Dear PAO,

We have a new neighbor who has been very annoying since he transferred here in our

barangay. He would make some noise at night by shouting, as if in a confrontation with

someone but he is only talking to himself. What is more annoying is that just last week he

brought home a dog. His dog is generally quiet during the day when my neighbor is out of the

house but at night, he would play with his dog and sometimes irritate it, making it bark so

loud. I already filed a complaint before our Barangay for unjust vexation and after several

conferences, I was given a certification to file action. I just want to know until when I can file

my formal complaint. I am planning to go to the province and I have not decided yet when I

intend to come back. Please advise me on this matter.

Cosme

Dear Cosme,

In the book, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, by Honorable former Associate Justice

of the Court of Appeals Luis B. Reyes, he mentioned that:

“Unjust vexation includes any human conduct which, although not productive of some

physical or material harm would, however, unjustly annoy or vex an innocent person.

(Guevara)

The paramount question to be considered, in determining whether the crime of unjust

vexation is committed, is whether the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation, vexation,

torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. x x x” (page

605, Book Two, Sixteenth Edition 2006)

In the situation which you have shared, it appears that your neighbor’s acts have been

causing annoyance and disturbance to you in particular. For which reason, you have lodged a
complaint before the Barangay against him. You also mentioned that your Barangay has

1
issued a certificate to file action in your favor. Accordingly, you may now proceed in filing your

complaint before the Office of the Prosecutor which has jurisdiction over your place of

residence as this is where the crime of unjust vexation transpired.

We wish to emphasize, though, that you may only pursue the said criminal complaint within a

period of two (2) months counted from the day on which you, the authorities, or their agents

discovered the crime. The counting of the said period is nevertheless interrupted when you

filed your complaint before the Barangay and will commence to run again upon the

termination of the Barangay conciliation proceedings and the issuance of the certificate to file
action. This is in consonance with Section 73 in relation with Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.)

No. 10951, amending Articles 287 and 9 of our Revised Penal Code, as well as Articles 90

and 91 of the said law:

“Section 73. Article 287 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

xxx

“Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging

from One thousand pesos (1,000) to not more than Forty thousand pesos (40,000), or both.

Section 1. Article 9 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as “The Revised Penal Code” is hereby

amended to read as follows:

Art. 9.

Light felonies are those infractions of law or the commission of which the penalty of arresto

menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (40,000) or both is provided. x x x”

“Art. 90. Prescription of crime. x x x

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

2
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the

authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or

information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the

accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not

imputable to him.” (Emphasis ours)

Correspondingly, it will be best for you to institute your complaint before the Office of the

Prosecutor within the abovementioned period as failure to do so would result in the

prescription of the crime which you intend to file against your neighbor.

We hope that we were able to answer your queries. Please be reminded that this advice is

based solely on the facts you have narrated and our appreciation of the same. Our opinion

may vary when other facts are changed or elaborated.

As defined here, vexation is defined as the act of harassing or causing trouble. So unjust
vexation must mean harassing our causing trouble without justifiable reasons.
There's a well-researched blog entry by a Bacolod-based lawyer here that already gave
examples, such as:
1. Disturbing and interfering with a religious ceremony;
2. Stopping a jeep and causing a disturbance without just reasons;
3. Embracing and taking hold of the wrist of a complainant;
4. Unjustly cutting off the electricity, water and telephone lines of a tenant

Art. 334. Intriguing against Honor. — The penalty of arresto menor or

fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed for any intrigue which
has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of a
person. (Revised Penal Code)

How is intriguing against honor committed?

3
 ● Intriguing against honor (also known as tsismis) is committed by any person who shall
make any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of
another person.

● The offender, without ascertaining the truth of a defamatory utterance, repeats the same
and pass it on to another, to the damage of the offended party.

● In intriguing against honor, the author is unknown, the offender appears to be repeating
only what he heard others say. The offender does not really want to assume responsibility for
the statement but imputes it to another from whom he learned the statement.

Intriguing against honor vs. Incriminating Innocent Person

Intriguing against Dishonor Incriminating Innocent Person

The offender resorts to an The offender performs an act by

intrigue for the purpose of which he directly incriminates or
blemishing the honor or imputes to an innocent person
reputation of another person. the commission of a crime. .

