, p. 12. Fn. 42.1: Larson, Ibid. Fn. 42.2: Larson, Ibid, p. 13]

#3: Dissertation at p. 101

As written:
By modifying the China aid bill to allow the unexpended portion to be used to continue to
aid the KMT, Congress had made it impossible for Acheson to abandon support for the
Nationalists and move to a realist policy of establishing relations with the communists
based on their effective control of the government of China. Congress’ action was, of
course, a reaction to the success of the anti-communist rhetorical campaign being waged
by the administration, but it was met by the unintended consequence of Mao declaring on
June 30, 1949, that China would align itself with the Soviet Union. To assure the Soviets
that he was not an Asian Tito, he stated, “We must lean to one side...Sitting on the fence
will not do; nor is there a third road.” 23

Mao’s announcement may have been influenced by the extension of the aid bill, but for

2
 months before his statement, the Chinese communist leadership had been giving mixed
signals; as Chou Enlai had stated:

“It is a fond dream of the United States to split China from the Soviet Union,” but he also
argued that “the Chinese Communist Party cannot afford to make enemies on both sides;
no force can prevent it from having two friends at once.” 24

Revision:
As Chace explains, by allowing part of the China aid bill to be used to continue to aid the
KMT, “Congress was making it impossible for Acheson to abandon support of the
Chinese Nationalists and move to a realist policy of establishing relations with Beijing on
the basis of who represented the effective government of China.” 22.1 Congress’ action
was, of course, a reaction to the success of the anti-communist rhetorical campaign being
waged by the administration, but it was met with the unintended consequence of Mao
declaring that China would align with the Soviet Union. As Chace reported, “To assure
the Soviets that he was not about to become an Asian Tito, [Mao] asserted, “We must
lean to one side...Sitting on the fence will not do; nor is there a third road.”” 23

Chace also notes that Mao’s announcement “may have been influenced by the extension
of the aid bill”, but for months before his statement, the Chinese communist leadership
had been sending mixed signals; as Chou Enlai had stated: “It is a fond dream of the
United States to split China from the Soviet Union,” but he also argued that “the Chinese
Communist Party cannot afford to make enemies on both sides; no force can prevent it
from having two friends at once.”24

[Fn. 22.1: James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the
American World, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998, pp. 218. Fn 23: Chace,
Ibid. Fn 24: Chace, Ibid, p. 218-219.]

#4: Dissertation at p. 102

As written:
Ten days after Mao’s speech, he dispatched Chen Mingshu to explain his thinking to
Ambassador Stuart. In mid-July 1949, Chen told Stuart that Mao’s declaration was
geared for domestic consumption and that the CCP still hoped for formal diplomatic
relations between the United States and a Chinese communist regime. 25

Trade was the key issue. The administration saw Sino-American trade as a way to pry the
Chinese communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao and Chou saw it as a hedge against
too close an alignment with Stalin. (Simultaneously, Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the
NATO treaty, perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset in the rapidly developing
cold war.) Despite the general agreement on the use of trade, however, Chou wrote a
memorandum blasting what he perceived to be American attempts of economic coercion
against China. China would not be used or manipulated, he implied, but again, he held
open the option of closer relations. 26

3
 Revision:
As Christensen and Chace have noted, ten days after Mao’s speech, he sent Chen
Mingshu to explain his thinking to Ambassador Stuart. In mid-1949, Chen told Stuart that
Mao’s declaration was meant for his domestic audience and that the CCP still hoped for
formal diplomatic relations with the United States. 25

Trade was the key issue. Chace and others have noted that the administration saw Sino-
American trade as a way to pry the Chinese communists away from Moscow; Mao and
Chou saw it as a hedge against Stalin. (Additionally, in view of the signing of the NATO
treaty, Stalin saw China as an increasingly valuable asset.) Despite the general agreement
on the use of trade, however, Chou wrote a memorandum blasting what he perceived to
be American attempts at economic coercion. China would not be used or manipulated, he
implied, but again, he held open the possibility of closer relations. 26

[Fns. 25 and 26: Chace, Ibid, p. 219]

#5: Dissertation at p. 105

As written:
In the Letter, Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the failures of the Nationalist
government “do not stem from an inadequacy of aid.” Emphasizing that “history has
proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army without morale
cannot survive the test of battle,” the Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States did
or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed the
results.”

The Letter was essentially a political document meant to portray the Chinese communists
as chumps of Moscow; it stated that the CCP leaders “have publicly announced their
subservience to a foreign power, Russia,” though, according to John Melby, who drafted
the White Paper, Acheson did not agree with this assessment but approved the language
to appease the China bloc.38 But by asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow, he
made it much more difficult to pursue his preferred policy of eventual recognition, even
if Mao were to conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic opposition. Even at this point,
Acheson was still searching for a way to keep apart Moscow and Beijing. He apparently
believed that the CCP would eventually have to choose between the interests of its own
people and those of the Soviet Union. By accusing Mao of submitting to Stalin, he hoped
to inspire the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.” 39

The White Paper aroused widespread fury. Journalist Walter Lippmann, who attacked the
language about China’s subservience to the Soviet Union, believed that the United States
was doing too much on behalf of a hopeless cause.

The China bloc was outraged because they believed the United States was doing too
little. General Patrick Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for the pro-

4
communists in the State Department who had engineered the overthrow of our ally, the
Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.” 40

Republican Senators such as Knowland, Styles Bridges, and Kenneth Wherry, along with
Democrat Pat McCarran assailed the White Paper as “a 1054 page whitewash of a
wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet
conquest.” 41

Revision:
As James Chace has admirably summarized in his 1998 biography of Dean Acheson, “in
the Letter…Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the failures of the Nationalist
government “do not stem from an inadequacy of American aid.”’ 36.1 Emphasizing that
“”history has proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army
without morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the Letter reiterated that “nothing the
United States did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could
have changed the results.”” 37

Chace notes, “The Letter was essentially a political document”, meant to “[portray] the
Chinese Communists as tools of Moscow. It stated that the Chinese Communist leaders
“have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia,”” though,
according to John Melby, who drafted the White Paper, Acheson disagreed with this
assessment but approved it to satisfy the China bloc.38 But by casting Beijing as the
junior partner, he made it tougher to try to achieve his preferred policy of eventual
recognition. Even at this point, as Chace notes, Acheson was still exploring ways to keep
the two nations apart. He apparently believed that the CCP would eventually have to
choose between Chinese and Soviet interests. As Chace put it, “by accusing Mao of
kowtowing to Stalin, he hoped to spur on the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.””39

