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To cite this article: Lynn Waterhouse (2006) Inadequate Evidence for Multiple Intelligences, Mozart Effect, and Emotional
Intelligence Theories, Educational Psychologist, 41:4, 247-255, DOI: 10.1207/s15326985ep4104_5
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EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, 41(4), 247–255
Copyright © 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
INADEQUATE EVIDENCE
WATERHOUSE
I (Waterhouse, 2006) argued that, because multiple intelligences, the Mozart effect, and emo-
tional intelligence theories have inadequate empirical support and are not consistent with cog-
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nitive neuroscience findings, these theories should not be applied in education. Proponents
countered that their theories had sufficient empirical support, were consistent with cognitive
neuroscience findings, and should be applied in education (Cherniss, Extein, Goleman, &
Weissberg, 2006; Gardner & Moran, 2006; Rauscher & Hinton, 2006). However, Gardner and
Moran offered no validating evidence for multiple intelligences, Rauscher and Hinton con-
cluded that “listening-to-Mozart” studies should be disregarded, and Cherniss, Extein,
Goleman, and Weissberg agreed that emotional intelligence lacked a unitary empirically sup-
ported construct. My reply addresses theory proponents’ specific criticisms of my review and
reasserts my original claims.
In “Multiple Intelligences, the Mozart Effect, and Emotional fered support for MI theory, but they provided no proof for
Intelligence: A Critical Review” (Waterhouse, 2006), I ar- this assertion.
gued that “MI theory has no validating data … the Mozart ef- Rauscher and Hinton (2006) conceded that “listen-
fect theory has more negative than positive findings, and EI ing-to-Mozart” studies do have too many negative findings to
theory lacks a unitary empirically supported construct.” I warrant being applied to the classroom. They argued instead
also argued that these theories’ brain system claims were not that skills developed in playing a music instrument transfer to
consistent with relevant cognitive neuroscience findings and spatial skills, and thus music instruction studies have find-
concluded that until these theories have garnered reasonable ings that are important for education. However, the concept
evidentiary support they should not be applied in education. of transfer lacks adequate empirical support (Barnett & Ceci,
Theory proponents counterargued that their theories were 2002; Mayer, 2004; Perruchet & Vinter, 2002).
well supported by both behavioral research and cognitive Cherniss et al. (2006) agreed that “conflicting constructs
neuroscience findings and should continue to be applied in continue to characterize EI theory,” but they viewed these
education (Cherniss, Extein, Goleman, & Weissberg, 2006; conflicts as a sign of vitality. Cherniss et al. also argued that
Gardner & Moran, 2006; Rauscher & Hinton, 2006). EI had significant predictive validity but they provided lim-
Gardner and Moran (2006) affirmed the importance of ited evidence to support this claim.
empirical evidence for multiple intelligences (MI) theory, In the discussions that follow I address theory proponents’
stating that “Theories such as evolution or plate tectonics or criticisms of my review and offer arguments to explain prob-
MI develop through the continuing accumulation of evi- lems I found in their criticisms.
dence.” They claimed that abundant empirical evidence for
MI theory existed in the studies Gardner relied on to develop
his theory, but this claim conflates theory generation and the- MI THEORY LACKS VALIDATING
ory validation. They also claimed that evidence for cognitive EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
systems such as reasoning and natural kind categorization of-
Gardner and Moran (2006) asserted that I erred in claiming
that MI theory lacked empirical support, that I misconstrued
Correspondence should be addressed to Lynn Waterhouse, Child Behav-
the conceptual basis of MI, that I misunderstood the defini-
ior Research, The College of New Jersey, 234 Bliss Hall, Ewing, NJ 08628. tions of several intelligences, and that I had a naïve view of
E-mail: lynwater@tcnj.edu science that limited my ability to value Gardner’s MI theory.
248 WATERHOUSE
The following discussions respond to these criticisms and conducting studies to explore the validity of the
outline two important evidence problems that Gardner and intelligences (Allix, 2000).