Intriguing against honor vs. Defamation

Intriguing against Dishonor Defamation

Where the source or the author Where the source of the

of the derogatory information
cannot be determined and the
defendant borrows the same
and, without subscribing to the
truth thereof, passes it to others.
information can be pinpointed
and definitely determined, and
the person, adopting as his own
the information he has obtained,
passes the same to another for
the purpose of causing dishonor
to complainant’s reputation.

Defamation

Facts: A approached B who was sitting at the entrance of the Fiscal's Office and asked why
she was with C. A said, "Why are you going with her? Masamang tao yan. All her neighbors
are her enemies. Maraming asunto sya."

4
Held: A committed defamation and not intriguing against honor. Defamation is defined as "a
public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead (Art.
353, RPC)

FIRST DIVISION

MELCHOR G. MADERAZO,cralawG.R. No. 165065

SENIFORO PERIDO, and
VICTOR MADERAZO, JR.,Present:
Petitioners,
cralaw
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,cralaw
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,cralaw
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
cralawPromulgated:
September 26, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the
September 3, 2004 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioners of unjust
vexation in Criminal Case No. 24309.

On October 22, 1997, an Information[2] was filed before the Sandiganbayan (First
Division), charging the following with grave coercion: Municipal Mayor Melchor G.
Maderazo; his nephew, Victor Maderazo, Jr., who is a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan; and Seniforo Perido, Caibiran Police Station Chief, together with Rodolfo Rico,
Orlando Mocorro, Rodolfo Azur, Reynaldo Oledan, Jordan Gervacio and Jose Cesora. The
Information reads:cralaw

That on or about the 27th day of January 1997, at about 2:20 oclock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Palanay, Municipality of Caibiran, Biliran, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
all public officers, having been duly elected, appointed and qualified to such
public positions above-mentioned, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping with (sic) each other, by means of violence and
intimidation, without any authority of law, with deliberate intent did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly eject one Medaria

5
 Verutiao from the market stall she was occupying and leasing from the
Municipality of Caibiran, thereby compelling her to give up her possession
and occupation to said market stall against her will, to the damage and
prejudice of said Medaria Verutiao and detriment of public service.

cralawContrary to law.[3]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime

charged.[4] The Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order[5] signed by all the parties,
where it was stipulated, among others, that all of the accused were government officials;
Verutiao was physically in possession of one of the stalls in the public market of the
Municipality of Caibiran previous to and as of January 27, 1997;on January 21, 1997, the
premises had been padlocked previously by Mayor Melchor Maderazo, so that her goods
were inside the stall, and she was unable to transact any business; on January 27, 1997,
the locks were opened by the government upon the authority of the mayor, the goods in
the premises were inventoried and taken to the police station where they have remained
up to the present.[6]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Case for the Prosecution[7]

The prosecution presented Verutiao as sole witness. She testified that she had been the
lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market. She paid a monthly rental
of P200.00.[8] She was allowed to finish the construction of the market stall with the
permission of the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer.[9] She averred that
Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984,[10] provides that, to facilitate the
development of the public market, in the absence of adequate government finance,
construction by private parties of buildings and other structures for commercial purposes
may be allowed and the expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder by applying
50% to the monthly rentals when occupied for business.[11]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the market stall, as stated in the itemized
statement of expenses[12] she submitted to then Municipal Treasurer Jose Lee
on February 14, 1992. She was not, however, reimbursed by the Municipality of her
expenses. After the construction, she then opened the stall for business. She paid the
rent for the whole year of 1992 but did not pay the rentals in 1993.

On January 13, 1994, Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease
contract,[13] renewable every year with a monthly rental of P400.00. It is also provided
that, any violation of the conditions therein agreed shall be sufficient cause for its
cancellation, notwithstanding the fact that the contract has not yet expired.

In 1995, the Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the
construction of the market stall.[14] However, considering that she had not been fully
reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her
rent.[15] Almost weekly, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to request for the
reimbursement.[16] She was told by then Treasurer Lee and his successor, Lorenzo
Dadizon, that the Municipality had no money and she had to wait for another budget
hearing.[17] The treasurers did not collect her rents for they knew that the Municipality
still owed her money.[18]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
6
On December 22, 1996 Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao where she
spent the Christmas holidays.[19] She returned to Caibiran on January 15,
1997.On January 17, 1997, she and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor
Melchor Maderazo, directing her to vacate the stall within twenty-four (24) hours because
of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall.[20]As of January 1997, Verutiao had an
unpaid rental of P2,532.00, after deducting her expenses for the construction of the stall.
The Mayor declared in his letter that the lease contract had been cancelled.