Chace details the widespread anger generated by the White Paper, including from
journalist “Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about China’s subservience to
the Soviet Union and also believed America had been doing too much in a losing cause.”
39.1

Chace also identifies the outrage of the China bloc, who believed the United States was
not doing enough, noting that General Patrick Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth
alibi for the pro-communists in the State Department who had engineered the overthrow
of our ally, the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.” 40

Chace further identifies Republican Senators such as Knowland, Styles Bridges, and
Kenneth Wherry, along with Democrat Pat McCarran, who assailed it as “a 1054 page
whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in
danger of Soviet conquest.” 41

[Fn. 36.1: James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the
American World, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998, p. 219. Chace cites the
China White Paper, pp. xiv-xvi: Chace, Ibid, p. 219, fn. 29. Fn. 37: Chace, Ibid,

5
 p. 219. China White Paper, pp. xiv-xvi. Fn. 38: Chace, Ibid, p. 219-220, citing
Melby as quoted by Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 96, fn. 79. Fn. 39: Chase,
Ibid, p. 220, quoting the China White Paper. Fn. 39.1: Chace, Ibid, p. 220. Fn.
40: Chace, Ibid, p. 220, citing Tsou, America’s Failure in China, p. 509. Fn. 41:
Chace, Ibid, p. 220, citing Tsou, America’s Failure in China, p. 509, and Isaacson
and Thomas, The Wise Men, p. 475.]

#6: Dissertation at p. 119

As written:
On March 29, 1950, Acheson once again testified in executive session before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. He reiterated his argument for nonintervention and
dismissed Taiwan as “not a great question in American foreign policy,” but he added that
“it may become a very great question if it obscures or changes or interferes with what we
are trying to do in regard to China.” And again, he stated the belief that a split with
Moscow was possible: “If the devil himself runs China, if he is an independent devil, that
is infinitely better than if he is a stooge of Moscow.” Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement
signed in February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe, will come into conflict with
Moscow.”69

Further, Acheson told the senators that he was particularly wary of Chiang’s
adventurism: the risk was that Chiang, who was running a war against the mainland by
“bombing Nanking and other cities,” would drag the United States into war with
mainland China. According to Acheson, Chiang “believed that World War III is
absolutely inevitable,” in which case “the United States will have to go back and conquer
China, and he will come riding in on our coat tails.” As far as Acheson was concerned,
Chiang was tempting Mao to invade Taiwan: “The communists would be criminally
crazy if they did not put an end to (Chiang’s hold on the island) just as soon as possible.”
70

Had this actually happened, Acheson believed that he could have overcome domestic
opposition to recognizing the communist regime.

Revision:
On March 29, 1950, Acheson appeared again in executive session before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. As Chace and others have summarized, he reiterated his
argument for nonintervention and dismissed Taiwan as a rather unimportant matter to
U.S. foreign policy but indicated that calculation might change. 68.1 And again, he stated
the belief that a split with Moscow was possible: “If the devil himself runs China, if he is
an independent devil, that is infinitely better than if he is a stooge of Moscow or China
comes under Russia.” 68.2 He went on to warn that despite the Sino-Soviet agreement,
“the Chinese, inevitably, we believe, will come into conflict with Moscow.”69

Chace notes further that “according to Acheson, Chiang “believed World War III is
absolutely inevitable,” in which case “the United States will have to go back and conquer

6
 China, and he will come riding in on our coat tails.” 69.1 As far as Acheson was
concerned, Chiang was actually inviting Mao to invade Taiwan. “The Communists would
be criminally crazy,” he advised the Senators, “if they did not put an end to [Chiang’s
island bastion] just as soon as possible.”’70

Chace observes that Acheson believed that if that developed, the administration might
have a chance to break down domestic opposition to recognizing the regime. 70.1

[Fn. 68.1: James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the
American World, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998, pp. 224. Fns. 68.2, 69,
69.1, 70 and 70.1: Chace, Ibid.]

#7: Dissertation at p. 136

As written:
America would continue its dominant role in containing the Soviet Union, but at a lower
level of effort and with a diminished prospect of armed intervention and greater material
assistance from allies.

Revision:
America would continue to lead in containing the Soviet Union but at a lower pitch and a
reduced scale. 2.1

[Fn. 2.1: Argyris G. Andrianopoulos, Western Europe in Kissinger’s Global

Strategy, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988, np: book out of print]

#8: Dissertation at p. 137

As written:
The objective was to reduce America’s burden of involvement without undermining its
global commitments and influence or the confidence of its allies, which in turn depended
on reducing the level of international tensions and the expectation of war with
adversaries.

Revision:
The objective was to maintain America’s global position, influence and obligations and
the trust of her allies, while lessening its own burdens as well as global tension over the
potential for war. 2.2

[Fn. 2.2: Andrianopoulos, Ibid.]

7
#9: Dissertation at pp. 141-143

As written:
The difficulty here, however, is that we have very limited experience with tripolar
systems; indeed, our actual experience is limited to the functioning of a single system—
the balance of power—operating within the multipolar (generally five powers)
framework that characterized world politics until World War II, or the bipolar
arrangement that has characterized them since. Alternative systems, such as tripolarity,
remain derived primarily from multipolar and bipolar theories.

The nature of international politics since 1945 can be viewed in terms of “systems
theory.” Jervis has argued that an “international system” exists when interconnections
exist between units in the system, so that changes in some parts of it produce changes in
other parts as well, and that the collective behavior of the system as a whole differs from
the expectations and priorities of the individual units that make it up. 5 Since World War
II, the major powers assumed that little could happen in the world without either
enhancing or damaging their own interests: as Jervis notes, “almost by definition a great
power is more tightly connected to larger numbers of other states than is a small power.”
6 Further, the collective behavior of states has not corresponded to their individual
expectations, particularly when many of the statesmen who pieced together the post-war
arrangements expected another war to erupt relatively soon thereafter.7

Systems theory provides criteria for differentiating between stable and unstable political
frameworks that may help to explain why some international systems last longer than
others. Deutsch and Singer defined “stability” as “the probability that the system retains
all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its
members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur.” This system has a
capacity for self-regulation; that is, to counterbalance threatening situations before they
spin out of control. Craig and George established that self-regulating mechanisms are
most likely to operate when there is some basic agreement among the major states of the
system on the objectives of it, when the structure of the system accurately reflects power
distribution in the system, and when pre-established procedures exist for resolving
differences.