Moran failed to address. Gardner and Moran’s (2006) third evidentiary claim was
that Gardner, Feldman, and Krechevsky (1998) reported em-
pirical evidence for multiple intelligence profiles in pre-
Gardner and Moran’s Proposed Evidence Does
school children. However, this 1998 report is inadequate as
Not Validate MI Theory
support for MI theory. No formal data analysis was pre-
Gardner and Moran (2006) offered four evidentiary claims sented, and the half-page discussion of findings is too brief
for MI theory. First, they claimed that MI theory was empiri- and too vague to be used by other researchers:
cally validated by the fact that “Gardner combined the empir-
ical findings of hundreds of studies from a variety of disci- Assessments did identify distinctive profiles for a majority of
plines” to develop MI theory. However, theory validation is a children … every child exhibited at least one strength …
process distinct from theory generation. The studies Gardner there was little correlation between the children’s perfor-
read that led him to hypothesize that there might be MI may mances on the different activities … because of the small
serve to warrant the reasonableness of his hypothesis, but the sample size (39 subjects), our results must be regarded as ten-
studies he read cannot validate the existence of MI. tative. (Gardner et al., 1998, p. 27)
Second, Gardner and Moran (2006) argued that MI
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subcomponents were supported by empirical evidence for Fourth, Gardner and Moran (2006) claimed that MI theory
“many specific neural systems … like theory of mind, recogni- will ultimately accrue evidence comparable to that for evolu-
tion of natural kinds, understanding of self, understanding of tionary theory and plate tectonics theory. However, in the 23
others,” and by evidence for “systems of numerical, linguistic, years since Gardner (1983) proposed MI, the sole empirical
and causal reasoning.” Gardner and Moran further argued that study of MI (Visser, Ashton, & Vernon, 2006) reported evi-
“modules identified by evolutionary psychologists, contrary dence disconfirming MI theory. By contrast, evolutionary
to Waterhouse’s argument that they refute MI theory, actually theory and plate tectonics theory accrued important validat-
align very well with Gardner’s intelligences and their ing empirical findings quite soon after they were proposed.
subcomponents.” However, Gardner and Moran did not sup- In the 23 years following Darwin’s publication of Origin of
ply a crucial specification: Which multiple intelligence is sup- Species in 1859 (Appleman, 2000), other scientists presented
ported by what evidence for which neural system or adapted an array of fossil and faunal evidence in support of Darwin’s
cognition module? For example, Astuti, Solomon, and Carey theory (Bowler, 1986). In the 23 years following the emer-
(2004) reported findings for studies of natural kind conceptu- gence of plate tectonics theory in the 1960s, data collected
alization in Madagascar. Natural kind conceptualization in- from ocean floor mapping, magnetic rock record measure-
cludes, among other things, seeing objects, animals, and other ment, radiometric dating of the Earth’s magnetic pole rever-
humans; labeling objects and individuals; grouping objects sal history, and precise location of earthquake sites provided
and individuals; and conceptualizing categories of groupings. strong validating empirical evidence for plate tectonics the-
Consequently, Astuti et al.’s evidence for natural kind catego- ory (Oreskes, 2003). MI theory has accrued no such validat-
rization “aligns with” at least four intelligences: the visual spa- ing empirical evidence in the 23 years since it was proposed.
tial intelligence, the naturalistic intelligence, the linguistic in-
telligence, and the interpersonal intelligence.
The Multiple Levels of MI
Examination of individual adapted cognition modules and
cognitive systems revealed that their specific behavioral Gardner and Moran (2006) argued that I misconstrued the
components aligned with more than one multiple intelli- intelligences as skills because I failed to “encompass the
gence (Waterhouse, 2006), thus cutting across the boundaries several levels on which MI theory examines intelligences.”
of Gardner’s intelligences. Consequently this evidence does Gardner and Moran proposed (a) the finer level of neuro-
not provide empirical support for the intelligences but, con- logical subcomponents of each intelligence, (b) the middle
versely, argues against the framework of MI. road level of the intelligences, and (c) the broader level of
A related problem is that neither Gardner nor any of his skills that use the intelligences “to produce proficient
adherents has defined a set of testable psychological and/or expert behavior.”
subcomponents for each of the intelligences (Allix, 2000). Contrary to Gardner and Moran’s (2006) claim, I did un-
Gardner (2004) asserted that because his “basic paradigm derstand these levels. My review outlined cognitive systems
clashes with that of psychometrics” (p. 214), and because of the same explanatory scope (middle road level) as MI
testing “results may well be misused,” he will not define whose findings countered the nature and boundaries of MI
testable subcomponents for the intelligences. Without such (Waterhouse, 2006). In their response Gardner and Moran re-
subcomponents, the intelligences are defined only by gen- defined the “What is it?” and “Where is it?” cognitive sys-
eral descriptions (Gardner, 1983, 1999, 2004), and the gen- tems down from middle road level to finer level neurological
erality of these descriptions has prevented researchers from subcomponents of the intelligences. They also redefined
INADEQUATE EVIDENCE 249
Kahneman’s decision-making processes up from middle important not to gloss over differences between the personal
road level to broader level skills that would deploy Gardner’s and other forms of intelligence” (p. 240).