On the same day, the spouses Verutiao, through counsel, sent a letter[21] to the Mayor,
stating, among others, that they can only be ejected from the market stall if the
Municipality reimbursed them for what they had advanced for the construction of the stall
and if the Municipality was no longer willing to lease the subject premises. They admitted
that Verutiao had not paid any rent since 1993 but maintained that, under Section 38 of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984,[22]she did not have to pay rental until her expenses
were reimbursed, as the rentals due would be debited from 50% of the amount she
advanced for the construction of the market stall, and that she will vacate the stall only
after the municipality shall have reimbursed her expenses in the construction.

On January 21, 1997, Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises.[23] The
locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor on January 27, 1997. The contents of
the market stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the police station for
safekeeping.[24] While these were being undertaken, Verutiao was in her farm about 4
to 5 kilometers away from the market stall.[25] She considered the act of the Mayor as a
political harassment, given that her husband, was then a candidate for councilor under
the ticket of the opposition; and that she was a leader of the opposing
party.[26]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Case for the Accused[27]

Except for the accused Victor Maderazo, the other accused opted not to testify. Victor
Maderazo declared that as of January 27, 1997, he was a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Caibiran.On said date, he was at thestall of Verutiao at the public market in the
company of Seniforo Perido, who was the Chief of Police of Caibiran, Barangay Captain
Rodolfo Rico, Revenue Collector Orlando Mocorro, and Faulio Quizo, and other
laborers.All of them witnessed the inventory of the goods in the stall of Verutiao which
Victor Maderazo made upon the request of Mayor Melchor Maderazo.Earlier, Verutiao was
informed, by letter, of the inventory of the goods in the stall, which, however, she failed
to attend. One of the employees of the Municipality brought the key to the stall and
opened it.Victor Maderazo then conducted an inventory of the goods, each was
described, while someone was listing the goods.The inventory was orderly.
The goods were then brought to the police station where the supplies were kept.

The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On September 3, 2004, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment[28] convicting the

accused Melchor G. Maderazo, Seniforo Perido, and Victor Maderazo, Jr. of the crime of
unjust vexation, but acquitted the other accused. The court ruled that Melchor Maderazo
had no authority to padlock, open and inventory the contents of the subject stall and
take the same to the police station. Although, he had the power to cancel the lease
contract, as Mayor, he could not eject the lessee by padlocking the market stall and
7
order the hauling and seizure of the goods contained therein. The remedies of the
Municipality in cases where there is delinquency in the payment of fees and rentals are
provided in the Local Government Code.
The court ruled that the accused cannot, however, be convicted of grave coercion
because they did not use violence, threats or intimidation. Verutiao could not have
possibly been intimidated or forced by the accused, as she was not at the market stall
when the same was padlocked, and its goods inventoried and hauled. The court,
however, held the said accused criminally liable for unjust vexation even if the private
complainant was not at the stall because the overt acts of the accused caused her
annoyance, irritation and vexation. The court ruled that if the second element of grave
coercion under Article 286, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code is lacking, the crime
committed falls under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the same Code. The fallo of
the decision reads:

cralawWHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused MELCHOR G.

MADERAZO, accused SENIFORO PERIDO and VICTOR MADERAZO JR. are
hereby CONVICTED of the crime of Unjust Vexation, in Criminal Case No.
24309 and hereby ordered to pay a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00).
Accused RODOLFO RICO, accused ORLANDO MOCORRO, accused RODOLFO
AZUR, accused REYNALDO OLEDAN, accused JORDAN GERVACIO, and
accused JOSE CESORA are hereby ACQUITTED of the Crime of Grave
Coercion in Criminal Case No. 24309 for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

cralawConsequently, the cash bond they have posted for their provisional
liberty are hereby CANCELLED and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
Caibiran, Biliran Cashier is hereby ordered to release the said Cash Bond to
accused Rico, accused Mocorro, accused Cesora, accused Azur, accused
Oledan, and accused Gervacio.

cralawTheHold Departure Order issued against accused Rico, accused

Mocorro, accused Cesora, accused Azur, accused Oledan, and accused
Gervacio are set aside and any Hold Departure Order issued by the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation pursuant thereto is hereby recalled.
However, the Hold Departure Orders issued against accused Maderazo,
accused Maderazo, Jr., and accused Perido stand.

cralawSO ORDERED.[29]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Petition Before the Court

The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition[30] and rely on the following
grounds:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERS OF

THE CRIME OF UNJUST VEXATION.

