Ali, 1

Asad Aun Ali

2015-11-0190

Pakistan’s Foreign Relations

Iqbal Ahmed Khan

28th March, 2014

“Critically examine Pakistan’s policy and strategy towards India since its inception to the
present.”

After successfully leading the freedom struggle for Muslims of the subcontinent, Quaid-e-Azam

was asked by an American journalist about the sort of relations he would like to keep with India.

The founder of Pakistan elucidated his vision of good neighbourliness similar to the ones

America has with its neighbours. His aim was to have peace within and peace without. Contrary

to Quaid’s noble vision, the path of Pak-Indo relations is littered with debris of a painful past.

Instead of good neighbourly relations, there has been a lot of confrontation marked by zigs and

zags. One of the oldest issues is the territorial acquisition of Kashmir, but more disputes have

risen up along the path (Hussain). The relation has been dependent upon a number of factors that

determined the course of actions for Pakistan and India. These factors can be broadly divided in

six categories: Kashmir Issue, Water Issue, Trade and Visas, Security Issues and Nuclear Issues.

This paper will briefly describe the issues and their roles in the formulation of foreign policy by

Pakistan towards India.

Since 1947 Pakistan took a hard line against India. At the time of partition Pakistan was not

given its rightful share of the state machinery, ordinance factories and the cash reserves. Due to

this, Pakistan became very weak militarily and economically. Such an attitude from India’s side
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sowed seeds of mistrust and harshness in the hearts of many Pakistanis and resulted in an

aggressive foreign policy towards India (Rashdi). In their first war on Kashmir, India and

Pakistan both suffered heavy losses. To avoid such losses in the future, Nehru proposed a No-

War Pact to Liaquat Ali Khan. The deal was signed in 1950 and Pakistan’s agreement to it

showed that it was indeed serious about changing its adversarial relations with India to friendly

ones (Burke). Soon after the signing of the deal, Pakistan Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra

and Pundit Nehru started talks regarding the Kashmir issue. These talks were not able to bring

successful results since Nehru backed out of the deal after Pakistan made a military alliance with

the United States in 1954. Nehru’s decision was based on the fact that Pakistan’s military

alliances with the United States of America would shift the balance of power in the subcontinent

(Jalalzai). Pakistan made the military alliance in search of hope for security and economic

prosperity but the policy backfired. The policy brought about three negative outcomes: Pakistani

military got really strong that led to the first military coup in 1958, diplomatic channels with

India broke down and Pakistan created an inveterate enemy of the Soviet Union. Thus, in its

efforts to get ahead of India militarily through its military alliance with the USA, Pakistan

created problems for itself.

The dispute over the territory of Kashmir arose as soon as the two countries became independent.

The two countries have approached the issue from an emotional perspective rather than a rational

one, with a result that it still remains a potential trouble spot between the two states (Zaidi). After

the first Indo-Pak war in 1948, the UN Security Council passed a resolution stating that a

plebiscite would take place to know the wishes of the people living in Kashmir and that Pakistan

should withdraw its army from the Kashmir territory. The plebiscite has not taken place to date

because India blames Pakistan for not withdrawing its army from the territory and uses the
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instrument of ascension signed by the Mahraja of Kashmir in 1947 that stated that the territory of

Kashmir would like to be a part of India instead of Pakistan. Later in 1962, when India went to

war with China, Pakistan maintained a neutral stance instead of attacking India at that very

moment. As a result of this, there was increased pressure on Nehru from USA and UK to settle

the talks through diplomacy. The result was Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks on the issue of Kashmir.

This round of talks continued till March 1963, but in vain (Zargar). The failure of talks led the

military government to believe that nothing could be done through peaceful means and they

decided to undertake Operation Gibraltar in 1964. The operation called for the incursion of

Kashmiri volunteers into Indian held Kashmir to create an uprising against the Indian forces.

This eventually led to a full-fledged war in 1965 in which Pakistan lost and suffered heavy

damages. Pakistan lost its respect in the eyes of USA and UK, since the arms that were being

supplied to both the countries were used to fight each other rather than the enemy. USA changed

its stance from friendly to neutral relations with Pakistan, which was a drawback for Pakistan’s

policy to take over Kashmir militarily (Sattar). It was only because of this drawback that

Pakistan was left mercilessly at the hands of Soviet Union in Tashkent to mediate to end the war

in 1966. The military adventures of Pakistan came to a halt in Kashmir until the 1987 elections in

Kashmir that were heavily rigged by the congress. The Kashmiris were very disappointed and

protested against the Congress rule under the umbrella of JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation

Front). Pakistan in 1989 supported the Harkatul Mujahideen, a militant group, against the rule of

Congress in Kashmir. This group was also supported by the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) after

they thought that the Afghan Model of training militants could be used against India in Kashmir.