intelligences. These down-a-level and up-a-level Gardner and Moran (2006) further argued that I was
redefinitions had the effect of side-stepping the evidence wrong to include empathy for natural things as part of the
against MI theory that these systems provide. Moreover, naturalist intelligence. However, Gardner (1999) proposed
Gardner and Moran’s redefinitions were inaccurate. that the naturalist intelligence involved biophilia, wherein
the naturalist “may well possess the talent of caring for, tam-
What is it and where is it processing streams could ing, or interacting subtly with various living creatures” (p.
not be MI subcomponents. The brain’s primary visual 49). The word empathy does not seem to me to be wide of the
cortex sends visual information along both the ventral (what mark as a summary incorporating “biophilia” and “caring
is it) and dorsal (where is it) processing streams, wherein for” and “interacting subtly.”
neurons further downstream to learn to respond to increas-
ingly organized sets of features (Deco & Rolls, 2005). These My View of Science is Based on the
two streams begin with shared visual information, but the Practice of Science
dorsal stream moves to incorporate body-in-space process-
ing, and the ventral stream moves to incorporate auditory Gardner and Moran (2006) argued that I had a “ naïve view of
processing. Thus, each stream’s mixed content processing science” that prevented me from being able to “acknowledge
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precludes it from being construed as a subcomponent of any or understand the enterprise in which Gardner has been en-
individual multiple intelligence. gaged.” My view of science is exemplified in my practice of
science. For example, our research group synthesized neuro-
science and behavioral findings on attachment to theorize
Kahneman’s systems could not be domain skills that abnormalities in the neurohormone oxytocin might con-
deploying the intelligences. Briefly, in Kahneman’s tribute to attachment impairments found in autism (Modahl,
(2003) prospect theory, Systems I and II govern decision mak- Fein, Waterhouse, & Newton, 1992; Waterhouse, Fein, &
ing by predicting utility value (Will this decision be good or Modahl, 1996). Our group then conducted empirical studies
bad?). System I is spontaneous but rigid and is probably based of this hypothesis in which we did find evidence for abnor-
in limbic and basal ganglia neural circuits, whereas System II malities in oxytocin in autistic individuals (Green et al.,
is effortful but flexible and is probably based in frontal lobe 2001; Modahl et al., 1998). Since that time other researchers
functions (Trepel, Fox, & Poldrack, 2005). System II operates have conducted a wide range of related research, and genetic
at the concept level, and System I operates both at the percept evidence has linked an oxytocin receptor gene with autism
and concept level (Kahneman, 2003). Because the percept (Wu et al., 2005).
level is the same as Gardner and Moran’s finer level, and the In fact, Gardner and Moran (2006) argued that my view of
concept level is the same as Gardner and Moran’s middle level, science is naïve because I do not view Gardner’s synthesis of
therefore neither System I nor System II could be interpreted research findings as validating evidence for MI theory. Syn-
as broader level skills deploying the intelligences. theses are important because they can summarize the current
state of research, can identify studies that should be con-
ducted, and can yield new theories. However, if a new theory,
Understanding Definitions of
such as MI theory, is generated by the synthesis of existing
Specific Intelligences
findings, then that new theory requires empirical validation.
Gardner and Moran (2006) were correct in stating that I be-
lieved Gardner (2004) had proposed two additional types of
MI Theory Problems That
intelligence. Although Gardner may have intended some-
Gardner and Moran Failed to Address
thing different, nonetheless both the content and parallel
structure of his published text argue that there are two MI Gardner and Moran’s (2006) response failed to address two
profiles, each yielding a separate form of intelligence. The problems for MI theory outlined in my review. Gardner
text posits that individuals with high IQs have “a mental claimed that the successful application of MI theory in edu-
searchlight” (intelligence), whereas individuals with jagged cation provided empirical support for MI theory (Gardner,
MI profiles have “a laser-form of intelligence” (Gardner, 2004, p. 214; Gardner & Connell, 2000, p. 292). However,
2004, p. 217). applying MI cannot provide evidence to validate the
Gardner and Moran (2006) argued that I was wrong to intelligences because the act of applying MI theory assumes
state that intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligences were the validity of the intelligences. Gardner and Moran offered
combined into a personal intelligence. However, Gardner no response to this problem.