8
 II

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER

MAYOR MADERAZO HAS NO POWER TO PADLOCK A MARKET STALL AND TO
HAUL THE GOODS CONTAINED THEREIN.

III

THE SACROSANCT RULE IS THAT WHERE THE PROSECUTION FAILS TO

DISCHARGE ITS BURDEN OF PROVING BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
EVERY FACT NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE THE CRIME FOR WHICH THE
ACCUSED IS BEING HELD TO ACCOUNT -- AS IN THE CASE AT BAR -- THE
ACCUSED MUST PERFORCE BE ACQUITTED.[31]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The threshold issue is whether or not the People adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt
of petitioners' guilt for unjust vexation.

Petitioners maintain that they are not criminally liable for unjust vexation because
Verutiao was not prevented from doing something not prohibited by law.She could not
have been possibly intimidated or forced by petitioners, and could not have been
prevented from doing business.In fact, she was not transacting business at the time.
Verutiao was not at her stall when it was opened and her goods inventoried; hence, she
could not have been vexed.

Under the Information, they were charged with grave coercion for allegedly evicting
Verutiao from her stall on January 27, 1997, thereby compelling her to give up her
possession, and depriving her of said market stall. However, they were convicted by the
trial court of unjust vexation because they allegedly padlocked the stall, hauled and/or
seized the goods contained therein. It was petitioner Mayor Maderazo who had padlocked
the stall earlier on January 21, 1997. Petitioners Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. were not
involved in the padlocking of the stall.For his part, petitioner Melchor Maderazo was not
at the stall on January 27, 1997; he cannot, thus, be guilty of unjust vexation for the
overt acts of his co-petitioners on January 27, 1997.

Verutiao's refusal to vacate the premises of the subject stall despite proper demand and
despite the fact that she was no longer operating the same, rendered her a deforciant,
and liable for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994.Consequently,
petitioner Mayor Maderazo had every right to consider the subject stall vacant; and
proceed in accordance with Section 44 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994, which
provides:

cralawSection 44 - Vacancy of Tienda or Stall before expiration of lease.

cralawShouldany reason (sic), a tienda, stall or stand holder or leases (sic)

discontinues or be required to discontinue his business before the expiration
of the lease, such tienda, stall or stand shall be considered vacant and its
occupancy thereafter shall be disposed of in the manner herein prescribed.

cralaw

9
Petitioners posit that a Municipal Mayor has the duty to enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the Municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers
and must ensure that all taxes and revenues of the Municipality are collected. He is
empowered to issue licenses and permits and to suspend or revoke the same for violation
of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits were issued; to adopt adequate
measures to protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality;
and to institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for
violation of ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or charges. Under Sec. 174 of the
Local Government Code, among the civil remedies for the collection of delinquent local
taxes, fees or charges, and other revenues is 'by administrative action through distraint
of goods, chattels or effects, and other personal property of whatever character,
including stocks and other securities, debts, credits, bank accounts, and interest in and
rights to personal property, and by levy upon real property and interest in or rights to
real property.

Petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo had the right to padlock the stall of Medaria Verutiao
on January 21, 1997, after she refused to vacate the stall despite his demand.Verutiao
had no more lease contract and was no longer operating the stall for the purpose it was
intended, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984.Moreover, she was
delinquent in the payment of monthly rentals.Under the circumstances, and in view of
herviolation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, petitioner MayorMelchor
Maderazo was duty-bound to institute the necessary administrative proceedings or to
take immediate action to correct the violation, protect the property of the Municipality,
and ensure that the delinquent revenues from the subject stall would be collected.

Petitioners aver that in closing down the stall, Verutiao was not ejected therefrom but
was merely stopped from improperly using it, in the exercise of petitioner Mayor
Maderazo's power and duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance
of the Municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers.

The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that, under the Local Government Code, the
local government concerned may avail of the following remedies, either alternatively or
simultaneously, for the collection of fees or charges: 1) the administrative remedies of
distraint of personal properties or levy upon real properties; and 2) by judicial action. But
from the evidence, petitioner Melchor Maderazo cancelled the lease contract and ordered,
which the other petitioners obeyed, to padlock and to subsequently cart and haul the
goods of spouses Verutiao inside their market stall to the precinct, under the guise that it
was done in accordance with the law.He did not avail of the judicial action which is
specifically provided in the Local Government Code.He failed to avail of the
administrative remedies of distraint and levy and its procedure as provided in Section
175 thereof.