Revision:
The problem, however, is that we have very limited experience with tripolar systems; as
Gaddis has pointed out, “our actual experience is limited to the operations of a single
system—the balance of power system—operating within the multipolar configuration
that characterized international politics until World War II, or the “bipolar” configuration
that has characterized them since.” 4.9 Other types of systems, such as tripolarity, remain
derived primarily from multipolar and bipolar theories.

The nature of international politics since 1945 can be viewed in terms of “systems
theory.” Gaddis summarizes Jervis’s definition of an “international system” ass one of
“interconnections” between” units in the system, so that changes in some parts of it
produce changes in other parts as well”, and that “the collective behavior of the system as

8
 a whole differs from the expectations and priorities of the individual units that make it
up”. 5 Since World War II, the major powers assumed that little could happen in the
world without either enhancing or damaging their own interests: as Jervis notes, “almost
by definition a great power is more tightly connected to larger numbers of other states
than is a small power.” 6 Further, the collective behavior of states has not corresponded
to their individual expectations, particularly when many of the statesmen who pieced
together the post-war arrangements expected another war to erupt relatively soon
thereafter.7

As Gaddis has additionally summarized, systems theory provides criteria for

differentiating between stable and unstable political frameworks that may help to explain
why some international systems last longer than others.7.1 Deutsch and Singer defined
“stability” as “the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics;
that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive;
and that large-scale war does not occur.”7.2 This system can counterbalance threatening
situations before they spin out of control. Craig and George established that “self-
regulating mechanisms” are most likely to operate when there is some basic agreement
among the major states of the system on the objectives of it, when the structure of the
system accurately reflects power distribution in the system, and when pre-established
procedures exist for resolving differences. 8

[Fn. 4.9: John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the
Postwar International System,” International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring
1986), p. 101. Fn. 5: Gaddis, Ibid, p. 102. Fn. 6: Gaddis, Ibid. Fn. 7: Gaddis,
Ibid, p. 103. Fn. 7.1: Gaddis, Ibid, p. 103, 104. Fn. 7.2: Gaddis, Ibid, p. 103, 104.
Also: Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and
International Stability,” in James Rosenau, Ed., International Politics and
Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 316. Fn. 8: Gaddis, Ibid, p. 103,
p. 104. Also: Gordon Craig and Alexander George, Force and Statecraft:
Diplomatic Problems of our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995,
np.]

#10: Dissertation at pp. 165-166

As written:
James Reston once called it “the most unpopular American war of this century”; a study
group for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence declared
that it “commanded less popular support than any previous American international war”;
and journalist David Wise stated that the Vietnam war was “the most unpopular war in
[American] history.” 51

Revision:
As Mueller identified, James Reston once called it “the most unpopular American war of
this century”; a study group for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence declared that it “commanded less popular support than any previous

9
 American international war”; and journalist David Wise stated that the Vietnam war was
“the most unpopular war in [American] history.” 51

[Fn. 51: John Mueller, “Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and
Vietnam,” American Political Science Review, Volume 65, Issue 2, June 1971, p.
371.]

#11: Dissertation at p. 168

As written:
Mueller found a "rally in support at the beginning of the war and high levels of public
support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support had declined in the wake of such
events as infighting among the South Vietnamese and the emergence of vocal criticism of
the war during the Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time, the public had also
come to see that the war would not be over quickly but was instead likely to be a “long,
bloody affair.” 56

The figure below shows the course of public support for the war. 57

American forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to over half a million. By the time
of the 1968 Tet offensive, support for and opposition to the war had hardened to a point
at which events on the battlefield or in Washington were less likely to make an
impression; support for the war was down to hard-core supporters and fell only an
additional ten points thereafter. 58

The principal reasons for continued support for the war were, not surprisingly, the
reasons established for American grand strategy by Truman two decades before: the
containment of communism, U.S. credibility, and strengthening the resolve of others to
resist communism. 59 The Roper Center's February 1968 poll found that 49 percent
thought one of the strongest reasons for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam was the
containment of communism; 33 percent cited the impact on the will of others to resist
communism; and 23 percent cited the potential loss of prestige and confidence of U.S.
friends and allies. 60

Compared to the benefits of a military victory, the political objective the Johnson (and
later, the Nixon) administration pursued—achieving a negotiated settlement—probably
limited the expected gains from the war for most members of the public and may have
contributed to the polarization of opinion. For example, while 29 percent of those Gallup
polled in November 1965 thought the war would end in a victory for the United States,
30 percent expected a stalemate or compromise, and 10 percent expected a very lengthy
conflict. By May 1966, 54 percent expected the war to result in a compromise, and by
February 1968, 61 percent expected such an outcome. 61

In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat unclear for many, the value of the strategic
stakes or consequences of a loss may have also diminished over the course of the war.

10
Revision:
Larson writes that “Mueller found a ’rally’ in support at the beginning of the war
and high levels of public support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support had
declined in the wake of such events as infighting among the South Vietnamese
and the emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the Fulbright hearings in
early 1966. By this time, the public had also come to see that the war would not
be over quickly but was instead likely to be a ‘long, bloody affair.’” 56

The figure below shows the course of public support for the war. 57

American “forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to over half a million. By

the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, support [for] and opposition [to] [sic] the war
had hardened to a point at which events on the battlefield or in Washington were
less likely to make an impression—support for the war was … down to hard-core
supporters and fell only… an additional ten points thereafter.” 58

Two decades before, Truman had laid out the bases for American grand strategy--
-containing communism, fortifying allies for the ideological fight, protecting U.S.
credibility---and here they were once again in the context of Vietnam. 59

As Larson notes, “The Roper Center’s February 1968 Roper Center poll found
that 49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons for the U.S. military effort in
Vietnam was containment of communism; 33 percent cited the impact on the will
of others to resist communism; and 23 percent cited the potential loss of prestige
and confidence of U.S. friends and allies”. 60

Any negotiated settlement of the war may have been perceived by the public as a
defeat, which informed the public polling as the conflict evolved. For example,
while 29 percent of those polled by Gallup in November 1965 thought the war
would end in a victory for the United States, 30 percent expected a stalemate or
compromise, and 10 percent expected a very lengthy conflict. By May 1966, 54
percent expected the war to end in a compromise, and by February 1968, 61
percent expected it to end that way. 61

The geostrategic stakes of the war, its loss, or settlement may have been murky to
many in the public. As the war wore on, however, its importance would loom
larger for some, as others grew increasingly impatient, frustrated or indifferent.