(1983, 1999) did treat these two intelligences as part of a Second, Gardner (1999) asserted that MI theory depends
larger whole of “personal intelligence” (1983, chapter 10; on each intelligence having its own neural processing circuit,
1999, p. 43). For example, Gardner (1983) stated that “it is arguing that if “musical and spatial processing were identi-
250 WATERHOUSE
cally represented” in neural circuits “that fact would suggest there was no evidence for general learning transfer, and no
the presence of one intelligence, and not two separate evidence for specific skill transfer, but there was some evi-
intelligences” (p. 99). My review outlined evidence for dence for specific transfer of general knowledge (pp.
shared neural circuits for the processing of many different 217–218). Perruchet and Vinter (2002) reported that “to-
types of content (Waterhouse, 2006). Gardner and Moran tally negative results are certainly the most frequent out-
(2006) offered no response to this evidence. come” in transfer research (p. 319).
In summary, Gardner and Moran (2006) provided no vali-
dating research evidence for MI theory, and they sidestepped
Schellenberg’s (2003) Claims Concerning Music
the problem that neuroscience findings for other cognitive
Lesson Effects
systems cut across MI boundaries. They were mistaken in
their claim that a theory based on a synthesis of research re- Rauscher and Hinton (2006) argued that I misrepresented
quires no empirical validation, and they did not address the Schellenberg (2003) by citing his article as support for the
problem that application research cannot validate MI theory. claim that transfer from music to spatial skill had not been
Finally, although Gardner (1999) claimed that MI theory demonstrated. Rauscher and Hinton argued that
would be nullified if the neural processing circuits for differ- Schellenberg’s (2003) statement that “positive transfer ef-
ent contents were found to be shared (p. 99), Gardner and fects to nonmusical domains, such as language, mathematics,
Moran offered no response to evidence that neural process- or spatial reasoning could be similarly unique for individuals
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ing circuits for different contents are shared. who take music lessons” (p. 444) meant that transfer from
music to spatial skills had been demonstrated. However,
Schellenberg’s statement (2003, p. 444) was hypothetical, as
THE MOZART EFFECT AND framed by this preceding statement: “If we suspend our dis-
MUSIC LESSON TRANSFER belief, however, and assume that music education affects
abilities … how could we account for this influence?” (p.
Rauscher and Hinton (2006) argued that I misconstrued the 443). In fact, Schellenberg (2003) proposed that “music les-
concept of transfer and misrepresented the contents of a re- sons … may confer benefits by providing close and extended
view article by Schellenberg (2003). Their major criticism, contact with an adult other than a parent or teacher” and that
however, was that I was wrong to lump listening-to-Mozart “similar effects should be evident with … chess and draw-
studies together with music instruction studies because “in- ing” lessons (p. 444).
struction studies, unlike the listening studies, have profound
implications for educational practice.” The following sec-
Music Instruction Studies Do Not Have
tions address these criticisms.
“Profound Implications” for Education
Rauscher and Hinton (2006) are to be commended as scien-
Transfer From Instrument Practice to
tists for their forthright review of the evidence for their own
Spatial Skills is “For Free” Learning
and others listening-to-Mozart studies. They concluded that
I argued that Rauscher’s (2002) claim that music will lead to “Given the contradictory findings of the studies on children,
improvement in spatial cognition (p. 276) meant that spatial we agree with Waterhouse that educational practice should
skill improvement occurred for free. Rauscher and Hinton not be influenced by this area of research.”
countered that because I lumped listening and lesson studies Rauscher and Hinton (2006) argued that music instruction
together I failed to understand that improved spatial cogni- studies, by contrast, have clearly demonstrated that skills de-
tion transferred via music lessons was not for free but was, veloped in playing a musical instrument do enhance spatial
instead, effortful, because children expended effort in prac- skills. They cited two published studies (Rauscher et al.,
ticing their instruments. Contrary to Rauscher and Hinton’s 1997; Rauscher & Zupan, 2000) and a review (Hetland,
claim, however, transfer is not effortful, it is for free learning. 2000). Rauscher et al. (1997) reported that, unlike the control
For example, if a student practiced the violin daily, and with- group, 34 young children given piano keyboard lessons
out any practice in origami paper folding, showed enhanced showed spatial reasoning improvement that lasted for 1 day,
origami folding skills, then no matter how effortful the violin and Rauscher and Zupan (2000) reported that 34 young chil-
practice was, the paper folding skill improvement is for free dren given 8 months of keyboard lessons did significantly
because no effort was expended in practicing origami. better in creating an object from pieces than did controls.