Even if Verutiao was delinquent in the payment of their rentals, petitioner Melchor
Maderazo is mandated to consider and resolve the exemptions being claimed by the
former and which were properly communicated to him.Petitioner Melchor Maderazo
cannot take the law into his hands, and order the seizure of the goods of the spouses
Verutiao which was implemented by the other petitioners, in clear violation of the law.

He maintains that nowhere in the Local Government Code is the Mayor of a Municipality
authorized to take the law into his own hands.Instead, the Local Government Code
10
provides specifically for the measures, procedures and remedies to be undertaken in
cases of delinquency in the payment of fees or charges due to the local government
concerned. Ordering to padlock, and to subsequently cart and haul the goods inside the
market stall being rented by Verutiao to the police precinct without any court order or
notice of distraint and levy prejudiced the spouses. Petitioner Mayor Maderazo's duties of
protecting the properties of the Municipality and enforcing the law do not include
depriving Verutiao of her means of livelihood. Perido and Maderazo, Jr. cannot escape
criminal liability by merely saying that they were following the orders of Melchor
Maderazo as only lawful orders deserved to be followed and obeyed.The participation of
petitioners Perido and Maderazo, Jr. went beyond just being witnesses because they
admitted that 'they opened the stall and x x x accounted for the goods and special effects
contained inside. Petitioners Perido and Maderazo, Jr. were invited to be at the vicinity as
witnesses but they acted beyond their participation as mere witnesses; they became
participants to an illegal and unauthorized act.

Petitioners Seniforo Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. occupy the positions of Station
Commander and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively.They are public
servants, and as such, owe the constituents of the Municipality of Caibiran, including
Verutiao, the performance of their official duties and obligations to a higher degree of
commitment and standards, and must necessarily conform to the norms of conduct set
forth by the law.

Verutiao was not at the subject stall and could not have possibly been intimidated or
forced by the accused.She could, likewise, not be prevented from doing business because
they were not transacting business at that time.By the actuations of the petitioners,
Verutiao was tormented and distressed.Unjust vexation is a form of light coercion which
is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some
physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.

The Ruling of the Court

On the first issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that indeed, the
prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove the guilt of petitioners
Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan Member Victor Maderazo, Jr. for unjust
vexation.

Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 287. Light coercions. ' Any person, who by means of violence, shall
seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same
to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no
case less than 75 pesos.

Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto

menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.

The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any human conduct
which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably
11
annoy or vex an innocent person.[32]Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the
Information, for the crime of unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint.
However, in unjust vexation, being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the
crime. Good faith is a good defense to a charge for unjust vexation because good faith
negates malice.The paramount question to be considered is whether the offender's act
caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person
to whom it is directed.[33] The main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust
vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his
hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for any person to
take into his own hands the administration of justice.[34]
cralawIn the present case, petitioner Melchor Maderazo opted not to testify in his behalf.
The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners of unjust vexation on its findings that
petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo had the stall of Verutiao padlocked and had it
reopened, and had the contents of the stall inventoried and taken to the police
station.However, the padlocking of the stall of Verutiao by petitioner Melchor
Maderazo took place on January 21, 1997 and not on January 27, 1997.Petitioners
were charged with grave coercion, but were convicted of unjust vexation for the
eviction of Verutiao on January 27, 1997 and not on January 21, 1997 following
the inventory of the contents of the stall and the transportation thereof to the
police station.The only events that took place on January 27, 1997 were the
unlocking of the padlock of the stall, the inventory of its contents by petitioner
Victor Maderazo on order of petitioner Melchor Maderazo, and the transportation of
the goods to the police station where it was stored.Petitioners Victor Maderazo,
Jr.and Seniforo Perido were not present when the stall was padlocked on January
21, 1997.

We agree with respondent's contention that based on the evidence on record, the overt
acts of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr., on January 27,
1997, annoyed, irritated and caused embarrassment to her.It was petitioner Melchor
Maderazo who ordered petitioner Victor Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to
conduct an inventory of the contents thereof, and to effect the transportation of the
goods to the police station.Petitioner Victor Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang
Bayan member, obeyed the order of the Mayor.

Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof
taken from the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was
nevertheless committed.For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party
be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the
private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned
of the overt acts of the petitioners.Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted
Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from
the business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from January 21, 1997.

Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo,
Jr., had no right, without judicial intervention, to oust Verutiao from the stall, and had
her merchandise transported to the police station, thereby preventing her from doing
business therein and selling her merchandize.Petitioner Mayor Maderazo had no right to
take the law into his own hands and deprive Verutiao of her possession of the stall and
her means of livelihood.

12
Admittedly, the lease contract of Verutiao and the Municipality expired on January 13,
1997 without having been renewed, and petitioner Mayor ordered Verutiao to vacate the
stall, also for her failure to pay the rent amounting to P2,532.00. Under Section 44 of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1999, the stall is considered vacant and shall be disposed of.
However, petitioner had to file an action for unlawful detainer against Verutiao to recover
possession of her stall and cause her eviction from said premises.[35] Verutiao insisted
on her right to remain as lessee of her stall and to do business thereat. Such action is
designed to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder and prevent those
believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property resort to force to gain
possession rather than to secure appropriate action in the court to assert their
claims.[36]It was incumbent upon petitioner Mayor to institute an action for the eviction
of Verutiao.He cannot be permitted to invade the property and oust the lessee who is
entitled to the actual possession and to place the burden upon the latter of instituting an
action to try the property right.[37]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralawAn action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings
established for the purpose of providing expeditious means of protecting actual
possession, which is presumed to be lawful until the contrary is proven.As this Court
emphasized in Dizon v. Concina:[38]

cralawSuccinctlydid this Court explain in one case the nature of the forcible
entry action: 'In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and
detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has
actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties
to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke
the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of
ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired
possession should remain in possession pending this decision; and the
parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over
the possession of the property which is the subject of
dispute.[39]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Undeniably, petitioner Mayor is tasked to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the Municipality and to implement all approved programs, projects,
services and activities of the Municipality[40] and to ensure that all taxes and other
revenues of the Municipality are collected.[41] He is obliged to institute or cause to be
instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for the recovery of funds and
property.[42] However, in the performance of his duties, petitioner Mayor should act
within the confines of the law and not resort to the commission of a felony. A public
officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws and
ordinances. He must exercise his power and perform his duties in accordance with law,
with strict observance of the rights of the people, and never whimsically, arbitrarily and
despotically.

Even as we find petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and VictorMaderazo, Jr. guilty of
unjust vexation, we find petitioner Seniforo Perido deserving of an acquittal.The
Prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with the other petitioners. He was at
the situs of the stall merely to witness the inventory and ensure peace and order.He
agreed to have the contents of the stall of Verutiao stored in the police station
presumably to protect the property from the elements and asportation by thieves until

13
after Verutiao shall have claimed the same or the disposition thereof determined by the
authorities concerned.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. TheDecisionof the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION thatpetitioner Seniforo Perido isACQUITTED of the crime
charged.The bail bond posted by him for his provisional liberty is cancelled.No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

Intriguing Against Honor

This felony is committed by any person who shall make any intrigue which has for its principal
purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of another person. It is committed by saying to
others an unattributable thing, that if it said to the person himself, slander is committed.

Intriguing against honor refers to any scheme or plot designed to blemish the reputation of
another by means w/c consist of some trickery.

The intrigue is resorted to to blemish honor or reputation of another person.

Must be committed by means of some tricky and secret plot, and not gossiping which falls
under defamation.

Where the source or author of derogatory information cannot be determined and defendant
passes it to others, defendant’s act is one of intriguing against honor; if it came from a definite
source, crime is slander.

Intriguing against honor is referred to as gossiping: the offender, without ascertaining the truth
of a defamatory utterance, repeats the same and pass it on to another, to the damage of the
offended party.

This crime is committed by any person who shall make any intrigue which has for its principal
purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of another person.

14
Art. 363. Incriminating Innocent Person. — Any person who, by any
act not constituting perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an
innocent person the commission of a crime, shall be punished by
arresto menor. (Revised Penal Code)

Elements:

1. That the offender performs an act;

2. That by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission
of a crime

3. That such act does not constitute perjury (Campanano, Jr. vs Datuin, G.R. No. 172142,
October 17, 2007).

How is incriminating innocent person committed?