[Fn. 56: Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of
Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1996), p. 24, and Larson, 1996, p.24, fn.51. Additionally, Larson cites at
p. 19 John Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, University Press of
America, 1973, p. 56 as “the definitive analysis of public opinion data for the
Korean and Vietnam wars.” Larson also reports that “Mueller cites a

11
 Harris/Newsweek poll showing that the percentage expecting a long war had
increased from 54 to 72 percent between the end of 1965 and mid-1966.”
(Larson, Ibid, p. 24, fn. 51). Fn. 57: Larson, Ibid, p. 25, citing Mueller,
1973, Table 3.3, pp. 54-55. Fn. 58: Larson, Ibid, p. 24, citing Mueller,
1973, p. 56. Fn. 59: “Mueller (1973) argues that the initial support for the
war also arose from a desire to support the president.” Larson, Ibid, p. 25,
fn. 53. Fn 60: Larson, Ibid, p. 25 and Larson, p. 25, fn. 54. Roper Center
poll, cited by Larson, reported in Mueller 1973, p. 49.]

#12: Dissertation at pp. 170-171

As written:
As the Sino-Soviet split became more apparent, the costs of Vietnam rose, leading to a
waning of public support, an intensification of the public’s suspicion, and the emergence
of increasingly skeptical criticism of the strategic importance of Southeast Asia. In fact,
concern about the impact on U.S. credibility of a precipitous withdrawal seemed to be the
dominant concern for realists. As early as 1966, George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau
argued that defending Vietnam to contain communism was a misapplication of the
containment doctrine, even though it was a logical consequence of the Truman Doctrine.
Kennan was, however, concerned about the ramifications for U.S. credibility of a
precipitous withdrawal. 64

Revision:
As the Sino-Soviet split grew more pronounced, Vietnam began to wear on the American
public. As Larson notes, “In fact, concern about the impact on U.S. credibility of a
precipitous withdrawal seemed to become the dominant concern for realists.”64 In 1966,
“such realists as George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau were arguing that defending
Vietnam to contain communism was a misapplication of the containment doctrine”, even
though it was a logical consequence of the Truman Doctrine. “Kennan was, however,
concerned about the ramifications for U.S. credibility of a precipitous withdrawal”. 64.1

[Fn 64: Larson, Ibid, p. 26, fn. 56. Fn. 64.1: Larson, Ibid.]

#13: Dissertation at p. 172

As written:
And according to Paul M. Kattenburg, the domestic consensus based upon containment of
the Soviet Union and communism had been fundamentally shaken by 1969. 66

Revision:
As Larson reports, paraphrasing Paul M. Kattenburg, “The domestic consensus based
upon containment of the Soviet Union and communism had been fundamentally shaken by
1969.” 66

12
 [Fn. 66: Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of
Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations, Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1996, p. 26, fn. 56 (emphasis added). Kattenburg quoted in Mark A.
Lorell, Casualties, Public Opinion and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam
War, Santa Monica CA: RAND, 1985, p. 61.]

#14: Dissertation at p. 177

As written:
This strategy was mapped out by Kissinger and his team in four foreign policy reports
between 1970 and 1973 that set forth explicitly most of the fundamental elements of the
Nixon strategy---the use of negotiations to integrate the Soviet Union into the existing
order; the idea of linkage; the possibility of a new relationship with China; and the Nixon
Doctrine---“often before events had taken place that made possible their realization.” 78

Revision:
This strategy was mapped out by Kissinger and his team in four foreign policy reports
between 1970 and 1973 that articulated “most of the fundamental elements of the Nixon
strategy---the use of negotiations to integrate the Soviet Union into the existing
international order, the idea of ‘linkage’, the possibility of a new relationship with
Peking, the Nixon Doctrine---often before events had taken place that made possible their
realization.” 78

[Fn. 78: Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 305-306.]

#15: Dissertation at p. 181

As written:
First, Nixon and Kissinger sought to address the changing nature of power. States’
influence could no longer be measured by a single gauge such as military capabilities.
With the Soviet Union rapidly approaching parity with the United States, the practical
utility of nuclear weapons had further decreased. Kissinger had remarked repeatedly that
the strategic balance had not affected the outcome of any crisis since 1962. The
constraints of public opinion and the problems of gradual escalation in Vietnam
demonstrated the limits of conventional force. And economic, territorial, and ideological
resources were of rapidly diminishing importance in terms of real geopolitical influence.
Underlying all of these trends, notes Gaddis, “the perception of power had become as
important as power itself.” 4

Revision:
First, Nixon and Kissinger sought to address the changing nature of power. As Gaddis
indicates, states’ influence could no longer be measured by a single gauge such as
military capabilities. 3.1 The Soviet Union’s rapidly approaching parity with the United
States lessened the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. Kissinger had remarked

13
 repeatedly that the strategic balance had not affected the outcome of any crisis since
1962. Gaddis also notes that the constraints of public opinion and the problems of gradual
escalation in Vietnam highlighted the parameters of conventional force. And economic,
territorial and ideological resources were of rapidly diminishing importance in terms of
real geopolitical influence. Underlying all of these trends, Gaddis concludes, “the
perception of power had become as important as power itself.” 4

[Fn. 3.1: Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 277. Fn. 4: Gaddis, Ibid.]

#16: Dissertation at pp. 195-196

As written:
The first was the emphasis on structure, the achievement and preservation of which came
about by cultivating certain behavior of the principal actual and potential participants and
giving them a stake in the system. In a balance of power system, only the large, capable
nations matter, because only they can have enough of a stake in the system and enough
resources to maintain it by exercising self-restraint and by restraining, deliberately or
implicitly, the conduct of other nations.

The second tendency of dealing flexibly and directly with the major adversaries was one
of maneuver. It was based on an attempt to create a more subtle and dynamic balance,
rather than dealing through formal alliances and their attendant problems of attaining
consensus, potential subversion and vetoes by allies, and free-riding. It also made
allowances for dealing in partial alignments, such as America’s tacit defense of China’s
northern border against the Soviet Union.

These two tendencies—structure (great power politics) and maneuver (flexible

diplomacy)—described a balance of power policy that was set into motion deliberately by
the administration in order to better cope with shifts in the international environment and
domestic pressures.