Two other groups by the name of Lashkara-e-Taiba and Al Faran, also supported by the ISI,

carried out massive atrocities against the Hindu population of Kashmir (Ahsan). These militant
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groups were later used to cross the Line of Control (LOC) and occupy the Indian Territory in

1999. This was another army adventure made solely by the then COAS Pervez Musharraf. This

led to the infamous Kargil Conflict in 1999, which resulted in a defeat for Pakistanat the hands of

the Indian forces. The Kargil Conflict cannot be separated from the Kashmir issue since the

Pakistan army was adamant on getting Kashmir either by hook or by crook, and preparation for

this attack started early in the 1990s when ISI started training militant groups in the name of

Islam against Hindu infidels (Shakoor). Pakistan government toned down on the Kashmir issue

after its defeat in Kargil. Although Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue to implement the

UN Security Council resolution and hold plebiscites was very clear, the military dictators of the

country brought about a different strategy to acquire Kashmir from India through warfare. The

result was that Pakistan created a monster in the name of Islamic militancy, which it cannot

handle now. The focus has shifted from Kashmir to internal security and peace of the country.

The water dispute is also as old as the Kashmir issue. Pakistan’s concern relates to the six rivers

that flow from northern India, including the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

Disagreements started between the two countries when Pakistan thought that India would cut off

all water supplies and Pakistan being an agrarian country would crumble. These disagreements

led to the formulation of the Indus Water Treaty in 1960 which banned India from making dams

on those rivers. There were several cases where the matter was resolved through diplomacy,

including the dams on Salal and Wullar lakes. However, concerns for Pakistan started growing

after the 1990s when India initiated the Baghlihar dam on the Chenab River. Pakistan was

concerned that India might pressurize Pakistan once the dam has been built. Pakistan took the

matter to UN in 2005 and in 2007, but the results came in favor of India. Pakistan has remained

dissatisfied over the result and created a perceived threat that India would block all waters and
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disintegrate Pakistan’s economy. This policy of spreading hatred against India is not going to

help Pakistan; even Raja Pervez Ashraf believed that India has the right to make dams on the

Chenab River. This matter has the potential to further aggravate tensions between Pakistan and

India. Pakistan should drop this stance over water issue and try to have a friendly attitude so that

India does not have an excuse to retaliate in anyway (Haq).

Another important foreign policy instrument used by Pakistan is trade and economic

cooperation. Trade has been the most important ingredient of bilateral relationships between

Pakistan and India. In 1947 Pakistan’s trade with India was nearly 70% but it plummeted soon

after the 1948 conflict. The trade remained in Pakistan’s favor up till the 1965 war, after which it

was suspended for 10 years. From there onwards trade has mostly remained in the favor of India.

A major event in the relations came when India granted the MFN (Most Favored Nation) status

to Pakistan in 1995. In spite of India’s strict restrictions on imports, it was able to import several

items from Pakistan and still keep the balance in its own favor because of the MFN status given

to Pakistan. The most important event for trade and economic cooperation has been The

Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan in 1997. From an economic point of view, both

sides agreed to open up their borders for trade of different commodities like cement, textiles and

rice. There was also emphasis on increasing and easing the visa issuance in both countries so that

people may interact with each other easily. They also decided to open up banks in each other’s

countries. The dialogue can be considered a compromise by both sides as they agreed to reduce

barriers to trade. This showed that relations were on a smooth track now, and it was a great

opportunity for Pakistan to help grow the economy from trade (Padder). This could have been

an excellent thing to carry forward and help stabilize relations but army’s intervention in Kargil

threw the whole plan in cold storage. Recently in 2010, the TAPI pipeline project was
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introduced. This project now has the potential to curb Pakistan’s energy crisis and bolster it

towards economic growth. The project is a sign of harmony and peace among the states of Asia,

especially Pakistan and India (Haq). Another initiative that has the potential to improve trade and

economic relations between the two is Pakistan’s decision in 2014 to grant MFN status to India,

despite the many backlashes by local anti-India forces in the state (Noorani). The status would

help allow Pakistan’s economy to flourish and import cheaply from India, whereas before

Pakistan was importing at a higher transportation cost from Latin American countries. This

policy will sustain for a long time, because Pakistan’s army has shifted its focus towards internal

threats, and also because peace with India is a major priority for the current government.