●Incriminating innocent person is committed by performing an act (not constituting perjury) by

which the offender directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a
crime. (Art. 363) It does not apply to false accusations but to acts tending directly to cause
false accusations, such as "planting" evidence and the like. (Lu Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui,
G.R. No. L-122, May 11, 1946)

Illustration: A took the wallet of B and put it into the pocket of C.

●One who falsely accuses another of a crime may he held liable either for libel or for perjury,
depending upon the manner or form in which the act is committed. (Lu Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong
15
Gui)

Incriminating Innocent Person vs. Perjury

Incriminating Innocent Person Perjury

Performing an act by which the The gravamen of the offense is

offender directly incriminates or the imputation itself, falsely
imputes to an innocent person made, before an officer.
the commission of a crime.

Limited to the act of act of The giving of false statement

planting evidence and the like, in under oath or the making of a
order to incriminate an innocent false affidavit, imputing to a
person. person the commission of the
crime.

Intriguing against honor vs. Defamation

Intriguing against Dishonor Defamation

The offender does not avail The offender avail himself of

himself of written or spoken written or spoken words in
words in besmirching the besmirching the victims's
victims's reputation. reputation.

The imputation made by the The imputation made by the

offender need not be public and
malicious.
offender must be public and
malicious, and, besides, must be
calculated to cause the dishonor,
discredit or contempt of the
aggrieved party.

Complex crime of incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest

For a criminal complaint or information to charge the commission of a complex crime, the
allegations contained therein do not necessarily have to charge a complex crime as defined
by law. It is sufficient that the information contains allegations which show that one offense
was a necessary means to commit the other.

The allegation that the act of planting the incriminatory evidence took place during the
supposed investigation after the unlawful arrest, are basis for the logical assumption, in the
16
absence of evidence, that the two acts imputed to the accused — that of unlawfully arresting
and that of planting incriminatory evidence — had closely followed each other, and that the
former was a necessary means to commit the latter.

Under the circumstances of the case, the accused had to arrest Marcial because it was the
only way that they could with facility detain him and, more importantly, search his person or
effects and, in the process, commingle therewith the marked peso bill. It should be observed
that without detaining, investigating and searching Marcial it would have been impossible, if
not difficult, for the accused to plant the marked one peso bill, because then they could not
have simply held Marcial and placed the marked one peso bill in his pocket, without the latter
vigoriously protesting the act. Besides, if the accused simply held Marcial and planted in his
pockets the marked one peso bill without arresting him, they could not have possibly
accomplished their purpose, because Marcial would have surely and easily discovered what
they were up to. Indeed, the accused had to arrest Marcial, even in the absence of a valid
reason, so that under the semblance of a police investigation, they could get whatever money
was inside his pockets and include in it the marked one peso bill. In short, the accused had to
arrest Marcial so that he could be detained and pretending to investigate him, search his
person and thereby have the opportunity of planting the marked one peso bill among his
belongings. (People vs. Alagao, G.R. No. L-20721, April 30, 1966)

G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was
convicted in Teves v. Sandiganbayan1 involved moral turpitude.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of
Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio
G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify2 petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a
cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is
disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office.4 The case was docketed as SPA No. 07-242 and assigned to the COMELEC’s First
Division.

17
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the
position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his
Certificate of Candidacy.5

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which was denied
in its assailed October 9, 2007 Resolution for being moot, thus:

It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for
the position of member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros
Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 May 2007
filed by respondent Edgar Y. Teves challenging the Resolution of this Commission (First
Division) promulgated on 11 May 2007 is hereby DENIED for having been rendered moot and
academic.

SO ORDERED.6

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

I.

THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN
ISSUE RAISED IN PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHETHER
PETITIONER IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.

II.

THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE RESOLUTION
THEREOF WILL DETERMINE PETITIONER’S QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER
PUBLIC POSITIONS IN FUTURE ELECTIONS.

III.

THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC IN EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS
OF THE FIRST DIVISION WHICH RULED THAT PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(H) OF R.A. 3019 AND THE IMPOSITION OF FINE IS A
CONVICTION FOR A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.

A.

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING

MORAL TURPITUDE SHOULD BE RESOLVED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE
FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.

18
 B.

THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT SUPPORTS

THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE
"TOTALITY OF FACTS" DOCTRINE, PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.7

The petition is impressed with merit.