Revision:
As Earl Ravenal explains, the first was the emphasis on “structure”, the designing and
maintenance of which came about by encouraging “certain behavior of the principal
actual and potential participants and giving them a stake in the system. In a balance of
power system, only the large, capable nations “count”, because only they can have
enough of a stake in the system and enough resources to maintain the system by
exercising self-restraint and by restraining, deliberately or implicitly, the exaggerated
conduct of other nations.” 33.5

Ravenal further argues that the second tendency of dealing “flexibly and directly with the
major adversaries” was one of maneuver. It was based on “an attempt to create a more
subtle and dynamic balance, rather than dealing through formal alliances” and their
attendant problems of attracting consensus, potential undermining by allies and free-
riding. 33.6 It also allowed for “partial alignments”, such as Washington’s implied

14
 defense of “China’s northern border against the USSR.”33.7

These two tendencies—“structure (great power politics) and maneuver (flexible

diplomacy)”33.8—described a balance of power policy that was set in motion
deliberately by the administration in order to better cope with shifts in the international
environment and domestic pressures. 33.9

[Fns. 33.5: Earl C. Ravenal, “Liberty and National Security: The Legacy of
Interventionism,” Libertarian Review, August 1977, Vol. IV, No. 4, p. 22. Fns.
33.6, 33.7, 33.8, 33.9: Ravenal, 1977, Ibid.]

#17: Dissertation at p. 236

As written:
Advising Chinese leaders that the Soviets were determined to amass enough nuclear
weapons to destroy their country, Kissinger secretly offered China U.S. satellite
information. “We would be prepared, at your request, through whatever sources you
wish, to give you whatever information we have about the disposition of Soviet forces,”
Kissinger told Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, in 1971.108
The specific reference was to Soviet forces deployed during the war that year between
India and Pakistan, but Kissinger’s offer was meant to lay the groundwork for a broader
proposal of assistance.

Revision:
As Kissinger noted at the time and as later reported, he informed the Chinese that
Moscow was bent on acquiring enough nuclear weapons to destroy them, then proceeded
to offer them U.S. satellite information. “We would be prepared, at your request, through
whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever information we have about the
disposition of Soviet forces,” Kissinger told Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador to the
United Nations, in 1971.108 As the Associated Press reported, “The specific reference
was to Soviet forces deployed during the war that year between India and Pakistan”, but
Kissinger aimed to lay the groundwork for a broader proposal of assistance.108.1

[Fn. 108: See also Associated Press, Kissinger Offered Secrets About Soviets to
China in 1970s, January 9, 1999, np. Fn. 108.1: Associated Press, Ibid.]

#18: Dissertation at p. 242

As written:
Briefing Chou on the Soviets on November 10, 1973 in the Great Hall of the People,
Kissinger repeated that it was in the interests of the United States to prevent a Soviet
nuclear attack on China. “They want us to accept the desirability of destroying China’s
nuclear capability,” Kissinger said. Instead, he offered China secret military cooperation

15
 with the United States, including “ideas on how to lessen the vulnerability of your forces
and how to increase the warning time” before a Soviet attack.

When Mao protested that China’s “nuclear capability is no bigger than a fly,” Kissinger
responded that the Soviets were “worried about what it will be ten years from now” and
told him that “there is nothing we are doing with the Soviet Union that you don’t know.
You can count on that for the future.” 117

Revision:
Kissinger reiterated to Chou that it was in the interests of the United States to prevent a
Soviet nuclear attack on China. “They want us to accept the desirability of destroying
China’s nuclear capability,” Kissinger said.116.1 Instead, he offered China secret
military cooperation with the United States, including “ideas on how to lessen the
vulnerability of your forces and how to increase the warning time” before a Soviet attack.
116.2

When Mao claimed that China’s “nuclear capability is no bigger than a fly,” Kissinger
responded that the Soviets were “worried about what it will be ten years from now” and
told him that “there is nothing we are doing with the Soviet Union that you don’t know.
You can count on that for the future.” 117

[Fn. 116.1: Memorandum of Conversation, Top Secret/Exclusively Eyes Only,

Department of State Records, Record Group 59, Records of the Policy Planning
Staff, (Director’s Files), 1969-1977, Box 372, Mao Book, December 1975, Mr.
Lord, National Archives, np. See also Burr, 1998, pp. 86-101. See also:
Associated Press, Kissinger Offered Secrets About Soviets to China in 1970s,
January 9, 1999, np. Fn. 116.2: Memorandum, Ibid, np; Burr, Ibid, pp. 86-101;
AP, Ibid, np. Fn. 117: Memorandum, Ibid, np; Burr, Ibid, pp. 86-101; AP, Ibid,
np.]

#19: Dissertation at p. 267

As written:
The Fulbright hearings of early 1966 had been highly critical of the war and had featured
establishment stalwarts criticizing it, thereby making dissent respectable. Growing
congressional and elite criticism of the war called into question both the importance of
U.S. interests in Vietnam and the wisdom of incurring additional costs in an intervention
that seemed to be showing little sign of progress, and the Democrats were getting the
blame.

Revision:
As Larson notes, “The Fulbright hearings in early 1966 had been highly critical of the
war and had featured establishment stalwarts criticizing the war, thus making dissent
respectable… Growing congressional and elite criticism of the war called into question
both the importance of U.S. interests in Vietnam and the wisdom of incurring further

16
 costs in an intervention that seemed to be yielding little evidence of progress” 2.5 ---and
the Democrats were getting the blame.

[Fn. 2.5: Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of
Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations, Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1996, p. 86.]

#20: Dissertation at p. 278

As written:
Three years before Nixon took office, fewer than four in ten Americans believed that the
war in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher costs. Given this already limited
willingness to accept Korea-level casualties, it was remarkable that Johnson and Nixon
were able to continue prosecuting the war so long after Vietnam’s casualty rates had
reached those of Korea. By the time of the Tet offensive in early 1968, the rate at which
casualties were being incurred had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer than four in
ten had earlier indicated a willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in the
thousands, with several hundred dying each week. Mueller notes that by then the war’s
costs had become too high for all but a minority, and Lorell argues that casualties,
especially war dead, had come increasingly the single most troubling aspect of the
Vietnam war. 20

Revision:
Three years before Nixon took office, Larson notes that “fewer than four in ten expressed
a belief that a war in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher costs. Given this limited
willingness to accept Korea-like casualties in a war in Vietnam, it is remarkable that the
Johnson and Nixon administrations were able to continue prosecuting the war so long
after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those of Korea.” 19.1 Larson argues that “by
the time of [the] Tet [offensive], the rate at which casualties were being incurred had
mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer than four in ten had earlier indicated a
willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in the thousands, with several hundred
dying each week.” 19.2 Larson points to Mueller’s observation that by then, the war’s
costs had become too high for all but a minority, and Lorell argues that casualties,
especially war dead, had become increasingly the dominant point of conversation about
the war. 20

[Fn. 19.1: Eric Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of
Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations, 1996, p. 27. Fn.
19.2: Larson, Ibid, p. 27-28. Fn. 20: Larson, Ibid, p. 29. Also Lorell (1985) p.
28 cited in Larson, Ibid, p. 29, fn. 65.]