The security of the state against India has also played an important role in the foreign policy of

Pakistan. From the beginning, India has been depicted as a threat because of the mistrust since

the time of partition when India refused to hand over Pakistan its due share in all the resources.

The mistrust also grew exponentially when Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO with the USA.

This led to adversarial relations with India, who was neutral in the cold war scenario. The most

important security concern that was faced by Pakistan was in the 1971 war in which India

aligned with East Pakistani. The relations hit the lowest ebb then, but due to efforts of Soviet

Union and USA relations were normalized after the Simla Accord in 1972. Later in 1980s, there

was a rise in the Khalistan movement, a separatist movement. It was alleged that the ISI was

assisting the Sikhs and interfering in India’s affairs. This policy angered the Indians so much so

that years later they assisted the separatist elements in Baluchistan. Soon after the Khalistan

movement, India launched its army training activity near the Pakistani border. This incident took

place in 1986-1987 and is referred to as The Brasstacks Crisis. The training, to show the

Pakistani army the strength of Indian army, was held on a massive scale. Pakistan army
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responded with a similar military exercise along the borders. The military exercise brought the

two countries near the verge of another war, which showed that the strategy of Indian Chief of

Army Staff to boast his strength was not very good (Sattar). Some years later when insurgency in

Kashmir came under the lime light, ISI was blamed for creating chaos in Kashmir by promoting

Islamic militancy. The smoothing of relations did not seem possible until 1999 when

Mr.Vajpayee came to Lahore and signed the Lahore declaration which focused on security and

peace between the two countries. A few months later Pakistan went to a war against India over

Kargil and the peace process was again derailed. Soon after 9/11 cross border terrorism grew at a

much faster rate with an attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, the Mumbai attack in 2008 and

various other incidents in which a lot of Indian citizens were killed. Although the President of

Pakistan distanced himself from these attacks, Pakistan was continuously blamed for the terrorist

attacks against India. Due to this pressure, Musharraf had to change his stance from supporting

to banning these groups and obliging to the world community that Pakistan would not provide

safe havens to terrorists (Noor). The problem was that the change of stance came very late and

by that time the militant organizations had grown so strong that they also began to challenge the

writ of Pakistani state by carrying out the same acts of terrorism in Pakistan. It would be safe to

say that Pakistan fell in the hole it dug for India.

The nuclear issue has received a lot of attention in the relations between the two neighbors. The

inception of the issue can be traced back to Pakistan’s defeat in the war of 1971. Consequently,

the gap between military capacities of the two contemporaries became glaringly obvious. Around

that time, Z. A. Bhutto’s regime focused resources towards the nuclear research and

development. Instances of Indian nuclear tests added fuel to this fire (Rizvi 2001). The

international community was quick to react, and both India and Pakistan faced serious sanctions,
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but Pakistan with its weaker economy suffered from the brunt of the blow. However, the nuclear

program persevered through the decade, and Pakistan became a nuclear power in 1985.

Although, it is quite important to make a side note about the Afghan situation that developed in

the 1980s as an ally against Russian advancements, Pakistan received a lot of financial

assistance. This helped recuperate the dying economy suffering from trade sanctions and an

expensive nuclear project. Pakistan’s insecurities about an Indian nuclear attack were reinforced

by reports announcing India’s intention to recommence its nuclear testing activities. The rise of

the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a pro-nuclear party, in 1998 peaked tensions (Jones 1998). A

dialogue was opened on the issue, and India issued a statement, saying that it will not be the first

to resort to nuclear warfare. Pakistan did not mimic Indian actions in this regard (Geller 2003). It

is not at all difficult to see that Pakistan’s stance has been very susceptible to Indian actions. The

huge defeat, subsequent tests and internal reports have always kept Pakistan on its toes.

Pakistan’s efforts may be guised in a gung-ho outfit, but it is nothing more than a mere facade.

Thus it can be clearly seen from the arguments presented in this essay that Pakistan clearly

deviated from Quaid’s vision of peace with India. Despite its small size, crumbling economy and

growing internal dissatisfactions, Pakistan has tried to compete with India in almost every issue.

As of recently, there has been a shift in Pakistan’s policy, its focus has shifted from India to

internal threats. There have been considerable efforts to promote peace and harmony in the

region, instances like the Aman ki Asha campaign, renewed emphasis on trade and economic

cooperation and issuance of visas to Indian and Pakistani citizens depict that. The new power

dynamics of South Asia cannot be ignored, especially the Indian attempts to create hegemony in

Afghanistan as well, after American withdrawal. Thus it would be beneficial for Pakistan to keep
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amicable if not friendly relations with India which will bolster Pakistan’s economy and better the

peace situation in the country.

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