The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14, 2007 elections did not
effectively moot the issue of whether he was disqualified from running for public office on the
ground that the crime he was convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still a justiciable issue
which the COMELEC should have resolved instead of merely declaring that the
disqualification case has become moot in view of petitioner’s defeat.

Further, there is no basis in the COMELEC’s findings that petitioner is eligible to run again in
the 2010 elections because his disqualification shall be deemed removed after the expiration
of a period of five years from service of the sentence. Assuming that the elections would be
held on May 14, 2010, the records show that it was only on May 24, 2005 when petitioner
paid the fine of P10,000.00 he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandignbayan. 8 Such being
the reckoning point, thus, the five-year disqualification period will end only on May 25, 2010.
Therefore he would still be ineligible to run for public office during the May 14, 2010 elections.

Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner’s violation of
Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.1avvphi1

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.lawphil.net

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.9

Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:

19
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a
public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution
or by law.10

Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A.
3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction.
The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or
by law.11

In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having
pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local
Government Code of 1991. The Court held therein:

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then
mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application
for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989
he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he
divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be
presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of
that nature. His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he
"turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he]
could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure" is
not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the
management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being
the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife,
still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent
Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such
their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares
20
all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband
and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited
under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local
government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:

xxxx

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit….
[Emphasis supplied].

The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.13

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same
involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of
the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are
not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the
instant case.

Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that:

Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the
foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se
involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set
forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:

"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be
inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves
immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."

This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International
Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se
or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve
moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita
only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of
the statute. (Emphasis supplied)1awphi1

Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s
conviction and found that the same does not involve moral turpitude.

21
First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELEC’s finding that petitioner used his
official capacity in connection with his interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by
transferring the management to his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him by the
people.

The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioner’s conviction involved moral
turpitude, misunderstood or misapplied our ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to
the COMELEC:

In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted may per se not
involve moral turpitude, still the totality of facts evinces [his] moral turpitude. The prohibition
was intended to avoid any conflict of interest or any instance wherein the public official would
favor his own interest at the expense of the public interest. The [petitioner] knew of the
prohibition but he attempted to circumvent the same by holding out that the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel Teves. Later on, he would aver that
he already divested himself of any interest of the cockpit in favor of his wife. But the Supreme
Court saw through the ruse and declared that what he divested was only the management of
the cockpit but not the ownership. And even if the ownership is transferred to his wife, the
respondent would nevertheless have an interest thereon because it would still belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, of which the [petitioner] is the other half.

[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to divest
himself but he did not and instead employed means to hide his interests. He knew that it was
prohibited he nevertheless concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he hid his interest
denotes his malicious intent to favor self-interest at the expense of the public. Only a man
with a malevolent, decadent, corrupt and selfish motive would cling on and conceal his
interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly shows his moral depravity and
proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of his fellowmen. Being a public official,
his act is also a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the totality of his
acts is contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, honesty and good morals. The crime,
as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves moral turpitude.15

On the contrary, the Court’s ruling states:

The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of
the business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not
well-founded." This it based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the
Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year
1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992,
it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the
LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his official capacity in
the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in the information,
because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 16

22
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to
gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his
interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering
that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession
of such interest.

As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:

As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then
until 31 December 1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was
not yet prohibited. It was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that
he transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it
was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her
sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the cockpit in question dated 28 January
1990 and 18 February 1991, she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and
Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her renewal application dated 6 January 1992, she
referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise in the separate Lists of
Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992, which she submitted on 22
February 1991 and 17 February 1992, respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit registration, she signed her
name as Operator/Licensee.17 (Emphasis supplied)

Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local
government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not
mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of
interest inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by a public officer of
pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions. Thus, in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that:

x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among
the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41 thereof. Such possession became unlawful or
prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992.
Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection with his prohibited
interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of the
prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although
ignorance thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the
imposition of the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of
1991.18 (Italics supplied)

The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one
days as minimum to twelve years as maximum to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a
recognition that petitioner’s violation was not intentionally done contrary to justice, modesty,
or good morals but due to his lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.

Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality as
it tends to bring forth idlers and gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC
involves moral turpitude.

23
Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied
tradition in our culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation. 19 While it is a
form of gambling, the morality thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. In
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., it was held that:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It
is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion,
the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit
some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing.
In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no
authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do no sit to resolve
the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is
settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive
departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is
exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own
conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of
justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on

Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves
from running for the position of Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the crime committed by
petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

24