17
#21: Dissertation at p. 281

As written:
Even with that flexibility, however, it was clear that the increasing costs came to be
judged by majorities as being incommensurate with the expected and actual benefits of
the war and its prospects for success.

Revision:
Even as the president enjoyed that flexibility, however, more and more Americans began
to feel that the war was not worth the costs. 26.5

[Fn. 25 refers to Larson, Ibid, pg. 29 and fn. 26 is an original idea with a citation
to Osgood. Fn. 26.5: Larson, Ibid, p. 29.]

#22: Dissertation at p. 304

As written:
A crucial part of the U.S.-China-Vietnam equation was the understanding reached on
Taiwan. In the Shanghai Communique, the United States made no specific public
concessions on when or if it would terminate diplomatic relations with the Republic of
China, but it did “acknowledge” Beijing’s position that there is “but one China” and that
“Taiwan is part of China.” Further, the United States reaffirmed the promises it had
initially made in 1970 that, as “tensions in the area” diminish, Washington would
“progressively reduce its forces and military installations in Taiwan.”

In addition, the United States asserted its interest in a “peaceful settlement” of the Taiwan
issue, but the communique did not indicate the specific concessions on Taiwan that
Nixon had offered the Chinese in order to firm up the new relationship. Nixon also
assured the Chinese that he would “actively work toward” and complete “full
normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by 1976,” the year that would end his second term in
office. He indicated that he would not support any Taiwanese military action against the
mainland or any kind of Taiwanese independence movement, and he agreed to
“discourage Japan or any other third country from moving into Taiwan as the U.S.
presence diminished.” This point was made to allay China’s concerns about potential
resurgent Japanese militarism, which also underpinned the U.S. move to withdraw only
gradually American military forces from Taiwan. Nixon made all of these pledges
secretly to the Chinese in order to avoid provoking Taiwan and its supporters in the
United States who opposed any kind of weakening of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. 76

Revision:
A crucial part of the U.S.-China-Vietnam equation was the understanding reached on
Taiwan. In the Shanghai Communique, the United States did not indicate when or if it
would end diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, but it did “acknowledge”
Beijing’s position that there is “but one China” and that “Taiwan is part of China.” 75.1
Further, the United States reiterated that, as “tensions in the area” diminish, Washington

18
 would “progressively reduce its forces and military installations in Taiwan.” 75.2

In addition, the United States indicated its continuing desire for a “peaceful settlement”
of the Taiwan issue, but the communique did not indicate the specifics on Taiwan that
Nixon had offered the Chinese in order to firm up the new relationship.75.3 Nixon also
assured the Chinese that he would “actively work toward” and complete “full
normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by 1976,” the year that would end his second term in
office.75.4 He further indicated that he would not support any Taiwanese military action
against the mainland or any kind of Taiwanese independence effort, and he agreed to
“discourage Japan or any other third country from moving into Taiwan as the U.S.
presence diminished.” 75.5 This point was made to allay China’s concerns about
potential resurgent Japanese militarism, which also underpinned the U.S. decision to
gradually withdraw from Taiwan. As Burr notes, Nixon made all of these pledges
secretly to the Chinese in order to avoid unnecessary consternation over Taiwan. 76

[Fns. 75.1, 75.2: Shanghai Communique, Shanghai: Feb 27, 1972, Foreign Policy
of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, p. 812. Fns.
75.3, 75.4, 75.5: Shanghai Communique, Ibid, p. 812. And William Burr, The
Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow, New
York: New Press, 1998, p. 30. See also: Memorandum to the President, from
Henry Kissinger, National Security Adviser, Subject: “Your Encounter with the
Chinese,” February 5, 1972, White House Special Files, Subject File: Henry A.
Kissinger Office Files, Box 13, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives
at College Park, MS, np. Fn. 76: Burr, Ibid, 1998, p. 30.]

#23: Dissertation at p. 305

As written:
The understanding reached between the U.S. and the PRC on Taiwan was connected with
a less explicit one on Vietnam. American force reductions from the ROC were dependent
on the general reduction of tensions in Asia. The implicit agreement was that China
would have to help to reduce those tensions by getting the North Vietnamese to work
with Washington to end the war. During the months after Nixon’s 1972 visit, Kissinger
continually briefed Chinese diplomats on the Paris peace talks and asked them explicitly
to intervene with Hanoi. The Chinese expressed criticism of U.S. bombings, but
Kissinger described the remarks as “moderate,” far less hostile than they could have
been. Even when the peace talks collapsed after Kissinger’s famous “peace is at hand”
remark, and the Chinese criticized him and argued that only the Soviets could benefit
from a continuation of the war, they listened to Kissinger and presumably delivered his
December 1972 warnings of possible bombing attacks to the North Vietnamese. And
even though Beijing condemned the Christmas bombings, it continued to play a
moderating role until the peace agreement was signed. 77

Revision:

19
 As Burr describes, the understanding reached between the U.S. and the PRC on Taiwan
was connected with one on Vietnam. American force reductions from the ROC were tied
to an overall de-escalation of tensions, including leaning on the Chinese to get the North
Vietnamese to work with Washington to end the war. During the months after Nixon’s
1972 visit, Kissinger briefed Chinese diplomats on the Paris peace talks and requested
their assistance. Even when the peace talks fell apart, the Chinese continued to respond
to Kissinger’s entreaties. And although Beijing publicly condemned the 1972 Christmas
bombings, it remained a central player until the peace agreement was achieved. 77

[Fn. 77: William Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with
Beijing and Moscow. New York: New Press, 1998, p. 30-31. Burr cites
Kissinger to the President, “My May 16 Meeting with the Chinese,” n.d., PPS,
Box 329, China Exchanges 1 March-24 June 1972.]