More important, Barnett and Ceci (2002) reviewed re- Hetland (2000) reviewed 15 studies of music instruction’s as-
search on transfer and concluded that, despite 100 years of sociation with improved spatial skills. However, only 6 of the
research, no clear evidence has emerged, and many re- 15 studies were published, and 2 of these 6 were the
searchers believe there is no experimental design that can Rauscher studies discussed previously (Rauscher et al.,
determine whether or not transfer exists (p. 634). Mayer 1997; Rauscher & Zupan, 2000). Moreover, 1 of the remain-
(2004) also reviewed transfer research and concluded that ing 4 published studies was not directly relevant because it
INADEQUATE EVIDENCE 251
used music and spatial training to enhance math skills shared and overlapping neural circuits for music and spatial
(Graziano, Peterson, & Shaw, 1999). Of the 3 remaining pub- skills. These extended effects, in turn, cause changes in gene
lished studies Hetland reviewed, only 1 reported an effect expression, and these changes in gene expression may lead to
with a p value of .05 or below (Costa-Giomi, 1999). reorganization of synaptic structures (and other forms of re-
Thus, Rauscher and Hinton (2006) claimed “profound im- modeling of neural circuits). The structural changes may
plications for educational practice” based on three published support durative enhanced spatial skills.
studies that linked music instruction to spatial skill enhance- This speculative model is consistent with neuroscience
ment—two of which are from Rauscher’s own group. These findings and offers a coherent account of results from the dif-
studies are promising, but insufficient at present to hold “pro- ferent types of music effect studies. It also provides an expla-
found implications” for education. nation for the fact that spatial skills are not the only cognitive
skills be found to be enhanced by music experience
(Schellenberg, 2004). Equally important, the model accounts
All Forms of Music’s Effect on
for spatial skill enhancement through music exposure or mu-
Spatial Skills Should Be Considered Together
sic instruction without invoking the unsupported notion of
Rauscher and Hinton (2006) stated that “Waterhouse’s con- transfer, and without resorting to a claim for a novel, previ-
flating listening studies with the music instruction studies ously undiscovered cognitive process.
will lead to greater misinterpretation of the research by edu-
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Murphy (2006) reviewed the state of research on mea- ported a range of predictive validity from 23% to 65%. Thus,
sures of EI and concluded that not only are existing measures contrary to Cherniss et al.’s claim, studies have reported that
of EI inconsistent with one another but current constructs of general intelligence accounts for more than 25% of the vari-
EI for which there are, as yet, no measures are so conceptu- ance in academic and job performance.
ally unclear that these constructs will not be able to be trans- As noted by Cherniss et al. (2006), Van Rooy and
lated into measures. Viswesvaran (2004) found that EI had incremental predictive
validity in relation to personality factors (p. 86). However,
the EI basis for this increment is unclear, and the increment is
EI Has Limited Predictive Validity
small. Gannon and Ranzijn (2005) found that EI added only
Cherniss et al. (2006) argued that, contrary to my review, five 1.3% beyond the 34.2% of variance in life satisfaction ac-
published studies reported that EI has significant predictive counted for by personality. Personality dimensions, in gen-
validity for a variety of life outcomes. However, these five eral, have been reported to have high predictive validity for
studies do not provide strong support for EI. One study as- job performance. Hogan and Holland (2003), for example,
sumed that attitudes, job skill, and leadership factors that dif- found that emotional stability predicted 43%, extraversion
ferentiated better collection agents were subserved by EI 35%, agreeableness 34%, conscientiousness 43%, and open-
(Bachman, Stein, Campbell, & Sitarenios, 2000), and an- ness to experience 34% of variation in job performance.
other reported only modest correlations for EI and leadership
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correlations between EI and IQ and between EI and personal- ponents should desist from implying that EI school pro-
ity (Schulte, Ree, & Carretta, 2004; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, grams can provide moral education.
2004). Consequently, theorizing about the brain circuits for EI
should include consideration of the evidence for structural and
neurochemical brain bases for general intelligence (Shaw et
CONCLUSION: PERSISTING WITHOUT
al., 2006) and for personality (Paris, 2005). Moreover, instead
ADEQUATE EVIDENCE
of considering only mindsight and face recognition, specula-
tive models should address the full range of existing evidence
Although Gardner and Moran (2006), Rauscher and Hinton
for neural bases for EI component behaviors such as attach-
(2006), and Cherniss et al. (2006) claimed that there was a
ment, empathy, face and emotion recognition, emotional sen-
wealth of empirical support for their theories, Gardner and
sation, emotional expression, the mirror neuron system, lan-
Moran offered no research evidence to validate MI, Rauscher
guage skills, personality components, working memory,
and Hinton included only three published music instruction
long-term memory, reasoning, decision making, and others
studies with significant positive findings for spatial skill en-
(Waterhouse, 2006).
hancement, and Cherniss et al. provided five published stud-
ies whose findings did not provide strong support for the pre-
dictive validity of EI.
EI Is Not a Basis for Moral Conduct Despite their inadequate empirical bases, these theories
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