#24: Dissertation at pp. 327-328

As written:
In fact, the case for expanded military assistance was made with unprecedented urgency
by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in preparation for the vastly increased Military
Assistance Program for 1972 and the large arms transfers of the succeeding fiscal years.
Laird characterized MAP as “the essential ingredient of our policy if we are to honor our
obligations, support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit
American ground combat units.” 104

Laird, however, recognized the declining popular and congressional support for military
assistance. His solution, considered annually in the Defense Department but proposed for
the first time in a secretarial posture statement to the Congress, was that “military
assistance should be integrated into the defense budget so that we can plan more
rationally and present to the Congress more fully an integrated program.” 105 Military
aid for certain “forward defense countries,” including South Vietnam, Thailand, and
Laos, and consisting of about 80 percent of the total category “Support for Other
Nations,” 106 was, in 1971, already included in the U.S. defense budget, though this
legislative ploy had not yet been applied to Taiwan or Korea.

To merge military assistance further into the regular functional appropriation categories
of the defense budget was to institutionalize a rationale for military assistance that had
become a traditional point of debate within the Department of Defense. As Laird stated,
“A MAP dollar is of far greater value than a dollar spent directly on U.S. forces.” 107

Revision:
In fact, as Ravenal has pointed out, “[t]he case for expanded military assistance was
stated with unprecedented urgency by Secretary of Defense Laird in preparation for the
vastly increased Military Assistance Program (MAP) for 1972 and the large arms
transfers of the succeeding fiscal years”. 103.1 Laird “characterized MAP as “the
essential ingredient of our policy if we are to honor our obligations, support our allies,

20
 and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit American ground combat units.”’ 104

Ravenal also noted that Laird, however, acknowledged “the declining level of popular
and Congressional support for military assistance”. 104.1 Further Ravenal notes that “his
solution, considered perennially within the Defense and State Departments but proposed
for the first time in a Secretarial posture statement to the Congress, [was] that “military
assistance should be integrated into the defense budget so that we can plan more
rationally and present to the Congress more fully an integrated program.”’ 105 And
additionally, “military aid for certain “forward defense countries,” including South
Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos, and consisting of about 80 percent of the total category
“Support for Other Nations,”” was, in 1971, already included in the defense budget. 106

Ravenal observed that folding military assistance further into the regular appropriation
categories mainstreamed military assistance and thereby lessened the likelihood of debate
over it. He cited Laird statement, “A MAP dollar is of far greater value than a dollar
spent directly on U.S. forces.” 107

[Fns. 103.1 and 104.1: Earl Ravenal, Foreign Affairs, “The Nixon Doctrine and
Our Asian Commitments”, January 1971, Volume 49, No. 2, p. 204. See also:
Earl Ravenal, Large Scale Policy Change: The Nixon Doctrine as History and
Portent, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1989, p. 19. Fns. 104, 105:
Ravenal, 1971, p. 204. Also: Ravenal, 1989, p. 19. Fn. 106: Ravenal, 1989, p.
19, quoting Melvin Laird, “Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget,”
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2, 1970, p. 57.
According to Ravenal, this was “$2,433 out of $3,127 billion in the President’s
Budget for Fiscal Year 1971. But in later years, when the administration had lost
its ploy to change the organization and review of the military assistance budget,
Thailand and Laos reverted to the category of military assistance, separate from
the U.S. defense budget.” Ravenal, 1989, Ibid, pp. 19. Fn. 107: Ravenal, 1971,
Ibid, p. 205. Also: Ravenal, 1989, Ibid, p. 20. See also: Laird, Ibid, p. 57.]

#25: Dissertation at p. 352

As written:
By mid-1969, there was a general acceptance by the Nixon administration of a policy of
gradual withdrawal while it also continued and formalized the policy of Vietnamization.
Thus withdrawal of a sort became official presidential policy and members of the
administration could move to support it. At the same time, however, leaders of the
Democratic opposition became increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people inclined to
follow their lead had a model.

Revision:
As Mueller states as reported by Larson, by mid-1969, the Nixon administration began to
move on “a policy of gradual withdrawal while it also continued and formalized the
policy of Vietnamization….withdrawal of a sort became official presidential policy and

21
 administration followers could move to its support. At the same time, of course, leaders
of the Democratic opposition became increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people
inclined to follow their lead had a model.” 139.5

[Fn. 139.5: Larson, Ibid, p. 89-90, fn. 37, quoting Mueller, 1973, p. 101.]

#26: Dissertation at pp. 355-356

As written:
In addition to Vietnamization, another practical manifestation of the counterweight
strategy was the war between India and Pakistan in 1971. The crisis stemmed from West
Pakistan’s refusal to grant autonomy to the people of East Pakistan, separated by a vast
expanse of Indian territory. As the crisis escalated, the administration, using Pakistan as
its secret channel to the Chinese, cautiously refrained from criticizing the Pakistani
government and delayed cutting off arms shipments to it, despite reports of “selective
genocide.” 147

Revision:
In addition to Vietnamization, another practical manifestation of the counterweight
strategy occurred during the war between India and Pakistan in 1971. “The crisis had
arisen over West Pakistan’s refusal to grant autonomy to the citizens of East Pakistan”,
separated by a vast expanse of Indian territory. 146.1 As the crisis grew, the
administration, wanting to avoid alienating its secret channel to the Chinese, withheld
criticism and “delayed cutting off arms shipments to [the Pakistani government]”. 147

[Fn. 146.1: Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 330. Fn. 147: Gaddis, Ibid.]

#27: Dissertation at p. 359

As written:
Following the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union embarked on a long-term program
of increasing its strength in strategic weapons. As Gaddis points out, the Johnson
administration decided not to respond with a corresponding military buildup for three
main reasons: first, because it underestimated the extent to which the Soviets were
building; second, because Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was convinced that
the American strategic programs had reached the point of diminishing returns; and third,
because the escalating costs of the Vietnam war made the administration reluctant to go
to Congress with requests for expensive new systems to counter Soviet increases. 155

Revision:
Following the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union set out to improve its position vis-à-
vis strategic weapons. As Gaddis points out, “the Johnson administration decided not to
respond with a corresponding American military buildup” for three main reasons: first,
“because it underestimated” the extent to which the Soviets were building; second,

22
 because Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara believed that the American strategic
programs had reached “the point of diminishing returns”; and third, because the
escalating “costs of the Vietnam war made the administration reluctant to go to Congress
with requests for expensive new systems to counter Soviet increases.” 155

#28: Dissertation at p. 404

As written:
The detente of the 1970’s did not succeed, in the view of many Americans, because of
Soviet actions that contravened what the United States understood detente to mean.
Either the Soviets undermined detente, or if they did act in ways consistent with it,
detente as a policy was flawed. From the American perspective, then, both Moscow and
detente itself shared the blame for the decline of the policy.

The view from Moscow, was, of course, very different. From the Soviet perspective, the
joint detente effort was abandoned deliberately by the United States as it sought to seek
advantages from a policy of confrontation, renew a quest for military superiority, and
were unwilling to accept strategic parity.

Revision:
According to Garthoff, “The detente of the 1970’s did not succeed, in the view of many
Americans, because of Soviet actions that contravened what the United States understood
detente to mean. Either the Soviets abused detente, or if they did act in accordance with
it, detente itself was flawed. Both the Soviet Union and détente itself were thus seen as
sharing the blame for a mounting series of disquieting developments.” 234.1

The view from Moscow, was, of course, very different. As Garthoff describes, from the
Soviet perspective, detente was abandoned deliberately by the United States as it sought
to “seek advantages from a policy of confrontation, [renew] an American quest for
military superiority, and had been unwilling to accept strategic and political parity.”
234.2

[Fn. 234.1: Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet

Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1982,
p. 1068. Fn. 234.2, Garthoff, Ibid.]

#29: Dissertation at p. 405

As written:
This difference in perspective made it difficult for Americans and Soviets to even
conduct retrospective assessments of the detente effort of the I970’s in order to determine
the causes of its failure. In fact, such assessments were not even considered necessary in
either Washington or Moscow. On each side, the actions of the other were blamed for the
breakdown of detente. But it may have been that neither side hoped that strongly that

23
 detente would succeed. From 1969 to 1979, the rival superpowers sought—with varying
degrees of success— to increase the range of cooperation and negotiation of differences
while regulating competition and reducing the likelihood and the intensity of
confrontation. Of the many reasons for its failure, perhaps the most profound is that it
was designed on the American side to be unsustainable.

Revision:
As Garthoff has indicated, this difference in perspective made it difficult for Americans
and Soviets to even analyze the roots of its collapse long after the fact: “Indeed, such
assessments are scarcely deemed necessary in either Washington or Moscow.” 234.3
Predictably, both sides blamed the other. But it may have been that neither side hoped
that strongly that detente would succeed. From 1969 to 1979, the two nations sought—
with varying degrees of success— “to increase the range of cooperation and negotiation
of differences while regulating competition and reducing instances and intensities of
confrontation.” 234.4 Of the many reasons for its failure, perhaps the most profound is
that it was designed on the American side to be unsustainable.

[Fn. 234.3: Garthoff, Ibid, p. 1068. Fn. 234.4: Garthoff, Ibid, p. 1068-1069.]

#30: Dissertation at pp. 420-421

As written:
When Beijing stated its intention to downgrade relations with the United States unless the
arms sales were stopped, the administration proposed reducing the sales gradually with
no upgrading of the quality of arms involved. The Chinese continued to demand the
complete cessation of sales and reverted to an earlier practice of equating the United
States and Soviet Union as equally threatening “hegemonic” powers. 260

Revision:
As Shultz noted, the U.S. offered to cut arms sales over time as a way to allay Beijing’s
concerns, an offer met with continuing Chinese demands for an end to all arms sales and
a resumption of their position that the U.S. and Soviet Union represented similar threats.
260

#31: Dissertation at pp. 444-45

As written:
Moreover, in order to test the approach against competing explanations, one needs to
understand what individual leaders were thinking when they were developing or
modifying the grand strategy and manipulating conflict, either by prolonging it or by
resolving it. An area specialist would be at an advantage over the generalist in applying
the model to particular cases, though both benefit from the parsimony inherent in the
model.

Revision:
24
 Moreover, as Christensen has indicated, in order to test the approach against other
potential explanations, one must understand what individual leaders were thinking when
they were developing or modifying the grand strategy and manipulating conflict, either
by prolonging it or by resolving it. Christensen emphasizes that an area specialist would
be at an advantage over the generalist in applying the model to particular cases, though
both would be served by the parsimony inherent in the model.4.5

[Fn. 4.5: Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic

Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1996, p. 248.]

#32: Dissertation at p. 453

As written:
For example, even the few Chinese threats to enter the Korean war may have been more
effective had Washington not been consumed with launching the new grand strategy.
Similarly, the need to preserve whatever remained of that mobilization made Nixon more
likely to curtail American involvement in Vietnam than he otherwise would have been.

This may help to illuminate for leaders why other leaders take the actions they do given a
mobilization situation. If foreign leaders recognize that initial mobilization is often
accompanied by a short-term but intense anti-foreign campaign, then they may avoid
drawing incorrect and possibly dangerous assumptions from those actions. Further, if
foreign leaders understand that a long-term mobilization is losing its momentum at home,
they may be able to foresee a realignment of that nation’s foreign policy that may include
more cooperative policies. In either case, it may not be necessary for foreign leaders to
assume that such posturing will lead to long-term hostile or conciliatory policies. If Mao
had understood American politics during the initial cold war mobilization, he might not
have felt as threatened by American actions in Korea and Taiwan and may have resisted
sending Chinese troops into Korea.

Revision:
As Christensen notes, for example, the few Chinese threats to enter the Korean war may
have been more effective had Washington not been consumed with launching the new
grand strategy. 13.5 Similarly, the need to preserve whatever remained of that
mobilization made Nixon more likely to try to minimize the American commitment in
Vietnam than he otherwise would have been.

This may help to illuminate for leaders why other leaders take the actions they do given a
mobilization situation. If foreign leaders recognize that initial mobilization is often
accompanied by a short-term but intense anti-foreign campaign, then they may avoid
drawing incorrect and possibly dangerous assumptions from those actions. Further, if
foreign leaders understand that a long-term mobilization is losing its momentum at home,
they may be able to foresee a realignment of that nation’s foreign policy that may include
more cooperative policies. In either case, it may not be necessary for foreign leaders to

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assume that such posturing will lead to long-term hostile or conciliatory policies.
Christensen observes that if Mao had understood American politics during the initial cold
war mobilization, he might not have felt as threatened by American movements in Korea
and Taiwan and may not have committed Chinese troops in Korea. 13.6

[Fn. 13.5: Christensen, Ibid, p. 253. Fn. 13.6: Christensen, Ibid.]

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Additions to Bibliography

Books

Andrianopoulos, Argyris G. Western Europe in Kissinger’s Global Strategy. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1988.

In lieu of erroneous entry: Mueller, John. Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973): Mueller, Dennis. Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Articles

Ravenal, Earl C., “Liberty and National Security: The Legacy of Interventionism,” Libertarian
Review, Vol. IV, No. 4, August 1977

Ravenal, Earl C., “The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49,
No. 2, January 1971

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